

THE CAMBRIDGE SHORTER HISTORY  
OF INDIA



LONDON  
Cambridge University Press  
FETTER LANE

NEW YORK • TORONTO  
BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • MADRAS  
Macmillan

TOKYO  
Maruzen Company Ltd

*All rights reserved*

THE  
CAMBRIDGE SHORTER HISTORY  
OF INDIA

by

J. ALLAN, M.A.

Keeper of the Department of Coins and Medals, British Museum

SIR T. WOLSELEY HAIG, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., C.M.G., M.A.

Lecturer in Persian in the School of Oriental Studies, University of London

H. H. DODWELL, M.A.

Professor of the History and Culture of the British Dominions in Asia,  
the University of London

---

Edited by H. H. DODWELL

---

CAMBRIDGE  
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1934



## BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

In general the reader is referred to the full bibliographies printed in the volumes of the *Cambridge History of India*, of which volumes II and IV have still to appear. These will cover the period from the beginning of the Christian era to the Muslim conquest, and the period of the Mughal empire. On their appearance up-to-date bibliographies for these periods will become available. As regards the other periods of Indian history, the following are the most important works which have appeared since the compilation of the bibliographies of the published volumes:

### PART I: EARLY INDIA

- Hemchandra Raychaudhuri. *Political History of Ancient India*. Calcutta, 1923.  
Marshall, Sir John. *Mohenjo-Daro and the Indus Civilization*. 3 vols. 1931.  
La Vallée-Poussin, L. de. *L'Inde jusque vers 300 av. J.-C.* Paris, 1924.  
— *L'Inde au temps des Mauryas*. Paris, 1930.  
Pargiter, F. E. *Ancient Indian Historical Tradition*. Oxford, 1922.  
Chamanlal, J. Shah. *Jainism in Northern India*. 1931.  
Law, B. C. *Ancient Indian Tribes*. Lahore, 1928.  
— *Ksatriya Clans in Buddhist India*. Calcutta, 1922.  
— *Ksatriya Tribes of Ancient India*. Calcutta, 1923.  
Stein, O. *Megasthenes und Kautilya*. Vienna, 1921.  
Meyer, Eduard. *Blüte und Niedergang des Hellenismus in Asien*. Berlin, 1925.  
Konow, Sten. *Corpus inscriptionum Indicarum*. Vol. II, Part I. *Kharoshthi Inscriptions*. Calcutta, 1929.

### PART III: BRITISH INDIA

#### PORTUGUESE

- Andrada, Ruy Freyre de. *Commentaries*. Ed. C. R. Boxer. 1929.  
Queroz, Fernão de. *Conquest of Ceylon*. Trans. Fr. S. G. Perera. 3 vols. 1930.  
Prestage, E. *The Portuguese Pioneers*. 1932.

#### DUTCH

- Reisebeschreibungen von Deutschen Beamten und Kriegsleuten im Dienst der Niederländischen West- und Ost-Indischen Kompagnien, 1602-1797*. 12 vols. The Hague, 1931-2.

## FRENCH

- Martin, F. *Mémoires*. Ed. Martineau. 2 vols. Paris, 1931-2.  
Dalglish, W. H. *Company of the Indies in the Days of Dupleix*. 1933.  
Bussy, *Journal de*. Ed. Martineau. 1933.  
Besson, —. *Les aventuriers français aux Indes, 1775-1820*. 1932.  
Martineau, A. *Le général Perron*. 1931.

## ENGLISH

- Collet, Joseph. *Private Letter-books*. Ed. Dodwell and Collet. 1933.  
Burnell, John. *Bombay in the Days of Queen Anne*. Hak. Soc., x. 1933.  
Weitzman, S. *Warren Hastings and Philip Francis*. Manchester, 1929.  
Das Gupta, A. P. *The Central Authority in British India*. Calcutta, 1931.  
Richmond, Sir H. W. *The Navy in India, 1763-83*. 1931.  
Furber, H. *Life of Henry Dundas*. Oxford, 1931.  
— *The Private Record of an Indian Governor-generalship*. Harvard, 1933.  
Roberts, P. E. *India under Wellesley*. 1929.  
Morison, J. L. *Lawrence of Lucknow*. 1934.  
Early British Relations with Assam. Ed. Suryyakumar Bhuyan. Calcutta, 1928.  
Turner, Ralph. *James Silk Buckingham*. 1934.  
Pentland, Lady. *Lord Pentland: a Memoir*. 1928.

# CONTENTS

<i>Preface</i>	<i>page</i> v
<i>Bibliographical Note</i>	vii

## PART I: ANCIENT INDIA

### *Chapter I. SOURCES AND EARLY HISTORY*

Sources	1
• The Indus valley culture	2
The Vedic period	6
The Brahmanic period	9
The Mahājanapadas	14
Magadha	16

### *Chapter II. ALEXANDER*

North-western India	21
Alexander's march eastwards	22
Defeat of Porus	24
March down the Indus	26
Return westwards	28

### *Chapter III. THE EARLY MAURYAS*

Chandragupta Maurya	31
Megasthenes	34
Kautilya	38

### *Chapter IV. ASOKA, THE SUNGAS AND THE ĀNDHRAS*

Asoka	42
Fall of the Mauryas	53
The Sungas	—
Khāravēla	57
The Āndhras	—

### *Chapter V. FOREIGN INVADERS OF NORTH-WEST INDIA*

Seleucid rule in Bactria	62
The Sakas and Pahlavas	66
The Kushāns	72
The Satraps	80

*Chapter VI. THE GUPTA PERIOD*

Gupta origins	page 87
Samudragupta	89
Chandragupta II	92
Skandagupta	95
Fall of the dynasty	96
The Hūnas	97
Fa Hien	98
Gupta literature	99
The Vākātakas	100
The later Guptas	101
The Maukharis	102

*Chapter VII. HARSHA VARDHANA*

The Vardhanas	104
Harsha	106

*Chapter VIII. NORTHERN INDIA IN MEDIEVAL TIMES*

Kashmīr	111
Nepāl	116
Assam	118
The Brāhman Shāhis	120
Sind	122
The Paramāras	123
Anhilwār	125
The Gurjaras	129
The Chāhumānas	135
The Gaharwārs	137
The Chandels	138
The Kālachuris	141
The Pālas	—
The Senas	147

*Chapter IX. THE DECCAN*

The Chālukyas	151
The Rāshtrakūtas	156
The Yādavas of Devagiri	163
The Hoysalas	164
The Kadambas	166
Vijayanagar	171

*Chapter X. SOUTH INDIA*

Early history	179
The Pāndyas	181
The Cholas	187
The Cheras	193
The Pallavas	195

## PART II: MUSLIM INDIA

*Chapter I. EARLY MUSLIM CONQUESTS AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE  
KINGDOM OF DELHI*

Sind	page 205
Mahmūd of Ghaznī	206
Muhammad Ghūrī	209
Aibak	210
The Slave kings	211
Īltutmish	212
Balban	214
Fall of the Slave kings	217

*Chapter II. THE FIRST MUSLIM EMPIRE: THE KHALJĪS AND THE  
TUGHLUKS*

Firūz Khaljī	220
‘Alā-ud-dīn	222
Fall of the Khaljīs	228
Muhammad ibn Tughluk	232

*Chapter III. FALL OF THE TUGHLUKS*

Firūz Tughluk	244
Decay of the empire	250
Timūr's invasion	251

*Chapter IV. THE SAYYID AND THE LODĪ DYNASTIES, AND THE KINGDOM  
OF JAUNPUR*

Khizr Khān	255
Mubārak	256
Buhlūl Khān Lodī	258
The Sharkī dynasty of Jaunpur	262
Sikandar Lodī	264
The later Lodīs	267

*Chapter V. THE KINGDOM OF BENGAL*

Early Muslim rulers	270
Sayyid Husain	273
Shīr Khān in Bengal	274

*Chapter VI. THE KINGDOMS OF THE DECCAN AND OF VIJAYANAGAR*

The Bahmanids	277
Wars with Vijayanagar	280
The break-up of the Bahmanī kingdom	289
The Five Kingdoms of the Deccan	296



*Chapter VII. GUJARĀT, MĀLWĀ AND KHĀNDESH*

Gujarāt	page 299
Gujarāt and Mālwā attack the Rājputs	302
Mahmūd Begarḥa	304
Māndū	306
Girnār	307
Chāmpāner	309
The Portuguese	—
Khāndesh	310
Mahmūd II	311
Sangrama Singh	312
Bahādur	314
Humāyūn	316
Akbar	319

*Chapter VIII. BĀBUR, HUMĀYŪN AND THE AFGHANS*

Bābur's invasion	321
Defeat of Sangrama Singh	326
Campaign against Bengal	328
Humāyūn in Mālwā	329
War with Shīr Khān	331
Shīr Shāh	333
Return and death of Humāyūn	336

*Chapter IX. AKBAR*

Bairam Khān	338
The <i>Ataga Khail</i>	343
Its fall	344
Uzbeg rebellion	346
Siege of Chitor	348
Capture of Ranthambhor	350
Conquest of Gujarāt	352
Conquest of Bengal	355
Administrative reorganisation	358
Campaign in Mewār	360
Religious policy	362
Consequent disaffection	365
Relations with the Portuguese	367
The <i>Dīn-i Ilāhī</i>	368
Campaign against the frontier tribes	370
Conquest of Kashmīr	371
Campaigns in the Deccan	372
Rebellion of Prince Salīm	375
Akbar's death and character	377

*Chapter X. JAHĀNGĪR*

His character	page 380
Khusraw's rebellion	383
Nūr Jahān	384
Affairs in Bengal and Mewār	388
Campaigns in the Deccan	389
Loss of Kandahār and consequent troubles	394
Mahābat Khān's rebellion	396

*Chapter XI. SHĀHJAHĀN*

His accession	399
Campaigns in the Deccan	400
Recovery of Kandahār	404
Shāhjahān's sons	405
Campaign in Balkh	406
Shāhjahānābād	407
Loss of and attempts to recover Kandahār	408
Aurangzib in the Deccan	409
The war of succession	412

*Chapter XII. AURANGZĪB, 1658-80*

Defeat of the rival princes	416
Aurangzib's character and general policy	420
Mīr Jumla in Assam	422
Shāyista Khān in Bengal and Arakan	424
Rebellion of the frontier tribes	425
Aurangzib's religious policy	428
Jāt, Satnāmi and Sikh revolts	429
The Rājput war	430

*Chapter XIII. AURANGZĪB IN THE DECCAN, 1680-1707*

Rise of Sīvaji	435
Sīvaji at court	437
Marātha administration	438
The Carnatic campaign	439
Aurangzib's war against Sambhuji	441
Overthrow of Bijāpur and Golconda	442
Capture and death of Sambhuji	444
Aurangzib's failure against the Marāthas	445
Condition of Northern India	448

*Chapter XIV. THE SUCCESSORS OF AURANGZĪB, 1707-1719*

Bahādur Shāh I	451
Jahāndār	454
Farrukhsiyar and the Sayyids	455

*Chapter XV. MUHAMMAD SHĀH*

Overthrow of the Sayyids	page 458
Nizām-ul-mulk	459
Extension of Marāṭha power	461
Nādir Shāh's invasion	463
Disruption of the Empire	466

*Chapter XVI. AHMAD SHĀH AND THE LAST DAYS OF THE MUGHALS*

Ahmad Shāh	469
The Abdālī invasions	471
'Ālamgīr II	473
The Marāṭhas in Northern India	474
The Pānīpat campaign	475

## PART III: BRITISH INDIA

*Chapter I. THE COMING OF EUROPEAN INFLUENCE*

Ocean communications	481
Prince Henry	482
Vasco da Gama	484
Portuguese and Muslims	487
Albuquerque	488
The Turkish efforts	491
Dii	492
Portuguese organisation	494
Religious policy of the Portuguese	497
Portuguese decay	499
Early Dutch expeditions	500
The United Dutch East India Company	501
Coen's ideas and policy	503
The Dutch conquests	504
Dutch administration	505

*Chapter II. THE EAST INDIA COMPANY, 1600-1740*

Foundation and early history	510
Roe's embassy	513
Anglo-Dutch relations	514
The early factories	517
Development under the later Stuarts	519
The Mughal War	521
The interlopers	523
The new company	524
Factory administration	525

*Chapter III. DUPLEIX AND CLIVE*

The French establishments	page 532
The Marāṭha Raid	534
The War of the Austrian Succession	535
Chanda Sāhib	538
Dupleix's ideas and recall	542
Bussy in the Deccan	544
Sirāj-ud-daula	548
The revolution of 1757	550
The Dutch attempt	553
The Seven Years' War	554
• The revolution of 1760	557
The Internal Trade Question	559
• The overthrow of Mīr Kāsim	561
Clive's second government	562

*Chapter IV. WARREN HASTINGS AND THE REGULATING ACT*

The Regulating Act	565
Hastings's government 1772-4	566
The Majority and Nandakumār	568
The Marāṭha wars	575
Hyder 'Alī	584
Suffren and the French	589
Treaty of Mangalore	591
Chait Singh and the Begums of Oudh	592
Hastings's resignation and impeachment	594

*Chapter V. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY AS THE SUPREME POWER IN INDIA, 1784-1818*

Pitt's India Act	597
State of India in 1784	598
Cornwallis's external policy	599
Wellesley and Tipu Sultān	603
Wellesley and the Marāṭhas	604
Wellesley and the Indian states	609
Minto	613
Moirā's policy	617

*Chapter VI. THE GROWTH OF THE COMPANY'S SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT*

The Home Government	625
The Government of Bengal	627
The subordinate presidencies	629
The Bengal land revenue and district administration	630
Madras revenue and district management	640

*Chapter VII. THE NORTH-WESTERN APPROACHES TO INDIA*

The Red Sea and Persian Gulf	page 646
Persia	649
Afghanistan and Lord Auckland	651
The First Afghan War	654
Ellenborough's policy	659

*Chapter VIII. THE COMPANY'S LAST CONQUESTS*

Ranjit Singh	663
The Sikh anarchy	665
The conquest of Sind	666
The First Sikh War	670
Hardinge's settlement	672
The Second Sikh War	676
Dalhousie's settlement	677
Early relations with the Burmese	678
The First Burmese War	679
The Second Burmese War	680

*Chapter IX. THE GROWTH OF BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY AND THE COMPANY'S RELATIONS WITH THE INDIAN STATES*

The diwānī of Bengal	683
Relations with the Mughal emperor	684
Subsidiary treaties and Wellesley's policy	685
Moirā's policy	687
Development of policy	688
Problems of annexation	691
Dalhousie's policy	692

*Chapter X. THE COMPANY'S ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM AND POLICY, 1818-58*

The Home Government	696
The government of Bengal	698
Legislation	699
Competitive recruitment	702
District administration	703
Regulation and Non-regulation government	710
The basis of the Company's rule	713
Missionary policy	714
Educational policy	716
Slavery, infanticide, and <i>sati</i>	720
<i>Thagi</i>	724
Social legislation	726

*Chapter XI. THE COMPANY'S ARMIES AND THE INDIAN MUTINY*

General causes of the Mutiny	page 728
The Company's armies	733
The decay of the Bengal Army	734
The greased cartridges	737
The outbreak of the Mutiny	—
The spread of the Mutiny	743
The siege of Delhi	747
Cawnpore	749
Lucknow	751
The Central India campaign	755
Attitude of the population	—

*Chapter XII. CROWN GOVERNMENT AND THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA  
AFTER THE MUTINY*

The transfer to the Crown	758
The Council of India	759
Position of the Queen	761
The Secretary of State and the Council	762
The Governor-General and Executive Council	763
Army Headquarters and the Commander-in-chief	766
The Legislative Councils	769
The growing control of the Home Government	773

*Chapter XIII. PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT ADMINISTRATION AFTER THE  
MUTINY*

Provincial rearrangements	778
Relations with the Central Government	—
Reform of the Law Courts and of Law	782
The rule of Law	786
The development of new departments	788
Agrarian legislation and credit	792
Famine policy	795
The Indian Civil Service	798
The other Services	801

*Chapter XIV. CENTRAL ASIA AND THE ROUTES TO INDIA*

The Overland Route	803
Afghanistan and Russia	804
Salisbury's policy	808
Stolietoff's mission	810
The Second Afghan War	812
Ripon's settlement	814

The Russo-Afghan boundary	page 815
The North-West Frontier	817
Tibet	820
The Persian Gulf and Russian entente	821
The Third Afghan War	823
<i>Chapter XV. BURMA, 1852-1918</i>	
The Second Burmese War	824
Thibaw	826
The Third Burmese War	828
<i>Chapter XVI. THE CROWN AND THE INDIAN STATES</i>	
The position in 1858	830
The question of annexation	831
Internal interference	832
The rendition of Mysore	834
Reading the treaties together	836
The Imperial Service Troops	839
Abandonment of isolation	840
<i>Chapter XVII. EDUCATIONAL AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, 1858-92</i>	
The universities	842
Elementary education	845
Muslim education	846
Female education	—
Curzon's policy	847
Social reform	851
The movement for political reform	—
The Indian press and the Ilbert Bill	853
The National Congress	854
Local self-government	855
The reforms of 1892	864
<i>Chapter XVIII. THE MORLEY-MINTO REFORMS</i>	
The press and political agitation	866
Tilak	868
Kāli-worship and the Swādeshi movement	870
Terrorism	871
Minto	873
Gokhale and Banerji	875
Minto's reform policy	876
The scheme of reforms	878
Indian members of council	881
The Government of India Act, 1909	883


*Chapter XIX. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS, 1910-19*

Growth of terrorism	<i>page</i> 886
The Delhi Durbar	888
The Muslim attitude	890
Effect of the reforms of 1909	892
The South African Question	893
The War of 1914	894
Revolutionary attempts	896
Projects of further reform	899
The idea of dyarchy	901
Montagu's visit to India	902
The Montagu-Chelmsford Report	904
The heads of provinces proposals	—
The Government of India Act, 1919	906
The King's Proclamation	908

*Index*


909





## MAPS

I. India c. 500 B.C.	<i>facing page 1</i>
II. India during the Maurya Empire including Alexander's campaign	page 30
III. India c. 500 A.D.	86
IV. N. India c. 1000 A.D.	110
V. S. India c. 1000 A.D.	150
• VI. The Tughluk Empire in 1335	234
• VII. India in 1524	323
VIII. India in 1560	341
IX. India at the death of Akbar (1605)	381
X. The Mughal Empire at the end of the seventeenth century	436
XI. India in 1763	476
XII. The French wars in the Carnatic	537
XIII. The Marātha wars	581
XIV. The Mysore wars	602
XV. The expansion of Bengal, 1760-1803	608
XVI. India in 1818	623
XVII. Sind and the Panjab	669
XVIII. The absorption of Burma	682
XIX. The mutiny of the Bengal Army	741
XX. The North-West Frontier	837
XXI. Political divisions of India in 1918	887



## CHAPTER I

### Sources and Early History

The most striking feature of the literature of ancient India when compared with European literature is the absence of historical works. It has no Herodotus or Thucydides, no Livy or Tacitus. The early literature is entirely religious and exegetic in origin, and, while important data regarding the social life of the people can be deduced from it, it contains little reference to historical events and still less matter of chronological value. The two great epics, while throwing light on life in the heroic age, contain little of importance for political history. The *Purāṇas*, whose authors might in some ways be compared to our medieval chroniclers, are mainly legendary and mythological collections; they contain a certain amount of genealogical matter, the historical significance of which it is very difficult to estimate. The only professedly historical work, the late twelfth-century chronicle of Kashmīr, contains a certain amount of historical information about a limited period, but the bulk of it is of little value. Bāṇa's *Harshacharita*, a pseudo-biographical work, contains disappointingly little of historical value and belongs to literature rather than history. A certain number of fragments of historical information are preserved in the most unlikely sources, such as the chance illustrations of the use of words by a grammarian.

It is therefore to other sources that we have to look to reconstruct the history of ancient India. The historical data that can be gathered from Sanskrit and Pāli literature cannot be despised, but interpretation is often difficult and there is an entire lack of chronological data. It is with the help of synchronisms given by foreign, mainly Greek and Chinese, writers that the chronology of Indian history has been built up. In addition to the casual references to India in classical literature, we have what has survived of the contemporary and later accounts of Alexander's Indian expedition, of the descriptions of India by Megasthenes, the Seleucid ambassador at the court of the Mauryas, and other Greek visitors to India. Chinese literature has contributed its share not only in the narratives of pilgrims like Fa Hien in the fifth and Hiuen Tsang

in the seventh century, who came to India to visit the sacred sites of Buddhism and study the law at the great schools there, but also in numerous references in historical works, notably to the migrations of various invaders of India from central Asia. Such foreign references are only occasional glimpses, and it is for their chronological value that they are important. The whole chronology of India has been built up from the identification of the Sandracottus of the Greek writers with Chandragupta Maurya.

Our most valuable source is still a native one; the epigraphic and numismatic evidence: countless inscriptions on rock, stone and copper plates have been discovered and read in the last century and a half. Some of these are official and are commemorative, and historical documents of the first importance, like the edicts of Asoka or the Allahabad pillar of Samudragupta; others are of a private nature, recording donations by individuals of land or other gifts to temples or for other religious purposes; in these it is facts casually stated like the name of the reigning king that give them their present value. One important feature of such inscriptions is that they are commonly dated in eras which it has been possible to ascertain. They also contain geographical data frequently of interest.

Coins also have survived in large numbers from the third century B.C. onwards. It was on the study of the bilingual inscription of the Greek kings of India that the foundations of Indian epigraphy were laid. Coins have restored to history whole dynasties which had been forgotten. They are sometimes dated, but it is a comparison of types and styles or a study of finds that frequently supplies important chronological information. It is, however, a curious fact that many important rulers do not seem to have issued coins at all and that many others were content to be anonymous on their coinages. Other branches of archaeology have also contributed their share in illuminating dark places in the history of India and the work of the Archaeological Survey in the last thirty years at sites like Taxila, Pātaliputra, and Mohenjo-dāro have been of the utmost value for the history of Indian culture.

Until quite recently our earliest knowledge of the people of India was derived from the hymns of the *Rig-Veda*, from which a picture of the life and culture of the Āryan invaders of India can be drawn. Archaeological research has now taken us back some fifteen

hundred years further. An examination of sites in the upper and lower Indus valleys and in Balūchistān has revealed that India possesses relics of a culture as old and as advanced as the ancient civilisations of Sumeria and Elam, with which it has links and similarities. The two most important of these sites are Harappa in the Montgomery district of the Panjab and Mohenjo-dāro—the “city of the dead”—on the lower Indus in the Lārkāna district of Sind. The latter, a place so little known twenty-five years ago, that it was not even mentioned in the Imperial Gazetteer, has been carefully excavated as far as the water permeating its lower levels from the Indus will permit, and the site has revealed the fact that 5000 years ago a well-built, flourishing city stood there. Enough is known of other sites of this culture to show that their organisation was similar. The city was built of brick, the walls above ground being of baked brick set in mud or gypsum mortar, while crude brick was used only for the foundations where they were not exposed to weathering; stone for building purposes, of course, was not procurable in the region of Mohenjo-dāro. The streets were laid out with great regularity. Most of the houses had their own wells from which they drew water that had filtered through from the river. Many of them had bathrooms; all had a good drainage system which, however, only led out into the street and was not carried outside the town. A remarkable feature of the houses is a rubbish chute with a bin outside into which the refuse fell. The civilisation of these cities is remarkable for the large number and excellence of the ordinary dwelling-houses, which is in contrast with what we find in Mesopotamia where the ordinary citizen seems to have lived in very wretched conditions, and where the buildings are either palaces or hovels. In addition to private houses, Mohenjo-dāro contained several larger buildings of uncertain use. They may have been places of worship, but there seems to be an absence of anything in the nature of images in them. A great pillared hall is one of the most striking buildings in the town and is thought to have been a place of assembly. The most prominent building is, however, a great public bath with ancillary buildings.

It has been possible to gather a certain amount of information about the life and habits of the citizens. They cultivated wheat and barley, and bred cattle, sheep, pigs and poultry for food; they also freely used the fish in the river—a food the early Aryans do

not seem to have cared for. Other animals of which remains have been discovered were the buffalo, camel, elephant and various kinds of deer. The tiger, the monkey and the hare were known to them, for they are depicted on their seals. Traces of the dog and horse have been found, but the date of these remains is uncertain. They may be much later.

They were acquainted with various metals—gold, silver, copper and lead. Silver was well known, while it was almost unknown to the Indians of the *Rig-Veda*, who called it white gold when they did come across it. Copper was used for weapons and utensils and humbler personal ornaments. Stone is naturally scarce in this region, but we find steatite used for mill-stones and a few other purposes. Numerous semi-precious stones like agate were used for beads and other ornaments; bone and ivory and shells were similarly used; wool and cotton were woven, and numerous spindle-whorls have been found. That the community was wealthy is evident from the ornaments discovered.

The weapons used were spears, axes, daggers, bows and slings—numerous sling-balls have been found. The sword does not appear to have been known, nor is there any trace of defensive armour. The earthenware was turned on the wheel. Many children's toys of clay have survived—rattles, dolls, whistles and carts, the latter being probably the earliest known representations of wheeled vehicles. Like Indians in all ages, they were extremely fond of gaming and numbers of dice have been found.

The most remarkable discovery was that of numerous seals bearing inscriptions in a pictographic character recalling other early systems of writing—Sumerian and Proto-Elamite, and probably having a common origin with them. These seals show a high degree of skill in engraving, and many animals, especially bulls, buffaloes and unicorns, appear upon them. Inscriptions in the same characters are found on pottery, but so far there is no trace of clay tablets or regular documents. The inscriptions have not been read; the characters are not an alphabet but signs, each representing a word. The Chinese system of writing is the modern parallel, and is probably the sole survivor of a group of systems having a common origin to which this Indus script belonged. This system of writing—specimens of which have also come from Harappa—disappeared completely in India; indeed it is difficult to assert that writing, as we know it, was practised in India much

before the third century B.C. Conjectures as to the language of these people are almost hopeless; one may confidently assert that it was not Sanskrit, and it is doubtful if it was a Dravidian language.

Not only seal-engraving but also the art of sculpture reached a high pitch among these people: a very fine torso of a man executed in red stone, which was discovered at Mohenjo-dāro, was at first thought to be of Greek workmanship, but it is now certain that it is 2500 years earlier.

Something has been gleaned about the religion of this period. The principal deity seems to have been the Mother Goddess who is so prominent in all early cults; a three-headed deity seems to be a prototype of Siva; if this is so, and there is no reason to doubt it, then he must have forced his way into the Āryan pantheon. There is ample evidence of the cult of baetyllic stones and of phallic worship. Trees and animals also seem to have played their part in the religion of this people. The dead were either buried or cremated.

The culture of the Indus valley bears a general resemblance to that of Elam and Mesopotamia. It was essentially a city culture. The name chalcolithic has been given to it, because it was a period in which the use of stone for implements had not quite died out, although it was being supplanted by metals. Features common to these early cultures are the pictographic script and the high development of the minor arts. Seals of the Indus-valley type have been found in Elam and there are other evidences of intercourse; from our knowledge of Mesopotamian chronology it has been possible to establish that the Mohenjo-dāro culture flourished about 3000 B.C. Whether this civilisation extended into the Ganges valley is not yet known; it may be that the Indus, as in later times under the Achaemenids, marked a boundary between east and west and that this culture should be linked with Mesopotamia and Irān rather than with India proper.

The picture thus offered of life in ancient India in this period is very different from that presented by the *Rig-Veda*. The Āryans were a pastoral people, and represent the aborigines with whom they wage a continual struggle as similar in pursuits to themselves. There are no references to strong cities like Mohenjo-dāro, and one thinks only of the existence of primitive villages with rudimentary defences. There are many points of difference. The bull



was the great animal with the people of the Indus-valley culture and the cow with the Āryans. The horse was perhaps unknown to the Mohenjo-dāro people, but it was well known to the Vedic Āryans. The metals as known to the two peoples were different. It is evident that the civilisation of this early period is quite different and cut off from that of the Vedas. It seems, however, to contain the germs of much that was to play a great part in the life of the people of India; if this culture owes a great deal to lands to the west with which it has obvious links, it is already, when we meet with it, firmly rooted in India with an Indian character of its own.

Our earliest literary source for the history of India is the hymns of the *Rig-Veda*, the date of which is from about 1500 to 1000 B.C. This is the literature of the early Āryan invaders of India, and, while purely religious in character, gives us a certain amount of information about the life of the community and a number of historical allusions. The hymns are addressed to various gods, and their matter is mainly mythological. The number of secular poems is very small, so that any historical information contained in the Vedic hymns can only be incidental. The poems bear no trace of a memory of the Āryan invasion of India and seem to have been composed in India. The geographical allusions cover a wide area, but are entirely Indian. The Āryans can be shown to be occupying the north-west corner of India, the Panjab. A number of rivers are mentioned, most of which can be identified and nearly all of them belong to the Indus system. Of the north-western tributaries of the Indus are mentioned the Kubhā (Kābul), Suvāstu (Swāt), the Gomatī (Gomal) and Krumu (Kurram). Most frequently mentioned is the river *par excellence*, the Sindhu, through an Iranian form of which the western world got the name of India, and the Sarasvatī (Sarsutī). The five rivers of the Panjab are all known: the Vitastā (Jhelum), Asiknī (Chināb), Parushnī (or Irāvātī from which its modern name Rāvi came), the Sutudrī (Sutlej) and the Vipās (Beās). Of these the Parushnī is the most prominent. The sea was unknown, the word *samudra* still having only its etymological sense of a collection of waters and being applied to large rivers. Mountains are frequently mentioned and are still in the vicinity of the poets. The Ganges and Jumna are just mentioned but the Vindhya mountains and the

Nerbudda are not. The fauna mentioned is in keeping with the geographical allusions. The lion is known but the tiger is not; the gradually increasing reference to the latter animal in late Vedic literature throws an interesting light on the eastward advance of the Āryans. The elephant is known, but is called *mriga hastin*—the “animal with the hand”—a name which could have been given only by strangers who had originally been unfamiliar with it; in time, however, *hastin* becomes the regular name.

The historical allusions in the *Rig-Veda* are confused and obscure. It is clear that the Āryas consisted of a number of tribes who were continually waging war on the aborigines and frequently on one another. They call themselves Āryas, meaning “noble of birth and race” in contrast to the native Dasyus or Dāsas, who are “black”, “of *dāsa* colour”, in opposition to the *ārya* colour. It is probably to this distinction of colour (*varna*—later, “caste”) that we have to go back for the origins of the caste system. Besides their colour, one interesting record of the physical features of the Dasyus has been preserved. They are called *anāsah*, “those who have no noses”, which suggests they had noses of the flat Dravidian type, which struck the invaders as contrasting very much with their own clear-cut features. A war of extermination seems to have been waged on them by the invaders and those not slain were made slaves; *dāsa* and *dasī* came to mean “slave” in Sanskrit just as “slave” in the Teutonic language was originally Slav. There is some evidence that Āryan tribes on occasion did not disdain Dāsa help against their kinsmen.

Five tribes are occasionally mentioned together as if they were allied, the Pūrus, Turvasas, Yadus, Anus and Druhyus. Of these the Pūrus, who lived on both banks of the Sarasvatī, were important; the Turvasas and Yadus were also of note. These appear with five other tribes in the battle of the ten kings, the great event in Vedic history, in which Sudās, king of the Tritsus, successfully routed a confederation of his enemies. His victory is commemorated by his chief priest Vasishtha. The river itself seems to have played an important part in the tactics of the battle. Sudās was equally successful in a campaign in the east of his kingdom, where he defeated three tribes led by Bheda on the banks of the Jumna. Our information is not sufficient to tell us whether, as is not improbable, there was any co-operation between his eastern enemies and those on the north-west. If there were,

he seems to have been an able strategist. Sudās came of a military family, for his grandfather Divodāsa was also a mighty warrior and a great enemy of the Dāsas, on whom he waged relentless war. The greatest leader of the Dāsas was named Sambara.

The Pūrus were also a powerful tribe, and we know the names of a number of their princes. One of these, Trasadasyu, seems to have earned this name in wars with the natives. There is some evidence that the Pūrus later amalgamated with another Vedic tribe, the Bhāratas, against whom they had fought, and that this combination formed the Kurus, who are not mentioned in the Vedas but play an important part in the Brahmanic age.

Scanty as is the information preserved regarding the warfare among the Āryas themselves, still less is known about what must have been much more important, their struggle with the aborigines, whom they gradually exterminated or absorbed. Very little is recorded of the divisions or leaders of the latter. The fact that they did not worship the gods of the Āryas brings them the constant reproach of godlessness and impiety. Their wealth seems to have consisted mainly in cattle, which they drove into the shelter of primitive defences when attacked. The capture of their poor defences is frequently extolled in the Vedic hymns. Of contact between the Vedic Indians and the external world, such as is suggested by the discoveries of Mohenjo-dāro for India and Elam, there is practically no trace, a possible loan-word or two only.

As to the mode of life of the Vedic Indians, we gather something from their literature. Their towns, if one may use the term, were nothing more than villages with some rude earthworks around as a defence. There is nothing in the literature to suggest well-planned cities such as have been revealed in the Indus-valley sites. They were a pastoral people. Cattle provided their main wealth, and the poetry is full of metaphors from pastoral life. They had horses for their chariots and for riding, and the dog for hunting and guarding their flocks. Agriculture was another important source of livelihood, and many aspects of it are touched upon. Their cereal was *yava*, which may be barley; they were also keen huntsmen, using the bow and arrow, snares and traps. They were wood-workers and smiths; the poets borrow metaphors from the trade of the wheelwright. They were exceedingly fond of chariot-racing, and seem to have been devoted to gambling.

Fishing is not mentioned, and navigation only of a very rudimentary nature. Milk and ghee and fruit were important articles of diet, but they seem also to have been mingled with considerable quantities of meat. They had musical instruments and dances. Their weapons were the bow, spear, sword, axe and sling. They cremated and buried their dead, who went to join Yāma, the first of men to die.

As to their political organisation, the tribe was the unit, ruled by its king or petty chief, who was by no means an autocrat, his power being limited by the tribal assembly. The kingship was usually hereditary. The king was the leader in battle, but we know little about his activities in time of peace. A very important post was held by his *purohita*, or domestic priest, and we know from the influence wielded by Visvāmitra and Vasishtha that he held great power. The priests had already developed a very elaborate ritual, which is in contrast to the picture of a primitive state of society that one gathers from allusions to other aspects of social life.

Most of the gods are personifications of natural phenomena like the Sun, Dawn and Fire. The two most important gods are Indra, the thunder-god, and Varuna, the god of the sky and the upholder of moral order; it is only in the hymns addressed to the latter that we find sublimity of thought and high ethical tone. Indra seems gradually to have ousted him from his supremacy. Vishnu is not yet the great deity he became in later times. Sacrifices were made to obtain boons from the gods. The offerings consisted of ghee and *soma*, and the personification of the *soma* plant is one of the deities worshipped. The *soma* owed its place to its intoxicating quality, which led it to be regarded as promising divine powers. In the later hymns a few abstract deities begin to appear. The only goddess of importance is Ushās, the "shining dawn", to whom some of the most poetical hymns are addressed. Sarasvatī, the river goddess, later became the goddess of wisdom. The few secular hymns throw light on wedding and funeral customs; one is of a philosophical nature and the earliest specimen of Indian speculation which later took form as the Sāṅkhya system.

In the later Vedic period, for which our sources are the literature of the later Vedas and the *Brāhmanas*, the centre of Aryan

culture has moved from the Panjab eastwards, and the land of the five rivers plays an insignificant part compared with Madhyadesa, the Middle Country, the land between the Jumna and the Ganges. Kurukshetra is now the headquarters of Brahmanical culture; its inhabitants, the Kurus, with their immediate neighbours and close allies, the Panchālas, are the people whose example is to be followed in every way. Their Brāhmanas are the most celebrated, and their kings are models of what a king should be. The language spoken there is the standard which others seek to copy; nowhere else are sacrifices performed so perfectly as in the land of the Kurus. The Kurus and Panchālas now occupy the place held by the Bhāratas in the earlier books of the *Rig-Veda*. The memory of the Bhāratas was still esteemed, but they were no longer a political unit. This was also true of other Rig-Vedic tribes like the Tritsus and Pūrus. The Kurus are not mentioned as a people in the *Rig-Veda*, but the occurrence in it of a name like Kurusravana, the "glory of the Kurus", shows that the family already existed. The first component of the name Panchāla suggests that they were formed by an alliance of five tribes. They are said to have been formerly called the Krivis. Neighbours of the Kuru-Panchālas were the Vasas and Usīnaras, of whom little is known. The Srinjayas are closely connected with the Kurus, whose fortunes they shared. Farther east lay the kingdoms of Kosala (Oudh) and Videha (northern Bihar), both destined to great futures. Magadha, which was later on to surpass them all, is barely mentioned and then with but little respect; this is also true of the Angas, the neighbours of Magadha on the east. In the south the Āndhras and other great peoples are mentioned only as still quite beyond the pale of Āryan culture.

A number of famous cities were now in existence, and everything points to a more settled form of civilisation. The capital of the Kurus was Asandīvat, better known as the Hastināpura of the epics. Kāśi, the capital of the kingdom of the same name, is the later Benares. Kausāmbī is another great city to which we have early references.

It is quite impossible to give a consecutive account of Indian history for the first half of the first millennium B.C., roughly the period covered by the literature of the *Brāhmanas*. Our sources are entirely religious in character, and preserve only incidentally anecdotes of a secular nature. The dynastic lists of the *Purānas*

are corrupt, and in any case contain little more than strings of names. These sources are supplemented by references in the epics. It has not yet been found possible to make a coherent story out of the mass of obscure and contradictory references of a historical nature that have been industriously gathered from these texts. The flashes of light that are occasionally obtained suggest that a great deal of early history was perfectly well known to the compilers of the vast sacerdotal literature of the period, but that they never thought of it as worthy of systematic record. One can therefore only outline the rise and fall in importance of certain kingdoms, and give a vague picture of the political history of India down to the rise of Magadha in the sixth century B.C.

There is a well known passage in the *Bṛihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad* in which Yājñavalkya is asked where the Pārikshitas have gone and answers that they have gone where those who have performed the horse-sacrifice go. The Pārikshitas were the first of the many dynasties recorded in Indian history that attained great power and then suddenly collapsed. Pārikshit, the founder of the line, was a king of the Kurus. According to a hymn of the *Atharva-Veda*, his reign was a kind of golden age in which the people flourished exceedingly, granaries were filled to overflowing, and the husbandman had a choice of beverages. Little definite is known about him, however, except that he had a number of sons, of whom the eldest and best known was his successor Janamejaya. The latter was a great conqueror, and among his conquests was the famous city of Taxila in the north. He performed the snake-sacrifice and at least one horse-sacrifice. Echoes of some dispute he had with the Brāhmins have survived in various sources. His capital was Asandivat and it was at his court that Vaisampāyana related the story of the great epic. His three brothers, Bhīmasena, Ugrasena, and Srutasena, all performed the horse-sacrifice. There is a hint in the *Satapatha-Brāhmaṇa* that they did this to atone for the guilt of slaying Brāhmins. If all four brothers did perform a sacrifice indicative of paramount sovereignty, it suggests a division of the Pārikshit kingdom among them, whether peaceful or otherwise we do not know. The names of later members of the line have survived, but beyond vague references to their misfortunes we know nothing of them. In the reign of one of them, Nichakshu, the capital was removed to Kausāmbī because the old capital had suffered greatly from the inundations of the

Ganges. The cause of the collapse of the dynasty is not known, but it is clear that great misfortunes came upon the Kurus; a plague of locusts forced large numbers to migrate, and the prophecy that the Kurus would be driven from Kurukshetra looked like being fulfilled. Although it was henceforth never of the same political importance, the land of the Kurus still retained a reputation as a centre of learning.

With the disappearance of the Pārikshitas from the scene, interest is transferred to the kingdom of Videha, the most notable of whose kings was the great Janaka. Videha corresponded to part of the modern Bihar, and its capital was Mithilā, which is a great city in the epics and in the *Jātaka*. Janaka was not much later in date than the last of the Pārikshitas, for we find their fall discussed at his court as an event of recent occurrence. He was a great monarch—a *samrāj* or emperor. Of his wars and conquests little is recorded, but there is evidence of a long rivalry and ultimate war with Kāśi, whose king, Ajātasatru, was exceedingly jealous of Janaka's fame. His court was a celebrated centre of learning to which Brāhmanas came from all parts of India to take part in the philosophical discussions in which Janaka delighted, like Menander and Akbar in later times. It is from the names of such Brāhmanas and the references to their origins that we learn a few details of contemporary history and geography. The greatest ornament of his court was the sage, Yājñavalkya Vājasaneyā. The names of the successors of Janaka are preserved in several sources in very contradictory fashion. The *Arthasāstra* records the story of the downfall of the last of them, Karala, who lost his throne as a punishment for an assault on a young Brāhman woman; not only did he lose his life and throne, but the kingship was abolished and replaced by a republic.

Adjoining Videha was the kingdom of Kosala, the royal family of which traced its descent from the Vedic hero, Ikshvāku; it corresponded roughly to the modern Oudh, and attained greater prominence at a later date. Its most important town was Ayodhyā, while others were Srāvastī and Sāketa. The genealogy of its kings is given down to Prasenajit, the Pasenadi of the Buddhist literature. He was a contemporary of Buddha, with whom he was on intimate terms. He was extremely interested in the teacher's views, but did not himself become a Buddhist. By this time Kosala seems to have absorbed the neighbouring kingdom of

Kāsi. In Prasenajit's old age he had a war with Ajātasatru of Magadha; during his absence from the country his son, Vidudabha, was proclaimed in his stead. The aged king went to seek assistance against the usurper but died on the way. Kosala thenceforth sank into insignificance with the rise of Magadha, into which it was ultimately incorporated.

Closely associated in the early period with Kosala was the little kingdom of Kāsi: Ajātasatru was the name of the king of Kāsi when Janaka ruled in Videha; he was likewise a philosopher and patron of learning, who liked to take part in disputations. He is reputed to have been jealous of the lustre shed on Janaka's court by the learned men who frequented it. The earliest recorded dynasty of Kāsi traced its descent from the Bhāratas, but Ajātasatru seems to have belonged to a later dynasty known as the Brāhma-dattas who came originally from Videha. Kāsi was for a time a great power and the wealth of its capital was celebrated. There are numerous references in the *Jātaka* to it. On one occasion it was besieged by seven kings. At one time Kāsi completely subdued Kosala in a war, in which the king of the latter was slain and his queen carried off prisoner. The tables seem soon to have been turned, however, for Kāsi finally passed to Kosala, one of whose kings earned the epithet "conqueror of Benares". Kosala absorbed Kāsi completely, probably in the seventh century B.C. By Buddha's time Kāsi was a province of Kosala, but the fact that it had once been independent was not yet completely forgotten. It shared the fate of Kosala and became a part of the growing empire of Magadha.

Gandhāra which passed to the Achaemenids in the sixth century is occasionally mentioned in this period. Its towns, Taxila and Pushkalavati, are already celebrated. The former in particular very early achieved the great reputation as a centre of learning which it enjoys in Buddhist literature. Pānini, the great Sanskrit grammarian, was a native of this region. South of Gandhāra lay the land of the Kaikeyas, one of whose kings, Asvapati, had a great reputation as a teacher. Several celebrated philosophers are recorded to have studied under him. In the period of the later *Brāhmanas* there were Āryan kingdoms in the Deccan of which we have no hint in the *Rig-Veda*. One of the most important of these was Vidarbha, which corresponded to the modern Berar; Kalinga, prominent in the last centuries before the Christian era,



is early mentioned. The Bhojas, who are a people of the Deccan in Asoka's inscriptions, are mentioned in the early Brāhmanical literature. Of non-Āryan people of the south the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* mentions tribes known as the Āndhras who later were a great people, the Pulindas who crop up again as contemporaries of Asoka, and the Sabaras, who, like some other peoples beyond the sphere of Āryan influence, had a reputation for their knowledge of occult science.

Buddhist and Jain sources represent northern India as divided among sixteen large states—*mahājanapadas*—in the period before the rise of Buddhism and Jainism, that is the late seventh and early sixth centuries B.C. Many of these were republics ruled by popular assemblies. The more important like Kosala and Magadha, with longer histories, are dealt with separately elsewhere. Beyond Magadha lay Anga with its famous capital Champā, one of the six great cities of India, worthy of being chosen by Buddha as the scene of his death. It had commercial relations with the Further East. Anga at one time was a much more important state than Magadha, but it was conquered by Bimbisāra, who slew its last king, and thenceforth Anga became a province of Magadha.

We have already seen that the Videhans drove out their kings and set up a republic. They appear to have joined a confederation of similarly organised tribes, one of whose number, the Vajjis, gave its name to the confederation. The Vajjis were very powerful in the last years of Buddha's life and a formidable obstacle to the ambitions of Ajātasatru of Magadha, who saw that they must be uprooted if his career of conquest was to be successful. He therefore sent a messenger to the aged Buddha to seek a prediction from him regarding the fate of the Vajjis. Buddha's remarks on the Vajjis show that they were very powerful and he stated that so long as certain conditions were fulfilled, notably the regular holding of assemblies, they would never be subdued. Ajātasatru's envoy saw that the Vajjis could be overcome by the king of Magadha not in open battle, but only by diplomacy and breaking up the alliance. Another passage in Buddhist literature records how Sunidha and Vassakāra, ministers of Magadha, built a new fortified town at Pātaligama to repel the Vajjis, and Buddha prophesied a great future for it. It became the Pātaliputra of

history. The most celebrated family in the Vajji confederacy was the Lichchhavis, who wielded considerable influence in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. Ajātasatru's mother was a Lichchavi, and 800 years later we find Samudragupta proudly recording that his mother came of this ancient line. Another clan was the Jnātrikas, in which Mahāvīra was born (whence his name Nātaputta).

Neighbours of the Lichchhavis were the Mallas, who had come to be of little importance by the time they appear in history and were easily conquered by Magadha. The Vatsas were an important community with the ancient city of Kausāmbī as their capital; hither came the people of Hastināpura when the old capital of the Kurus was destroyed. The kings of Vatsa traced their descent from the Bhārata family. One of the most famous kings of the Vatsas was Udayana (Udena), son of Satānīka Parantapa, and one of the great heroes of Sanskrit literature. Little definite is known about him, but the memory of his important matrimonial alliances through his queen Vāsavadattā with Avantī and through Padmavatī with Magadha is preserved by the dramatists; and his renown as a conqueror survived till the time of Somadeva in the eleventh century A.D. The Kurus and Panchālas are still included among the great states, but they had sunk from their former greatness and seem to have accepted a republican constitution like their neighbours.

Mathura was already an important city, the capital of the Sūrasenas. Originally ruled by members of the ancient Yādava family, from which dynasties of the Deccan in later centuries liked to trace their descent, the Sūrasenas became a republic. They still retained their individuality in the time of Megasthenes, but they must by then have long passed under the sway of Magadha. One of the *mahājanapadas*, Avantī, corresponding to the modern Mālwa, seems to have always been ruled by a king; little is known of its earlier history. Its capital was Ujjain and the earliest dynasty seems to have been the Haihayas. A change of dynasty must have taken place in the sixth century, for Pradyota, the first king of whom anything definite is known, was a usurper, an able and powerful man but with a reputation for cruelty. His dynasty raised Avantī to a position of considerable eminence and it was the most powerful rival of Magadha for the hegemony of northern India. In the final struggle Magadha, led by Sisunāga, was triumphant.

In the sixth century B.C. two great teachers arose in India, Mahāvīra and Buddha; Jain and Buddhist literature, therefore, is able to supplement the *Purāṇas* as a source for the history of India, more particularly of Magadha, at this period. Both these teachers were of aristocratic birth and connected with important families, with the result that much valuable information has been preserved which might otherwise have been lost. Vardhamāna, who on attaining supreme knowledge became known as Mahāvīra or Jina, was the son of an important chief and his wife, the sister of Chetaka, king of Vaisālī, and the aunt of Bimbisāra of Magadha; while Gautama, the Buddha, was the son of a chief of the ancient Sākya family. It is, however, not entirely by accident that Magadha begins to play the most prominent part in the recorded history of northern India. The lists of kings of Magadha in the *Purāṇas* show that it must have had a long history. The earliest references in the later Vedic literature show that the region was not yet wholly under the influence of Brahmanic culture. Of the earliest recorded dynasty, that founded by Brihadratha, nothing is known except that it came to an end in the sixth century; its last monarch seems to have been overthrown by the Pradyotas of Avanti. Their hold over Magadha, if it was ever complete, must have been short, for when we enter the historical period as documented by the Buddhist and Jain sources, we find Magadha ruled by a powerful monarch called Bimbisāra, whom the Jains knew as Srenika. He had probably taken advantage of the troubles that had accompanied the fall of the last dynasty to seize power and consolidate his position, much as Chandragupta Maurya did at a later date. Tradition makes him the son of Bhattiya, a petty dynast who had suffered much at the hands of his powerful neighbour, Brāhmadatta, king of Anga. Bimbisāra's first task was to avenge these insults to his father, which he did most thoroughly. He slew the last of the Brāhmadatta dynasty, occupied Champā, his capital, and annexed the territory of Anga, thus bringing the territory of Magadha down to the coast and putting an end to the long rivalry between the two kingdoms. There is, perhaps, an echo of this campaign in the *Jātaka* which tells how a king, Ugrasena, helped a defeated king of Magadha to conquer Anga and combine the two kingdoms under his rule. This seems to have been done by Bimbisāra in his father's lifetime, for it is recorded that he acted as his father's viceroy in the

conquered territory. The importance of Magadha under Bimbisāra may be gathered from his matrimonial alliances; among his wives were the daughter of the king of Kosala and sister of Pasenadi, and Chellanā, the daughter of Chetaka, king of Vaisāli, two of his more important neighbours. He maintained diplomatic relations with remoter kingdoms, for it is recorded that Pukusāti, king of Gandhāra, sent him an embassy. As Gandhāra had passed to the Achaemenids by 516 B.C., this statement is of some value for Indian chronology. Bimbisāra probably reigned c. 540-490 B.C. His capital was at first the ancient one of Girivraja, but he seems to have been the founder of the new city of Rājagriha, which arose around the new "king's house". His kingdom is said to have included 80,000 townships, the overseers of which all became Buddhists. Various meetings between Bimbisāra and Buddha are recorded; one is a very early one in which the king offers the young ascetic wealth and preferment and all that the world can give. Numerous benefactions made by him to Buddhist communities are recorded. His kind-heartedness and considerateness are illustrated by the stories of his abolishing fares at ferries for ascetics and of the *bhikkhus* feasting on his mangoes. That he realised the importance of a strong army and would tolerate no weakening of its moral is evident from the *Mahāvagga*, where we are told of the prompt steps he took to get Buddha to prevent the ordination of his soldiers when some of them began to desert the profession of arms for a religious life. He was succeeded by his son Ajātasatru, the Kūnika of the Jains, whose mother was the daughter of the king of Kosala; he had been his father's viceroy in his Anga dominions, which seem to have become the regular appanage of the *yuvarāja*. Buddhist tradition makes the prince in his early days a friend of Buddha's great opponent, his cousin Devadatta and the arch-enemy of Buddhism. It says that he once wanted to take his father's life, but the plot was discovered and he was forgiven; finally he put Bimbisāra in prison, where, if he did not actually slay him, he at least caused his death by starvation. He afterwards became a Buddhist and expressed contrition for his crime to the then aged Buddha. How much of this story is true it is impossible to say. Bimbisāra may, like many Indian kings, have abdicated in his old age in favour of his son. The matrimonial alliances, which had been one cause of Bimbisāra's strength, provoked the wars of his son's reign.

Ajātasatru's mother had died of grief at her husband's death, and her brother, Pasenadi, king of Kosala, claimed back a village, the revenues of which had supplied her pin-money. Ajātasatru claimed it as his inheritance; a war resulted in which fortune favoured first one and then the other side. At one time the king of Kosala looked like being routed; finally, however, he was so successful as to take his nephew prisoner. The quarrel was settled by his giving a daughter in marriage to Ajātasatru and settling the revenues of the disputed village upon her. The next war was with another of Bimbisāra's brothers-in-law, the king of Vaisāli. Bimbisāra had given a celebrated elephant and some valuable jewels to his son by the Lichchhavi princess. These Ajātasatru claimed on his accession to the throne, but his half-brother fled with his treasures to his uncle in Vaisāli. The latter took his part and refused to surrender the fugitive. When the king of Magadha declared war on him, the Kosala ruler summoned his allies to his assistance, and the war lasted many years. The support given to the king of Vaisāli shows that his neighbour already feared the rising power of Magadha. After a long struggle Magadha was triumphant, and Vaisāli passed under its rule. Ajātasatru is said to have owed his success to his artillery, a kind of ballista which threw huge stones, and to an ancestor of the armoured car, a chariot fitted with death-dealing weapons which wrought great havoc. Buddhist tradition makes Ajātasatru's success the result of his tact and diplomacy as well as of his prowess in the field. He is said to have reigned eighteen years and must therefore have lived till about 460 B.C.

Ajātasatru was succeeded by his sons, Darsaka and Udayibhadra or Udaya, but their order is uncertain. The existence of the Darsaka of the *Purānas*, who is not mentioned by Buddhist tradition, is confirmed from his appearance as king of Magadha and brother of one of the queens of Udayana, king of Avantī, in the drama *Svapnavāsavadattā*, written over a thousand years later. Of Udaya we know that he built a new capital, Kusumapura, afterwards known as Pātaliputra, destined to be for centuries the most important city in India. The dynasty lasted several generations longer; nothing is known of the history of the period and the names of the rulers vary in Buddhist and Purānic tradition. According to the Buddhists every king of this line came to the throne by murdering his father. Finally a popular rising took

place, so strong was the feeling against the dynasty, and drove the last descendant of Bimbisāra from the throne. A minister named Sisunāga, who had no doubt played a prominent part in the movement, was placed on the throne. He had been the governor of a province. The new ruler went back to the old capital of Girivṛāja, whether for strategic reasons, or because of the unpopularity of everything associated with the old dynasty, we do not know. The *Purānas* say that he destroyed the power of the Pradyotas, that is to say, Magadha in his reign was powerful enough to dispose of its old rival, Avantī. His son and successor was the Kākavarna of the *Purānas*, called Kālāsoka by Buddhist writers. He restored Pātaliputra to its place as capital, and the second Buddhist council was held in his reign. Bāna records the fact that he was assassinated. On his death the kingdom was inherited by his sons, from whom it passed as an easy prey to the founder of the Nanda dynasty, who was probably connected with the former dynasty in some way.

The last ruler of the line of Sisunāga was murdered about the beginning of the fourth century B.C. by a king whom the *Purānas* call Mahāpadma, the founder of the Nanda dynasty, who is described as the destroyer of all the Kshatriyas and as sole monarch, terms which suggest that he brought many neighbouring kingdoms under his rule. Stories of the rise to power of the first Nanda have survived in Greek sources. Curtius says that the founder of the Nanda power, whom he calls Agrammes, was a barber in humble circumstances, whose handsome figure attracted the queen through whom he gained an important place at court. He finally murdered his sovereign, seized the throne and murdered the king's children. This king must have been Kālāsoka, the Kākavarna of the Saisunāga line, whom Bāna mentions as having been murdered near his own city. Jain tradition also records that Nanda was the son of a barber; the *Purānas* on the other hand describe him as a son of a Saisunāga by a Sudra mother, so that he may have had some claim to the throne through his father. The corrupt form, Agrammes or Xandrames, under which classical texts preserve the name of his son, has not been satisfactorily identified in Indian sources. Ceylon tradition gives him the name of Ugrasena, and it has been suggested that this or a patronymic from it is the original of Agrammes, but the form Xandrames looks more like some other Indian

word. The Greek references to the power of the kingdom of the Gangaridae show that there is some truth in the Purāṇic statement that he was a great conqueror, and the great power inherited by Chandragupta is further evidence of this.

He probably reigned for twenty-eight years. He is said to have been succeeded by his eight sons who ruled in succession, but their reigns covered very few years. The last of them, Dhana Nanda, the Agrammes of the Greeks, was detested by his subjects because he had inherited the plebeian character of his father and none of the virtues of a king. The wealth of the Nandas was proverbial, and it is probable that the extortions by which it was acquired increased their unpopularity. The country seemed to be ripe for the revolution which put the Maurya Chandragupta on the throne; it was organised by the Nanda's former minister Kautilya, to whom the credit of its success is given by various Indian sources. That the revolution was not by any means bloodless is seen from a curious reference in the *Milindapanha* to a haunted battlefield. This had been the scene of the last stand of the Nanda general, Bhaddasāla, against Chandagutta (Chandragupta) in which many thousands had been slain. With the accession of the Mauryas the history of Magadha becomes the history of India; there is little doubt that Chandragupta Maurya owed a great deal to his predecessors, who had gradually consolidated the power of Magadha, accumulated wealth, and trained great forces, which he soon led successfully into the field and probably improved through his knowledge of the Greek armies.

## CHAPTER II

### Alexander

In the fourth century B.C. it is at last possible to give a more or less connected account of a short period in the history of India, or at least of the Indus valley; this we owe to the classical records of Alexander's Indian campaign. In 330 B.C. Alexander routed Darius, occupied Persepolis and then set about the subjugation of the eastern provinces of the Achaemenid empire. Early in the spring of the following year he marched from Seistan to the site of the modern Kandahār, where he built the city of Alexandria-in-Arachosia. Thence he pushed on to the Kābul valley, where the army encamped until the passes of the Hindu Kush were opened in the following spring. To the north lay the still unconquered Persian province of Bactria, which constituted a threat to Alexander's communications and prevented any further advance westward. At the foot of the Hindu Kush, at a point guarding the entrance to the roads to Bactria, another Alexandria was built, with smaller settlements like Cartana and Nicaea within reach of it. This Alexandria is identified with the modern Charikar. In the following year, the Greeks engaged in the campaign which brought the whole of eastern Irān under their power, and it was not till early in 327 B.C. that Alexander again turned southwards and eastwards. News of his successes had gone before him, and there seems to have been some hesitation among the Indian rulers whom he was likely to encounter first whether they should offer him peace or war. One of the more prominent among them, Ambhi (Omphis), son of the king of Taxila, had little doubt as to the advisability of making a friend of Alexander, and, while the latter was still in Bactria, had sent messengers to offer him assistance in invading India. His father seems on reflection to have come to the same conclusion, probably hoping thus to gain an ally able to crush his powerful rival, whom the Greeks call Porus (Paurava?), whose kingdom lay on the other side of the Hydaspes. Porus had for some years been engaged in subjugating his neighbours and now felt strong enough to threaten the kingdom of Taxila, hitherto apparently paramount in these regions.



In the summer of 327 B.C., the Greeks returned to Charikar, which was enlarged and strengthened and organised as a base of operations. Nicanor, son of Alexander's old friend Parmenion, was put in charge of this important depôt. Alexander went on with the bulk of his army to Nicaea, whence he sent envoys to ask the Indian rulers of the Indus to meet him in the Kābul valley. That some had already joined him we know from the mention of a certain Sisikottos (Sasigupta) as attached to his army. This summons finally decided the king of Taxila to join the invader, and his example was followed by other less powerful princes. The hill-tops, however, were still held by numerous tribes, as independent then as they are to-day, who declined to sacrifice the opportunity of harassing an army passing through the valley. Alexander had therefore to take steps to secure his route. He sent one half of his army direct to the Indus, probably following the Kābul river all the way and avoiding the Khaibar pass. On reaching the Indus, they were to make ready to cross immediately on Alexander's arrival after coming through the hills. It is impossible to trace the route followed by Alexander himself, but, from the incidents recorded, it is clear that his advance involved a series of attacks on mountain strongholds, which were frequently taken only after fierce fighting; at one town Alexander was wounded by an arrow, which filled his followers with such fury that the town was razed to the ground and all prisoners slain. The strongest opposition was offered by a people called the Assakenoi whose capital was Massaga, a very strong fortress, the natural advantages of which had been improved by all the engineering devices of the time. But the Greek artillery proved equal to the task, and the capture of the stronghold was facilitated by a chance shot which killed Assakenos (Asvaka), the king of the region. His mother and daughter, or, according to another version, his wife and son, were taken prisoner. The garrison of this city included a large body of mercenaries from the south, who agreed to join Alexander on condition that their lives were spared. They changed their mind, however, and, rather than fight against their countrymen, resolved to escape under cover of night. But their plans were discovered and the Greeks, catching them unawares, slew them all, despite their desperate resistance; their number is said to have been 7000. Thus severely did Alexander punish this breach of faith, for he could take no risks so far from

his base in the midst of an enemy country. The reception of the Macedonians, however, was not always hostile. At one town, called Nysa by the Greeks, the inhabitants claimed kinship with them and said they were descendants of followers of Dionysus who had settled there during his campaign in the east. The profuse growth in the neighbourhood of the vine and ivy, plants sacred to Dionysus, and certain place-names like Nysa and Meru (Meros), lent support to the story, and for a few days the Greeks made holiday with their long-lost kinsmen. When Alexander left the Nysans, 300 of their horsemen went with him and accompanied his army right through his Indian campaign. Probably the greatest exploit of this campaign was the siege and capture of Aornos, a mountain stronghold on the Indus, accessible only by a single path. The story ran that even Hercules on his Indian campaign had failed to capture it. Elaborate preparations were made to ensure success, Alexander himself working with his men to fill in a ravine which cut off the approach to the summit. Finally the Greeks secured a position commanding the fortress, and the garrison began to negotiate for surrender. In the darkness of the night, however, they endeavoured to escape; but the movement was seen, and Alexander himself led an attack in which many of the defenders were slain. The capture of this fortress was a source of particular pride to the Greeks, and special sacrifices were offered to celebrate their victory. Various attempts have been made to locate the place, but the descriptions preserved by the classical authors, who no doubt exaggerate the difficulties of its position, are not sufficient to identify it with certainty. Sisikottos (Sasigupta), an Indian who had long been in Alexander's service, was left in charge of the garrison. In the meanwhile, the other army under Hephaistion and Perdikkas had reached the Indus and had duly made preparations to cross. They had met with little opposition on their march; only the overthrow of a chief named Astes (Hasti) is recorded. The site of the bridge of boats which they built has been identified as Ohind, some sixteen miles above Attock. Alexander marked his arrival at the river by great sacrifices and other celebrations, and gave his troops a month's rest and relaxation. Here he was joined by Ambhi, who had succeeded to the throne of Taxila on his father's death, and who brought him large presents of sheep, oxen and money. Early in 326 B.C., on a day when the omens had been

declared favourable, the army crossed the Indus and marched in the direction of Taxila, the king of which came out a few miles with his whole army to meet them. The display of military force was such that Alexander feared treachery until Ambhi rode out and put his army at his disposal. The Greeks were entertained most hospitably, and lavish gifts were exchanged between the allies. Alexander's generosity indeed was such as to arouse the jealousy of some of his own officers. The Greeks found much to interest them in the great Indian city, and anecdotes of the curious things that impressed them have come down to us—notably of naked ascetics, one of whom, called Kalanos by the Greeks, joined Alexander and accompanied him till his departure from India.

In the meanwhile Porus, the great rival of the king of Taxila and the leader of the opposition to Alexander, was preparing to resist the invader whom new Indian allies were daily joining. When Alexander summoned him to Taxila, he haughtily answered that they would meet in arms upon his frontier. Although Abhisara, a powerful chief and former ally of Porus, now submitted to Alexander, Porus gathered all his available forces and those of his remaining allies and vassals on the banks of the Hydaspes, towards which Alexander advanced rapidly in spite of the heat of summer, having sent with his advance guard the boats which had been used to cross the Indus. The Indian horsemen whom Porus sent to harass the advance were easily disposed of, and soon the two armies were facing one another, on opposite sides of the river. For some time the Greeks sought in vain a possible landing-place on the other side, while the Indians vigilantly guarded against any attempt to cross. The river was rising, the rains had begun, and it looked as if the Greeks would have to postpone their attack till the waters had sunk again to their low level in the autumn. Alexander indeed seems to have encouraged this belief by collecting great stores. But at the same time his reconnaissances along the river-bank kept the Indian host in a state of considerable tension.

At last one morning, after a night of unusual storm, the Indian sentries reported that the Greeks were crossing some sixteen miles above the camp. Alexander had made all his preparations at a place where a wooded island hid his movements; he led a picked force by night to this point, and pushed off into the flooded river under cover of the island so that his men were

within reach of the further bank before they became visible. The Macedonians thus could land, though with great difficulty, and draw up their forces before any serious opposition could be offered. Porus had at once sent his son with a force of cavalry and chariots to hinder their landing, but it was too late. The force proved no match for the Macedonian cavalry; it was routed with heavy losses; and the shattered remnants returned to tell Porus that Alexander was fully arrayed to meet him. Porus then drew up his army; in the centre were 200 elephants, with 30,000 infantry in rear, while on each wing were 150 chariots and 2000 cavalry; the infantry were armed with the powerful Indian bow which required to be rested on the ground; but the wet weather which had soaked the soil interfered with the proper adjustment of the weapon and caused valuable time to be wasted.

Alexander's mounted archers attacked the Indian left wing and were followed by the heavier cavalry, whose pressure forced Porus to bring supports round from his right wing. A body of Macedonian horse rode round the Indian army, and caused further confusion by attacking them in the rear. Alexander now drove home his attack on the wings, which fled to the shelter of the elephants in the centre. At first the elephants had some success against the Macedonian infantry, but the discipline of the latter held good, and ultimately confusion began to prevail in the Indian ranks. The Indian cavalry were no match for the heavy Macedonian cavalry, whose charges did great execution in their now broken ranks. The elephants then began to stampede. This wrought havoc among the crowded Indians, while the Macedonians had plenty of room to evade their rushes. The whole enemy line was finally surrounded, and cavalry and infantry alike cut to pieces. Any who could find a gap through which to escape, fled, only to meet the remainder of the Greek army under Krateros, who had crossed opposite the camp in readiness to receive the fugitives. The Indian losses were enormous, and included two sons of Porus and many of his high officers. The Greek losses were about 1000 and the Indian 15,000 killed with 9000 taken prisoners. Porus himself fought nobly on an elephant of gigantic size, and was always to be found in the forefront of the battle. The king of Taxila galloped up to him with a message from Alexander, but the proud Indian refused to listen to one whom he regarded as a renegade and hurled a spear at him.

Ambhi then returned to Alexander, and a detachment of horsemen was sent who were able to persuade Porus that he had done his duty and that there was no shame in surrender. The king, a man of unusual physique, now completely exhausted and bleeding from a number of wounds, was led to Alexander, who greeted his noble antagonist with honour and readily agreed to recognise his kingly rank. Porus was restored to his kingdom, to which Alexander added considerable territory; and he became a valuable ally of the Macedonians. The victory is commemorated on a remarkable medallion struck by Alexander, on one side of which he is being crowned by Victory, while on the other the battle is symbolised by a combat between a Macedonian horseman and an Indian elephant-rider.

To commemorate his victory Alexander built on the battlefield the city of Nicaea, and on the site of his camp on the other side of the river arose another town, Bucephala, named after his celebrated steed, which had succumbed after accompanying his master so far. Bucephala became a place of considerable importance, and its successor is the modern Jhelum.

The funeral rites of the dead were performed, sacrifices offered and games celebrated, and the army allowed a brief relaxation.

Alexander then led a force into the country of the Glausai, who submitted. He gave the conquered territory to Porus, and crossed the Chināb into the lands of another Porus, who had previously made overtures to the invaders but had changed his mind. On the approach of the Greeks Porus fled and his territory was easily subjugated. Leaving Hephaistion to consolidate his conquests, Alexander advanced to the Rāvi (Hydraotes), where he met with a more vigorous resistance, notably at a town called Sangala which was stormed, 17,000 of the defenders being slain and 70,000 taken prisoner. Alexander's losses were not great and the conquered town was razed to the ground. Friendly relations were established with a king named Sopeithes (Sophytes, Saubhuti) who entertained Alexander royally; his hunting parties and his dogs particularly impressed the Greeks. The Hyphasis (Beās) was reached, and Alexander, nearing the eastern limit of the Indus valley, had already begun to hear of the splendours of the kingdoms of the Ganges. But his exhausted army could go no farther. In reply to his appeal to it to follow him, Koinos, who was one of his most trusted officers and had commanded the cavalry in

the battle with Porus, acted as spokesman and emphasised the fact that only the exhausted remnants of Alexander's once great army remained. Arrian, who gives a full account of the proceedings, contrasts the silence that followed Alexander's appeal with the applause that greeted the words of Koinos. Alexander retired to his tent and, after a three days' struggle with himself, admitted the necessity of turning back. He therefore built twelve great altars of stone on the banks of the river to commemorate his progress. This was in the late summer of 326 B.C. Classical writers record that these altars, dedicated to the gods of Greece, were long held in veneration by the kings of India, who came to offer sacrifices at them.

Alexander returned to the Hydaspes to make preparations for his return journey down the Indus to the sea; here he received reinforcements from Babylon. Porus was appointed ruler of the lands between the Hydaspes and the Hyphasis, and Ambhi, king of Taxila, was given the lands between the Hydaspes and the Indus, while Philip was appointed satrap of the lands west of the Indus. A fleet was prepared to take the horses and part of the army down the river, while the remainder, under Hephaistion and Krateros, was ordered to march down either bank.

Philip followed in command of the rearguard. In a few days the junction of the Jhelum and Chināb (Hydaspes and Akesines) was reached without opposition, but two boats were lost in the whirlpools. Farther south, however, opposition was being prepared. The Siboi submitted, but the Agalassoi, who resisted, were severely punished for the losses they inflicted on the Greeks. The Malloi (Mālavas) and the Oxydrakai (Kshudrakas), two powerful tribes on the lower Rāvi, combined with other warlike tribes to offer strong resistance to the invaders. Alexander's sudden attacks took them individually by surprise, and the Malloi were routed, in spite of their superior numbers, before their allies could join them. The towns, however, offered some resistance. At one of these Alexander, needlessly exposing himself, was struck by an arrow and apparently seriously wounded. His troops, maddened at their leader's fall, sacked the town and massacred the inhabitants. The wounded Alexander was taken by boat to his base, and on his recovery received the submission of the Malloi, while the Kshudrakas, to avoid a similar fate, came in of their own accord to pay homage to the victor. Other tribes also submitted, and


some supplied boats for the Greek army, which continued its progress till the junction of the Chināb and Indus was reached, where a halt was made and a city founded. Farther south, at the city of Sogdi, another Alexandria was planned, which was to be the great port of the upper Indus. The next great ruler whose territory was to be entered was one known to the Greeks as Mousikanos, who had so far made no overtures to the advancing conqueror; on the approach of Alexander, however, he hastened to offer presents and to pay homage, which Alexander readily accepted, and left him on his throne. The Greeks found much to interest them in his kingdom, the customs of which reminded them of Sparta. At this moment Mousikanos's rival and enemy, Sambos (Sambhu), who had previously joined Alexander, rebelled but was quickly disposed of. In the meanwhile, however, the philosophers (*i.e.* the Brāhmans) had been urging Mousikanos to withdraw his submission, and, when he openly rebelled, Peithon, the new governor of the lower Indus territory, was sent against him. The monarch was captured and executed along with many of the Brāhmans, who were everywhere stirring up the people against the Greeks. The enormous slaughter recorded among the natives of this region shows that Alexander could not afford to take risks and was determined to strike terror into the lands through which he was passing.

Krateros was then sent with nearly half the army to return by the route through the mountains over which they had come. Alexander continued down the river with the fleet, while Peithon replaced Krateros on one bank, and Hephaistion remained in charge on the other. In the summer of 325 B.C. the joint forces reached Patala, an important city standing at a place where the Indus divided into two arms, probably somewhere south-east of the modern Hyderabad in Sind. Hephaistion was ordered to build new walls for the city, and to do everything necessary to make it a great port and naval base. Alexander himself explored the two arms of the Indus and reached the sea, where he sacrificed to Poseidon. On returning to Patala, he made preparations for his departure from India. While Alexander marched through Gedrosia along the northern coast of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, Nearchos was to remain in charge of the fleet, keeping within touch of the coast and the army. Alexander set out on his hazardous march through the land of the Aritai, which



he left Apollophanes to govern. Heavy fighting followed his departure, in which Apollophanes was slain. Entering the deserts of Gedrosia, Alexander found it impossible to keep in touch with the fleet as he had intended, and had to go inland round the mountains. The soldiers suffered terribly from the heat and scarcity of water, and were obliged to abandon the booty which they had taken in India and carried so far; ultimately the survivors reached Carmania, where their troubles were over. Nearchos left an account of his voyage, for he had been asked by Alexander to make observations of the countries along which he coasted, and portions of his narrative have been preserved by later writers. The fleet kept close to the coast, anchoring from time to time to await favourable winds or to get in touch with the garrisons and depôts left by Alexander. After seeing many strange and wild peoples, and enduring great privations, this portion of the expedition finally reached Ormuz, where they found Greeks who told them Alexander was not far away. Nearchos at once went to report to the king. With their meeting the story of Alexander's expedition to India ends; it had lasted three years, 327-324 B.C. His death in the following year prevented the consolidation of his Indian conquests, and a few years after his death not a single Greek officer was left in India. He had, however, proved, as the Muslims were to do in later centuries, the tremendous superiority of a trained army over the vast and unwieldy Hindu armies fighting according to the text-book. He had found routes to India by land and sea which he could have used again, had he survived to do so. He had completely altered the balance of power and the political complexion of north-western India; this was probably the main result of his expedition, but we cannot trace the results in detail. Of the cities he founded none has as yet been excavated, and the majority are unidentified; something of them and of his roads must have remained to facilitate the advance of his successors from Bactria a century later. To us the most important thing is the light thrown on Indian history by the records that survive in the classical historians of an achievement which rightly made a great impression on the ancient world. Alexander is not mentioned in Indian records until the Muslim period; but the Greek historians have preserved the name of one great Indian, Porus, unknown in his own land, as well as others of less note.





### CHAPTER III

## The Early Mauryas

Very soon after Alexander's departure from India the slightness of the Macedonian hold on the territory which had acknowledged his suzerainty became apparent. Philip, whom he had left as satrap of the north-western provinces, was treacherously assassinated, and Alexander appointed his two Indian allies, Porus and the king of Taxila, to administer these provinces under the general supervision of Eudemos, whose own command lay farther south. The latter was able to maintain his authority, probably more or less nominal, for some six years, when he left India to assist Eumenes in his struggle against Antigonos; he had previously put to death, probably through treachery, one of his Indian colleagues, possibly the great Porus. The lands on the lower Indus, at least those west of the river, remained under Peithon. Little strength was required to shake off the precarious hold of the Greek garrisons in India when the news of Alexander's death reached the lands beyond the Indus.

For the history of the events that followed we are entirely dependent on scattered references in classical literature and a Sanskrit play, the *Mudrārākṣha*, which is of a much later date. When Alexander made enquiries about the lands of the Ganges valley, he was told that there were two great kingdoms there, the Prasii and the Gangaridae. "Prasii" is identified as the Sanskrit *Prachyās*, the "Easterns", and, as we know the Gangaridae lived around the delta of the Ganges, it must be a general term for the states under the suzerainty of Magadha, then the most important kingdom of northern India. The king, Agrammes or Xandrames, was said to be a man of low character, the son of a barber and the paramour of the queen of his predecessor whom he had murdered in order to seize the throne. He is identified as the Dhana Nanda of the *Purānas*. The Indian leader who, according to Justin, liberated India from the yoke of Greek servitude, was Sandracottos, or Chandragupta, a young man whose ambitions had early attracted the interest of the Nanda house. It is generally agreed that Chandragupta was of humble origin on the maternal side, and the family name, Maurya, borne by his dynasty,

suggests that her name was Murā. Through his father, however, he was connected with the royal house of Magadha. Buddhist tradition asserts that the Mauryas were descended from an ancient noble family, the Moriyas, who play a prominent part in the time of Buddha. By his arrogant behaviour Chandragupta had aroused the wrath of his master, the Nanda king of Magadha, in whose army he held a high command, and his execution had been ordered. He fled northwards, and during his exile met Alexander, whom, according to Plutarch, he advised to continue his advance into the Ganges valley, where the incompetence and unpopularity of the reigning monarch would make the conquest of Magadha an easy task, thus corroborating what Alexander had already been told by his Indian allies. The text of Justin has *Alexandrum* as the name of the monarch from whom Chandragupta fled, and it is usual to emend this to *Nandrum* (i.e. Nanda), as in the above story. If we reject this emendation, however, then it was Alexander himself whom Chandragupta had offended so seriously that he had to seek safety in flight. It is very likely, in any case, that he, like many other Indian rajas, visited Alexander to seek his help against a rival, and that he hoped to persuade the Macedonian to aid him to the throne of Magadha. He was certainly able to raise a sufficient force to return to Magadha and overthrow the son of the usurper, who now ruled in his father's place. Chandragupta seated himself on the throne to which, through his father, he had some claim, and set about the organisation and extension of the vast army which his predecessor had commanded. The troubles that followed the death of Alexander found Chandragupta strong enough to overrun northern India and drive the Macedonian garrisons everywhere back across the Indus, so that his frontier became coterminous with that of Seleucus, then ruler of the eastern part of Alexander's dominions. Throughout his career, Chandragupta was assisted and advised by a very able Brāhman named Vishnugupta Chānakya, who plays a Machiavellian part in the *Mudrārākṣasa*. According to the play, Chānakya disposed of Parvataka and his brother Vairodhaka, who had been Chandragupta's chief allies. It is just possible that this Parvataka is the king whom the Greeks call Porus, and that we have here further evidence that he came to an untimely end. After disposing of the Greeks, Chandragupta was able to conquer all northern India, but we have no details of his campaigns.

In the twenty years following Alexander's death, the struggle for his dominions in Asia was finally settled in favour of Seleucus Nikator. About 304 B.C. Seleucus had sufficiently consolidated his hold on his empire to think of resuming Alexander's campaign in India, and with this object he crossed the Indus. Whether Chandragupta and Seleucus ever came into direct conflict is not evident from the sources, but it is probable that they did not. It is certain that Seleucus found the Indians much too strong for him. Chandragupta had learned something of military matters from the Macedonians, and his army was no longer a mere unwieldy mass. We do know that Seleucus, who was probably anxious about events far away in Asia Minor where Antigonos was again preparing for a final bid for power, concluded a treaty with Chandragupta, the terms of which suggest that the latter was victorious, if not in the field, at least in the negotiations. The Indian monarch presented Seleucus with 500 elephants, which were destined to play an important part in the final conflict with Antigonos at Ipsus, and in return received the satrapies of Parapanisadae, Aria and Arachosia, and the eastern part of Gedrosia, that is to say the southern half of modern Afghanistan and Baluchistan. Seleucus withdrew to the west of the Hindu Kush, thus leaving the Indian emperor a natural frontier. It is not quite clear whether a matrimonial alliance formed part of this treaty, or whether the right of marriage between the two families was simply recognised. If the usual oriental practice was followed and if we regard Chandragupta as the victor, then it would mean that a daughter or other female relative of Seleucus was given to the Indian ruler or to one of his sons, so that Asoka may have had Greek blood in his veins. Seleucus sent an ambassador, Megasthenes, to the Maurya court, who left a valuable record of his sojourn in India. We know little of the details of Chandragupta's reign, but from a classical source we learn that by his tyrannical rule he forfeited the name of liberator which his campaigns against the Macedonians had earned him. This may mean no more than that he saw the necessity of ruling with a firm hand his vast empire, much of which would have slipped away from him on the slightest display of weakness; in his younger days he had seen too many kings lose their lives and thrones not to take every precaution against possible rivals and assassins. His interest in public works is shown by his construction of the great lake

Sudarsana, near Junāgarh, which was improved for his grandson Asoka by a Yavana governor named Tushāspa. Jain tradition, which is neither corroborated nor contradicted elsewhere, says that Chandragupta was, or became, a Jain and abdicated to spend the remainder of his life as an ascetic. There is nothing improbable in the story.

In any case, after a reign of twenty-four years he was succeeded in the early years of the third century B.C. by his son Bindusāra, whose epithet Amitraghāta, "the slayer of his foes", has been preserved by the Greeks in the form "Amitrochates". Of his reign we know little; a rebellion which broke out in Taxila was easily suppressed by his son Asoka, who found that the discontent of the people was with the local governor and not with the king. Bindusāra kept his father's empire intact and may even have extended it in the south, for Asoka succeeded to a vast empire. He maintained friendly relations with Seleucus, who sent an ambassador to his court. It is to a chance incident in their relations that we owe the preservation of his name in Greek literature, for he was the hero of the anecdote of the monarch who asked Seleucus to procure him figs, wine and a philosopher, but was told that sophists were not for sale among the Greeks. The interest of the anecdote lies in its suggesting that the two monarchs kept up a regular correspondence.

Seleucus sent an ambassador named Megasthenes to the court of Chandragupta, where he spent a number of years; he had previously been on the staff of Sibyrtios, satrap of Arachosia, and had several times visited the Maurya capital. He was therefore chosen for this new post as familiar with Indian courts and likely to be *persona grata* with Chandragupta himself. Megasthenes compiled an account of India, its geography, social life and political institutions, which formed the principal source upon which later classical writers drew for their knowledge of India. The book survives only in the fragments preserved by later writers, yet it tells us more about India than any other foreign account before the time of al-Bīrūnī. There is no reason to doubt the general accuracy of Megasthenes on matters which came under his own observation, or for which he could readily have secured trustworthy informants. The few travellers' tales which he records do not in any way justify suspicion of the more sober parts of his book.

The capital of the kingdom of the Prasii, or Magadha, was, he tells us, Palibothra, *i.e.* Pātaliputra; it stood where a large tributary (the Sōn) joins the Ganges, and occupied a narrow parallelogram, eight miles in length and one and a half in breadth. It was surrounded by a wall defended by 570 towers and pierced by a number of gates. Around the city was a ditch 600 feet broad and 30 cubits deep. The king, we are told, was also known by the name of his capital.

Elaborate precautions were taken to secure the safety of the king's person. He was continually surrounded by a bodyguard of women who were probably, if we may judge from the *yavanis* of Sanskrit literature, of foreign origin. The casual statement of Megasthenes, that a woman who kills a king when he is drunk becomes the wife of his successor, suggests the dangers that threatened the throne in India, and is probably a memory of the means by which the Nanda had gained the throne of Magadha. The king was in constant terror of his life and regularly changed his sleeping apartment lest plotters should come upon him in the night. That this was one of the dangers that did threaten an Indian king we know from the author of the *Mudrārākshasa*, who tells us how Chānakya saved Chandragupta, not only from being poisoned, but also from a plot to assassinate him at midnight in his chamber. The king was not entirely confined to his palace, however. He used to leave it to administer justice in the court, a part of his duties in which he showed great energy, sometimes spending the whole day there if necessary. When the hour came for his daily massage, a very popular exercise among the Indians, he did not allow it to interrupt the business of the court, but continued to hear cases while four attendants massaged him. Sometimes he left the palace to offer sacrifice or to go hunting. On the latter occasions his route was marked off by ropes and he was surrounded by his bodyguard of Amazons, who were in turn escorted by spearmen. It was death for any one to attempt to enter within the ropes, and drums and gongs were beaten to herald the king's approach. When hunting in his grounds he shot from a platform to which the game was driven; in the open country he rode an elephant. His women-guards were armed with every variety of weapons, and rode on elephants or horses, or drove in chariots, just like men.

Besides his body-guard of women, Chandragupta had con-

siderable military forces; he is said to have had at his disposal 600,000 infantry, 30,000 cavalry and 9000 elephants, in addition to chariots and camp followers. Similar figures are given for the Āndhra kingdom a century or two later, and Muslim writers fifteen hundred years afterwards report equally huge and unwieldy armies in the Hindu kingdoms of the south.

The army was administered by a board of thirty officials divided into six groups of five each, in charge of departments; one department with its council of five was responsible for co-operation between the army and the admiral of the fleet, while a second dealt with transport and commissariat of all kinds, the provision of bullocks, the transport of artillery, food for the soldiers and fodder for the cattle; it was their duty also to supply drummers and gong-beaters, grooms and grass-cutters for the horses, and all the technical service required. The other four departments controlled the fighting-men, who were divided into the four traditional arms of India, infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants. The king maintained stables for the horses and elephants and depôts for the arms; the soldiers had to return their mounts to the one and their arms to the other. The foot-soldiers carried a bow of a man's height, which shot an arrow three yards long, and was so large and powerful that it had to be rested on the ground and a foot used to draw it. All were armed with a long, narrow shield and a long sword, and some carried javelins also. The cavalry bore a lance, sword and buckler. The soldiers, who were maintained at the king's expense, spent their time drinking in idleness when not fighting, but they were always ready to take the field, for they had to provide nothing of their own.

Megasthenes also gives an outline of the civil administration of the country and of the capital. The latter was ruled by six boards each consisting of five members. The first board dealt with everything relating to industry. The second was responsible for the control of foreigners, it allotted lodgings to them during their stay in the country, and maintained a staff whose duty it was to supervise their movements and to escort them until they left. They were looked after if they fell ill, buried if they died, and in the latter case their estates were administered on behalf of their heirs. The third board corresponded to our registrars of births and deaths. It is interesting to note that Megasthenes was struck by the fact that the object of this office was not the purely

utilitarian one of gathering statistics for taxation purposes, but that it existed on the general ground that births and deaths among all classes of the community were a matter of concern to the government. The fourth board dealt with trade and commerce in all their aspects. It had its inspectors of weights and measures, and saw to it that all produce was duly sold in the public markets as it came into season. A tax was levied on the seller of each commodity, and if a merchant wished to deal in more than one he had to pay additional taxes. New and second-hand articles had to be kept separate, any breach of this rule being a punishable offence. The sixth board collected the taxes, the tithes on articles sold in the markets. Any attempt to evade this tax was punished by death. In their collective capacity the boards dealt with matters of general public interest, such as the maintenance of public buildings and the upkeep of market-places and temples.

Megasthenes gives no details of the provincial administration of the empire, of which, however, we are able to learn something a generation later from the inscriptions of Asoka. The former describes the seventh and highest class of the population as that of the king's ministers, who held the chief government posts and the legal offices. Another class, the sixth, consisted of the inspectors, who watched all that went on and reported secretly to the king. These offices were given only to very reliable men, who obtained much of their information through the courtesans of the cities and camps. They were believed never to make false reports, and indeed there are other ancient testimonies to the high reputation of Indians for truthfulness. Asoka seems to have increased considerably the number of these inspectors and to have extended their duties.

Megasthenes divides the people of India into seven classes, three of which have already been mentioned. One he calls the "philosophers", *i.e.* the Brāhmans, who are employed privately to offer sacrifices or publicly by the king. At the new year they were assembled by the king to make suggestions for improving the country and furthering public interests generally; good advice was rewarded by exemption from taxation.

The second class, the agriculturists, formed the bulk of the population. They were exempt from military service, and the remarkable spectacle is presented to us of peasants carrying on their labours undisturbed with a battle raging close at hand. The



land was the property of the king, who received one-fourth of the produce from the tiller of the soil.

Megasthenes' next class comprised herdsmen and hunters, who alone were allowed to deal in animals. For their services in protecting the tilled fields from birds and beasts they received an allowance of grain from the king.

The fourth class included all those who worked at trades, or sold goods, or performed any manual labour. Some, like the armourers and shipbuilders, were employed directly by the king, and were not allowed to work for private individuals. The soldiers were provided with weapons by the state. The admiral of the king's navy hired out ships to private individuals for the transport of goods and passengers. The soldiers, the fifth class, have already been mentioned. It will thus be seen that Megasthenes had grasped the general principle of the caste system.

Other officials were in charge of the rivers and of the irrigation system, measuring the land and seeing that every one had his share of water. Of the Maurya interest in irrigation schemes we know from an inscription of Rudradāman, which tells how he restored the irrigation system of the Sudarsana lake, first planned by Pushyamitra, the governor for the Maurya Chandragupta, and afterwards improved, as already stated, by Asoka's governor, Tushāspa. Other officials built roads and set up mile-stones with distances engraved on them. This, taken in conjunction with the statement of Megasthenes that the Brāhmins made their suggestions to the king in writing, are early indications of the general literacy suggested by Asoka's inscriptions.

In 1905 the manuscript of a work on politics (*Arthasāstra*) was discovered in south India, professing to be composed by Vishnugupta, or Chānakya, or Kautilya, the celebrated minister of Chandragupta, conqueror of the Nandas. Nothing is elsewhere recorded of his having written a book on the subject of which he was a practical master. The work has been much discussed since its discovery, and many distinguished scholars maintain that it is the work of the famous Maurya minister. References to works on politics are not uncommon in Sanskrit literature, but such as had survived were of late date. With the *dharmasāstra* we are familiar; it deals with law and morality: the *Arthasāstra* is not concerned with morality, but with profit and expediency. It

assumes that the end justifies the means. In view of the importance of the *Kautilīya Arthasāstra*, however, as a work dealing largely with practical affairs, we may here give a brief sketch of its contents. Its practical aspect must not be overestimated. Many of its details and regulations are probably quite theoretical and appear to be the outcome of the Indian love of systematisation. The only form of government it conceives is an absolute monarchy. Book I therefore deals with the education and training of a king; he should study religion, philosophy and economics in every aspect that may affect the lives of his subjects, and should himself practise self-control. The selection of ministers and means of testing them are then discussed, together with the employment of spies and other agents at home and abroad. In conclusion, the king's private life is dealt with and the precautions that should be taken to protect him in the palace, in the harem and from his sons. Book II particularises the duties of the vast army of inspectors who control every sphere of the citizen's life, from the collection of taxes to the prevention of fire. The third and fourth books treat of civil and criminal law, the punishment of crime and the methods of extorting confessions. They also deal with the means of averting and relieving such natural calamities as famine and flood. Book V treats of ministers, and how to get rid of those who are not trusted. It also deals with the replenishment of the treasury, and gives an elaborate scale of salaries for servants of the state. The sixth book sets forth the proper qualities of a king and the nature of his foreign relations. In the seventh the six forms of state policy are discussed. According to some Indian writers there are only two, war and peace; but Kautilya distinguishes six, by the addition of degrees of neutrality or alliance, and discusses at length the question whether the stronger or weaker enemy should be attacked first. The eighth book investigates the vices of a king, and the calamities which may threaten a kingdom. The ninth and tenth deal with war, when and how to make it, how to avoid it if possible, but how to prosecute it whole-heartedly once it has been begun. The eleventh book expounds the various ways of weakening an enemy by sowing dissension in his camp, while the twelfth tells how to reduce a foe too strong to be met in the field by the use of spies, assassins, poison and women. The thirteenth book is similar, and describes the art of capturing an enemy fortress by provoking dissension

within, frightening the garrison by apparently supernatural means, luring out and capturing its king by stratagem, or in the last resort by direct attack; in conclusion the pacification of conquered territory is dealt with. The fourteenth book deals with secret means of injuring an enemy. The concluding book contains the scheme of the whole work, which it attributes to Kautilya.

Great ingenuity has been displayed, but with little real success, in finding in the *Arthasāstra* passages to prove its Maurya date by comparison with statements of Megasthenes. Coincidences indeed occur, but many of them are repeated in other ages of Indian history, and the differences are much more striking. Megasthenes finds more corroboration in Manu than in Kautilya. There is no reference to the boards of five described by Megasthenes; indeed, the author of the *Arthasāstra* distinctly states that three or four is as large a number as can be trusted to form a council. The writer makes no reference to a navy or to the elaborate passport regulations and rules for the care of strangers recorded by Megasthenes. It may be noted, also, in passing that allusions to natural products in the text suggest familiarity with south rather than north India. In so far as Megasthenes can be accepted as an authority, the *Arthasāstra* describes a much more complicated system of taxation and a more highly developed industrial and commercial life than existed under Maurya rule. The frequent references to gold coins for example must refer to a period in the Christian era.

In dealing with the date of the *Arthasāstra* it is very necessary not to lay too much emphasis on detail. It does not read like the work of a minister of a great empire, but presupposes a small kingdom surrounded by enemies of equal or greater strength. There is nothing in it to suggest that the author played a very active part in politics. It is incredible that Chānakya could have written a work of this kind without revealing a personal touch. The opinions of a certain Kautilya are frequently quoted in a way which shows that the compiler followed him and his school. It is possible that the great Kautilya compiled a book of political aphorisms which are quoted by the author along with other writers but with more approval. But there is no means of proving that the Kautilya in question is the Maurya minister. In declining to credit Chānakya with the authorship of the *Kautilya Arthasāstra*,

we are not diminishing his reputation. It is not by any means a work to be compared with Aristotle's *Politics*. There is no internal evidence as to the date of the work; that must be sought elsewhere. It was known to Bāna and Dandin, and probably to Kālidāsa, so that it was in existence in the sixth or fifth century A.D. From the literary point of view it does not appear to be a work of the third century B.C., a period in which no work of a like form is known to have been written. The book indeed describes itself correctly as "a compendium of all the *Arthasāstras* that have been written by ancient teachers for the guidance of kings in acquiring and holding the earth". It is thus one of those encyclopaedic works compiled in the third or fourth century A.D., when the codification of knowledge was fashionable. The *Purānas*, the *Mānavadharmasāstra*, and the *Kāmasūtra*, a book with which the *Arthasāstra* has many affinities in style, are other works of this date, a period when scholars were at work codifying and systematising the various branches of knowledge. The attribution to Chānakya is late, and was probably encouraged by the tradition that he had written an *Arthasāstra*.

## CHAPTER IV

### Asoka, the Sungas and the Āndhras

After a reign of some twenty-five years, Bindusāra was succeeded about 274 B.C. by his son, Asokavardhana, usually known as Asoka, whose importance in the eyes of Buddhists has given him a place in Indian history to which, from a political point of view, his grandfather is much more entitled. He is called Asokavardhana in the *Purāṇas*, and in Buddhist literature Asoka; in the only one of his inscriptions in which he refers to himself by name he is Asoka. In all his other inscriptions he is called Devānāmpriya, usually with the epithet Priyadarsin. The term Devānāmpriya, "dear to the gods", may be translated as "His Majesty"; from one of the rock edicts we learn that it was also used by his predecessors, and we find it in an inscription of his grandson, Dasaratha; in the *Mudrārākshasa* it is applied to his grandfather, Chandragupta. One other reference to Asoka is found, that in the Girnar inscription of the satrap Rudradāman, which calls him Asoka Maurya. It hardly required the recently discovered Maski inscription to confirm the identity of the Asoka of Buddhist tradition with the Priyadarsin or Piyadasi of the inscriptions. It is to these inscriptions, engraved on rock in various parts of his vast empire, that we owe the fact that we have a picture of Asoka such as we possess of no other character in early Indian history. But although they throw some valuable light on the history of his reign, these inscriptions were not intended as historical documents.

For the events attending Asoka's accession our only source of information is Buddhist tradition, but there is no serious reason to doubt its statement that he had served with success as governor of Taxila and was acting in the same capacity at the still more important centre of Ujjain when he succeeded to the throne, to which in the usual Indian manner he had been designated by Bindusāra as the most worthy of his sons. That his elder brother Susima disputed his claim and was vanquished is probably true, but it is not necessary to believe that Asoka had ninety-nine brothers and disposed of them all to make his throne secure.

We know that his coronation took place four years after his accession; the reasons for the delay are unknown, but the fact gives support to the tradition that his claim to the throne was disputed. Moreover, his inscriptions are dated not from his accession, but from his solemn coronation, the anniversary of which was always celebrated with particular ceremony.

Asoka inherited a vast empire which two able rulers had been organising and pacifying for half a century, and he seems to have had little cause for wars of offence or defence. In the ninth year after his coronation, however, he states that he waged war on the Kalinga country, which adjoined his empire on the south-east, cutting it off from access to the Indian Ocean. This campaign was probably similar to that of Samudragupta six hundred years later. The kingdom of Kalinga in those days was very powerful, and the severity of the campaign and the miseries it inflicted on both sides made a deep impression on the victor, who records that 100,000 men were slain, 150,000 taken prisoners, and many times that number perished of disease and hardship. He became filled with remorse when he saw the losses by slaughter, disease and capture which the war had entailed, and, looking back in later years, said that he would then regret deeply even a thousandth part of such losses in war. The Kalinga war marks the close of the Maurya era of conquest begun by Chandragupta. From the distribution of Asoka's inscriptions and other sources we have a good idea of the extent of his empire; the inscriptions mention his governors of Taxila in the Panjab, Tosali in Kalinga, Ujjain in central India, and Suvarnagiri in the south; while he himself ruled in Pataliputra, the ancient centre of Magadhan culture, and occasionally called himself king of Magadha. The location of his pillar inscriptions at Delhi (Topra and Meerut), Allāhabād, Lauriya and Rāmpūrva in northern Bihar, and at Sanchi in Bhōpāl, adds little to our geographical knowledge, but those at Niglīva and Rumnindei show that the Nepalese Terai was within his dominions. Nepalese tradition records that he founded the city of Lalitapatan, where he built five stupas. His daughter Charumati settled in Nepāl in a convent built by her. We have it on Kalhana's authority, late it is true, that Asoka ruled Kashmīr, where he built Srinagar.

The inscriptions engraved on rocks are more widely distributed. The most northerly is at Shahbazgarhi, 40 miles north-east of

Peshāwar, and there is another to the east of this at Mānsehra in the Hazāra district of the Panjab. On the borders of the empire, in the lower Himalaya, are the Kalsi edicts, 15 miles west of Mussoorie. In western India are edicts at Girnar in Kāthiāwār and at Sopāra in the Thāna district of Bombay, and in the east, in the conquered Kalinga country, at Dhauli, to the north of Puri and Jaugada, in the Ganjam district of Madras. In the centre of the empire are the Bhabra edict, found near Bairat in Jaipur, and others at Sahasrām in Bengal and Rupnath in the north of the Central Provinces. The south has the Maski edict, in the Rāichūr district of Hyderabad, and edicts at Gavimath and Palkigundu in the Koppal district of Hyderabad, and at Siddapura in Mysore. It is evident then, from the testimony of the epigraphic records, that Asoka ruled the whole of India except the extreme south, which was in the hands of the Cholas and Pāndyas. The inscriptions refer also to the nations on the borders of the empire. There were in the south, as already mentioned, the Cholas and Pāndyas, whose lands stretched as far as Tamraparni, *i.e.* Ceylon; while one edict adds two smaller border chiefs, the Keralaputra, *i.e.* the king of Kerāla or Malabar, and the Satiyaputra, not yet satisfactorily identified, but probably connected with the Āndhras. Mentioned along with these independent kingdoms of the south are the Yavana king, Antiyaka, that is the Seleucid Antiochos Theos, whose lands marched with the Maurya empire on the north-west, and the other Greek kings who were his neighbours. On the outer fringe of the empire, but within the king's territory, were the Yonas, the Greeks in the lands ceded by Seleucus to Chandragupta; other Yavanas are named, along with the Gandhāras, apparently as independent; they were probably the rulers of southern Afghanistan and the land west of the upper Indus. The Kambojas, mentioned with them and located north-west of Gandhāra in the Hindu Kush, spoke a semi-Iranian language and were regarded by Hindus as only half-civilised. Another group of frontier peoples living within the king's territory but probably retaining some vestiges of autonomy, belonged to the south. The Pulindas or Parindas and the Āndhras were peoples of the Deccan, the latter of which rose to great power on the break-up of the Maurya empire. The Bhojas, Pitinikas and Rashtrikas are other peoples of the centre or south who cannot be identified with certainty. Independent evidence of Maurya suzerainty in

Kāthiāwār is found in Rudradāman's inscription. Kashmīr tradition need not be doubted when it says that Kashmīr was included in Asoka's dominions, and that he built the first Srinagar as its capital.

One of the most important pieces of information contained in the inscriptions of Asoka is chronological. The thirteenth rock edict refers to the realms of his contemporaries, Antiyaka, king of the Yavanas, and beyond him Turamaya, Maga, Antekina and Alikasagara; these are identified as the kings of the Greek world at this time, Antiochos (Theos) the Seleucid king of Syria (265-246 B.C.), Ptolemy (Philadelphos) king of Egypt (285-247 B.C.), Magas, king of Cyrene (285-258 B.C.), Antigonos of Macedon (277-239 B.C.), and Alexander, probably Alexander king of Epirus (272-255 B.C.). The latest period at which all these were ruling together may be put at 258-257 B.C., which may be regarded as the thirteenth and fourteenth years after Asoka's coronation, in which the inscription was cut. His coronation may therefore be dated about 270 B.C., and his accession 274 or 273 B.C. This date, which, it should be remembered, is only the latest possible, fits in very well with the traditional lengths of the reigns of Chandragupta and Bindusāra, for the former of which we have points fixed within narrow limits by the death of Alexander the Great and the treaty with Seleucus. It is of course possible that Bindusāra may have reigned for a shorter period than the twenty-five years with which he is credited in the *Purānas*, in which case Asoka's accession must be put a little earlier.

A certain amount of information regarding the administration of the empire can be gleaned from the inscriptions of Asoka, for officials of various ranks are mentioned with hints as to the scope of their duties. The great provinces were ruled by governors, several of whom were members of the royal family; these were the north-western province, which Asoka himself had ruled in his youth, with its capital at Taxila; the important western province administered from Ujjain; the recently conquered lands of the Kalinga in the east, the capital of which was Tosali; and the southern province, the governor of which resided at Suvarnagiri, identified as the modern Kanakagiri.

A later record already mentioned has preserved the name of a local governor of Girnar who is described as a Yavana raja; his name, Tushāspa, seems to be Persian and certainly is not Greek.



Next to the provincial governors were the district commissioners, the *mahāmātras* or *pradesikas*, of whom there seem to have been several grades, for sometimes *mahāmātras* received orders from other officials of the same name. Thus the *mahāmātras* of the district of Isila were subordinate to the prince and *mahāmātras* of Suvarnagiri, who had authority over the whole province. Some districts seem to have preserved an old republican constitution, for they were administered by a *parishad* or group of *mahāmātras*, to whom Asoka gave his orders direct. *Mahāmātras* were also appointed for other than purely administrative purposes. The *anta-mahāmātras* supervising the border tribes must have had duties of a semi-military character, while the *dharma-mahāmātras* were inspectors of religion and morals. Another important class of officers were the *rājukas*, a word which originally meant a land-surveyor, one who measured land with a rope (*rajju*) to assess the tax upon it. But in Asoka's time the *rājukas* were officials of great power, controlling hundreds of thousands of men, with full discretion to punish or reward. Megasthenes calls them *archons*. Minor officials were the *yutas* or *yuktas*, who acted as secretaries to the council. Light is perhaps thrown on Asoka's foreign relations by a reference to his *dūtas* in a context which implies that he sent them to the lands of the Greek princes mentioned above. The reference may be only to special envoys who were missionaries rather than political representatives; but when we remember that Seleucus and Chandragupta maintained representatives at one another's courts, we are justified in taking the word *dūta* in its usual meaning and in assuming that Asoka was diplomatically represented at the courts of the great kings of the Greek world of his day.

After the Kalinga war, Asoka decided to employ his position and power not, in the traditional manner, in military conquests and the extension of his dominions, but to promote the cultivation of the virtues by the system of ethics, which he calls *dhamma* (*dharma*), duty, the law of right living, morality. His system was based on Buddhism, by which he had then become deeply influenced. In the seventeenth year of his reign he laid down the new principles by which the empire was to be ruled and the lives of the people guided. These were published in a series of edicts engraved on rocks or on specially prepared pillars in various parts of the country, and composed in the particular form of Prākṛit

which was the vernacular of the district. They were, as the seventh pillar edict says, inscribed wherever there were rocks or pillars, so that they might be permanent. Their contents were intended to be made known to every citizen. It is impossible to say how far we ought to assume widespread literacy from the dissemination of these inscriptions. The fact that they are called *śravaṇas*, proclamations, suggests that they were read aloud by officers appointed for the purpose and that, like proclamations in medieval Europe, it was through the ear rather than the eye that their contents were promulgated, although they were afterwards set as reminders in a public place for all to see. The inscriptions of the north-west are in the local script of Gandhāra, Kharoshthi, which runs from right to left, while those elsewhere are in the Brāhmī alphabet, the ancestor of the Devanāgarī alphabets, which, like the Kharoshthi, can be traced back to a Phoenician original. But whereas Kharoshthi is a natural evolution from an Aramaic original, Brāhmī is a learned and artificial adaptation of a foreign alphabet to the phonetic system of the Indian grammarians. It is of interest to note that the writers of some of the Brāhmī inscriptions, even in the far south, give their signatures in Kharoshthi, which suggests that they were brought from the north-west to do the work. There is no reason to doubt that the idea of inscribing these edicts on stone was suggested by the Persian custom, and the very formula with which they open, "Thus speaks king Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin", seems to be modelled on the corresponding Achaemenid formula. The word *lipi* or *dipi*, meaning an inscription, is also Persian. The Kharoshthi alphabet had been in use in the provinces of the north-west, which had been under Persian rule; and the fact that the words *lip* and *pish*, signifying to write, are both Persian loan-words, suggests that the art of writing thus came to India.

It is customary to classify Asoka's inscriptions as follows, in what may, with considerable certainty, be described as their chronological order.

I. The minor rock edicts inscribed in nine different places, dating from about 257 B.C. In these Asoka appeals to all earnestly to exert themselves to obtain true happiness, and gives a brief summary of the law of right living.

II. The unique Bhabra edict addressed to the clergy of Magadha is of special value for the history of the Buddhist canon, as in it

the king commends seven texts, which can all be identified, as specially worthy of attention.

III. The fourteen rock edicts found in seven different places, and dated in the seventeenth and eighteenth regnal years, or about 257-256 B.C. These tell the story of the change in Asoka's outlook on life and expound the principles he wished to be observed.

IV. The two Kalinga edicts, which are specially concerned with the conquered province and are therefore not duplicated elsewhere. These take the place of certain edicts in the general series.

V. The dedications in the Barābar caves near Gāya of the seventeenth and twenty-fourth regnal years. These are quite brief but are of interest as showing that Asoka did, as he claimed, honour all sects, for the Ajīvikas, a very strict order of ascetics, for whom, possibly, he even had the caves excavated, had little or nothing in common with Buddhists.

VI. The two pillar inscriptions in the Terai are important as corroborating the literary tradition that Asoka performed a pilgrimage to the sites associated with Buddha. That at Rumnindei fixes the position of the Lumbinī garden where Buddha was born. The Nigliṭa pillar tells us incidentally that Asoka also revered the former Buddhas.

VII. The seven pillar edicts, found in six places, were published about 243 B.C. and supplement the rock edicts.

VIII. The last records of Asoka's reign are the minor pillar edicts, which relate to the government of the Buddhist church.

The most marked feature of Asoka's preaching was its exaggerated insistence on the sanctity of life, especially of animal life. In his youth he had been devoted to war and to hunting. Tradition indeed says that he used to be known as the "cruel Asoka". He tells us himself that thousands of animals used to be killed daily to supply the needs of the royal household. The revulsion of feeling he experienced after the Kalinga war, and his gradual adoption of Buddhist teaching, facilitated by the old Indian doctrine of successive rebirths, not only made him cease from war, but also led him to prevent the slaughter of animals as far as possible. He says that he had reduced the daily allowance of flesh in his household to two peacocks and a deer, and even this was later abolished. As Megasthenes tells us, hunting had always been the sport of Indian kings; Asoka says that kings in the past

had been fond of hunting expeditions and similar amusements, but that he no longer cared for such frivolous entertainments and had ordered them to be replaced by tours of inspection, varied with visits to holy men and the discussion of ethical problems (Rock Edict VIII). Fifteen years later, in the thirtieth year of his reign, the fifth pillar edict laid down a code of regulations for the protection of animal life throughout the kingdom. A large variety of animals was not to be killed under any circumstances, including parrots, wild geese, bats, ants, tortoises, squirrels, porcupines, lizards, rhinoceroses, pigeons, and all quadrupeds which were neither useful nor edible. This last qualification applied to most of the animals on the list. There was little economic or other advantage in preserving most of the animals mentioned, so that it was probably their very uselessness that made their slaughter seem so needless to Asoka. It should be noted that the list shows that Asoka did not restrict the liberty of his subjects to eat animal food nearly as much as he did that of the royal household. Goats, ewes and sows, with young or in milk, were not to be slaughtered, nor their young till they were six months old. On certain days of the year, fifty-six in number, fish were not to be caught or sold, and on the same days no animals might be killed in the royal game-preserves. These regulations can be justified as easily on economic as on humanitarian or religious grounds. The object was to introduce a close time for semi-domesticated animals, like the game in the royal preserves and the fish in artificial ponds. The branding of horses was forbidden on certain days as was also the castration of animals. The humanitarian motive underlying these measures is probably indicated by the fact that the edict concludes with the statement that the king was accustomed to release a number of prisoners on each anniversary of his coronation. With the slaughter of living creatures and cruelty to them, Asoka classed disrespect to relatives, Brāhmins and ascetics, and he therefore urged the cultivation of such virtues as obedience to parents, kindness to servants, generous treatment of friends, and respect for holy men. He emphasised the need of speaking the truth, an interesting commentary on the classical stories of the truthfulness of Indians. All sects were to be honoured equally, and in this the king himself set an example to his subjects. A man who disparages other sects from pride in his own really injures his own sect; it is essentials that matter and not external forms.

Asoka highly commended charity, but he pointed out that no charity excels the gift of right living. He himself displayed his benevolence in highly practical fashion; special officials were appointed to supervise the distribution of his charities and those of his queens and other members of the royal family. Travellers in particular were well cared for. Along the roads banyan trees were planted to give shade to man and beast; at each half *kōs*, wells were dug; and rest-houses were built and watering-places made for the comfort of wayfarers. Medical services were provided for man and beast, and healing herbs were imported and planted in districts to which they were not native.

We give one of Asoka's edicts (Pillar Edict VII as translated by Hultsch), as a specimen of the style and matter of these documents:

King Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

The kings who were in times past, had this desire, that men might (be made to) progress by the promotion of morality; but men were not made to progress by an adequate promotion of morality.

Concerning this, King Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

The following occurred to me. On one hand, in times past kings had this desire, that men might (be made to) progress by an adequate promotion of morality; (but) on the other hand, men were not made to progress by an adequate promotion of morality. How then might men (be made to) conform to (morality)? How might men (be made to) progress by an adequate promotion of morality? How could I elevate them by the promotion of morality? Concerning this, King Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

The following occurred to me. I shall issue proclamations on morality, (and) shall order instruction in morality (to be given). Hearing this, men will conform to (it), will be elevated, and will (be made to) progress considerably by the promotion of morality. For this purpose proclamations on morality were issued by me, (and) manifold instruction in morality was ordered (to be given), (in order that those agents) (of mine) too who are occupied with many people, will exhort (them) and will explain (morality to them) in detail. The *rājukas* also, who are occupied with many hundred thousands of men,—these too were ordered by me: "In such and such a manner exhort ye the people who are devoted to morality".

Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

Having in view this very (matter), I have set up pillars of morality, appointed *mahāmātras* of morality, (and) issued (proclamations) on morality.

King Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

On the roads banyan-trees were caused to be planted by me (in order that) they might afford shade to cattle and men, (and) (mango-groves) were caused to be planted. And (at intervals) of eight kōs wells were caused to be dug by me, and flights of steps (for descending into the water) were caused to be built. Numerous drinking-places were caused to be established by me, here and there, for the enjoyment of cattle and men. (But) this so-called enjoyment (is) (of little consequence). For with various comforts have the people been blessed both by former kings and by myself. But by me this has been done for the following purpose: that they might conform to that practice of morality.

Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

Those my *mahāmātras* of morality too are occupied with affairs of many kinds which are beneficial to ascetics as well as to house-holders, and they are occupied also with all sects. Some (*mahāmātras*) were ordered by me to busy themselves with the affairs of the *saṃgha*; likewise others were ordered by me to busy themselves also with the Brāhmanas (and) Ajīvikas, others were ordered by me to busy themselves also with the Nirgranthas; others were ordered by me to busy themselves also with various (other) sects; (thus) different *mahāmātras* (are busying themselves) specially with different (congregations). But my *mahāmātras* of morality are occupied with these (congregations) as well as with all other sects.

King Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

Both these and many other chief (officers) are occupied with the delivery of the gifts of myself as well as of the queens, and among my whole harem (they are reporting) in divers ways different worthy recipients of charity both here and in the provinces. And others were ordered by me to busy themselves also with the delivery of the gifts of (my) sons and of other queens' sons, in order (to promote) noble deeds of morality (and) the practice of morality. For noble deeds of morality and the practice of morality (consist in) this, that (morality), viz. compassion, liberality, truthfulness, purity, gentleness, and goodness, will thus be promoted among men.

King Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

Whatever good deeds have been performed by me, those the people have imitated, and to those they are conforming. Thereby they have been made to progress and will (be made to) progress in obedience to mother and father, in obedience to elders, in courtesy to the aged, in courtesy to Brāhmanas and Sramanas, to the poor and distressed, (and) even to slaves and servants.

King Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin speaks thus:

Now this progress of morality among men has been promoted (by

me) only in two ways, (*viz.*) by moral restrictions and by conversion. But among these (two), those moral restrictions are of little consequence; by conversion, however, (morality is promoted) more considerably. Now moral restrictions indeed are these, that I have ordered this, (that) certain animals are inviolable. But there are also many other moral restrictions which have been imposed by me. By conversion, however, the progress of morality among men has been promoted more considerably, (because it leads) to abstention from hurting living beings (and) to abstention from killing animals. Now for the following purpose has this been ordered, that it may last as long as (my) sons and great-grandsons (shall reign and) as long as the moon and the sun (shall shine), and in order that (men) may conform to it. For if one conforms to this, (happiness) in this (world) and in the other (world) will be attained. This rescript on morality was caused to be written by me (when I had been) anointed twenty-seven years.

Concerning this, Devānāmpriya says:

This rescript on morality must be engraved there, where either stone pillars or stone slabs are (available), in order that this may be of long duration.

From the inscriptions we also learn that Asoka became a lay-brother (*upasaka*) for more than two and a half years after his adoption of Buddhism. That he actually became a monk is possible, but the precise significance of the passages in question is still disputed. In any case we know from his own records that he did go on a pilgrimage to the holy places of Buddhism. His road to Nepāl is marked by pillars with inscriptions at Bakhira, Lauriya and Rāmpūrva. Thence he went to visit the Lumbinī garden, and set up a pillar to mark the spot where Buddha was born. At Niglīva he set up a pillar to commemorate his enlargement of the stupa of the Buddha Kanakamuni. It is related that he was accompanied by the famous saint Upagupta who at the king's request acted as his guide.

Buddhist tradition records that Asoka convened a great Buddhist council to deal with various abuses that had grown up in the church. According to Asoka's own statement, he sent envoys all over India and to the lands of his Greek neighbours; though in the latter case it is not clear whether they were religious or diplomatic representatives, or possibly both. Singalese tradition traces the introduction of Buddhism into Ceylon to Asoka's brother, Mahendra, who went at the head of a mission and settled



there. It has even preserved a list of missionaries sent to other parts of the world.

Of the family life of Asoka we know little. The name of one of his queens, Kāruvākī, survives in an edict relating to her charities. She was the mother of his son Tivara. Another son's name, Jalauka, is known from Kashmīr tradition, which describes him as no Buddhist, but an able king who defended Kashmīr well and extended its territory. The name of Kunāla, another son, is also recorded.

There is little doubt that Asoka's pacific tendencies resulted in the Maurya empire collapsing with more than usual rapidity. He died about 232 B.C., after a reign of some forty years, and little is known of the remainder of his dynasty. His grandson, Dasaratha, is known from an inscription recording an endowment given to the Ajīvikas. The number of persons mentioned in the *Purānas* as his successors may mean that the dynasty broke up into several branches. The last of the line was certainly Brihadratha, who was killed by Pushyamitra, the founder of the Sunga dynasty, about 185 B.C.; various minor dynasties continued, however, for centuries, to claim Maurya blood. Hiuen Tsang records one such in the seventh century A.D. The southern dominions of the Mauryas passed to the Āndhras and Kalingas, and, in the north-west, the Greeks from Bactria began to retake territory that had for a brief period owned the rule of Alexander.

About 185 B.C. the last Maurya, Brihadratha, ruling over a much diminished empire, was assassinated by his commander-in-chief, Pushyamitra, who seized the throne. The story related in the *Harshacharita* of Bāna, who has preserved a number of "sad stories of the deaths of kings", is no doubt reliable, although written eight centuries later than the event to which it refers. According to this author, Pushyamitra assembled the entire Maurya army on the pretext that he wished his sovereign to see what a fine force could be put into the field, and then assassinated him at the review. The army was, apparently, devoted to Pushyamitra, who knew, therefore, that he could successfully carry through his *coup d'état*. He was a member of the Sunga family, and the *Purānas* apply the name Sunga to the ten sovereigns constituting the dynasty which he founded. The Sungas were a very old family, claiming descent from Bharadvaja, the family



priest of the great Vedic hero, Divodāsa, king of the Tritsus. They were presumably vassals or feudatories of the Mauryas, and in literature are particularly associated with Vidisa, the modern Besnagar, an ancient centre of culture, in the neighbourhood of which, at Bhārhut, Rupnath, and Kausāmbī, are still found extensive remains of the Sunga period. At Bhārhut occurs the only epigraphic reference to the dynasty of the Sungas that has survived. An inscription there states that two gateways were erected "in the reign of the Sungas". Pātaliputra, however, remained the capital of the empire, although it is improbable that Magadha continued to play a predominant part. Only the centre of the vast empire of Asoka passed to the Sungas. In the south and south-east the Āndhras and Kalingas were at the same time establishing themselves securely in independent kingdoms, while evidence that the north-west had already passed from the Mauryas is found in the account of the Indian campaign of Antiochos the Great. The "Sophagasenus" (Saubhāgasena), whom Polybius calls king of the Indians, and who exchanged gifts with Antiochos, was evidently a great king and not a petty chief, for Antiochos treated him as an equal. His territory must at one time have formed part of Chandragupta's empire, and this casual reference is valuable as showing that the process of disintegration, which we know to have begun in the south at the beginning of the second century B.C., had begun even earlier in the north-west. Saubhāgasena, or rather the founder of his line, must have declared his independence very soon after the death of Asoka. Kashmīr tradition records that, on his father's death, one of Asoka's sons made himself independent in Kashmīr and the adjoining territory. The Sungas therefore inherited only the central parts of the old Maurya empire.

It is possible to make certain deductions about Pushyamitra's reign from Kālidāsa's *Mālavikāgnimitra*, although the play was written five hundred years after the event with which it deals. Its hero, Agnimitra, the ruler of Vidisa, and son and viceroy of Pushyamitra, is in love with Mālavikā, the daughter of the king of Vidarbha. The reference to the war between Pushyamitra and Yajnasena of Vidarbha, suggests that the apportionment of Maurya territory between the Sungas and Āndhras was not completed without bloodshed, if we assume that the ruler of Vidarbha was a feudatory of the Āndhras, as seems likely. It has also been

suggested that Khāravela, the famous Kalinga king, was the enemy of Pushyamitra, and the Hathigumpha inscription has been interpreted to make Khāravela claim a victory over him. The two must in any case have been contemporaries and rivals, although it is difficult to say whether they came into actual conflict. The play also contains a reference to a horse-sacrifice performed by Pushyamitra; in the course of its wanderings the body of troops escorting the horse under the leadership of Pushyamitra's grandson, Vasumitra, encountered a body of Yavanas (Greeks) on the south bank of the Indus; a fierce fight resulted in a victory for the Indians, and the prince brought his charge safely home. There is no doubt that Kālidāsa is right in saying that there were encounters between the Greeks and Indians in Pushyamitra's reign. We learn from another source that this was the period in which the Bactrian Greeks were making great inroads into India. Patanjali, the grammarian, a contemporary of Pushyamitra, has preserved some important fragments of history in his grammatical examples. Thus, to illustrate the use of the present tense to indicate an incomplete action, he takes the sentence "We are sacrificing for Pushyamitra", a probable allusion to the Sunga king's horse-sacrifice, and proof that the grammarian was his contemporary. As examples of the use of the imperfect to indicate events not witnessed by the speaker but recent enough to have been seen by him, he gives the examples: "The Greek was besieging Madhyamikā", and "The Greek was besieging Sāketa". These are almost the only records in Indian literature of the great Greek invasion which reached Madhyamikā near Chitor in Rājputāna and Sāketa in Oudh. An additional allusion to this campaign occurs in the *Gargī Samhitā*. This *Purāna* says that "the wicked and valiant Greeks" occupied Sāketa, Panchāla, and Mathura, and advanced as far as Kusūmadhvaja (i.e. Pātaliputra). These references to the campaigns probably of Eucratides and certainly of Menander, show that, although much harassed by the Greeks, Pushyamitra ultimately drove them out of Magadha. Buddhist legend, which represents Pushyamitra as a great persecutor of the Buddhists, states that he went to Sākala (Sialkot) and exterminated the monks there. But, as the *Milindapanha* refers to Sākala as Menander's capital, it is possible that Menander, or an earlier ruler like Demetrius, had taken this important city from Pushyamitra. So far as can be judged from

the evidence available, Buddhist tradition is unjust to the memory of Pushyamitra. Buddhist architecture unquestionably flourished in the Sunga period, and, while Pushyamitra, a member of an old Brāhman family which had adopted the profession of arms, did a great deal to revive Brahmanical ritual, which had been neglected for a century, there is no real reason to think that he actually persecuted Buddhists.

Agnimitra succeeded his father in 148 B.C.; according to Kālidāsa, he had previously governed the southern provinces of the kingdom. Of his successor, Sujyeshtha, nothing is known. The fourth king, Vasumitra, had, as we learn from Kālidāsa, been in command on the north-west frontier in his grandfather's reign. According to Bāna, he was killed while engaged in amateur theatricals by one Mitradeva, perhaps a member of the powerful family of Brāhman ministers which ultimately supplanted the Sungas. An inscription recording the excavation of a cave at Pabhosā is dated in the tenth year of a king whose name has been read as Udaka, identified with the fifth Sunga king, whose name is recorded in the *Purānas* as "Antaka", "Odruka", and "Andraka". An inscription at Besnagar records the erection of a Garuda pillar by Heliodoros, a native of Taxila, who had been sent as ambassador by the Greek king, Antalkidas, to Bhāgabhadra Kaśīputra in the fourteenth year of his reign. Bhāgabhadra has been identified with the fifth Sunga king, but, more probably, with the ninth—Bhāga, Bhadaka, or Bhāgavata. The latter may also be the Bhāgavata of another Garuda pillar at Besnagar dated in his twelfth regnal year, but the Bhāgabhadra of one pillar can hardly be the Bhāgavata of the other.

The last Sunga king, Devabhūti, or Devabhūmi, was murdered about 80 B.C. at the instigation of his minister, Vasudeva, by a slave-girl disguised as his queen. Such checks as we can apply to the Purānic chronology of the Sunga period suggest that this date is approximately correct. We have already mentioned the epigraphic and classical references to the Sungas. It seems impossible to attribute to the Sungas the extensive series of coins issued by a dynasty whose rulers' names all ended in *-mitra*. Like other series of the period, it must have been struck by contemporaries or feudatories.

From the *Purānas*, confirmed by Bāna's story, we learn of the foundation of the Kānva dynasty by Vasudeva. Of this short-

lived dynasty we know only the names of its four kings, who are said to have ruled for forty-five years, after which the last of them was dispossessed by the Āndhras, then the paramount power in the Deccan. It is impossible to identify the Āndhra king who destroyed Susarma, the last member of the Kānva dynasty, about 28 B.C.

A little light is thrown on the history of Kalinga in the second century B.C. by the celebrated and much discussed Hathigumpha inscription of Khāravēla. The Kalingas had early taken advantage of the decline of the Maurya power to regain the independence they had lost under Asoka. Of their history we know nothing till the time of Khāravēla, the third ruler of the Cheta dynasty, from whose inscription, unfortunately very badly preserved, we derive certain information. He had become crown prince at the age of fifteen and king at twenty-four. In the eighth year of his reign he had attacked and put to flight the king of Rājagriha (Magadha), and sacked the fortress of Goradha. In his tenth year he had sent troops into Bharatavarsha, and two years later had filled the kings of northern India (Uttarapatha) with terror and bathed his elephants in the Ganges. He conquered Brihaspatimītra, king of Magadha. In defiance of Sātakarni, lord of the west, he sent an army into the Āndhra country. He conquered the Rashtrikas and Bhojakas. Even making allowance for the enthusiasm of his panegyrist, Khāravēla was evidently a powerful ruler, but no record of his name or of his dynasty is found in any Purāṇic list. The Hathigumpha inscription is believed to be dated in the year 165 of the Maurya era, or about 160 B.C.; this would support the proposed identification of Brihaspatimītra with the Sunga Pushyamitra, Pushya being a synonym of Brihaspati. In any case, if Khāravēla's arms did reach Magadha and the Ganges, it must have been at the expense of the Sungas. Nothing is known of the fate of Khāravēla or of his dynasty, if indeed he had any successors on his throne. It is most probable that they were destroyed when the final day of reckoning came with the Āndhras, and that the latter more than avenged themselves for the Kalinga ruler's early successes.

The Āndhras, whose modern representatives, the Telugu people, still occupy the region between the Godāvarī and the Krishnā, on the east coast of India, are mentioned very early in Indian

literature. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* describes them as a people outside the sphere of Āryan influence. From a reference in Pliny, we learn that some centuries before his time, presumably in the early Maurya period, they were a powerful people with a large army and some thirty fortified towns—next to the kingdom of Magadha the strongest state in India. Their capital was first Srikākula, on the Krishnā, and later Dhanyakataka, higher up the same river. Asoka mentions them among the peoples who had adopted his teaching; thus, while there is no evidence that they were his vassals, he presumably exercised a nominal suzerainty over them. Like other peoples, the Āndhras certainly took advantage of the decline of the Maurya empire to extend their dominion. Towards the end of the third century B.C. they were rapidly expanding their territory under a king named Simuka, who founded the Sātavāhana or Sātakarni dynasty, which ruled the Telugu country for nearly 500 years. The meaning of the title Sātakarni is uncertain. It has presumably been given a Sanskrit popular etymology, and the first component is probably connected with the *Sata* in Sātavāhana (whose badge is the *sata*). In the reigns of Simuka and his younger brother and successor, Krishna, the power of the Āndhras extended almost across the whole width of India, as the inscriptions at Nasik and Nānaghāt show. The third member of the dynasty, Sātakarni, is mentioned as lord of the west in the inscription of Khāravela, king of the Kalingas, dated in the 165th year of the Maurya era (157 B.C.), and the 13th of Khāravela's reign. Khāravela was also the third ruler of his house, so that both dynasties must have arisen about the same time, *i.e.* during the decline of the Mauryas. The relations of the two powers are not clearly defined in the inscription, but we are told that Khāravela was in contact with the Sātavāhana king in the second year of his reign (168 B.C.), which gives a fixed point in Āndhra chronology. Khāravela says that he sent an army to the west, disregarding Sātakarni, "the protector of the west". About the same time the Āndhras came into conflict with the Sungas of Magadha, over whom they were ultimately victorious, for in the latter part of the second century the Āndhras were issuing coins in western Mālhwā, and there is an Āndhra inscription of a century later from eastern Mālhwā which shows that this region had also passed under their rule. It was probably Khāravela who dealt the final blow to the power

of Magadha. About 28 B.C. an Āndhra king slew the last of the short-lived Kānva dynasty which had ousted the declining Sungas, and this is all that is known of Āndhra history till the beginning of the second century A.D., by which time there had risen to power on the western coast of India the Saka dynasty of the Kshaharātas, whose territory marched on the south with that of the Āndhras.

An inscription at Nasik of the Āndhra queen, Balā Srī, dated in the reign of her grandson, Vāsishthīputra Srī Pulumāvi, records the conquests of her son, Gautamīputra Srī Sātakarni, probably the greatest of the Āndhra kings. He is said by his mother to have destroyed the Sakas, Yavanas and Pallavas, to have uprooted the Kshaharātas, and restored the glories of the Sātavāhanas. A list of the lands he conquered is given in considerable detail; they correspond to the modern Gujarāt (Surāshtra), Mālwa, portions of central India, Berar (Vidarbha), and the country around Nasik and Poona. That is to say, he claimed to have conquered much of the land which had been ruled by the Kshaharāta Nahapāna, and which at a later date, again fell under the rule of the western Kshatrapas. Gautamīputra's claim to have uprooted the Kshaharātas and to have conquered large portions of their territory is confirmed in a remarkable fashion by his coins. A great find of over 13,000 silver coins was made at Joghalthembi, in the Nasik district, in 1906; it consisted of 4000 silver coins of Nahapāna and 9000 of the same pieces restruck by Gautamīputra. From this it may be deduced that the Āndhra king conquered country belonging to Nahapāna, called in the local currency, and counter-marked it with his own types, a proceeding paralleled in other lands and periods. Of Gautamīputra's reign, which may be dated A.D. 90-120, there survives an inscription issued from his victorious camp at Vajayantī (Banavasī) in his eighteenth regnal year, probably on his return from his campaign against Nahapāna. He was succeeded by his son Vāsishthīputra Srī Pulumāvi, who is identified with the Sātakarni, lord of the Deccan, whom Rudradāman twice routed but did not destroy because of their relationship, which, as we learn from the inscription of the Āndhra queen, Balā Srī, was the result of the marriage of Rudradāman's daughter to the Āndhra king. The Kshatrapa ruler seems to have regained much of the land that had been conquered by Gautamīputra. Srī Pulumāvi is identified with

the *Siroptolemaiou* of Ptolemy, who calls him king of Paithan (Pratishthāna?).

Vāsishthīputra reigned till about A.D. 155. Some fifteen years later we have records of another powerful Āndhra monarch in Gautamīputra Śrī Yajña Sātākarni, who ruled from about A.D. 165 to 195. The distribution of his inscriptions and his coins, and specially the fact that he struck silver coins in the style of those of the western Kshatrapas, suggests that he extended the Āndhra dominions, and did something to revive the glories of Gautamīputra Śrī Sātākarni's reign. In the third century the Āndhra dominions were broken up between two dynasties, branches of the Sātākarni family, the line of Sātavāhana and the line of Churu, under circumstances of which we know nothing, and at last the five hundred years of Āndhra rule came to an end about the middle of the third century A.D., after which we find their territory shared by the Ābhīras, Pallavas and Kadambas.

The inscriptions of the Āndhra period are of disappointingly little value for the political history of the time, but they throw some light on the social life of the period. Buddhism and Brahmanism flourished side by side. To the former we owe the many rock-cut caves of the period which were excavated by pious donors as homes for *bhikṣhus*, for whose maintenance provision was also made. Of Brahmanism we learn that while most of the old Brahmanical sacrifices, including the *asvamedha*, were performed by the Sātākarni kings, this did not prevent them from endowing charities for Buddhist monks. During this period foreigners of various origins, Sakas and Yavanas, were penetrating into all ranks of Hindu society and adopting Hinduism and Buddhism. An illustration of this is seen in the marriage of the Āndhra king, Gautamīputra, to the daughter of the Saka Rudradāman. If we may judge by the numerous endowments and the sums spent on sacrifices, the country was very wealthy. Trade and commerce flourished, especially with the western world. It is mainly to the Āndhra kingdom that the account of eastern trade in the *Periplus* refers. Ptolemy also had heard of the fame of the Āndhra kings of his time. The Āndhras have left us an extensive series of coins, mainly of lead. Their attribution to definite rulers is occasionally a matter of difficulty, but their distribution and types throw some light on the history and extent of the Āndhra dominions. The legends are always in Prakrit, never

in Sanskrit. The titles on coins and in inscriptions show that the Āndhra kings bore matronymics; these are characteristic of this dynasty. An Āndhra queen, in addition to her personal name, e.g. Balā Srī, had a religious surname, e.g. Gautamī, and her son was Gautamīputra, i.e. son of the lady of the *gotra* of Gotama. These religious titles are explained as having been given in honour of the family priest, but it should not be forgotten that in the Nasik inscription Gautamīputra is called a Brāhman, and we are also told that he destroyed the pride of the Kshatriyas. There may therefore be some foundation for the tradition that the Sātavāhanas were of mixed Brāhman origin.

While the western Kshatrapas in the second century A.D. use Sanskrit in their inscriptions, and Rudradāman proudly records his ability to compose according to the canons of Sanskrit rhetoric, the Āndhras used only Prākṛit; and it is interesting to note that they are the traditional patrons of Prākṛit literature. Hāla (i.e. in Dravidian Prākṛit, Sāta[vāhana], the seventeenth king in the Purāṇic lists, but unknown from inscriptions) is credited with having compiled the *Sattasai* (*Saptasatākā*), an anthology in the Prākṛit of Mahārāshtra; while Guṇādhyā, one of his ministers, wrote the original *Bṛihatkāthā* in Prākṛit. Sarvavarman is said to have composed his Sanskrit grammar, the *Kātantra*, for an Āndhra king who was ashamed of his ignorance of Sanskrit and found Pāṇini too difficult. None of these traditions will bear the test of detailed criticism; but they seem to enshrine the fact that Prākṛit, to the exclusion of Sanskrit, literature, flourished at the court of the Sātavāhanas.



## CHAPTER V

### Foreign Invaders of North-West India

With the rapid disintegration of the Maurya empire at the end of the third and the beginning of the second century B.C., the north-west of India began to pass into the hands of Greeks from Bactria where they had been established since the time of Alexander the Great. The history of India in the second and first centuries B.C. is therefore largely concerned with a limited area, some of which is now the modern Afghanistan and Balūchistan, and politically not part of modern India. The reason for this is the relative wealth of material, numismatic and epigraphic, left by the successive waves of invasion, Greek, Scythian and Kushān. The Greeks are known to Indian literature as Yavanas or Ionians, a name which came to India through Persia, and owes its origin to the fact that the Persians, as they became acquainted with Greeks other than those of Ionia, extended the term Ionian to all Hellenes. The earliest occurrence of the word in India is in Pānini, which shows that the word had passed into Sanskrit before the time of Alexander the Great. In its Prākṛit form, Yona, we find it in the inscriptions of Asoka as the name of his Hellenistic neighbours. The word survived in India long after its original application was forgotten, and came to mean foreigners in general—indeed there are signs that it was quite early applied, not only to the Greeks, but also to the Sakas; so that in later times it was regularly applied to the Muhammadans.

Of the history of the Greeks in the Seleucid province of Bactria in the third century B.C. we know very little. Some time in the reign of Antiochos I (280–261 B.C.), Diodotos was appointed satrap of Bactria, then a great and wealthy province, which had grown up around cities founded by Alexander to maintain his political hold and to disseminate Greek culture. Diodotos gradually strengthened his position, and may even have declared his independence. More probably, however, full independence was achieved only by his son Diodotos II. About the same time, the middle of the third century B.C., Parthia also became independent. Diodotos II came to terms with the Parthian monarch, and was thus able to defy his Seleucid suzerain without fear of

attack from Parthia. Diodotos II probably reigned from about 250-230 B.C. Of his end we know nothing, but when, in 212 B.C., Antiochos III came to the east hoping to regain the allegiance of the Parthian and Bactrian rebels, he found a certain Euthydemos, a native of Magnesia, on the throne of Bactria. Having brought the Parthian ruler, Arsaces III, to terms, Antiochos III then attacked Euthydemos in spite of the latter's protest that he was no rebel but had become king by putting the children of rebels to death. This suggests that Diodotos II had been slain by Euthydemos, and that Diodotos I had rebelled against the Seleucids. Fierce fighting followed, and Euthydemos sustained a long siege in Balkh, his capital. When negotiations for peace at last began, they were conducted on behalf of Euthydemos by his son Demetrios. Antiochos recognised the independence of Bactria, and was so much impressed by Demetrios that he gave him his daughter in marriage. Antiochos then proceeded to cross the Hindu Kush. In the Kābul valley he received the homage of a king named Saubhāgasena, who, or one of whose immediate ancestors, had set up an independent kingdom there on the decline of the Maurya power. The fact that he is described by Strabo as king of the Indians suggests that he was a considerable ruler; and the same writer's statement that the two kings renewed their friendship shows that he had been ruling for some time and had already had diplomatic relations with Antiochos. He may have been a grandson of Asoka, as Prof. F. W. Thomas suggests, quoting the statement of Tāranāth, the Tibetan historian, that Asoka's son, Virasena, was the king of Gandhāra, and observing how names in *-sena* run in families.

This Indian ruler gave Antiochos supplies for his army and war-elephants, and promised him a large treasure, which Antiochos left Androsthenes to collect. He himself had to turn his back on India and hurry to the west where he was urgently required. On his departure Euthydemos appears to have extended his authority over Arachosia and the lands through which the Seleucid had passed. His coinage is extensive, and the variety of monograms on it indicates the existence of numerous mints. The provenance of his coins suggests that his rule was widespread, while the change in its portraiture from youth to old age is evidence of a long reign. He probably died about 190 B.C., leaving his son a Bactrian empire which included modern

Afghanistan. Demetrios, whose ability had been early recognised by his father's appointing him to negotiate with Antiochos III, extended his power into India, that is to say, over the Hindu Kush. While he was engaged in India a rising, headed by Eucratides, took place in Bactria about 175 B.C., leading to the establishment of a separate kingdom. We do not know what became of Demetrios, but Bactria and most of his Indian conquests seem to have passed to his rival, since the latter had assumed the title "Great" before 162 B.C., a date fixed by the rebellion of the Seleucid Timarchus who copies the coins of Eucratides; the conquest of India must therefore have taken place earlier. Justin says that Demetrios was ruling in India when Eucratides was king of Bactria and Mithridates of Parthia, and that these two began to rule about the same time, that is about 170 B.C.

Of the family of Demetrios several kings are known, but only from their coins. These include Euthydemos II, certainly his son, named after his grandfather, and Demetrios II, to whom, rather than to Demetrios I, are to be attributed the bilingual coins showing that this family occupied lands where a form of Prākṛit was spoken. A fine series of coins serves to connect its issuers, of whom nothing else is known, with the family. These are the coins of Agathocles, Pantaleon and Antimachos, who must have ruled about the middle of the second century. Two of them, Agathocles and Pantaleon, struck coins in India, imitating the local types of Taxila. Agathocles also issued a remarkable series of commemorative pieces in honour of Alexander the Great, Antiochos II, Diodotos and Euthydemos I. Antiochos and Agathocles were probably grandsons of Euthydemos I. About the middle of the second century then, the old kingdom of Bactria, together with the Indian conquests, was divided between the houses of Eucratides and Euthydemos. The former held Bactria, Kābul, Gandhāra, and Taxila, while the latter ruled the Panjab from Sākala (Sialkot). It is possible through the coin-types to connect with one or other of these houses a number of kings, otherwise unknown to history. The latest historical reference to the Bactrian Greeks is Justin's account of the end of Eucratides, who "conquered India and became lord of a thousand cities". While returning to Bactria from his successful Indian campaign, he was murdered by his son and colleague, probably about 155 B.C. The parricide was probably Heliocles.

Of the members of the house of Euthydemus only two, Apollodotos and Menander, are mentioned in literature. According to the author of the *Periplus*, their coins were still in circulation at Broach in the first century A.D. The fact that coins have been found with the types of Eucratides re-struck on those of Apollodotos shows that the latter was of a slightly earlier date than the former and Demetrios. Menander is the most celebrated of the Yavanas. He is the Milinda, king of Sākala, who plays the leading part in the *Milindapanha*, "the Questions of Milinda", a Buddhist philosophical treatise in the form of a dialogue between the king and the Buddhist sage, Nāgasena, who ultimately converts the king, who had been notorious for his skill in puzzling the sages with heretical questions. The Pāli texts have preserved in Indianised form the names of some of his Greek courtiers, such as Anantakāya, *i.e.* Antiochos. The fame of Menander survived till the time of Plutarch, who records that his ashes were distributed among a number of cities which disputed the honour of preserving them. His coins are still exceedingly numerous and indicate a prolonged rule over an extensive kingdom. Menander was probably the Yavana who invaded Magadha, as recorded by Patanjali. His queen was possibly Agathocleia, who issued coins first in her own name, and later in conjunction with her young son Strato I. Strato's coins evidence the length of his reign, for the latest depict him as an old man dividing the rule with his grandson, Strato II. The family of Apollodotos I is represented during this period by Apollodotos II, Apollphanes, Dionysos, Zoilos and Hippostratos. By the end of the reign of Strato, the debased and crude nature of the coins suggests that the fortunes of the Greek kings had sunk to a low ebb, and towards the close of the first century B.C., Sakas, like Ranjubula, were issuing coins copied from Greek types in regions where Greeks once had ruled.

Eucratides was succeeded in Bactria and in his Indian territories by Heliocles, his son, and possibly also his murderer. The latter was the last of the Greeks to rule in Bactria, which afterwards passed to the Sakas. He probably extended his father's conquests in India. Members of his house known from their coins are Philoxenos, Artemidoros, Epander, Amyntas, Peucolaos, Lysias and Antalkidas. The last-named is mentioned in an inscription at Besnagar, near Bhilsa, which records the erection of a column

in honour of Krishna by the Yavana ambassador, Heliodoros of Taxila, who had been sent by the Greek king, Antalkidas, to the local rāja, Kāsīputra Bhāgabhadra. The inscription shows incidentally that the Yavanas had adopted Indian religions, for Heliodoros describes himself as *bhāgavata*. Of the other kings whose names are known from their coins little can be told. There is evidence to show that their lands gradually passed to the Sakas, who rapidly reduced the territory held by the Greeks until they were confined to the mountain-valleys of Afghanistan. Hermaeus was the last of the Greek kings of the Indian border-land. His coins are numerous but not varied. They were widely imitated by the Kushāns when they invaded the Kābul valley, just as those of Heliocles had been copied by the barbarians in Bactria half a century earlier. Hermaeus may have survived till the middle of the first century, but not much later. Some of his coins bear the bust of his queen, Calliope, who is otherwise unknown.

In the first century B.C., under a pressure similar to that which, about a century earlier, had destroyed the last vestiges of Hellenic rule in Bactria, the Greeks began to be driven from their remaining possessions in India by the Sakas and Pahlavas. These two ethnics, Saka and Pahlava, are regularly associated with each other and frequently with the Yavanas, in Indian literature and inscriptions. Even the earliest epigraphic references show that the two were inextricably confused, at least so far as can be judged from their names. "Saka" is the Indian term for Scythian, and "Pahlava" for Parthian. For centuries the nomad Scythians of central Asia had owned more or less allegiance to the Persian empire, that is to say, to the settled and more highly cultured peoples of Irān. The degree of suzerainty admitted, and the area it covered, varied with the power of the reigning Persian monarch. It is with the Scythian tribes of Bactria and Seistān, who had migrated thither and settled in the centuries immediately before the Christian era, that we are here concerned. The young Parthian empire had to maintain a severe struggle with the then powerful Scythian tribes, who had long forgotten the allegiance they had once owned to the Achaemenids. Phraates II was killed in a war with the Scythians in 128 B.C., and Artabanus in 123 B.C. Mithridates II, however, in his long and successful reign,

once again asserted the supremacy of the settled heirs of an ancient culture over the nomads, and it was probably during this period that the intermingling of Sakas and Parthians took place, the Sakas becoming more or less settled in Drangiana, Arachosia, and the border provinces of the old Achaemenid empire. After the reign of Mithridates II, these Scythian or Scytho-Parthian vassals of the Parthians began to reassert themselves and invade India. The stimulus to this invasion came ultimately from the movements of central Asian tribes in the second century B.C., which will be described later in connection with the rise of the Kushāns. When the Yueh-chi conquerors of Bactria were themselves thrust southward by the Hiung-nu, they exerted a pressure on the semi-settled Scythians which set the latter in motion again. The strength of the Parthian kingdom naturally deflected them eastwards, through Seistān, southern Afghanistan (Kandahār), and Balūchistan, into the lower Indus valley. They did not enter India through the Hindu Kush, as the Greeks had done, but followed ancient routes to the south, such as that used by Krateros when Alexander sent him home with a portion of his army. It was from these new settlers that the lower Indus valley became known to the classical geographers as Scythia. It must be remembered also that in ancient times the natural frontier between Irān and India in this region was the Indus. It was so under the Achaemenids and under the Parthian Mithridates II in historic times, while the links between the early Indus valley and Sumerian cultures suggest that this natural frontier was very old.

The distinction made between the Saka and Pahlava dynasties in India is somewhat artificial. Nomenclature is of little assistance. Persian names were used in Saka families and *vice versa*. Their coinages were similar, and the system of government by satraps was common to Sakas and Pahlavas, and was taken over from them by the Kushāns. It is, however, the usual practice to call the line of Maues, with its predominantly Scythian names, Sakas, and to apply the term Pahlava or Parthian to the later group of rulers with distinctively Persian names, belonging to the line of Gondophares. But, as will be shown, they were closely connected.

The empire of Mithridates II stretched as far as the southern Indus valley, and it must have been when Parthian power began to decline after his death in 88 B.C. that his Saka and Pahlava

satraps began to assert their independence, and use the forces under them for their own advancement. The earliest Saka king of India is the Maues of the coins, who is identified with the Moga of the Taxila plate of Patika, the son of Liaka Kusūlaka, Moga's satrap of Chukhsa and Chhahara. The name Moga is the same as Mauakes, the name of the leader of the Sakas at Gaugamela, which is formed from the stem of Maues and the derivative suffix *-ka*. The provenance of his coins and their types suggest that Moga ruled Gandhāra and the western Panjab. Taxila certainly owned his sway, for he had a satrap there. It is probable that the conquests made in his advance northwards thrust a wedge between the Greeks in the Kābul valley and those left in the eastern Panjab. He used the Iranian title "king of kings" on his coins, while his satrap called him the "great king". The Taxila copper plate of the latter is dated in a Parthian month of the year 78, but the era is unknown. Several dated inscriptions of the Sakas and Pahlavas survive, but they appear to be in local eras, probably in more than one. Maues must have flourished in the third quarter of the first century B.C., or even a little later. His title, "king of kings", could only have been assumed after the death of Mithridates II, at a period when the Parthian power was very weak. The period of civil war in Parthia in the third quarter of the century was a time when a powerful satrap might well have asserted a virtual independence, and set out to extend his power in a direction which would not bring him into direct conflict with his nominal suzerain.

Maues was succeeded by Azes, who continued his predecessor's coin-types, adding to them others which show that the Sakas were ruling the lands once held by the descendants of Apollodotos and Menander. Thus by the time of Azes, Saka rule had been extended over the eastern Panjab also. The coins of this family afford a certain amount of genealogical information, but it is not always clear. On Maues' coins his name appears alone with the title "king of kings". But the coins of his successors, Azes King of Kings, of Spalahores his brother, and of Spalagadames his nephew, sometimes also bear on the obverse Greek legends, with the name Vonones King of Kings—a Parthian, as distinct from a Scythian name. Azes sometimes struck coins, like Maues, in his own name alone, but also sometimes with Azilises King of Kings as well as with the strategos Aspavarman, son of Indra-

varman. Azilises, likewise, issued coins both in his sole name and with Azes King of Kings on the reverse. Spalirises issued coins alone as king's brother, as king of kings, and as great king with Azes as king. Herzfeld is probably justified in asserting that Vonones, whose suzerainty Azes, Spalahores, and Spalagadames all recognised by putting his titles on the obverse of their coins, and who struck no Saka coins of his own, was the Arsacid Vonones who reigned from A.D. 8-14. This gives a fixed point in the series. In Dr Herzfeld's view Spalirises was the brother of Maues, and Azes his son; Spalahores was the brother of Azes, and Spalagadames his son, while the Azes who struck coins jointly with the strategos Aspavarman, with whom Gondophares also struck coins, was Azes, the successor of Maues. There are on this theory only two kings before Gondophares—Maues and Azes. The other names which appear on coins are those of vassals and governors, and Azilises is simply another form of the name Azes.

But, on the view that Vonones is not the Arsacid, but an independent contemporary of Maues, ruling in Arachosia and issuing coins in imitation of the types of the house of Eucratides, Spalirises and Spalahores were brothers of Vonones, and Spalagadames was his nephew; while in the other line Azilises would be the successor of Azes I and be succeeded by Azes II, another nephew of Vonones; thus there would be a connection between the two families. Azes must have reigned from about 20 B.C. to A.D. 20 and, if Azes I, Azilises and Azes II are three rulers, they must occupy about the same period.

Besides Liaka Kusūlaka and his son Patika, inscriptions have preserved the names of various satrap families of the period of the great kings Maues and Azes. Zeionises, also known from his coins, was the son of Manigula, satrap of Chukhsa, previously ruled by Liaka Kusūlaka. The celebrated "Lion-capital" from Mathura, the capital of a pillar in Persian style consisting of two lions back to back, completely covered with inscriptions, gives genealogical information about the satraps of Mathura. The inscription records a donation by the chief queen of the great satrap Rājūla (the Rājuvula and Ranjubula of the coins) who is also known by his copies of the coins of Strato I, and, presumably, put an end to the rule of that family. He also copied the coins of the local rajas of Mathura, as also did his predecessors, the satraps Hagāna and Hagāmasha. Other coins bear the name of his son,



Sodāsa, who succeeded him as great satrap. From another inscription we know that Sodāsa was a satrap when Padika, perhaps the Patika of the Taxila inscription, was great satrap. Another member of the family known to us by his coins is Kharaosta, son of Arta, the son of a daughter of Ranjubula. The names and periods of two other satraps, the strategos Indravarman and his son Aspavarman, are preserved by their coins. The latter was governing in the reigns of Azes (or Azes II) and Gondophares, the third of the great kings of the Sakas and Pahlavas. The family of Gondophares is usually distinguished as Pahlava, for all its members bear Iranian names. His name is the old Persian *Vindapharna*, "winner of glory", and appears in the Greek legends on his coins as *Undopherros* or *Gondopharos*, and in the Kharoshthi as *Gudaphara* or *Gandaphara*.

The coins of Gondophares, all of very base silver and copper, are exceedingly numerous, and indicate a long reign over a wide area. In addition to the coins issued in his own name and those already mentioned as also bearing the name of the strategos, Aspavarman, he issued others conjointly with Sasas, with Guda the king's brother, and with Abdagases son of his brother, and as king of kings with Orthagnes as king of kings. The name of Orthagnes, like that of Vonones, occurs only in the Greek inscriptions on the obverse, and, if we admit that Vonones is the name of a Parthian suzerain, Orthagnes must also be that of a Parthian suzerain. In this case Herzfeld would identify Orthagnes with that unnamed son of Vardanes, mentioned by Tacitus, who claimed the throne against Volagases I about A.D. 55. In any case the striking similarity of the Orthagnes coins to the coins of Pacorus makes it unlikely that Orthagnes was a predecessor of Gondophares. He may, like the strategos Sasas, the king's brother Guda, and his son Abdagases, have been a governor for Gondophares, but in this case he would hardly have borne the suzerain title of king of kings. The other members of the family who strike coins in their own name alone are Pacorus, already mentioned, and Sanabares, who probably ruled kingdoms of their own on the break-up of the empire of Gondophares. Sasas, Abdagases, Guda, Sapedanes and Satavastra were local governors—the last two in the region of Taxila. The coins of Sanabares are purely Parthian in type and not Indian, showing that he secured the western part of the kingdom. Gondophares reigned from about A.D. 20–60

and his successors can hardly have ruled more than twenty years before the Kushān conquest. Much of the territory of the Saka empire was recovered by the slightly more stable Parthia. The date A.D. 78 may therefore be taken as marking the end of Pahlava rule. One family of Persian origin, the so-called western satraps, however, continued for nearly 300 years.

Classical references to this period are scanty. According to Philostratos, Apollonios of Tyana visited India about A.D. 44, and found a Parthian king, Phraates, ruling at Taxila independently of Vardanes, the king of Parthia. Phraates has not been identified with any of the rulers known from coins. The author of the *Periplus* in the last decades of the first century A.D. says that at that time the lower Indus valley was under the rule of Parthian chiefs, who were constantly deposing one another. The Saka empire was clearly in a state of dissolution. We have an inscription from Takht-i Bahi, dated in the twenty-sixth year of the reign of Gondophares (*Gudufara*), in the fifth day of the month Vaisākha of the year 103. If this is dated in the Vikrama era, and the use of a Hindu month suggests an Indian era, the inscription was composed in A.D. 45, which would give A.D. 19 as the year of accession of Gondophares, a very probable date, as we have already seen.

The names of Gondophares and of some of his family have survived in the apocryphal *Acts of St Thomas*. Gondophares appears under the form Gudnaphara; and Gad, the king's brother, also mentioned in the *Acts*, must be the Guda or Gudaya of the coins. St Thomas, who had been sent to convert India, undertook to build Gondophares a palace, but spent the money in charity, and told the king he was building him a palace in heaven. For this he was thrown into prison along with Abanes, the merchant who had brought him to India. Gad, the king's brother, then died, and, being carried to heaven, saw the palace which St Thomas had built by his good deeds. He was then restored to life and was converted along with Gondophares. This story exists in various forms, all of which end in the martyrdom of St Thomas in another Indian kingdom. These legends are important, not so much as regards the life of St Thomas, as because they show that in the first century A.D., in the milieu in which they arose, there was a certain amount of knowledge of India. No one doubts that Gudnaphar is Gondophares, who, through the Armenian

form of his name Gathaspar, becomes Caspar, one of the Three Magi; Gad, the king's brother, is the Guda of the coins; while Labdanes or Abdan, may, though with less certainty, be identified as the Abdagases of the coins. Misdaios, the king in whose land St Thomas was martyred, is simply the "Mazdaean" and is not mentioned by name. His general, Siphor or Sifur, is Shāpūr or Sapor, and his capital, Quantaria, is Gandhāra (Kandahār). The son of Misdaios is Ouzanes, a name which may conceal Kushān in its form Gusana. The question whether St Thomas really visited India is still unsettled, in spite of all that has been written on the subject, and, although the south Indian tradition is also very old, it does not provide sufficient proof. Nevertheless there is not enough evidence on the other side for us to deny the possibility. It is interesting to note that the legend seems to refer to the Kushāns as powerful Zoroastrian neighbours of the Pahlavas.

To trace the rise of the Kushān dynasty, it is necessary to go back to central Asia in the second century B.C., regarding which Chinese historians have preserved a few scraps of information. Towards the middle of the second quarter of the second century B.C.—the date usually given is 165—a central Asian tribe, called by the Chinese the Hiung-nu, won a crushing victory over their neighbours, the Yueh-chi, and compelled them to abandon the pastures on which they lived and to move westwards. The king of the Yueh-chi was killed defending his land, and it is recorded that his skull was fashioned into a drinking-cup for the victorious chief of the Hiung-nu. His widow assumed control of the tribe, or rather people, for they numbered several hundred thousands. In their search for new lands, the Yueh-chi came into conflict in the valley of the Ili with the Wu-sun, whose numbers were not sufficient to prevent the invaders from sweeping through the country and killing their king, whose son escaped to a friendly kingdom. One body of the Yueh-chi now turned southwards, and became distinguished from the main body by the name Little Yueh-chi. The main body continued to advance until they reached the lands of the Sakas, who failed completely to defend themselves against the Yueh-chi hordes. The Sakas were forced to abandon their lands north of the Syr Darya and seek a new home, which they found in the territory of the Greek kings in what is

now southern Afghanistan, while the Yueh-chi then settled in Bactria.

Some twenty years later, the infant son of the slain Wu-sun king, having reached manhood, sought, with the assistance of the Hiung-nu among whom he had found a home, to avenge his father's death. He attacked the Yueh-chi, driving them out of the lands they had taken from the Sakas, and forcing them to move on to the Oxus valley, where they easily reduced the prosperous, unwarlike inhabitants, called by the Chinese the Ta-Hia. Here, in course of time, the Yueh-chi, having passed from a nomadic to a settled mode of life, prospered and gradually covered Bactria and Soghdiana. In this connection the Chinese historians inform us that there were five clans or tribes of the Yueh-chi, of which the Kushāns were one.

Our chronological data are, unfortunately, very scanty. It was probably about 140 B.C. that the son of the Wu-sun king avenged his father's death, so that it must have been towards the beginning of the first century B.C. that the Yueh-chi, having abandoned their nomadic habits, had begun to lead a settled existence in Bactria. The Chinese historian next tells us that over a hundred years after the partition of the land of the Ta-hia among the Yueh-chi, the chief of the Kushāns conquered and deposed the chiefs of the other four sections and declared himself king of the five tribes. This event must have taken place early in the first century A.D., probably about 25 or 30, when Kadphises was in the early thirties. This king, known to the Chinese as Kieu Tsiu K'io, is identified with the Kujala Kadaphes or Kujala-Kadphises of the coins, for convenience called Kadphises I. In his conquests he repeated the achievements of the Bactrian Greeks of two centuries earlier, and occupied the lands south of the Hindu Kush, southern Afghanistan and the provinces of Kābul and Kandahār. He is also said to have invaded Parthia. The Kushān empire of Kadphises I thus stretched from the Parthian frontier to the Indus, covering modern Afghanistan and much of the plains to the north of it (Bukhāra). The advance across the Hindu Kush involved the extinction of the Greek and Parthian dynasties still reigning in the Kābul valley. Kujala-Kadphises is the first member of his family whose coins are known. These still exist in enormous numbers, but are of copper only. One group with the name Kujala-Kasa inscribed in Kharoshthi, and Kozoulo-Kadphises in

Greek, falls into two classes: those which also bear the names of Hermaeus, the last Greek king, and those which bear the name of Kadphises alone. We are probably hardly justified in continuing to assume that the first class indicates some kind of alliance between Kadphises and Hermaeus, and that the second class was coined after Kadphises had extinguished his ally. It is more probable that Kadphises simply imitated the coins of Hermaeus which he found current in his new territory, as his ancestors had done with the coins of Euthydemus and Heliocles, and that the two classes indicate stages in the evolution of an independent Kushān coinage. To Kadphises I are, probably, to be attributed the coins bearing the name Kujala-Kaphsa in Kharoshthi and Kozoulo-Kadaphes in Greek. These appear to be copied from Roman coins. The original is usually said from the obverse to be a coin of Augustus, but it is most probably a very common coin of Claudius, as the reverse type is almost certainly borrowed from the type of Constantia on a curule chair. There is no coin of Augustus from which both sides could have been copied. The stratification at Taxila suggests that the coins of Kadphises I are a little later than those of Gondophares, so that they may quite well be as late as the third quarter of the first century A.D. Chinese historians tell us that Kadphises I lived to be over eighty. He must have died about A.D. 80, so that we are tempted to put the date of his death and of the accession of the Kushān conqueror of India in A.D. 78. The Chinese state that his successor was his son, Yen-kao-chen, who, they say, conquered India and there established a chief to govern it. From his time onwards the Yueh-chi became exceedingly powerful, and the name Kushān became synonymous with Yueh-chi, which was forgotten by all except the meticulous Chinese historians. Yen-kao-chen is identified with the Wīma Kadphises (Kadphises II) of the coins. The Chinese statement that he conquered India probably means that he extended Kushān power across the Indus. The coins of Wīma Kadphises are handsome pieces in gold and copper, which give him a string of proud titles, mahārāja, king of kings, son of heaven, *mahisvara*, impartially borrowed from Parthia, China and India. His favourite reverse coin-type is Siva and his bull Nandi, and the epithet *mahisvara* may also indicate devotion to Siva. The gold double staters are particularly fine pieces, presenting an excellent portrait of the Kushān conqueror. On one

type he is represented driving a chariot, a type which may also go back to a Roman original. His gold coins and his large handsome copper pieces are mainly found north-west of the Indus. The obverse legends are in the Greek character and the reverse legends in a fine Kharoshthi. These pieces were probably struck in Gandhāra or even Bactria, and not east of the Indus. The Chinese statement that Kadphises II did not rule India himself but through a viceroy has suggested the theory that to this viceroy should be attributed the enormous numbers of copper coins found in the Panjab, struck for an anonymous "great king". These coins are certainly of about this date and have several links with the coins of Kadphises.

In the last quarter of the first century A.D., Chinese armies under the great general, Pan Chao, carried Chinese power westwards almost to the Caspian, conquering Khotan, Kashgar, and other regions lying on the northern borders of the Kushān empire. The Kushān king, alarmed at the collapse of the bulwarks protecting him from the Chinese, sent an embassy to the Chinese general, who treated it with disrespect. Kadphises therefore sent an army through the Pāmirs to teach the Chinese a lesson. It reached the plains exhausted by the hardships of the journey, and was easily routed by the Chinese. The king of the Kushāns then had to buy peace, and the arrival of his ambassadors bearing tribute to the emperor is recorded by the Chinese historians. The relations of Kadphises II with the west were more fortunate, and a flourishing trade developed between the Kushān kingdom and the Roman empire. The embassies said by Dion Cassius to have been sent to Trajan from India, may have come from the Kushān court. Pliny bears testimony to the enormous sums of money annually sent to India in payment for the luxuries imported thence to Rome, and the institution of a gold coinage by Kadphises II, in a region which had been without a gold currency since the days of the Achaemenids, is probably to be connected with this influx of the precious metal. Certain small copper coins attributed to Kadphises I bear a remarkable resemblance to Roman *denarii*; but there is no agreement about the original from which they were taken; as already mentioned, we are inclined to find it in the common Constantia type of the Emperor Claudius (A.D. 41-54); if the Kadphises who struck them is Kadphises I, he must be even later than is generally sup-

posed. The fine coins of Wīma Kadphises II form a curiously isolated group, in types as well as in style.

Kadphises II was followed by a ruler named Kanishka, a name famous in Buddhist tradition. The connection between Kanishka and the Kadphises family is quite unknown, if indeed there was any. It is not certain that Kanishka was the immediate successor of Kadphises II; there may have been a gap between them; the evidence, however, of coin-finds in which the two are continually associated, and the stratification of Taxila, leave little doubt that Kanishka was closely related in time with Kadphises II and indeed succeeded him. His continuation and development of the Kushān gold coins points in this same direction. Further evidence lies in the remarkable similarity in portraiture between the representations of the two monarchs on their coins.

To the Buddhist, Kanishka was as great a figure as Asoka, but unfortunately no early historian mentions him, and his date is very much disputed. Whether he was the founder of the Saka era and came to the throne in A.D. 78, or whether his accession took place forty to sixty years later, is still uncertain, in spite of recent discussions of the evidence. The Chinese were cut off from news of India after A.D. 125, and the fact that Kanishka is not mentioned by Chinese historians thus favours a date not earlier than, say, A.D. 125-50. Moreover two hundred years is ample time for the development from his coinage to that of his successors, which the Guptas copied. It seems impossible that the coins of Kanishka can be, say 300 years earlier than the prototypes of the Gupta coinage. The fact that the Brāhmī script of some of his inscriptions is almost Gupta points in the same direction. We have inscriptions of Kanishka, unfortunately of little historical value, dated in the Kanishkan era, which continued in use under his successors. These show that he cannot have reigned more than twenty-four years, for an inscription of his successor Huvishka is dated in the twenty-fourth year of this era. While Kanishka's inscriptions are in Kharoshthi or Brāhmī, his coins bear legends in the Greek alphabet. Two varieties survive, a regular script in the Greek language, and a more cursive style with inscriptions in the Iranian language of the Kushāns. Like Kadphises on his copper coins he is always depicted as sacrificing at an altar; the bust-type favoured on the gold coins of Kadphises is not used by Kanishka. There is no reason

to doubt that the gold coinage of Kanishka was suggested by the Roman solidus; some of the reverses are direct copies of Roman types. These pieces could only have been issued at a time when to the barbarian mind the typical Roman coin had the emperor on one side and a deity on the other with his name. Now it was not till the reign of Titus, or more probably of Trajan at earliest, that this was true. It is therefore hardly possible that Kanishka's coins were issued before the second century A.D. The complete absence of Kharoshthi from his coins is very remarkable when we remember the lengthy and beautifully written inscriptions of Kadphises and the use elsewhere by Kanishka of the Kharoshthi script. The reverse types represent a multitude of deities, Persian and Indian, the former predominating. Greek deities are also found, and include Heracles, Serapis, Helios and Selene. Kanishka's gold coins are not found east of the Indus; which is also true of the gold and the large brass pieces of Kadphises. The countless copper coins found in the Panjab are probably later imitations. Only one gold piece bearing the figure of Buddha is known, so that, to judge from the coins, Buddha played a very insignificant part, compared with Iranian deities, in the mythology of Kanishka's subjects.

Kanishka added Kashmīr to the Kushān empire, and founded a city there called Kanishkapura. Many of its buildings are attributed to him or to his successors. He is said to have invaded India and led his armies as far as Magadha, from which he carried off the learned Buddhist Asvaghosha. His Indian capital was at Peshāwar (Purushapura), where he built an enormous relic-tower, and a monastery which was for centuries a seat of learning. Kanishka is said to have fought successfully against the Parthians. The greatest military achievement of his reign, however, was the successful campaign across the Pāmirs which added Kashgar and Khotan to his dominions. He was thus able to avenge the defeat suffered by the Kushān arms in the preceding reign, and to carry back hostages, though, probably, not from the Chinese empire itself, but from some vassal state. Five centuries later Hiuen Tsang found the memory of those hostages still revered in the monasteries where they had resided, and he relates a curious story about the treasure they had given to one monastery to be used if ever required.

In the case of Kanishka, as in that of Asoka, Buddhist legend



emphasises his cruelty and irreligion before his conversion. There exists no corroboration from other sources of the statement that Kanishka, on realising that he had been the cause of the slaughter of some hundreds of thousands of men in war, became penitent and thenceforth devoted himself to good works, but the fact that a similar story is told of Asoka is really no reason for disbelieving it in this case. We should not, however, forget the other story that Kanishka was murdered because his people were tired of his aggressive wars. The fact that he depicts Buddha on his coins along with Zoroastrian, Hellenic and Indian deities throws an interesting sidelight on his conception of Buddha, who in the Hīnayāna system had already become a god. We are told that Kanishka was perplexed in his studies by the diversity of thought in the various schools. He is said therefore to have summoned a conference of learned Buddhists, which was held in Kashmīr and was presided over by the learned Vasumitra and the then aged Asvaghosha. This council of some five hundred members examined the whole of Buddhist literature and prepared exhaustive commentaries. The results of their deliberations are said to have been inscribed on copper plates which were buried in a stupa specially built to receive them. It must be remembered, however, that while there is no doubt about the existence of the Buddhist Council and the work it did, Kanishka's connection with it is not absolutely certain. Paramārtha, for example, who is the earliest and most reliable authority on the subject, does not mention Kanishka, but says that Asvaghosha was sent for from Ayodhyā to superintend the deliberations, thus showing that he did not know the story of Asvaghosha's more or less involuntary sojourn at the court of Kanishka. No record is preserved of the length of Kanishka's reign, but his successor, Huvishka, was reigning in the twenty-fourth year of the Kanishkan era. According to one legend Kanishka, when lying sick, was murdered, by reason of the discontent provoked by his constant wars.

Two tangible relics of Kanishka survive; one is the life-sized statue of him, unfortunately now headless, found at Māt in the Mathura district; the other is the relic casket discovered in 1908 in the Shahjiki Dheri mound at Peshāwar, long ago identified as the stupa of Kanishka mentioned by the Chinese pilgrims. The casket, which contained relics of Buddha, is surmounted by figures of Buddha, Brāhma, and Indra, and includes among the

designs on its side Kanishka standing between the sun and moon. The inscription on it records that the stupa was built by Agisala, presumably Agesilaos, a Greek architect.

Kanishka was succeeded by Huvishka, from whose reign survives the most extensive coinage of the Kushān series. Inscriptions are known of a son of Kanishka named Vāsishka, who evidently ruled in Mathura for some years as his father's viceroy; but it is unlikely that he lived to succeed his father as sovereign, as no coins of his seem to have survived. Of Huvishka's reign we know nothing, but his extensive coinage justifies the assumption that it was of considerable length. The types are even more numerous than those of Kanishka, but do not include any representation of Buddha. Iranian deities such as Mithra and Mao, sun and moon gods, and Pharro, god of fire, still predominate, but Indian deities are more numerous. One of the most remarkable of his coins bears a figure of Roma. The coins bear excellent portraits; the obverse is a bust and not a standing figure as in the case of Kanishka. His reign must have occupied the greater part of the second half of the second century A.D. The absence of coins indicates that a second Kanishka, whose name has survived in inscriptions, was not a paramount sovereign but a viceroy of Huvishka. The latter was succeeded by Vasudeva, who, if we can judge by the great reduction in the number of his coin-types, must have ruled a much diminished empire. Though Vasudeva bore an Indian name—the Bazodeo of the coins being a reproduction of Vasudeva—he still used the Kushān or Saka language in his coin legends. Except for a rare type of the goddess Nanaia, his coins bear the god Śiva on their reverse. It is thus evident that he had lost much of the Iranian territory which his predecessors had ruled. One is tempted to suggest that this was due to the rise of the Sassanian empire. This would necessitate assigning a very late date to Vasudeva, but it may be remembered that the Chinese historians indicate that the Kushān (Yueh-chi) empire was still flourishing in the early third century. The inscriptions in his name show that he ruled about thirty years. On his death the Kushān empire broke up into numerous little states, whose rulers imitated the coins of Kanishka and Vasudeva, adding in the fields their own initials or monograms written perpendicularly in central Asian fashion. The numismatic evidence shows that these petty dynasties ruled in the third and fourth

centuries, gradually disappearing before the advance of the Sassanians in the west and north, and of the Guptas in India. Such other evidence as we have also points to the recovery of autonomy by Indian dynasties, and republics like the Yaudheyas, and Mādrakas, in the third century A.D., in lands which must have been included in the Kushān empire at its greatest extent. The third century is, however, one of the darkest in Indian history, and it is not till northern India was again united under one great ruler in the next century that fresh light is thrown on its development.

We have already mentioned several families of satraps who ruled in north-western India on behalf of Pahlava suzerains, but probably enjoyed a considerable degree of independence. The most important of these were the northern satraps of Mathura. Further south, in western India, we have records of two important dynasties who call themselves satraps (Kshatrapas), one of which ruled, until its conquest by Chandragupta II, for over three hundred years from the end of Parthian domination. Two families, known to modern historians as the Western Kshatrapas and to Indian literature as the Sakas, must be distinguished. The first, short-lived, is that of the Kshaharātas, of whom two members are known from coins and inscriptions, Bhūmaka and Nahapāna, who were probably father and son. The reverse types of their coins—arrow, thunderbolt, and discus—recall certain coins of Maues, Azes, and Spalirises, and the lion-capital on the reverse of Bhūmaka's coins is a further link with this dynasty. The bust on the obverse of Nahapāna's silver coins resembles that on the coins of Ranjubula (Rājūla), but this may be due to derivation from a common prototype such as the coins of Strato I. The family name Kshaharāta is evidently the same as that mentioned in the Patika inscription of Liaka Kusūlaka, who was satrap of the Kshaharas and Chukhsas. A further link with Mathura is found in an inscription from that area which mentions a Kshaharāta satrap called Ghataka. All this suggests a date for these coins in the first century A.D. Bhūmaka calls himself a satrap on his coins, which are of copper only, while Nahapāna uses the Indian title rāja on the reverse and rāja and *kshatrapa* in the very corrupt Greek legend on the obverse, which again suggests a date contemporary with Ranjubula. Both Brāhmī and Kharoshthi legends appear on the reverse.

Nahapāna is known from several inscriptions of his son-in-law, Ushavadāta (Rishabhadatta), husband of his daughter Dakshamitrā, who bears an Indian name. These inscriptions record charitable endowments, but incidentally one of them states that Ushavadāta was sent by his father-in-law to assist the tribe of Uttamabhadras to repel an invasion of the Mālavas, which he did successfully. The geographical references in the inscriptions show that Nahapāna ruled over a considerable area in western India, around the Gulf of Cambay, much of which Nahapāna could have gained only at the expense of the Āndhras. The inscriptions are dated in the years 41 to 46 of an unspecified era, which is usually supposed to be the Saka era, a theory which would fix the year A.D. 124 as a date in Nahapāna's reign. But his coins cannot be assigned to so late a date in the second century A.D.; this would make the interval between Nahapāna and the Mathura dynasty too great. The Kshatrapas' possession of Āndhra territory was brief, for we know that Gautamīputra destroyed the Sakas, Yavanas and Pahlavas, and, more precisely, "exterminated the race of Kshaharātas". No inscriptions or coins of any successors of Nahapāna are known, and there is no reason to doubt that the Āndhra victory was complete. The Sātakarni king even countermarked the coins of Nahapāna with his own types and inscription, so that the memory of the Saka king might be rooted out; this shows that he conquered the area in which these coins had been current. Somewhere after the middle of the first century, then, Nahapāna swiftly rose to power, and, probably after a long reign, fell before the advancing power of the Sātakarnis. If the name Nahapāna survives in a corrupt form in the *Mambanos* of the *Periplus*, and there is no good reason to doubt this identification, he must have been ruling in the third quarter of the first century A.D. His capital is said to have been Minnagar, which has not been identified. Isidore of Charax knew that *nagara* means "town", for he called the city Minpolis. *Min* is probably a manuscript corruption of some form like *Jun* and "Minnagar" may be a corruption of the original form of Junnār. The centre of Nahapāna's power certainly lay towards the coast, while that of the other line of satraps was in the interior at Ujjain. Ptolemy knew of Tiastanes, whose capital was Ozene, that is Chashtana of Ujjain.

We have seen that the Saka-Pahlava rule came to an end about

A.D. 80, and, working in the other direction, we find from the history of the Kushāns that this date for the establishment of Wima Kadphises in India fits in very well with their history. It is probable that the exact date was A.D. 78, the starting-point of the Saka era. This era had, however, nothing to do with the more important event, the change from Parthian to Kushān sovereignty in northern India, but dated from the assumption of independence by a family of satraps in western India, who took advantage of the transfer of power in the north to become independent. The era employed by Nahapāna—or rather by his son-in-law—cannot be the Saka era, and must date from an earlier period. It is probably a local one. The Vikrama era is hardly possible as this would be too early.

But the Saka era is undoubtedly that used by the other line of satraps, who traced their descent from Chashtana, so that it is natural to suppose that the era dates from his accession. It is hardly likely that the fall of the Kshaharātas, the rise and fall of the Sātakarni king, the rise of Chashtana, and the secure establishment of his line in the person of Rudradāman took place in the six years between 46 (if we assume Ushavadāta's date is the Saka era) and 52, the date of the Āndhan inscriptions of Rudradāman. These inscriptions from a place in Kachch record the erection of a private monument in the "52nd year of Rudradāman, son of Jayadāman, of Chashtana son of Ysāmōtika". There is no "and" in the text yet the expression has been taken to imply a joint rule; this would make Chashtana still alive in the fifty-second year of the Saka era, which makes it improbable but not impossible that the era dates from his accession. It is much more probable that in the inscription we have to supply "grandson", as in the usual formulae later. The inscription as it stands is certainly not lucid. We know that Chashtana was the grandfather of Rudradāman, and the inscription proves that the latter was reigning in A.S. 52. It is therefore not too much to assume that his grandfather began to reign fifty-two years before this. The inscription therefore presents no insuperable difficulty to the assumption that the Saka era of A.D. 78 dates from the accession of Chashtana, the founder of the line which used it and to which it owes its name of *Sakanripakāla*, i.e. the era of the Saka kings.

The second family of satraps, the line founded by Chashtana, was destined to rule for several centuries. A long series of coins,

giving valuable genealogical details and regularly dated, enables us to date the rulers of this line with an accuracy which is not reached again till Muhammadan times. They used the Saka era to which they gave their name, a name by which they were still known to Bāna, who records that the last of them was killed by Chandragupta II. The earliest ruler of this line, and the one to whom later rulers trace their descent, was Chashtana, son of Ysāmotika. The head on the obverse of his coins closely resembles that of Nahapāna and comes from the same prototype as does the corrupt but still recognisable Greek inscription. The obverse suggests that these coins cannot be very much later than Nahapāna's. The reverse, however, presents a striking difference, for the types are purely Indian. The "mountain and river" are types of the Deccan, long familiar on Āndhra coins, to which are added a crescent and star—probably the sun and moon. A rare type with crescent and star alone on the reverse is probably Chashtana's earliest issue, struck before he extended his power into Mālwā. He undoubtedly extended his territory very considerably at the expense of the Āndhras, who were too busy dealing with the other dynasty to interfere with him. The mention of Chashtana by Ptolemy suggests that he reigned into the second century, so that his date is probably A.D. 78-110. His son, Jayadāman, only bore the title Kshatrapa and not Mahākshatrapa, from which it would appear that the young dynasty suffered some diminution in territory or influence in his reign (c. A.D. 110-20), no doubt at the hands of the Āndhras, who, having exterminated the Kshaharātas, attempted with some success to wipe out the other family of invaders. This is confirmed by Rudradāman's boast of his victories over the Āndhras, and by his claim that he had won for himself the title of "great satrap", corresponding to the Indian "king of kings" which is never used by the Western Kshatrapas.


With the reign of Rudradāman we are on surer ground, for to it belongs one of the most important inscriptions of ancient India, that of Gīrnār, which records the repairs made to the dam of a lake already mentioned in connection with Asoka's reign. Rudradāman's viceroy in the province of Surāshtra at that time was the Pahlava, or Parthian, Suvisākha, son of Kulaipa, whose foreign descent was not forgotten in spite of his Indian name. The importance of the inscription lies in the information

it gives about Rudradāman. He had conquered the "proud and indomitable" Yaudheyas, who had, presumably, threatened him from the north; in the south he had twice defeated Sātakarni, lord of the Deccan, and on each occasion had restored him to his throne on account of their relationship—the Kshatrapa was the Āndhra's father-in-law. He won for himself the title of "great satrap", and among the lands which owned his sway were Kachch and Kāthiāwār, Sind, eastern and western Mālwa and portions of Rājputāna. The inscription refers to "other territory", not specified, as conquered by his own prowess, and implies that some of the places named had been conquered by him. He was evidently the first great ruler of the dynasty, and must have extended his power mainly at the expense of the Āndhras. The inscription is dated 72 (A.D. 150), and seems to belong to the end of his probably long reign. We know from the Āndhan inscription that he was reigning in 52 (A.D. 130), so that his probable dates are A.D. 120–55. The repairs to the dam were difficult, but the cost was borne by the personal resources of the sovereign, without oppressing the people by extra taxes. Thus the bursting of the dam three centuries after its erection gives us an unexpected glimpse into Indian history. The language of this inscription is good Sanskrit, but the coin legends of Rudradāman and his successors retain Prākṛit features. Rudradāman was succeeded by his son Dāmaghsada, whose name was given the Indian form Dāmajada in his lifetime. His successor, Jivadāman, began to date his coins, a custom continued by his successors to the end of the dynasty. Almost nothing is known of the history of the western satraps for the next two hundred years. A regular series of coins exists, enabling us to trace the succession of rulers with precision, but the few inscriptions of the period contain nothing of historical interest. About A.D. 236–40, the Ābhīra, Īsvaradatta, seems to have conquered a portion at least of Kshatrapa territory, where he issued for a time coins of the local type. The direct line of Chashtana became extinct, in A.D. 304, with the death of Visvasena, son of Bhartridāman. His successor, Rudrasimha II, does not give his father Jivadāman any important title, but there is no reason to doubt that he was in some way connected with the old family. The dynasty was probably of little importance in the fourth century. The last member of the dynasty known from his coins is Rudrasimha III, whose coins

are dated in 31 [Saka] (c. A.D. 390). He was no doubt the "Saka" king who was killed by Chandragupta II when he sacked his capital. The Guptas continued the issue of silver coins of Kshatrapa style with their own emblem, the Garuda, replacing the Kshatrapa symbols on the reverse.

A minor dynasty known as the Traikūtakas ruled into the fifth century in the Konkan, a territory that had once belonged to the satraps whose coins they copy. Coins and inscriptions of two kings are known, Dahrasena and his son Vyāghrasena. The name of Dahrasena's father, Indradatta, survives on his coins. The former claims to have performed the horse-sacrifice. The latest known date of Vyāghrasena is A.D. 480.





## CHAPTER VI

### The Gupta Period

In the fourth century a series of important inscriptions again enables us to reconstruct the history of India in its main outlines to a degree not possible since the time of Asoka. The most valuable of these is the Allāhābād inscription of Samudragupta, engraved on one of the stone pillars which Asoka set up and inscribed with his edicts. The substance of Samudragupta's inscription, however, is very different from that of Asoka's, for it details the conquests of one of the greatest rulers India has ever known, but who, before the decipherment of his inscriptions and the correct attribution of his coins, was quite unknown to history.

With Samudragupta himself we shall deal later. We are here concerned first of all with his genealogy as recorded by his inscriptions. He was the son of Mahārājādhirāja Chandragupta and his queen the Mahādevī Kumāradevī of the ancient family of the Lichchhavis; Chandragupta was the son of Ghatotkacha, who was the son of Gupta. Samudragupta's lineage is carried back no farther, nor are the names of his grandmother and great-grandmother given. This genealogy is frequently repeated in the inscriptions of the successors of Chandragupta. Gupta and his son Ghatotkacha bore the simple title mahārāja belonging to a petty dynasty, but Chandragupta and his successors used the title mahārājādhirāja—"king of kings", which indicates paramount sovereignty. The inscriptions are dated in an era beginning from the accession of Chandragupta I; the first year of this era, it has been ascertained, ran from February 26, A.D. 320 to March 15, A.D. 321. The fixing of the date of the beginning of the Gupta era laid the foundation for the chronology of the period. Practically nothing is known of Chandragupta I and his ancestors, or of the circumstances which enabled one of the many petty dynasties of the time gradually to triumph over all its neighbours. Gupta's territory presumably lay around Pātaliputra. A single fact about him has been preserved by the Chinese pilgrim I Tsing, who travelled in India in the last quarter of the seventh century, and who states that a mahārāja named Gupta built a

temple near Mrigasikhāvana for some Chinese pilgrims whose devoutness had deeply impressed him, and endowed it with twenty-four villages. No serious objection to identifying this king with the grandfather of Chandragupta can be based on the fact that I Tsing says these events took place five instead of four centuries before his visit. The identification is supported by the fact that the lands in question must have been within Gupta territory. Gupta may be conjectured to have reigned from A.D. 275-300. He was succeeded by his son Ghatotkacha, of whom nothing is known, though his rather uncommon name occurs as a component of the names of later members of the family. Ghatotkacha was succeeded by his son, Chandragupta I, whose queen, Kumāradevī, was the first to be regularly mentioned in the inscriptions. She was a daughter of the Lichchhavi line, an ancient family known to have been ruling at Vaisālī in the early days of Buddhism. The pride with which this ancestry is claimed suggests that the alliance had important results on the fortunes of the Gupta family. Chandragupta's assumption of the title mahārājādhirāja probably indicates that he extended his ancestral dominions by force of arms, and perhaps his marriage with Kumāradevī formed part of the settlement after his conquest of the adjoining kingdom of Vaisālī. But no doubt it was rather the ancient lineage of the Lichchhavis than any material gain resulting from the alliance that impressed the Guptas, who themselves appear to have been of humble birth. We know little of the events of the third century A.D., but the Gupta family was probably one of those that rose with the decline of the power of their Kushān suzerains. It is just possible that Gupta and Ghatotkacha are foreign names, under a Sanskrit guise, and that the Guptas were not of Hīndu blood. In any case the name Gupta suggests a humble origin.

We have no records of Chandragupta's reign; his kingdom probably comprised the Ganges valley from Prayāga to Pārali-putra. His importance is evident from the fact that the Gupta era sprang from the custom of reckoning dates from the year of his accession, a custom which was continued mechanically under his successors. Coins exist which commemorate the alliance of Chandragupta and Kumāradevī, but, like several other pieces of a medallion nature, these were struck by Samudragupta. Chandragupta may be assumed to have reigned till about A.D. 335.

Chandragupta was succeeded by his son, Samudragupta, one of the ablest and most versatile rulers India has known. He may not have been Chandragupta's eldest son, for the Allāhābād inscription contains a brief but vivid picture of the scene at court when his father chose him as the worthiest of all his sons to succeed him on the throne. Our knowledge of his reign is derived from his Allāhābād inscription, one of the most important documents of its kind. The other inscription of his reign, at Eran, is very fragmentary, and adds nothing to our knowledge. The Allāhābād inscription, a work of considerable literary merit and interest, gives an account of his conquests in some detail, and, although neither chronologically nor geographically precise, enables us to understand the development of his empire. The inscription is not dated, but must have been set up towards the end of the long career of conquest on which Samudragupta must have set out very soon after his accession, for many campaigns must have been required to achieve the results chronicled. His rivals are divided into four classes according to his treatment of them: kings who were slain by him and whose kingdoms were incorporated into his dominions; kings who were defeated and taken prisoner, but reinstated as tributaries; "frontier kings" who seem voluntarily to have paid some kind of homage to the victor; and kings of more distant monarchies who may, as the inscription asserts, have felt the force of his arms and who certainly seem to have shown some recognition—probably exaggerated by his panegyrist—of his rise to power. The first to suffer were his neighbours of the Ganges valley, for he "violently uprooted" Rudradeva, Matila, Nāgadatta, Chandravarman, Ganapatināga, Nāgasena, Achyuta, Nandi, Balavarman and many kings of Āryāvarta. Of these kings Ganapatināga has been identified as one of the dynasty of Padmavatī or Narwar, while Achyuta is probably a member of the dynasty coins of which are found at Ahichchatra, and of which he may have been king; the others are known only from this inscription. Nāgasena may have been connected with the Narwar dynasty.

Samudragupta's next campaign was directed against all "the kings of the forest country" whom "he made his servants", and the kings of the south, whom he claims to have captured, but whose lives he spared. The place-names mentioned enable us to follow the route of this campaign. Samudragupta was long

believed to have reached the Malabar coast. The name Kaurāla in the inscription was emended to Kairala and identified with Kerāla or Keralaputra (*i.e.* Madura), and from this the conclusion was drawn that Samudragupta reached the Chera kingdom of south India. Further support for this theory was secured by identifying Kauttura with Kottūra-Pollāchi in the Coimbatore district, and Palakka with Pālghāt, the headquarters of the district of the same name bordering on Malabar district. Kauttura, however, is now identified with Kothur in Ganjam, and Palakka with a town of that name (Palakollu) in the Kistna district, which in those days lay in Pallava territory. Erandapalla was formerly identified with Erandol in the Khāndesh district of Bombay, and it was supposed that Samudragupta had returned northwards through Bombay, Devarāshtra being identified as Mahārāshtra. But in the inscription Airandapalla is mentioned along with the fortress of Kottūra, which suggests that it also should be sought for in Orissa. The plates of the Ganga king, Devendravarman, of the eleventh century, found at Siddhantam near Chicacole in the Ganjam district, record a gift to a native of Erandapali. This is evidently the Erandapalla of the Allāhābād inscription, and it was therefore in the Ganjam district. Further, Devarāshtra can no longer be equated with the Marātha country, for a copper-plate inscription, found at Kāsimkota in the Vizagapatam district, mentions a gift, made by the eastern Chālukya king, Bhīma I, of a village in Elamancha Kalingadesa, which was part of the province called Devarāshtra, so that Devarāshtra must have been in the Vizagapatam district of Madras. Samudragupta's campaigns therefore covered a more limited area than was at one time thought. All the kingdoms mentioned in the inscription were on the eastern side of the Deccan. The course of his southern expedition was, therefore, somewhat as follows: marching southwards, he conquered Mahendra of Kosala, on the banks of the Mahānadī, in the region of Sirpur and Sombalpur. He then crossed the forest country south of Sonpur, in which only Vyāghrarāja is mentioned by name. Reaching the Orissa coast, he defeated Mantarāja, king of Korala, Mahendra of Pishtapuram, Swāmidatta of Kottūra-on-the-hill, and Damana of Erandapalla. On reaching the banks of the Krishnā, he was met by a confederation of kings led by Vishnugopa, the Pallava king of Kānchī, who is the only one of these kings known from inscriptions. Other

rulers of this region who united to check the progress of the invader were Nilarāja of Avamukta, whose name may, perhaps, be preserved in Nilapalli in the Godāvarī district; Hastivarman of Vengī, possibly Vegi, a few miles north of Ellore in the Kistna district; Ugrasena of Palakka, Kubera of Devarāshtra, and Dhanamjaya of Kusthalapura. He may have defeated and released these kings as he claims, but he made no permanent conquests in these regions, and it is very probable that Professor Jouveau-Dubreuil is right in thinking that the last-named rulers formed a confederation which proved too strong for Samudragupta and compelled him to retire.

None of these kingdoms, as Samudragupta himself states, was permanently annexed, but there is no doubt that he exacted a heavy tribute from many, if not all, of them, and carried away enormous wealth, as Malik Kāfūr did nearly a thousand years later.

The next group of states mentioned are those of the frontier kings, who appear voluntarily to have paid tribute and homage. On the east lay Samatata in the Brahmaputra delta, with Davāka to the north of it and Kāmarūpa (Assam) to the north-east; on the north were Nepāl and Kartripura, a clue to the location of which may be given by the modern Kartarpur in the Jalandhar district. With these kings are grouped a number of republican tribes like the Yaudheyas and Mādrakas in the Panjab and the Arjunāyanas, Mālavas and Ābhīras farther south.

With the fourth group, the Daivaputras, Sahis, Sāhānusāhis, Sakas and Murundas, he simply maintained diplomatic relations. The first three words are titles, and the last two ethnic terms. All were representatives of the Sakas and Kushāns who had invaded India nearly four centuries before and gradually conquered all northern India. It is not possible to identify them with certainty, nor even to analyse with precision the compound word of the Sanskrit text. There are various references in literature to the Murundas who may be located in the upper Ganges valley, with the Sakas to the north-east of them. The Daivaputras probably ruled over the remainder of the Panjab, while the Sahis and the Sāhānusāhis, or Sāhisāhanusāhis, should be located in modern Afghanistan.

The fact that Samudragupta's coins are copied from those of the Sakas is evidence of the conquest of a considerable territory

in which Saka and late Kushān coins had long been current, just as the silver coinage of the Guptas began with the conquest of the land of the Western Satraps, whose coinage was immediately imitated.

That the people of Sinhāla and all the dwellers in the islands brought gifts to Samudragupta, we learn from other sources. Meghavarmān, king of Ceylon (c. A.D. 350-80), sent him gifts, with a request that he would build a monastery at Bodh Gāya for Buddhist pilgrims from Ceylon, and this accordingly was done.

One of the titles given to Samudragupta by his successors is "Restorer of the horse-sacrifice". It was probably at the conclusion of his conquests rather than at the beginning of his career that he celebrated this ancient rite with great splendour. Since it is not mentioned in the Allāhābād inscription, it was probably performed at a date later than that of its incision. A possible allusion to it occurs in the Eran inscription, in the reference to lavish distributions of gold. An interesting memorial of the sacrifice survives in the coins struck to commemorate it, bearing the sacrificial horse on the one side and on the other the queen, who played an important part in the ceremony, with legends relating to the efficacy of the sacrifice.

The inscriptions also tell us that Samudragupta was both poet and musician; the latter statement is corroborated by the existence of coins showing him seated and playing a lyre, while the former accomplishment may explain the existence of metrical legends on his coins. Other coins liken him to Kṛitānta, the god of death, as do the inscriptions. One of his favourite titles, an allusion to his conquests, was *Sarvarājochchettā*, "exterminator of all kings", and the use of this epithet on a series of coins bearing the name Kācha proves that they were issued by Samudragupta. Samudragupta probably instituted the Gupta coinage late in his reign, for his coins bear allusions to his conquests, and perhaps owe their profusion to the great quantity of gold which he carried back from his south Indian campaigns. Samudragupta probably lived till about A.D. 385. The name of the queen, who was the mother of his successor, was Dattadevī.

This son, chosen by his father to succeed him, was Chandragupta II, who took the honorific title *Vikramāditya*. Samudragupta himself is not known to have adopted a title of this form, but may have been called *Parākramāditya*.

Several inscriptions of Chandragupta II's reign are extant; but all originate from private individuals, and all are of chronological rather than historical importance. The Udayagiri cave inscription records a dedication by a mahārāja of the Sanakānika family, who was a feudatory of Chandragupta, and who dates his inscription in the year G.E. 82. The Sanchi inscription, dated G.E. 93, commemorates a donation made by one of Chandragupta's officers. The Udayagiri inscription is undated, and records the excavation of a cave in honour of Siva by one of Chandragupta's ministers, Vīrasena-Sāba. This inscription is important because it states that the latter was accompanying Chandragupta II, when he was "seeking to conquer the whole world", so that it was probably incised during Chandragupta's campaign against the Western Satraps. The only interest of the Gadhwā inscription is that it is dated G.E. 88. It is from his coins that we learn of the greatest achievement of Chandragupta's reign, the conquest of the Western Satraps. Already the influence of Samudragupta's conquests must have been felt by the Western Satraps, who may perhaps be included among the Sakas of the Allāhābād inscription. The Udayagiri inscription is evidence of the Gupta occupation of eastern Mālwa. The latest coins of the Western Satraps, those of Rudrasimha III, belong to the year 31-, *i.e.* A.D. 388-97. After his conquest of Surāshtra Chandragupta II instituted a silver coinage which imitates closely that of the Satraps. The earliest date on these is G.E. 90 or 90+, *i.e.* between A.D. 409 and 413, since Chandragupta died about the latter year. The conquest therefore took place somewhere between A.D. 395 and 400. One of the few references in literature to the Guptas concerns this campaign; according to it Chandragupta slew the last king of the Sakas in his enemy's city while courting another man's wife.

With the westward development of the Gupta empire Ujjain became increasingly important, and probably began to overshadow the ancient capital of Pāṭaliputra. The inscriptions give Dhruvadevī as the name of Chandragupta's queen, the mother of his successor, Kumāragupta. Bloch's excavations at Basarh (Vaisālī) produced a large number of seals of the period of Chandragupta II, many belonging to officials of the province, and revealing the fact that there existed under the Guptas a highly organised civil service. The most important of these seals



is one of Queen Dhruvaswāmīnī (Dhruvadevī), wife of Chandragupta and mother of the mahārāja Govindagupta, presumably a brother of Kumāragupta, and governor of Vaisālī. The Ghatotkachagupta whose seal was found was probably another son, and certainly was a member of the imperial family. He may be identified with the governor of Eran mentioned in the Tumain inscription. By another queen, Kuberanāgā, Chandragupta had a daughter, Prabhāvatiguptā, who married the Vākātaka, Rudrasena II. The fact that some of her inscriptions refer to her father as Dēvarāja suggests that this was another name or title of Chandragupta.

While Samudragupta's reverses retained traces of their Kushān prototypes, Chandragupta's coins display considerable originality of type and become purely Indian. He was fond of representing himself on horseback, or in combat with a lion. His title was *Vikramāditya*. To his reign belonged the introduction of a silver coinage which became extensive in the reign of his successors; he also issued copper coins, being, most probably, the only member of his dynasty to do so.

The Sanchi inscription shows that Chandragupta was still reigning in G.E. 93 (*i.e.* A.D. 412-13), while the Bilsad inscription of G.E. 96 (*i.e.* A.D. 415-16) is of the reign of Kumāragupta I, whose accession may therefore be dated in A.D. 414. Little is known of the events of his reign, but his extensive coinage and the distribution of the inscriptions of his reign suggest that he retained his father's empire intact. The Bilsad inscription, recording a private dedication, describes his reign as one of "increasing victory". Other inscriptions, the Gadhwā of G.E. 98 (A.D. 417-18), the Udayagiri of 106 (A.D. 425-6), the Tumain of 116 (A.D. 435-6), the Karamadande of 117 (A.D. 436-7), the Mankuwar of 129 (A.D. 448-9), are of importance only by reason of their dates. The long Mandasor inscription of Kumāragupta and Bandhuvarman, his governor at Dāsapura, contains nothing of historical importance. It records the building and repair of a temple in Dāsapura (Mandasor) by the local guild of silk weavers in the Mālava year 493 (A.D. 437-8). Coins are the sole evidence that he, like his grandfather, performed the *asvamedha* sacrifice. He added a number of new types to the coinage, notably one in which Kārttikeya is represented on his vehicle the peacock, and one in which the king appears riding on an elephant. His

silver coinage is very extensive, and during his reign the use of silver coins spread from the place of their origin in the western provinces to the home provinces. With Kumāragupta's reign the period of Gupta greatness closed, and it is evident from his son's records that his last years were troubled.

Kumāragupta was succeeded in A.D. 455 by Skandagupta, the son of his queen Anantadevi. From Skandagupta's reign important inscriptions survive, the most valuable being that of Bhitari, an undated inscription, the primary object of which was to record the installation by Skandagupta of an image of Vishnu, and the allotment to it of a village in memory of his father in order to increase his merit. The value of this inscription lies in its historical allusions, from which we learn something of the dangers then threatening the Gupta empire. It contains three allusions to the restoration of the family fortunes by Skandagupta. We are told that, preparatory to restoring the fallen fortunes of his family, Skandagupta slept a night on the bare ground; that on his father's death he conquered his enemies and re-established the ruined fortunes of his house; and that with his own armies he stabilised the tottering lineage of the Guptas. Unfortunately the precise nature of the catastrophe thus averted is not stated. There is indeed a reference to his conquest of the Pushyamitras, tributaries, otherwise unknown, who had developed great power and wealth. This people seems to have attempted with some success to overthrow the Guptas in the closing years of Kumāragupta, but they were finally crushed by Skandagupta, his father having died, apparently, while he himself was in the field against them, for it was to his mother that he announced his victory on his return, a fact which seems to explain the mention of his mother in the inscription. The other enemy referred to by name are the Hūnas, with whom Skandagupta fought a fierce battle and was victorious. He seems to have had other troubles to face also. The inscription appears to belong to the early part of his reign, so that the earliest recorded invasion of India by the Hūnas must have taken place about A.D. 455. Another long inscription of his reign is that at Junāgarh, commemorating the restoration, in 138 (A.D. 457-8), by order of the son of the governor of Surāshtra, who had been appointed to his office by Skandagupta himself, of an embankment which had burst two years earlier. The opening lines are a panegyric of Skandagupta, and we are again

told how, after his father's death, he conquered his enemies and broke the pride of the Mlechchas, who are, presumably, the Hūnas. He appointed governors in all his territories, deliberating with great care before deciding upon whom to confer these important offices. This suggests that the danger which had threatened his frontiers might recur. A Jain inscription, dated G.E. 141 (A.D. 460-1), and recording the dedication of five images at Kakubha, describes Skandagupta's reign as peaceful and calls the monarch lord of a hundred vassal kings, but these are only conventional phrases. The Mathura inscription of 135 (A.D. 454-5), the Kosam of 139 (A.D. 458-9), and the Indore plate of 146 (A.D. 465-6) are all of his reign, but contain no historical information of importance.

Skandagupta assumed the title *Kramāditya*, although he seems to have used *Vikramāditya* as well. His gold coins are scarce compared with those of his predecessors, and his later gold issues seem to belong only to the east, a fact which suggests a reduction of territory. His extensive silver coinage, however, shows that during the first part of his reign at least he retained his western dominions. His only new type shows the goddess Lakshmī standing beside him, and thus supports the statement of the Bhitari inscription that he believed himself specially favoured by her.

With the death of Skandagupta about A.D. 470, the glory of the dynasty seems to have passed. The names of a number of his successors are known, chiefly from coins, but the order of their succession is a matter of some uncertainty. On a celebrated seal, found at Bhitari, occurs the genealogy of Kumāragupta II *Kramāditya*, who was the son of Narasimhagupta *Balāditya*, the son of Puragupta *Vikramāditya*, the son of Kumāragupta I. This seal makes no mention of Skandagupta, but traces the Gupta line through his brother Puragupta. Coins are known of all these rulers as well as of Vishnugupta *Chandrāditya*, who seems, from the evidence of coin-finds, to have been the son of Kumāragupta II. Coins are also known of Vainyagupta III *Dvādasāditya*, of Prakāsāditya, whose Gupta name is not known, and of a Ghatotkachagupta *Kramāditya*. It is possible that these represent the descendants of the line of Skandagupta, and that, the much reduced Gupta empire having been split into two divisions in the last quarter of the fifth century, the family of Skandagupta held the central, and that of Puragupta the eastern, dominions.

The evidence of coin-finds suggests that Prakāśāditya succeeded Skandagupta, but the order of his successors is uncertain. Further evidence of the disruption of the empire is afforded by the existence of dated coins and inscriptions of Budhagupta, who must have reigned about A.D. 480-500, and who was presumably succeeded by Bhānugupta, mentioned in inscriptions of G.E. 191 (A.D. 510-11), which seem to relate to a battle fought against the Hūna invaders. Budhagupta may have been another son of Kumāragupta I, or perhaps a nephew. The coins of Budhagupta and the sites of his inscriptions suggest that this line ruled in the western part of the empire. Of all these rulers only Narasimhagupta (if he is the Balāditya of Hiuen Tsang) is known to have played a part in history. The Chinese pilgrim credits him with building a great temple at Nālandā, the Buddhist university, which he furnished in magnificent style.

Skandagupta's defeat of the Hūnas had only postponed the evil day for the Guptas, and in the last decades of the fifth century, after passing through Persia and sweeping away the petty Kushān and Saka kingdoms of the north-east, they poured into India. Soon the Hūna empire included all the western and central Gupta dominions. The Hūnas produced two great rulers in India, Toramāna and his son Mihirakula. An inscription which mentions the former was found at Eran, and his coins copy the silver pieces of Skandagupta or Budhagupta, while numerous copper coins and an inscription, found at Gwalior, survive from the reign of his son. Toramāna's reign continued into the sixth century; Mihirakula, of whose history more is known, has an unenviable record in Buddhist tradition.

According to Hiuen Tsang, Mihirakula persecuted the Buddhists and invaded the lands of Balāditya, king of Magadha. Balāditya not only routed the invader but captured and afterwards released him. Mihirakula then took refuge in Kashmīr, where he established himself as a ruler. Other evidence exists of Balāditya's interest in Buddhism, but it is difficult to judge how far Hiuen Tsang's story is true. We may probably deduce from it that Balāditya defeated Mihirakula, and was able to check the Hūna advance. The problem is complicated by the existence of two inscriptions of a king named Yasodharman, who claims to have achieved precisely those things which Hiuen Tsang ascribes to Balāditya. Both these inscriptions are at Mandasor.

The first (which is in duplicate) is on a pillar of victory erected to the glory of Yasodharman, who ruled over territory which not even the Guptas had owned, and had invaded lands which not even the Hūnas had penetrated; from the river Lauhitya to Mount Mahendra, and from the Himālāya to the western ocean kings acknowledged him; even Mihirakula paid homage to him after being overthrown. The other inscription mentions Yasodharman only incidentally, as having conquered powerful kings of the north and east; it is important because, being dated in the year S.E. 590 (A.D. 533-4), it shows that Mihirakula had a long reign. Nothing more is known of Yasodharman, who, even when due allowance has been made for his panegyrist, must have been a powerful ruler. There is no reason to doubt his claim to have defeated Mihirakula and restored him to liberty. The difficulty lies in reconciling his inscription with the statement of the Chinese pilgrim who credits Balāditya with the same achievements. The probability is that Balāditya inflicted some check on the Hūnas, but that their complete rout was due to Yasodharman, and that the Chinese pilgrim gives to the patron of Buddhism more of the credit than was his due. It is probable that in India, as in Europe, the Hūna power declined as rapidly as it rose, and that its collapse was not effected by any individual Indian liberator. In the latter half of the sixth century the Hūnas seem to have broken up into a number of petty tribes of little political importance. But the terror which the name of Mihirakula inspired not only is recorded by a contemporary, the Alexandrian monk, Cosmas, who visited India in his time, but finds an echo, nearly six centuries later, in the pages of the Kashmīr Chronicle.

A line of Gupta rulers, whose precise connection with the imperial line is not known, continued to rule in Magadha for two centuries longer. Their genealogy appears from inscriptions, notably those of Ādityasena about A.D. 672, who seems to have somewhat revived the glory of his ancient house and celebrated the horse-sacrifice. Ādityasena traced his descent from a certain Krishnagupta, and claimed Kumāragupta as his ancestor. His son Dāmodragupta overcame the Maukharis. The last known member of the dynasty is Jīvitagupta, the second of that name.

The Chinese pilgrim, Fa Hien, visited India in A.D. 405-11, and has left an account of his travels, which, however, contain disappointingly little of interest to the modern reader. One may

deduce from his record that the country was prosperous and well-governed, and Pātaliputra seems to have been the capital of the empire. The Buddhist holy places had fallen into neglect, and it is very doubtful if Buddhism was as prominent as the pilgrim would have us believe. The Gupta emperors were Hindus, but some of them are credited with a tolerant interest in other faiths. The Gupta period was, however, one of a great Brahmanical revival. Both Samudragupta and his grandson, for example, celebrated the ancient horse-sacrifice with all its very elaborate ritual.

Seals and inscriptions reveal glimpses of very highly organised civil and military services and elaborate court ceremonial. The ministers were men of wide culture. A dedication informs us that Chandragupta II's war minister, for example, was a poet, logician and rhetorician. The Gupta age was the classical period of Sanskrit literature. The emperors regularly used Sanskrit for their inscriptions, while in the earlier periods pure Sanskrit inscriptions were rare, the language used being generally the local Prākṛit. This is the period of great names in Sanskrit literature. The memory of the glories of the court of Chandragupta II, and the men of letters who shed lustre upon it, undoubtedly survives in the old tradition that the "nine gems" of Sanskrit literature flourished at the court of Vikramāditya of Ujjain, although nothing is known of several of the "nine gems", and others cannot possibly be contemporaries. The great Allāhābād inscription of Samudragupta is the work of an otherwise unknown Harisena, who was no mean poet, and forms an important landmark in the chronology of *kāvya* literature. Kālidāsa, the greatest name in Indian literature, flourished at the court of Chandragupta II, and may have survived until the reign of Skandagupta. Of the other "nine gems" Varāhamihira, the astronomer, and Amarakosa, the lexicographer, lived about a century later. To the Gupta age belong also a number of encyclopaedic works and digests of a theoretical and practical nature like the *Purāṇas*, the *Laws* of Manu, the *Arthasāstra* of Kautilya, and other works, all revealing a love of codification and systematisation. The *Panchatantra* also took its present form about the same time. In art and architecture the period was of an importance which can only be appreciated now that excavations have yielded materials for study. The sculpture is characterised by vigour, and evinces a

gradual liberation from Gandhāran influence, its technical execution being very fine. All the arts seem to have flourished at the Gupta court in a manner worthy of a great dynasty.

An important dynasty contemporary with the Guptas was that of the Vākātakas, whose territory seems originally to have corresponded with modern Berar. The origin of the word Vākātaka is unknown but the rulers of the line bear good Sanskrit names. Inscriptions serve to trace the descent of the dynasty from Vindyasakti, who does not appear to have been a ruling sovereign, but whose son, Pravarasena, is referred to as mahārāja, and is said to have performed four horse-sacrifices, thereby earning the title of *saṃrāj*, or emperor. Pravarasena's son was Gautamīputra, but the second ruler of the line seems to have been Pravarasena's grandson, Rudrasena I. The latter's son Prithivīśena had an unusually long reign and conquered the land of Kuntala (*i.e.* the Kadambas). His son Rudrasena II married Prabhavātī, a daughter of Chandragupta II, who proudly records her Gupta lineage in an inscription. They had a son named Devakarasena who may be the Pravarasena II who succeeded Rudrasena II. In the first half of the fifth century, the Vākātaka kingdom, lying between the Gupta empire and the kingdoms of the south, had become the dominant power in the Deccan, and through the Vākātakas the culture of northern India began to penetrate into the south. In the last quarter of the century Narendrasena asserted that he was obeyed by the king of Mālwa, a claim which suggests that the Vākātaka power had extended northwards with the break up of the Gupta dominions on the death of Skandagupta. Later rulers were Devasena and Harisena, his son, who laid claim to considerable conquests, including Kuntala, Avantī, Kalinga, Trikota and Āndhra. The dynasty disappeared in the middle of the sixth century, supplanted, apparently, by the Kālachuris. The presence of Vākātaka inscriptions in the Ajanta and other sculptured caves is an important factor in the chronology of Indian art. The Nāchnā inscription refers to a certain Vyāghra, feudatory of Prithivīśena I, in central India, and it is not improbable that he is the Vyāghra mentioned in the Allāhābād inscription of Samudragupta, and that at this period the Guptas replaced the Vākātakas as the suzerain power in central India, and that the centre of gravity of the latter dynasty was henceforth transferred to the south.

A number of copper-plate inscriptions survive in which some information is preserved concerning a dynasty which ruled at Valabhī, in Surāshtra, from the fifth to the eighth centuries A.D. These contain unusually full genealogical lists, but little historical information. The founder of the dynasty was a certain *senāpati*, Bhātarka, who laid the foundations of the family fortunes by overthrowing a neighbouring tribe called the Maitrakas. The inscriptions of this house are dated in the Gupta era, the use of which was thus continued to the year 447 (*i.e.* A.D. 766). Little is known of the political history of the dynasty, but it may be inferred from the prosperity of Valabhī in the seventh century that its territory had been considerably extended with the decline of Gupta and Hūna power. Harsha defeated a king of Valabhī and drove him from his kingdom to seek refuge with the Gurjara, Dadda II, who protected him and assisted him to make his peace with Harsha. The latter not only restored him to the throne, but gave him his grand-daughter in marriage. This king seems to have been Dhruvasena II, the nephew of Silāditya. Valabhī rivalled Nālandā as a great school of Buddhist learning, and its memory is enshrined in the pages of Chinese pilgrims.

A line of Gupta rulers, whose connection with the imperial line is not clearly known, continued to rule in Magadha in the sixth and seventh centuries. Our knowledge of them is derived mainly from the inscriptions of two of their number, Ādityasena and Jīvitagupta II. The Apsad inscription of Ādityasena, whose short Shāpūr inscription is dated 66 (*i.e.* A.D. 672), traces his descent from Krishnagupta, of whose origin nothing is stated. If he were a direct descendant of the imperial Gupta line, we should have expected some reference to the fact. Of Krishnagupta's son and grandson, Harshagupta and Jīvitagupta I, the conventional phrases of the inscription tell us nothing, but the next ruler, Kumāragupta, is stated to have defeated the army of the Maukharī, Isānavarman, whom we know to have been reigning in 611 (*i.e.* A.D. 554). It is also recorded that Kumāragupta died and was buried in Prayāga. His son, Dāmodragupta, fell fighting against the Maukharīs, fresh from their victories over the Hūnas. Of his successor it is recorded that he won a victory over Susthitavarman, king of Kāmarūpa, the memory of which long survived in that region. His son, Mādhavagupta, seems to



have acknowledged the suzerainty of Harsha. The Devagupta who had conquered the Maukhari, Grahavarman, and had been in turn easily defeated by Rājyavardhana, Harsha's brother, probably belonged to this dynasty, but as the line was not continued through him he does not appear in the Apsad inscription. It is probable, since Mādhavagupta was an ally and possibly a vassal of Harsha, that Devagupta was the former's immediate predecessor.

Ādityasena, son of Mādhavagupta, evidently took advantage of the death of Harsha to resume an independent position. The distribution of his inscriptions shows that he ruled in southern and eastern Bihar in the third quarter of the seventh century. As evidence of his sovereign power, he performed the horse-sacrifice, and his inscription claims that his fame extended beyond the seas. To the joint piety of himself, his mother, and his wife we owe the work from which we have our knowledge of the dynasty. The Deo-Baranark inscription of the last known member of the dynasty, Jīvitagupta II, carries on the genealogy from Ādityasena through Devagupta and Vishnugupta, without adding anything definite to our knowledge of the dynasty.

The great rivals of these later Guptas in Magadha were the Maukharis, of whom, again, little is known. They seem to have been of an old family, as a seal survives, inscribed with characters of the third century B.C., and bearing the legend *mokhalinam*, "of the Maukhalis", or Maukharis. The pride with which matrimonial alliance with them is recorded is further evidence of their ancient lineage. Two families of them are known. The more important is that known from the seal of Sarvavarman, which traces his lineage back through Isānavarman, Isvaravarman, and Ādityavarman to Harivarman. From an inscription of his son, Sūryavarman, we learn that Isānavarman was ruling in 611 (i.e. A.D. 554), and that he had conquered the land of the Āndhras, defeated the Sulikas, otherwise unknown, and caused the Gaudas to cease their raids and remain within their own territory. We also learn from an inscription of Ādityasena that Isānavarman suffered a reverse at the hands of Kumāragupta. Ādityavarman's queen, Harshaguptā, was probably a sister of Harshagupta of Magadha; and his son, Isvaravarman, seems also to have married a Gupta princess, Upaguptā. A little later Grahavarman, the

Maukhari king, son of Avantivarman, married Rājyasrī, a sister of Harsha, and from Bāna we learn of the end of the dynasty. Grahavarman was slain by the Gupta king of Mālwa, and his queen cast into prison, and it was in seeking to avenge his brother-in-law that Rājyavardhana was lured into the power of the treacherous Gauda king, Sasānka, and slain. With this our knowledge of the main Maukhari line ends. From a Jaunpur inscription, however, we learn of another branch of the family, Anantavarman, son of Sardulavarman, son of Yajyavarman, probably of minor importance.

## CHAPTER VII

### Harshavardhana

The sources for the history of Harsha's reign are fuller and more numerous than usual. Epigraphy provides two inscriptions, dated A.D. 628 and 631, and an important seal which records his genealogy. A certain amount of light is also thrown on the history of his reign by the inscriptions of certain of his contemporaries, but the space given to his story in text-books of Indian history, while many equally great rulers are dismissed with a line or two, is the consequence of the preservation of two literary sources, the *Harshacharita* of his court poet, Bāna, and the *Travels* of the Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsang. The *Harshacharita* is not by any means an historical work in the modern sense of the term; it is an exercise in a particular literary genre, with an historical instead of a mythological theme. While it thus leaves much to be desired as an historical source, it is, nevertheless, a great deal more than we possess for many rulers of much greater note. The second work, the memoirs of the celebrated Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsang, is unique of its kind. The author spent sixteen years in India, studying, observing, and taking notes; and his accuracy has frequently been confirmed by archaeological research. As he was primarily interested in religion, he does not deal directly with political history, but he could not live for so long a period in various parts of India without noting much that is now of value to us.

The rapid collapse of the Hūna dominion in northern India, and the failure of the Guptas to recover anything like their former prestige, permitted the appearance of a number of new dynasties, including those of Valabhī, the Chālukyas, the Maukharis, the later Guptas, and especially the Vardhanas of Sthānvisvara (Thānesar), who were destined to play an important part in history. Thānesar is an ancient site on the Sarasvatī, a river famous even in Vedic times. The city occupied an important strategical position, and had been the scene of the great battle recorded in the epic between the Kauravas and Pāndavas on the field of Kurukshetra. It was there also that the final decisive battle

between Muslims and Hindus was to be fought. Of the kings who ruled there in the middle of the sixth century little is known. Their genealogy, so far as it is traceable, goes back only to the beginning of the sixth century, and there is no reason to think that the Vardhanas were a ruling family of any importance at an earlier date. If Bāna is to be believed, Harsha was descended from a long line of kings; but the inscriptions of the latter, a much more reliable guide, trace his descent through his father, Prabhākaravardhana, and grandfather, Ādityavardhana, to Rājyavardhana and Naravardhana. The three last-named receive only the feudatory title of mahārāja, so that they must have been of minor importance only. Ādityavardhana's wife, Mahāsenaguptā, was probably a sister of Mahāsenagupta of Magadha. This alliance suggests that Ādityavardhana must have considerably extended his paternal estates. It must also have brought him further advantages, for his son Prabhākaravardhana was no longer a mere mahārāja, but bore the paramount titles of *paramabhattacharaka* and *mahārājadhirāja*, and numerous feudatories paid him homage. Little is known of the circumstances attending his rise to supreme power, but Bāna relates something of his campaigns. He fought successfully against his northern neighbours the Hūnas, as well as the Kushān king of Gandhāra, and the ruler of Sind on the west. He is said also to have been victorious over his neighbours in the south, the Gurjaras, the Lātas, and the king of Mālhwā, who sent his two sons, Kumāragupta and Mādhavagupta, to the court of Thānesar as hostages. Towards the end of his reign, another campaign against the Hūnas became necessary, and the king put his eldest son, Rājyavardhana, in charge of the operations. The latter's younger brother, Harsha, accompanied him part of the way. Meanwhile Prabhākaravardhana fell seriously ill, and the news reaching Harsha first, he returned home. The king's illness proved fatal, the royal physician committed suicide, and the queen, Yasomatī, threw herself on the funeral pyre. This took place in A.D. 605.

Further bad news awaited Rājyavardhana on his return home. A messenger arrived from Kanauj to say that his brother-in-law, the Maukhari, Grahavarman, had been killed, and his sister, Rājyasrī, thrown into prison, by the king of Mālhwā who was on the point of invading Thānesar. Rejecting Harsha's offer to accompany him, Rājyavardhana at once set out against his

enemy. He was victorious, but very soon afterwards was treacherously murdered by Sasānka, king of Gauda, who had invited him to visit him unarmed. Harsha at once determined to avenge his brother. A general named Bhāndi was sent to deliver the imprisoned princess. Finding that she had escaped and had sought refuge in the Vindhya forests, he returned and rejoined Harsha, who then set him to avenge Rājyavardhana's murder while he himself went back to seek his sister. Bāna's work ends with their reunion.

Sasānka may have suffered some reverse at Bhāndi's hands, but he did not lose his life, for we find an inscription of his as late as A.D. 620. The main result of this campaign was an alliance with Bhāskaravarman, king of Kāmarūpa, who thought it advisable to be on good terms with an enemy of his neighbour the king of Gauda. But Harsha's campaign was much more important, ending in the conquest of Mālwā. On his return home, a council of ministers was held to invite Harsha to assume the royal power. This he did only after much persuasion and after consulting an oracle which warned him against formally ascending the throne and assuming royal titles. For the first part of his reign, therefore, he was known as the *kumārārāja* and took the title of *Silāditya*. His age on his assumption of power was probably about eighteen.

The kingdoms adjoining the lands of the young ruler on the south were Mālwā, of which little is recorded, and Valabhī, somewhat better known. The former seems to have been ruled by a branch of the Gupta family, if we may judge by the names of the hostages already mentioned. Still farther south the most important dynasty was that of the Chālukyas, who ruled Mahārāshtra and waged continual warfare on their southern neighbours. In the east, in Magadha, the Maukharis and Guptas divided power, and beyond them lay the kingdoms of Kāmarūpa and Nepāl (both as much under Chinese or Tibetan influence as Indian), together with Samatata and Gauda.

Harsha's first task seems to have been the thorough reorganisation of his army, and the Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsang, has left us many details of its size and constitution. For five consecutive years, he says, the elephants never quitted their harness nor the soldiers their armour. But details of this prolonged warfare are lacking.

An obscure reference in an inscription of Mādhavagupta of

Magadha suggests that he had become a feudatory of Harsha, who must therefore have established his ascendancy over Magadha. According to Bāna, he levied tribute on the Tukhāras, inhabitants of inaccessible, snow-clad mountains, a statement which suggests victories in the far north-west. From the same source we learn that he crushed the king of Sind.

We know from an inscription of Dadda II that Harsha conquered Dhruvasena, king of Valabhī, and restored him only on Dadda's intercession. A clue to the date of this campaign lies in Hiuen Tsang's statement that Dhruvasena, whom he met at Harsha's court, had recently adopted Buddhism. The Chinese pilgrim was at Harsha's court in 640, so that the campaign must have been concluded a year or two earlier. When Harsha came to make a trial of strength with his neighbour in the south, the Chālukya Pulakesin II, one of the greatest rulers of that line, he was less successful. The latter had gradually become supreme in the Deccan and if, as he claims, he had conquered the kings of Lāta, Mālwa and Gurjara, was infringing on Harsha's sphere of influence. It may have been this fact that caused Harsha to take the field against him. All that we know is that Pulakesin was victorious, and Harsha failed to cross the Nerbudda.

From scattered references we learn something of Harsha's foreign relations. Tāranāth records that the king of Persia exchanged gifts with the king of Madhyadesa, *i.e.* with Harsha, and there exists, also, some information about Pulakesin's relations with Persia. Through Hiuen Tsang Harsha established diplomatic relations with China, several embassies being exchanged.

Of the closing years of Harsha we know little, but from the reports of an embassy from China, which arrived in 647, we learn something of the anarchical state of the country immediately after his death. Harsha having died and left no heir, Arjuna, one of his ministers, had seized the throne, and his troops attacked and pillaged the small force accompanying the Chinese ambassador, Wang Hiuen Tse, who escaped to Tibet. There he raised an army of 12,000 men, supported by a contingent of 7000 cavalry from the king of Nepāl, and, returning to India, stormed the usurper's capital, taking it with great slaughter. Arjuna escaped, and, raising a new force, again offered battle, but was captured and carried prisoner to China, whither the victorious Wang Hiuen Tse returned in 648. He is said to have

captured 480 towns in India, and the fear inspired by his advance is reflected in the sending of gifts to him by a king named Kumāra of eastern India, and by the king of Kāmarūpa. There was in India no one capable of following in Harsha's footsteps; his empire, which had depended on him alone, crumbled to pieces, and northern India, falling back into its condition of fifty years earlier, split up once more into a number of petty states. Of these the most important was that of the Guptas of Magadha, whose representative, Ādityasena, seems to have seized the occasion to restore something of the glories of his ancient line. He used the era of Harsha dating from A.D. 605-6.

Indian sources throw little light on Harsha's methods of administration, but something of its nature can be gleaned from Hiuen Tsang, who states that the king was continually travelling up and down his wide dominions to see with his own eyes how the people were ruled. Only in the rainy season did he stay at home. He kept continuously in touch by courier with officials in the remoter provinces. Of the details of the administration we know very little, but the Chinese pilgrim was impressed by the benignity of the government. The country was not too heavily taxed; forced labour was paid for; merchants travelled about freely; the tolls levied on roads and ferries were light; officials were paid regularly. Hiuen Tsang found the Indians a law-abiding people; rebels were punished by being thrown into prison, and left to die; heinous crime was punished by mutilation, and trial by ordeal was much in use. The army was divided into four branches, infantry, cavalry, chariots and elephants, and was recruited only from the bravest men of the kingdom, whose profession was also followed by their sons. Special officials were appointed to keep records of the events of the reign, but no trace of such chronicles has survived. Everything seems to indicate that Harsha ruled his empire as an absolute autocrat without the assistance of the usual ministers. When his hand was withdrawn, the structure therefore collapsed.


Harsha was a Buddhist, and in his later years displayed great enthusiasm for both the theory and the practice of his faith. The charge of intolerance, rare in India, has been brought against him, probably with some justice. He favoured the Mahāyānist against the Hīnāyanist school, and for this reason treated the Chinese pilgrim with honour and convened a great assembly at which

his guest expounded the law. A vivid account of this conference at Kanauj has been left to us by Hiuen Tsang's biographer.

The king himself attended with his ally, the king of Kāmarūpa, and numbers of his feudatories, including his grandson, the king of Valabhī. A feature of the buildings in which the assembly met was a great tower built to house a golden image of Buddha. This tower was almost destroyed by fire, and immediately afterwards an attempt was made to assassinate the king. The would-be assassin confessed that he was the instrument of a plot hatched by Brāhmans, exasperated at the excessive favour shown to Buddhists. The tower had been set on fire by incendiaries, who had hoped to murder the king in the ensuing confusion. Rigorous steps were taken against the conspirators. This indeed seems to have been a period when sectarian feeling ran high in India, for a little earlier Sasānka, a devout Saivite, had destroyed convents, burned the sacred bodhi tree at Gāya, and broken the footprint of Buddha at Patna. The bodhi tree was later replanted by Pūrnavarman, a local rāja who, according to Hiuen Tsang, was a direct descendant of Asoka, to whom the sacred sites of Buddhism had been objects of special care. Harsha's support seems to have had little permanent effect on Buddhism, which undoubtedly suffered a rapid decline after his death, except in the regions where it had long been dominant. Harsha found time to be a patron of literature as well as religion. Three dramas from his pen survive, of which the best known are the *Nāgānanda* and the *Ratnāvalī*, the third being the *Priyadarsikā*. Although these are not the work of a great poet, they show that Harsha had considerable literary talent and that he was a master of the technique of his subject. He also composed his own inscriptions, one of which bears his autograph. Of the literary men at his court the greatest was Bāna, author of the *Harshacharita* and the *Kādambari*. Mayūra, Bāna's father-in-law, has a great reputation in Sanskrit literature, but few of his works have survived. To the same period belongs the Jain poet, Merutunga and the great lyric poet, Bhartrihari. ✓



N. INDIA  
c. 1000 A.D.



## CHAPTER VIII

### Northern India in Medieval Times

The secluded kingdom of Kashmīr has so far produced no inscriptions. It is, however, unique in India in that it possesses a chronicle of its own, the *Rājataranginī* of Kalhana, composed in the middle of the twelfth century and continued by later hands down to the sixteenth century. Until it approaches his own time, Kalhana's work has little real historical value. Kashmīr had been under Maurya rule in the time of Asoka, who built a new capital there. His son Jalauka, a somewhat legendary figure, is said to have founded in Kashmīr an independent kingdom, to which he added conquests in the plains. Several hundred years later Kashmīr formed part of the empire of Kanishka. Not till Hiuen Tsang's visit to it in A.D. 631-3 does its continuous history begin. The Chinese pilgrim does not mention the name of the ruler of his day, who treated him with great respect, but he was probably Durlabhavardhana of the Kārkota family, who came to the throne early in the seventh century and, like his son and successor, Durlabhaka, enjoyed a long reign. During the seventh century the power of Kashmīr was considerably extended by Durlabhaka's sons, Chandrapīda and Muktāpīda, who seem to have acknowledged in some way the suzerainty of the Chinese emperor. Muktāpīda, known also as Lalitāditya, extended his rule far beyond the valley of Kashmīr, conquering part of Kanauj, whose ruler, Yasovarman, he defeated and killed about A.D. 740, and gaining territory at the expense of Tibet and others of his neighbours. He built the Mārtānda Temple of the Sun, the ruins of which still exist. His grandson, Jayāpīda Vinayāditya, who ruled in the middle of the eighth century, is a romantic figure in Kashmīr tradition, and marvellous stories are told of his exploits. It is probable that Kashmīr was still a great power in his reign of some thirty years, the later part of which is said to have been marked by great cruelty and extortion. In the middle of the ninth century the exhausted Kārkota dynasty came to an end, being succeeded by the Utpalas, the first of whom was Avantivarman (A.D. 855-83), who devoted himself to restoring

peace at home rather than to waging wars of aggression abroad. He was assisted by a very able minister named Sūra, who built new towns and carried out great irrigation works. The name of his great engineer, Suyya, to whose work in draining the marshes and protecting the valley from avalanches, Kashmīr owes its fertility, is preserved in the name of the town of Sōpur (Suyyapura), which was founded by him. This king was also a great patron of literature. The death of Avantivarman was followed by a civil war in which Sankaravarman, the rightful heir, ultimately triumphed over his rivals. But he dissipated the resources of the kingdom in foreign wars, in none of which did he achieve any marked success. In one of these wars he met his death in A.D. 902. To meet the expenses of his army, Sankaravarman introduced an elaborate and oppressive system of taxation, which affected every detail of the life of his subjects. Not content with these extortions, he raided the temple treasures, and it is recorded that his extravagance obliged him to reduce the royal patronage till then enjoyed by men of letters. His young son, Gopālavarman, succeeded him but, having displayed an excessive curiosity regarding the conduct of his minister, was disposed of, and his mother, Sugandhā, summoned to the throne. After ruling for two years, she also was deposed by the soldiers (*tantrins*), who were the real power in the land. Her attempt to regain the throne with the help of *ekāngas*, a kind of military police, who were jealous of the power of the *tantrins*, ended in her capture and death in A.D. 914. The country, the nominal ruler of which was a young grandson of Sukhavarman and cousin of Sankaravarman named Nirjitavarman and known as Pangu, was reduced to a pitiable condition by corrupt ministers, themselves in the power of the soldiery. A famine, in which thousands perished, was exploited by those in authority, who sold the available supplies at enormous profits. The *tantrins* placed on the throne whoever would pay them. Finally, in A.D. 936, their power was completely broken by Chakravarman, brother of Nirjitavarman, whose administrative ability was unfortunately not equal to his military prowess. His infatuation for a low-caste dancing girl whom he made his chief queen aroused the horror of the aristocrats, and on a night in A.D. 937 he was surprised and murdered in his palace. Another brother was then placed on the throne, but his cruelty and wickedness passed all bounds. On his death, at which "even his queens

were delighted", in A.D. 939, the Utpala dynasty came to an end, and an assembly of Brāhmins elected a new king, Yasaskara, under whom the land enjoyed a prosperity which it had not known for half a century. On his death in A.D. 948, he was succeeded by his young son, Sangrāmadeva, with a council of ministers as regents. One of these, Parvagupta, murdered the young king and seized the throne. He proved a strong but unpopular ruler, whose short reign was rendered notorious by his extortions. His son, Kshemagupta, inherited only his vices, and was ruled entirely by his queen, Diddā, or rather by her relations, the powerful Lohara family. Her name even appeared on the coinage, and on his death in A.D. 958, she continued to rule for nearly half a century, at first as regent for the young heir, Abhimanyu. Assisted by an able minister, Naravāhana, she suppressed a great rebellion, led by some of her former ministers. On her son's early death, his mother built numerous religious edifices to his memory, but this fit of piety soon passed and she murdered the next two rulers, her grandsons, Nandigupta and Tribhuvana. Finally, in A.D. 975, her surviving grandson, Bhīmagupta, came to the throne but shared the fate of his predecessors as soon as he was old enough to express horror at his grandmother's profligacy. Diddā's last infatuation was for a young man of humble origin and great ability, Tunga, whose rapid rise to power and favour provoked a rebellion led by the queen's nephew. Tunga suppressed this rising, as he did an even more dangerous one led by Prithivīpāla of Rājapur, a vassal of Kashmīr. The queen died in 1003, leaving the throne to her nephew, Sangrāmarāja, through whom it passed to the Lohara family. She had made the new king and Tunga swear to support one another, but the latter was old and worn-out, and one or two failures, notably the defeat of the army sent to help the Shāhis against Mahmūd of Ghaznī, encouraged his enemies, who succeeded with the king's connivance in murdering him. The country could ill afford to lose him.

A brighter period began with the accession of Ananta in 1028. Early in his reign his extravagance involved him in financial difficulties, but his queen, Sūryamatī, took control, paid his debts, and placed in office a number of able and honest ministers. The country was thus well-governed, and Ananta was tempted to launch out on a career of conquest. At first he met with some success, but the later part of his reign saw defeat abroad and

trouble at home, and he was persuaded to abdicate in favour of his son Kalasa, though retaining control through his able minister, Haladhara. Kalasa, however, proved worthless. In spite of his clever mother's devotion to him, he turned against his parents, who were saved only by the loyalty of part of the army. His further acts of cruelty and ingratitude finally drove Ananta to commit suicide and the old queen to join her husband on the funeral pyre. The shock of his parents' death reformed Kalasa, who proceeded to establish order at home and to make the name of Kashmīr respected abroad. In his later years he had trouble with his capable and versatile son, Harsha, who was led by his father's want of generosity to conspire against him. The discovery of this conspiracy was an overwhelming blow to Kalasa. He imprisoned his son, but himself soon lapsed into the bad habits of his youth, thus hastening his end. Before he died in 1089, he appointed as his successor his second son, Utkarsha. Harsha, still in prison, was saved by the rebellion of the new king's half-brother, Vijayamalla. Being released to assist Utkarsha against the rebel, he seized the throne and imprisoned his brother, who terminated his three weeks' reign by committing suicide. Harsha, singularly gifted both physically and mentally, is one of the greatest figures in the history of Kashmīr. A patron of literature and architecture, he was also an innovator and a leader of fashion. He was at first successful both at home and abroad but in the course of time his character deteriorated. His extravagance led him to plunder the temples, which he wantonly desecrated; his foreign policy brought down on him a number of reverses; and the cost of his military enterprises forced him to impose excessive taxation. A rebellion broke out under the leadership of powerful nobles. At first unsuccessful, the rebels then summoned Uchchala, an able general whom Harsha had wrongfully exiled, to return and lead them against the tyrant. Though Uchchala was routed by Harsha, the latter had at once to turn his attention to a new danger, an invasion led by Sussala, Uchchala's brother. In the fighting that followed Harsha's resistance was gradually worn down by the two invaders. His son, Bhoja, who had ably assisted him in the defence, was killed, and Harsha himself met his death in 1101, being discovered, while hiding in a village, by some of Uchchala's men. Thus ended a career which had begun with such splendour and promise. The events of his reign are described

with first-hand knowledge by Kalhana, the historian, who was the son of one of his faithful supporters.

Uchchala, having seized the throne of Kashmīr, made his brother, Sussala, ruler of Lohara. He was an able ruler, generous and considerate to the poor. After successfully resisting an attempt by Sussala to dethrone him, he was at last murdered in his palace one evening in 1111 by a certain Radda, who claimed the throne as a descendant of Yasaskara. The death of the usurper after a brief reign brought to the throne Uchchala's step-brother Salhana. But the real power lay in the hands of a noble named Gargachandra, by whose favour and assistance Sussala obtained the throne, Salhana being deposed and imprisoned. After a long struggle, Sussala was driven from Kashmīr by Bhikshāchāra, Harsha's grandson, who had escaped from Uchchala's control and been brought up at the Paramāra court. The new master of Kashmīr gave himself up to voluptuous pleasures, and in six months Sussala easily recovered his capital. Bhikshāchāra was by no means disposed of, however, but remained a thorn in Sussala's side for some six years. The country suffered greatly during these changes, for the horrors of civil war were accentuated by famine. In 1123 Sussala crowned his son, Jayasimha, king, but, on second thoughts, he retained the power in his own hands until, in 1128, he was treacherously murdered. Jayasimha's tact secured such support from the people that he was able to hold the throne for nearly thirty years. But his success was due to his diplomatic, rather than to his military, ability, and he lost for a while the ancestral domain of Lohara through the success of a rebellion led by Salhana's brother, Lothana, who routed the army sent against him. Lothana, though an able ruler, was deposed by a less competent nephew, who proved no match for Jayasimha, and the latter soon regained his lost territory. A few years later, he was also able, by his own diplomacy and the military skill of his generals, to withstand a series of attacks by disaffected vassals aided by large Muhammadan contingents. He died in 1155, having passed his later years in comparative peace. His son, Paramānuka, enjoyed an uneventful reign of ten years, and, with the death in 1172 of Vantideva, his son and successor, the Lohara dynasty came to an end. Among the incompetent rulers who followed, the historian has a word of praise for Jagaddeva (1198-1213). The thirteenth century, of which we

have little record, appears to have been a period of civil war and anarchy. A return of peace and prosperity in the reign of Suhadeva (1301-20) was cut short by the invasion of a large Muhammadan army from the east under a leader called Dulucha, who cleared the country of able-bodied men, carrying them off as slaves. Wherever the Muslim army went, it left desolation behind it, while a Tibetan invasion made similar havoc in the north. On Suhadeva's death, Rinchana, the Tibetan leader, seized the throne, and married his daughter, Kotādevī. He ruled the country well and justly until he was murdered in 1323. Sāhamera (Shāh Mīr), an able Muslim who had been in Suhadeva's service and had risen to be Rinchana's trusted adviser, then became the real power in the land. He placed on the throne as a *roi fainéant*, a member of the Tibetan's family, named Udayanadeva, and married him to Rinchana's widow. On her husband's death, the queen endeavoured to snatch the reins of state out of the hand of the powerful Sāhamera. The latter, however, soon discovered her scheme and forced her to marry him and share with him her rights. But no sooner was the ceremony over than he threw her into prison and seized the throne, assuming the title of Shams-ud-dīn. With his accession in 1339 Hindu rule in Kashmir came to an end, although the kingdom retained its independence until the reign of Akbar.

The ancient kingdom of Nepāl, which comprised only the Nepāl valley and not the extensive mountainous region now known by the name, has always remained independent of India, and in its external relations it has been connected rather with China and Tibet. It has, however, from time to time, made contact with India. Asoka is said to have visited the valley when making his pilgrimage to the holy places of Buddhism. He built there a new capital called Lalitaparan, and his daughter remained in the country as a nun in a convent which she herself built. Stupas and other buildings are still pointed out, the foundation of which is attributed to the great Buddhist emperor and his daughter. More historically precise is the assertion in Samudragupta's Allāhābād inscription, that the king of Nepāl was one of the frontier kings who acknowledged his suzerainty and paid him tribute. It is probable that Nepāl did not own his sway in the same degree as some of the other states mentioned in this

inscription, but in view of the fact that Samudragupta's mother was a Lichchhavi princess, and that a Lichchhavi dynasty ruled Nepāl at this time, it is not impossible that Chandragupta I had defeated the ruler of Nepāl, and received one of his daughters in marriage, according to Indian custom when peace was made.

Nepāl possesses numerous local chronicles, which are, however, of little historical value for the early period; and their chronology, when it can be checked, is unreliable. About the beginning of the Christian era, the valley was ruled by the Kirāṭa family, which was succeeded by the Somavansī dynasty. Concerning their successors, the Lichchhavis or Sūryavamsīs, more accurate information is available. Inscriptions of this period survive, dated in an era, the beginning of which, though uncertain, must have been about A.D. 110, the date suggested by Sylvain Lévi. The exact relationship of this Lichchhavi dynasty to the ancient family of the name is not known. In the seventh century A.D. the power of the Lichchhavi ruler, Sivadeva, gradually passed into the hands of Amsuvarman, a powerful and capable minister, whose name is associated, in the inscriptions, with that of Sivadeva and who married the daughter of his master, of whom nothing further is known. Amsuvarman's own inscriptions are dated in a new era, the source of which is disputed. He appears to have acknowledged the suzerainty of Tibet, and is mentioned by the Chinese historians, either on this account or by reason of his great reputation. He is identified with the Nepalese king who had died just before Hiuen Tsang visited India. On his death (c. 645) his successor, Jishnugupta, resumed the use of the old Lichchhavi era, but was apparently not a member of the old family, although his successor certainly was, and the Lichchhavis ruled for at least another century.

Little is known of Nepāl history in the later part of the seventh, and during the eighth, ninth and tenth centuries. Its rulers acknowledged the suzerainty of Tibet till after the middle of the ninth century, and it is probable that the new Nepāl era, which began in A.D. 879, marks the end of foreign domination. From the eleventh century it is possible to establish accurate genealogical lists, although little is known of political events. The country seems to have been prosperous. Lying on the route joining China, Tibet and India, it became the home of rich and prosperous merchants in control of the traffic. Commerce began to play



a large part in the life of what had been hitherto a purely agricultural community. Gunakāmadeva, who is reputed to have reigned for sixty years in the ninth century, is said to have been fabulously wealthy.

In the middle of the eleventh century Nepāl was brought into ruder contact with the outside world. The Chālukya, Somesvara II, reckoned Nepāl among his vassals, and other references to successes in Nepāl exist in inscriptions of rulers of the Deccan. How far these references show that Nepāl was directly affected by the expeditions of the Chālukya, Vikramāditya VI, into north-eastern India we do not know; but one of his soldiers seems, like the ancestor of the Senas, to have settled in Bengal, where, a century later, his descendant, Nānyadeva (the name seems to be Canarese), was securely established at Tīrhut, whence he extended his power over Nepāl, or a considerable part of it. After his defeat and capture by Vijayasena of Bengal, his descendants continued to rule in Tīrhut, but possessed no influence in Nepāl, where, in the first quarter of the twelfth century, a soldier named Sivadeva took advantage of the troubled times to win the country and throne for himself.

In the reign of Tughluk I of Delhi (1320-5), Nepāl came into contact with the Muhammadans, when they destroyed the little kingdom of Tīrhut and sacked its capital, Simraon, where a descendant of Nānyadeva still reigned—probably the Harisimha of the Nepalese chroniclers. In the early fifteenth century the Chinese annalists record an exchange of embassies with the king of Nepāl. In the thirteenth century a new dynasty, the Mallas, came to the throne, and their descendants ruled Nepāl until the Gurkha conquest in 1768, despite the division of the kingdom among his heirs by Yakshamalla about 1470.

In early times the modern province of Assam formed the centre of a much larger kingdom, frequently mentioned in the epics and *Purānas*, and known as Kāmarūpa, with its capital of Prāgjyotishapura, one of the great cities of ancient India. Local tradition traces the descent of its kings from the mythical Naraka, who is dated about 2700 B.C. But the first known historical event in the history of Kāmarūpa is its conquest—the completeness of which can only be surmised—by Samudragupta who, in his Allāhābād inscription, numbers its ruler among the frontier kings who paid him homage. The suzerainty of Samudragupta may

have been more than nominal, for the king of Assam believed to have been his contemporary called himself Samudravarman, apparently after the great emperor, while their wives were both called Dattadevī. But in any case relations with the Guptas were not always friendly, for Ādityasena's Aphsad inscription records that Mahāsenagupta routed Susthitavarman in a battle fought on the Lauhitya or Brahmaputra. More is known about Susthitavarman's son, Bhāskaravarman, also referred to as Kumāra by the Chinese writers, whom the attacks of Sasānka, king of Gauda, forced to seek an alliance with Harsha. Bāna has preserved an account of the honours with which Harsha welcomed Bhāskaravarman's embassy on that occasion. He evidently enjoyed a long reign, for, while the overtures to Harsha were made quite early in the latter's reign, probably about A.D. 610, he was still reigning when Hiuen Tsang visited his capital in A.D. 643, and five years later he assisted the Chinese general, Wang Hiuen Tse, to destroy Arjuna, who had usurped the throne of Thānesar. The fact that his Nidhanpur copper-plates, tracing his genealogy for some three hundred years back to Pushyavarman, are dated from his camp in Karnasuvarna, once held by Sasānka, suggests that he had been able to take advantage of the deaths of Harsha and the Gauda king to extend his territory. The line of Pushyavarman seems to have been displaced soon after the reign of Bhāskaravarman, which probably ended about A.D. 650, by a certain Sālastambha, whose descendants held power till they in turn were overthrown by a dynasty founded by Prālabha, which became extinct when its last representative Tyāgasinha died childless about the beginning of the eleventh century. The dated inscriptions of this period contain nothing of historical importance and raise, without settling, a number of chronological and genealogical problems. A Pāla inscription, however, states that the king of Prāgjyotisha (Assam) owed some kind of allegiance to Jayapāla.

On Tyāgasinha's death, the throne was filled by the election of a certain Brahmapāla, whose son, Ratnapāla, boasted of many victories. He claims to have triumphed over the Gurjara king, the lord of Gauda (*i.e.* the Pāla king), the lord of Kerāla (presumably the Chola Rājendra I), the lord of the Deccan (that is, the Chālukya, Vikramāditya VI, who did in fact invade Kāmarūpa in one of his northern expeditions in his father's reign), and the

Bāhikas and Taikas (presumably marauding bands of Muslims). He was succeeded by his grandson Indrapāla, of whom, as of the later members of this dynasty, little is known.

Assam became involved in Muhammadan expansion in the thirteenth century. The disastrous expedition of Muhammad ibn Bakhtiyār to Tibet in 1205 was undertaken against the advice of the "Rai of Kāmṛūd", i.e. king of Kāmarūpa. The Muslims insisted on advancing into Tibet at an unsuitable season of the year. They reached Tibet exhausted, and were at once expelled by superior forces. In the meantime the Assamese had destroyed a bridge on the only route of return, and there attacked the Muslims who were either killed or driven into the river. Only a hundred escaped of the 10,000 who had set out. Assam itself was invaded by the Muslims in 1258, but after some initial success, the attempt ended in disaster. Equally unsuccessful was the great expedition of Mīr Jumla in the middle of the seventeenth century. In the thirteenth century the line founded by Brahmapāla was brought to an end by the Āhom conquest, which established a powerful kingdom lasting till the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Of the history of the Kābul valley and the old province of Gandhāra little is known from the decline of the great Kushān empire in the third century A.D. Al-Bīrūnī states that it was governed by a dynasty of sixty rulers who bore the title *Shāhi*, a word which is related to the old Kushān form, *Shao*, king. He calls them Turks, or Turushkas, so that they probably traced their descent from the Kushāns. The Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsang, notes that this region was ruled by a *kshatriya*, whom the Arab historians of the wars of the seventh and eighth centuries call *ratbīl*, a title which has not yet been explained. Nothing is recorded of the history of this long line of *Shāhis* until the last of them, Lagatūrmān, who reigned at the end of the ninth century. He was thrown into prison by his minister, a Brāhman named Kallār, who usurped the throne, and founded a new dynasty, the names of whose members are recorded by al-Bīrūnī, as Sāmānd (Sāmanta), Kamalū, Bhīm (Bhīma), Jaipāl (Jayapāla), Ānandapāla, Tarojanapāla (Trilochanapāla) and Bhīmapāla. Coins of some of these survive to corroborate the Arab chronologist's account.

The Kashmīr chronicler, Kalhana, throws some additional light

on the history of this dynasty of Brāhman Shāhis. Sankaravarman, ruler of Kashmīr in the last quarter of the ninth century, sent against "Alakhāna, king of Gurjara", an expedition which was victorious in spite of the support given to his enemy by Lalliya Shāhi. A few years later Prabhākaradeva, minister of Gopālarman, deposed the Shāhi ruler of Udabhāndapura (Wahind, Ohind, Und), and set up the latter's son, Toramāna, in his stead, giving him the new name of Kamaluka—the Kamalū of al-Bīrūnī. Lalliya is apparently to be identified with the Kallār of al-Bīrūnī, and the difference in form has been explained as a copyist's error in the text of the unique Arabic manuscript of the *Indica*; the Arab writer's Sāmānd is the Sāmantadeva of the coins, and he is probably the unnamed father of Toramāna referred to by Kalhana. Bhīma, the next ruler in al-Bīrūnī's list, is known to the Kashmīr chronicler as the grandfather of Queen Diddā of Kashmīr. He was still ruling about A.D. 950, for he built a temple in Kashmīr in the reign of Kshemagupta. The name of the next ruler, Jayapāla, is not mentioned by Kalhana, but we learn from Arabic sources of his struggle against the Ghaznavids. When the pressure of the Muslims drove him out of the Kābul valley, he chose Bhātinda, in the modern Patiala state, as his capital because it was the best centre from which to organise the defence of the Panjab. The Arabs describe him as "ruler of Hindustan" and a very powerful king. Sabuktigīn conducted several raids into Hindu territory, and finally a great battle was fought on the frontier in which the Muslims had the advantage. A truce was arranged and Jayapāla retired to his own territory. But he soon began to break the terms of the truce and to ill-treat the representatives of the Muslim power. The Muslims then prepared to punish him. Jayapāla appealed for help to his neighbours in the south, and obtained from them large contingents and much money. With a great force he assumed the offensive, but the well-disciplined and ably led Muslim troops of Sabuktigīn routed the unwieldy Hindu army, and Jayapāla was forced to retreat and to cede further territory to the Ghaznavid. In A.D. 998 Mahmūd came to the throne of Ghaznī and soon made plans for an invasion of India. In 1001 he completely routed Jayapāla, taking vast booty and many prisoners, including the king himself. A huge ransom was paid for him, but after this disgrace he was not restored to the throne. His son, Ānandapāla, suc-

ceeded to his much diminished territory and Jayapāla died soon afterwards. The new ruler refused Mahmūd's demand of passage through his territory and resisted valiantly, but in the end Mahmūd forced his way through in spite of the assistance sent to Ānandapāla by the neighbouring Hindu kings. Immense quantities of booty were taken by Mahmūd on this campaign, notably at the sack of Kāngra. About 1014 Ānandapāla was succeeded by his son, Trilochanapāla, who appealed for help against the Muslims to Sangrāmadeva of Kashmīr (1003-28). The Kashmīr general who was sent to his assistance neglected his advice in the encounter which followed, with the result that he was routed and not even the bravery of Trilochanapāla could avert defeat. The Shāhi maintained a hopeless resistance for some time, until finally he fell in 1021, and with him the dynasty came to an end. His son, Bhīmapāla, was killed a few years later, and so thoroughly was the Shāhi house extinguished that thirty years later Kalhana says that men wondered if it had ever really existed. Al-Bīrūnī also remarks on the completeness of the disappearance of the Hindu Shāhis and pays a high tribute to their nobility of character. Younger members of the family took refuge at the court of Kashmīr, where they gained a high reputation as brave soldiers, though with a passion for intrigue.

Indian sources afford no information regarding the history of the lower Indus valley after the Kushān period. From scanty and obscure references in the Arab historians of the early Arab invasions of Sind in the seventh century A.D. we learn that, shortly before the Arabs became interested in the region, there had been a change of dynasty. The Rāi dynasty, which had reigned for 137 years, consisted of five kings, the last of whom was Rāi Sāhasī. On his death his minister, a Brāhman named Chach, married the widowed queen and succeeded to the throne, thus founding a new dynasty. His wide dominions stretched to the borders of Kashmīr. His victory over a king whom the Arabs call Mahrat of Jaipur is recorded. He had a long reign and was succeeded by his brother, Chandra, and then by his son, Dāhir, who met his death in the Arab conquest of Muhammad ibn Kāsim in A.D. 712. Hiuen Tsang, who visited Sind in the reign of Chach, says that its ruler was a Sūdra and a Buddhist, a statement difficult to reconcile with the Arab story of a Brāhman

ruler. The Arabs had been attacking Sind for seventy years before they finally conquered it. It is probable that many Hindu chiefs remained as local rulers, acknowledging Arab suzerainty. From time to time the Arabs undertook campaigns into India from their base in Sind. The great governor Junaid not only put down a Hindu rising led by a son of Dāhir, the last Chach ruler, but carried Arab arms as far as Ujjain and defeated the Gurjaras. The Lāta Chālukya, Pulakesin, records his defeat of an Arab army which had reached his lands, and Nāgabhatta, the founder of the Gurjara power, is recorded to have turned back a Mlechcha invader, perhaps the expedition of Junaid already mentioned. The Gurjaras certainly formed a bulwark against the Arab advance, and for this reason the Arabs cultivated the friendship of the rival clan of the Rāshtrakūtas of Mānyakheta (the Balharās). The Arab rulers of Sind treated the Hindus with a tolerance not shown by later Muslim conquerors. In the eleventh century Upper Sind passed into the hands of the Ghaznavids, while Lower Sind seems to have become independent under a local Sumra dynasty, which is given an Arab pedigree but is believed to have been Rājput. The Sumras governed with more or less success for three hundred years, until they were finally supplanted by the Sammas, who ruled Sind till its conquest by Akbar. In the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries they suffered from occasional attempts of the Delhi sultans to exert the suzerainty which they claimed over Sind, but towards the end of that period they became completely independent. They bore the title of Jām, which still remains in use in western India.

The sources for the history of the Paramāra dynasty, which ruled in Mālwa from the ninth to the eleventh century, consist of an inscription preserved at Udayapur in the Bhilsa district of Gwalior State, another at Nāgpur, several land grants, and one literary source, the *Navasāhasāṅkacharita* of Padmagupta.

The dynasty claimed descent from Paramāra, "slayer of enemies", the hero who was created by Vasishtha out of the fire-pit to help him to win back his cow. The first historical king of the Paramāras, however, was Upendra, also known as Krishna-rāja. The family belonged to the region of Mount Ābu, where they held the fortress of Achalgadh, with their capital at Chandravali, a few miles to the south-east. Little is known of Upendra,

but he is said to have achieved kingship by valour, from which we may infer that he was the first of the family to enlarge his territory and win renown beyond the original limits of the family estates. He conquered Mālhwā early in the ninth century. Of the next three kings, Vairasimha, Siyaka I, and Vākpati I, nothing is known, and of the next, Vairasimha II, it is recorded only that he was also called Vajratasvāmin. His successor is variously called Srī-Harshadeva, Siyaka, and Simhabhata. His full name was probably Harshasimha, Siyaka being a Prākṛit corruption of Simhaka. He conquered the land of Radūpātī, and overcame a king of the Hūnas, then a Kshatriya tribe, though they may formerly have been Huns. He also carried off by force the wealth of King Khottiga, presumably a Rāshtrakūta king of Mānyakheta. Further evidence of the hostility between these dynasties is found in Dhanapāla's *Paiyalachchi*, which states that Mānyakheta was "plundered by the lord of Mālhwā" in A.D. 972. Harshasimha's son was Vākpati II, known as Munja, Amoghavarsha, or Prithivī-vallabha, who is celebrated as a poet and patron of literature. His panegyrist describes him as a great soldier also, and claims that he conquered the Karnātas, Lātas, Kerālas and Cholas, and defeated Yuvarāja, the Kālachuri king of Chedi. He can hardly have come into contact with either the Kerālas or the Cholas, but that he won a victory over the Lātas of central Gujarāt is not improbable. Victorious in six campaigns against the Chālukya king, Tailapa II, in a seventh, against the advice of his minister, he crossed the Godāvarī into Chālukya territory, where he was captured and ultimately put to death, after an unsuccessful attempt to escape, about A.D. 995; Chālukya inscriptions also record this success of the Chālukya arms. Vākpati II Munja was succeeded by his younger brother, Sindhurāja, called Navasāhasānka, whose exploits are recorded by his court poet, Padmagupta. He defeated a king of the Hūnas, and his biographer claims for him victories over Kosala, Vagada, Lāta and the Muralas. If the last name is used definitely for the Kerālas in particular, and not vaguely for the Dravidian kingdoms in general, the statement can hardly be correct. It probably implies little more than that hostilities continued between Mālhwā and the Chālukyas of Kalyāni. Sindhurāja was succeeded by his son, Bhoja, the best known member of the dynasty, who reigned for forty years. The sources emphasise his literary versatility, and many of his

works still survive. These include writings on politics and architecture, and he is said to have been an extensive builder. Extravagant claims are made in the Udayapur inscription regarding the extent of his kingdom, which, far from extending from the Himālaya to Malabar, as is asserted, can scarcely have exceeded the limits of modern Mālwa. He is further alleged to have conquered the land of Chedi, Bhīma king of the Gurjaras, the land of Lāta, the Karnātas and the Turushkas. But with regard to his war with the Karnātas, that is, the old enemy of the Paramāras, the Chālukyas of Kalyāni, an inscription of the Chālukya Jayasimha III, of the year 1019-20, asserts that he defeated Bhoja and put to flight the confederacy of Mālwa, and it is certain that the Chālukyas suffered no serious reverse during this reign. Any victory won by Bhoja must therefore have been greatly magnified by his panegyrist. We also learn from Bilhana of a later defeat of Bhoja by Jayasimha's successor, Somesvara II, who stormed Dhārā and forced Bhoja to seek safety in flight. Bhoja's victory over the Chaulukya of Anhilwār, Bhīma I, is recorded by Merutunga. While Bhīma was away fighting in Sind, Bhoja sent an army which succeeded in capturing his capital. Of his other campaigns nothing is known. Two were waged with old enemies of the dynasty, while the Turushkas were presumably a raiding force of Muhammadans sent out by Mahmūd of Ghaznī on one of his Indian campaigns. Bhoja seems to have been involved in fighting to the end of his reign for, according to Merutunga, he was either slain or else he died during a combined attack on him by Karna, king of Chedi, and Bhīma I, a statement which does not find the corroboration which might be expected from the panegyrists of these two rulers. He reigned from about 1010 to 1065. Of his successor Udayāditya the panegyrist tells us that he freed his country from the enemies who had conquered it, or had been threatening it, at the time of his predecessor's death. It was presumably after him that the dynasty began to sink into the insignificant position it seems to have occupied in the twelfth century.

With the rise of the kingdom of Anhilwār (Anahilavāda) in the eighth century, it becomes possible to give a fairly continuous account of the history of Gujarāt, relating to which a number of writings of an historical nature are available. In the early part



of the century a line of petty chiefs, known as the Chāvādās of Panchāsar in Vadhiār, began to come to the front. The stories told of Jayasekhara, the father of Vanarāja and founder of the dynasty, are more or less mythical. Vanarāja, a posthumous child brought up in exile by an uncle, collected enough men and money by brigandage to establish himself securely in the spot which afterwards became the great town of Anhilwār. He was installed as a sovereign ruler about A.D. 765. A statue at Sidhpur probably represents him. Of his successors little is known, but the throne remained in the family till the tenth century, the last Chāvādā being slain in A.D. 961 by his nephew and son-in-law, Mūlarāja, who seized the little kingdom of Anhilwār. Mūlarāja belonged to the Chaulukya or Solanki family; the former is a learned and the latter a popular variant of the well known name Chālukya, but the connection between the Chaulukyas and the great Deccan family of the name is not known. Mūlarāja soon began to expand his power and, according to the Jain historians, became the greatest figure of the dynasty. He conquered Kachch and Kāthiāwār in the south, and won victories over the kings of Lāta in southern Gujarāt and Ajmir in the north. Bārappa, the king of Lāta, was killed in the course of the war with Mūlarāja, but the campaign against the king of Ajmir seems to have been less successful. Mūlarāja also attacked an Ābhīra ruler who had been interfering with pilgrims to the shrine of Somnāth at Prabhāsa, and took this "cow-eating barbarian" prisoner. Another of his victims was Lākha, a son of the king of Kachch, whom he finally slew, after having been defeated by him several times. After a life of fighting and conquest, Mūlarāja devoted his last years to good works. He built numerous temples, and gathered at his court learned men from other lands. He is said to have voluntarily ended his life on the funeral pyre; in any case he died about A.D. 996, and was succeeded by his son, Chāmunda, who had distinguished himself in his father's wars, but of whom as king nothing is known except that he reigned until 1010. The success of his son, Durlabha, at a *svayamvara* attracted the enmity of the rejected suitors, but he was as successful in the field as in love. Durlabha's nephew, Bhīma I, succeeded him in 1022, and seems to have further extended the power of the dynasty. He conducted a successful campaign against the king of Sind, but, while he was thus engaged, Kulachandra, a

general of the Paramāra king, Bhoja, pillaged Anhilwār so thoroughly that the phrase "the sack of Anhilwār" became proverbial.

The great event of this reign was the destruction of the great temple of Somnāth (Somanātha) in Prabhāsa, by Mahmūd of Ghaznī in 1024, recorded in detail by the Muslim historians. The idol, Somnāth, was said to be the most revered of all the idols of India, and its shrines had been enriched for centuries by the Hindu rulers of the surrounding country. In 1024, on his tenth raid into India, Mahmūd set out for Anhilwār. At his approach Bhīma fled, and Mahmūd pushed on through the desert until he reached the coast and the strong fortifications of the sacred city. The first onslaught of the Muslims lasted a whole day but was unsuccessful, and the attack was renewed next morning. Finally they forced their way into the town, and the Hindus made their final stand before the temple, which they defended valiantly till they fell, the few who tried to escape by sea being pursued and put to the sword or drowned. Mahmūd burned part of the great idol, and carried part to Ghaznī, where he made of it a step at the entrance to the principal mosque. Fifty thousand Hindus were slain in the storming of the town, and booty valued at over two million dinars was taken.

After taking Somnāth, Mahmūd marched against Bhīma, who had taken refuge in the fortress of Khandahat, some 250 miles away, and drove him from his stronghold. After the conqueror's return to Ghaznī, Bhīma began to rebuild the temple of Somnāth. It is recorded that he defeated the Paramāra ruler of Ābu, who surrendered Chitrakūta to him. He died in 1064 and was succeeded by Karna, who devoted his energies mainly to public works. After a troubled reign of thirty years, he was succeeded by his son, Siddharāja, who was still a minor, the real power being exercised by his mother, Miyānalladevī. On reaching manhood, Siddharāja made a state pilgrimage to Somnāth, commemorating it by remitting the taxes levied on the pilgrims, an act which must have involved a considerable loss of revenue. He was a great builder, and local tradition ascribes to him everything of architectural importance in the country. After a successful campaign in Surāshtra, he became involved in a great war with the Paramāra, Naravarman, which dragged on for twenty years. The Paramāra capital was finally taken, and Yasovarman,

who had succeeded his father on the Paramāra throne, was taken to Anhilwār and imprisoned in a cage. To celebrate his conquest of Mālwā, Siddharāja assumed the title "lord of Avantī". His next war was with the famous king, Madanavarman, of the Chandel dynasty, but against him he does not seem to have gained any remarkable success. Siddharāja died in 1143, leaving no heir, and the throne passed from this branch of the family to another descendant of Bhīma I, named Kumārapāla. During Siddharāja's reign, he had been obliged to flee the country to avoid the king's alleged designs against him, leaving his brother-in-law, Krishnadeva, to watch over his interests during his exile. On succeeding to the throne, Kumārapāla proved himself a capable ruler. He was uniformly successful in his campaigns against his neighbours, notably over Mallikarjuna, king of the Konkan, and the king of Surāshtra. He found time to restore much of the great shrine of Somnāth, where the remains of his work can still be seen. He was also a patron of learning and a great benefactor of the Jains. His chief minister was the celebrated Hemachandra, the most learned man of his time. Kumārapāla died in 1174 at a great age, and was succeeded by his nephew, Ajayapāla, whose cruelties were soon brought to an end by his assassination in 1177. Of his successors, Mūlarāja II and Bhīmarāja, little is recorded, but it is clear that the power of the dynasty declined, and that the government of the country gradually passed into the hands of the Vāghelas, who had been ministers of the Chalukyas and traced their descent from Anaka, the son of a sister of the Solankī, Kumārapāla.

Anaka's son, Lavanaprasāda, a minister of Bhīmadeva II, extended the estates of the Vāghela family and gradually became independent of his sovereign, whose reign over the northern portion of the Chalukya kingdom lasted till 1242. Lavanaprasāda's ambitions were opposed by Yādava Singhana of Devagiri. But the latter was completely routed, and forced to conclude a treaty which rendered the Vāghela ruler free from aggression on the south. In 1232 Lavanaprasāda abdicated in favour of his son, Vīradhavalā, who, in the course of his six years' reign, conducted a number of successful campaigns, and won a great victory over a Muslim force led by the Ghūrid sultān Bahrām Shāh of Delhi. Vīradhavalā's son, Vīsaladeva (1243-61), boasted himself a great warrior, devouring the armies of the

Yādavas like fire. His good administration did much to alleviate the miseries of a three years' famine which afflicted the country in his reign. He completed the establishment of Vāghela rule throughout Gujarāt, but the power of the dynasty seems to have weakened in the next two reigns, until, in the time of Karnadeva (1296-1304), the Muslims made an easy conquest of the country. A Muslim army under Nasrat Khān occupied Anhilwār in 1287, and Karnadeva, abandoning his wives, his children, and all his wealth, took refuge with the Yādava king of Devagiri. The Muslims continued their successes, taking Cambay and once more destroying the temple of Somnāth. In this campaign there was captured in Cambay a slave named Malik Kāfūr, who afterwards became a great general of the sultans of Delhi. The fate of Karnadeva is unknown, but Gujarāt remained thenceforth under Muslim rule.

Though the Hūnas founded no lasting kingdoms, another invading people was destined to prosper and for five centuries to play a considerable part in the history of northern India. These were the Gurjaras, a people of central Asian origin, whose name still survives in such place-names as Gujarāt. The Gurjaras probably invaded India soon after the Hūnas, in conjunction with whom they are mentioned, although always distinguished from them in early references. But as the name is not included in Skandagupta's references to the Hūnas, the inference is that they arrived a little later. They seem to have settled first in the Panjab, although detailed information regarding them begins only after they reached Rājputāna. The earliest specific reference to the Gurjaras is found in Bāna's *Harshacharita*, in which it is stated that Harsha's father, Prabhākaravardhana, was a terror to the Hūnas, Gurjaras, Lātas and Mālavas. The Aihole inscription (A.D. 634) of the great Chālukya, Pulakesin II, records his triumphs over the Lātas, Mālavas and Gurjaras, so that the Gurjara kingdom must have lain in the same region as those of the Lātas and Mālavas. A few years later Hiuen Tsang visited the kingdom, the capital of which is identified as the modern Bhilmal.

The history of the Gurjaras has been traced, however, mainly from their own inscriptions and only since these inscriptions have been fully understood has the greatness of the Gurjaras been

realised. The inscriptions deal mainly with one clan, the Pratihāras, who seem early to have taken the lead among their fellows.

We have already seen that hostility existed between the Gurjaras and the kings of Thānesar, and that Harsha and his father were apparently able to frustrate all their attempts at expansion. But, with the complete collapse of Harsha's empire after his death, this obstacle to their southward progress disappeared.

Their first great leader was Harichandra, and from him and his Kshatriya queen, Bhadra, the Pratihāra dynasty traced its descent. From another wife, an unnamed Brāhman woman, were descended the Parihāra Brāhmins, and medieval genealogists found an ancestor for the family in Lakshmana, who had acted as door-keeper (*pratihāra*) to his brother Rāma. By the time of Harichandra the Gurjaras must have adopted Hinduism in its entirety, for he is said to have lived at first the quiet, rural life of the learned Brāhman teacher. But, when the opportunity came, presumably in the turmoil following on the death of Harsha, he displayed and developed the remarkable military talents till then latent in him. Details of Harichandra's conquests are wanting, but he evidently occupied considerable territory in Rājputāna. Five of his sons are mentioned in inscriptions. They conquered Mandyapura (Mandor), and built a stronghold there. Harichandra's successor was Rajjila. Two generations later the family divided into two ruling branches. The main Bhāndi or Jodhpur stock retained its former possessions, while Rajjila's grandson, Nāgabhata I, settled at Medantaka and established the Avantī branch of kings.

In Broach and other parts of southern Gujarāt Harichandra's younger brother, Dadda I, set up a subordinate state, of which the most famous ruler was Dadda II. A number of inscriptions survive relating to this branch of the family. The territory which it ruled seems to have been gained at the expense of the Kālachuris, and its further advance into the Lāta country probably brought it into conflict with Pulakesin II, as has already been mentioned. In view of Harsha's designs on the south, Pulakesin probably came to some agreement with the Gurjaras in order to prevent them from lending their support to the invader; and this understanding between Pulakesin and the Gurjaras perhaps explains why the king of Valabhī, Dharasena IV, fled for protection from

Harsha to the Gurjara of Broach, Dadda II, and why the latter was able to negotiate terms with Harsha on his behalf. After the collapse of Harsha's empire, Dadda III is stated to have fought "the kings of east and west", and an inscription of Jayabhata III, the last of this southern branch, claims a victory in A.D. 730 over the king of Valabhī. Originally a viceroyalty of the main branch, and probably never completely separated from it, the line of Broach could always rely on the support of the Gurjaras in Rājputāna, and therefore enjoyed a power and prestige out of proportion to the size of its dominions.

The history of the main branch of the family is obscure. Of Tata, Yasovardhana, and Chanduka, nothing is known. Probably in the reign of the ninth king, Siluka, the Arab invasion led by Junaid swept over all the Gurjara territories (c. A.D. 725-35). The Nausari grants of A.D. 738 record that the Arabs were ultimately defeated and driven back by the Lāta Chālukya, Pulakesin, while the Arab historian, Balādhurī, states that the invaders conquered Jurz (Gurjara) and Barus (Broach), but were less successful against Uzain (Ujjain) and Maliba (Mālwa). The power that checked the eastward advance of the Arabs was the Avantī dynasty of Rājputāna and western Mālwa, whose descendants were destined to play a great part in the history of northern India. That Ujjain in the eighth century was the centre of the Pratihāra power we know from various sources. The Jain *Harivamsa*, for example, was finished in A.D. 783-4, when Vatsarāja, who must be the Gurjara of that name, was reigning at Avantī; the Sanjan plates of the Rāshtrakūta, Amoghavarsha, of A.D. 871 mention a Gurjara Pratihāra, king of Ujjain; and the Gwalior inscription of Bhoja traces the foundation of his dynasty's greatness to Nāgabhata, who defeated the Mlecchas, i.e. the Arabs. It is thus evident that one clan of the Gurjaras successfully withstood the Arab invasion which overwhelmed much of the territory of the other branch which had hitherto been predominant. The leader of the successful clan was Nāgabhata, to the inscriptions of whose successors we owe most of our knowledge of the dynasty. He was ruler of Avantī, and may be dated about A.D. 725-40.

Meanwhile the older Jodhpur or Bhāndi family was less successful. The statement that Siluka "fixed the boundaries" of Stravani and Valla means that he was able to preserve these two provinces from the Arabs. Thus, although his power was not

annihilated, it must have been greatly reduced. Nāgabhata, of the Avantī line, was succeeded by Kakkuka, whose successor, Devarāja, seems to have attacked his weakened relative of Jodhpur. But Siluka defeated Devarāja and so, for the moment, contrived to retain, as the inscription has it, "the badge of the umbrella", *i.e.* suzerainty over all the Gurjaras. Devarāja's son, Vatsarāja, however, again assumed the offensive, and at last wrested the supremacy of the Gurjara clans from the Bhāndis, *i.e.* Siluka or his sons, whose family had held it for two hundred years from the time of Harichandra. Thereafter the political importance of the Gurjaras centres round the newer line, the Avantī family. The fourth king of this line was Vatsarāja (*c.* A.D. 775-800), the son of Devarāja and Bhuyikā. His reign is recorded with more than usual fulness, for at that time began the three-cornered struggle of the Gurjaras, Pālas and Rāshtrakūtas for the hegemony of northern India. The eighth century had seen the rise to power of the Rāshtrakūtas of Mālkhed in the south, and the Śānjan plates of the Rāshtrakūta, Amoghavarsha, record that the founder of that line conquered Avantī and forced its king to serve as door-keeper at a sacrifice. The king thus humiliated was presumably Devarāja. But civil war in the Rāshtrakūta kingdom gave to Devarāja's son, Vatsarāja, an opportunity which he at once seized. He attacked his eastern neighbour the king of Vanga (western Bengal), presumably Gopāla, founder of the Pāla dynasty, and defeated him together with his vassal, the king of Gauda (eastern Bengal). Soon afterwards, however, Vatsarāja was routed in his turn and driven into the desert by the Rāshtrakūta, Dhruvasena, as the latter's son records, but he must have recovered from this reverse, for at a later date, as we have seen, he secured the headship of the Gurjara clans. Vatsarāja was succeeded by Nāgabhata II (*c.* A.D. 800-25), son of his queen Sundarī. The new king seems to have formed an alliance with the rulers of Sind, Āndhra, Vidarbha, and Kalinga, thus driving a wedge between the Pālas and Rāshtrakūtas. He then attacked and overthrew Chakrāyudha, whom the Pāla ruler had seated on the throne of his recent conquest, Kanauj. War followed upon this direct challenge to the Pālas, and Dharmapāla's numerous army was scattered by Nāgabhata at Monghyr. That Nāgabhata, too, had gathered a great following is evident from the fact that several of his feudatories proudly recorded their share in the battle. Among

them was Kakka, the representative of the older Pratihāra line. Further successes are claimed for Nāgabhata. He is said to have captured fortresses in Anartta (Kāthiāwār), Mālwa, Kirāta, Turushka, Vatsa and Matsya (Rājputāna). The Turushkas were the Arabs, established in Sind, who probably still retained some hold on Gurjara territory in Gujarāt. We learn from Rāshtrakūta records, however, that Nāgabhata II was not more successful against the Rāshtrakūta power than his father, Devarāja, had been, and they claim that he fled at the approach of Govinda III, who advanced northwards as far as the Himālāyas, receiving the homage of Dharmapāla on the way, and defeating Nāgabhata, who lost some part of his territory in Mālwa. Nāgabhata was succeeded in A.D. 832 by his son, Ranabhadra, of whose reign little is known. It appears, however, from the Gwalior inscription, that although he suffered severe reverses he recovered his prestige by driving out invaders, who cannot be identified with certainty but were probably the Pālas. He was succeeded, probably after a short reign, by his more talented son, Mihira, known as Bhoja, a son of Queen Appadevī. Bhoja's first success seems to have been won over his relatives of the main branch of Harichandra's family, two able members of which, Bauka and Kakkuka, had conquered territory from the Avantī line after it had been weakened by the Rāshtrakūta invasions. Bhoja recovered this land, but it seems to have been taken once again by Kakkuka about the middle of the ninth century. In the first half of this century Devapāla, the king of Bengal, claimed that he had made all northern India tributary, and that he had humbled the pride of the king of the Gurjaras [Bhoja], who had been puffed up by his early successes.

The Rāshtrakūtas also claim to have defeated Bhoja about this time, but in spite of these reverses he was still resolved, as the inscription has it, to "conquer the three worlds". His opportunity came with the death of the great Devapāla, who left no worthy successor. With the assistance of two Chedi rulers, Bhoja routed the Bengal army, and about the same time internal dissensions among the Rāshtrakūtas relieved him from trouble in the south. He lived to a great age, reigning for nearly fifty years over a wide empire, which he ruled from Kanauj, and which included practically all northern India except Sind and Kashmīr. An Arab traveller comments on the size of Bhoja's army and the



magnificence of his cavalry, and adds that he was no friend of the Arabs. His country must have been well governed, for no other Indian kingdom was so free from robbers. Bhoja added Magadha to the Pratihāra empire, an extension to the east for which his predecessors had fought in vain. The empire thus stretched from the source of the Ganges to that of the Reva, and from the eastern to the western ocean. The Pratihāra dynasty had reached its zenith, and thereafter its glories waned. The poet Rajasekhara held a position at the court of Bhoja.

He was succeeded about A.D. 890 by Mahendrapāla, his son by Queen Chandrabhattarikā. Bhoja II succeeded his father, Mahendrapāla, and after a brief reign was himself followed by his half-brother, Mahīpāla (c. A.D. 914-40). Early in this reign, the Rāshtrakūta, Indra III, must have occupied Kanauj, for his inscription claims that he devastated "Mahodaya, celebrated as Kusasthala", both of which are names of Kanyakubja. This defeat proved, however, only a temporary blow to the Pratihāra power, which, taking advantage of the troubles in the Rāshtrakūta kingdom, soon began to recover. Mahīpāla was loyally aided to recover his throne by the Chandel king, Harsha, but the latter's son, Yasovarman, displayed a more independent temper, and his allegiance to his Pratihāra suzerain must have been only nominal. Mahīpāla died about A.D. 940, leaving his kingdom, so far as can be judged, more prosperous than he had found it. He was succeeded by his son, Mahendrapāla II. From an inscription of the Chandel, Yasovarman, we learn that in A.D. 954 he forced Devapāla to surrender to him a highly prized image of Vishnu, a fact which reveals the inferiority of the Gurjaras to the rising power of the Chandels. Devapāla was succeeded by his brother, Vijayapāla, under whom the weakness of the empire became increasingly apparent. Yasovarman's successor, Dhanga, won "royal power by defeating the king of Kanauj", and we know that in the course of a long reign he took Gwalior from the Pratihāras and extended his frontiers as far as Benares. About the same time the Chaulukya, Mūlarāja, founded the kingdom of Anhilwār in Gujarāt and southern Rājputāna, and much of the land where the Gurjaras had ruled longest thus passed from their possession. The Paramāras established themselves in Mālhwā at the same time, and in the middle of the tenth century the Chedi king claimed a victory over the

Gurjaras, so that the Pratihāra empire was threatened on all sides. Vijayapāla succeeded to a much diminished empire at a time when the threat from the Muslims had become more serious than it had been since the days of his great ancestor, Nāgabhata. While the Rāshtrakūta king was on good terms with the Muhammadans, the Gurjara rulers had always been their enemies. In A.D. 991 the king of Kanauj (Rājyapāla or his father) assisted Jayapāla in the great battle of the Kurram valley, and shared in the Hindu defeat which opened India to the Muslims. In the battle of Peshāwar, in 1008, the Gurjara kingdom again played its part under Ānandapāla. Ten years later the Muslims reached Rājyapāla's territory, at a time when he was engaged in defending himself against the Chandels in the south. Mahmūd of Ghaznī occupied Baran and Mathura and advanced on Kanauj. Rājyapāla, unable to defend it, abandoned it, and Mahmūd, after sacking the city, returned home. Though he met with more resistance on his next invasion, he was equally successful and received the submission of Rājyapāla. An alliance of Hindu states led by the Chandels then fell upon this much-tried ruler whom they regarded as a traitor to the Hindu cause for his submission. He died defending himself against them, and was succeeded by his son Trilochanapāla, who survived till about A.D. 1030. Mahmūd himself came to avenge the death of Rājyapāla, whom he regarded as his vassal, and the Hindu army fled, leaving vast quantities of booty. Trilochanapāla made a feeble stand and then fled, abandoning his capital to the invader, and retiring to Allāhābād, where seven years later (1027) he still exercised some little royal power. We know nothing of his successors, if indeed he had any. About the end of the eleventh century Kanauj passed to the Gāhadavālas who held it for a century till the Muslim conquest.

In the twelfth century a line of petty chiefs who had long ruled over Sāmbhar in Rājputāna attained to greater power. These were the Chāhumānas (Chauhāns), whose ancestors claimed to have assisted in checking the advance of the Arabs of Sind in the eighth century. At the end of the eleventh century Ajayadeva extended the power of the dynasty and founded Ajmir. Vighraharāja still further increased its territories, and interesting memorials of his reign survive in two dramas, one written

in his honour and the other said to have been composed by him, which were discovered on stone tablets in Ajmir. Prithivīrāja, the Rāī Pithora of the Muslims, a nephew of Vīgraharāja and son of his brother Somesvara, is the most celebrated of the Chauhān kings, and is a great figure in the popular literature of Rājputāna, particularly in the *Chand-rāīsā*, the Hindī epic attributed to his court poet. Prithivīrāja's most romantic exploit was the abduction of the daughter of Jayachandra of Kanauj, and his greatest military achievement was his invasion of Chandel territory and his defeat of its king, Paramardi. He successfully repelled the onslaught of Muhammad ibn Sām in the first battle of Tarāorī (1191), but in the next year the vast army which he and his allies had assembled was easily routed by the carefully trained and disciplined, though much smaller, Muslim forces. Prithivīrāja was captured and put to death, his capital Ajmir sacked, and its inhabitants carried off into slavery. Delhi, not long founded, was taken in the next year. Govindarāja, an illegitimate son of the dead king, was appointed by the Muslims to govern the conquered territory, but, being deposed by his uncle, Harirāja, he fled to Ranthambhor, where the dynasty survived for nearly a century.

After some minor successes against the Muslims, Harirāja was defeated by Kutb-ud-dīn Aibak and retired to Ajmir, where he mounted the funeral pyre, and Ajmir thus passed finally under the Muslims. Vīra Narāyana, Govindarāja's grandson, the representative of the Chauhān line at Ranthambhor, was then enticed to Delhi and poisoned by Īltutmish, who had failed to take Ranthambhor by direct attack. Vīra Narāyana's uncle, Vāgbhata, was able, however, to maintain the Chauhān possession of Ranthambhor and to ward off the attacks of the sultans of Delhi. The next Chauhān ruler of note was Hamīra, grandson of Vāgbhata, who came to power about 1282. He won victories over his Hindu neighbours, notably over Bhoja, king of Mālhwā, and recovered Ajmir and Sāmbhar. These successes made him so dangerous that the Delhi sultan decided to send an army against him. On its defeat, 'Alā-ud-dīn Muhammad undertook the command of the campaign in person. In 1301, after a long siege in which the defence suffered from the desertion of some leading Hindus, the fortress of Ranthambhor was stormed, and Hamīra with most of his chief officers was slain. Thus, after an excep-

tionally long and vigorous resistance, the Chauhān dynasty fell before the Muslims.

In the Jumna-Ganges doab, on the collapse of the Gurjara-Pratihāra empire with the death of Rājyapāla early in the eleventh century, power seems to have passed for a while into the hands of various petty dynasties of which little is known. By the end of the century, however, the new and powerful line of the Gāhadavālas (Gaharwārs) had established itself securely in this territory. The first member of the family to rise to fame and fortune was the successful soldier, Chandradeva, son of Mahī-chandra. Details of his career are not known, but an allusion in one of his grandson's inscriptions suggests that he took advantage of the troubles following on the death of the Kālachuri king, Karnadeva, to set himself up at Kanauj. The capital of the dynasty was, however, Benares, and Kanauj seems rather to have been the residence of a vassal dynasty of Rāshtrakūtas. The dated inscriptions of Chandradeva cover the period 1090-1100, so that he reigned approximately from 1085 to 1102. He was succeeded by his son, Madanapāla, whose earliest known date is 1104, and latest 1109. His reign may therefore be fixed at 1102-12. He was the first of the dynasty to issue coins. The greatest of the Gaharwārs was Madanapāla's son, Govindachandra, whose numerous inscriptions cover the forty years 1114-54, so that his dates may be given as 1112-55. The frequency with which his coins are still found suggests a long and prosperous reign. He had already distinguished himself in his father's reign as a soldier, not only defeating the Pāla king of Bengal "in spite of his irresistible elephants", but also repelling a Muslim invasion.

Unfortunately the inscriptions of his reign contain little information of historical value. They allude, however, to his successful defence of Benares against the Muslims, from which it is clear that the Hindus suffered no loss of prestige in his reign. The distribution of his inscriptions shows that his arms reached Patna, which was taken from the Pālas. There are also indications that his power had been extended to the south at the expense of the Kālachuris, and perhaps this explains the friendly relations which Madanapāla established with the Cholas. He was succeeded by his son, Vijayachandra; two other sons are mentioned in his inscriptions, the *yuvārāja* Ashphotachandra and another

unnamed; but we do not know what became of them, and Vijayachandra's reign, though it lasted some fifteen years (1155-70), is itself obscure. According to an inscription of his son he routed a Muslim invader. More is known of this son, Jayachandra, who reigned for some twenty years (1170-90). He came into conflict with the Senas, and is probably the king whom Lakshmanasena claims to have defeated. He was on friendly terms with the Chandels, and assisted them against the Chāhumānas (Chauhāns). The Muhammadans describe him as very powerful. His daughter, Samyogitā, was the heroine of the romantic episode in which the Chāhumāna Prithivīrāja played the part of young Lochinvar at her *svayamvara*, resulting in that feud between the two powerful Hindu rulers which proved disastrous when the Muslim invasion began in earnest.

In the last decade but one of the twelfth century, power in the north-west passed from the last of the Ghaznavids to the young and vigorous Ghūrids, and Muhammad ibn Sām soon proved an enemy to be dreaded. In 1191, after some early successes, he was defeated in the first battle of Tarāorī by a powerful Hindu coalition led by Prithivīrāja, and retired to Ghaznī, where he spent the winter organising his next advance into India. In 1192, in the second battle of Tarāorī, he completely routed the Hindus and slew Prithivīrāja. It is said that the latter's father-in-law, Jayachandra, not only failed to assist him on this occasion, but was in league with the Muslims. Northern India thus passed into Muhammad's hands and he next attacked Jayachandra, who thus found cause to regret his contribution to the Muslim successes. In the battle of Chandwār, in 1193, he stubbornly resisted Muhammad's general, Aibak, but was slain by a chance arrow and his army then fled in disorder. The Muslims took immense quantities of plunder; they occupied Benares; they destroyed its temples and built mosques upon the ruins. Thus the Hindu king perished, and a Muslim governor ruled in his stead; but the Gaharwār family survived for some time longer, for an inscription dated 1197 of Harichandra, son of Jayachandra, suggests that the former still ruled in the eastern corner of his grandfather's great kingdom.

Another dynasty which rose to power at the expense of the Pratihāras was that of the Chandels of Jejākabhukti, the modern

Bundelkhand, which takes its name from the Bundelas, a clan which only appeared there in the fourteenth century. Early in the ninth century, a Chandel chief named Nannuka overthrew the local Pratihāra ruler at Mau-Sahaniya, near Chattarpur, and became the founder of the Chandel dynasty. The Chandels, who were probably of Gond origin, gradually extended their power till they reached the Jumna which formed their frontier on the Kanauj side. They may at first have acknowledged the suzerainty of the Gurjara-Pratihāras, but the sixth king, Harshadeva, was a powerful and independent ruler in the second decade of the tenth century. He claims to have replaced on the throne of Kanauj a king whom he calls Kshitipāla, who is evidently Mahīpāla. The circumstances in which the latter lost his kingdom are not known, but the Rāshtrakūta, Indra III, claims to have defeated the king of Kanauj, and Harsha's restoration of the latter must be connected with these events. But whether Harsha interceded with the victorious Rāshtrakūta, or whether he drove him out of Kanauj, on behalf of the deposed ruler, we do not know. In any case the success of the Rāshtrakūtas was only transitory. Harsha's son, Yasovarman (c. A.D. 930-50), conquered Kālinjar and generally enlarged and consolidated the power of his dynasty. He built the great temple of Vishnu at Khajurāho, and was powerful enough to extort for it from Devapāla of Kanauj a famous image of the god. In an inscription of his son he is said to have waged successful wars with the Gaudas, Kosalas, Mālavas, Chedis, Gurjaras and others, that is to say, with all his neighbours. There is no reason to doubt that he raised the Chandels to a position of acknowledged power. The most famous member of the dynasty was Yasovarman's son, Dhanga, who reigned for nearly fifty years (A.D. 950-99), and, like others of his family, was a great builder. As one of the leading Hindu rulers of the time, he was summoned by Jayapāla to join the confederation against Sabuktigīn and shared in the disastrous defeat of the Hindu coalition. Dhanga lived to be a hundred, and was succeeded by his son, Ganda (999-1025). Enraged at the submission of his neighbour, Rājyapāla of Kanauj, to Mahmūd of Ghaznī, Ganda despatched a force under Vidyadhara, who captured the Gurjara capital and slew Rājyapāla in 1019. The wrath of the great Muslim leader was roused by this treatment of his vassal, and he advanced against the Chandel kingdoms. But though Ganda assembled an

army, huge in comparison with Mahmūd's force, he fled by night, not daring to strike a blow. The Muslims collected a vast quantity of booty with which they returned to Ghaznī. A second campaign in 1023 was equally successful. Ganda again refused to fight, surrendering to the invader the stronghold of Kālinjar and its vast treasures. Mahmūd gave him back part of his territory, including Kālinjar, and returned home, and for nearly two hundred years no Muslim force again entered this region. Little is known of Ganda's successors until Kīrtivarman (1060-1100), who, after losing his throne for a short time in a long and bitter struggle with the Kālachuri, Karna, at last completely overcame his enemy. These events are recorded not only in his own inscriptions, but also in the prologue to a Sanskrit drama, the *Prabodha-chandrodaya*, which was performed before the king by command of his general, Gopāla, to celebrate his success against the Kālachuris. His great-grandson, Madanavarman (1128-65), was the next distinguished member of the dynasty. He defeated his neighbour, the Kālachuri king of Chedi, slew the "Mālava" (i.e. Paramāra) king, and was on friendly terms with the Gāhadvāla king of Benares. His successor was Paramardi (Parmāl), who ruled for nearly forty years (1165-1203). His defeat by the celebrated Chauhān, Prithivīrāja, at the battle of Sirswagarh in 1182 is another of the great exploits of that romantic hero. The Chauhāns occupied Mahobā, the capital, but were forced to retire later. Twenty years afterwards the Chandels had completely recovered from this reverse. When the Muslim general, Kutb-ud-dīn Aibak, invaded their territory, Parmāl was able to offer a vigorous resistance. He finally retired into the fortress of Kālinjar which he defended until he was granted honourable terms of surrender. But the Hindu king having died before these terms could be carried out, his minister, Ājadeva, continued the defence until he was forced by lack of water to surrender unconditionally. Thus fell one of the most celebrated strongholds of medieval India. Its temples were turned into mosques, and Aibak carried off its vast treasures and thousands of Hindu slaves. He then occupied the capital, Mahobā, and, having appointed a governor to rule the conquered territory, returned northwards. The Chandel dynasty thus ceased to be a power in India, although members of the family survived as local chieftains till the end of the sixteenth century. In spite of the destruction wrought by the Muslim

invaders, many splendid temples still stand as memorials of the dynasty.

To the south of the lands of the Chandels lay the territory of their rivals, the Kālachuris, or Haihayas, of Chedi, in central India. The Kālachuri line is probably ancient, for they use an era of their own dating from A.D. 249. Haihayas are mentioned in Chālukya records of the sixth and seventh centuries. The Kālachuris of the ninth to the twelfth century trace their descent back to Kokalla I, who reigned in the last quarter of the ninth century. He fought with Bhoja I (Mihira) of Kanauj, and with the Rāshtrakūta, Krishna II. Little is known of his successors, Mughdatunga and Keyuravansha or Yuvarāja. The next ruler, Lakshmana (c. A.D. 950-75), invaded Orissa and carried off a famous image of the serpent, Kaliya, which he placed in the temple of Somnāth. His daughter married the Chālukya, Vikramāditya IV. Of his successors, Yuvarāja and Kokalla II, nothing of importance is recorded.

In the eleventh century Kokalla II's son, Gangeyadeva (1015-40), considerably extended the power of the dynasty. His son and successor, Karna (1040-70), seems to have had some initial successes; he was at first victorious over the Pālas and contributed to the overthrow of Bhoja of Mālwa. The Pālas, however, claim to have defeated him in the end, and the fact that Vighrahapāla III married one of his daughters suggests that Karna was the conquered party. Kīrtivarman, the Chandel king, defeated him, while the Chālukya, Somesvara I, declares that he "utterly destroyed" the power of Karna. The Kālachuri power must therefore have been much diminished in his reign. When Lakshmidhara of Mālwa invaded Chedi in the reign of Karna's successor, Yasahkarna, he records that his progress was like a "pleasure excursion", so little opposition did he meet. In the course of the twelfth century the dynasty divided into two unimportant lines, that of Dāhāla with its capital at Tripura in the west, and an eastern line established at Ratanpur.

From the death of Harshavardhana to the rise of the Pāla dynasty the history of Bengal is almost unknown. That part of it was under the rule of the later Guptas of Magadha, may be assumed from the distribution of their inscriptions, but their records comprise little more than a list of names preserved in the



inscription of Jīvitagupta II. The end of the ancient Gupta line is obscure, but there is a certain amount of evidence to show that the seventh and eighth centuries were very troubled times in Bengal. It was overrun by Yasovarman of Kanauj in the early part of the eighth century, and invaded from Kāmarūpa (Assam). Finally, it seems to have been conquered by the Gurjaras and Rāshtrakūtas. When the Avantī Gurjara, Vatsarāja, having overthrown the main Gurjara dynasty of Bhāndi, was in turn defeated by the Rāshtrakūta, Dhruvarāja, an inscription states that "the two umbrellas of Bengal", i.e. the sovereignty of Gauda and Vanga, passed from the Gurjaras to the Rāshtrakūtas. The Gurjara conquest must therefore have been short-lived; and probably the Rāshtrakūta triumph also was temporary, but no evidence exists to determine the length of the Rāshtrakūta occupation. Presumably the new invaders were soon forced to withdraw, and local dynasties recovered their lost authority. During this period of invasion, anarchy, and misrule, the old Gupta dynasty disappeared, and the need of a strong ruler became increasingly evident. At a formal election, the details of which are wanting, Gopāla was chosen to save the country from anarchy (*matsyanyāyam*, the law of the fishes, by which the great devour the small). The choice seems to have been based entirely upon ability, for Gopāla was probably neither a Kshatriya nor a Brāhman, though he is said to have sprung from a cultured family. Unlike most dynastic founders of the period, his descent is not traced back in inscriptions to any mythical or epic hero. His father, Vapyata, had been an able soldier, and probably he, or some earlier ancestor, had succeeded in founding a petty kingdom by force of arms in the troubled period of the eighth century. Later writers invent for the Pālas the usual mythical descent, from the sea or from the solar race.

Of the events of Gopāla's reign little is recorded. The consolidation of his power must have absorbed all his energies, but, on his death, his son was able to set out at once on military expeditions, so that Gopāla must have left the kingdom in a strong and settled condition. Tibetan records state that Gopāla reigned for forty-five years, but this can hardly refer to the period of his full power. His dates are probably c. A.D. 765-70. His son, Dharmapāla, whose mother was Deddadevī, a daughter of the king of Bhadra, was, however, the real founder of the greatness

of the dynasty. He became the leading figure in northern India in the second half of the eighth century, and his influence survived far into the ninth. He seems to have thought the position which he had inherited from his father strong enough to warrant attacks upon his neighbours. From the Bhāgalpur grant of Narāyanapāla we learn that Dharmapāla conquered Indrarāja and others and bestowed their lands on the "humble suppliant", Chakrāyudha. This may be interpreted to mean that Dharmapāla dethroned Indrarāja, king of Kanauj, and installed Chakrāyudha in his place. If, as is probable, Indrarāja is to be identified with the Indrāyudha of the Jain *Harivamsa*, Dharmapāla must have achieved considerable military success in northern India. References in the contemporary inscriptions of other dynasties suggest that after the fall of the Chandel, Yasovarman, no effective government survived in the Ganges valley. Dharmapāla therefore invaded Kanauj and placed his own nominee on the throne of Indrāyudha, the third successive member of the Kanauj dynasty to perish at the hands of an invader. Here, however, Dharmapāla was obliged soon to meet other rivals in the persons of the Gurjara kings, Vatsarāja and Nāgabhatta II, and the Rāshtrakūtas Dhruva and Govinda III, and Pāla success seems to have been short-lived. Dharmapāla quickly lost his dominant position and was forced to seek alliance with Govinda III against Nāgabhatta, thus encouraging Rāshtrakūta ambitions and endangering Pāla supremacy. Dharmapāla was a Buddhist, and built a celebrated monastery at Vikramasila, on the bank of the Ganges. He seems to have enjoyed a very long reign, probably of forty-five years (A.D. 770-815).

He was succeeded by Devapāla, who is stated to have been a great conqueror. His elephants, we are told, reached the Vindhya, and his cavalry scoured the Kamboja country. Though these claims are undoubtedly exaggerated, they must be based upon some military success. The panegyrist's phrases probably mean that Devapāla had more than held his own against his Gurjara and Rāshtrakūta rivals. An inscription belonging to his reign, and throwing light on the foreign relations of India at this period, is a grant to a Buddhist monastery made by a king of Java and Sumatra, which indicates that there must have been a regular pilgrim traffic by sea between Bengal and the Farther East. Devapāla probably reigned from c. A.D. 815 to 854. There is a

reference in an inscription to the *yuvārāja*, Rājyapāla, who, however, presumably died before him, for Devapāla's successor was his cousin Vigrahapāla I, the son of Jayapāla, the general to whom much of the military success of Devapāla's reign is attributed. Vigrahapāla seems also to have been known as Sūrapāla. Nothing is known which corroborates the claims of his inscription that as a destroyer of enemies he resembled Indra. On the contrary, he seems to have been of an unwarlike and ascetic disposition, and there is a hint that he abdicated in favour of his son, Narāyanapāla (c. A.D. 845-97), whose reign was long and by no means uneventful, although the course of events is not at all clear. His inscriptions suggest that he ruled over a considerable portion of Bihar. Those were troubled times, and northern India was beginning to pass under the rule of the Gurjaras, whose representative, Bhoja I, had been advancing his boundaries northwards from the ancestral lands of the Pālas. He had established his capital at Kanauj, which he may have taken from the Pālas; and in any case Pāla territory suffered considerable diminution during this period. Bhoja invaded Bengal, and inflicted a disastrous defeat on its king. Other epigraphical evidence confirms our belief in a great war between Bhoja and the Pālas, and it is clear that for a time Magadha also was added to the Pratihāra empire.

Narāyanapāla was succeeded by his son, Rājyapāla, another great builder. The distribution of his inscriptions shows that the Pālas still held the Patna district, but the Gurjaras had by then crossed the Sōn and occupied the Gāya district, while in the north they had overrun Tīrabhukti (Tīrhut). There is reason to believe, however, that these Gurjara successes were short-lived, and that the Pāla power began to revive in the reign of Rājyapāla's successor, Gopāla II, who ruled for nearly sixty-six years. His reign coincided with the beginning of the decline of the Gurjara power, and he recovered the Gāya district. Bhoja II was defeated by the Rāshtrakūta, Krishna II, and the latter's grandson, Indra III, crossed the Jumna and sacked the city of Mahodaya. The Rāshtrakūtas claimed that they had bathed their horses where the Ganges enters the sea, and had put Mahīpāla to headlong flight. The Gurjaras were overwhelmed by their southern foes, and though later they rallied a little, they had suffered a blow from which they never fully recovered, and the Pālas presumably seized this occasion to regain some of their lost territory.

But other misfortunes awaited them. An inscription of Mahīpāla I, son of Vigrahapāla II and grandson of Gopāla II, states that he won back his ancestral kingdom from those who had unjustly seized it. The nature of this disaster is not clear, but probably the rulers of Kamboja were coming to the front and extending their territory at the expense of the Pālas. Mahīpāla I reigned for fifty years (c. 992–1040), and was clearly a successful king. He ruled over the Gāya, Patna, and Muzaffarpur districts of Bihar, and possibly over the Tippera district also. He restored the failing fortunes of the Pālas, and for that reason soon came into conflict with other rising powers. There is some evidence of a struggle between him and the Kālachuris and Karnātas, but more is known about the Chola invasion of his country. Rājendra Chola I earned the title of *Gangavijayī* by reaching the Ganges in a northward thrust, and his campaign is recorded in the Tirumalai rock inscription. Passing through Orissa, and Kosala, he subdued Dandabhukti, which is identified with the modern province of Bihar. He then moved on, and, after conquering eastern Bengal (Vangāladesa), attacked and defeated Mahīpāla I and reached the Ganges. This was the northern limit of his conquests, and Mahīpāla seems to have recovered from this reverse and to have been able to check the further advance of the conqueror about 1020.

About the same time Benares seems to have passed from the Pālas to the Kālachuris of Chedi. Mahīpāla I was succeeded by Nayapāla, also called Nyāyapāla, of whom we know only that he ruled for some fifteen years and held portions of Bihar. He was succeeded by his son, Vigrahapāla III, who early came into conflict with the Chedi ruler, the Kālachuri Lakshmīkarna, who had already given the Pālas trouble, and who, though he enjoyed a long and successful reign, suffered many reverses in his old age. In his last war with the Pālas, Karna was defeated and had to sue for peace. Vigrahapāla married his daughter Yauvanasrī, and refrained from completely depriving his father-in-law of power. There is also a record of a Chālukya invasion in the reign of Somesvara I (c. 1044–68), led by his son, Vikramāditya, who defeated the kings of Gauda and Kāmarūpa. This raid of the Karnāta ruler brought bodies of his countrymen into Bengal, where they afterwards formed small principalities, and this probably explains the origin of the Sena dynasty. The history of the

reigns of Vighrahapāla's successors, Mahīpāla and his brothers, is derived from the *Rāmacharita* of Sandhyākara Nandi. According to this work Mahīpāla on his accession imprisoned his two brothers and eventual successors, Sūrapāla and Rāmapāla. Divvoka, chief of the Kaivartas, and a vassal of the Pālas, rebelled and conquered a considerable portion of northern Bengal. Mahīpāla II, neglecting the advice of his minister, hurriedly advanced against him, and began a disastrous campaign which ended in his defeat and death.

Sūrapāla II succeeded for a brief period, after which the third brother, Rāmapāla, took his place. Divvoka's throne was then occupied by his nephew, Bhīma, who harassed what was left of Pāla territory. Rāmapāla, having first convinced himself that he could rely on the support of his feudatories, then took the field against Bhīma, his army being led by Sivarāja. The latter seems to have driven the intruders out of the ancestral lands of the Pālas, but his success was only temporary, and Rāmapāla soon had to lead a larger army into northern Bengal. He next carried hostilities into the south, against Dandabhukti, Vālaalabhī, and other places, many of which are difficult to identify. After consolidating his conquests he began to wage war farther afield in Utkala, Kalinga and Kāmarūpa, the last campaign being conducted by his feudatory, Mayana. One of the Yādavas of eastern Bengal also appealed for his assistance, probably on account of an invasion by Sāmantasena, then rising to power. Rāmapāla was succeeded by his son, Kumārapāla, under whose weaker rule the forces of disruption, which had been checked by Rāmapāla, began to break forth again. His reign was short, and his able minister, Vaidyadeva, seems to have been a more important figure than his master, for he claims the credit of a naval victory, probably on the lower course of the Ganges. Kumārapāla was succeeded and probably murdered by his uncle, Madanapāla, who ruled for some twenty years from about 1130. Down to his reign the Pāla dominions still included eastern Magadha and northern Bengal, but the dynasty was nearing its close. Vijayasena, the first important ruler of the Sena dynasty, seems to have gained power in eastern and western Bengal, and, encouraged by the weakness of Madanapāla, invaded northern Bengal and captured the southern part of Varendra. He himself states that he attacked the king of Gauda, *i.e.*, Madanapāla, with a great force, and

captured the king of Mithilā. Nothing is known of Madanapāla's sons or successors, but the Gāhadavāla kings of Kanauj, notably Govindachandra, were certainly advancing eastward, thus reducing still further the territory of the Pālas.

In 1160 a king named Govindapāla is mentioned, whose name and Buddhist title suggest that the Pālas were still a ruling family. He seems to have survived till 1199, when Chauhāns, Pālas, and Senas were all swept away by the Muslims.

The Pāla dynasty thus ruled for an unusually prolonged period. Dharmapāla and Devapāla made Bengal one of the great Indian powers, and their successes were by no means despicable; but the rise of the Kamboja family about the middle of the tenth century was a shock from which they never quite recovered. Their rule formed a period of beneficent and artistic activity. Numerous tanks still testify to their zeal for public works, and they proved the sincerity of their Buddhist faith by their generous patronage of learned men and famous monasteries.

By the middle of the twelfth century, at the end of Madanapāla's reign, the dynasty retained very little territory in Bengal, and Pāla rule was confined to a part of Magadha. It had in fact been supplanted by the Senas, who had been gradually gaining power since the middle of the preceding century. The origin of this dynasty is not definitely known, but there is evidence to show that it came from the south. Its founder was Sāmantasena, who flourished in the third quarter of the eleventh century. In his inscriptions he is designated a Kshatriya of Karnāta, "born in a family which was the glory of Rādhā", in western Bengal, and again, "born in a family of Brāhma-Kshatriyas". His ancestry is traced back to Virasena, a monarch of the south belonging to the lunar line. The family had, therefore, come originally from the south, and had settled at Rādhā. The epithet 'Brāhma-Kshatriya' suggests that Sāmantasena was a Brāhman who had taken to the profession of arms, and indeed the epithet 'Brāhma' disappears from the later inscriptions. Of Sāmantasena we know very little. An allusion to his slaying the robbers of Karnāta suggests that he fought in the south, and another statement seems to indicate that he retired to a hermitage in his old age. Of his son, Hemantasena, nothing precise is recorded; but the fact that his queen is called 'Mahārājñī' (i.e. Mahādevī)

suggests that he claimed to be a ruler of some importance, for this title was usually given only to queens of independent sovereigns.


The real founder of the Sena kingdom was Hemantasena's son, Vijayasena, who reigned from about 1100 to 1165. His wife was a member of the Sūra family, and this alliance may have increased his prestige. In his Deopara inscription, he claims that he defeated Navya and Vīra, attacked the lord of Gauda, humbled the king of Kāmarūpa, protected the king of Kalinga, made many lesser rulers captive, and sailed his fleet up the Ganges. Of these the lord of Gauda has been identified as Madanapāla, who was driven out of Bengal by the Senas; but the chief importance of the inscription lies in its proof that Vijayasena found Pāla territory divided up among a number of petty dynasties, of which till his time the Senas had themselves been one.

The find-spots of his inscriptions show that Vijayasena ruled over considerable territory and to this extent his claims are corroborated. He is said to have amassed great wealth and to have distributed it lavishly to the pious. His son was Ballālasena, "lord of Gauda". He was celebrated for his learning, several compilations being attributed to him. He reigned from about 1165 to 1185. His son and successor was Lakshmanasena, to whom the inscriptions give imposing titles which suggest great military achievements. A literary source states that he reached the hills of Malaya (Travancore) in his "conquest of the world". Inscriptions also record that he erected pillars of victory at Puri, Benares, and Prayāga, to mark the limits of his conquests, and that he overcame Kāmarūpa. He seems to have swept away the last remnants of Pāla power, and so to have come into contact with the Gāhadavālas, who, in the twelfth century, had been advancing gradually into Magadha.

In the meanwhile, however, the Muhammadans were progressing steadily down the Ganges. In 1192 Muhammad ibn Sām had avenged Prithivīrāja's defeat of the Muslims in the previous year, and had crushed the Chāhumāna opposition to his advance. In 1193 Delhi had fallen, and in 1194 Kanauj, and in the same year Muhammad ibn Bakhtiyār, one of Kutb-ud-dīn Aibak's generals, advanced rapidly, conquered Bihar, took Nadiya and overthrew Lakshmanasena who escaped with his life. If the Muhammadan historians are to be believed, the invaders met

with no organised opposition, and their conquest was extraordinarily easy. The Gāhadavālas seem to have withdrawn and left open the way through Magadha. In Bihar itself there were no armed men, and the capital, Nadiya (afterwards Lakhnautī), was taken by only eighteen horsemen. Lakshmanasena escaped across the river into eastern Bengal, where early in the thirteenth century his sons succeeded him. Literature seems to have flourished at his court, the most notable names being those of Jayadeva, author of the *Gitagovinda*, Halāyudha, and Dhoyī, author of the *Pavanadūta*, an imitation of the celebrated *Meghadūta*. Inscriptions surviving from the reigns of his sons, Visvarūpasena and Kesavasena, tell us only that these kings granted certain lands in the Vanga region and ruled for about fourteen and three years respectively. But, although the progress of the Muhammadans was slower in eastern than in western Bengal, by the middle of the thirteenth century all trace of Hindu rule had disappeared.





## CHAPTER IX

### The Deccan

In the sixth century the Chālukya inscriptions provide a series of records which enable us to give a consecutive account of the history of the Deccan and south India for two hundred years. The history of the Western Chālukyas falls into two periods. The Western Chālukyas of Bādāmi (Vātāpi) established a kingdom corresponding to the modern Bombay Presidency with additions to the south and east, but without Kāthiāwār and Gujarāt, and held this territory from the middle of the sixth to the middle of the eighth century, when they disappeared before the Rāshtrakūtas. About a hundred years later Taila II, who claimed descent from the old Chālukya family, overthrew the Rāshtrakūtas and founded the line of the Western Chālukyas of Kalyāni, which survived for two centuries more. The Eastern Chālukyas, an offshoot of the Western branch, ruled at Vengī for nearly five hundred years from the beginning of the seventh century.

The inscriptions trace the descent of the family back to a certain Jayasimha and his son Ranarāga. Nothing is known of either, but they were, presumably, not independent princes. The first sovereign ruler of the dynasty was Ranarāga's son, Pulakesin I Satyāśraya, who bore the title mahārāja. He rose to power about A.D. 550, and established himself at Vātāpi, the modern town of Bādāmi in the Bijāpur district, from which he conquered a little kingdom at the expense of the Kadambas. He was succeeded about A.D. 566 by his eldest son Kīrtivarman I, called Pururana-parākrama, who further extended the family territory at the expense of the Kadambas, taking their capital, Banavasī. Extravagant claims are made for him in later inscriptions, but he cannot, for example, have conquered kings of Magadha and Vanga. He was succeeded about A.D. 597 by his brother, Mangalesa Ranavikrānta, who gained considerable territory to the north from the Kālachuris. He also conquered a region named Revatīvīpa, which is probably the modern Redi and certainly was on the sea, for the Aihole inscription records that the attacking Chālukya army was reflected in the waters of the ocean. Manga-

lesa died about A.D. 608, during a civil war between himself and his nephew Pulakesin II Satyāśraya, son of Kirtivarman I. His death was followed by a period of great confusion and strife, out of which Pulakesin finally emerged triumphant. He had, however, to repel invaders who thought to take advantage of the weakened state of the kingdom, and to reconquer Banavasī. By a series of campaigns he quickly re-established Chālukya power and extended it north, east and south. The Lātas and Gurjaras were routed, and an attempt by Harshavardhana of Thānesar, then the greatest king of northern India, to extend his power southwards was checked on the Nerbudda. In the east the Kalingas were defeated, and the fortress of Pishtapuram, mentioned two hundred years earlier in the record of Samudragupta's campaign, was reduced. In the south the Pallavas were attacked and their king driven to take refuge within the walls of Kāñchī, his capital. Pallava records claim a victory for Mahendravarman I over the Chālukyas at Pollilūr, a town near Kāñchī, and so confirm the claim made by the Chālukyas that they almost reached the walls of the Pallava capital. Farther south the Chola country was invaded, but an alliance was then formed by the Chālukyas with the Cholas, Pāndyas and Kerālas. This account of Pulakesin's reassertion of the power of the Chālukyas, which is recorded in the Aihole inscription of A.D. 634, has in it nothing improbable. On the conclusion of his campaign he returned to his capital, Vātāpi, from which he ruled his dominions "as if they were one city". His formal coronation took place in A.D. 609, some time after the death of his predecessor. Pulakesin adopted the *biruda* of Satyāśraya, by which name he is commonly referred to in the records of the family. He is the first member of his dynasty to assume the titles of *mahārājādhirāja* and *paramesvara*. The latter title he is said to have acquired by defeating Harshavardhana. His dominion became so extensive that he appointed his younger brother, Vishnuvardhana I, to govern the eastern territories from Vengī. Either with or without the consent of his brother, Vishnuvardhana soon established himself as an independent sovereign, becoming the founder of the Eastern Chālukyas who ruled in Vengī for five hundred years.

Towards the end of the reign of Pulakesin, the Pallavas avenged their early reverses. Narasimhavarmān I, having won a series of victories over his immediate neighbours, proceeded to attack the

Chālukyas. He routed Pulakesin in a series of battles and destroyed his capital, in memory of which achievement he assumed the title "Vātāpikonde", "taker of Vātāpi". After the downfall of Pulakesin II about 642, there seems to have been an interregnum of some ten years.

From Arabic sources we learn that Pulakesin exchanged embassies and presents with Khusraw II of Persia, and one of the Ajanta paintings depicts the presentation of a letter from the Persian king to Pulakesin. The Chinese pilgrim, Hiuen Tsang, has left an account of the kingdom of Pu-lo-ki-she, *i.e.* Pulakesin, one of whose cities he visited, probably Nasik. He describes Pulakesin's subjects as submissive and well behaved. In the Chālukya army the custom prevailed of giving wine not only to the men, but to the elephants, to make their onrush irresistible. Harsha conquered his enemies in the east and west but had been unable, even with the help of many kingdoms, to subdue the Chālukyas in the south.

The fortunes of the Chālukyas were restored by Vikramāditya I Satyāśraya, a son of Pulakesin. In a series of campaigns he re-conquered the lands of his ancestors and recovered his inheritance. He cast down the glory of the three kings who had seized his father's lands, and restored to the gods and the Brāhmins the grants which the invaders had confiscated. The three usurpers were the Pallava kings, Narasimhavarman, conqueror of Bādāmi, and his successors, Mahendravarman and Paramesvaravarman I. The struggle with the Pallavas must have been long and severe, for Pallava records of the early part of the reign of Paramesvaravarman state that he won a great victory over the Chālukyas and that Bādāmi was again destroyed. But then fortune turned. Paramesvaravarman was routed, and the Pallava capital, Kānchī, taken by Vikramāditya, who, ably assisted by his son, Vinayāditya, and his grandson, Vijayāditya, re-established Chālukya superiority and made the Cholas, Pāndyas and Kerālas feel his power. This restoration of Chālukya authority was completed about A.D. 655, and the distribution of the records of this reign goes to prove that the whole of his father's territory was recovered by Vikramāditya. Records also survive of two of his brothers, Chandrāditya and Ādityavarman, who on his behalf governed provinces of his kingdom.

In A.D. 680 Vikramāditya was succeeded by his son, Vinayāditya Satyāśraya, who had distinguished himself, as already men-

tioned, in his father's campaigns in the south and east. He had also fought in the north, as did his son, Vijayāditya Satyāśraya, who came to the throne in A.D. 696, after long experience both as a commander in the field and as an administrator under his father and grandfather. He was a great builder, the most famous of his temples being the Samgamesvara at Pattadakal. He was succeeded about A.D. 733 by his son, Vikramāditya II, likewise a great builder and benefactor of temples. He made war on the Pallavas, routed their king, Nandipotavarman, entered Kānchī, and in a temple there set up an inscription recording his victory. He continued his advance towards the south, commemorating his defeat of the Pāndyas and Cholas by setting up a pillar of victory on the shore of the southern ocean. His son, Kīrtivarman II, who succeeded him in A.D. 746, and who had conducted a successful campaign against the Pallavas in his father's reign, was destined to be the last of his line. Half a century later the whole of the Western Chālukya empire was in the possession of the Rāshtrakūtas. In the middle of the eighth century the Rāshtrakūta, Dantidurga, had acquired sovereign power by conquering Vallabha (*i.e.* Kīrtivarman II), and routing the Karnāṭaka (*i.e.* Chālukya) army, despite its long experience in wars with the Pallavas and Cholas. Kīrtivarman seems to have made an attempt to regain his territory in the reign of Krishna I, the second Rāshtrakūta ruler, but he was completely routed and thereafter for two centuries the Rāshtrakūtas remained supreme. Taila II, who restored the fortunes of the family and founded the line of Kalyāṇi, traced his descent back to a cousin of Kīrtivarman II.

As has already been stated, Pulakesin II appointed his younger brother, Vishnuvardhana, viceroy of his eastern dominions in the Vengī country, which lay between the Godāvarī and the Krishnā and was bounded on the west by the Eastern Ghauts. About A.D. 630 Vishnuvardhana established himself as an independent ruler, and his dynasty remained distinct for nearly five centuries. He reigned from A.D. 615 to 633 and dated his regnal years from his installation as governor. All the rulers of the dynasty are known, and the chronology is unusually accurate, but the inscriptions do not yield much precise historical information. Vijayāditya II, called Narendramrigarāja, who reigned from A.D. 799 to 843, fought many battles with the Gangas and Rāshtrakūtas, and built

numerous temples in honour of Sambhu (Siva). He is probably that lord of Vengī whom the Rāshtrakūta, Govinda III, claims to have summoned to his presence, and ordered to help in the fortifying of one of his cities, presumably his new capital; so that on this occasion at least the Rāshtrakūta armies were triumphant. Of Vijayāditya III Gunaka (A.D. 844–88) we know that he routed the Rāshtrakūta, Krishna II (c. A.D. 888–915), and destroyed his capital, Mālkhed, and that he won a victory over the Gangas. He also slew in battle a certain Mangi, who may have been a Chola king. The claim of the Rāshtrakūta, Amoghavarsha (c. A.D. 814–77), that the lord of Vengī paid homage to him must refer to some Chālukya reverse earlier in Vijayāditya's reign. Some time after his death the Rāshtrakūtas gained a series of successes and overran the Vengī country, which had to be reconquered by Bhīma I (A.D. 888–918) from Krishna II. The former's successor, Amma Vishnuvardhana VI, had to fight for his throne against a number of his relatives and feudatories who conspired against him with his hereditary enemies, the Rāshtrakūtas. The throne changed hands by a series of usurpations until Bhīma II, who slew his predecessor Yuddhamalla and reigned from A.D. 934 to 945. He won a series of victories over his neighbours, notably Govinda V.

Bhīma's son, Vijayāditya VI (A.D. 948–70), was able to succeed him and thereafter the succession continued in the direct line. For the thirty years from A.D. 973 to 1003 the land of Vengī "was without a leader". Nothing is known of the dynasty during this period, but the probability is that the country was conquered and occupied by the Cholas. Of Saktivarman, who reigned from 1003 to 1015, coins survive. His nephew Rājārāja I (called after his Chola grandfather) Vishnuvardhana VIII had a long reign, (1022–63) as had his son, Kulottunga Chodadeva I (1063–112), who also had a Chola mother. These intermarriages with the Chola royal family made this king more Chola than Chālukya by blood, and gave him a strong claim to the Chola throne, which trouble in the Chola country enabled him to enforce. Inscriptions state that he preferred the Chola throne, and made his uncle, Vijayāditya VII, viceroy of Vengī, and that he did this because he was desirous of devoting himself to further conquests. His first campaign seems to have been that directed against his Chola neighbour, and a literary source, the *Vikramāṅkadevacharita*, primarily concerned with the Western Chālukyas, throws some light on the

circumstances in which the Eastern Chālukya became lord of the Chola country. Vikramāditya VI, of the former dynasty, in his father's lifetime, had, we are told, repeatedly defeated the Cholas, and had sacked Kāñchī, as his father had done before him. On the accession of his brother, Somesvara II, Vikramāditya VI was planning yet another campaign against the Cholas when the Chola king begged for peace and a treaty between the two kingdoms was cemented by the marriage of his daughter with Vikramāditya. The Chola king died soon afterwards and the troubles which followed brought Vikramāditya back to restore order. He set his Chola brother-in-law on the throne, but had scarcely reached the frontier on his homeward journey when he received news that the Chola had been slain in a new rebellion, and that Rajiga, lord of Vengī, had seized the throne of Kāñchī. According to the Chālukya poet, Vikramāditya routed Rajiga, though Rajiga had won over to his side the reigning Western Chālukya, the former's brother, Somesvara II. Later mentions of Vikramāditya's campaigns against the Cholas probably refer to wars with the Eastern Chālukyas, who, despite Rajiga's defeat, maintained their hold upon Kāñchī. The name Rajiga is a popular form of Rājendra Chola, which was the name of the Chālukya ruler before he seized the Chola throne, after which he became Kulottunga Chodadeva. It is clear then that the Eastern Chālukya profited by troubles in the Chola kingdom to seize the power there and to place in the old home of the dynasty viceroys, among whom were three of his sons. A Tamil poem celebrates the campaign of Kulottunga's minister, Karunākara, against Anantavarma Chodagangadeva, the ruler of Kalinga, who had refused to pay tribute. With Kulottunga the Eastern Chālukyas merge into the Cholas, although his grandson, Kulottunga Chodadeva II, in 1132 still claims a Chālukya genealogy. This mixed dynasty lasted a century and a half.

In the sixth decade of the eighth century the sovereignty over the lands roughly corresponding with the modern Bombay Presidency passed from the Western Chālukyas to the most powerful branch of the Rāshtrakūta family, later known as of Mānyakheta or Mālkhed, from their capital. For a time another branch of this family held the northern part of the Western Chālukya empire, but it was soon ousted by its more powerful relatives in the south. Only the names of the earliest members of

the dynasty, Dantivarman I, Indra I, Govinda I, Kakka I, and Indra II, who flourished in the latter half of the seventh and first half of the eighth century, are known from later records. The first important member, and the real founder, of the dynasty was Dantidurga Khadgāvaloka, who was reigning in A.D. 753. He was the first to assume titles indicating paramount sovereignty. He defeated the Western Chālukya, Kirtivarman II, routing his great army, despite its previous victories over the Cholas and Pāndyas. Dantidurga seems to have held all the Chālukya dominions except some lands in the south and north, the latter being occupied by another branch of the family, which was represented about this time by Kakkarāja II. Dantidurga was succeeded by his uncle, Krishna I, known as Akālavarsha or Subhatunga who dethroned his nephew because he had lapsed into evil ways. By finally overthrowing his nephew's enemy, Kirtivarman II, Krishna I firmly established Rāshtrakūta supremacy or, as the inscriptions put it, he snatched the goddess of fortune from the Chālukya family and made the boar (the badge of the Chālukyas) flee like a timid deer. The records also lay great stress on his victory over a certain powerful ruler, otherwise unknown, named Rāhappa, who, it has been suggested, may have been Kakkarāja II of the northern branch of the Rāshtrakūta family.

Krishna I was succeeded by his younger son, Dhruva Dhāravarsha, the elder son, Govinda II, having reigned, if at all, only for a very brief period. Dhruva defeated the Gangas and Pallavas, and, somewhere about A.D. 780, routed Vatsarāja of Ujjain, who had conquered Gauda. His son, Govinda III, called Prabhūtarvarsha and Jagattunga, whom we know to have been chosen as yuvarāja in his father's lifetime from among several brothers, reigned from about A.D. 783 to 815. It is clear that he established the position of the dynasty on an even broader basis than his predecessors had done. In his various campaigns he secured the submission of the Gurjara king and of the lord of Mālwa and won much wealth from the Pallavas. It was in his reign that the new capital, Mānyakheta, was built, and the fact that he was able to compel Vijayāditya of Vengī to assist in its construction is evidence of the strength of Govinda's position. He waged continual warfare with the Eastern Chālukyas. The records of his conquests suggest that his kingdom extended from the west coast far inland to the east, and from the Vindhya down to the Tungabhadra.



In view of the extent of his dominions he appointed to govern the Lāta country in the north his brother, Indrarāja, who quickly disposed of the Gurjara leader opposing him. Govinda III was succeeded by his son called Amoghavarsha, but whose real name is not known. The succession was disputed but, with the assistance of Kakkarāja, son of Indrarāja, just mentioned, Amoghavarsha finally prevailed. His reign, which lasted from A.D. 815 to 877, witnessed no diminution of the empire he had inherited from his father, although some of the claims made in his inscriptions, such as that the king of Magadha paid homage to him, are undoubtedly exaggerated. The wars with the Eastern Chālukyas continued. Amoghavarsha completed the fortification of Mānyakheta. In his old age he abdicated in favour of his son, Krishna II, who reigned till A.D. 912 and was known as Akālavarsha or Subhātunga. In his reign the Eastern Chālukya, Vijayāditya III, claims to have defeated him and burned his capital. Later records, however, admit a successful counter-thrust by Krishna II, who overran the land of Vengī, which had to be reconquered by Bhīma I. Krishna II's son, called Jagattunga, did not come to the throne, the next occupant of which was Krishna's grandson Indra III Nityavarsha. Indra's successor, Govinda IV Prabhūtarvarsha, seems to have suffered reverses at the hands of the Eastern Chālukyas, and in the end to have lost the affections of his people. He was succeeded about A.D. 933 by his uncle, Vaddiga Amoghavarsha. The next ruler was the latter's son, Krishna III Akālavarsha, who reigned from A.D. 940 to 970. The great event of his reign was the war with the Chola king, Rājāditya, who was treacherously killed at Takkola by a Ganga prince, Būtuga, who was handsomely rewarded for the murder by Krishna III. The Gangas and Pallavas were overcome, and he seems also to have held his own in the north against the Gurjaras, but his younger brother and successor, Khottiga Nityavarsha, was defeated by the Paramāra king, Siyaka, and his capital plundered. He was succeeded in A.D. 972 by his nephew, Kakka II Amoghavarsha, for whom are claimed successes over his neighbours the Gurjaras, Cholas and Pāndyas. In A.D. 973 he was overthrown by the Western Chālukya, Taila II; the dynasty came to an end; and the lands reverted to their former holders, the Chālukyas. The Rāshtrakūta family survived, however, and various members of it played a part in the history of the next two centuries.

With the overthrow of Kakka II in A.D. 973 by Taila, who was descended from the old Bādāmi Chālukya line, the two hundred years of Rāshtrakūta usurpation came to an end, and the Chālukya dynasty was restored. The new line is known from its capital as the dynasty of the Western Chālukyas of Kalyāni, a town, now in the Nizam's dominions, founded by Somesvara I.

Taila or Tailapa II, called Ahavamalla, ruled for twenty-four years (A.D. 973-97), and regained most of the lands which his family had formerly ruled. He bore the titles of *mahārājādhirāja* and *paramesvara*, evidence of paramount sovereignty, and in one inscription he is given the title of *chakravartin*. His capital may still have been the Rāshtrakūtas' capital of Mānyakheta. He does not seem to have ruled in Gujarāt; there the Chaulukya kings of Anhilwār still reigned, and they also held the Lāta country. While it can hardly be true that he conquered Chedi, Orissa, and Nepāl, his claim to have subjugated the Kuntala country is borne out by the distribution of Chālukya inscriptions; moreover the Western Chālukyas call themselves lords of Kuntala. The limits of this region are not clear, but it corresponds roughly with the whole of the Kanarese districts. Another of his military successes, the capture and execution of Munja, the Paramāra king of Mālhwā, has already been mentioned.

In A.D. 997 Taila was succeeded by his son, Satyāśraya, also called Solliga or Sallina, but no records from his reign survive. From Chola sources, however, we learn that he had to defend himself against Rājārāja Rājakerarivarman, who overran his country and claimed considerable success. On the other hand, a later Chālukya inscription (Haltur), while admitting the initial Chola successes, asserts that the Chālukya ultimately drove out the enemy, captured great stores of wealth, and conquered the southern country. Of the next few kings, Dasavarman, Vikramāditya V, Jayasimha I and Jayadekamala, we know little more than their names. The last-named claims to have overthrown Bhoja, the Paramāra, defeated the Chola and Chedi monarchs, and put to flight the confederacy of Mālhwā. Other records refer to his victory over the Chola king, Rājendra, who, however, claimed successes himself.

The next king, Somesvara I Trailokyamalla-Ahavamalla, was a ruler of considerable importance. The inscriptions of his reign show that numerous feudatories owned his sway. Bilhana tells

us that he made Kalyānapura his capital, a statement supported by the fact that the inscription of 1053 in which the town is first mentioned, calls it the settled residence of the king. During this reign the war with the Cholas continued, but while the Chola records represent Rājendra as conquering Somesvara at a place named Koppam, on the Perara river, a Western Chālukya inscription of 1071, while admitting the invasion and the damage done by the Cholas, adds that the Chola king lost his life later in the campaign, and that the Chola succession was thus broken, for he left no direct heir. An inscription recording a donation by Somesvara on his return from a conquest of the southern countries and of the Cholas serves to fix the date of this Chālukya victory at about 1060. Bilhana also tells us that the Chālukya king carried the war into the enemy territory and penetrated as far as the capital, Kānchī, the ruler of which had to flee to the jungle. He also credits Somesvara with the capture of Dhārā, the Paramāra capital, and with the destruction of the power of Karna, the Kālachuri ruler of Chedi.

Of his three sons the second, Vikramāditya VI, showed such promise that Somesvara proposed to appoint him to succeed to the throne, but, as he refused to usurp his elder brother's right, the latter, Somesvara II, was appointed yuvarāja, while Vikramāditya set out on a series of military expeditions. He repeatedly defeated the Cholas and assisted the king of Mālhwā to regain his kingdom. He is also said to have reached Bengal and Assam, to have attacked the king of Ceylon, and slain the lord of Kerāla. Finally, we are told, he captured Gangaikonda from the Cholas, Vengī, the capital of the Eastern Chālukyas, and Chakrakotra, a fortress of the Paramāras. On his way home he heard that his father, who had fallen very ill, on learning that his disease was incurable, had solemnly committed suicide by drowning himself in the Tungabhadra. Vikramāditya thereupon hurried home to console his elder brother, who succeeded to the throne in 1068. His reign was uneventful, but when he became intoxicated with pride and neglected his subjects, Vikramāditya deposed him about 1075 and reigned in his stead. Bilhana tells a more elaborate story of these events. According to him the two brothers remained on good terms until Somesvara began to fall into evil ways and tried to injure Vikramāditya, who therefore left the capital with his men, taking his younger brother with him. In spite of the king's

efforts to bring him back, Vikramāditya led his army to the Tungabhadra, where he rested it in preparation for an invasion of the Chola country. He seems however to have turned first to the south-west, for he received the homage of Jayakesin, lord of the Konkan, and of the king of Kerāla. He then opened hostilities against the Cholas, but was stopped by the overtures of the Chola king, Vira Rājendradeva I, and they parted on good terms, sealing their friendship by Vikramāditya's marriage with the daughter of the Chola king. But the death of the latter plunged the kingdom into a state of anarchy. Vikramāditya hurried to Kānchi, put down the rebellion, established his brother-in-law on the throne, and returned to the Tungabhadra. There he heard that his brother-in-law had lost his life in a new rebellion and that the throne had been seized by the Eastern Chālukya, Kottunga (Rajiga). Vikramāditya and Somesvara II then set out, the one to expel, and the other to assist, the usurper, and when Vikramāditya at last came up with Rajiga's forces, Somesvara's army was not far behind. In the conflict that ensued, Vikramāditya seems to have received valuable assistance from the Yādava prince, Seunachandra II. Rajiga fled and Somesvara was taken prisoner. The latter's fate is not known, for although Vikramāditya at first proposed to restore his brother to the Chālukya throne, he finally proclaimed himself king and appointed Jayasimha III viceroy at Banavasi. These events took place in 1076, from which year Vikramāditya began a new era, the *Chālukya-Vikrama-kāla*. He probably reigned for nearly half a century, and numerous epigraphical records survive, the distribution of which frequently confirms Bilhana's statements, while the many feudatories mentioned show that the authority which Vikramāditya claimed was real. His reign was, on the whole, peaceful, disturbed at home only by an attempted rebellion of his younger brother and abroad by a campaign against the new Chālukya family of Chola kings, whose arrogance demanded chastisement. About 1117, the Hoysalas claim to have invaded the Belvola country and advanced as far as the Krishnā. From Sinda records we learn of the defeat and pursuit of an invading Hoysala army by Achgi III, a loyal feudatory and devoted supporter of the Chālukyas.

Vikramāditya VI's younger brother presumably died before him and about 1126 Somesvara III succeeded to the throne. His numerous records indicate that he enjoyed a peaceful reign, with

leisure to follow literary pursuits. He was succeeded by Jagadekamala II, in whose reign Hoysala invaders reappeared, but were again driven back by the Sindas, although Hoysala records claim considerable successes in the field. Of his successor, Taila III, little is known, but it is evident that the power of the Chālukyas was beginning to decline, and some time during his reign a severe blow seems to have been dealt to them by the Kākatiya prince, Prola, who captured Taila, but afterwards released him. Internal troubles were a further source of weakness. Bijjala, the powerful commander-in-chief, incited the army to rebel and finally usurped the throne. Claiming descent from the Kālachuri kings of central India, Bijjala appears first about 1140 as a feudatory of Jagadekamala II, and later as governor of Banavasī and a devoted servant of the Chālukyas. He is mentioned in a Bijāpur inscription of the third year of Taila, without any special titles, and in 1155, although he was then *mahāmandalesvara*, he still recognised Taila as his sovereign. But in the next year he threw off his allegiance and declared himself independent, assuming, among other important titles, that of Kālachurya *chakravartin*. In 1162 he adopted the titles of a paramount sovereign, and rapidly annexed all the Western Chālukya dominions, apparently with the assistance of the Silāhāra Vijayāditya of Karad, for a record of this family claims that Vijayāditya's help enabled Bijjala to become a *chakravartin*. A few years later, in 1168, while his dominions still remained intact, he abdicated and transferred the throne to his son, Sovideva (Somesvara), whose inscriptions dwell on his wife's accomplishments rather than on his own achievements. Sankama, Vira Narāyana and Singhana followed. In 1183 the Chālukyas' sovereignty was restored through the efforts of the *dandanāyaka* Brāhma, in the person of Somesvara IV, son of Taila III. Bijjala having been assassinated in revenge for cruelty to two Jains, and none of his sons and successors possessing his ability, the Chālukyas found it easy to re-establish their authority. Brāhma's services are commemorated by a variety of epithets. He is called "the establisher of Chālukya sovereignty", and the "death-fire to the Kālachuryas". A Hoysala inscription also records his exploits, and mentions that his father, Kavana, was the leader of the Kālachurya forces. But the restoration was short-lived. The Yādavas of Devagiri seem to have been encroaching from the west, while the Hoysalas, under Vira Ballāla I, were advancing from the south,

and a Hoysala inscription expressly mentions a victory over the Chālukya general, Brāhma. Between these two enemies Somesvara was gradually driven into the south-west corner of his kingdom, where he maintained his authority over a remnant of his feudatories, and on his death about 1190 the dynasty ended. A few references to the Chālukyas occur in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, and now and then individuals appeared who claimed Chālukya blood, but none of them seems to have been a direct descendant.

The Yādava dynasty of Devagiri is credited with a long pedigree by Hemādri in his *Vratakhanda*, but their epigraphical records begin only in A.D. 1000, with a grant of Bhīllama II, a vassal of the Western Chālukyas, and not till the second half of the eleventh century did an outstanding figure emerge in Seunachandra II, who claims to have rendered signal service to the Chālukya, Vikramāditya VI. The first member of the family to assume the titles of paramount sovereignty was Bhīllama III, who, about 1187, seized the northern and eastern portions of the lands of his Chālukya suzerain, Somesvara IV, and who was killed in battle by the Hoysalas. Bhīllama founded the city of Devagiri, with which the dynasty was thenceforth associated. His son was Jaitugi I, who claims to have slain in battle the Tailanga king, identified with the Kākatiya, Rudradeva. Numerous records exist of his son, Singhana, who succeeded about 1210, but they contain little precise information, though, from their distribution, it is evident that he ruled over all the lands that had belonged to the Western Chālukyas. References to his successes against the Hoysalas are frequent. His claims are very exaggerated, and, taken literally, imply a dominion extending over India. He certainly won some successes in the north, crossing the Tapṭī and reaching the Mahī, and ravaging the country round Broach. About 1247 he was succeeded by his grandson, Krishna, who seems to have been able to keep the kingdom intact, but little definite information about his reign is available. His brother, Mahādeva, succeeded in 1260, and, while the dynasty suffered no loss of prestige in his reign, its end drew near under his successor, Rāmachandra (1271-1310). He was victorious over the Hoysalas, taking their capital and building a temple there in honour of his victory. At the end of the thirteenth century local records cease, but the

Muslim historians record the conquest of the kingdom. In 1294, during the Muslim invasion, 'Alā-ud-dīn Muhammad defeated Rāmachandra outside his capital, which was taken and plundered. Peace was made on payment of a large indemnity and a promise of tribute to the victor, who then withdrew. In 1306, Rāmachandra being in arrears with his tribute, Malik Kāfūr laid siege to Devagiri in the course of his Deccan campaign. New terms were made. Rāmachandra was treated with honour and restored to his throne, and thereafter he paid homage to the Delhi sultan. His son, Sankara, who succeeded in 1310, was less well disposed to the Muslims, and in 1312 was seized and put to death in the course of Malik Kāfūr's fourth campaign in the Deccan. Devagiri then became Malik Kāfūr's headquarters until his return to Delhi. Harapāla, a brother-in-law of Sankara, then raised a rebellion in the Deccan which spread rapidly until Mubārak took the field against him, when he was captured and executed, and the Yādava dynasty was brought to an end.

The Hoysalas (Poysalas), like the Rāshtrakūtas and other great families, claimed descent from the line of Yadu, *i.e.* the lunar race. The town first associated with their rule is Velāpura (Bellare) in Mysore, but, at a later date, the centre of their government was transferred to Dorasamudra, the modern Halebid. Various legends associated with the rise of the dynasty suggest that they were originally Jains, and later became Vaishnavas. The earliest reference to the Hoysalas is in an inscription of 1006, which mentions that an officer of the Chola king, Rājarāja, had defeated a Hoysala minister named Naganna. The records of the Hoysala dynasty, however, do not trace it beyond Vinayāditya, who is known to have flourished about 1048 as a feudatory of the Cholas. Of his son, Ereyanga, we have no records, but we are told in a later inscription that he conducted a campaign into the north, in which he destroyed Dharā, the capital of the kings of Mālhwā, and that he was equally successful against the Cholas and in Kalinga. How much of this is true we have no means of telling, but his successes were presumably won on behalf of his Chālukya suzerain, and not as an independent monarch. His son, Ballāla I, succeeded him early in the twelfth century and was soon afterwards followed by his younger brother Vishnuvardhana who was reigning in 1117. From a land grant one learns that he was the first

to establish his family in a position of independent authority, by conquering the lands at one time held by the Gangas, which he took from the Chola king.

By 1117 Vishnuvardhana had defeated the Pāndyas and Tulus, subdued a number of petty chiefs, conquered considerable territory, and even threatened Kāñchī. Fourteen years later even greater claims are made on his behalf; he is then said to have humbled the Cholas, Pāndyas, and Kerālas, and to have slain the king of the Āndhras. An inscription of a later reign says that he was strong enough to be treated as an equal by the Chālukya, Vikramāditya VI. But his boast of having washed his horses in the Krishnā is unconfirmed. This region owned the suzerainty of Vikramāditya, and records of the latter's devoted Sinda feudatories assert that they routed the Hoysalas, besieging Dorasamudra and driving the king from his capital. This is the more probable version and any distant conquests which Vishnuvardhana made cannot have been permanent. Frequent mention is made of a member of the Ganga family, Gangarāja, whose support enabled him to secure extensive territory. But though Vishnuvardhana evidently exercised considerable freedom of action, he still bore only the titles of a feudatory.

His son, Narasimha, seems to have done nothing to extend the power of the family, but his grandson, Vīra Ballāla I, established himself as an independent king and signalised the event by establishing about 1191-2 an era of his own. He had already defeated Brāhma, the general of Somesvara IV, the Western Chālukya, and Bhillama, the Yādava king of Devagiri; but his assertion that he became the ruler of all the lands that had belonged to the Western Chālukyas must be accepted with reserve. His final struggle with his Yādava rivals probably took place in the last decade of the twelfth century, for an inscription dated 1202 records that he defeated and slew Bhillama in the vicinity of Gadag. Vīra Ballāla thus became master of most of the territory which the Yādavas had conquered from the Chālukya, Somesvara IV, and reigned over his extended dominions till about 1212. Narasimha II seems to have lost some of his father's territory, but claims victories over the Pāndyas and Kadambas. After a reign of some twenty years he was succeeded by Vīra-Somesvara whose son, Narasimha III, was reigning in 1254. One of his inscriptions, dated 1279, contains an interesting reference to the fact that natives of the Kanarese



country resident in Benares paid a tax to the Turushkas, *i.e.*, the Muhammadan sultan of Delhi. The last ruler of the Hoysala dynasty was Vira Ballāla III, whose inscriptions are dated from 1292 to 1317. In 1310 'Alā-ud-dīn Muhammad, having completed the conquest of the Yādavas, sent an army under Malik Kāfūr and Khvāja Hājji against the Hoysalas. Crossing the God-āvarī, the invaders laid waste the Hoysala kingdom, captured the king, and sacked his capital. After being detained in Delhi for three years, Ballāla was released, and, on his return, set about organising the defences of his country against further Muslim attacks. In the course of this he founded the impregnable city of Vijayanagar, whence Hindu leaders long continued to defend the south against their enemies. Thus arose out of the Hoysala empire the kingdom known by the name of its great fortress and capital.

With the decline of the Āndhras the western part of the southern Deccan, like the eastern, passed to the Chutus, of whom little is known. Not till this region, known as the Karnāṭaka, came into the possession of their successors, the Kadambas, does its history begin. The story of the rise of the Kadamba dynasty is told in the Talgund inscription of Kākusthavarman (c. A.D. 425-50). Its founder was a Brāhman named Mayūrasarman, who went to study in Kānchī, for centuries a famous centre of learning. There he quarrelled with a Kshatriya and was humiliated to find that those who followed the profession of arms held students in contempt. Determining, therefore, "to exchange the implements of sacrifice for the sword", he set up as a freebooter, gathered a following in his native district, and soon grew powerful. He became a thorn in the side of the Pallavas, then suffering under Samudragupta's invasion. Deeming it advisable to come to terms, they recognised Mayūrasarman as lord of considerable territory in the west, with Banavasī as his capital, and in return he acknowledged Pallava suzerainty. His date may be put at A.D. 340-60. Of his successors little is known. Of Kangavarman, Bhagiratha and Raghu only conventional records survive in the inscriptions, from which one gathers they were not left in peace by their neighbours. One of them was the king of Kuntala over whom the Vākātaka Prithivīśena I claimed a victory. Raghu was succeeded by his brother, Kākusthavarman, in whose reign the country seems to have enjoyed unusual prosperity. He was probably the greatest

of the early Kadambas. His daughters made distinguished marriages, from which we may deduce that his neighbours were anxious to have him as an ally. One of them married a "Gupta" king, *i.e.* one of the Vākātakas, who were exceedingly proud of their descent from the daughter of Chandragupta II. Sāntivarman, son and successor of Kākustha, ruled with equal success and added to the Kadamba dominions, which became so extensive that he appointed his brother, Krishnavarman, to rule the southern portion as viceroy. The next ruler, Mrigesavarman, came to the throne in A.D. 472. During his reign the southern province, under his uncle, Krishnavarman, seceded and became independent, while another member of the family, Kumārarvarman, established himself in the east, where he was succeeded by his son, Mandhata. Mrigesavarman fought successfully against the Gangas and Pallavas. His uncle, Krishnavarman, was less fortunate. Though apparently so successful at first that he is said to have performed the horse-sacrifice, he suffered a severe defeat in a war with the Pallavas, and probably became a Pallava vassal, for his son in disgust became a hermit. Another son, Vishnuvarman, was set on the throne by the Pallavas but neither he nor his son, Simhavarman, appears to have been in any way distinguished.

On the death of Mrigesavarman, both Mandhata and Vishnuvarman, the representatives of the younger lines, tried to seize Banavasī and the lands of the older branch, but Ravivarman, the youthful heir, finally routed Mandhata and slew Vishnuvarman. He became one of the great rulers of the Kadambas. Not only did he defeat all claimants to the throne and unite all the Kadamba territory, but he waged successful war on his neighbours, the Gangas and Pallavas. He overthrew the Pallava whom he calls Chandadanda, presumably Skandavarman V. The distribution of his inscriptions shows that he did extend his territory. He made a new capital at Palāsikā (Halsi). Ravivarman's long reign probably covered the first four decades of the sixth century. His son, Hari-varman, was the last of the main line and was succeeded, whether peacefully or otherwise cannot be determined with certainty, by Krishnavarman II of the southern branch. This reign was marked by the loss to the Chālukyas of the northern portion of Kadamba territory, where Pulakesin I made Vātāpi his capital. Krishnavarman II is stated to have ruled his diminished territory with sufficient success to justify his performing the horse-sacrifice, but

his son, Ajavarman, was reduced to the position of a vassal of the Chālukyas. Ajavarman's son, Bhogivarman, took advantage of Pulakesin II's engagements elsewhere to regain a short-lived independence, but, as soon as the Chālukya was free, he crushed his rebellious vassal and the dynasty thus came to an end, its lands passing to the Chālukyas. About this time Hiuen Tsang visited Banavasī. For over two centuries, the Karnātika shared the history of the Chālukyas—for whom it was ruled by their vassals, the Alūpas—and the Rāshtrakūtas.

The Kadamba family however was not extinct, and when Tailapa II succeeded in overthrowing the Rāshtrakūtas and re-establishing the Chālukyas, he rewarded a Kadamba named Irivabedanga who had assisted him, by restoring to him, about A.D. 975, the old kingdom of Banavasī. Irivabedanga's son, Chattadeva, proved a valiant supporter of the Chālukyas. His kingdom formed a bulwark against the Cholas and must have suffered much from their invasions. He played a prominent part in the war between the Chālukyas and Paramāras, assisting considerably in the rout of the latter. Chattadeva enjoyed a long reign which lasted till 1031 at least, and those of his immediate successors were uneventful except for occasional Chola raids. A dispute regarding the succession, which arose between Taila's grandson, Sāntivarman, and the latter's nephew, Kīrtivarman, was amicably settled by a partition of territory. The latter made an unsuccessful attempt to cast off his allegiance to the Chālukyas. Early in the twelfth century the Kadambas began to suffer from the ambition of the Hoysala, Vishnuvardhana, who, after defeating the Pāndyas, turned his attention to the Carnatic. He sacked Banavasī and proceeded to lay siege to Hangāl, the capital, which was finally reduced in spite of the valiant defence of Taila II, who was taken prisoner and put to death in 1130. Tailapa's son and eventual successor, Mallikarjuna, was more fortunate, for during his reign the Hoysalas were fully occupied in resisting the Sinda general dispatched by the Chālukyas to curb their rapidly increasing power. Mallikarjuna's nephew, Kīrtideva, succeeded, probably with the help of the Kālachuris, who had replaced the Chālukyas as overlords of the Kadambas, in regaining all that had been lost to the Hoysalas. Kāmadeva, son of Kīrtideva, not only successfully resisted Hoysala aggression, but turned the tables on them by invading their territory. During his reign (1180-1217) Kadamba independence, so seriously threatened fifty years before, was firmly re-established, and he

left to his successor, Mallideva, a considerable kingdom which remained, for a time, unmolested by its exhausted enemies. Towards the end of his reign, however, Mallideva seems to have acknowledged the suzerainty of the Yādavas, who helped him to avenge a defeat which he suffered at the hands of the Hoysalas. Kāmādeva, who succeeded to the throne about 1260, and who was probably a son of Mallideva, seems to have assisted his Yādava suzerain against the Hoysalas and to have been suitably rewarded. Towards the end of the century, however, the Yādavas were weakened by the Muhammadan invasion, and the Hoysalas who, under the able Vīra Ballāla III, had settled their domestic troubles and were seeking to regain their former position in the Deccan, invaded Kadamba territory, at first with considerable success, but in 1300 they were completely routed at Sirsi by a combined Kadamba and Chālukya force. In 1310 Malik Kāfūr sacked Dora-samudra and took the Hoysala king prisoner. The Kadambas also must have suffered, as the Muslim army passed through their country, but, like the Hoysalas, they recovered. The final destruction of the Hoysalas and the death of Vīra Ballāla III did not however restore the Kadambas to power, for Vīra Ballāla had securely laid the foundations of the great Vijayanagar empire, and Purandara, the last Kadamba ruler, was one of the first victims of Harihara, or rather of his brother, Mārāpa, and the Banavaśī and Hangāl territory, with which the Kadambas had been associated for a century, passed from them.

In the tenth century another branch of the Kadamba family began to rise to prominence with the decline of the Rāshtrakūtas. Their capital was at first Chandūr (Chandrapura), and their original territory was a strip of coast between the sea and the mountains to the south of Goa, which was still in the possession of the Silāhāras. Later inscriptions trace the foundation of this kingdom to a certain Shashtha and his son, Chaturbhujā. The latter's son, Guhalladeva, extended his power at the expense of his neighbours and claims to have assisted a Pallava king, presumably against the Cholas. The next ruler, Shashtradeva, reduced the Southern Silāhāras, his neighbours on the north, and added the Konkan to his ancestral lands. His capture of Goa is compared by his panegyrists to Rāma's conquest of Ceylon. He died, after a long reign, about 1050, leaving a considerable and well-established kingdom to his son, Jayakesin I, who moved his capital to the city of Goa, already embellished by his father. In the north he

extended his power still further by slaying the last Silāhāra king, Mammuri, and adding Kāpardika to his territory. Thence he led a successful expedition into the Lāta country. In the south he claimed a success against the Cholas, presumably won on behalf of his Chālukya overlord, for he seems to have acted as intermediary in the peace negotiations that followed. A few years later, in connection with the struggle between the two Chālukyas, Somesvara II, and his brother, Vikramāditya VI, Jayakesin claims to have helped to set the latter on the throne. He also brought under his rule the other branch of the Kadambas, that of Hangāl and Banavāsī, thus for a time uniting all the Kadamba lands under one ruler. The next two kings were undistinguished, but Jayakesin II, who came to the throne in 1104, was one of the greatest of the dynasty. Early in his reign, taking advantage of Chālukya preoccupation with a Hoysala invasion, he cast off his allegiance. But, having been speedily reduced to obedience by force, he was conciliated by diplomacy, and the Chālukya further attached his powerful feudatory to him by giving him his daughter in marriage. Towards the end of his reign Jayakesin, like his relative in Hangāl, lost territory to the Hoysala, Vishnuvardhana. In 1148 he was succeeded by his son, Permādi, who remained faithful to the Chālukyas until their overthrow in 1186, when he proclaimed himself independent as emperor of the Konkan. In the reign of his brother and successor, Vijayāditya (Vishnuchitta), the Kālachuryas made an unsuccessful attempt to extort allegiance from the Kadambas. The Hoysalas were more successful, however, for Vijayāditya paid tribute to Vīra Ballāla III, and about the same time Kāmadeva of the Hangāl branch also claimed that Vijayāditya was his feudatory. The next ruler, Jayakesin III, had a long and uneventful reign, for the Hoysalas and Yādavas were too busily engaged with each other to be able to interfere elsewhere; but, when the struggle was decided in favour of the Yādavas, one of their first victims was the next Kadamba ruler, Tribhuvanamalla, who was slain in a crushing defeat about 1236. The Yādavas then ruled the Kadamba country for ten years until its recovery by Tribhuvanamalla's son, Shashtadeva. After his victories over the Yādavas, Malik Kāfūr marched on Goa and destroyed it, the old city of Chandūr becoming the capital of Kāmadeva, who had succeeded his brother-in-law about 1260 and who ruled till 1310. The last blow to the Kadambas was the invasion of Muhammad ibn Tughluk in 1327, when Chandūr was destroyed. The sultans

of Delhi did not again invade the Konkan, but a Muslim force finally sacked Chandūr and destroyed the last vestiges of Kadamba power. According to Ibn Battūta the Muslims attacked Chandūr by invitation of a rebel son of the Kadamba king, and after a long siege took the town. It never was regained by the Kadambas, who disappear from history.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, when the Muslims were preparing to extend their conquests southwards, the Deccan and south India were divided into four kingdoms, two in the Deccan and two in the peninsula. The western half of the Deccan formed the territory of the Yādavas of Devagiri (Deogīr); to the south and east lay the Hoysala kingdom, with the Kākatiyas of Warangal to the north and to the south the Pāndyas, who had enlarged their territory at the expense of the Cholas, after the latter had been reduced by the Hoysalas. The Hoysalas lay therefore in a central position, and had to be on their guard against their neighbours in all directions. The relative geographical positions of these four powers and their divided interests formed the main reason for their taking no concerted steps against the Muslim invaders. The serious nature of the threat from the north was not at first realised, as the early Muslim invasions were little more than raiding expeditions with plunder as their chief object. Not until Malik Kāfūr was sent with definite orders to conquer southern India were the eyes of the Hindu rulers of the south opened to the danger that threatened them, but the danger of one kingdom evoked neither sympathy nor cooperation from the others. Deogīr fell, and Warangal became a base for further advance southwards. The Hoysala capital was the next to fall, and its ruler also became a Muslim feudatory. Finally a pretext was found for Muhammadan intervention in the far south. Vīra and Sundara, the two sons of Māravarman, disputed the Pāndyan succession, and the latter is said to have appealed for help to the Muslims, who invaded the Pāndyan territory, set Sundara on the throne, and collected vast booty. Malik Kāfūr then returned to Delhi, where he was detained by the troubles that broke out on the death of 'Alā-ud-dīn. South India then recovered so much of its independence that when Mubārak came to power he was obliged to reconquer it. In a vigorous campaign he extinguished the Yādava dynasty, made Deogīr a Muslim province, and constructed a series of forts in strategical positions on his southern

frontier. While the Hoysala ruler, Vīra Ballāla, recognised his danger and made counter preparations, the Kākatiyas shared the fate of the Yādavas. Muhammad ibn Tughluk advanced southwards as far as Madura and Cannanore in 1328. But the Hoysala monarch, continuing his defensive preparations and moving his capital to a more suitable centre, prevented the Muslims from conquering Madura. The governor there declared himself independent. Vīra Ballāla gradually extended his territory southwards and himself seriously threatened Madura; but in a battle fought at Trichinopoly in 1342 he was taken prisoner and put to death, and, a few years later, his son and successor met a similar fate. The Hoysala monarch's work was, however, continued by competent officers. Prominent among these were three brothers. The eldest Harihara, governed the southern Marāṭha country, with his headquarters at Bankapur, while Kampa held Nellore and Udayagiri, and Bukka Hampi and Dorasamudra. Their two younger brothers also held minor posts, while farther south was Bukka's able son Kampana, doorkeeper to the Hoysala king. These five brothers and their nephew were the founders of the kingdom of Vijayanagar, and the protagonists of a Hindu movement seeking to defend its threatened culture in the south. A learned Brāhman, Vidyaranya, is credited with sharing in their councils. The great stronghold of Vijayanagar was built by Vīra Ballāla III, soon after Muhammad ibn Tughluk's destruction of Kampli and the Muslim conquest of Dorasamudra. In the meanwhile the Bahmanīs had established their power in the Deccan, and were watching Delhi as anxiously as the Hindus. Harihara is last mentioned about the time that Bahman Shāh declared his independence. By the time of the latter's death, Bukka seems to have been the sole surviving representative of the five brothers, who had inherited the Hoysala traditions of hostility to Islam. When Fīrūz Shāh III announced that he would not attempt to bring the south again under the rule of Delhi, the Hindus of Vijayanagar and the Muhammadans of Gulbarga, freed from this anxiety, were able to undertake hostilities on their own account. As soon as Bukka had destroyed the kingdom of Madura, and was free from danger on the south, a pretext for a quarrel was soon found. Bahman Shāh prohibited the gold coins of Vijayanagar from circulating in his kingdom. Bukka resented this and was supported by the Hindu bankers of the Deccan, who melted down the coins of

their Muslim sovereign. Repeated warnings were disregarded, till in 1360 all Hindu bankers and money-changers in Muslim territory were put to death and for the next forty years their descendants were not allowed to resume business. The king of Vijayanagar arrogantly protested against the Muslim claim to issue gold coin as an assertion of sovereignty, demanding that the Rāichūr Doāb should be surrendered to him, and threatening to join the sultan of Delhi in an attack on the Deccan. The Bahmanī sultan, Muhammad I, delayed his reply to this ultimatum until his preparations were complete. He then demanded why his vassal of Vijayanagar had not sent him gifts on his accession and required that they should be sent at once. A joint Hindu force from Warangal and Vijayanagar then took the field against him, but the Bahmanīs were victorious and, marching to Warangal, levied a great indemnity before returning to Gulbarga. Hostilities continued, and in 1362 on the complaint of some horse-dealers that on their way through Vināyak Deva's country they had been compelled to sell him their best horses, Muhammad raided Warangal, captured Vināyak Deva, and put him to a cruel death. In the course of his withdrawal, Muhammad was much harassed by the Hindus, losing a considerable number of men and all his baggage. In 1365 Muhammad, in a fit of drunken humour, demanded that a troupe of dancers, who had been entertaining him, should be paid from the Vijayanagar treasury. This order infuriated Bukka, who sent the messenger back with contumely, and, rapidly crossing the Tungabhadra at the head of an army, captured Mudgal and massacred the garrison. Muhammad swore revenge, and the vigour with which he began to put his threats into action so alarmed Bukka that he fled with his cavalry, leaving the rest of his numerous army to follow as best it could. The Muhammadans captured a vast quantity of booty, and slew 70,000 Hindus regardless of age, rank, or sex. After the rainy season they again took the field, and in 1367 a fierce battle was fought at Kauthal, the first great conflict between Hindus and Muslims in the Deccan. At first victory inclined to the Hindus, but when the Muslim reserves came up, with the king himself in command, the tide began to turn, and the superiority of the Muslim artillery with its European and Turkish gunners determined the issue. The Hindu forces fled, pursued by the victors, who gave no quarter. Bukka shut himself up in Vijayanagar which was besieged by the



Muslims without success, until, feigning a retreat, they tempted out the defenders, who were taken by surprise and routed. Bukka fled back to his stronghold, and Muhammad began a general massacre, which continued until Bukka sued for peace. This was granted only when Bukka consented to honour Muhammad's draft on his treasury. More than 400,000 Hindus had been slain, and it was agreed that in future non-combatants should be spared.

In 1377 Mujāhid succeeded to the Bahmanī throne and demanded the cession of large tracts of lands from Bukka, whose refusal was reinforced by a counter-claim. Mujāhid thereupon took the field against Bukka, who evaded battle for six months and finally shut himself in his capital. After some minor successes the invaders withdrew, taking with them a large number of prisoners. They then besieged Adoni for some months without success, after which peace was made, the Muslims returned home, and for the next twenty years the two kingdoms refrained from war. In 1379 Bukka was succeeded by Harihara II, who, taking advantage of local risings against the Muslims which were then engaging the shah's attention, invaded Bahmanī territory in 1398 at the head of an enormous army. With the comparatively small force left at his disposal to meet this new threat, Firūz Shāh advanced to the Krishnā, on the other bank of which the Hindu army, numbering over 900,000, was encamped. In view of the overwhelming odds, direct attack was hopeless, but a certain Surāj-ud-dīn, who occupied a minor judicial post in the Bahmanī service, obtained Firūz's sanction of a bold stratagem which proved entirely successful. Surāj-ud-dīn, who was an expert conjurer, crossed the river with a small company of players and gave exhibitions of skill in the Hindu camp. The performers' fame quickly spread, and they were invited to the tent of Harihara's son. After displaying their more peaceful arts, they proceeded to give a marvellous demonstration of sword-play, in the course of which they fell suddenly upon the prince and his retinue, slew them and their guards, and escaped in the darkness. The Hindu camp was thrown into great disorder, confusion turning to panic as rumours grew and spread. In the meanwhile the passage of the Muslim army across the river was covered by a small force which had been sent over in readiness for this purpose. The panic-stricken Hindus could offer no ordered resistance, and Harihara fled, leaving his army to its fate. The Bahmanīs chased the fugitives into Vijaya-

nagar, where peace was made—on payment of a large indemnity to ransom the prisoners taken in the campaign, and Firūz Shāh withdrew in triumph.

Harihara died in 1406 and was succeeded by his son, Bukka II, who very soon broke the peace with the Bahmanīs. Hearing of the beauty of a goldsmith's daughter of Mudgal, he sent to her parents to demand her, but the girl herself declined the honour, and when Bukka, at the head of a small force, crossed the Tungabhadra to seize her, she fled. The Hindus then pillaged the country, until they were defeated and expelled by the governor of the province. At the end of the year Firūz headed an expedition to avenge this insult, but could effect nothing against the defences of Vijayanagar. He therefore withdrew, but took up a strong position at some distance from the capital, where he defied Bukka's efforts to dislodge him. In the meanwhile the shah's brother, Ahmad Khān, was plundering the country, seizing vast quantities of treasure and taking numerous prisoners. Peace was at last secured only when Bukka appealed for it in person, and agreed to accept humiliating terms. In addition to satisfying exorbitant demands for money, jewels, elephants and slaves, he was forced to give a daughter in marriage to Firūz, whose son then married the goldsmith's beautiful daughter. Bukka died in 1408, and was succeeded by his brother, whose son, Vira Vijaya, followed him after a short reign of five years. Some initial successes won by the latter over the old and enfeebled Firūz were vigorously avenged by the new Muslim ruler, Ahmad Shāh. Vira Vijaya defended the south bank of the Tungabhadra with a huge but unwieldy army until Ahmad assumed the offensive. He sent a force across by night which, while preparing to attack the Hindu army in the rear, actually captured Vira Vijaya himself, who, though he escaped, was too late to rally his men, and they were quickly scattered by the main Muslim force, which had already crossed the river. Ahmad then marched his army through the country, plundering and slaughtering in revenge for the Hindu atrocities of the earlier part of the campaign. Everything possible was done to wound the religious and natural feelings of the Hindus, until at length Vira Vijaya sued for peace, which was again purchased at a heavy price. On Vira Vijaya's death, Devarāya II, his successor, reorganised the Vijayanagar army. Like the Bahmanīs, he recognised the value of Turkish mounted archers, and enlisted 2000

of them, giving them a mosque, and taking every precaution against offending their religious scruples. In due time the force of 60,000 men trained by these mercenaries made its influence felt. When Devarāya II died in 1449, he left a powerful army and a kingdom with an excellent administrative system, and his successor, Mallikarjuna, who ruled till about 1468, was able to repel the Muslim attacks. In circumstances which are not quite clear, Mallikarjuna was succeeded by his brother, Virupāksha, who put to death all possible claimants to the throne, and proceeded to rule both incompetently and cruelly, until Sāluva Narasimha, the viceroy of the eastern provinces, intervened, deposed the king, and himself ruled for six years, during which he restored order in the provinces that had seceded from Virupāksha. Sāluva Narasimha was succeeded by his two sons, one after the other, the second being deposed by Vīra Narasimha, a son of that Narasa who had been Sāluva Narasimha's trusted general and adviser. On Vīra Narasimha's death in 1509 his minister secured the throne for the king's youngest brother, Krishnadevarāya, destined to be Vijayanagar's greatest ruler. By the beginning of the sixteenth century the Bahmanis had given place to the five Muslim kingdoms of Bijāpur, Ahmadnagar, Bīdar, Berar, and Golconda, while the Portuguese, who had by that time established themselves at Goa, introduced a new element into south Indian politics. Krishna employed the early years of his reign in consolidating his northern and western frontiers. He then turned to the east, where the kings of Orissa still held sway as far south as Udayagiri, which he took in 1513. In the following year he resumed his campaign and reduced other strongholds of the king of Orissa, the most important being that of Kondavīr. After these and other victories of the Vijayanagar arms, peace was made, and Orissa ceded all the land south of the Krishnā. On his return home from his campaigns, Krishnadevarāya devoted himself to restoring the buildings that had been damaged or destroyed in the Muslim invasions. His next warlike act was the seizure of the Rāichūr Doāb, long coveted by his predecessors, and he was able to resist the efforts of the 'Ādil Shāhīs to recover it. His later years were troubled by illness, as well as by the rebellions of his relatives and trusted officials. Achyutarāya succeeded him in 1530, and was obliged, immediately after his accession, to take the field against Sellappa, a rebel governor who had taken refuge with the king of Travancore.

After thus successfully inaugurating his reign, Achyuta returned home and gave himself up to a life of leisure, allowing the real power to pass into the hands of his brothers-in-law, the Tirumalas. But their exercise of the royal authority was resented by three brothers, one of whom was connected by marriage with Krishnadevarāya, and they took up arms against the usurpers. At first the latter were successful, but later were forced to seek the assistance of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil of Bijāpur and in the end the three brothers triumphed. In the meanwhile Achyuta had died and been succeeded by his son, Venkatarāya, who was killed by one of the Tirumalas. In 1542 the three brothers placed on the throne Sadāsivarāya, one of whose first acts was to invade Bijāpur in concert with the rulers of Golconda, Ahmadnagar and Bīdar. Ibrāhīm, however, withstood this assault and won over the ruler of Bīdar, 'Alī Barīd, from his unnatural alliance. In 1547 a new alliance between Burhān Shāh of Ahmadnagar and Sadāsivarāya led to a number of victories over Bijāpur, the most notable being the capture of the stronghold of Sholapur, which was retained by Burhān Nizām Shāh. On the death of Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh in 1558, his successor, 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh, formed a confederation against his powerful rival, Ahmadnagar. Having won over Sadāsivarāya to his side, and secured the help of Ibrāhīm Kutb Shāh of Golconda, he felt strong enough to demand the return of Sholapur, and when this was refused, the allied armies invaded Ahmadnagar, where the Hindus were guilty of great excesses against the Muslim inhabitants. Although deserted by their Golconda ally, and harassed by a Berar army under Jahāngīr Khān, the invaders were victorious, and dictated humiliating terms to Husain. In these events Sadāsiva had taken the lead, and began to treat his ally, 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh, as a vassal. Husain at once began to plan his revenge, and with Ibrāhīm Kutb Shāh laid siege to Kalyāni in 1561. On the approach of 'Alī and Sadāsivarāya to the relief of the town, they turned to meet them. But Husain lost most of his artillery in country made impassable by floods, while his ally fled at the first attack. He was therefore forced to retire, leaving his camp and artillery in the hands of the Vijayanagar army. The victory of the Hindus was marked by further atrocities against Muslim non-combatants, from which their Muslim ally was unable to restrain them. Sadāsivarāya proceeded to lay siege to Ahmadnagar, but, having lost a large part of his army in a sudden flood, was forced

to return home, whence he sent demands for the cession of territory by friend and foe alike. It soon became apparent that, unless he were checked, he would become paramount in south India. The differences between the Muslim rulers were therefore composed; an alliance was formed by the kings of Ahmadnagar, Bijāpur, Golconda and Bīdar; and, at the end of 1564, the combined forces met at Sholapur, which had been handed back by Husain to 'Alī as his daughter's dowry. From Sholapur the allies advanced to Talikota, on a tributary of the Krishnā. The Hindus in the meanwhile had not been idle, and, while a large force guarded the fords of the Krishnā, Sadāsiva, with the main army of nearly a million, took up his position a few miles to the south. The Muslims, finding the fords guarded, marched for three days up stream, the Hindus following on the opposite side. They then turned suddenly, and, covering in one day the whole distance, crossed by the unguarded fords. A fierce encounter took place on January 5, 1565. On the Hindu side, the king of Vijayanagar commanded the centre, with his brothers on right and left, while Husain, with the artillery, commanded the Muslim centre. The first charge of the Hindu cavalry almost won the day, but Husain was able to hold his ground until his army had recovered from the shock, and the Muslim artillery quickly wrought havoc in the close ranks of the Hindus. A cavalry charge increased the confusion, and Sadāsiva, who had refused a horse and directed the battle from a throne, sought to escape in a litter. He was captured, by accident rather than design, and was immediately executed by Husain Shāh. The loss of their leader ended the resistance of the Hindus. Besides taking vast quantities of plunder, the victorious Muslims, aided, no doubt, by Muslim mercenaries in the garrison who had been disgusted by Sadāsiva's atrocities against their coreligionists, captured Vijayanagar, till then believed to be impregnable. The battle of Talikota marked the end of Hindu dominion in south India, which a year or two earlier had seemed to be passing, state by state, under Vijayanagar control. A comparatively small, but well-trained and disciplined force had triumphed over a huge, but unwieldy and ill-trained army. One of Sadāsiva's brothers became a vassal of Bijāpur, while the other continued to hold a portion of the country in the south; but Krishnadevarāya's great Hindu kingdom had become only a memory.

## CHAPTER X

### South India

The southern extremity of the Indian peninsula has always had a history and character of its own. This is the Tamil country, *Tamilakam*, the northern boundary of which is roughly a line drawn from Mahé in the west to Venkata, about a hundred miles north of Madras, in the east. Tamil was originally the language of the whole area, Malayalam, the language of the Malabar coast, having branched off from it in the historical period. The name *Tamilakam* was known to Ptolemy in the readily recognisable form of *Damirike*. Tamil is really the same word as Dravidian (*Dravida*), but it has come to have a more limited application.

Early references to the extreme south are rare in the Sanskrit literature of northern India. There is no mention of it in Pāṇini, but his commentator, Kātyāyana, who lived in the fourth century A.D., knew of the Cholas and Pāṇdyas. The epics show some knowledge of the place-names of the south, while the *Arthasāstra*'s fuller acquaintance with southern products has provoked the suggestion that it is the work of a southern author; but this fact should rather be regarded as evidence of a late date. Although dynasties like the Pāṇdyas later claimed descent from the Pāṇḍus and other epic heroes, it is quite clear from the early Tamil literature that the Tamils were not Āryans, and that between the two there existed a great breach and a hereditary enmity similar to that between the Āryans and Dasyus in the north.

South India was traditionally divided into three kingdoms, Chola, Pāṇḍya and Chera (or Kerāla). In the interior were also a number of tribes or petty principalities, none of whose chiefs ever attained recognition as a "crowned king". Tamil literature depicts the early rulers of southern India as continually engaged in war, a state of affairs equally true of the historical period. The kingdoms of the south were extremely wealthy. Their land grew spices, especially pepper, much sought after in the western world; their elephants gave ivory, also highly prized; the sea yielded pearls, and their mines precious stones. They manufactured muslins and silks. From early times they traded with Egypt and

Arabia on the one side, and with the Malay archipelago and thence with China on the other. Their seaports were great commercial centres, sending forth the valuable products of their own lands in return for those of foreign regions. This trade was ancient. It was ultimately, if not directly, from south India that the ships of Tarshish brought to Solomon ivory, apes and peacocks. The Hebrew word for "peacock" is clearly a Tamil loan-word, and the English "pea-" can be traced through Latin and Greek to the same Tamil source. Other Tamil words which early came into Greek with exports from the south were the words for rice, ginger, cinnamon, and other articles. A Greek play discovered on a papyrus in Egypt contains passages which have been identified as Tamil. The Greeks of Egypt under the Ptolemies of the last three centuries B.C. traded regularly with India, and, when Egypt became a Roman province, this commerce was still further developed. By Pliny's time men had discovered how to take advantage of the monsoons and use the shortest sea-route, instead of hugging the coast as they had done in the earliest days of this trade. Pliny gives a brief account of the trade with India, and the author of the *Periplus* gives further details. The former laments the wealth of Roman gold poured into India in payment for luxuries, and this is corroborated by the extensive finds in southern India of Roman coins, both gold and silver, of the first two and a half centuries A.D. The Pāndyan king sent embassies to Augustus, and the fact that there were colonies of Roman merchants in the seaports of southern India suggests that their position was regulated by diplomatic agreements. An elaborate customs-system existed. Tamil sources corroborate the Roman writers. They tell us of wine, lamps and vases imported by the 'Yavanas' and gold brought in exchange for pepper. Both Greeks and Romans are known to the southern literature as 'Yavanas', a word which must have come from the north through the Sanskrit. The Sanskrit *mlechcha*, 'barbarian', is also applied to them. There is no trace of any name which might have been used by these Greeks or Romans of themselves—but it could not have been 'Ionians'. Tamil poets describe the fine ships of the 'Yavanas', while Pliny tells us of the archers they carried as a protection against pirates. The discipline of the Roman veterans seems to have impressed the Tamil kings, for they employed bodyguards of Roman soldiers, whose habit of wearing long coats was as remarkable to the

southern poets as the comparative nudity of the Tamils has been to strangers at all periods. These Romans are described as dumb because they could only communicate with their fellow-retainers by gestures, and they seem to have kept to themselves. The earliest copper coins of south India and Ceylon are copies of Roman coins of the Constantinian period, by which time, however, regular trade had ceased. It is just possible that they were issued in some of the Roman settlements which are believed to have existed.

The Romans are said to have had two cohorts stationed at Muziris (Cranganore) in the Chera country to protect their interests, and even to have built a temple of Augustus. The great Chola port of Kāveripattanam (Puhār) also had a quarter for foreign merchants. How far it is true that southern Indian, and particularly Pallava, architecture shows Roman influence is a question still to be settled. Ptolemy's geographical knowledge of southern India is much more detailed and accurate than of the north. Classical sources, however, tell us nothing of political history; for that we are dependent on Tamil literature and inscriptions. The history of the south is the history of the three kingdoms, each of which had its day, with a period in which the intruding Pallavas were predominant.

The earliest reference to the Pāndyas and their territory is found in Megasthenes, who mentions the kingdom of *Pandaiē*, celebrated for its pearls. It was, he says, called after the daughter of the Indian Hercules, *i.e.* Siva, which is probably an echo of some myth connecting Pāndya with the Pāndus. In the inscriptions of Asoka the Pāndyas are mentioned among the southern neighbours of the Mauryas. Pliny refers to the *Pandae* who, he says, were ruled by women, a statement which no doubt owes its origin to inaccurate stories of the matriarchal institutions of southern India. The *Mahāvamsa* records a Pāndyan occupation of Ceylon from 43 to 29 B.C. The 'Pandion' who sent an embassy to Augustus must have been a Pāndyan king. The cotton and pearls of the Pāndya country are mentioned in the *Arthasāstra*.

It is not till the early centuries of the Christian era, with the rise of the literature of the Tamil academies (*sangam*), that we have any regular record of the Pāndya territory as forming an important kingdom in southern India, occupying the most southerly and the south-eastern part of the peninsula, roughly corresponding with



the modern districts of Tinnevely, Rāmnād and Madura, with its capital at Madura, the 'southern Mathura'.

The references to Pāndya rulers which occur in the *sangam* literature are quite incidental, and it is not possible to reconstruct from them any consecutive history. Mudukudumi Peruvaludi is mentioned as a celebrated conqueror, and there are references to a great battle at Talaiyālangānam, in which a young king named Nedunjeliyan finally triumphed over a confederation of adversaries who at first seemed likely to crush him. The *sangam* literature, however, tells more of the social life of the Pāndyas than of their political history. The country was wealthy and prosperous, and already completely under the influence of Brāhmanism. The Pāndya kings performed the Vedic sacrifices.

For the period from the fourth to the sixth century no records exist. Not till the eighth and ninth centuries do dated inscriptions set the chronology on certain ground. It is probable that during the earlier period Pāndya power suffered an eclipse, but a revival began in the seventh century under a king named Kadungon and his son, Māravarman. The latter's grandson, Arikesari Māravarman, a more authentic figure, destroyed the Paravas, and won a great victory over the Kerāla (Chera) king at the battle of Nelveli. He seems to have enlarged considerably the Pāndya kingdom. His son, Kochchadaiyan Ranadhīra, was also a great conqueror, and won numerous titles of honour on the battlefield. He carried the Pāndya arms as far as Mangalore in the west where he defeated the 'Mahāratha' probably the Western Chālukya Vikramāditya I. His son, Rājasimha I, consolidated his father's conquests in the west, and routed the Pallava king, Pallavamalla. Jatila Parāntaka, the son and successor of Rājasimha I, ascended the throne about 760. During his long reign of nearly fifty years, he continued his father's campaigns, winning particular successes in the north and west. The Kongu king was captured and thrown into prison, and his land passed definitely under Pāndya rule. A similar fate befel the king of Venād in the south. Parāntaka was one of the greatest of the earlier Pāndya kings, and his rule extended far beyond that of any of his predecessors. An equally successful reign is claimed for his son Śrīmāra Śrīvallabha, who took the title *Parachakrakotapala*, and who is said to have conquered Ceylon. His success in Ceylon is admitted by Singhalese sources, but it is difficult to reconcile with the Indian evidence

their story of a great counter-offensive which ended in the death of the Pāndya king, the sack of his capital, and the placing of a Singhalese nominee on the throne. Srimāra's victory over the Pallavas at Kudamūkkū seems to be admitted by the Pallavas, but was later avenged by Nripatunga at Arichit. The next Pāndya king, Varagunavarman, reigned from A.D. 860 till about 880. At first he held his own with some success against the Pallavas and the rising power of the Cholas, but towards the end of his reign he suffered a severe reverse at the hands of Aparājita, son of Nripatunga. Passing over the brief reign of Varaguna's brother, we come to that of his nephew, Rājasimha II, which is well documented from Pāndya and Chola records. By this time the power of the Cholas constituted a serious threat to the older kingdom; Rājasimha II therefore looked around for allies, and, with the help of a force sent by the king of Ceylon, invaded the lands of the Chola king, Parāntaka. In a great battle fought at Velūr the invaders were completely routed. The Pāndya king escaped with his regalia to his ally in Ceylon, leaving his capital to be occupied by the Chola king. The Chola success was complete, and the half-hearted efforts of Rājasimha to restore his fortunes were of no avail. The Pāndya kingdom was thus deprived of its independence for some three centuries, from about A.D. 920 until the end of the twelfth century.

The Pāndya line, however, was not extinct, and the lot of the Chola governors was difficult. The weakening of Chola power in the middle of the tenth century after the great victory of the Rāshtrakūta, Krishna III, gave to Vīra Pāndya, a member of the old ruling family, an opportunity which he hastened to seize. He seems to have killed the Chola governor, but, when the Cholas had recovered from the shock inflicted on them in the north, he was overcome and executed. Rājarāja, the great Chola, seems to have found it necessary to reconquer the Pāndya country, but he finally established his power there, as is evident from the fact that he used it as a base for his invasion of Ceylon. His son, Rājendra, still had a firm hold on the conquered territory at the time of his invasion of Ceylon in 1017, but a year or two later he had to remove his rebellious Pāndya vassal, whom he replaced by his own son. The new viceroy was given the name or title 'Chola-Pāndya', and for some generations afterwards the country was ruled by a succession of Chola princes who bore this name. Pāndya princes

of the old family still gave occasional trouble, and regularly received assistance from Ceylon. With the weakening of Chola power occasioned by the troubles following the accession of Kulottunga I, the Pāndyas again began to raise their heads. Towards the end of the eleventh century the records of local rulers became fuller. So completely had Chola suzerainty disappeared by the middle of the twelfth century that a civil war broke out in the Pāndya kingdom between two Pāndya princes, Kulasekhara and Parākrama. The latter held Madura, but the former appears to have had the better claim to represent the ancient line. Parākrama was offered the assistance of the king of Ceylon, but, before Singhalese reinforcements, under a general named Lankāpura, could arrive, Kulasekhara captured Madura and put his opponent to death. According to the *Mahāvamsa*, the Singhalese pursued the victorious Pāndya, and, after various successes, drove him out of the Pāndya lands and set Vīra Pāndya, a son of Parākrama, on the throne, and, in spite of Chola assistance, again defeated Kulasekhara. However, it is more probable that the Chola troops turned the scale, for Lankāpura retired to Ceylon and Kulasekhara was restored to the throne. The Cholas had occasionally to protect him and his successor, Vikrama, against Vīra Pāndya and his Singhalese allies, but, in 1182, this opposition was finally crushed, and Vikrama's rights to Madura and the throne were recognised. Kulottunga III assumed the title of *Pāndyari* after this victory. Though this was the last occasion on which Cholas actively interfered in Pāndyan affairs, Kulottunga remained the suzerain of Vikrama Pāndya for whom he had done so much.

With the accession of Jātavarman Kulasekhara, at the end of the eleventh century, and the rapid decline of Chola power after the death of Kulottunga III, the relationship rapidly changed and the Pāndyas recovered much of their former eminence. Unfortunately, in spite of the numerous records that we possess for this period, the lack of precise chronological and genealogical data makes it difficult to give a clear account of the period. The matter is further complicated by the existence of numerous Pāndya rulers who seem at times to have shared the powers of the king with whom they acted as co-regents. But a great revival of Pāndya power began with the next ruler, Māravarman Sundara Pāndya, who ascended the throne in 1216. He extended his kingdom by conquering Chola territory in an expedition in the course of

which he destroyed Tanjore and put to flight the Chola ruler, who was restored to his throne only when he and his heir had done homage to the Pāndyas—thus rapidly had the relative fortunes of the two kingdoms changed. A few years later the Chola, Rājārāja III, rebelled but was easily defeated. Nevertheless he was still permitted to continue on his throne. Perhaps this was due to the influence of the Hoysalas, who about this time began to interfere in the affairs of the south. The Hoysala, Narasimha II, styles himself “restorer of the Chola kingdom”. It is therefore probable that the Chola owed his restoration and maintenance to the influence of his powerful neighbour on the north, who had no wish to see the Pāndyas incorporate the Chola kingdom. We have, however, no precise details of the negotiations.

Māravarman Sundara Pāndya was succeeded in 1238 by the second ruler of this name, who maintained Pāndya prestige in southern India in spite of the increasing aggressiveness of the Hoysalas. He was succeeded in 1251 by Jātavarman Sundara Pāndya, the greatest of the later Pāndya dynasty, who ruled over the whole of the peninsula. The Cholas had by then sunk into oblivion, and the Hoysalas, who had taken their place, were not strong enough to interfere in the south. Chera had become a Pāndya province, as also had Ceylon. Sundara Pāndya's rout of the Hoysalas and capture of their fortress of Kannanūr-Koppam was a serious check which they evidently tried to avenge, for a few years later the Pāndya records another victory over a Hoysala force at Perambalūr. He also defeated the Kākatiya ruler of Warangal, who had gone to the assistance of one of the southern princes. Thus Pāndya arms were successful in every direction, and Sundara was able to assume the title of a paramount sovereign, and style himself *mahārājādhirāja*. The records of his buildings and lavish endowments show that he had accumulated vast wealth. His reign lasted till about the end of the third quarter of the thirteenth century.

Records also survive of a contemporary Pāndya who assisted him in his campaigns. This was Jātavarman Vīra Pāndya, who took part in the conquest of the Kongu and Chola country, and played a specially prominent part in the occupation of Ceylon. Another late contemporary of Sundara, Māravarman Kulasekhara, became his successor. The existence of this system of co-rulers accounts for references to the “five kings of Ma'bar”, and similar stories of foreign travellers, who seem to have supposed that these kings

ruled in complete independence of one another. Māravarman appears to have fought with success in Travancore, and to have led an expedition to Ceylon, whence he carried off the sacred tooth, which was only restored when Parākrama Bahu visited the Pāndya court as a humble suppliant. To this period belong the accounts of southern India written by Wassāf, the Muslim historian, and Marco Polo. Like all foreigners who visited the region, they emphasise the wealth of the country, and in particular its rich stores of pearls and precious stones. According to Wassāf, Māravarman Kulasekhara was murdered by his legitimate son, Jātavarman Sundara Pāndya, because his illegitimate half-brother, Vīra Pāndya, had been designated to succeed to the throne, and civil war resulted. Chronological and other difficulties stand in the way of accepting the story of the parricide, but there is evidence that civil war did break out between the rival claimants to the throne, and that Sundara, being defeated, took refuge with the Muslims shortly before Malik Kāfūr's raid on southern India. It has been suggested that Sundara Pāndya sought help at the Muslim court against his brother, and that this was the cause of Malik Kāfūr's expedition to Madura. There seems, however, to be no authority for this view. Malik Kāfūr's expedition was the natural extension of his previous campaigns, and there is no evidence to prove that he made any distinction between the brothers. The Muslim raid further contributed to disorganise a country already suffering from civil war. Some years after the first Muslim sack of Madura, the sultan of Delhi sent another force under Khusraw Khān in search of further loot. In the meanwhile the ruler of southern Travancore, Ravivarman Kulasekhara, of the old Chera dynasty, who had not been affected by the Muslim advance, sought to turn the plight of his neighbours to his own aggrandisement. In 1315 he defeated Vīra Pāndya and his brother, and made the Pāndyas and the remnant of the Cholas his subjects, though a little later he seems to have been forced to cede some of the conquered territory to the Kākatiyas of Warangal. This last blow hastened the disintegration of the Pāndya dynasty, which then ceased to be a power in the south. The Muhammadan occupation of Madura and the independent sultanate established there in the fourteenth century, surrounded by Hindu foes on all sides, did not last long. It was to the new kingdom of Vijayanagar that the hegemony of southern India passed when the Muslims had been

disposed of. The Pāndyas never again recovered their ancient capital of Madura, though minor rulers of the ancient line can be traced in the south in Tinnevely down to the eighteenth century, more than two thousand years after their first recorded appearance.

The Cholas, like the Pāndyas, are mentioned as ruling in southern India as early as the period of the Asoka inscriptions. Their kingdom (Cholamandalam, *i.e.*, Coromandel) lay to the north-east of that of the Pāndyas, between the Pennār and Velūr rivers. For the earlier history of the dynasty we are again dependent on the *sangam* literature, which preserves only a few anecdotes of early, more or less mythical, kings, usually illustrating their strong sense of justice, such as that of the king who committed suicide because his pet parrot met its death through his negligence. The same story is told at a later date of a Kadamba king, Jayakesin I. The *Mahāvamsa* records the conquest of Ceylon in the middle of the second century B.C. by a Chola named Elāra who ruled it for nearly half a century. The historical period begins only in the middle of the second century A.D., with the reign of Karikāla. Ascending the throne while still a youth, he succeeded his grandfather, who had been killed in battle with the Chera king. The young ruler's first exploit was the rout of a combined force of Cheras and Pāndyas, who were endeavouring to follow up their earlier success and make an end of the Chola kingdom. When peace was made, however, he gave his daughter in marriage to the son of the Chera king. He also raided Ceylon, whence he carried off 12,000 men as slaves to labour at the great irrigation works he began on the Kāveri. His wealth was fabulous and he built the great new capital of Kāverīpattanam on the coast, abandoning Uraiūr, the ancient residence of his family. The Chola power was certainly greatly extended and consolidated during his reign, though his poets no doubt exaggerate when they say that he carried his standards to the Himālaya. Karikāla's successor was his grandson, Nedumudi-killi, under whom the Chola power rapidly declined. The new capital was overwhelmed by the sea and utterly destroyed; the Cheras and Pāndyas gained ground at the expense of the Cholas, while the attacks of the Pallavas in the north further contributed to reduce the Cholas to insignificance.

Thereafter for some centuries, the Cholas played only a minor part in history, although occasional references show that the

dynasty was not extinct. But, after the decline of the Pallavas in the eighth century, they rose once more to power. About the middle of the ninth century, Vijālaya, a member of the old ruling family, took advantage of the troubled state of southern India, and of the war between the Pallavas and Pāndyas in particular, to secure for himself a firm position and regain much of the old Chola territory including Tanjore, which he made his capital. His son, Āditya, who came to the throne about A.D. 880, continued his father's successful policy, and, by his defeat of Aparājita, dealt the final blow to Pallava supremacy. Parāntaka I, Āditya's son, having succeeded in the first decade of the tenth century to a considerable kingdom, turned his attention to the south where, after a successful campaign in Pāndya territory, he sacked its capital, Madura, thus winning the honorific title of 'Madurainkonda', and drove its king, Rājasimha, into exile in Ceylon. An attempt by the latter to restore his fortunes with the aid of a considerable Singhalese force ended in complete disaster, and the Pāndya kingdom, including much that had once been Chola territory, passed to Parāntaka. Towards the end of his prosperous reign of some forty years began the Rāshtrakūta attacks, in one of which his heir, Rājāditya, was killed. The brief reigns of the five rulers who followed were marked by desperate efforts of the Rāshtrakūtas to curb the rising power of the Cholas. On one occasion Kāñchī (Conjeeveram) was occupied and Tanjore besieged. To Parāntaka's reign belong the famous group of inscriptions from Uttaramerur which throw so much light on the organisation of communities in the Tamil country. When the great Chola king, Rājarāja, came to the throne in A.D. 985, the menace from the north had been removed through the overthrow of the Rāshtrakūtas by the Chālukyas. The golden age of the Chola dynasty then began. During the first ten years of his reign, Rājarāja consolidated his hold on the old Pāndya kingdom in the south and added the Chera territory in the west to his dominions. He had already won fame in his youth by a naval exploit in which he destroyed the Chera fleet off the Malabar coast. Having also brought under his sway the Bānas, his immediate neighbours on the north, he carried his campaign of conquest into Kalinga (Orissa), and to the south as far as Travancore. At the beginning of the eleventh century, therefore, the Cholas ruled the whole of southern India, and Rājarāja was then able to add Ceylon to his

already extensive dominions. The last years of his reign were spent in fighting the Chālukyas, who then held the position in the southern Deccan formerly occupied by the Pallavas. In the twentieth year of his reign (1012) Rājārāja built the great Rājārājesvāra temple at Tanjore, on which the record of his achievements can still be read, and endowed it with treasure taken by him in his campaigns.

In 1012 Rājārāja was succeeded by his son, Rājendra Uttamachola, a man in every way worthy of the throne. He had already distinguished himself as a warrior in his father's campaigns, and as a ruler he displayed great administrative talent. It is not always possible to decide from the inscriptions which of his conquests belong to the period of his father's reign and which to his own. He ravaged the country round Dharwar with an enormous army, but does not seem to have effected any permanent conquest. A similar raid some years later ended in a victory for the Chālukya king, Satyāśraya, who seems on this occasion to have been better prepared to meet the invader.

From an expedition to Ceylon he brought back the heirlooms of the royal treasury, and kept the Singhalese king a prisoner for life in the Chola capital. He also added to his treasury the crown of the Chera kings, reputed to have belonged to Parasurāma. In the north Rājendra was equally successful. After defeating the Chālukya king, Jayasimha III, in 1020, he continued his advance northwards, leaving as he went records of victories in Orissa and Kosala, reached Bengal, where he put to flight Govindachandra and Mahīpāla, and came at last to the banks of the Ganges. In memory of this exploit he took the title of 'Gangaikonda'. He sent a naval expedition across the Bay of Bengal, which occupied Kādara (variously identified with the capital of Pegu, and with Kedah, and other places in the Malay peninsula), and returned with considerable booty. His campaigns, however, were not permitted to distract his attention from home affairs. He built a new capital, Cholaपुरam, with a remarkable irrigation system and handsome palaces and temples, whose deserted ruins still convey an idea of its former grandeur. Rājendra ruled till 1042, but the inscriptions of his son, Rājādhirāja, are dated from 1018 when, in accordance with Chola custom, he was first associated with his father as joint ruler. His period of sole rule was filled with fighting neighbouring princes, who strove to avenge the



humiliation they had suffered at the hands of Rājendra. After overcoming his rebel vassals in the Pāndya and Chera country, Rājādhirāja curbed Chālukya aggression, and then invaded Ceylon where he defeated and slew four kings. At the end of these campaigns he performed the horse-sacrifice, and assumed the well-merited title of 'Jayamkondachola'. War with the Chālukyas soon broke out again, and in the great battle of Koppam, on the Tungabhadra river, the Chola king was slain in 1052. His brother, Rājendra, however, took command and saved the day for the southern power. Chola and Chālukya records flatly contradict one another as to subsequent events, so that it is probable that their relative positions, if changed at all, were changed but slightly in favour of the Cholas. Bilhana says that the Chālukyas occupied Kānchī, the Chola capital; while Chola records say that Rājendra advanced as far as Kolhapur, where he erected a column to commemorate his victory. Under the new king, Rājendra, a great famine is recorded in 1055. The chief military exploit of this reign was an expedition to Ceylon in 1054, in the course of which the Singhalese were routed and their king, Vijayabāhu, driven to take refuge in a mountain-fortress. The distribution of Rājendra's inscriptions shows that the Chola empire suffered no loss of territory in his reign. He died in 1063, and was succeeded by his brother, Vīra Rājendra. The new ruler was at once involved in a war with the Western Chālukya king, Somesvara I, whose forces had crossed the Tungabhadra and invaded Chola territory. They were driven back and pursued by the Cholas, who won a great victory in a pitched battle at Kūdal-sangaman. A few years later the Chālukya king challenged the victor to meet him again at the same place. The Chola accepted and for a month waited in vain at the rendezvous for the Chālukya to appear. The latter died soon afterwards and was succeeded by his elder son, Somesvara II, while the second son, Vikramāditya, fled to the Chola court where he was well received by the king, who himself records that he recognised him as king of the Western Chalukyas. It was presumably then arranged between them that Vikramāditya VI, who had married a daughter of Rājendra, should receive Chola support to dethrone Somesvara. Meanwhile the Singhalese king, Vijayabāhu, took advantage of the Chola engagements in the north to organise a rebellion, by which the Chola garrison was driven out of Ceylon. On the death of Vīra Rājendra in 1070 the

succession was disputed and the heir, Ādhirāṇḍendra, only succeeded to the throne by the help of his brother-in-law, the Western Chālukya, Vikramāditya VI. Ādhirāṇḍendra's reign was brief, and with his murder in 1074 the direct Chola line seems to have become extinct.

The Eastern Chālukya, Rājendra II, viceroy of Vengī, was a grandson through his mother of the Chola, Rājendra Gangai-konda; indeed he was three-quarters Chola by blood, for his grandmother also had been a Chola princess. Whether he seized or succeeded to the Chola throne is uncertain; he may have been brought up as a Chola prince, while his uncle, Vijayāditya, was allowed to succeed at Vengī as viceroy of the Western family. In any case Rājendra disposed of the latter, and united the Eastern Chālukya and Chola kingdoms under one rule, assuming soon afterwards the name Kulottunga Chola, by which he is best known. But before he could be crowned, he had to repel an attempt by the Western Chālukya prince, Vikramāditya VI, to avenge his Chola brother-in-law with the ostensible help of Somesvara II. By a secret arrangement, however, with Rājendra, Somesvara, who had his own reasons for wanting to rid himself of his ambitious younger brother, had ordered his own troops to turn on those of Vikramāditya in the course of the battle. Vikramāditya was thus caught between two fires, but escaped unhurt, and later took his brother prisoner and seized the Western Chālukyan throne in 1076. This is Bilhana's story, his 'Rajiga' being Rājendra. Kulottunga claims his indecisive action with Vikramāditya as a victory for the Chola arms. The new king took up his residence in the Chola capital, while one of his sons acted as governor of the old Chālukya province of Vengī. In addition to victories nearer home, Kulottunga's inscriptions record an expedition into Kalinga about the end of the eleventh century, and a more successful one in 1111 led by the general, Karunākara Tondamān. Kulottunga's reign of forty-nine years came to an end in 1112, when he was succeeded by his son, Vikrama Chola, viceroy of Vengī. To Kulottunga's reign belongs the great and elaborate (though not the first) survey of the country for taxation purposes, a kind of Domesday Book. The numerous inscriptions of the period throw a great deal of light on the highly organised systems of administration and taxation in force under the Cholas. The later years of this reign were marked by the rise of the Hoy-

salas in southern and western Mysore. Nominally governing for the Western Chālukyas, on the death of the aged Vikramāditya VI, the Hoysala, Vishnuvardhana, asserted the independence for which he had long been preparing, and the Hoysala power rapidly expanded with the decline of that of the Chālukyas and Cholas. Vikrama Chola seems to have lost the province of Vengī as soon as he left it to assume the crown in the capital, but on the other hand the Chola ancestral dominions suffered no diminution during his reign of fifteen years. He died in 1133, the year in which the Hoysala, Vishnuvardhana, who had been gradually increasing his power at the expense of the Chālukyas, claims to have "shaken the pride of the Cholas". Kulottunga II, who succeeded Vikrama, is best known as a patron of literature. His successor in 1146 was Rājārāja II, whose reign of fifteen years left Chola power on the verge of collapse. The Hoysalas had become independent and powerful, and in the south the Chola hold was sufficiently relaxed for two claimants to the ancient Pāndya throne to engage in civil war. The Singhalese strongly supported one claimant, Parākrama, and when he was murdered by his rival, they put his son, Vīra Pāndya, on the throne. The Chola, Rājādhirāja II, son of Rājārāja II, then intervened on behalf of the other pretender, Kulasekhara, drove out the Singhalese, and installed his protégé. A generation later a Chola king, Kulottunga II, again intervened successfully in a civil war in the Pāndya kingdom. When this Chola king ceased to reign in 1216 and was succeeded by Rājārāja III, the Pāndyas were once more powerful and were steadily encroaching on Chola territory. In the course of one campaign Tanjore was destroyed and the Chola was forced to become a vassal of the Pāndya king. The representative of the once great Chola empire had finally to call for the assistance of the Hoysala, Narasimha II, in order to regain his independence. On all sides the vassals of the Cholas were beginning to cast off their allegiance. Among them was Ko-Perunjinga, a chief of Pallava descent, whose headquarters were at Sendamangalam in the modern South Arcot district. He had tried to make himself independent while the Chola king was involved with the Pāndya invasion, but had been suppressed by the strong hand of Narasimha II. Ten years later, however, in 1232, he captured and imprisoned the Chola king. But a strong Hoysala force sent to secure his release outmanœuvred Perunjinga and forced him to surrender his prisoner, who was restored to his

throne and occupied it for some ten years in comparative peace. In 1243, however, Perunjinga's son, who bore the same name as his father, rebelled and assumed the royal titles. At the same time the Kākatiyas were advancing from the north to share with the Hoysalas in the partition of the Chola empire, while in the south the Pāndyas were vigorously striving to regain at the expense of the Cholas their old position. Rājarāja III, who survived till about 1252, was obliged from 1246 to share his diminished kingdom with a rival, Rājendra III, who maintained his authority in Tanjore till 1267, when Chola rule came to an end.

The third of the traditional divisions of the Tamil country was Kerāla or Chera, the king of which, the Keralaputra, is mentioned in the Asoka inscriptions and three hundred years later by Pliny and the *Periplus*. The Chera country lay to the west and north of that of the Pāndyas, and comprised the narrow strip of land between the mountains and the sea, the southern half of it being the modern state of Travancore. Of its political history, for which we are mainly dependent on incidental references in early Tamil literature and the inscriptions of the Cholas and Pāndyas, we know little compared with its two more important neighbours in the east. The great days of the Chera country seem to have been the early centuries of the Christian era, when it ranked with the two other southern kingdoms of the period. With the cessation of trade between its ports and the west, its wealth, and consequently its power, declined. Its documented history begins in the middle of the second century A.D., with the great battle fought between Cheras and Cholas, in which the father of Karikāla was slain and the Chera king, Ādan I, also lost his life. But for a time at least peace must have reigned between the two kingdoms, for Ādan II later on became the son-in-law of Karikāla. The Chera king next allied himself with the Pāndya, Nedunjeliyan, against the powerful Chola. At the battle of Vennil the latter was victorious over the allies, and the Chera king committed suicide from shame, so tradition has it, at having been wounded in the back. In the troubles that broke out after the death of Karikāla, Ādan II's successor Senguttuvan, the 'Red Chera', came to the rescue of the hard pressed heir, Nedumudi-killi, routing his rivals and establishing his cousin securely on the throne. Chera poets claim many successes for this new king, and there is probably a sub-

stratum of fact in their exaggerated account of his expedition to the north, in the course of which, they assert, he crossed the Ganges. He was succeeded early in the second century by the equally warlike Sey, called Yānaikkan, who fought with the Cholas and Pāndyas. In a battle with the latter he was taken prisoner, but succeeded in escaping and regaining his power. This is the last recorded event in the history of the Chera country till the beginning of the eighth century, when the Pallava Paramesvara Potavarman claims to have twice defeated the Chera king. In A.D. 783 the Pāndya, Jatila Parākrama, records his conquest of Venād, the southern part of the Chera country (Travancore), then, apparently, a separate kingdom, and the destruction of the fortress of Vilinam. Within the next ten years, however, the Chera king succeeded in regaining his lost territory, and a document exists, signed at the beginning of the tenth century by the Chera king, Sthanu-Ravi, and the Chola, Āditya, with whom he was evidently on good terms. It was to the Chera country that the Pāndya, Rājasimha, fled before Parāntaka I about 918. We know that Parāntaka married a Chera princess, and it is probable that this was part of a treaty by which the Chola secured Chera support, or at least neutrality, for his southern campaigns. Later in his reign the Chera king seems to have recognised the Chola as his overlord, and Parāntaka II also married a Chera princess. About this time the Chera king, Bhāskara Ravivarman, granted a charter to the Jewish colony at Cranganore (Muziris). This colony was certainly of great antiquity and claimed to have come to south India after the Roman conquest of Palestine in the first century A.D. Towards the end of the century harmonious relations with the Cholas ceased, for one of the earliest exploits of Rājarāja I was the destruction of the Chera fleet, and before he had been long on the throne he had conquered the "lords of the Chera country". A similar claim is made by his grandson, Rājādhirāja, in his famous Manimangalam inscription, and it is evident from occasional references that the Cholas held at least the southern Chera country until the beginning of their decline in the twelfth century, when, in the second quarter of the century, a king named Virakerāla again established its independence. His successor was Vira-Ravivarman, who acknowledged the suzerainty of the growing Pāndya power. Towards the end of the century the Chera king joined Vira Pāndya against Kulottunga III and shared his

defeat, but was restored to his throne. From the thirteenth century a few records survive of Chera kings in Travancore. The most important of these was Ravivarman Kulasekhara, who came to the throne in 1299. So skilfully did he turn to advantage the weakening of his neighbours by civil wars and Muslim raids, that in 1315 he claims to have conquered both the Chola and Pāndya kingdoms. But he was later driven out of Chola territory by the Kākatiya, Rudra II, and his successor, Mārttandavarman, seems to have ruled only in Travancore, where he was established in 1317. Little is known of the history of the Chera country between that date and the rise of the modern kingdom of Travancore.

The Pallava dynasty played a great part in the history of south India, where it was the dominant power from the fifth to the ninth century, during the period between the two Chola empires. At its greatest extent the Pallava empire included most of the Chola territory along the Coromandel coast on the east, and to the north portions of the old Āndhra-Sātavāhana empire, comprising the Telugu country round the lower Krishnā, and the lands to the south of it, with its capital at Kāñchī (Kāñchīpuram, *i.e.*, Conjeeveram). The origin of the Pallavas was for long a matter of conjecture but that they were foreigners has now been established with as much certainty as is possible in the circumstances. Kāñchī was, of course, one of the great cities of ancient India, and is mentioned by the grammarian, Patanjali, in the second century B.C. But there is no such early reference to the Pallavas, nor do they find a place among the traditional kingdoms of the Tamil country. They were a dynasty or family, and not a people.

A number of Pallava records survive, which fall into several groups. The earliest of these consists of a small series of copper-plate grants of the third century A.D., written in Prākṛit. Of the fifth and sixth centuries there remain a few inscriptions and a further series of grants written in Sanskrit. Of the seventh, eighth and ninth centuries we have a wealth of documents on copper and stone, also in Sanskrit, but usually accompanied by a Tamil version or summary. A fixed point in the early history of the Pallava dynasty is the mention of Vishnugopa of Kāñchī in the Allāhābād inscription of Samudragupta. There is no reason to

doubt that the former was a Pallava, for the Pallavas held Kānchī at that time, and indeed Vishnugopa is mentioned in the genealogical lists of later inscriptions. He must have been reigning about A.D. 350, and it is very probable that with his allies he was powerful enough to check Samudragupta's advance to the south.

The Pallavas were a family of foreign origin, the name Pallava or Palava being equivalent to Pahlava (Parthava) or Parthian. There is some evidence that, as might be expected, families of Persian origin had come from the north-west and west into the Deccan in the early centuries of the Christian era and taken service there. By the time of the inscription of the Āndhra queen, Balā Srī, the Pahlavas had penetrated far enough south to come into conflict with Gautamīputra. They were then probably vassals or allies of the Western Kshatrapas. The Junāgarh inscription of Rudradāman of the middle of the second century states that his minister was a Pahlava named Suvisākha. It is not improbable that nobles of Pahlava origin were in the service of the Āndhras. Some, no doubt, came in the train of the daughter of Rudradāman, who married the Āndhra king. In any case the etymological identity of 'Pallava' and 'Pahlava' is obvious, and presents no difficulty. That 'Pallava' should later have been given a popular etymology and derived from a word meaning 'sprig', is natural enough. The founder of the Pallava family must have been a local governor of Pahlava origin, who, with the decline of Āndhra power in the beginning of the third century A.D., made himself independent in the Telugu country on the lower Krishnā. Whether he directly succeeded the much reduced Āndhra-Sātavāhanas or whether, as is more probable, he gained his territory at the expense of the Chutu-Sātakarnis or the Nāgas, who shared the old Āndhra empire for a time, is not certain. The origin of the little-known dynasty of the Salankāyanas may have been similar.

Of this early dynasty a few grants survive. From these, which are, it should be noted, like the Āndhra inscriptions, in Prākṛit, we learn that the founder of the dynasty whose real name is not given was known as Bappadeva and that he was succeeded by Sivaskandavarman, Buddhyanakura and Visvavarman. If we take the fifth ruler to be Vishnugopa, whose dates must have been about A.D. 325-50, and assume as a fair average that the reigns of his four predecessors covered a century, then Bappadeva must have reigned about A.D. 225-50, very likely dates for the rise of

a new power in this region. It is probable that Bappadeva's headquarters were still at Amarāvati, the old capital of the Telugu country. Who extended Pallava power to the south at the expense of the Cholas is uncertain, but it was probably the second ruler, Sivaskandavarman. He is said to have performed the horse-sacrifice, which indicates a career of conquest as does also the title 'Vijayaskandavarman', by which he was known. No inscriptions of Bappadeva survive, but we have one of his son as crown-prince, dated in the tenth year of Bappa's reign. A much later inscription tells us that the founder of the dynasty was Virakurcha, who married a daughter of the Nāga king, and became the father of Skandavarman or Skandasishya. It is thus very likely that Bappadeva's name was Virakurcha, and his marriage with a Nāga princess suggests victories won over the Nāga supplanters of the Āndhras; but of them, no more is known than of their neighbours, the Chutus.

The second group of Pallava inscriptions belongs to the fifth and sixth centuries. These, like the inscriptions of the Guptas, are written in Sanskrit. There is no reason to doubt that the kings whose names are thus preserved were the successors of those already mentioned. The records are mainly of a private nature, commemorating pious donations, and containing little to enable us to reconstruct the history of the period. It is not even possible with certainty to arrange the rulers in chronological order, nor do we know that all the members of the family named as benefactors or mentioned in other connections, were independent rulers. Some, probably, were only princes. The names of some thirteen rulers are known between Skandavarman, who probably succeeded Vishnugopa about A.D. 350-75, and Simhavishnu, who reigned in the last quarter of the sixth century. With the latter the great period of Pallava history begins, and our material becomes more plentiful. That the Pallava power was considerable in the middle of the fourth century is evident from the fact that they came into contact with the Kadambas in the west and were able to exercise a nominal suzerainty over this rising power. There is some evidence that for a time the dynasty had two branches, one of which ruled the older Telugu province in the north and the other the Tamil province (Tondaimandalam), with its capital at Kāñchī. What little is known of the history of this period is derived from the records of other dynasties. With the help of their



feudatories, the Gangas, the Pallavas conquered the Bānas. In the middle of the fifth century a Pallava king, called in the Kadamba record Nanakkāsa, inflicted a disastrous defeat on the Kadamba king, Krishnavarman, and laid his country waste, so that his son, Sivānanda, retired from the world to become a hermit. Later on, however, the Pallavas restored to power Sivānanda's son, Vishnuvarman, and the Kadambas recovered rapidly, for fifty years later Ravivarman claimed to have "uprooted the lord of Kānchī", that is, to have won a victory over the Pallavas. There is evidence of a breach between the Pallavas and Gangas at the beginning of the sixth century, when Durvinīta recounts, among other exploits, the capture of the Pallava king.

The great period of Pallava history begins towards the end of the sixth century with the reign of Simhavishnu Potarāja, also called Avānisimha in allusion to his conquests. Records become more numerous, for the Pallavas of this epoch were great builders. They brought from their northern province and original home the art of hewing shrines out of rock and transforming caves into temples. They also built largely in stone, instead of wood which had till then been the building-material of the south. To the Pallavas and to the stimulus given by them, we owe the great series of temples, most of which still stand in southern India. Simhavishnu's successors speak of him as a great conqueror, who extended Pallava territory southward at the expense of the Cholas. The Pāndyas and even Ceylon are said to have felt the force of his arms. He was succeeded about A.D. 600 by his son, Mahendravarman, the first great builder of the dynasty. His foundation inscriptions show that he ruled a wide territory, most of which he must have inherited from his father, for no particular conquests are recorded of him. One of the most interesting memorials of his reign is found in the reliefs in Ādivarāha temple at Mahābalipuram (built by his grandson), which represents both himself and two of his wives and his father, also with two of his wives. In his reign began the conflict with the Chālukyas, then very powerful under Pulakesin II, the vanquisher of Harsha. About A.D. 610 the Chālukya deprived Mahendravarman of the province of Vengī, over which he set his brother as viceroy. The Pallavas never regained this province, which later became the Eastern Chālukya kingdom. In his Aihole inscription Pulakesin claims to have driven the Pallava king to seek refuge behind the walls of

Kānchī, while Mahendra claims to have routed the Chālukyas at Pollilūr near Kānchī. It appears then that the Chālukyas advanced with success far into Pallava territory but were finally driven back again. In any case the growth of the Chālukyas forced the Pallavas to seek expansion southward. Mahendravarman was a patron of arts and letters and a musician. He wrote a comedy, the *Mattavilāsaprahasana*, which is of unexpected value for the history of the obscure sect of the Kāpālikas.

His successor was Narasimhavarman (A.D. 625-60), known as Mahamalla. Early in his reign he repelled a Chālukya invasion and inflicted defeat on Pulakesin in three successive battles. He followed up these victories by invading Chālukya territory, taking and sacking the capital, Bādāmi (Vātāpi), and returning to Kānchī with vast booty. In memory of this exploit he took the title Vātāpikonda. The general who led the victorious army was Paramjoti. Pulakesin may have been killed in this campaign, for the Chālukyas themselves record that their capital was without a ruler for thirteen years after its destruction by the Pallavas. Manavamma, a claimant to the throne of Ceylon, took refuge at the Pallava court and apparently distinguished himself there, for the Pallava king sent an expedition to Ceylon to put him on the throne. The Singhalese, however, were more than a match for him. A second and stronger force was then sent, which achieved its object. This success had a considerable moral effect on the kingdoms of south India and is compared in the inscriptions to Rāma's exploit.

Narasimha also was a great builder; the city of Mamallapuram (Mahamallapuram) which bears his name was founded by him, and the great rock-temples there are his work. It was in his reign that Hiuen Tsang visited Kānchī. He calls the country Dravida. The capital, he says, was still largely Buddhist, but various forms of Hinduism also flourished there. The Buddhist teacher, Dharma-pāla, was a native of Kānchī. Asoka was credited with the building of *stupas* in the vicinity.

On his death Mahamalla left a great and prosperous country to his successor, Mahendravarman II, who seems to have had a short but peaceful reign (A.D. 660-70). The next ruler, Paramesvaravarman, was again involved in war with the Chālukyas, and both sides claim success. Vikramāditya I asserts that he conquered Kānchī but spared it; Paramesvara, on the other hand, took a

Chālukya town, as yet unidentified, which he calls Ranarasika. Vikramāditya was able at least to advance far south, but, in the vicinity of Trichinopoly, was met by a combined Pallava and Pāndya force and defeated in three battles. The last of these, Peruvalanallūr, ended most disastrously, for the Chālukya king had to flee "with only a rag to cover him". The Kurram plates give a vivid description of the battle, but unfortunately lack the details which a modern historian would like to have. The severe fighting of this reign was followed by a period of peace which enabled Narasimhavarman II (Rājasimha), who ruled in the last quarter of the century, to devote himself to building. His most notable temple is the Kailāsanātha in Conjeeveram. The next ruler, Paramesvaravarman, reigned only for a short time, probably A.D. 715-17, his successor being Nandivarman II Pallavamalla, a son of Hiranyavarman, who himself perhaps never reigned. The death of Paramesvaravarman seems to have been followed by civil war. There was at least one other claimant to the throne, Chitramaya, who was supported by the Pāndyas. The war lasted some time with alternating fortune until finally Nandivarman's general, Udayachandra, inflicted a severe defeat on the Pāndyas and slew the pretender with his own hand. Whether Chitramaya was a son of Paramesvaravarman or had in some way a better claim to the throne than Nandivarman, we do not know. It is probable that the direct line had become extinct and that there were several claimants. Nandivarman was descended from a younger son of Simhavishnu. His succession seems to have been popular, for it is recorded that he was chosen by his subjects. He must have been quite young at his accession for he reigned for sixty-five years. One notable event of his reign, recorded in Chālukya inscriptions, was a Chālukya invasion, in which Vikramāditya II soon after his accession (A.D. 733) occupied Kānchī, spared the city, and even generously gave to the Rājesvara temple gifts which an inscription still commemorates. He had defeated the Pallava king's attempt to turn him back and took much booty from him before entering the undefended capital. Later on Nandivarman regained his capital and waged war against the Tamil kings. On one occasion he was shut in his fortress of Nandipura by the Tamil army, but the besiegers were scattered by a relieving force led by Udayachandra, who followed up this exploit by other successes in the south and north. Nandivarman in the course of


his long reign had wars with all his neighbours, Tamil, Chālukya and Ganga. A new power, the Rāshtrakūtas, had risen in the Deccan with the end of the Chālukyas; Dantidurga in the middle of the century swept through Chālukya territory and invaded the land of the Pallavas, for a time occupying Kānchī itself; this exploit was repeated half a century later, in the reign of Govinda III.

Of the next reign, that of Pallavamalla's son, Dantivarman (c. A.D. 780-830), little is known; he was the son of a Rāshtrakūta princess and married a Kadamba princess. Towards the end of his reign he seems to have lost territory to the Pāndyas. Nandivarman III (c. A.D. 830-50) was the son of his predecessor. He checked the Pāndya advance in the battle of Tellaru and is credited with other victories over the retreating invaders. The next ruler, Nripatungavarman (A.D. 850-75), still found the southern kingdom a menace, but won a great victory over it at Arichit. Aparājita (A.D. 875-85) with Ganga help dealt a heavy blow to the Pāndyas in the battle of Perambiyam. But he was not destined to enjoy his success for long. The Chola, Āditya I, was then rapidly restoring the fortunes of his ancient line, and was soon powerful enough to attack the failing Pallava kingdom, and, having conquered Aparājita, regained the territory of Tondaimandalam for its former rulers. With Aparājita the Pallava dynasty may be said to have come to an end. The family survived for some centuries and one member of it, Perunjinga, played a part at the break-up of the Chola empire. Though most of the deeds of the Pallavas are forgotten, they have left us an unsurpassed series of monuments, which show that the arts flourished under their rule to a degree that can hardly be paralleled elsewhere in India.



Part II

MUSLIM INDIA



## CHAPTER I

### Early Muslim Conquests and the Foundation of the Kingdom of Delhi

India lay above the high water-mark of the flood of Arab conquest which, in the later part of the seventh and the early part of the eighth centuries of the Christian era, swept over Syria, Egypt, Persia, Transoxiana, Asia Minor, Northern Africa, and Spain; but in A.D. 711 Sind was invaded by an Arab force under Muhammad ibn Kāsim. The invasion is said to have been provoked by an act of piracy or brigandage for which Dāhir, the Brāhman raja of Sind, was unable or unwilling to make reparation, and was sanctioned by the Caliph al-Walid at the instance of al-Hajjāj, viceroy of the eastern provinces of the caliphate. Dāhir was slain and Sind was conquered, and became an Arab province, remaining so until A.D. 871, when, as the authority of the 'Abbāsids declined, two Arab chiefs established independent principalities, one in Upper Sind, with its capital at Multān, and the other in Lower Sind. The two states retained the fiction of allegiance to the caliphate, and early in the eleventh century, when Mahmūd of Ghaznī was wasting northern India with fire and sword, the Muslim governor of Upper Sind professed to be the caliph's vassal.

The conquest of Sind had no far-reaching effects and the religion which was destined to dominate India for nearly five centuries did not penetrate beyond the frontier tract annexed by the Arabs. The governor of Sind invaded Kachch, but the expedition was a mere raid, and no settlement was made. For the most part, the Arab governors of Sind maintained friendly relations with the Maitrakas of Valabhī in Gujarāt, and with the Chāvadās and Chālukyās who succeeded them; the states of Rājasthān were protected from aggression by the Thar or Indian Desert; and the Muslim rulers of Multān seem never to have made any serious attempt to subdue the Upper Panjab.

As the power of the 'Abbāsīd caliphs declined, national spirit revived in the peoples conquered and converted to Islam by the



Arabs. Among the earliest dynasties which became virtually independent in the eastern provinces of the caliphate was a Persian house, the Sāmānids, who had their capital at Bukhāra. Very soon after the rise of such independent dynasties, the Turks became one of the most prominent peoples in the eastern caliphate. Originally rude and uncivilised nomads, they were as remarkable for the beauty of their women as for the bravery and fidelity of their men, and they were employed as royal slaves, the men chiefly in military service, at the courts of Muslim rulers. They "embraced Islam with all the fervour of their uncouth souls", and absorbed much of the culture of their masters. Alptigīn, a Turk in high office under the Sāmānids, having been deprived of his place, left the court, and in A.D. 962 established an independent principality with its capital at Ghaznī. He was followed, after his death, by his son Ishāk and he by three of his father's slaves, the third of whom, Sabuktigīn, founded in A.D. 976 a dynasty which endured for more than two centuries.

Northern India was parcelled out at this time among a number of Hindu dynasties, none of which was predominant; Solankīs in Gujarāt, Chauhāns in Ajmir, Tomāras in Delhi, Pawārs in Mālwa, Kachhwāhas in Gwalior, Chandels in Bundelkhand, Parihāras in Kanauj, and Pālas in Bengal. The Hindu prince with whom Sabuktigīn came into contact was Jayapāla, raja of the Panjab, probably a Jāt by race, whose capital was Bhātinda, and whose dominions extended on the west to Kābul. In the course of four campaigns, Jayapāla lost all his territory west of the Indus, and Peshāwar was occupied by the Muslims. In A.D. 998 Mahmūd, the eldest son of Sabuktigīn, succeeded his father on the throne of Ghaznī, after a brief contest with his younger brother, Ismā'il.

Mahmūd is one of the most prominent figures in the history of Islam. During a reign of thirty-two years he extended his empire over the whole of the country now known as Afghanistan, the greater part of Persia and Transoxiana, and the Panjab. He is said to have made a vow to wage every year a holy war against the misbelievers of India, and he invaded the country no fewer than seventeen times, extinguished the ruling house of the Panjab, crossed the Ganges, penetrated into Bundelkhand, and reached the western sea. The caliph, al-Kādir, on receiving the dispatch announcing one of his victorious raids, caused it to be publicly proclaimed that "what the Companions of the Blessed Prophet

had done in Arabia, Persia, Syria, and 'Irak, Mahmūd had achieved in Hindūstan", an empty vaunt, for in India Mahmūd was a raider rather than a conqueror. He plundered temples, acquiring immense booty, destroyed ancient monuments, and slew and enslaved vast numbers of the inhabitants, but it was not until 1022, when he annexed the Panjab, which ultimately became the last refuge of his house, that he effected a permanent conquest and became an Indian ruler. He was opposed on some of his expeditions by individual Indian rulers, such as Jayapāla, Ānandapāla, and Nīdar Bhīm of the Panjab, and Ganda of Kālinjar, and on others by confederacies of Hindu princes. But no single Indian prince was strong enough to withstand him, and, owing to mutual jealousies and animosities, one defeat sufficed to dissolve any confederacy.

The most famous of all Mahmūd's expeditions was that to Somnāth, on the coast of Kāthiāwār, undertaken in 1020, ostensibly for the purpose of destroying the idol worshipped at that shrine, but in fact with the object of plundering its wealth. The idol was destroyed, and Mahmūd returned to Ghaznī with much spoil, harassed on his retreat by the Jāts of the Panjab, whom he punished in 1027, when he led his army into India for the last time. The remaining years of his life were occupied with the western affairs of his empire, with the Saljuk Turks, already a menace, whom he had allowed to settle in Khurāsān, and with the Buwayhids, from whom he wrested the kingdom of Rayy. On April 21, 1030, he died. It would be unjust to judge him by his Indian raids alone. There he was a ruthless marauder, but his court at Ghaznī was in his age the chief centre of art, literature, and science. "Like many a great soldier he loved the society of educated men; after sweeping like a pestilence for hundreds of miles across India, or pouncing like a hawk upon Khvārazm beside the Sea of Aral, and then coursing south to Hamasān, almost within call of Baghdād itself, he would settle down to listen to the songs of poets and the wise conversation of divines."

Mahmūd was succeeded, after a fratricidal struggle, by his second son, Mas'ūd, during whose reign the Saljuks began their attacks on the great empire which his father had founded. He was well served by Hindus, who contributed to his army a large corps of cavalry under a Hindu officer, Tilak, a man of humble origin who was advanced to the dignity of a noble of his court; but the

Saljuks gradually expelled from Persia the descendants of Mahmūd, who continued, however, until 1161 to rule their eastern dominions, including the Panjab, from Ghaznī. They were sometimes troubled by rebellions in the Panjab, and they occasionally led or dispatched raiding expeditions into Indian states, but none of them made any serious attempt to extend his Indian dominions, and the Hindu states of northern India were left free to pursue their internecine strife. The Gaharwār Rājputs superseded the Parihāras in Kanauj, Benares, and Ayodhyā, and reduced the Tomāras of Delhi to vassalage. The Kālachuris of Chedi extended their authority over Magadha and Bihar, broke the power of the Pawārs of Mālhwā, and nearly succeeded in becoming the paramount power in northern India, but, falling on evil days, were supplanted by the Vāghela chief of Rewa. Neither the Gahlot state of southern Rājasthān, nor the Pāla kings of Bengal and Bihar, attempted to oppose Mahmūd's raids, and the latter dynasty, the members of which were devout Buddhists, was ousted from its kingdom by the Senas of Bengal, who were Brahmanical Hindus. In the middle of the twelfth century the Chauhān prince of Sām-bhar and Ajmir expelled the Tomāras from Delhi, and added their dominions to his own. His nephew and successor, Prithivīrāja, became the most powerful Hindu prince in northern India, but jeopardised the cause of national unity by a domestic dispute with the Gaharwār raja of Kanauj, and by stripping the powerful Chandel raja Parmāl of Bundelkhand of much of his territory, including the important fortress of Mahobā.

In Mahmūd's reign the district of Ghūr, on the southern slopes of the Safid Kish range, had been ruled by a petty prince whom he reduced to vassalage. As the power of the Ghaznavids declined, that of the Shansabānids, the descendants of this prince, grew. One of them was poisoned by Bahrām, the fifteenth of the Ghaznavids, whose sister he had married; and his brother expelled Bahrām from Ghaznī, but was afterwards defeated by him and treacherously put to death. 'Alā-ud-dīn Husain, another brother, who became ruler of Ghūr, avenged their deaths by capturing and burning Ghaznī, from which act of vandalism he became known as Jahānsūz or 'the World-Burner'. He was afterwards defeated and imprisoned by Sultan Sanjar the Saljuk, and was succeeded in Ghūr by two nephews, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Muhammad and Shihāb-ud-dīn (afterwards Mu'izz-ud-dīn) Muhammad, who ruled jointly and, strangely enough, amicably.

Bahrām returned to Ghaznī, but his son and successor, Khusraw Shāh, was driven from the city by the Ghuzz Turkmāns, and retired to Lahore, which then became the capital of the Ghaznavids. He died there in 1160 and was succeeded by his son Khusraw Malik, the last of the line.

The two brothers of Ghūr founded an extensive but ephemeral empire, with which we are not here concerned; and while the elder occupied himself with extending this empire westward, he left the affairs of its eastern provinces in the hands of the younger, usually styled Muhammad Ghūrī, who established himself in Ghaznī.

Muhammad Ghūrī, unlike Mahmūd, who had been content with plundering raids into India, resolved to extend the rule of Islam over the idolators, and to conquer their land. His first expedition, in 1175, was against Multān, where the Ismā'īlī heretics had established their rule. Wresting the city from them, he appointed an orthodox governor, and next captured the strong fortress of Uch, betrayed into his hands by the wife of its Hindu governor. Three years later he led a disastrous expedition across the Indian desert into Gujarāt, where his exhausted army was defeated by Bhīma, the young Vāghela raja of the country, and suffered so much during its retreat across the inhospitable desert that only a remnant reached Ghaznī. In 1181 he invaded the Panjab and there left a garrison which was attacked by Khusraw Malik. But this degenerate descendant of Mahmūd sued for peace when Muhammad, in 1186, again appeared before the gates of Lahore, and was treacherously seized and sent to Ghūr, where he was afterwards put to death as a dangerous incumbrance. Thus ended the line of Mahmūd of Ghaznī.

The annexation of the Panjab carried Muhammad's frontier eastward to the Sutlej, and provided him with an advanced base of operations. In 1190 he crossed the Sutlej and took Bhātinda, then in the dominions of Prithivīrāja of Delhi, whom the Muslim historians style 'Rāi Pithaura'. Prithivīrāja marched to meet him and came up with him at Tarāorī, near Karnāl, where Muhammad was wounded and defeated, but in 1192 he returned at the head of 12,000 horse, again met Prithivīrāja at Tarāorī, and defeated and dispersed the Hindu army, both Prithivīrāja and his brother being slain. After the battle various fortresses surrendered, and Muhammad marched to Ajmir, plundered the city, carried off numbers

of its inhabitants as slaves, and appointed as his tributary governor a son of Prithivīrāja.

These successes had given Muhammad northern India almost to the gates of Delhi, and, on departing for Ghaznī, he left as governor of his Indian dominions Kutb-ud-dīn Aibak, the most trusty of his Turkish officers, not only to administer the new conquests, but also at his discretion to extend them. Henceforward Aibak was the Muslim ruler of northern India, for his master, who retained Ghaznī as his capital, was so occupied with the affairs of Khurāsān that he only twice again marched into India, once in 1193, when he defeated and slew Jayachandra, raja of Kanauj and Benares, and again in 1205, to crush a dangerous rebellion of the Khokhars in the Salt Range of the Panjab.

Aibak subjugated the Gangetic doāb, crushed a rebellion in Ajmir and appointed a Muslim governor of the province, avenged a former defeat of Muhammad by twice invading the dominions of Bhīma, raja of Gujarāt, and sacking his capital, defeated Parmāl, the Chandel raja of Kālinjar, whose ancestor had paid tribute to Mahmūd, surpassed Mahmūd by capturing his two greatest fortresses, Kālinjar and Mahobā, and established a port to the east of the Ganges by capturing the important city of Budaun.

Meanwhile another Turkish officer, subordinate to Aibak, had been carrying the banner of Islam further afield. Muhammad Khaljī, son of Bakhtiyār, had invaded Bihar, taken its capital, Odantapuri, slain the Buddhist monks in its great monastery, and returned to Delhi with his plunder, which included the monastery library. He was dismissed with honours, received as a fief his past and future conquests, and returned to Bihar, whence, in 1202, he invaded Bengal, drove its sovereign from Nadiya, his capital, and annexed that rich kingdom, making Gaur, or Lakhnāwati, his provincial capital.

The Khokhars, already mentioned, had been encouraged to rebel by the news that Muhammad Ghūrī, whose elder brother had died, had suffered a severe defeat at the hands of 'Alā-ud-dīn, king of Khvārazm. Aibak was unable to crush the rebellion, and in October, 1205, Muhammad left Ghaznī for India. The rising was crushed with appalling severity, great numbers of Khokhars being slain, or captured and sold into slavery; but Muhammad, while on his way back to Ghaznī, was assassinated, on March 15, 1206, on the banks of the Indus, by fanatical heretics of the

Ismā'ili sect. He left no son, and though, on his death, two puppet princes were successively raised to the throne in Ghaznī, the viceroy of his provinces, Aibak in India and Tāj-ud-dīn Yildiz in Kirmān, assumed the insignia of royalty. Aibak thus became the first Muslim sultan of Delhi. One of his earliest tasks as a sovereign was the appointment of a governor in Bengal. Muhammad Khaljī had rashly led an expedition from the plains into the Himālāya, with the result that his army had been almost annihilated. On his return to Lakhnāwati, he took to his bed, and was murdered by an ambitious kinsman, 'Alī Mardān, who, concealing his guilt, persuaded Aibak to appoint him governor. His advancement profited him little, for his high rank disturbed the balance of his mind. He assumed the royal title, and behaved with such arrogance and cruelty that his officers conspired and slew him.

Aibak's military activity was confined chiefly to the period of his viceroyalty, but after his master's death he embarked on one foolish adventure which has left a blot on his reputation as a soldier. Having defeated Tāj-ud-dīn Yildiz, viceroy of Kirmān, who claimed the sovereignty of the Panjab, he drove him from Ghaznī and occupied that city, but permitted his troops to treat its citizens as enemies and to plunder them, with the consequence that they secretly summoned Yildiz to their aid, and he, returning when Aibak was celebrating his success with wine and revelry, surprised him so completely that he fled to Lahore without striking a blow. The victory of Yildiz confined Aibak to India, so that he became a purely Indian sovereign, founding the dynasty known as the Slave Kings of Delhi. He died in November 1210, as the result of an accident at polo.

The designation of this dynasty will appear to many a contradiction in terms; but in an eastern monarchy, where the sovereign was the heir of all his subjects, who held both life and property at his pleasure, to be the personal slave of the ruler was a distinction rather than a disgrace. The Ghaznavids were sprung from a Turkish slave; the Mamelukes, at a later period, were the Circassian slaves of Egyptian rulers. Loyal service earned for a slave a regard and esteem sometimes withheld from a son born in the purple, and corrupted from his cradle by flattery and luxury. A favourite slave often received the hand of his master's daughter in marriage; and Muhammad Ghūrī, when a courtier condoled with him on having no son, is said to have replied that in his

Turkish slaves he had thousands of sons, who would succeed him and carry on his name. So it happened on the death of Aibak. A worthless son, Ārām, succeeded him, but Nāsir-ud-dīn Kabācha, his son-in-law and governor of the Panjab, withheld his allegiance from Ārām. Bengal was already independent, and the attitude of the Hindus was so menacing that within a year Shams-ud-dīn Īltutmish, the foremost slave and the son-in-law of Aibak, deposed the weakling and ascended the throne, but succeeded to no more than a remnant of Aibak's wide dominions. Kabācha claimed Lahore, but that city was occupied in 1214 by Yildiz, who had been driven from Ghaznī by 'Alā-ud-dīn Khvārazmshāh. Īltutmish defeated and captured Yildiz, and shortly afterwards put him to death, and in 1217 recovered the Panjab from Kabācha.

In 1220 the heathen Mongols under Chingīz Khān swept over Khvārazm and Persia, expelling 'Alā-ud-dīn from his great empire. India lay beyond the range of their conquests, as it had lain beyond the range of those of the Arabs five and a half centuries earlier, but not beyond the reach of their raids, and the foreign affairs of the Muslims of India, for more than a century after this time, were confined chiefly to the repulse of those raids and to their relations with the Mongol Īl-khāns of Persia. It was now that Jalāl-ud-dīn Mangobarni, heir to 'Alā-ud-dīn, fled before Chingīz into India and took refuge in Lahore, where he allied himself with the Khokhars, and then, having humiliated Kabācha in Multān and plundered his territory, returned to Persia.

Meanwhile Īltutmish had reduced 'Iwāz Khān, the rebellious governor of Bengal, to obedience, recovered from the Rājputs the fortress of Ranthambhor, and, after the return of Mangobarni to Persia, was free to deal with Kabācha, who was defeated, and afterwards accidentally drowned in the Indus. The officers of Īltutmish completed their task of conquering Lower Sind, and thus extending his dominions to the sea. Bengal again rebelled, but the rebellion was crushed by Īltutmish's eldest son, Mahmūd, who governed the province for his father till his early death, after which Īltutmish was obliged to suppress yet another rebellion. Later on he recovered Gwalior, his earliest fief, which had been seized by the Hindus, and slaughtered 700 of its garrison. He had then established his authority throughout the dominions which Aibak had ruled, and in 1234 carried the arms of Islam for the first time into Mālwa, captured Bhilsa, and sacked Ujjain, de-

stroying all the temples in that ancient city. His last campaign was undertaken with the object of subjugating the turbulent Khokhars of the Salt Range, whose hostility still menaced the peace of the realm; but, on his way thither, he fell sick, and, having been borne back to Delhi in a litter, died on April 29, 1236.

İltutmish was the greatest of the Slave Kings. To the dominions of Aibak he added Lower Sind and part of Mālhwā, besides restoring and maintaining order in the loose congeries of fiefs of which those dominions were composed. He was a builder as well as a conqueror and an administrator, and left monuments both at Delhi and Ajmir displaying his taste in architecture. On his death his son Firūz, a weak and licentious prince, was raised to the throne. The royal slaves had by then formed themselves into a college or council of forty, which divided among its members all the great fiefs of the kingdom and the highest offices in the state. İltutmish had preserved the royal dignity intact, but the Forty would not endure a *roi fainéant*, and after a reign of six months Firūz was deposed and put to death. The choice of the Forty next fell upon Raziyya, the daughter of İltutmish, whom he had named as his successor, but whose sex was at first considered an insuperable bar to her elevation, though her dying father had assured his advisers that they would find her a better man than any of her brothers. She suppressed, by subtle intrigue rather than by force of arms, a serious rebellion of those of the Forty who hesitated to acknowledge her, and a rising in Delhi of the Ismā'īlī heretics, whom İltutmish had already once been obliged to punish for revolting and attempting his life, and the fanatics were now annihilated. Raziyya offended the Forty by promoting to the important place of master of the horse an African named Yākūt. There appears to have been no impropriety in her relations with him, but the proud Turks would not endure her preference for a negro, and rebelled, slew Yākūt, and deposed and imprisoned Raziyya, raising to the throne her brother, Bahrām. Altūniya, the leading rebel, disappointed of what he conceived to be his just share of the spoils, released her, married her, and attempted to restore her, but was defeated, and both lost their lives.

During the reign of Bahrām the Mongols invaded the Panjab, sacked Lahore, and laid the city waste. The king was too feeble to take any steps against them, and gradually estranged the Turkish nobles by mistimed and futile attempts to assert his



authority over them. The Forty besieged him in the White Fort at Delhi, which fell on May 10, 1242, when Bahrām was seized and put to death. After an abortive attempt by one of the Forty to seize the crown, the rest of that body raised to the throne Mas'ūd, the son of Firūz, during whose short reign the country was disturbed by a rebellion in Bengal, by the invasion of the same province by the Hindus of Cuttack, by a Hindu rebellion in Bihar, and by an invasion of the Panjab by the Mongols. On June 10, 1246, Mas'ūd was deposed and thrown into prison, where he perished shortly afterwards, and his uncle, Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd, the youngest son of İltutmish, was raised to the throne.

Mahmūd was an amiable and unassuming prince, possessing the virtues of continence, frugality, and practical piety, and a taste for caligraphy, which led him to employ his leisure in making copies of the Koran. For the greater part of his reign he was under the influence of Ghiyās-ud-dīn Balban, a Turkish slave whom İltutmish had purchased and married to one of his daughters, and who had given a daughter in marriage to Mahmūd. During the brief and troubled reigns of Mahmūd's predecessors, the kingdom had fallen into disorder. The Mongols had not only sacked Lahore and levelled its buildings with the ground, but had so devastated the country west of the Jhelum that no cultivation remained, but in the neighbourhood of the Salt Range. The turbulent Hindus of the doāb were in rebellion, as were also the Meos of Mewāt, the region now nearly covered by the Alwar state. On the advice of Balban, who held the office of lord chamberlain, Mahmūd first set out to recover the Panjab. The Khokhars were subdued, and a marauding force of Mongols fled when it found itself confronted by Balban's army. The doāb was reduced to obedience, a Hindu raja who had occupied the country on both banks of the Jumna above Allāhābād was driven back into Bundelkhand, and the Meos were severely chastised. Balban's reward for these services was promotion to the post of lieutenant of the kingdom, his brother, Kashli Khān, succeeding him as lord chamberlain; and he next led a successful expedition into eastern Mālwa, but on his return to court discovered that he had become the victim of a plot. The queen-mother, who, it was afterwards discovered, had been secretly married to Kutlugh Khān, one of the Forty, a eunuch named Raihān, and some of the Forty who were jealous of his influence, had conspired against him, Raihān being the leader of the

conspiracy, and persuaded the king that his power was dangerous. He was dismissed from court to his fief, and immediately afterwards transferred to a less valuable fief, in order to provoke him into rebellion, but he remained quiet until a majority of the Forty, weary of the eunuch's arrogance, joined him, and took the field against Mahmūd and Raihān. The rebels hesitated to strike a blow against their sovereign, and Mahmūd secretly longed for the aid and support of his father-in-law. Private communications emboldened him to dismiss the eunuch from court to the fief of Budaun, and to restore Balban to his former place. Henceforward he was supreme in the kingdom. Kutlugh Khān was transferred from Bayāna to Oudh, and afterwards, when Raihān was put to death, joined a formidable band of rebels led by Kishlū Khān, governor of Multān, who had transferred his allegiance from Mahmūd to Hulāgū, the Mongol Il-khān of Persia. Balban marched against these rebels, but they eluded him and appeared before Delhi, only to find the city in a state of defence. Most of their followers deserted them, and made their peace with the king, and the leaders fled into the Siwālik hills. Later in the year Kishlū Khān joined a predatory host of Mongols who invaded the Panjab, but hastily retreated on learning that Mahmūd was about to march against them. Their retreat was fortunate, for the kingdom was in such disorder that no army could safely have marched against an invader. The Hindus of the doāb and the Meos of Mewāt were again in revolt, two great fief-holders were virtually in rebellion, and Bengal had ceased to remit revenue to Delhi. Balban dealt effectively with all these rebels, and barbarously with the Meos, who had given most provocation; while a welcome mission from Hulāgū assured Mahmūd that no Mongol raids on India would in future be permitted. Mahmūd died, without an heir, on February 18, 1266, having designated as his successor his father-in-law, Balban, who in any case would probably have ascended the throne.

But his position was not free from embarrassment, for the hereditary principle had then been established for fifty years, and the Forty were inclined to resent the predominance of one of themselves. Balban, on the other hand, was resolved to found a new dynasty, and, perceiving that success would be doubtful until the power of the Forty had been crushed, set himself to crush it. For the easy manners of Mahmūd's court, where the mild and

unassuming king had been content with but little outward deference, he substituted a rigid ceremonial. His court was an austere assembly, where jest and laughter were seldom heard. Offenders among the Forty were punished with the utmost severity. One, who had caused the death of a slave, was flogged to death; another for a similar offence received 500 stripes and redeemed his life with a great sum; another, who had been defeated by rebels, was hanged over the gate of the city which he had ruled. Yet he allowed aged, inefficient, and dishonest fief-holders to retain their fiefs without performing the services for which they had been granted. The royal diversions were hunting, conversing with theologians, and listening to sermons, at which Balban wept copiously, though he could remain unmoved at the sight of cruel tortures.

In spite of his severity his reign was disturbed by rebellions and by Mongol invasions, but Lahore was rebuilt, and provincial government was restored in the Panjab; the Meos, who during Mahmūd's last years had plundered the country to the gates of the capital, suffered severely for their offences; and rebellions of the Hindus of the doāb and of Katehr, the region east of the Ganges, were crushed, and in Katehr such numbers were slaughtered that the air was polluted for miles with the stench of the corpses. But the most formidable rebellion was that headed by Tughril, whom Balban had appointed to the government of Bengal. This man defeated successively two royal armies sent against him, and induced numbers of officers and men of the defeated forces to transfer to him their allegiance. The news of these reverses so enraged Balban that he gnawed his own flesh in his fury, and set out in person to crush the rebel, his army being accompanied by a large fleet of boats collected on the Jumna and the Ganges. Tughril long eluded him, and the army despaired of ever seeing their homes again, for Balban had sworn not to turn back until Tughril had been taken or slain. At length a troop of horse came upon the rebel force encamped in a forest, and took it completely by surprise. Tughril was slain, his head was carried to Balban, and the army withdrew, with a great number of prisoners, to Lakhnāwati, where those who belonged to that city were punished by impalement upon rows of stakes. Balban appointed his second son, Bughrā Khān, governor of Bengal, and adjured him to take warning against rebellion from the dreadful spectacle which he

had just witnessed. Those who had deserted to the rebels from the royal armies were reserved for punishment at Delhi, and a double row of stakes more than seven miles in length had been set up for their impalement, but, before the army reached the capital, its *kāzī* induced Balban to abandon his design, and the deserters suffered very little for their crime.

Balban, then eighty years of age, was at the height of his prosperity and glory. His elder son, Muhammad Khān, a most promising prince who had been designated his heir, had been appointed governor of Multān, in order that he might repel Mongol raids into India. On March 9, 1285, after defeating a large force of Mongols, he fell into an ambush, and was slain. The old king continued to hold his court, and in public no change in his demeanour was visible, but in his chamber he rent his clothes, cast dust upon his head, and mourned his son as David mourned Absalom. The dead prince was henceforth styled *Shahīd*, "the Martyr", and his son was designated heir to the throne.

When Balban died, in 1287, his nobles disregarded his wishes, and raised to the throne Kaikubād, son of the worthless Bughrā, who was in Bengal at the time of his father's death. Kaikubād's reign was brief and evil. He had been brought up by his grandfather in the strictest paths of virtue and under the most rigid discipline. On ascending the throne at the age of seventeen or eighteen, he burst his bonds, neglected all business, and abandoned himself to the satisfaction of his appetites. His example set the fashion, and the reaction from Balban's stern rule produced a general outburst of licentiousness. The son of the martyr prince was put to death, and one Nizām-ud-dīn, son of the aged magistrate of Delhi, acquired absolute control of the debauched youth and of all public business. Even the slothful and self-indulgent Bughrā wrote to his son, warning him of the inevitable consequences of this neglect of public business, and of permitting a subject to usurp his authority. After a Mongol force had been defeated at Lahore, and a large number of the raiders publicly executed at Delhi, Kaikubād learned that his father was leading his army from Lakhnāwati towards Delhi. His object could hardly be doubted, and in March, 1288, Kaikubād marched from Delhi to meet him. The two armies met on the Gogra, and Bughrā, after sending some menacing messages to his son, changed his tone, and even consented to do homage to him as sovereign of Delhi. The

meeting between father and son was affecting. Bughrā advanced to do homage, but Kaikubād, overcome by natural feelings, descended from his throne and received him with the respect due to a father. Friendly meetings, not devoid of conviviality, continued for some days, and Bughrā found an opportunity of secretly warning his son against the designs of Nizām-ud-dīn. They parted with tokens of affection, and returned, each to his own capital. "Alas!" cried Bughrā, as he set out, "I have seen the last of my son, and the last of Delhi." Kaikubād, on his return, dismissed Nizām-ud-dīn to Multān, and, on his hesitating to obey, caused him to be poisoned. His removal dislocated the machinery of the administration, and Kaikubād appointed to the fief of Baran and the command of the army Jalāl-ud-dīn Fīrūz Khaljī. His appointment gave great offence to the Turkish nobles, and to the people of the capital, who affected to despise his tribe and feared both his power and his ambition. As soon as Fīrūz had taken possession of his fief, Kaikubād, as a result of his incontinence and intemperance, was stricken with paralysis and lay a helpless wreck in his palace. Fīrūz marched on Delhi, and the Turkish nobles enthroned Kayūmars, the three-year old son of Kaikubād; but the sons of Fīrūz dashed into the city, carried off the child-king, and defeated a force sent in pursuit of them. Most of the Turkish nobles now submitted to Fīrūz, while the populace maintained an attitude of sullen aloofness. The wretched Kaikubād was put to death; his corpse was thrown into the Jumna; and on June 13, 1290, Fīrūz was enthroned in the palace of Kīlūgharī as Jalāl-ud-dīn Fīrūz Shāh. Thus ended the line of the Slave Kings.

The Muhammadan kingdom of Delhi was not a homogeneous political entity. The government was feudal, but differed from the feudal systems of Europe in that the fief-holders had no hereditary, or even personal, title to their fiefs, but might be, and often were, transferred from one fief to another. The great fiefs, in which the fief-holders discharged most of the functions of provincial governors, were centres of Muslim influence, but the subordinate machinery of government and the agency for the ordinary collection of the revenue were largely Hindu, and the tiller of the soil probably found very little difference between Muslim and Hindu rule, since under neither was he usually allowed to retain more of the fruits of his labour than sufficed to satisfy the most frugal needs of himself and his family. When, owing to the weak-

ness of the central government, or of a local administration, he withheld his land-rent, or followed a rebellious Hindu chieftain into the field, he was often barbarously treated, but he was punished for contumacy or rebellion, not, as the rhapsodies of pious Muslim historians might lead us to believe, for idolatry. Nor was Muslim rule firmly established throughout the area within its geographical limits. The north-western frontier districts were constantly devastated by Mongol inroads; the Khokhars were only occasionally in subjection; the fortresses of Gwalior, Rānshambhor, and Nāgaur changed hands more than once; the great fiefs were interspersed with lands held by the Hindu chieftains, whose subjection was as fitful as that of the Khokhars; Mewāt had been harassed, but never subdued; the Hindus of the doāb were frequently in revolt; those of Katehr harried the eastern frontier; and the great fiefs in the west were merely outposts against the chiefs of Rājasthān. What enabled a comparatively small foreign garrison to maintain its supremacy over Hindūstan, the Panjab, and Bengal, was its religious homogeneity and the impossibility of any union among the Hindus. From them the spirit of caste has for ages ousted the sentiment of nationality. Caste despises caste, or resents in caste the assumption of superiority. The Brāhman contemns the cultivator; the cultivator resents the attitude of the Brāhman; both despise the menial. Each Rājput clan deems itself superior to any other, and there has never been an Indian nation. Another factor in the stability of Muslim rule was the gradual Indianisation of the ruling class. The original invaders had nothing in common with India, but they made it their home, and their descendants knew no other. Many Hindus accepted the religion of their conquerors, and thus made intermarriage possible, and Hindu concubines taken in war introduced Hindu blood into Muslim families. Even from the works of bigoted Muslim historians much evidence of the gradual Indianisation of the invaders may be gathered. But even as to-day, to the Muslim the Hindu was ever an idolatrous misbeliever, and to the Hindu the Muslim was ever an unclean Mlechchha.

## CHAPTER II

### The First Muslim Empire: The Khaljīs and the Tughluks

The Khalj were a Turkish tribe, but, having been long domiciled in the country now known as Afghanistan, had adopted some Afghan habits and customs, and the opposition to Firūz of the Turkish nobles and of the citizens, interesting as evidence of the existence of a body of public opinion, was based on the belief that he was an Afghan, and therefore a barbarian. So bitter was this opposition that for some time he dwelt in the suburb of Kīlūgharī, and did not enter the city. It was soon discovered that he had been misjudged, for no milder king had ever sat upon the throne of Delhi. Whatever violence he had committed in his younger days, he was then an old man, engaged in making his peace with Heaven, and his foolish tenderness to rebels and other criminals subjected him to rebukes from a blunt and outspoken kinsman, Ahmad Chap, who was one of his chief courtiers. His position was difficult. The remnant of the Turkish nobles had opposed his ascent of the throne, but their power was broken, and he allowed most of them to retain their places. His tribesmen, though by no means neglected, resented his generosity, and murmured that he knew neither how to punish his foes nor reward his friends.

Among the old nobles allowed to retain their fiefs was 'Abdullāh, known as Chhajjū, who enjoyed the rich fief of Kara, on the Ganges, about forty miles above Allāhābād. He was a nephew of Balban, and, rising in rebellion, assumed the royal title and marched on Delhi. But he was defeated near Budaun by Arkali Khān, the second son of Firūz. When Chhajjū and his associates were brought before Firūz he not only pardoned them, but entertained them at a wine party, to the indignation of Ahmad Chap and his other courtiers. Chhajjū was not, however, restored to his fief, which was bestowed upon 'Alā-ud-dīn, the nephew and son-in-law of Firūz.

The worst instance of the leniency of Firūz to criminals was his treatment of some *thags*, now mentioned for the first time in

history. A few of the assassins, seized at Delhi, gave information which led to the arrest of over a thousand. Not one was punished, but the whole gang was sent down the river and set free in Bengal. Certain courtiers, disgusted with the king's misgovernment, freely discussed over their wine his deposition and removal. Their conversation was reported, but the only punishment inflicted on them was a year's banishment from court.

Once only did Firūz depart from his policy of leniency, and this was in the case of a religious leader named Sīdī Maulā, suspected by reason of his mode of life and the unknown source of his wealth. He failed to satisfy Firūz, and was put to death in his presence. The darkening of the sun by a dust-storm, and a famine which followed, were attributed by the superstitious to divine wrath with the slayer of the holy man; but it is not improbable that Sīdī Maulā was associated in some way with the *thags*.

Firūz once more enraged the worthy Ahmad Chap by abandoning an expedition which he had undertaken for the recovery of Ranthambhor. A hundred such fortresses, he said, were not worth a single hair on a true believer's head; but he might have reached this decision without leaving Delhi, and without openly displaying his fear of the Rājputs. 'Alā-ud-dīn, who had received the fief of Kara, was treated by Firūz more as a son than a nephew, and his uncle would believe no ill of him; but he was unhappily married, and his wife and his mother-in-law, the principal wife of Firūz, may have suspected his designs, for he was both ambitious and unscrupulous, and they gave him no peace. He undertook, with his uncle's leave, an expedition into Mālhwā, and, as a reward for the spoils of Bhīlsa, which he laid at the sultan's feet, received, in addition to Kara, the great fief of Oudh. At Bhīlsa he heard of the wealthy Marātha kingdom in the western Deccan, the capital of which was Deogir, the modern Daulatābād, and, on his return from Delhi to Kara, began secretly to equip a force for a descent on this kingdom, then ruled by Rāmachandra, the seventh of the Yādava dynasty. He set out in 1294 at the head of seven or eight thousand horse, and after marching for two months by unfrequented routes, arrived at Ellichpur in Berar, the northern province of the kingdom. He explained his presence, and secured himself from molestation, by giving out that he was a discontented noble of Delhi, seeking service in southern India. He then pressed on to Deogir, where he took Rāmachandra completely by surprise.



The greater part of the army was absent with the *raja's* wife and eldest son, Sankara, who were performing a pilgrimage, and 'Alā-ud-dīn defeated Rāmachandra and drove him into his citadel, which was not provisioned. The Muslims plundered the city, and the *raja* sued for peace, which was granted on condition that they were allowed to retire with their plunder, and with what they could extort from the citizens. Sankara then returned, and, though begged by his father not to break faith with the invaders, attacked them, and was defeated.

News of 'Alā-ud-dīn's return reached Fīrūz while he was on a hunting tour at Gwalior; and he was urged to punish him for having ventured on such an enterprise without permission, but he rebuked his courtiers for their unworthy suspicions, and decided to return to Delhi and await his nephew's arrival. "If you return to Delhi", cried Ahmad Chap, striking his hands together, "you slay us with your own hand!" Pretending that he feared to meet his uncle after his presumption, 'Alā-ud-dīn lingered at Kara until the old king, urged thereto by Ulugh Khān, 'Alā-ud-dīn's brother, decided to visit him there. Despite the warnings of his counsellors, he travelled to Kara by boat. 'Alā-ud-dīn knelt before him on the river bank, and, as his uncle kindly raised him, two of his companions, at a signal, cut the old man down, and severed his head from his body, raising it aloft on a spear, while 'Alā-ud-dīn, causing an umbrella to be raised over his head, was proclaimed king.

The royal army was hurriedly led back to Delhi, while 'Alā-ud-dīn marched in more leisurely fashion towards the capital, scattering largesse on his way. As he approached the city, his cousin Ibrāhīm Khān, who had been proclaimed king, fled with his mother and was pursued to Multān, where both were captured, together with Arkali Khān, Ibrāhīm's elder brother. The two princes were blinded, and their mother was imprisoned. On October 3, 1296, 'Alā-ud-dīn was enthroned in the Red Palace of Balban, and those who were disgusted by his ingratitude and treachery were silenced by the gold of the Deccan.

With the reign of 'Alā-ud-dīn begins what may be called the imperial period of the sultanate, during which the kings of Delhi extended their authority, either directly or indirectly, over the whole of the Indian peninsula. This period lasted for about half a century.

The first state doomed to extinction was Gujarāt. This kingdom had been ravaged and plundered once by Mahmūd and twice by Aibak, but had never owned a Muslim sovereign. It was now ruled by Rāja Karan, the Vāghela. 'Alā-ud-dīn sent from Delhi an army under his brother, Ulugh Khān, and his minister, Nusrat Khān. The country was overrun, the capital was occupied, and Karan was forced to flee, first to Deogīr, and later into Baglāna. A mutiny broke out in the army during its return from Gujarāt, but was suppressed, those of the mutineers who escaped taking refuge with Hamīr Singh in Ranthambhor. 'Alā-ud-dīn's successes turned his head, and he pondered two extravagant schemes; to emulate Alexander the Great as a world-conqueror, and to emulate Muhammad as a prophet and the preacher of a new faith. Like Alexander, he had hitherto succeeded in everything which he had undertaken, and like Muhammad he had, he said, four faithful companions to propagate his faith. He was brought to his senses by his faithful old servant, 'Alā-ul-mulk, formerly his lieutenant in Kara, and now *kotwāl* of Delhi. To his first scheme it was objected that he had not yet conquered India, and that, should he conquer it, he would require a regent as trusty as Aristotle to rule it while he fared forth into the world. As to the second, the *kotwāl* said, prophecy and religion were not based on temporal power, but on revelation. The old man concluded by warning him against excess in wine, which bred extravagant fancies. 'Alā-ud-dīn acknowledged the justice of the rebuke, commended his adviser, and abandoned his projects, but nevertheless described himself on his coins as "the Second Alexander".

Ranthambhor had been in the hands of the Hindus since the reign of Raziyya, and was now held by Hamīr Singh, who had offended 'Alā-ud-dīn by harbouring the deserters from the army. An army was sent to reduce the fortress, and, when Nusrat Khān was killed, the king led a second army from Delhi. At Tilpat, on his way to the fortress, he was benighted in the hunting field, and in the morning his nephew Ākat Khān, who was in search of him, tempted by his apparently defenceless condition, attacked and wounded him, and, believing that he had killed him, returned to the camp and demanded to be recognised as king. But the officers were cautious, and would not believe that the king was dead until they saw his head; and in the meantime 'Alā-ud-dīn, who had been joined by other troops, and whose wound had been dressed,

approached the camp with the royal umbrella over his head. Ākat Khān fled, but was overtaken and beheaded, and 'Alā-ud-dīn, on his recovery, continued his march to Ranthambhor and infused new life into the siege.

While he was yet before Ranthambhor two serious rebellions broke out. His sister's sons rose in Budaun and Oudh, but were captured and sent to him, and their eyes were cut out in his presence; and Hājji Maulā, an old officer who had been disappointed of succeeding 'Alā-ul-mulk as *kotwāl*, rose in Delhi, murdered the *kotwāl*, headed a mob which plundered the treasury, and enthroned a Sayyid, said to be descended, through his mother, from Īltutmish, with the suggestive name of Shāhinshāh. The city was in the hands of the rebels for a week, but they were at length overpowered, Hājji Maulā was slain, and the unfortunate Sayyid was beheaded. Ranthambhor was betrayed into the hands of 'Alā-ud-dīn, Hamīr Singh was put to death, a Muslim governor was appointed to the fortress, and 'Alā-ud-dīn returned to Delhi. He now set himself to discover the reasons for the rebellions which had broken out in the short period since his accession, and decided that they were due to lack of information regarding discontent, the use of wine, intermarriages between and social gatherings among the families of the great nobles, and the general prosperity, which relieved many of the necessity for working for their bread, and left them leisure for idle thoughts and mischievous plots. To remedy the irregularities arising from these causes he issued four ordinances. By the first he abolished the feudal system, substituting direct payments from the treasury for the granting of fiefs, resumed all rent-free grants of land and religious endowments, and directed the tax-gatherers to exact from the people all that they could pay. The second ordinance established an army of spies, who were to report not only breaches of the ordinances, but all that passed in the houses of the nobles. The third prohibited the manufacture and use of wine, and offences against this ordinance were punished with great barbarity, but 'Alā-ud-dīn discovered, as has lately been discovered by others, that such an ordinance could not be enforced, and was obliged to permit the sale of wine under certain conditions. The fourth ordinance prohibited, except with special leave, social gatherings in the houses of the nobles, and marriages between the members of their families; and finally a special code of laws against Hindus was framed. The

most burdensome taxes were imposed upon them, in order that to none might be left sufficient to enable him to ride a horse, to carry arms, to wear rich clothes, or to enjoy any other luxuries. This law was rigorously enforced.

In 1302 'Alā-ud-dīn marched to Chitor, the chief fortress of the Gahlot Rājputs, and is said to have entrapped the regent, Bhīma Singh, and to have refused to release him until he should surrender his beautiful wife, but the regent was rescued by a stratagem, and the king returned to the siege of Chitor, which he captured and sacked, after the garrison had performed the awful rite of *jauhar*, immolating their wives and daughters to save them from dishonour, and then rushing on the foe and sacrificing their own lives.

During the king's absence from his capital an army of 120,000 Mughuls<sup>1</sup> invaded his dominions, on this occasion with the object of conquest. They advanced rapidly on Delhi. The Kara contingent, which had just returned from a disastrous expedition into the Deccan by the east coast route, could not march to its relief, and the Mughuls closed the other approaches to the capital, so that 'Alā-ud-dīn, on his return, was obliged to take refuge in the fortress of Sirī, where he was beleaguered for two months. The Mughuls, who had devastated all the surrounding country, and were alarmed by the approach of reinforcements, then vanished as suddenly as they had appeared. This humiliating experience caused 'Alā-ud-dīn to improve the defences of his kingdom. All the fortresses between Delhi and the frontier were thoroughly repaired, and were garrisoned, but in 1304 the Mughuls again invaded the country in force.

During the campaign in Gujarāt a eunuch named Kāfūr had been captured and presented to 'Alā-ud-dīn under the name of Hazārdīnārī, or "the thousand dīnār slave", that being the price for which his former master had bought him. He first won the king's regard by his beauty, and became his vile favourite, but he was an efficient soldier, and was sent with Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluk, master of the horse, against the Mughuls who invaded the country in 1304. They came up with them on their retreat,

<sup>1</sup> This people is usually described as Mongols before and as Mughuls after its conversion to Islam. Mughul is the Arabic form of Mongol, and the Mughuls of Persia and Transoxiana were now Muslims.

laden with booty, and inflicted on them a crushing defeat, bearing back to Delhi their leaders and 8000 others, all of whom were publicly executed. For this service the eunuch was made lieutenant of the kingdom, with the title of Malik Nāib, and Tughluk was made governor of the Panjab.

'Alā-ud-dīn's designs of conquest, and the liability of his realm to Mughul raids, required the maintenance of a great standing army, but, owing to the influx of treasure from the south, the value of money had fallen, and prices had so risen that the soldier could not live on his pay. This the king was not disposed to augment. Instead, he issued an edict arbitrarily fixing the prices of all the necessities and most of the luxuries of life, on such a scale that the soldier was able to support himself in moderate comfort. This device would not commend itself to a modern economist, but the tariff was calculated with care, for, after a few initial difficulties with obstinate merchants and traders, it was enforced, and though prices rose when it was rescinded after 'Alā-ud-dīn's death, they fell a few years later to a level not much above the prices fixed by him.

Mālwa had hitherto been little molested by the Muslims. Īltutmish had advanced as far as Chanderī, and 'Alā-ud-dīn had sacked Bhīlsa, but these were mere raids. The country was now invaded with a view to its conquest, and an army under 'Ain-ul-mulk, governor of Multān, defeated on December 9, 1305, a great Hindu force under Koka, or Haranand, a raja of the Paramāra tribe of Rājputs, and the Muslims became masters of Ujjain, Māndū, Dhār, and Chanderī. Kāner Dev, the Chauhān raja of Jālor, submitted to 'Alā-ud-dīn and became his vassal, though he rebelled two years later, and was put to death.

After 1304 the Mughuls only twice again invaded India in force, once in 1306, to avenge their late defeat, and again in 1307. On both occasions they were defeated by Tughluk, now known as Ghāzī Malik, and large numbers of captives were sent to Delhi for execution; but there was never peace on the frontier, and Tughluk declared in an inscription that he had defeated them on twenty-nine occasions, and hence was entitled Ghāzī.

Rāmachandra of Deogīr had been remiss in the payment of tribute and the eunuch Malik Nāib was sent to call him to account, and also to capture the daughter of Karan of Gujarāt, whom her mother, now a member of the royal harem, wished to see again.

The princess, having been betrothed to Sankara, son of Rāmachandra, was on her way to Deogīr and was captured, not by Malik Nāib's troops, but by those of Alp Khān, governor of Gujārāt, and was sent to Delhi. Rāmachandra submitted, paid all arrears due from him, and was sent to Delhi, whence he was allowed to return to Deogīr as governor on the king's behalf, but the province of Berar was annexed.

The Deccan and the peninsula were then divided between three great Hindu kingdoms, that of Deogīr on the west, that of Telingāna in the east, and the Hoysala kingdom to the south of the Krishnā and Tungabhadra. The ruler of Telingāna, Pratāparudra II, had his capital at Warangal, and in the southern kingdom Vira Ballāla III reigned at Dvāravatīpura, the ruins of which are yet to be seen at Halebid in Mysore. Malik Nāib learned much of the wealth of the eastern and southern kingdoms while he was at Deogīr, and 'Alā-ud-dīn, who had but recently returned from a victorious campaign in Mārwar, sent him in 1308 to make a second attempt to establish his authority in Telingāna. Aided by Rāmachandra of Deogīr, he invaded Telingāna by way of Indūr, and besieged Warangal. On his carrying the outer line of defence, a high earthen rampart, Pratāparudra sued for peace, tendering an enormous indemnity and promising to pay an annual tribute. These terms were accepted, and the eunuch returned to Delhi with his spoil, and with further accounts of the wealth of the Hoysala kingdom. In 1310 he was again sent southwards to deal with this kingdom as he had dealt with Telingāna.

Meanwhile Rāmachandra of Deogīr had, in the words of a Muslim historian, "gone to Hell", and the loyalty of his son Sankara, who had succeeded him, was so doubtful that Malik Nāib, before continuing his southward march, was obliged to consider the protection of his line of communications. He marched on Dvāravatīpura with such rapidity as to take the Hindus entirely by surprise. Vira Ballāla in the first attack on his capital was captured and compelled to submit, and much plunder was taken. Malik Nāib then marched on to the extreme south of the peninsula, defeated and plundered the rajas ruling the small kingdoms of the Pāndyas and the Kerālas, plundered the great temple of Madura, and, marching to the Palk Strait, built at Rameswaram, on the island of Pāmban, a mosque which he named after his master.

'Alā-ud-dīn's power had reached its zenith. With the exception of a very few remote regions, the whole of the Indian peninsula owned his sway, and his wealth certainly exceeded that of any prince then living; but his bodily and mental powers were failing, his temper was embittered and his intellect clouded by ill health, and his declining years were darkened by rebellion and disorder.

Of the various hordes of Mongols who had invaded India, many had accepted Islam, had been allowed to settle in the country, and had been provided for in the royal service, where they were known as New Muslims. They were discontented and turbulent and had been a continual source of trouble. The mutineers in the army returning from Gujarāt, the followers of Ākat Khān, and many other rebels, had been New Muslims; and the king therefore dismissed the whole community from his service. The malcontents hatched a plot to assassinate him as he was hawking in the neighbourhood of Delhi, but it was discovered, and a decree for the massacre of all the New Muslims was issued, obedience being ensured by a promise that the slayer of a New Muslim should become the owner of all that his victim had possessed. Between twenty and thirty thousand were slaughtered, and their wives, children, and property were seized by their murderers.

In 1312 Khizr Khān, the king's eldest son, who had married Deval Devi, the princess of Gujarāt, was designated heir apparent, and Malik Nāib, who hated him, so resented this action that at his own request he was sent back to the Deccan. There he collected all arrears of tribute, put to death Sankara, who had defied the royal authority, assumed the government of Deogīr, captured Gulbarga, annexed the doāb between the Krishnā and the Tunga-bhadra, invaded and plundered Telingāna and the Hoysala kingdom, and took the sea-ports of Dābhol and Chaul. 'Alā-ud-dīn, who had been obliged to take to his bed, and was neglected by his family, recalled the eunuch to Delhi, where he was able to take revenge on all his enemies by persuading the king that they were conspiring against his life. Alp Khān was put to death, and the two elder princes, Khizr Khān and Shādī Khān, with their mother, were imprisoned. The eunuch's malevolent activity enraged all, and rebellions broke out in Gujarāt, Rājasthān, and Deogīr, where Rāmachandra's son-in-law, Harpāl, proclaimed himself inde-

pendent. On January 2, 1316, 'Alā-ud-dīn died, and his favourite produced a will disinheriting the three eldest sons, and leaving the crown to the fourth, Shihāb-ud-dīn 'Umar, a child of five or six. The two eldest sons were blinded, and soldiers were sent to blind the third, Mubārak, but he bribed them to slay the monster who had employed them.

Mubārak at first assumed office as regent for his young brother, but two months later deposed him and ascended the throne as Kutb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh, and soon afterwards caused the child and his two elder brothers to be put to death.

Mubārak at first gained much popularity by the rescission of all his father's harsher edicts. The abolition of the feudal system had been much resented, as had also a regulation requiring that all horses produced for service in the army should be branded, for more profit could be made from fiefs than from fixed salaries, and the production of borrowed horses for muster parades was far less costly than the maintenance of horses fit for service. The feudal system was restored; grants of rent-free land were made; and the branding regulation and the tariff of fixed prices were withdrawn. The sudden removal of all restraints produced an outburst of licentiousness similar to that which had disgraced the reign of Kaikubād, and once again the king's example encouraged his subjects, for his morals were no better than his father's, and from the earliest days of his reign he was under the influence of a vile favourite who had belonged to one of the scavenger castes of western India, but had nominally accepted Islam, and had been entitled Khusraw Khān. The old nobles were disgusted by the ribaldry and the foul obscenities which Mubārak not only permitted, but encouraged at his court, and by the appearance of their ruler, decked out with female finery and jewels.

The restoration of order was the new king's first serious task. He sent to Gujarāt 'Ain-ul-mulk of Multān, who quelled the rebellion there, and, in 1317, himself set out for the Deccan. Harpāl fled from Deogīr, but was pursued, captured, and flayed alive; and Mahārāshtra was once more parcelled out among Muslim officers. He remained at Deogīr for a year, during which time he built the great mosque still standing there, and in the autumn of 1318 he dispatched Khusraw, now lieutenant of the kingdom, on an expedition to Madura. During his march to Delhi he narrowly escaped death as the result of a plot in which some of his own



relatives, the descendants of his grand-uncle Yaghrush Khān, were implicated. On reaching Delhi he put to death all Yaghrush Khān's descendants, twenty-nine in number, some of whom were mere infants. Mubārak then, in the midst of his debauchery, ventured on an act but little less impudent than that which his father had contemplated. The 'Abbāsīd caliphate of Baghdād had been extinguished by Hulāgū in 1258, and there was no caliph in the eastern Islamic world. The drunken young libertine arrogated to himself the titles of Commander of the Faithful and *al-Wāthik billāh*.

His insane behaviour disgusted his friends and encouraged his enemies; his favourite's half-brother rebelled in Gujarāt, but was captured and pardoned; Malik Yaklakī, governor of Deogīr, rebelled in that city, and lost his nose and ears; and Khusraw was meditating treason in the south when he was recalled to Delhi, and those who had revealed his designs were punished. Surrounding his infatuated master with his own creatures, he put him to death on the night of April 14, 1320, and in the morning the courtiers, who had assembled in ignorance of what had happened, saw the outcast on the throne, and heard him proclaimed as Nāsir-ud-dīn Khusraw Shāh. The royal treasure was dissipated in an attempt to secure the support of the nobles and the army; but Khusraw soon betrayed the nature of his conversion to Islam, and Muslim historians record with indignation the open celebration of idolatrous worship at court, and the gross insults offered to their faith. Mosques were defiled and destroyed, and copies of the scriptures of Islam were used as seats and stools.

The eyes of all Muslims then turned towards Tughluk, the old warden of the marches. Khusraw was deserted by 'Ain-ul-mulk of Multān, and Tughluk, marching on Delhi, encountered the usurper on September 5, defeated him, and put him to death. He then sought for a scion of the royal house whom he might en-throne, but none survived, and all acclaimed him as king.

The new king was of mixed blood, the son of a Turkish father and an Indian mother. Though old, he was full of vigour; within a week he had pacified the capital, and within forty days his sovereignty was everywhere acknowledged. He enforced some of the more salutary laws of 'Alā-ud-dīn, and, as a natural consequence of recent events, Hindus were subjected to some repressive legislation. He pursued and punished all who had par-

participated in Khusraw's offences, and recovered most of the public money which the usurper had lavished on his creatures and supporters. He devoted himself to the improvement of the administration and restored a most efficient postal service, but his chief care was the encouragement and extension of agriculture, to which end he reduced the demand for land revenue.

Only one vassal, Pratāparudra of Warangal, appeared to believe that his fealty to Delhi was dissolved by the extinction of the Khaljīs, and in 1321 Tughluk sent his eldest son, Muhammad Jauna, entitled Ulugh Khān, to reduce him again to obedience. Pratāparudra, after enduring a siege for some time, attempted to purchase peace, as before, by submission, but his offer was rejected, and the siege continued. The Hindus, however, interrupted the postal service of the army, so that for some time no news was received from Delhi, and Ulugh Khān, misled by evil counsellors, announced the death of his father, and tried to persuade the army to acknowledge him as king. But Tughluk's officers refused to rebel against their old master, and the dissensions in the army necessitated the raising of the siege. Ulugh Khān succeeded in silencing for ever some of his opponents, and returned by forced marches to Delhi, with his personal contingent of horse. There, by some means or other, he persuaded his father either of his innocence or of his penitence, and in 1323 he was permitted to lead another expedition into Telingāna, and on this occasion he was entirely successful. Pratāparudra surrendered; he, his family, and his principal nobles were sent to Delhi with a great quantity of treasure; and Telingāna was annexed, and administered by Muslim officers as a province of the empire. Ulugh Khān, after establishing a Muslim government in the country, led a raid into a Hindu kingdom in Orissa.

The kingdom of Bengal, ruled by the descendants of Bughrā Khān, the younger son of Balban, had been left in peace during the brief period of Khaljī rule at Delhi. But Bughrā's grandsons were now disputing the succession; and the eldest, having been worsted by his younger brother, Bahādur, appealed to Tughluk for aid. Tughluk, welcoming this opportunity for intervention, recalled Ulugh Khān from Telingāna, installed him as regent in Delhi, and marched into Bengal, annexing on the way the Hindu province of Tirhut, and driving its raja into Nepāl. Nāsir-ud-dīn,

one of Bughrā's grandsons, was established as a vassal ruler in Lakhnāwati, and Bahādur was carried off, a prisoner.

Meanwhile Ulugh Khān's conduct at Delhi had aroused his father's suspicion, for he appeared to be preparing to usurp the throne. His father warned him, but Ulugh Khān apparently succeeded in allaying his suspicions, for on his return from Bengal he was received ceremoniously in a temporary pavilion at some miles distance from Delhi, before his triumphal entry into the city. This pavilion was so ingeniously constructed that it could be caused to collapse in a moment, and it fell on the old king, killing him.

It was in February or March, 1325, that Ulugh Khān succeeded his father under the title of Sultān Muhammad ibn Tughluk. He was a genius, with a share of that madness to which great wit is nearly allied, and his character was a strange medley of the most contradictory qualities. It is described by two contemporary writers, one native, fettered by the bonds of official reticence, and one foreign, untrammelled by any such bonds. Both are lost in astonishment at his arrogance, his piety, his disregard for the sacred law, his humility, his pride, his lavish generosity, his rapacity, his care for and his hostility to his people, his preference for foreigners, his love of justice, and his ferocious cruelty, and can find no better description of him than that he was a freak of creation.

The imperial policy of Tughluk, and of his son after him, differed widely from that of 'Alā-ud-dīn, who had been content to leave native rulers in possession of their ancestral domains, provided that they acknowledged him as their overlord and paid tribute. Under the new dynasty "local feudatories were superseded by governors appointed by the head of the state, and the selection of fitting and trustworthy representatives was attended by far greater risks than of old, now that the national bond, so effective among the ruling classes under the dynasty of the Turks, had disappeared amid the dissensions of Turk and Khaljī, both of whom had to bow to an alien sultan of curiously mixed breed. In the Muhammadan distrust of unconverted Hindus, all manner of foreign adventurers were installed in divisional posts; these men, having little or no interest in the stability of the throne, were ever ready to aid any projected rising, or to join, with their combined forces, any of the more influential rebels. The annals

of the period present a mere succession of outbreaks—no sooner was one section of the empire brought back to its allegiance than another would seek to assert its independence”.<sup>1</sup>


This brief view of the difficulties and defects of the administration would be incomplete without some mention of the pernicious system adopted by Muhammad in the later part of his reign of farming out the revenues, not of small areas, but of great provinces and even of groups of provinces, to men of base origin and bad principles, usually to the highest bidder. Under this system outbreaks of disorder became almost inevitable. Either the exactions of the farmer of the revenues drove the cultivators into revolt; or the farmer himself, unable to raise the sum which he had bid, found no course open to him but rebellion.

Muhammad's first measure was to assemble at Delhi officials from all the twenty-four provinces of the empire for the compilation of a register of the lands, and of the revenue assessed on them, his object being to establish a uniform system of land revenue throughout the empire, and to ensure that no village escaped taxation. Of this register, unfortunately, no vestige remains.

In the second year of his reign the series of rebellions against his authority began. His cousin Gurshāsp, the son of Tughluk's sister, rebelled in Sāgar, in the Deccan, but was defeated as he was marching on Deogīr, and took refuge with the raja of Kampli, near the Tungabhadra. The raja refused to surrender him, and, having sent him to Vīra Ballāla III, met the Muslim troops in the field, and was defeated and slain. Vīra Ballāla surrendered the refugee, who was carried to Deogīr, and there flayed alive, his skin, stuffed with straw, being sent to the principal cities in the empire for exhibition. Kishlū Khān, governor of Multān, refused to exhibit the miserable relic, and buried it. He then rose in rebellion, whereupon Muhammad marched against him, and slew him.

It was, perhaps, the rebellion of Gurshāsp in the Deccan that suggested to Muhammad the desirability of a more central position than Delhi for his capital, and in 1327 he decreed that Deogīr, which he renamed Daulatābād, should supersede Delhi. The city was much beautified and the courtiers and officials were required to build houses there, and make it their home. The

<sup>1</sup> Thomas, *Chronicles*, pp. 204, 205.



citizens of Delhi also were encouraged to migrate to Daulatābād, and, elaborate arrangements having been made for their comfort on the way thither, many did so, but it was not until two years later, when Muhammad, having repelled and pursued into the Panjab a raiding force of Mughuls under the Chaghātāy Khān, 'Alā-ud-dīn Tirmāshirīn, returned to Delhi and found the citizens bitterly resentful of the depopulation and impoverishment of the city, that he deported them wholesale to his new capital. He attempted, but with little success, to repopulate Delhi from other cities in northern India. The traveller Ibn Battūta, who arrived there five years later, writes, "When I entered Delhi it was almost a desert".

At about the same time the assessment of the land revenue in the Gangetic doāb was greatly enhanced. The extent of the enhancement is uncertain, but was evidently extravagant, for the Hindus of this region were still disaffected and turbulent, and it was devised as a punitive measure. It failed of its object, for most of the cultivators, unable to meet the increased demand, abandoned their holdings and took to brigandage, and one of the richest and most fertile tracts in the empire became the seat of war between the people and the royal troops.

To replenish his treasury, Muhammad had recourse to his famous device of a fictitious currency. He must have heard of the paper currency of Kublai Khān in China, and of the parchment currency attempted by the Il-Khāns in Persia, but the failure of the latter did not discourage him. His subsequent action proves that he understood the principles of a managed currency, and that he did not believe, as is suggested by some historians ignorant of those principles, that his command could raise the value of the baser to that of the precious metals. He issued brass or copper tokens, to pass current for the silver *tangā* of 140 grains. Success might have been possible had the measure been efficiently supervised, but no steps were taken to prevent fraud. "There was no special machinery to mark the difference of the fabric of the royal mint and the handiwork of the moderately skilled artisan. Unlike the precautions taken to prevent the imitation of the Chinese paper notes, there was positively no check on the authenticity of the copper tokens and no limit to the power of production of the masses at large."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Thomas, *Chronicles*, pp. 245, 246.

In the three years during which the tokens were current, the country was flooded with counterfeits, but Muhammad boldly faced the situation, called in the tokens, and redeemed all, both genuine and counterfeit. The loss must have been enormous, and the remains of the mountains of base metal which arose at the treasuries were to be seen a century later.

In 1333 and 1334, during which time the Moorish traveller, Ibn Battūta, whose record of his travels is one of the best authorities for this reign, arrived at Delhi, Muhammad was engaged in attempting to restore order in the doāb, but succeeded only in devastating the country. His lavish treatment of Ibn Battūta after his return to Delhi is a fair example of his indiscriminate liberality to foreigners, though the traveller was not, as were some wandering mendicants, unworthy of his bounty. A worthless descendant of one of the caliphs of Baghdād, who visited his court some years later, received such extravagant gifts and allowances that Muhammad's treatment of him cannot be reconciled with sanity, for its recipient was merely a well-born beggar, mean and miserly almost beyond belief, and grossly dishonest.

Muhammad was called away from Delhi by the news of a serious rebellion in the peninsula. Ahsan, the governor of Ma'bar, the most southerly province of the empire, had raised the standard of revolt at Madura, and had assumed the royal title. Muhammad marched against him by way of Daulatābād and Warangal, but, in Telingāna, his troops were smitten with pestilence, and his advance was arrested. He was obliged to halt in order that the plague might be stamped out, and that his army might rest. When the disease abated, he led the rest of his army back to Bīdar, and never had another opportunity of recovering his southern province, where Ahsan Shāh founded a Muslim dynasty, which was overthrown in 1378, by the third ruler of the newly established Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar.

The treasury had been depleted by lavish expenditure, and, above all, by the currency experiment, and Muhammad, in order to refill it, introduced the farming system, to which reference has already been made. The government of the province of Bīdar was bestowed upon Nusrat Khān, in consideration of his undertaking to pay annually into the treasury the sum of ten millions of *tangas*.

During Muhammad's absence in Warangal a report had spread that he had himself succumbed to the plague. This encouraged Malik Hūshang, a noble with whom he had been on terms of peculiar affection and intimacy, to rebel in Daulatābād. On learning that Muhammad yet lived, the rebel fled and took refuge with a petty Hindu chieftain, but was surrendered to Muhammad, and Muhammad, strange to say, pardoned him.

One of the objects in welcoming foreigners to India had been Muhammad's hope that they would help him to accomplish one of his extravagant designs, the conquest of Khurāsān. For this purpose he had raised an enormous army, which was such a drain on the treasury that in the second year of its existence no funds remained for its payment, and it melted away. The beggarly scion of the caliphs, already mentioned, had lived before his arrival under the protection of Tirmāshīrīn, in Transoxiana, and Muhammad was doubtless counting on his assistance when he welcomed him so bounteously. Another immigrant who had been received with the same object was a Mughul chieftain named Hulāgū, who had received a fief at Lahore. He rebelled, but his revolt was suppressed by the minister, Khvāja Jahān, who had been advanced to his high place at the beginning of the reign as a reward for having been the architect of the pavilion which had buried the king's father beneath its ruins.

On leaving Daulatābād for Delhi, Muhammad granted to those who had been deported eight years before a general permit to return to their old homes, and most of them joyfully accepted the concession, but some had become attached to the land of their exile and remained.

During the king's protracted absence from Delhi a heavy calamity had befallen northern India, and famine was sore in the land. For seven years the rainfall had been deficient, and the severity of the famine had been increased by the havoc which the king's punitive measures had wrought in the doāb. As he marched through Mālhwā the effects of famine appalled him. Towns and whole districts of that fertile province were depopulated. On reaching Delhi he issued for six months regular rations of grain to all the citizens, and cooked food was distributed daily at various shrines in the city. Large sums were advanced to enable husbandmen to buy seed and plough-cattle, to sink wells, and to improve and extend their holdings; but those tempted



by hunger to apply these advances to the satisfaction of even more pressing needs were punished with such rigour that the tale of executions shocked and disgusted even those accustomed to Muhammad's barbarous severity. He then decreed a fresh evacuation of Delhi, moved on this occasion by a desire for the welfare of his people. The fertile province of Oudh had for years prospered under the beneficent rule of its governor, 'Ain-ul-mulk, and as the king dared not transport corn from its overflowing granaries across the sorely-vexed doāb, he built on the Ganges, near the ancient city of Kara, a town of booths to which he gave the Sanskrit name of Sargadvārī (*Swarga-dvāra*) or "the Gate of Paradise", and which he made his headquarters for the next six years. To this town he brought the citizens of Delhi, and there they were fed on the corn of Oudh, and lived in moderate comfort.

After the foundation of Sargadvārī he committed an act of folly for which he has been blamed to an unmerited degree. It has been represented as an attempt to conquer China, or at least Tibet, but was in fact no more than a punitive expedition on a large scale against a refractory chieftain in the Himālāya, but even so it was foolish enough. An army of 100,000 horse and a large number of foot was sent into the mountains by way of Nagarkot, or Kāngra, which it captured, and then advanced into the territories of the hill-chieftain. It was overtaken by the heavy rains of the mountains, and began to retire with its plunder, but the mountaineers cut off its retreat, and destroyed it almost to a man. Only two officers and ten men returned to Delhi. The loss of the troops and treasure was far from being the most injurious effect of the disaster. The king's prestige received such a blow that provinces smouldering with discontent under his tyranny were ready at any moment to blaze into rebellion. Nusrat Khān, unable to pay even a quarter of the vast price which he had promised for the government of Bīdar, had already risen in rebellion, but had been defeated and captured and sent to Delhi by Kutlugh Khān, governor of Daulatābād. In Gulbarga 'Alī Shāh Kar rose in rebellion, marched to Bīdar, slew the governor, and occupied that town, but he also was captured and sent to Delhi by Kutlugh Khān. He was banished from India, and afterwards, on returning without leave, was put to death. On the death of the governor of eastern Bengal in 1339 one of his

officers assumed independence in that province, and western Bengal was shortly afterwards severed from the empire by rebellion. 'Ain-ul-mulk, governor of Oudh, had for years ruled that province with justice and clemency, and the victualling of Sargadvārī had been entirely due to his prudence and foresight, and to his arrangements for the transport of grain. He had demurred to the surrender of some refugees whom Muhammad had stigmatised as criminals, and was deeply perturbed by the announcement of the king's design to transfer him from Oudh to the government of the Deccan. He rebelled, and seized the royal elephants, horses, pack-animals, and cattle, which were grazing in Oudh. He assumed the title of Sulṭān 'Alā-ud-dīn; his troops, numbering 50,000, attacked Muhammad, marching to take refuge in the fortified city of Kanauj, but were defeated, and the rebel, having been captured, was carried before Muhammad, who had the grace to remember his long and faithful service, and, after keeping him in confinement for some months, released and reinstated him. Malik Shāhū Lodī, an Afghan, next rose at Multān, slew the governor, and seized the city, but fled beyond the Indus on learning that the king was marching against him. The subsequent rebellions in Gujarāt and the Deccan were partly due to the galling restrictions placed on Afghan officers in consequence of Shāhū's revolt. When Muhammad returned to Delhi, the famine was at its height, and the people were eating human flesh. Theorist as he was, he had for some time been pondering a code of regulations to restore prosperity to the country, and these were immediately issued. The first divided the empire into administrative districts measuring thirty by thirty leagues, or about 8100 square miles, in none of which was a span of land to be left uncultivated. No allowance was made for forest, pasture, or uncultivable land. A fixed rotation of crops, which was ordained, displayed complete ignorance of the principles of agriculture. Each district was placed under the control of an officer whose title may be translated 'undertaker', in the sense in which that term is used in Anglo-Irish history; but it was found to be difficult to bribe even irresponsible adventurers to undertake the execution of the regulation. Seventy million *tangas* were thus expended, and at last some persons were induced to undertake to re-people the land and to see that every square mile maintained a fixed number of horsemen. The bribes

are described by one historian as the blood-money of the undertakers, who, when they perceived the impossibility of carrying out their agreements, appropriated to their own use all that they had collected, trusting to events to enable them to escape their merited fate. At the end of the stipulated term of three years, says Baranī, not one-hundredth, nay not one-thousandth, part of the undertakings had been fulfilled, and, had not Muhammad died when he did, not one of the undertakers would have survived his resentment.

The second regulation encouraged the Mughuls to settle in India, and great sums were expended in inducing these foreigners to make India their home. The third regulation was framed with a view to the development and expansion of the resources of the state, but these were already taxed to the utmost, and we are not told how Muhammad proposed to exact any more from a starving and harassed people. The fourth enhanced the severity of the penal code, already sufficiently barbarous. "The king", says Ibn Battūta, "slew both small and great, and spared not the learned, the pious, or the noble. Daily there were brought to the council-hall men in chains, fetters, and bonds, and they were led away, some to execution, some to torture, some to scourging. May God preserve us from such calamities!"

Ibn Battūta left Delhi in July, 1342, the king taking advantage of his departure to entrust him with a mission to China. This had no result, but the traveller's account of his journey through India discloses the deplorable state of the country. The doāb was in rebellion, and not even an escort of a thousand horse sufficed to save him from being captured by Hindu rebels. He escaped, and eventually reached the Muslim court of Madura.

In 1343 Muhammad was occupied in the regions between the Jumna and the Sutlej, where many Hindus had abandoned agriculture for brigandage, dispersing the gangs of bandits and capturing their leaders. On his return to Delhi he received with the most extravagant honours the envoy of the puppet 'Abbāsīd caliph in Cairo, al-Hākim II, his self-abasement before the astonished Egyptian verging on the grotesque. As Baranī says, "Without the caliph's command the king scarcely ventured to drink a cup of water".

Rebellions continued. The caliph's envoy was yet at Delhi when Nizām-ul-mulk, a worthless debauchee to whom the

district of Kara had been farmed for an immense sum, finding that he could not pay one-tenth of the price, rose in rebellion, styling himself Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn. Muhammad was preparing to march against him when he received the rebel's skin, sent him by 'Ain-ul-mulk of Oudh.

The revenue of the Deccan had fallen by ninety per cent. owing to the introduction of the farming system and consequent rebellions. Grave apprehensions were aroused by the recall of the mild and pious Kutlugh Khān, who had governed the province benevolently throughout the reign, and by the announcement of the king's intention to divide the Deccan and Mālwa into four *shikkas*, or revenue divisions, from which he proposed to collect annually 670 million *tangas*. Alarm was increased by the selection of the collecting agency, at the head of which was placed 'Aziz Khammār ("the Vintner"), a low-born, unscrupulous, and extortionate adventurer. Those who were chiefly blamed for the trouble in Mālwa, Gujarāt, and the Deccan were the "centurions", military officers who, in a civil capacity, were responsible for the maintenance of order and the collection of the revenue in *parganas*, or groups of villages. Regarding these officials 'Aziz had received special instructions, and, summoning eighty-nine of them before him, he had them executed before his official residence at Dhār. The horror of the centurions of Gujarāt and the Deccan at this atrocious act was increased by the king's openly avowed approval of it, and those of Gujarāt rose in rebellion and plundered a large consignment of revenue, leaving that province for the capital. The king marched from Delhi, and on his way towards Gujarāt was incensed, but not surprised, by the news that 'Aziz, having marched against the rebels, had been defeated and taken by them, and put to death with torture. He continued his march in the spring of 1345, and a force detached by him defeated the centurions near Baroda. They fled towards the Deccan, and the king, marching to Broach, sent a force to intercept them. This force came up with them on the Nerbudda, and again defeated them. Some fugitives reached Daulatābād, and a few took refuge in Baglāna, where the raja imprisoned them. Those centurions of Broach, who had shown their loyalty by marching with the royal army against their fellows, were put to death by Muhammad's order, and the news of this ferocious act added fuel to the fire of sedition in the Deccan. Muhammad

remained at Broach, collecting arrears of revenue with great severity, and putting to death all suspected of having sympathised with the rebellion. He sent orders to the governor of Daulatābād, directing him to send the centurions of that province to Broach under escort. Of his intention there could be no doubt, and the centurions, having been dispatched as ordered, turned on their escort at the end of the first day's march, slew its leaders, and returned to Daulatābād. There they imprisoned the governor, seized the treasure, and proclaimed Ismā'il Mukh the Afghan, one of their number, king of the Deccan, under the title of Nāsir-ud-dīn Ismā'il Shāh. Muhammad marched to Daulatābād, and the rebels went forth to meet him, but were defeated and driven into the citadel, while the centurions of Bīdar under Hasan, entitled Zafar Khān, fell back on Gulbarga in order to recruit their forces. Sartiz, governor of Ellichpur, was sent against them, and Muhammad opened the siege of Daulatābād. He was thus engaged when he received news of another serious rising in Gujarāt under the leadership of Taghī, a man of humble origin. Leaving a force to continue the siege of Daulatābād, he marched back into Gujarāt, and for more than three years was engaged in pursuing the elusive Taghī, and in bringing into the Muslim obedience, for the first time, the raja of Gīrnār, now Junāgarh, in Kāthiāwār, who had harboured the rebel. When Gīrnār fell, both its ruler and the raja of Kachch, his ally, made their submission to Muhammad; but Taghī had fled into Sind before the leaguer of Gīrnār had been completed; and Muhammad, having spent the rainy season of 1350 in Gondal, prostrated by an attack of fever, set out in the autumn for Sind, in pursuit of Taghī, having summoned to his assistance a contingent of four or five thousand Mughuls, under a chieftain named Ultūn Bahādur. He marched on Tatta, but, when within thirty leagues of that town, again fell sick, and continued his journey by boat. Within fourteen leagues of Tatta he was obliged to rest, and great fear fell upon his army, which was held together by his personal authority alone. Far from home, encumbered with their wives and families, within reach of the enemy, and attended by allies whom they feared, they knew not what would befall them on the death of their leader. On March 20, 1351, the event they dreaded came to pass, "and so", says Budaunī, "the king was freed of his people, and they of their king".

The great empire founded by 'Alā-ud-dīn and ruled by Muhammad at the beginning of his reign had for some time been in the course of dissolution. First the peninsula and then Bengal had fallen away from it. Shortly after Muhammad had left Daulatābād to deal with Taghī in Gujarāt, Zafar Khān had advanced from Gulbarga to Bīdar, and, having there defeated and slain Sartīz, had marched to the relief of Daulatābād. On his approach the royal troops had raised the siege and had beaten a hasty retreat into Mālwa. Ismā'il Shāh, descending from the citadel, had welcomed his deliverer and abdicated in his favour, and on August 3, 1347, Zafar Khān was proclaimed king of the Deccan under the title of 'Alā-ud-dīn Bahman Shāh, and the great tract of country, lying between the Nerbudda on the north and the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra on the south, was cut off from the kingdom of Delhi for two and a half centuries. Thus ended the first Muslim empire in India.

## CHAPTER III

### The Fall of the Tughluks

In an Oriental monarchy the demise of the crown, unless the throne is at once filled, throws the state into anarchy, for the king is the state, and if there is no king there is no state. The death of Muhammad occurred in peculiarly unfortunate circumstances, and, while anarchy at Delhi was probable, anarchy in the army, leaderless and beset by dangers, was immediate. With the army at the time was Muhammad's cousin-german, Firūz, entitled Malik Rajab. It is said by his court historians that Muhammad had bequeathed the crown to him, but this is uncertain, and Firūz was most unwilling to assume it. The army, having already begun to retreat in a straggling and disorderly fashion, was attacked in rear by the people of Sind and in flank by its recent allies, the Mughuls, and was plundered by both; yet it was two days before Firūz yielded to the importunity of its officers, and assumed the royal title. Having done so he drove off the enemy and led the army towards Delhi.

The aged minister, Khvāja Jahān, had meanwhile attempted to ensure peace in the capital by proclaiming a child whom he alleged to be the son of Muhammad, but whom the panegyrists of Firūz represent to be supposititious. The child's paternity, as alleged by the minister, was no recommendation to the people, who declined to be ruled by the son of the tyrant, and, as Firūz approached, the minister's position became hopeless, and he was obliged to seek the royal camp as a suppliant. Firūz punished him only with banishment to Sāmāna, but the nobles, who had from the first insisted that he should be put to death, caused him to be assassinated on his way thither. Firūz was a contrast to his cousin. He made no serious attempt to recover either Bengal or the Deccan, and was an administrator rather than a soldier. He did his best to repair the errors of Muhammad, whose memory he respected, though he trembled for the fate of his soul, and imposed upon himself the duty of vicarious atonement. All those who had been tortured or mutilated, and the heirs of all who had been unjustly put to death, received compensation, and were

required to execute deeds, attested by witnesses, declaring themselves to be satisfied. These deeds were laid in a chest, placed in Muhammad's tomb, to enable him to meet any charges which might be brought against him beyond the grave.

The first administrative measure adopted was the appointment of an assessor of the land revenue, who, within six years, completed a tour of the kingdom and submitted his report. The demand on account of land revenue was so reduced as to leave ample provision for the cultivator's needs, and one result of this and other beneficent measures was an enormous expansion of the cultivated area. In fertile tracts thriving villages inhabited by a contented peasantry dotted the country at intervals of about two miles, and in the neighbourhood of Delhi alone there were 1200 garden villages in which fruit was grown, and which contributed £15,000 a year to the treasury. The annual revenue from the *doāb*, nearly depopulated during the last reign, soon amounted to £65,000, and that of the crown lands of the whole kingdom to over five and a half millions. At a later period Firūz abolished some twenty-five vexatious cesses, chiefly of the nature of octroi duties, at a loss to the exchequer of about a quarter of a million, but the result was a fall in prices which brought them to the level of 'Alā-ud-dīn's tariff. Nor was it only by lightening the burdens of the people that he encouraged agriculture and trade, for he is still remembered as the author of schemes of irrigation, and traces of his canals yet remain. He also sank 150 wells for the purposes of irrigation and the relief of travellers, and indulged a passion for building which equalled, if it did not surpass, that of the Roman emperor, Augustus. He built many villages and towns, among them Firūzābād or New Delhi, Fathābād, Hissār, Firūzpūr near Budaun, and Jaunpur; four mosques, thirty palaces, two hundred caravanserais, five reservoirs, five hospitals, a hundred tombs, ten baths, ten memorial pillars, and a hundred bridges.

He was pious, and mild and indulgent to those of his own faith, for whom he abolished capital punishment, but he was a rigid Muslim, and the harsher side of his piety was displayed in his persecution of heretics, sectaries, and Hindus. He burned to death a Brāhman accused of attempting to propagate his faith; and he insisted on Brāhmans paying the *jizya*, or poll-tax on non-Muslims, which they had long evaded. Towards the end of his reign Kharkir, the raja of Katehr, treacherously put to



death the Sayyid governor of Budaun and his two brothers. The powers of Firūz were beginning to fail, and he had become slothful; but this insult to his faith aroused him from his lethargy, and his vengeance was worthy of his cousin. In the spring of 1380 he marched into Katehr, and there commanded a massacre of the Hindus so general and so indiscriminate that, as one historian says, "the spirits of the murdered Sayyids themselves arose to intercede". The raja fled into the hills, leaving his subjects to the mercy of Firūz, who slew vast numbers and enslaved 23,000, and on his departure left an Afghan governor, with orders to devastate Katehr annually with fire and sword. For five successive years he visited the province, and so supplemented the Afghan's bloody work that in these years "not an acre of land was cultivated, no man slept in his house, and the death of the three Sayyids was avenged by that of countless thousands of Hindus".

In 1352 one Hājji Iliyās had established his authority over both eastern and western Bengal, and styled himself Shams-ud-dīn Iliyās Shāh. He invaded Tirhut with the object of annexing the province, but Firūz, though he had acquiesced in the independence of Bengal, was not prepared to suffer its ruler to encroach on his own dominions, and marched against him with an army of 70,000 horse. Iliyās retired to Ikḍāla, a village situated on islands in the Brahmaputra, and protected by the dense jungle which clothed the river's banks. Firūz was unable to reduce this stronghold, and was obliged to retreat before the rainy season began. Iliyās followed him, and is said to have been defeated in the field, but Firūz was obliged to continue his retreat.

Four years later an envoy from al-Mu'tadid, the puppet caliph in Egypt, reached Delhi with a commission recognising Firūz as the sultan of Delhi, but bearing also a letter announcing that the caliph had recognised Bahman Shāh as king of the Deccan. Three years later Firūz again invaded Bengal. Iliyās had died in 1357, and had been succeeded by his son, Sikandar Shāh, a pretext for attacking whom was furnished by the Persian, Zafar Khān. He had married the daughter of Mubārak Shāh, who had established his independence in eastern Bengal in 1338. Zafar Khān's hopes of succeeding his father-in-law had been shattered by the conquest of eastern Bengal by Iliyās in 1352, and he had taken refuge at the court of Firūz, where he had been favourably

received and generously treated. The flimsy pretext of vindicating his rights served Firūz, who marched from Delhi in the spring of 1359 and halted for six months, until the end of the rainy season, on the Gumti, where he founded the city of Jaunpur. In the autumn he continued his march, and Sikandar, like his father, retired to Ikdāla. The second siege was no more successful than the first, and Sikandar obtained peace on very favourable terms. The historians of Firūz say that Sikandar agreed to pay an annual tribute of forty elephants, and to surrender Sonārgāon, the capital of eastern Bengal, to Zafar Khān, but the tribute was seldom, if ever, remitted to Delhi, and Zafar Khān preferred the security and emoluments of his place at Delhi to the precarious tenure of a vassal throne. On the other hand Firūz presented to Sikandar a jewelled crown and 5000 fine horses, and recognised his royal title.

Firūz retired to Jaunpur and, in the autumn of 1360, led an expedition into Orissa, his objective being Puri, famous for the great temple of Jagannāth. He reached Puri, occupied the raja's palace, and is said to have sent the great idol to Delhi, to be trodden underfoot by the faithful, and the raja, who had fled into Telingāna, made his peace with a promise to send an annual tribute of twenty elephants. Firūz then attempted to reach Kara, which he had made his base, by the direct route through the hills and forests of Jhārkhand, or Chota Nāgpur. Here the army lost its way, and wandered for six months in an unknown country. Supplies were not to be had, and numbers perished from the hardships and privations which they suffered. Meanwhile the absence of news from the army caused grave unrest at Delhi, and the minister, a Brāhman of Telingāna who had received the name of Makbūl when he accepted Islām, and was now entitled Khānjahān, had much difficulty in maintaining order; but the news that the army had emerged into the plains of Bihar allayed the excitement of the populace, and the king was received with great joy on his return.

In 1351, before the caliph's recognition of Bahman Shāh of the Deccan, Firūz had marched from Delhi with the object of recovering Daulatābād, but, his progress having been arrested by reports that the raja of Kāngra had ventured to invade his kingdom and plunder some of the districts at the foot of the mountains, he turned against him by way of Sirhind, visited the temple of

Jwāla-Mukhi, some of the books in the library of which he caused to be translated into Persian, and, on the surrender and submission of the raja, generously allowed him to retain his state as a fief of Delhi.

The enforced retreat from Sind, and the insolence of its people had rankled in the memory of Firūz, ever since his accession, and in 1362 he set out for that country with an army of 90,000 horse and 480 elephants, accompanied by a great fleet of boats which he had assembled on the Indus; but when he reached Tatta, the capital, the crops had been reaped and stored in the city, which was resolutely defended by its ruler, Jām Mālī, and his nephew Bābaniya. The besiegers were famine-stricken, and three-fourths of their horses were carried off or disabled by disease. The fleet was captured, and Firūz decided to retire into Gujarāt to enable his troops to recruit their strength and replace their horses. During the retreat the sufferings of the army were terrible. Famine still prevailed, and starving men fell out by the wayside and died. They were treacherously guided across the Rann of Kachch, where there was no fresh water, and thirst was added to their other sufferings. Once again no news of the army reached Delhi for some months, and the minister was reduced to the expedient of forging a dispatch to allay the excitement of the people. At length the army debouched into the fertile plains of Gujarāt, and there gradually recovered its strength. During the rainy season of 1363 Firūz led it again into Sind. His return was unexpected, and he arrived before Tatta while the crops were yet green. After an unsuccessful attack on the city he sent to Delhi for reinforcements, and his troops cut the crops, which afforded them ample supplies, while the garrison began to feel the pinch of famine, and were so distressed that even before the reinforcements arrived the jām sent envoys to sue for peace. He was allowed to retain his kingdom on undertaking to pay annually 400,000 *tangas* as tribute, but for the time being both he and his nephew were required to accompany Firūz to Delhi as hostages. The sufferings of the army during its retreat into Gujarāt had so affected Firūz that he swore never again to make war, but for the suppression of rebellion. Thus it was that when, in 1366, envoys came from Bahrām Khān Māzandarāni, who was in rebellion against his brother-in-law, Muhammad Shāh Bahmanī I of the Deccan, and offered, should Firūz aid him, to hold the

Deccan as a fief of Delhi, they were told that their employer and his friends were suffering the just punishment of rebellion, and were summarily dismissed.

Death now began to deprive Fīrūz of his best and dearest. In 1372 his faithful minister, Makbūl Khānjahān, died, and was succeeded in his office and his title by his son, and in 1374 Fīrūz's favourite son died. The gradual impairment of his faculties, which then first became evident in his neglect of public business, may be attributed to his grief at his loss. A few years later the failure of his powers kindled the ambition of the new minister, who succeeded in persuading him that his eldest surviving son, Muhammad, was conspiring to remove him, and to usurp the throne. The prince was summoned to a durbar, at which he was to have been arrested, but evaded attendance on the plea of ill-health, and a little later forced his way into his father's presence and convinced him that it was Khānjahān, not he, who was harbouring ambitious designs, and, with his permission, led the household troops in an attack on the minister's house. Khānjahān was defeated and wounded, and fled into Mewāt, but Koka the Chauhān, the Rājput chief with whom he took refuge, surrendered him to one of the prince's officers, and his head was sent to Muhammad in Delhi.

Fīrūz, no longer capable of ruling, associated his son with himself in the government, and even in the royal title, causing him to be proclaimed as Nāsir-ud-dīn Muhammad Shāh. Muhammad, believing his succession to be assured, neglected all public business and devoted himself entirely to pleasure. For five months the administrative machinery, which had been reformed by Fīrūz in the early years of his reign, worked automatically, until the apathy and incompetency of Muhammad threw it out of order. Many of the old servants of the crown rose against him in the interests of Fīrūz, and, when hard pressed by his troops, forced their way into the palace and brought the old king forth in a litter. Muhammad's troops, finding themselves arrayed against Fīrūz, deserted their master, and he fled into Sirmūr with but a few retainers. Fīrūz then promoted his grandson, Tughluk, son of the deceased Fath Khān, to the position recently held by Muhammad, and conferred on him the royal title. On September 20, 1388, Fīrūz died, at the age of eighty-three, after a reign of thirty-seven years.

The great empire of India had begun to dissolve before the death of Muhammad ibn Tughluk, and before the death of Firūz even the kingdom of Delhi was already dissolving. As his bodily and mental powers decayed, power fell more and more into the hands of the nobles and officers of state, and on his death he left a disputed succession, one of the worst legacies which the subjects of an oriental ruler can inherit, even when the result of the contest is reasonably certain; but there now remained none of the royal house worthy of the throne. His grandson, Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluk II, succeeded him at Delhi, while his son Muhammad was preparing in the Sirmūr hills to assert his title to the throne. Tughluk, before he could come to grips with his uncle, was driven from the throne, and put to death by his cousin, Abu Bakr. The details of the contest are too complicated and confusing to be followed minutely here. On August 31, 1390, Muhammad established himself in Delhi, and Abu Bakr fled into Mewāt, where he was shortly afterwards captured. Muhammad's brief reign was troubled, for the Hindus of the doāb and Bahādur Nāhir, the chief of Mewāt, were again in rebellion. On January 30, 1394, Muhammad died, and was succeeded by his son Humāyūn, who ascended the throne as 'Alā-ud-dīn Sikandar Shāh, but died within two months.

A eunuch, Malik Sarvar, had risen to power during Muhammad's reign, and had been left as regent at Delhi during the king's absence from the capital. He persuaded the provincial governors, who were assembled at Delhi to consult about restoring order in the Panjab, to enthrone, under the title of Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd, Humāyūn's brother, the younger son of Muhammad. The new king was feeble-minded, and throughout his reign was a puppet in the hands of one or other of the great nobles. The kingdom was in a deplorable condition. The Khokhars were in rebellion in the Panjab; in the eastern provinces the Hindus, who had long ceased to contribute anything to the exchequer, threw off all semblance of obedience, and Sarvar induced or compelled the young king to bestow upon him the lofty title of *Sultān-ush-shark*, or "King of the East", and to commit to him the duty of crushing the rebellion and restoring order. He left Delhi in May, 1394, reduced to obedience the rebels in the doāb, and occupied Jaunpur, where he established himself as an independent ruler. The day on which he left Delhi may be

reckoned as the date of the foundation of the dynasty of "the Kings of the East", or Jaunpur. Meanwhile Sārang Khān, governor of Dīpālpur, had defeated the Khokhars and established his own authority in the Panjab, and at the same time the two great provinces of Mālwa and Gujarāt were severed from the kingdom. Dilāvar Khān, governor of Mālwa, never assumed the royal title, but from 1392 onwards he neither remitted tribute nor paid any heed to the affairs of Delhi. Zafar Khān of Gujarāt assumed the royal title in 1396, as Muzaffar Shāh; but for some time before that year he had ceased to hold communication with the capital.

In the miserable remnant of the kingdom factious nobles were contending with each other for the possession of the person of a puppet king. One Sa'adat Khān prevailed for some time, but the king wearied of his control, and, fleeing from him, took refuge in Delhi with Mukarrab Khān, while Sa'adat Khān, enraged by his desertion, proclaimed as king in Fīrūzābād Nusrat Khān, the younger son of Fath Khān, eldest son of Fīrūz. There were thus two kings in adjoining cities, each a puppet in the hands of a powerful noble. The affairs of the kingdom were in this condition when Pīr Muhammad crossed the Indus, and, in May 1398, occupied Multān.

To this portent the factious nobles of Delhi paid no heed. One Mallū, who had received the title of Ikbāl Khān, murdered Mukarrab Khān, gained possession of the person of Mahmūd, and drove Nusrat Shāh as a fugitive into the doāb.

The continuance of squabbles for precedence, in a kingdom but a shred of its former self, in face of the deadly peril which now menaced India, betrays the ignorance and parochial outlook of those in whose hands it remained. The terrible amir of Samarkand, Tīmūr, conqueror of Persia and Mesopotamia, had announced his intention of invading the country, and Pīr Muhammad, his forerunner, had already occupied a frontier province. Tīmūr seldom required either a pretext or a stimulus for his aggressions, but India supplied him with both. The pretext was the toleration of idolatry by its Muslim rulers, and the stimulus was the disintegration of the kingdom, unparalleled in its history. Tīmūr joined his grandson at Multān and marched on Delhi. He massacred the people of Talamba, defeated Jasrat the Khokhar on the Sutlej, captured Bhatnair and massacred its inhabitants,

and then marched on towards the capital, plundering and massacring and enslaving those of the villagers and townsfolk who failed to make their escape. On December 10, 1398, having crossed the Jumna, he occupied Lonī, and, having massacred its Hindu inhabitants, made it his headquarters. Two days later his captives exhibited some signs of joy when a reconnaissance, led across the river by Tīmūr himself, was attacked by Mallū. The poor wretches, to the number of 100,000, paid for their indiscretion with their lives. On December 17, Tīmūr, crossing the river, fell upon and defeated the army which Mallū and Mahmūd led out from Delhi. Mallū concealed himself in Baran, but Mahmūd made the best of his way to Gujarāt, and sought an asylum with Sultān Muzaffar. Tīmūr granted an amnesty to the people of Delhi, but the licence of his troops provoked a rising which was punished by a general massacre, and for several days his army sacked the city, slaying many thousands of its inhabitants, whose "bodies were given as food to the birds and the beasts, their souls being sent to the depths of hell". So many captives were taken that in the army "there was none so humble but he had at least twenty slaves". On January 1, 1399, Tīmūr retired, and after taking Meerut by storm and massacring its Hindu inhabitants, followed the line of the lower slopes of the Himālayas, marking his track by the almost daily slaughter of great numbers of Hindus.

At Delhi Khizr Khān, the Sayyid, who had been expelled from the province of Multān by Mallū's brother, Sārang Khān, made his submission to Tīmūr, and accompanied him on his retreat as far as Kashmīr, where Tīmūr dismissed him, after appointing him to the government of the Panjab. Some historians say that he was also appointed Tīmūr's viceroy in Delhi, but this addition was perhaps suggested by later events.

After the invader's departure the whole of northern India was in indescribable disorder and confusion. As a result of the wholesale destruction of stores of grain and standing crops, famine was rife in the land, and the thousands of putrefying corpses polluted the air and the water, and bred a pestilence. "Delhi was utterly ruined, and those of its people who were left died, while for two whole months not a bird moved wing in the city." Of the kingdom hardly a trace remained. The Panjab and Upper Sind were ruled by Khizr Khān as Tīmūr's viceroy; Ghālib Khān was

independent in Sāmāna, and Shams Khān Auhadī in Bayāna; Kālpi and Mahobā formed a principality under Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd, and Mewār another under Bahādur Nāhir; Gwalior had been recovered by the Tonwār Rājput, Har Singh, and a Rājput clan had established its independence in Etāwah. Nusrat Shāh occupied Delhi, but was driven thence by Mallū who, after an abortive campaign against Jaunpur, where Sarvar had been succeeded by his adopted son, Mubārak, returned in 1401 to Delhi, and invited Mahmūd to return to his capital. The wanderer's experiences had been bitterly humiliating. Muzaffar Shāh of Gujarāt had been at no pains to conceal from him that his presence was distasteful, and he had fled from Gujarāt to Mālwa, where Dilāvar Khān had treated him more courteously, and housed him in comfort; but he could not refuse to return to his kingdom, and, on his reaching Delhi, Mallū interned him in his palace and governed the remnant of his kingdom without even feigning to consult him. In 1402, on the death of Mubārak Shāh in Jaunpur, Mallū marched to attack his successor, Ibrāhīm, in the hope of recovering Jaunpur, but, on coming face to face with Ibrāhīm's army, dared not attack it. Mahmūd, whom he had carried with him to Kanauj, attempted to take refuge with Ibrāhīm, but was so ill received that he again fled, and established himself in the strongly fortified city of Kanauj, while Mallū, much weakened by his defection, returned to Delhi. During the next three years Mallū attempted, but without success, to recover Gwalior, Etāwah, and Kanauj, and in 1405 marched against Khizr Khān, who was then established in Dīpālpur. On November 12 Khizr Khān defeated and slew him near Pāk Pattan. On his death the direction of affairs at Delhi fell into the hands of a body of officers headed by Daulat Khān Lodī and Ikhtiyār Khān, at whose invitation Mahmūd returned to his capital. Daulat Khān succeeded in recovering Sāmāna, which had been captured and held by one of Khizr Khān's officers, and then a year was wasted in languid and inconclusive warfare with Jaunpur, while Khizr Khān began to close in on Delhi. He twice besieged the city, but on each occasion was obliged to retire owing to the scarcity of supplies. In February 1413, Mahmūd died at Kaithal, after a nominal reign of twenty years, and the Tughluk dynasty came to an end. On his death the local officers transferred their allegiance to Daulat Khān Lodī, but in March 1414 Khizr Khān opened



the siege of Delhi, and captured it after four months. He had for some years ruled the Panjab, and the acquisition of Delhi added little to his territories, for the authority of those from whom he took it extended hardly beyond the neighbourhood of the city walls.

## CHAPTER IV

### The Sayyid and the Lodī Dynasties, and the Kingdom of Jaunpur

Khizr Khān founded the Sayyid dynasty, of which four kings reigned for thirty-seven years. Their territory consisted of Delhi and the country round its walls, and the history of the period is a record of raids to collect revenue or tribute, and of futile campaigns against the more powerful kingdom of Jaunpur. Khizr Khān, during the seven years of his reign, was constantly in the field, engaged, according to Muslim historians, in quelling rebellions, but there was little active rebellion, for there was no need for it. Fief-holders and Hindu chieftains lived ordinarily at peace in their strongholds, disturbed occasionally by Khizr Khān who, when he was in need, attacked them. He could not reduce their strongholds, but he could cut off supplies and harass the wretched cultivators until their rulers bought him off by meeting his demands, and by promises, never kept or intended to be kept, of regular payments in future. In his short reign he thus harried the raja of Etāwah four times, those of Katehr and Gwalior three times, the feudatories of Chandwār (Fīrūzābād), Koīl, Bayāna and Sirhind twice, and those of five other districts once. Throughout his reign and those of his successors the territories nominally subject to Delhi were frequently raided from the north-west by Jasrat the Khokhar, who was independent in the northern Panjab, declining to acknowledge the sovereignty of the Sayyids, and would have seized the throne of Delhi but that the powerful feudatories who withheld their allegiance from that throne would have actively combined against him. Khizr Khān died on May 20, 1421. He never assumed the royal title, but was content to be styled *Rāyāt-i-a'lā* or the 'Sublime Banners', a title which embodied a profession of vassalage of Tīmūr and his son Shāhrukh. His elder son, who succeeded him as Mu'izz-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh, assumed the royal title and owed no allegiance to the Timurids. His reign, like that of his father, was spent largely in a series of raids on those whose allegiance he

claimed, but who would never acknowledge his sovereignty until compelled by force to make some material contribution to his treasury.

Khizr Khān, though no statesman, was an active and energetic soldier, and the same, in a less degree, may be said of his son. Gradual degeneracy is a marked characteristic of oriental dynasties, but in this dynasty the degeneracy was rapid, not gradual. Four generations of the house sat upon the throne, and each of the last three rulers was more contemptible than his predecessor. Mubārak, though inferior to his father both as a soldier and as a statesman, was not so slothful or mean-spirited as his successors. He led expeditions into the districts which his father had invaded, and into some others; he drove Jasrat out of his kingdom, and with the help of Bhīm, raja of Jammū, whom Jasrat afterwards defeated and slew, attacked and destroyed his principal stronghold; he fortified and garrisoned Lahore, which had been in ruins since Tīmūr's invasion, and he dealt vigorously with a new enemy. This was Shaikh 'Alī, lieutenant of Suyūrghātmish, fourth son of Shāhrukh and governor, on behalf of his father, of Kābul. It may be that his raids into India were attempts to punish Mubārak for having repudiated allegiance to Shāhrukh. He occupied Multān and plundered its inhabitants until driven out by one of Mubārak's officers, and he received a yearly sum as blackmail from the governor of Lahore. He marched to Bhātinda, then held by a rebel, compelled Mubārak's troops to raise the siege of the town, and received a great sum as the price of his assistance, but was defeated, on his retreat, by the governor of Multān. He continued, however, to raid the Panjab, and occupied the fortress of Shorkot. He defeated and slew Islām Khān Lodī, one of Mubārak's best officers, and governor of the important district of Sirhind; but two years later his nephew, Amīr Muzaffar, was attacked by Mubārak in Shorkot, and was obliged to purchase a safe retreat by giving his daughter in marriage to Muhammad, Mubārak's nephew and adopted son.

On discovering that his powerful minister, Sarvar-ul-mulk, whom he dared not dismiss, had long been neglecting his duty, Mubārak appointed a coadjutor, and Sarvar-ul-mulk, resenting what he regarded as supersession, formed a conspiracy against his master. Mubārak, unconscious of his danger, was employing himself in building Mubārakābād, a town on the Jumna, until

he was called away by the welcome news that Bhātinda had at last fallen, and that Fūlād, the leader of the rebellion, had perished. He marched to Bhātinda, and was there extinguishing the embers of disaffection when he learned that Ibrāhīm Shāh of Jaunpur and Hūshang Shāh of Mālhwā had claimed the sovereignty of the district of Kālpī, and were marching to decide the question by an appeal to arms. He could not permit two independent rulers to dispute the sovereignty of a district which had always, at least nominally, belonged to the kingdom of Delhi, and he returned to Delhi to assemble his forces. On his way to Kālpī, he turned aside to visit Mubārakābād, and there, on February 19, 1434, Sarvar-ul-mulk caused him to be assassinated.

He left no son, and the nobles at Delhi enthroned Muhammad, the son of his deceased brother, Farīd. Sarvar-ul-mulk's guilt was known to all, but he held possession of the royal treasury, armoury and elephants, and Muhammad dared not dismiss him. In order to intimidate the loyal nobles, the minister executed one of their number, and distributed such fiefs as were vacant to his own partisans, but the great fief-holders of the kingdom, well aware that he aspired to the throne, assembled their forces and marched on Delhi. Here the regicide was besieged for three months, and, on discovering that Muhammad, as was not surprising, was in sympathy with the besiegers, attempted to assassinate him, but the king's attendants were prepared for the attempt, and slew him and some of his chief accomplices. The nobles who were besieging the city, led by Malik Ilāhdād Lodī, governor of Sambhal, and Kamāl-ud-dīn, formerly Sarvar-ul-mulk's coadjutor, were admitted and the remaining conspirators were seized and executed. Muhammad was again enthroned, and Kamāl-ud-dīn became his minister.

The king had hitherto been the victim of circumstances, but, as soon as he had an opportunity of displaying his fitness for rule, he so abused it as to lose both the affection and the confidence of those who had freed him from his enemies. He made a pilgrimage to Multān, to visit the shrines of saints, but so lightly was his authority regarded there that little more than three years after his departure the people of the city elected their own governor, a pious man named Shaikh Yūsuf.

Muhammad's predecessors had fitfully maintained a measure of authority by a constant series of forays against those who

refused or neglected to acknowledge it, but he remained in his capital, sunk in indolence and vice, until his nobles perceived that, if the ancient pre-eminence of Delhi were to be preserved, they must seek some other ruler. Mention has already been made of the Lodī tribe of Afghans. Islām Khān of that tribe had held for some years the important fief of Sirhind, until he was defeated and slain by Shaikh 'Alī; Ilāhdād, governor of Sambhal, had been one of those who freed the king from the treacherous faction of Sarvar-ul-mulk; but the foremost member of the clan was Buhlūl, nephew and adopted son of Islām Khān, whom he had succeeded in the fief of Sirhind. As the king's weakness and meanness of spirit became more apparent, Buhlūl gradually extended his authority over the Panjab, and withheld the revenue due to the royal treasury. Muhammad's authority did not extend beyond Pānīpat to the north; on the south-east the raja of Gwalior no longer made any pretence of fealty, and Mahmūd Shāh of Jaunpur annexed the lower doāb. The Hindus elsewhere in the doāb ignored with impunity an authority which was never asserted, and the tribesmen of Mewāt plundered the country almost to the gates of the capital. Buhlūl Lodī was obviously the coming man, but the nobles would not submit to one of their own number, and a faction appealed in 1440 to Mahmūd I of Mālwa, an active and warlike prince, who in 1436 had seized the throne of that kingdom, and implored him to restore the former glories of Delhi. Muhammad, on learning that Mahmūd was responding to their appeal, assembled such troops as he could muster and begged Buhlūl to hasten to his aid. Buhlūl responded readily, not in loyalty to Muhammad, but in order to save the kingdom for himself, and the armies met between Delhi and Tughlukābād. A battle which began at noon lasted without decisive advantage to either side until nightfall, when each army retired to its camp, and Muhammad, who had lurked in his palace, too pusillanimous to lead his troops, made undignified proposals for peace. These would probably have been rejected with contempt, had not Mahmūd learned that a mob had risen in his capital and proclaimed a pretender. He accordingly accepted the proffered terms, and the next day began his retreat, but Buhlūl, violating the condition that he should be allowed to retire unmolested, followed him, gaining a trivial success over his rearguard, and some plunder. He was received on his return with extravagant

demonstrations of joy; his petty triumph was magnified into a great victory; and Muhammad distinguished him by styling him his son and conferring on him the title of Khānkhānān. He now feigned loyalty to Muhammad, who in the following year visited him at Sāmāna, and bestowed on him the fiefs of Dīpālpur and Lahore, which were no longer his to give. He also desired him to crush Jasrat, but Buhlūl, on discovering that Jasrat was not opposed to his designs on Delhi, left him in peace, and enlisted large numbers of Afghans, largely of his own tribe. He then picked a quarrel, on trivial grounds, with Muhammad, and besieged him in Delhi, but was bought off and returned, unmolested, to his fiefs, where he styled himself Sultān Buhlūl.

After the siege of the capital the disorders of the kingdom increased daily, and when Muhammad died, in 1444, no point on his frontier was more than forty miles distant from Delhi, and the kingdom inherited by his son, who took the title of 'Ālam Shāh, or 'World-King', comprised little more than the city and the neighbouring villages. He was more feeble-minded and mean-spirited than even his father had been, and in 1447, when he marched to Budaun, he found that city so attractive that he decided, in spite of the protests of his advisers, to reside there rather than at Delhi, and in 1448 he retired thither, leaving the control of affairs at the capital in the hands of his two brothers-in-law. They quarrelled, and one killed the other in a faction fight; but the mob rose against the survivor and put him to death. Hamīd Khān, who had been 'Ālam Shāh's minister, and Hisām Khān, another noble, became arbiters of the destinies of Delhi, and sought a ruler. 'Ālam Shāh refused to leave Budaun, and they would gladly have found another puppet in whose name they could rule, but none was to be found, and they were obliged to have recourse to Buhlūl, lest he should seize the throne by force. He came, and on April 19, 1451, ascended the throne, having written to 'Ālam Shāh a letter, explaining that he was actuated solely by jealousy for the royal authority, which had been set at nought. 'Ālam Shāh, content with ease, replied that he cheerfully resigned his throne to Buhlūl, whom his father had styled his son, as to an elder brother; and he remained contentedly in Budaun, where the revenue of the small territory which he was permitted to retain sufficed to provide his pleasures.

The condition of the kingdom which Buhlūl was called to govern has been described, but he was already, before he ascended the throne of Delhi, a powerful ruler. Most of the Panjab owned his sway, and his kinsman, Daryā Khān, was ruler of the upper doāb and of most of the province now known as Rohilkhand.

The new king was active and warlike, and was resolved to restore the kingdom to its former pre-eminence. He would be a puppet in the hands of none, and one of his earliest acts was to imprison Hamīd Khān, at whose invitation he had ascended the throne. On the other hand, his relations with members of his own tribe differed from those of former kings of Delhi with their courtiers. The rude Afghans, many of whom were his own kinsmen, would not abase themselves before a leader whom they regarded as no more than *primus inter pares*; but he knew how to control them, and was content to forgo courtly obeisance while he could command military obedience. Shaikh Yūsuf, the popularly-elected governor of Multān, having been expelled from that city by a Balūch chief, now begged Buhlūl to recover the lost province, and late in 1451 Buhlūl left Delhi for Multān, but was almost immediately recalled by the news that Mahmūd Shāh of Jaunpur had invaded his kingdom. He was never able to recover the province of Multān, where the Langāhs, as the descendants of the Balūch chief were called, reigned until after Bābur had conquered Hindūstān.

Some of the old nobles of the Sayyids, finding the energetic rule of the new king little to their taste, had invited Mahmūd to attack the city and expel the Afghans, and Mahmūd, responding to the appeal, had been joined, during his advance, by Buhlūl's kinsman, Daryā Khān Lodī, whose adherence was, however, a matter rather of necessity than of choice. Buhlūl hastened back, attacked the invaders, who were deserted by Daryā Khān at a critical moment, and put them to flight. Mahmūd thereupon raised the siege of Delhi, and retired to Jaunpur; but this action marked but the opening of a period of hostilities with Jaunpur which endured until 1479, when Husain, the last of the Sharkī dynasty, was overthrown, and Jaunpur was annexed.

A detailed account of these campaigns would be neither interesting nor instructive. Jaunpur had been, ever since Tīmūr's invasion, a more powerful kingdom than Delhi, and Buhlūl judged aright when he decided that the first step to be taken was

the restoration of Delhi's power by the subjugation of Mewār and the fief-holders and Hindu chieftains of the doāb. This action necessarily brought him into conflict with Jaunpur, and he was twice reduced to such straits, by the approach to Delhi of an army superior in numbers to his own, as to offer to submit and hold Delhi as a fief of Jaunpur. Fortunately for him, these offers were rejected, and on each occasion he contrived to defeat his enemy. In 1458, when he compelled the raja of Etāwah to swear allegiance to him, he was attacked by Mahmūd of Jaunpur; but Mahmūd died suddenly, as the armies drew within striking distance, and his place was taken by his son Muhammad. Buhlūl then attacked Muhammad; but, while hostilities were yet in progress, Muhammad learned that his brother, Husain, had been proclaimed king in Jaunpur, and he was shortly afterwards put to death by those of his officers who favoured Husain's cause. Although the accession of Husain introduced a new element of strife, for his wife Jalīla, a sister of 'Ālam Shāh, constantly urged him to avenge her brother's wrongs, and to restore him to the throne of Delhi, it was followed by nearly five years of peace, which gave Buhlūl time to continue his task of establishing order throughout his kingdom, and of reducing the great fief-holders to obedience. In 1473, Husain, stirred at length to action, marched on Delhi and rejected Buhlūl's offer of submission, but was defeated, his women falling into the hands of Buhlūl, who magnanimously sent them unmolested to Jaunpur. A truce of three years, accepted by both kings, was broken by Husain, and a series of campaigns followed, in which the advantage lay, on the whole, with Buhlūl. In March, 1479, Husain marched on Delhi for the last time. His prospects of success were better than on any previous occasion, but he was induced to make peace on receiving the cession of all the territory to the east of the Ganges. As he was retiring, in leisurely fashion, Buhlūl perfidiously attacked him, defeated his army, and pursued it. This victory marked the turn of the tide in favour of Delhi. Husain, in attempting to redeem his losses, was more crushingly defeated than ever before; and Buhlūl then took the offensive. Husain was again defeated, and driven to Gwalior, where the raja, Kirat Singh, still faithful to him, enabled him again to take the field; but he suffered a series of defeats at the hand of Buhlūl, who, after capturing Jaunpur and placing an officer named Mubārak



Khān in command of the city, marched to Budaun, which had been nominally subject to Jaunpur since the death of 'Ālam Shāh in 1478. Husain re-assembled his forces, and expelled Mubārak Khān from Jaunpur, but Buhlūl returned and drove him from his kingdom into Bihar, where he thenceforth lived as a refugee. Buhlūl then, in 1486, placed his eldest surviving son, Bārbak, in Jaunpur, and, though he permitted him to use the royal title and to coin money in his own name, the independence of Jaunpur had come to an end.

The history of this kingdom, founded by Malik Sarvar in 1394, is chiefly limited to its wars with Delhi, of which some account has already been given. The dynasty which ruled it is known as the Sharkī dynasty, partly from the title bestowed on Sarvar, and partly because it was established in the eastern provinces of the kingdom of Delhi. Sarvar extended his authority not only over Oudh, but also over the doāb, as far as Koīl, and on the east into Tirhut and Bihar. He sent no aid to Delhi when it was attacked by Timūr, and paid no heed to the invader. He died in 1399, and was succeeded by his adopted son, Malik Karanful, who assumed the title of Mubārak Shāh; Mubārak was succeeded in 1402 by his younger brother, who ascended the throne as Shams-ud-dīn Ibrāhīm. He was persuaded by the saint, Kutb-ul-'Ālam, to invade Bengal for the purpose of punishing Rāja Ganesh, who, having acquired in that kingdom more power than its nominal ruler, was persecuting Islam. Ganesh, unable to cope with the foes whom his policy had raised against him, promised to desist, and permitted Kutb-ul-'Ālam to convert his son, Jaimal, to Islam; and the saint, satisfied with his success, induced Ibrāhīm to retire. In 1433, the idea of annexing the district of Kālpī, now ruled by Sādīr Khān, occurred simultaneously to Ibrāhīm and to Hūshang Shāh of Mālwā, and both marched on Kālpī, but before they met, Ibrāhīm was recalled by the news that Mubārak Shāh of Delhi was marching on Jaunpur. He was relieved of his apprehensions by the assassination of Mubārak, but Hūshang had profited by his absence to annex Kālpī, and Ibrāhīm was obliged to acquiesce.

Ibrāhīm was a cultured prince, a liberal patron of learning, and a builder. Some of the monuments of architecture raised by him or under his encouragement were destroyed when Buhlūl took Jaunpur, but the Atala Mosque, the earliest and finest example

of the Jaunpur style, yet remains. Ibrāhīm died in 1436, and was succeeded by his son, Mahmūd Shāh.

Meanwhile Kālpī had again, owing to disputes regarding the succession in Mālwa, become independent, and its governor, Naṣir Khān, or Naṣir Shāh, as he styled himself, had been grossly violating the sacred law of Islam. His treatment of Muslim women gave great offence to Mahmūd of Jaunpur, and he complained to Mahmūd I, then reigning in Mālwa. Some correspondence ensued, and in November, 1444, the two kings marched to Īrij, and after desultory and indecisive hostilities which lasted for some months, both agreed that Naṣir, who had been expelled from Kālpī, and was held to have been sufficiently punished, should be reinstated on promising amendment.

Mahmūd died in 1457, and was succeeded by his son, Muhammad, whose barbarous cruelty led to his death and to the enthronement of his brother Husain. Husain was the most warlike, but not the most fortunate of his line. His wars with Delhi were not his only military enterprises. During a four years' truce with Buhlūl, he led a great army on a foray into Orissa, first plundering and devastating Tīrhut, and then extorting from the raja of Orissa vast treasure, which Muslim vanity represents as the first instalment of an annual tribute. In 1466 he sent an army to reduce the fortress of Gwalior, and, though the fortress was not captured, the raja, Mān Singh, paid a heavy indemnity, and he and his successor, Kirat Singh, remained faithful to Husain until he was finally driven from his kingdom.

The dynasty reigned in Jaunpur for rather more than eighty years, and left very creditable memorials in their public buildings. Ibrāhīm was the most enlightened monarch of the line, and in his reign his capital earned the title of "the Shīrāz of India". The character of Husain, the last of the line, is perplexing and disappointing. He was a man of ideas, with wide opportunities and commensurate resources, ever on the point of realising some great scheme of aggrandisement, and ever missing his opportunity through carelessness, folly, and perhaps physical cowardice. He lived in Bengal under the protection of Shams-ud-dīn Yūsuf Shāh and his successors until 1500, but hardly made any attempt to recover his throne, except by futile intrigue.

After the conquest of Jaunpur, Buhlūl marched to Dholpur, and was content to extort from the raja, Vināyak Deo, as earnest

of submission, a large sum in gold, and from Kirat Singh of Gwalior, whom he also visited, eight million *tangas*; he reduced some refractory fief-holders to obedience, but on his way to Delhi fell mortally sick at Saket. His illness produced a crop of intrigues regarding the succession. Some favoured the eldest surviving son, Bārbak Shāh; others held that Bārbak had been provided for at Jaunpur and supported the claims of A'zam-i-Humāyūn, son of Khvāja Bāyazīd, Buhlūl's eldest son; others, again, considered Nizām Khān, the second surviving son, the fittest successor to his father, but the Afghan nobles generally objected to Nizām Khān, whose mother was the daughter of a Hindu goldsmith. Nizām Khān was summoned to the camp, but remained at Delhi, mistrusting his father's intentions. On Buhlūl's death, however, he joined the camp at Jalālī, and on July 17, 1489, ascended the throne as Sikandar Shāh.

The early days of his reign were disturbed; for those who had opposed his elevation, principally of his own kin, were not disposed to submit to him, and he was obliged to have recourse to arms. Some he deprived of their fiefs, which he bestowed on his adherents, and some he conciliated. Among his opponents was his brother, Bārbak, whom he defeated, and generously re-appointed to Jaunpur, taking, however, the precaution of bestowing the great fiefs in that province upon his own partisans. But Bārbak failed to deal effectively with a serious rebellion of the Hindu land-holders of the province, instigated by Husain, the former king, and contented himself with coquetting with the rebels, and with Husain. Sikandar suppressed the rebellion, and removed his brother from the government of the province. He also recovered the important fiefs of Kotala, Kālpī, and Bayāna, and bestowed them on men whom he could trust, and he reduced Kirat Singh of Gwalior to obedience.

The rebels, though defeated by Sikandar, had not been crushed, and a number remained in arms under Bhīl, raja of Phāphāman. For some years Sikandar was engaged in extensive operations against them in Jaunpur, and in the districts of Kara, Chunār, Benares, Tirhut, and Bihar. Husain was once encouraged by the rebels to attack him, but suffered a crushing defeat and fled into Bengal. 'Alā-ud-dīn Husain Shāh of Bengal, resenting the invasion of Bihar and the pursuit of his *protégé*, sent a column against the pursuing force, but neither party had anything to

gain by active hostilities, and a treaty was concluded. Its terms were vague, but the peace was not broken and Sikandar retained possession of Bihar. He retired from Bihar to Jaunpur, where he discovered that some of his courtiers had entered into a conspiracy to depose him, and raise to the throne his younger brother, Fath Khān. He treated them leniently, and their only punishment was banishment from court. In 1499 he left Jaunpur for Sambhal, and remained there for four years, being the first sovereign of Delhi to place the administration of the trans-Gangetic province of Kāchh on an entirely satisfactory footing, subject, however, to the bigotry which was a prominent feature of his character. A Brāhman of Bengal had aroused the indignation of orthodox Muslims by publicly maintaining that Islam and Hinduism were both true religions, and were but different roads by which God might be approached. The governor of Bihar was directed to send the offender to court, where Sikandar asked the jurists whether it was permissible thus to preach. They decided that, since the Brāhman had admitted the truth of Islam, he should be invited to embrace it, with death as the alternative. The decision commended itself to Sikandar, and the penalty was exacted from the Brāhman, who refused to change his faith.

In 1500 Mān Singh of Gwalior gave offence by harbouring some disaffected nobles, and two years later, when Sikandar attacked Vināyak of Dholpur and annexed his state, the latter, also, took refuge with Mān Singh. Sikandar marched towards Gwalior with the intention of annexing the state once more to the kingdom of Delhi, but on his way thither his army was smitten with a pestilence, and suffered so severely that he was obliged to abandon for the time all thought of pursuing the campaign. He restored Vināyak in Dholpur, and made peace with Mān Singh, but with no intention of keeping it, for, instead of returning to Delhi, he transferred his capital to Āgra. This was the first occasion on which this city, which acquired such importance under the Timurids, came prominently into notice. It had merely been a dependency of the more important fortress of Bayāna.

The nature of Sikandar's subsequent operations indicates the strength of Mān Singh and the extent of his territory, for the king did not venture to attack him in Gwalior, but only attempted the systematic reduction of fortresses and conquest of

districts subject or tributary to him. In March, 1505, he captured Mandrāel,<sup>1</sup> destroyed Hindu temples in the town, erected mosques on their sites, and plundered and laid waste the country round the fortress. On his way back to Āgra he removed Vināyak from Dholpur, and appointed a Muslim governor to the state. After the rainy season he again took the field, and devastated a large area of the Gwalior country, slaying or enslaving those of the inhabitants who failed to save themselves by flight. On his return he met and defeated Mān Singh's army on the banks of the Chambal, and, after the rainy season of 1506, carried the fortress of Utgīr<sup>2</sup> by assault, treated its temples as he had treated those of Mandrāel, and appointed a Muslim governor to the fortress. Early in 1508 he marched on Narwar, usually included in the kingdom of Mālwa, but then subject to Gwalior. This fortress was reduced by famine, and Sikandar, after his custom, destroyed its temples and on their sites raised mosques, which he endowed with lands in the district. He then after some successful operations against the Hindus of the Athghāt district, returned, in the summer of 1509, to Āgra. After the rainy season of that year, while he was in Dholpur, fortune added another province to his kingdom. The brother of Muhammad Khān, ruler of the small but independent state of Nāgaur, having rebelled against him, fled to Sikandar and sought his aid, but Muhammad Khān forestalled attack by sending gifts to Sikandar and acknowledging him as his sovereign.

Troubles in Mālwa next provided him with an excuse for interfering in the domestic affairs of that kingdom. Sāhib Khān, elder brother of Mahmūd II, was proclaimed king by a faction, and held the districts of Chanderī, Rāisen and Bhīlsa, but distrusted his partisans and fled to Sikandar, who willingly befriended him, and, early in 1514, sent five nobles to govern the territory, nominally on the pretender's behalf, but in fact as a fief of Delhi.

Sikandar was then led to believe that Daulat Khān, who held the fortress of Ranthambhor for Mahmūd II of Mālwa, was prepared to surrender it to him, and marched to Bayāna to receive his submission, but there discovered that his informant had been playing a double game, and had secretly urged Daulat not to surrender the place. On his return to Āgra, Sikandar fell sick

<sup>1</sup> Situated in 77° 18' E. and 26° 18' N.

<sup>2</sup> Situated in 76° 57' E. and 26° 7' N.

of fever and of a quinsy, but struggled against his malady, and continued to attend to the business of state until, on November 21, 1517, he was choked while trying to swallow a morsel of food, and died.

He was the greatest of the three kings of his house, and completed with success the task left unfinished by his father. We hear little of the Panjab during his reign, and he drew no troops from it to aid him in his eastern campaigns, but it was more tranquil and obedient than it had been in his father's reign. His vigorous rule amply justified the choice of the minority which, in the face of strong opposition, raised him to the throne, and his firmness saved the kingdom from becoming the plaything of an oligarchy of turbulent, ignorant, and haughty Afghans. He showed weakness only in his support of his incompetent brother, Bārbak, for whom he had a sincere affection, strengthened by compunction for having supplanted him in his birthright; but, when he discovered that leniency was a mistaken policy, he dealt fittingly with him.

The greatest blot on his character was his bigotry. The accounts of his conquests, doubtless exaggerated by pious historians, resemble those of the raids of the protagonists of Islam in India. The wholesale destruction of temples was not the best method of conciliating the Hindus of a conquered area, and the murder of a Brāhman, whose only offence was a desire for an accommodation between the religions of the conquerors and the conquered, was not a politic act; but Sikandar's mind was warped by habitual association with theologians.

The Lodī nobles at Āgra raised to the throne his eldest son, Ibrāhīm, but a faction, for its own ends, advocated the partition of the kingdom, and carried off to Jaunpur, and there enthroned, Jalāl Khān, who was either a younger brother of Ibrāhīm, or his uncle, the youngest son of Buhlūl. This prince's partisans were gradually seduced from their allegiance, and he retired from Jaunpur to Kālpī. There he gained a powerful adherent, and attempted to recover Jaunpur, but his new friend quarrelled with him on the way thither, and in his absence the royal troops captured Kālpī. He then marched on Āgra, but the governor of that city, who took the field against him, persuaded him to make his submission, promising to induce Ibrāhīm to pardon him and reinstate him in Kālpī. On Ibrāhīm's refusal, he fled and took

refuge with Bikramājīt, who had succeeded his father, Mān Singh, in Gwalior. Ibrāhīm therefore decided to carry out his father's design of expelling the Tonwār Rājputs from that state and of re-annexing it to the kingdom of Delhi. Before his army reached Gwalior, Jalāl had fled and taken refuge with Mahmūd II of Mālwā, but the siege was opened vigorously, and Jalāl later fell into Ibrāhīm's hands. He had fled from Mālwā into the Gond principality of Garha-Katanka, and the Gonds sent him as a prisoner to Ibrāhīm, who ordered his confinement in the state prison of Hānsī, but he was murdered on the way thither. In 1518 the fortress of Gwalior was surrendered to Ibrāhīm, and the state became once more part of the kingdom of Delhi.

The remainder of the reign was passed in strife with the great nobles of the kingdom. These Afghans were insubordinate and unruly, preferring their own interests and those of their clans to the public good. Buhlūl had controlled them by conciliating their prejudices, indulging their vanity, and playing off one against another. Sikandar had dealt more sternly with them, but rightly estimated the sentiments and the predilections of each, and had known when to be severe and when to be lenient; but Ibrāhīm, by nature suspicious and timid, feared them, and having detected some in disloyal schemes, distrusted all, and dealt harshly even with those who were loyal. Some were deprived of their fiefs, some were imprisoned, and many, apprehensive of a similar fate, rose in rebellion. Those sent against them were injudiciously warned that unless they crushed them they would themselves be treated as rebels, so that failure, or even apprehension of failure, left open no course but rebellion. The king mistrusted and feared his nobles, and they mistrusted and feared him. Matters stood thus when Ghāzī Khān, son of the governor of the Panjab, visited Delhi. The control of the Lodīs over this great province had been feeble ever since Buhlūl, having seized the throne of Delhi, had been obliged to confine his attention to the recovery of those provinces which were near at hand, and in order to retain the allegiance of the governor of the Panjab had found it necessary to treat him with consideration. The province was ruled by Daulat Khān Lodī, who had been much perturbed by reports of the state of affairs at Delhi, and had sent his son to ascertain how matters stood. Ghāzī Khān found them even worse than he expected. Daryā Khān, of the Lohānī tribe of Afghans,

had asserted his independence in Bihar, and on his death his son, Bahādur Khān, having been proclaimed king, had annexed Oudh and Katehr. Disaffection was rife at court, and the king suspected all. Ghāzī Khān returned to the Panjab with the lowest opinion of Ibrāhīm, and warned his father that he would not be left long in possession of Lahore, should the king be successful in his campaigns against the rebels in Hindūstān and Bihar. From this moment date Daulat Khān's virtual assumption of independence and his intrigues with Bābur, which led to Ibrāhīm's overthrow and to the establishment of yet another foreign dynasty on the throne of Delhi.

Daulat Khān died while Bābur was yet on the way to his great conquest, and at the same time died Bahādur, or Sultān Muḥammad, king of Bihar; but on April 18, 1526, after a reign of nine years, Ibrāhīm was defeated and slain by Bābur at Pānīpat.



## CHAPTER V

### The Kingdom of Bengal

The allegiance of the Muslim governors of Bengal to Delhi depended chiefly on the personality and activity of the sultan. Remittances of revenue or tribute were seldom regular, and sometimes ceased altogether, and its capital, Gaur, or Lakhnāwati, was known in Delhi as Balghākpur, "the City of Rebellion". Officers settled in Bengal became acclimatised; but the hot, moist climate which stimulated its productiveness was disliked by those accustomed to the drier atmosphere of Hindūstān. They described the province as "a hell filled with good things"; and their distaste for service in Bengal, the impossibility of military movements in the rainy season over its sodden soil, and the succession of Mongol raids which for a century kept the sultans of Delhi occupied on their north-western frontier, encouraged rebellion in Bengal and helped to ensure its success.

Bughrā, the second son of Balban, became independent in Bengal when his son Kaikubād ascended the throne in Delhi, and his successors retained their independence until two of his grandsons quarrelled over the succession, when the elder invoked the aid of Tughluk, who invaded Bengal and carried off the younger, Bahādur, as a prisoner. He was afterwards allowed to return to eastern Bengal, but rebelled and was put to death. In 1339 'Alī Shāh, who had established himself as ruler of western Bengal, rebelled, and Muhammad ibn Tughluk never had leisure to attempt the reconquest of the province. In 1345, 'Alī was assassinated at the instigation of his foster-brother, Shams-ud-dīn Iliyās, who annexed eastern Bengal in 1352, and thus became sovereign of all Bengal. The two campaigns of Fīrūz Shāh against Iliyās and his son Sikandar were the last attempts of a sultan of Delhi to assert his authority over Bengal until Humāyūn overran the country in 1538, and Bengal remained an independent kingdom until it was annexed by Akbar.

Bengal, whether as a province of Delhi or as an independent kingdom, was not a homogeneous Muslim state. Great Hindu land-holders held estates which were, in fact, principalities, and

their allegiance to a Muslim ruler, like his to a sultan of Delhi, depended on the ruler's personality. The chief of these states was Bishnupur, governed by a Hindu dynasty which was founded in the eighth century and endured until the eighteenth, when it was ruined by the ravages of Marāthas and by the famine of 1770, which depopulated its territory. Another state was Dīnājpur, which early in the fifteenth century produced a powerful chieftain who dominated the Muslim sultan, and eventually usurped his throne.

Sikandar Shāh, who succeeded his father Iliyās in 1357, had seventeen sons by his first wife, and by his second but one, Ghiyās-ud-dīn A'zam, the ablest and most promising of them all. A'zam's stepmother, by traducing him to his father, in the hope of securing the throne for one of her own sons, drove him into rebellion, and in 1389 his father marched against him, and their armies met at Goālpāra, where Sikandar was defeated and slain. A'zam ascended the throne, put out the eyes of his seventeen half-brothers, and sent them as a gift to their mother. He is more pleasantly remembered by an interesting correspondence with the great Persian poet, Hāfiz, and by his regard for the law of Islam. He died in 1396, and, though he was succeeded by his son, Hamza, the actual ruler of Bengal during Hamza's reign and that of his successor, Bāyazīd, was Rāja Ganesh of Dīnājpur, styled Kāns by Muslim historians. Ganesh persecuted Muslims, and Kutb-ul-'Ālam, a Muslim saint, summoned to the aid of the faithful Ibrāhīm Shāh of Jaunpur. Ganesh besought the saint to persuade Ibrāhīm to retire, but he refused to intercede for an infidel, and Ganesh delivered to him his son, in order that he might be converted to Islam and proclaimed king. The saint agreed, and induced the invader to retire, whereupon Ganesh seized his son, compelled him to undergo an elaborate ceremony of purification, in order that he might be re-admitted to the Hindu fold, and persecuted the Muslims more severely than before, but died in 1414, and his son, whose conversion had been genuine, and who had been imprisoned for refusing to abjure Islam, was raised to the throne as Jalāl-ud-dīn Muhammad, and persecuted the Hindus more severely than his father had persecuted Muslims, compelling great numbers of them to accept Islam.

The general attitude of the Muslim rulers of Bengal to their

Hindu subjects was tolerant, but it is evident, from the numerical superiority in eastern Bengal of Muslims who are certainly not the descendants of dominant invaders, that from time to time waves of proselytism swept over the country. Such was the case during the reign of Jalāl-ud-dīn, who had a convert's zeal as well as good reason to hate the faith of his fathers.

He was succeeded in 1431 by his son, Shams-ud-dīn Ahmad, whose tyranny in the later days of his reign became so unbearable that in 1442 he was put to death by two of his officers, one of whom, Nāsir Khān, claimed descent from Iliyās, and succeeded, as Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd, to the throne, thus restoring the old line. He was a builder, and besides restoring and beautifying Gaur, built a mosque at Satgām. His son Rukn-ud-dīn Bārbak, who succeeded him in 1459, was the first king in India to raise African slaves in large numbers to high rank. He had no fewer than 8000 of these slaves, and they afterwards became a curse to the state. He died in 1474, and his son and successor, Yūsuf, caused much discontent and disaffection by insisting on the strict observance of the Islamic law and forbidding the use of wine. He died in 1481, and his son, Sikandar, was discovered, after he had been enthroned, to be a maniac, and was deposed in favour of his grand-uncle, Jalāl-ud-dīn Fath Shāh, a son of Muhammad. Fath Shāh attempted to cope with the African menace, and sternly curbed the insolence and punished the excesses of the slaves who thronged the court. The Africans resented his repressive measures, and in 1486 their leader, a eunuch named Sultān Shāhzāda, caused him to be assassinated and usurped the throne, under the title of Bārbak Shāh. Another African, Indīl Khān, had been loyal to his master, and, on returning to the capital after an expedition, took advantage of the usurper's condition after a drinking bout to put him to death. Fath Shāh's widow, whose son was but two years old, begged the avenger of her husband's murder to ascend the throne, and Indīl, after a decent display of reluctance, was proclaimed under the title of Saif-ud-dīn Firūz. During his short reign of three years he restored order in the kingdom, and discipline in the army, but historians have justly observed that his elevation established an evil precedent, and that it became an accepted rule in Bengal that the slayer of a king's murderer was entitled to the throne. On the death of Firūz in 1489, the young son of Fath Shāh was proclaimed as Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd II,

but the regent, an African named Habash Khān, was almost immediately murdered by another African, Sīdī Badr the Madman, who, not content with the regency, put the young king to death and ascended the throne as Shams-ud-dīn Muzaffar Shāh. This bloodthirsty monster, during a reign of three years, put to death most of the leading men in the kingdom, and alienated both his people and his army by extorting exorbitant taxes from the former, and reducing the emoluments of the latter, so that when his minister, 'Alā-ud-dīn Husain, a Sayyid of Tirmiz, retired from his service in disgust, the army placed him at its head and rose against the usurper, who was besieged for four months in Gaur, and at last slain in a *sortie* which he led from the city. Those of the old nobles who still remained alive raised Sayyid Husain to the throne in 1493, on receiving from him guarantees which bore some resemblance to a European constitution of 1848.

During the brief period which intervened between the death of the negro and the establishment of the Sayyid's authority, the scum of the populace rose in Gaur, and indulged in an orgy of rapine. Husain Shāh's orders that it should cease were not at once obeyed, and his punishment of the refractory was both prompt and severe. He is said to have put to death 12,000 of the robbers, and to have enriched the treasury with the booty taken from them, and, in his disgust at the lawlessness of the capital, he transferred his residence to Ikdāla.

Husain was, with the exception of Iliyās, the greatest of the Muslim kings of Bengal. He enriched the capital and other towns with fine buildings, and he restored security by breaking up two dangerous corporations. The first was the large force of *pāiks*, or Hindu infantry, which had long been employed as guards of the palace and of the king's person, and had gradually attained to a position resembling that of the Praetorian Guards at Rome; and the second was the great body of Africans. A great part of the force of the *pāiks* was disbanded; the remainder were employed at a distance from the capital; and duties at the palace were entrusted to Muslim troops. The Africans were expelled from the country, and most of the exiles, after vainly seeking an asylum in Delhi and Jaunpur, where their record in Bengal was well known, drifted to the Deccan and Gujarāt, where men of their race had for some time been largely employed.

Husain also recovered the territory which had, during the six preceding reigns, fallen away from a trunk too feeble to support its branches, and extended his dominions to the borders of Orissa. In 1498 he invaded the kingdom of Assam, but this attempt at foreign conquest was unfortunate. Assam was occupied, but the raja and his troops merely retired into the hills, and, during the rainy season, when the dispatch of reinforcements into the country was impossible, fell upon the Muslim garrisons and put them to the sword. After this experience Husain confined his military activities to securing his frontiers. He died in 1518, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Nusrat Shāh, who was a prince of gentle and amiable disposition, and, instead of following the barbarous eastern custom of slaying, mutilating, or imprisoning his brothers, doubled the provision which his father had made for them. Early in his reign he annexed Tirhut, and, after the defeat and death of Ibrāhīm Lodī of Delhi, he welcomed to Bengal the Afghan refugees who fled thither rather than serve the conqueror, and he married a daughter of Ibrāhīm. He made a demonstration against Bābur by sending a force to invade Oudh, but withdrew it, and after Bābur had captured Jaunpur, attempted to conciliate him with gifts.

In his reign the Portuguese made their first appearance in Bengal. Martim Affonso, who had been sent in charge of a trading expedition into the Bay of Bengal, established himself in Chittagong, and, though he had attempted to conciliate Nusrat by sending to him a mission bearing gifts, the misconduct and arrogance of the Portuguese so incensed the king that he ordered their arrest and the confiscation of their property. The governor of Chittagong treacherously seized their leaders at a banquet to which he had invited them, slew such of the community as had not time to escape to their ships, confiscated property worth about £100,000, and sent his prisoners to Gaur. The Portuguese retaliated by burning Chittagong.

Nusrat's character deteriorated as a result of his debauchery, and in 1533 he was murdered by some of the palace eunuchs whom he had threatened with punishment. His son, Firūz, was murdered after a reign of a few months by his uncle, Mahmūd, who was almost immediately involved in troubles by the rebellion of Makhdūm-i-'ālam, who held the fief of Hājipur in Bihar, and had entered into an alliance with Shīr Khān of Sasarām,

afterwards Shīr Shāh of Delhi. The two rebels defeated and slew the governor of Monghyr, and were greatly enriched by their spoils, but Makhdūm was at last defeated and slain by Mahmūd's troops. Shīr Khān, marching to avenge his death, was held up for a month at Teliyāgarhi, on the Ganges, the 'Gate of Bengal', but ultimately forced the defile, defeated the main body of Mahmūd's army between Teliyāgarhi and Gaur, and then besieged Gaur. He was recalled by a rising in Bihar, but left his son, Jalāl Khān, and an officer named Khavāss Khān, to continue the siege, and the garrison was reduced to such straits by famine that on April 6, 1538, Mahmūd led it forth against the besiegers. He was defeated and put to flight, his sons were captured, and Gaur was sacked and occupied by Jalāl Khān.

Shīr Khān returned to Bengal, pursued Mahmūd, and again defeated him. He fled for protection to Humāyūn, who, taking advantage of Shīr Khān's absence in Bengal, had taken Chunār and advanced into Bihar. Shīr Khān sent Jalāl Khān and Khavāss Khān to hold the Gate of Bengal, and there they defeated the advanced guard of Humāyūn's army, but retired on the approach of his main body, and, as Humāyūn advanced on Gaur, Shīr Khān fled into Chota Nāgpur; but Humāyūn, instead of pursuing him, lingered aimlessly at Gaur, which he renamed Jan-nārābād, or the 'Abode of Paradise', while his officers occupied Sonārgāon, Chittagong, and other ports in his name, until the climate bred sickness in his army and destroyed many of his horses and camels. Meanwhile Shīr Khān had occupied the fortress of Rohtās, from which he menaced Humāyūn's line of communications by descending on Monghyr, and putting his officers there to the sword. At the same time, in 1539, Humāyūn received the news of the rebellion of his brother, Hīndāl Mīrzā, in Delhi, and, overwhelmed by this accumulation of misfortunes, hastened back towards Āgra, leaving Jahāngīr Kulī Beg behind him as governor of Bengal. Shīr Khān intercepted his retreat at Chausa, on the Ganges, and after holding him there for three months, fell upon his army, defeating and dispersing it. He afterwards disposed of Jahāngīr Kulī Beg by causing him to be assassinated. Having thus become supreme in Bengal, he assumed the royal title, and the increasing confusion in the newly established empire of Delhi enabled him to oust Humāyūn and to ascend the imperial throne.

When he marched from Bengal in 1540 to attack Humāyūn, he left Khizr Khān as governor of the province. Khizr Khān's head was turned by his elevation. He married a daughter of Mahmūd Shāh, and assumed so many of the airs of royalty that Shīr Shāh, when he was established on the imperial throne, returned to Bengal to nip his ambition in the bud. Khizr Khān, not strong enough to try conclusions with the conqueror of Delhi, welcomed him submissively, but, being unable to justify his recent presumption, was imprisoned. Shīr Shāh obviated a recurrence of his offence by dividing Bengal into a number of small prefectures, the governors of which were responsible to a central controller of the revenues.

Thus, for a time, ended the independence of Bengal. It revived under an Afghan dynasty after Shīr Shāh's death, but was finally extinguished by Akbar's army in 1576.

The annals of Bengal are stained with blood; the long list of Muslim kings contains the names of some monsters of cruelty; but it would be unjust to condemn them all. Some certainly reciprocated the attitude of the lower classes of their Hindu subjects, who welcomed them as their deliverers from the priestly yoke, and even described them in popular poetry as the gods, come down to earth to punish the wicked Brāhmans. Others were enlightened patrons of literature. At the courts of Hindu rajas priestly influence maintained Sanskrit as the literary language, and there was a tendency to despise the vulgar tongue as a literary vehicle, but Muslim kings, who could not be expected to learn Sanskrit, could both understand and appreciate the writings of those who condescended to use the tongue in which they themselves communicated with their subjects, and it was the Muslim sultan rather than the Hindu raja who was the patron of vernacular literature. Nusrat Shāh, anticipating Akbar, caused the *Mahābhārata* to be translated from Sanskrit into Bengali, and of two earlier versions of the poem one possibly owed something to Muslim patronage, and the other was made to the order of Husain Shāh, Nusrat's father, who is mentioned in Bengali literature with affection and respect.

## CHAPTER VI

### The Kingdoms of the Deccan and of Vijayanagar

In 1347, after the army left in the Deccan by Muhammad ibn Tughluq had been driven from Daulatābād, Ismā'il, who had been elected king, abdicated in favour of Hasan, who had relieved the fortress. Hasan claimed descent from Bahman, son of Isfandiyār, known in the west as Artaxerxes Longimanus, and assumed the royal title of Bahman Shāh. Of the dynasty which he founded, known as the Bahmanids, eighteen kings ascended the throne, of whom fourteen ruled the Deccan until 1490, when the provincial governors assumed independence, and the great kingdom was divided into five separate states.

While the Muslims in the Deccan were in revolt against Delhi, and the power of the Hoysala dynasty of Dvāratīpura was declining in the peninsula, three brothers who governed its northern provinces founded a great Hindu kingdom, with its capital at Vijayanagar on the Krishnā. This kingdom gradually spread over the whole of the south of the peninsula; and Kānhayya, a scion of the Kākatiyas, established himself in their kingdom.

Bahman made Gulbarga his capital, and divided his kingdom into four provinces (*taraf*), Gulbarga, Daulatābād, Berar and Bidar. The provincial governors, or *tarafdars*, had great power. Each commanded the army of his province, and was solely responsible for its administration and for the collection of the revenue. The system worked tolerably well under a king powerful enough to keep the governors under control, but its dangers became apparent even in the reign of Bahman's successor, and it was the power of the *tarafdars* that ultimately led to the dismemberment of the kingdom.

For the greater part of his reign of eleven years Bahman was engaged in quelling the unruly in his kingdom and in establishing order. The recognition of his sovereignty in the Deccan by al-Mu'tadid, the puppet caliph in Egypt, contributed perhaps to



his success in this task, which by 1357 was so far completed that he was able to lead an expedition into Gujarāt with a view to the conquest of that province, which was still subject to Delhi; but he fell sick at Navsārī, and was obliged to return to Gulbarga, where he died on February 11, 1358.

He was succeeded by his eldest son, Muhammad I, the early part of whose reign was devoted to the organisation of his government. His system is worthy of record, for it was imitated first in the five states which rose on the ruins of the kingdom, and, later, by Sīvajī, the founder of the Marāṭha power. He appointed eight ministers of state: (1) *vakīl-us-saltana*, or lieutenant of the kingdom, who was the immediate subordinate of the sovereign, and held the regency when he was absent from the capital; (2) *wazīr-i-kull*, who supervised the work of all other ministers; (3) *amīr-i-jumla*, minister of finance; (4) *wazīr-i-ashrāf*, minister of foreign affairs and master of the ceremonies; (5) *nāzīr*, assistant minister of finance; (6) *pēshwā*, who was associated with the lieutenant of the kingdom, and whose office was, in later times, almost always amalgamated with his; (7) *kot-wāl*, or chief of police and city magistrate in the capital; and (8) *sadr-i-jahān*, or chief justice and minister of religious affairs and endowments.

The royal bodyguard consisted of 200 esquires to the king and 4000 gentleman-troopers, divided into four reliefs, each of 50 esquires and 1000 troopers, commanded by one of the great nobles at the capital. The tour of duty of each relief was four days, and the whole force was commanded by one of the ministers, who, however, performed his routine military duties by deputy.

Muhammad I soon became involved in war with Kānhayya of Warangal, and with Vijayanagar, now ruled by Bukka I. The Hindu bankers and money-changers in the Deccan were in the habit of retaining and hoarding, or selling to the mints of Vijayanagar and Warangal, Muhammad's gold coins, which were finer than those of the Hindu mints, so that the Hindu coins became the ordinary gold currency of the kingdom. Muhammad naturally objected to this practice, and, after repeatedly warning the offenders, in 1360 put them all to death, their place being taken by more amenable Hindus who had accompanied the armies from northern India. It was not until the reign of Firūz,

the eighth king of the dynasty, that the descendants of the slaughtered men were able to purchase from the crown the right to resume the occupation of their fathers. Bukka and Kānhayya regarded this measure as an assertion of suzerainty, and addressed to Muhammad arrogant and provocative messages. He detained their envoys for eighteen months, and then demanded, with an effrontery exceeding theirs, the payment of vast sums as tribute. Kānhayya's son Vināyak then attacked the fortress of Kaulās, but was driven thence by the armies of Berar and Bīdar under Bahādūr Khān, who marched on Warangal and compelled Kānhayya to ransom his capital with a great sum. A year later Muhammad, angered by another insult, marched on Vailampallam, the appanage of Vināyak, captured Vināyak, and hurled him from a *balista* on the ramparts into a fire which had been kindled beneath. Muhammad suffered severely during his retreat, and avenged his losses by laying waste Kānhayya's country in two successive years. Kānhayya ultimately purchased peace by paying a huge indemnity and surrendering the important fortress of Golconda. Henceforth the Hindu ruler of Telingāna was a vassal of the Muslim kingdom of the Deccan.

Bahman had appointed as governor of Daulatābād his sister's son, Bahrām Khān Māzandārāni, who, pretending that his uncle had promised to leave him a share of the kingdom, sent two missions to Firūz Shāh of Delhi, imploring aid, the reply to which was that, if the rebels of the Deccan were suffering under a tyrant, they had only themselves to thank. But one member of the mission, Ahmad Fārūki, obtained from Firūz the small fief of Thālner, on the Taptī, and, having assumed independence there in 1382, founded the dynasty which ruled Khāndesh until nearly the end of Akbar's reign. Before Muhammad I could seriously attempt the suppression of his cousin's rebellion, he was involved in war with Vijayanagar. On March 21, 1365, while merry with wine after a banquet held to celebrate his victories in Telingāna, he rewarded the singers and dancers who had entertained him with a draft on the treasury of Vijayanagar. Bukka, having treated with contumely the envoy who presented the draft, crossed the Tungabhadra and put to the sword the garrison of Mudgal. Muhammad then crossed the Krishna and avenged the garrison by slaughtering 70,000 Hindus. After spending the rainy season in Mudgal, he took the field, and met

Bukka's army at Kauthal. Here, early in 1367, was fought the first of many great battles between the Muslims of the Deccan and the Hindus of the peninsula. It was fiercely contested, but the Hindus were routed. In the course of three months, during which Muhammad pursued Bukka through his dominions, no fewer than 400,000 Hindus, including 10,000 Brāhmans, were slaughtered. The garrison of Mudgal was now avenged and Muhammad's draft was honoured. The Hindus, horrified by the bloodshed, proposed that both parties should agree to spare non-combatants in future. Muhammad consented, and the pact, though twice violated, mitigated to some extent the horrors of the long period of intermittent warfare between the two states.

The history of the foreign affairs of the kingdom of the Deccan is largely that of its warfare with Vijayanagar. It was occasionally involved in conflicts with Gujarāt, Mālwa and Khāndesh, with the Gonds, and with the Hindus of Telingāna, but Vijayanagar was the real enemy, and between this campaign, in which the Muslims inflicted such terrible punishment on the Hindus, and the disruption of the Bahmanī kingdom in 1490, the two kingdoms were involved in no fewer than six great wars. The advantage lay chiefly with the Muslims, whose troops were vastly superior to the masses of half-trained men whom the Hindus placed in the field; but, when fortune favoured the Hindus, they were as ruthless as their foes. After a time the Hindus perceived where their defect lay, and remedied it by the employment of Muslim mercenaries, who were superior to any troops which their own dominions could supply.

In 1377 Mujāhid, the son and successor of Muhammad I, demanded of Bukka I the cession of the territory between the Rāichūr doāb and the Arabian Sea, and, on receiving an insolent reply, invaded the Hindu kingdom, pursued Bukka for some months through the Carnatic, and besieged both Adoni and Vijayanagar, but failed to reduce either. On his return to Gulbarga Mujāhid was assassinated at the instance of his uncle, Dāūd, and, during the confusion which followed his death, Bukka invaded the doāb and besieged Rāichūr; but when Muhammad II, Dāūd's nephew, was enthroned in 1378, and order was restored, the Hindus raised the siege and retired to Vijayanagar. Muhammad II, who reigned until 1397, was a pacific ruler, and during his reign the peace between the Deccan

and Vijayanagar was not broken. On his death two puppets were successively raised to the throne, but were deposed within a year, and were followed by Firūz, the eighth of his line. On Muhammad's death Harihara II, the third raja of the first dynasty of Vijayanagar, invaded the doāb with a vast army, but he had underestimated his enemy, and Firūz, though beset by difficulties, marched against him with 12,000 horse. Harihara then retired to the south of the Krishnā, where his great army was widely distributed in order to obtain supplies. A small band from the Muslim army entered the Hindu camp disguised as minstrels and obtained admission to the tents of Harihara's son, who was entertaining a party to drink and music. In the course of their performance, they suddenly fell upon the inebriated Hindus, stabbed the prince, extinguished the lights, and escaped in the darkness. In the panic which ensued, different bodies of the Hindu army turned their arms against each other, and Firūz crossed the river during the confusion, and at dawn fell upon the terrified host and pursued it, with great slaughter, to the gates of Vijayanagar. Non-combatants were not slain, but large numbers were enslaved, and, as these included 10,000 Brāhmins, the members of the priestly caste in the city insisted on their being ransomed, and Harihara obtained peace by the payment of a heavy indemnity.

In 1406 the 'War of the Goldsmith's Daughter' broke out. A poor goldsmith of Mudgal had a beautiful and accomplished daughter, and Bukka II, who had succeeded his father, Harihara, in Vijayanagar, inflamed by the accounts which he had heard of the girl's beauty, sent a body of 5000 horse to Mudgal to seize her. These troops, finding that the girl and her parents had fled, plundered Mudgal, but, after they had been joined by Bukka, were driven back to Vijayanagar by Fūlād Khān, governor of the doāb. Later in the year Firūz avenged the invasion of his territory by again marching to Vijayanagar. Though he failed to take the city, and was repulsed and wounded, two forces of his troops plundered the country to the south of the capital, taking 60,000 captives, and subduing the country to the west of the doāb. Bukka obtained peace by the cession of this tract, by paying a heavy indemnity, and by giving a daughter in marriage to Firūz, but the marriage failed to promote goodwill between the two monarchs.

The important fortress of Pāngul, about twenty-five miles to the north of the confluence of the Krishnā and the Tungabhadrā, lay in the Golconda territory, which had been ceded by Kānhayya to Muhammad I. After 1413 it was occupied by the troops of Vīra Vijaya, who had succeeded his brother, Devarāya I, in Vijayanagar in that year; and in 1418 Firūz, though his powers were then failing, marched to recover it. The siege was prolonged for two years, during which time disease among men and beasts bred disorder and panic in his army. Vīra Vijaya marched to the relief of the town, routed and pursued the army of Firūz, and occupied the southern and eastern districts of his kingdom, where the Hindus repaid with interest the treatment which they had so often received at the hands of the Muslims. Ahmad Khān, the brother of Firūz, then drove them beyond the frontier, and in September, 1422, succeeded his brother on the throne.

At the end of the year Ahmad Shāh led an army to avenge the disaster of Pāngul, for the Hindus had violated the old treaty by slaughtering non-combatants. Vīra Vijaya, with a vast army, held the southern bank of the Tungabhadrā, but a division of the Muslims crossed the river above his left, and, while marching eastwards to take the Hindu army in rear, came at dawn upon the garden in which Vīra Vijaya was lodged. The raja, surprised, hid himself in a standing crop of sugar-cane, and the troopers who discovered him, taking him for the gardener, drove him on before them with their whips, bearing a sheaf of sugar-cane for their refreshment. Meanwhile the main body of the Muslim army had begun to cross the river, and the leaderless host of Hindus, already attacked in rear by the division which had captured the raja, broke and fled. While the Muslims were plundering the camp, the raja made his escape, and, being too exhausted and too broken in spirit to attempt to rally his army, joined it in its flight to Vijayanagar.

The Hindus then had reason to repent of their breach of the humane treaty, for never in the course of the wars between the two kingdoms did either army display such ferocity as did Ahmad's, marching through the kingdom, slaughtering men, and enslaving women and children. An account of the butchery was kept, and, whenever the tale of the victims reached 20,000, Ahmad halted and celebrated the event. On one of these occasions, while he was hunting, a party of the enemy surprised him.

His bodyguard held its ground until relief arrived, and the Hindus were driven off. The defence made by the foreign archers of his guard so impressed Ahmad that he ordered the principal foreign officer in his service, entitled Malik-ut-tujjār, to raise a corps of three thousand of them, a measure which was destined to have a deep and lasting effect on the history of the Muslims in the Deccan.

As Ahmad approached Vijayanagar, Vīra Vijaya, appalled by the sufferings of his people, sued for peace. The long arrears of tribute were borne to the Muslim camp, and the Muslims retained their captives, of whom two Brāhman boys, after conversion to Islam, were to attain to the highest rank in the service of the state, and eventually to found dynasties of kings.

After this severe blow Devarāya II, who succeeded his brother in 1424, perceived the inferiority of his troops to those of his enemy and reorganised his army, which had hitherto consisted of 200,000 inferior cavalry and nearly a million of worse infantry. He enlisted Muslims freely, and employed them both in the ranks and as instructors of his Hindu troops. His army, after its reorganisation, consisted of 10,000 mounted foreign archers, 60,000 Hindu horse, also trained to the use of the bow, and 300,000 tolerably well-trained infantry. But even with this army, it was not until twenty years had passed that Devarāya attempted reprisals for the misery which Ahmad Shāh had inflicted on his people. In 1443 he invaded the doāb, captured Mudgal and laid waste the country, while his two sons besieged Rāichūr and Bankāpuram. 'Alā-ud-dīn, who had succeeded his father on the throne of the Deccan in 1436, marched into the doāb, and met Devarāya at Mudgal. Devarāya's elder son was killed in battle, and the Hindus were obliged to sue for peace, which was granted on Devarāya's promise to make no further default in the payment of tribute. This was the last war between Vijayanagar and the Bahmanī kings, and this brief record of it closes the account of the relations of the kingdom of the Deccan with its southern neighbour.

During the successful campaign of Muhammad I against Vijayanagar, his cousin Bahrām had been in rebellion in Daulatābād. He had been virtually independent for some years; he had gained the support of a Marāṭha chieftain named Kondbā, of some of the fief-holders in Berar, and of a local saint named Zain-ud-dīn; he had entered into an alliance with the raja of Baglāna; and he was enriched by the accumulation of several

years' revenue of his province. Muhammad I, in appointing Khān Muhammad to Daulatābād with instructions to crush the rebel, underestimated his strength, for Khān Muhammad, approaching the rebel forces at Paithan, on the Godāvārī, begged the king to come to his assistance. Muhammad, who was hunting in the neighbourhood, marched on Paithan, and the rebels, on learning of his approach, dispersed and fled, and were pursued to the frontier of Gujarāt, in which province they took refuge.

From Daulatābād Muhammad returned to Gulbarga. Brigandage was rife in the kingdom, and he dealt with it so drastically that within six months the heads of 20,000 bandits were sent to the capital. Otherwise the kingdom was at peace for the rest of his reign, and he was occupied in public business and in building. He built two mosques at Gulbarga. One, the great mosque, completed in 1367, measures 216 by 176 feet, and, unlike other mosques in India, has a roofed courtyard. Of this building Sir John Marshall writes: "To single out for praise any particular feature of the mosque would be difficult; yet there is about the whole a dignified simplicity and grandeur that place it in the first rank of such buildings".

Muhammad died in the spring of 1377, and was succeeded by his elder son, Mujāhid, remarkable for his personal beauty, his great bodily strength, and his headstrong disposition. During his expedition to Vijayanagar he gave great offence to his uncle Dāūd, by publicly rebuking him for neglect of duty, and on April 15, 1378, while the army was returning to the capital, some assassins entered the king's tent at night and slew him, and Dāūd was proclaimed king.

Dāūd's action was generally condemned. The provincial governors returned to their provinces without tendering their allegiance to him, and the aged Saif-ud-dīn Ghūrī, lieutenant of the kingdom, refused to serve him, and retired into private life. Mujāhid's sister employed an assassin who, on May 30, 1378, slew the usurper while he was at public prayers in the great mosque, forestalled an attempt to proclaim his young son by blinding the child, and raised to the throne Muhammad,<sup>1</sup> son of Mahmūd Khān, the fourth son of Bahman Shāh.

<sup>1</sup> Wrongly styled Mahmūd by Firishta, who ridicules those historians who give him his correct name, but is refuted by inscriptions and legends on coins. English historians have blindly followed Firishta.

Peace was restored. Muhammad II punished the partisans of the late usurper, and the provincial governors returned to their allegiance, and Saif-ud-dīn to his duties.

Muhammad II was a man of peace, devoted to learning, and his reign of nineteen years was undisturbed by foreign wars. His love of learning was encouraged by Mir Fazlullāh Injū of Shīrāz, a Sayyid who held the office of *sadr-i-jahān*, at whose instance the great poet Hāfiz was invited to Gulbarga, and embarked, but a storm in the Persian Gulf so unnerved him that he landed and returned to Shīrāz, excusing himself in a well-known ode. During this reign the Deccan was visited by a terrible famine, to relieve the distress caused by which large quantities of grain were imported from Gujarāt and Mālwa, and orphanages were established, but these benefits were restricted to Muslims, and were probably used as a means of propaganda. In the last year of the reign a rebellion at Sāgar was suppressed; and on April 20, 1397, Muhammad II died of a fever. On the following day Saif-ud-dīn Ghūrī, the faithful old servant of his house, passed away at the great age of 104 and was buried beside his master.

Muhammad was succeeded by his elder son, Ghiyās-ud-dīn, a youth of seventeen, who angered Tughalchīn, the chief of the Turkish slaves, by refusing to appoint him *vakīl-us-saltana*, and afterwards indiscreetly placed himself in his power, lured on by an infatuation for his daughter. Tughalchīn blinded him, caused the principal nobles of the court to be assassinated, and on the same day, June 14, 1397, raised to the throne Shams-ud-dīn Dāūd, the younger half-brother of the blinded king, and assumed the place which Ghiyās-ud-dīn had denied him.

This treatment of the royal family was resented by two of the king's cousins, Firūz and Ahmad, who had been brought up by Muhammad II, and married to two of his daughters. They were the sons of Ahmad Khān, the third son of Bahman Shāh. They withdrew from the capital, assembled their forces, and attacked Tughalchīn, but were defeated and put to flight. They then feigned penitence, and were allowed to return to Gulbarga. On November 15, 1397, they gained admission to the palace on the pretext of paying their respects to the king, and there they and their adherents overpowered both him and Tughalchīn. The elder brother ascended the throne as Tāj-ud-dīn Firūz Shāh, and the young king was blinded. The blind Ghiyās-ud-dīn was



brought from Sāgar, a sword was placed in his hand, and Tughalchīn, who was compelled to sit before him, was cut to pieces by his former victim. Ahmad Khān was then appointed chief minister and Fazlullāh *vakīl-us-saltana*.

Firūz Shāh's war with Vijayanagar has been mentioned. It was with difficulty that he defended his southern frontier, for he had first to crush a rebellion of Kolis north of the Krishnā, and then to detach from his force the armies of Daulatābād and Berar, for his kingdom had been invaded on the north by Narasingha, the Gond raja of Kherla, who had ravaged the eastern districts of Berar. On returning from his campaign against Harihara II, he learned that these armies had not been able either to restore order in Berar or to punish Narasingha, whose acts of aggression had been instigated by Dilāvar Khān of Mālhwā and Nasīr Khān of Khāndesh. He therefore again took the field, and, in the winter of 1398, compelled the governor of Māhūr, who had declared for Narasingha, to surrender that fortress. He then marched on to Ellichpur and sent Ahmad and Fazlullāh against Narasingha. After a hotly contested battle they defeated the Gonds and drove them into Kherla, capturing Kosal, Narasingha's son. Narasingha, after a siege of two months, made his submission, waited on Firūz at Ellichpur, paid tribute, and surrendered a daughter to Firūz.

On his return to Gulbarga Firūz built for himself the town of Firūzābād, on the Bhīma. In 1401 he is said to have sent a submissive message to Tīmūr, then in Āzarbāyjān, and to have received in reply a grant of the kingdoms of the Deccan, Gujarāt, and Mālhwā, the report of which so alarmed Muzaffar I of Gujarāt and Dilāvar Khān of Mālhwā that, after warning Firūz to keep the peace, they entered into an alliance with Harihara II of Vijayanagar. It was this alliance which emboldened him to withhold payment of tribute and his son, Bukka II, to attempt to abduct the goldsmith's daughter of Mudgal. Firūz, after returning from Vijayanagar, sent for the girl and gave her in marriage to his son, Hasan Khān. Her parents received gifts of money and a grant of their native village, and it was probably on this occasion that Firūz restored to the money-changers of the Deccan the right of following their ancestral calling.

Firūz, a man of twenty-seven at the time of his accession, had been an amiable, generous, accomplished, and tolerant prince,

possessed of a vigorous constitution and understanding, but these had been undermined by excesses, and he became slothful and lethargic. In 1412 he led an expedition to Māhūr, but failed to reduce its rebellious governor to obedience, and, after a raid into Gondwāna, returned to Gulbarga and gradually abandoned all public business, leaving it in the hands of two manumitted slaves, Hūshiyār and Bīdar. In 1417 he so far roused himself as to recover arrears of tribute from the raja of Telingāna, and then set out on the disastrous expedition to Pāngul, already described. Its failure was largely due to his lethargy. After his return to Gulbarga he fell sick, and Hūshiyār and Bīdar, in order to secure the succession to his weak and voluptuous son, induced him to order that his brother, Ahmad, should be blinded. Ahmad fled from the capital and was pursued by Hūshiyār and Bīdar, but defeated them, and drove them back to Gulbarga. Here they brought into the field in a litter Firūz, now grievously sick, and ventured another battle, but the king swooned, and a rumour that he was dead caused most of his army to transfer its allegiance to Ahmad. The citadel was surrendered, and in an affecting interview Ahmad accepted his brother's abdication, and took charge of his two sons.

Ahmad ascended the throne on September 22, 1422, and ten days later his brother died, his death being probably accelerated by Ahmad. Ahmad owed his success very largely to Khalaf Hasan, a rich merchant from Basra, whom he rewarded with the title of Malik-ut-tujjār and the place of lieutenant of the kingdom, and then occupied himself with setting affairs in order. The status and powers of its chief officers were more precisely determined, and Ahmad was then at leisure to avenge the disasters of the Pāngul campaign, in the manner already described. On his return from Vijayanagar in the summer of 1423, the rains failed, causing a famine, and in the following year it appeared that they were about to fail again. Ahmad ascended a hill beyond the city-wall, and, in the sight of the multitude, prayed for rain. Fortune favoured him, clouds gathered, and rain fell. The drenched and shivering multitude hailed him as a saint, and henceforward he proudly bore the title of *walī*.

He then extinguished the semi-independence of Telingāna. In 1424 he invaded the country, captured the raja, put him to death, and extended the eastern frontier of his kingdom to the sea.

The raja who held Māhūr was still in rebellion, and late in

1425 Ahmad marched against him, induced him by promises of pardon to surrender, and then put him to death, with five or six thousand of his followers. He then marched northwards to Kalam, captured the place from a Gond rebel, and led a foray into Gondwāna.

The foreign policy of the Bahmanids had hitherto been restricted to their relations with the great Hindu kingdom in the south, to which they might well have confined their attention; but Tīmūr's empty grant of the kingdoms of Gujarāt and Mālwā turned their eyes towards the north, and Ahmad conceived the vain project of converting that grant into a reality. Hūshang of Mālwā had, in 1422, furnished him with a *casus belli* by compelling his vassal, Narasingha, to swear allegiance to Mālwā, and, in 1428, while Ahmad, at Ellichpur, was strengthening the defences of his northern frontier by rebuilding the fortresses of Gāwil and Narnāla in the Sātpuras, Hūshang marched on Kherla in order to enforce the payment of arrears of tribute. Ahmad protested against this molestation of his vassal, but retired, and Hūshang, attributing to fear a retreat which was in fact due to religious scruples, followed him, but suffered a crushing defeat and was driven back into Mālwā. Ahmad, returning to Gulbarga, was so attracted by the climate and situation, and perhaps by the legendary glories, of the ancient city of Bīdar, that he decided to adopt it as his capital, instead of Gulbarga, and in 1429, when his new city had risen, continued his designs against the northern kingdoms by entering into a close alliance with Nasīr Khān of Khāndesh, who gave a daughter in marriage to 'Alā-ud-dīn, Ahmad's son. Ahmad then attacked Gujarāt, which was ruled by a king of his own name. Between 1430 and 1432 his troops were defeated in four campaigns at various points on his northern frontier. The final battle, fought near Bhaul,<sup>1</sup> on the Girna, between armies led by the two kings in person, is described as indecisive, but Ahmad of the Deccan, dismayed by his losses, retreated at once to Bīdar. The state was so exhausted by this disastrous war that Hūshang of Mālwā retrieved his late discomfiture by capturing Kherla and putting Narasingha to death. Ahmad marched against him, but was so ill-prepared that he submitted to a composition of the quarrel by Nasīr Khān of

<sup>1</sup> Situated in 20° 36' N. and 75° 5' E.

Khāndesh on terms disgraceful to himself. He admitted that Kherla was a fief of Mālhwā, and accepted the insolent concession that the rest of Berar should remain a province of the Deccan.

After this humiliating treaty the bodily and mental powers of Ahmad gradually decayed, and he died in 1435. His character was simpler than that of his versatile and accomplished brother, Fīrūz, for whose learning, with its taint of scepticism, he substituted a simple faith, tinged by superstition. He was at first a follower of Jamāl-ud-dīn Husainī, Gīsū Daraz ("Long Locks"), a zealot from Delhi who settled at Gulbarga; but he later transferred his devotion to the famous saint Nīmatullāh of Māhān, near Kirmān, in Persia, whose son, Khalīlullāh, visited the Deccan and converted Ahmad, as is clear from the inscriptions in his tomb, to the faith of the Shiah. However to him religion was a personal matter, and he wisely refrained from interfering with that of his subjects. The first militant Shiah ruler in India was Yūsuf 'Adīl Shāh of Bijāpur. Ahmad's preference for foreign troops was a cause of bitter strife in his kingdom. Foreigners had been employed from the earliest days of the rule of the Bahmanids in the Deccan, but, with the growth of the foreign legion, they became numerous enough to form a political party. The natives of the Deccan were less energetic and enterprising than those of more northern latitudes, and, being unable to compete with the hardy Arab, the intellectual Persian, and the virile Turk, were obliged to give place to them at court as well as in camp. The feud was complicated by religious differences. The Deccanis were Sunnis, and, though all the Foreigners<sup>1</sup> were not Shiahs, a sufficient number of them belonged to that sect to brand the party with heterodoxy. But one class of foreigners, afterwards largely employed, stood apart from the rest. These were the Africans, whom attachment to the Sunni faith, and the contemptuous attitude adopted towards them by other foreigners, threw into the arms of the Deccanis. Thus, in this disastrous strife, the Foreign party consisted of Turks, Arabs, Mughuls and Persians, and the Deccani party of natives of the Deccan and negroes. War between the two parties was openly declared when Khalaf Hasan of Basra attributed a defeat suffered by him in one of the campaigns against Gujarāt to the cowardice of the Deccanis, and the feud thus begun was

<sup>1</sup> This word, when used of the political party, will be spelt with a capital letter.

not confined to intrigues for place and power, but frequently found expression in pitched battles and bloody massacres, of which last the Foreigners were usually the victims. Thenceforward the history of the domestic affairs of the Deccan is mainly a record of this strife, which contributed in no small measure to the disintegration of the kingdom, and afterwards to the weakness of the states which rose on its ruins. When Ahmad died, Miyān Mahmūd Nizām-ul-mulk, a Deccani, was lieutenant of the kingdom and Khalaf Hasan governor of Daulatābād.

Ahmad was succeeded by his eldest son, 'Alā-ud-dīn, who, after quelling a rebellion headed by his brother, Muhammad, was involved in hostilities with Khāndesh. His wife, daughter of Nasir Khān of Khāndesh, complained to her father of 'Alā-ud-dīn's neglect of her for a younger Hindu wife, and Nasir Khān invaded Berar. Khalaf Hasan undertook to expel him, but enraged the native party by insisting that he should not be hampered by the inclusion of Deccani troops in his army. He drove Nasir Khān out of Berar, invaded Khāndesh, there again defeated Nasir Khān, and returned in triumph to Bīdar, laden with spoil. His success assured the supremacy of his party, and gained for it the place of honour at court, on the right of the throne, the Deccanis and Africans being relegated to the left.

'Alā-ud-dīn, after his campaign in the Rāichūr doāb in 1443, already described, devoted himself for some time to the administration of his government, to the destruction of Hindu temples, the punishment of wine-bibbers, and works of benevolence, but gradually retired into the seclusion of the harem, so neglecting business as to hold a public audience no oftener than once in four or five months. During this period the Deccanis regained much of the power which they had lost, and their leader, Miyān Mīnullāh, organised a campaign for the subjugation of the northern Konkan, the command of which was given to Khalaf Hasan. The climate of this tract proved deadly to the foreign troops; they were betrayed and misled by a raja whom they trusted, and the powerful raja of Sangameshwar took the demoralised army by surprise, defeating it, and slaying Khalaf Hasan with the greater part of his troops. The remnant made its way back to Chākan, which Khalaf Hasan had made his base; and the Deccani officers there, who had refused to accompany

the force, secretly reported that the disaster had been due to the rashness of Khalaf Hasan and the treachery of his troops. The report was purposely delivered to the king when he was drunk, and he was persuaded to allow the Deccanis to punish the remnant of the Foreigners in their own way. They lured them from the fortress of Chākan, murdered their officers at a banquet, and slaughtered the rest, among them many Sayyids. The wives and children of the murdered men were taken by their murderers. One, Kāsim Beg, and two other foreign officers contrived, with great difficulty, to escape, and to lay before the king a true account of the whole affair. He was overcome by remorse, executed the leaders of the Deccani party, dismissed the lesser members of the party from the places which they held, and forswore the use of wine. Kāsim Beg was appointed to the vacant government of Daulatābād, and his two companions were promoted to high rank.

In 1453 'Alā-ud-dīn's confinement to his palace as the result of an injury led to rumours of his death, which encouraged Jalāl Khān, governor of Bālkonda, and his son, Sikandar, to rebel. Jalāl Khān had married a sister of the king, and his son aspired to a share in the kingdom. They persuaded Mahmūd I of Mālwa to aid them, but he retired in dudgeon on discovering that 'Alā-ud-dīn still lived. The rebels were besieged in Bālkonda by Khvāja Mahmūd Gāvān of Gīlān, a foreign officer who afterwards rose to the highest rank in the state. They surrendered, and the king pardoned them, and injudiciously allowed them to retain Bālkonda.

'Alā-ud-dīn died in 1458. Shortly before his death an Arab merchant, who had been unable to obtain payment for some horses which he had sold to courtiers, heard the king's titles recited in the *khūta*, and among them *al-Ādil* ("the Just") on which he prided himself. The Arab sprang up and cried, "No, by God! Thou art not just, generous, clement, or compassionate. O tyrant and liar! Thou hast slain the pure seed of the prophet, and in the pulpit of the Muslims takest to thyself such titles as these!" The king retired to his chamber, and left it no more until he was borne forth to the grave.

He was succeeded by his eldest son, Humāyūn, whose reputation was so bad that a party attempted to enthrone one of his younger brothers, Hasan; but Humāyūn fought his way into the

palace and seized the throne, imprisoning Hasan. He favoured the Foreign party, but the Deccanis were not entirely excluded from office.

The short reign of this monster was marked by a series of rebellions. Jalāl Khān and Sikandar again rose; the Hindus of Telingāna rebelled; and, during the king's absence at Warangal, the populace at the capital released his two brothers and other political prisoners. These risings were punished with revolting cruelty. The *kotwāl* of Bīdar, though he had done his best to suppress the populace, was confined in a cage and exhibited daily in the city for the rest of his life, which soon came to an end, for he was allowed no food but portions of his own body, which were cut off and offered to him. The troops who had failed to suppress the rising were massacred. Hasan Khān, who had assumed the royal title, was thrown to a tiger. Others were thrown to beasts, tortured, boiled to death, or slowly cut to pieces, joint by joint. He unjustly executed, without inquiry, a high official, Nizām-ul-mulk Ghūrī, who was related to the royal house of Mālwa, and whose family fled thither and placed themselves under the protection of the king, Mahmūd I. After these atrocities Humāyūn, known as *Zālim*, or "the tyrant", became a homicidal maniac. "The torch-bearer of his wrath ever consumed both Hindu and Muslim alike; the broker of his fury sold at one price the guilty and the innocent; and the executioner of his punishments slew whole families for a single fault." Nobles summoned to court made their wills and bade their families farewell; the inmates of the harem were butchered in mere sportive brutality; and from the families of his subjects, high and low, he exacted the *droit du seigneur*. He fell sick, and an African girl, at the instigation of others, stabbed him lest he should recover. He died on September 4, 1461.

He was succeeded by his infant son, Nizām Shāh. The Hindus of Orissa and Telingāna then invaded the kingdom and advanced to within twenty miles of Bīdar before they were defeated and driven back; but they returned when it became known that Mahmūd I of Mālwa was invading the kingdom to avenge the death of his kinsman. The child-king was borne out with his army, which met Mahmūd near Kandhār, but was defeated, and the boy was carried off by his mother to Fīrūzābād, while Mahmūd I captured the city of Bīdar and besieged the citadel,

but retired on learning that Mahmūd Begarha of Gujarāt and Mahmūd Gāvān had taken the field to cut off his retreat. Though he suffered considerable loss during his withdrawal, he reappeared in the following year and reached Daulatābād, but returned in haste on hearing that Mahmūd Begarha was again threatening his territories.

The youthful Nizām Shāh died on July 30, 1463, and was succeeded by his brother, Muhammad III, aged nine. The Foreign party retained its predominance in the state, which was governed by the queen-mother and Mahmūd Gāvān until Muhammad reached the age of fifteen, when his mother retired from the regency. Muhammad reigned for nineteen years, for eighteen years of which the lieutenant of the kingdom was Mahmūd Gāvān, the greatest statesman who ever served a Muslim ruler of the Deccan. During the king's minority he avenged Khalaf Hasan's death by conquering the Konkan, and another noble, Malik Hasan, reduced to obedience all Hindu chiefs in Telingāna, and was rewarded with the government of that province. The kingdom of the Bahmanids, for the first time, stretched from sea to sea, its coast-line extending on the west from Bombay to Goa, and on the east from Coconada to the mouth of the Krishnā.

Mahmūd Gāvān, though a foreigner, refused to identify himself with either party in the state, and divided the honours evenly between the two factions. He held the governments of Gulbarga and Bijāpur, and Yūsuf 'Ādil Khān, a Turk who was the leader of the Foreign party, that of Daulatābād. Berar was bestowed on Fathullāh 'Imād-ul-mulk, and Telingāna, as has been said, on Malik Hasan. These last two were Brāhmans by birth. Fathullāh was a Brāhman of Vijayanagar, and Hasan was the son of Bhairav, a Brāhman of Pāthri on the Godāvārī, who had fled to Vijayanagar. Both had been captured as boys during Ahmad Shāh's campaign in Vijayanagar, and had been brought up as Muslims, but neither forgot his origin. The Foreigners were well-disposed towards the Deccanis, and Fathullāh was a lifelong friend of Yūsuf, the leader of the Foreign party, but Hasan, crafty, ambitious and unscrupulous, was ill content that a foreigner should hold the first place in the state, and never rested until he had destroyed Mahmūd Gāvān.

At the end of 1472 Muhammad marched with Mahmūd Gāvān against the rajas of Bankāpuram and Belgaum, defeated



them, and added Bankāpuram to Mahmūd's fief of Bījāpur. Further military operations were checked by a terrible famine, following the failure of the rains for two successive years, which devastated the Deccan, and was followed by an epidemic of cholera. Little or nothing was done for the wretched sufferers. When this calamity was passed, the king and Mahmūd Gāvān were obliged to march into Telingāna, to suppress a rebellion in Kondavīr, which had been abetted by a raja in Orissa. The rebellion was quelled; the raja was punished; and Muhammad, after completely tranquillising Telingāna, made Rājahmundry his headquarters for nearly three years, and there took, by the advice of Mahmūd Gāvān, the first step in the reform of the provincial administration of his kingdom by dividing the great province of Telingāna into two, with Rājahmundry as the capital of the eastern, and Warangal as that of the western province. The measure was necessary, but Hasan bitterly resented the dismemberment of the great province which he had governed. For some time after this Muhammad was engaged in an expedition into the eastern Carnatic, which formed part of the kingdom of Vijayanagar, and after his return the division of the four great provinces of the kingdom was completed. Berar was divided into the provinces of Gāwīl, or northern, and Māhūr, or southern Berar; Daulatābād into those of Daulatābād on the east, and Junnār on the west; and Gulbarga into those of Gulbarga on the east and Belgaum on the west. At the same time the powers of the provincial governors were curtailed in many ways.

The new provincial governments were fairly divided between the two parties of the state, but the reforms were most unpopular, and Hasan, who had been the first to suffer by them, formed a conspiracy against the life of their author. The conspirators, taking advantage of the absence of Yūsuf with an expeditionary force, induced the keeper of Mahmūd's seals, an African, to affix his private seal to a blank sheet of paper, on which they afterwards wrote a treasonable letter to the raja in Orissa who had instigated the rebellion at Kondavīr. The letter was read and shown to the king when he was drunk. Without making any inquiries, he sent for Mahmūd and roughly demanded of him what was the punishment meet for a traitor. "Death by the sword", replied he, confident in his innocence. The letter was then shown to him, and he exclaimed, "By God, this is a manifest

forgery! The seal is mine, but the writing is none of mine, and I know nothing of the matter". The king made no reply, but, as he rose to leave the hall, ordered the executioner to put Mahmūd to death. The minister knelt, recited the short creed of his faith, and, as the sword fell, cried, "Praise be to God for the blessing of martyrdom!" He was seventy-eight years of age when, on April 5, 1481, he was murdered, and he had well and faithfully served the Bahmanids for thirty-five years. He was learned, accomplished, generous, charitable, and blameless in his private life. He had endeavoured to heal the disastrous feud between the Deccanis and the Foreigners, and, but for the rancour of the Brāhman, Hasan, might have succeeded. The king found that his murdered minister had left no hoards, having distributed his income, as he received it, in charity; and his treasurer, when examined, demanded proof of his master's guilt, and openly charged the king, who could produce none, with murder. The whole camp was in confusion. The Foreigners and the respectable members of the Deccani party joined Yūsuf 'Ādil Khān, and refused even to see the king. The wretched man, deserted by all but the conspirators, was thrown into their arms, and was obliged to accede to their demands. Hasan became lieutenant of the kingdom, with the title of Malik Nāib, and his son Ahmad received the province of Daulatābād, vacated by Yūsuf when he took possession of Mahmūd's fiefs of Bijāpur and Belgaum. Muhammad returned to Bīdar, accompanied by the Malik Nāib and his friends, the rest of the nobles marching apart, and avoiding all intercourse with him. From Bīdar they returned to their provinces without taking leave of him, and, when summoned to attend him on a progress to Belgaum, where he hoped to conciliate Yūsuf, marched at a distance from the royal troops, and again returned to their provinces without leave. Muhammad attempted to drown his remorse in drink, and after his return to Bīdar he died from its effects on March 22, 1482, crying out with his latest breath that Mahmūd Gāvān was slaying him. He was but twenty-eight years of age, an accomplished and high-spirited prince, who was better served than any of his predecessors, and might well have been the greatest of his line, but for his love of strong liquor, which destroyed first his authority and then his life. It was the curse of his race, and of the long line of eighteen kings there were few who were not habitual

drunkards. The massacre of the Foreigners at Chākan, and the murders of Nizām-ul-mulk Ghūrī and Mahmūd Gāvān, all factors in the ruin of the dynasty, were due to orders issued by kings under the influence of drink.

On Muhammad's death his son, Mahmūd, a boy twelve years of age, was enthroned by the Malik Nāib. Mahmūd, who soon became a slave to the vice of his house, was never king but in name, being always under the influence of one dominant minister or another. The gathering of the provincial governors to swear allegiance to the young king led to street-fighting between the two factions, lasting for twenty days, and costing 4000 lives before peace was restored. In 1486 the Malik Nāib carried Mahmūd on an expedition to suppress a rebellion in Telingāna, but discovered a conspiracy against his own life, and fled to Bīdar, where Dīlpasand Khān, one of his own creatures, played the Malik Nāib false, strangled him, and sent his head to the king. Mahmūd then favoured the Foreigners, and the Deccanis, in 1487, conspired to dethrone him, and might have succeeded, had not his Turkish guards stood by him until the foreign troops could be assembled. They put the conspirators to death, but meanwhile, in their absence, the city mob plundered their houses, until the king at sunrise took his seat on the throne, and ordered a general massacre of the Deccanis and Africans. The carnage continued for three days, and was not checked till a Turk named Kāsim, and entitled *Barīd-ul-mamālik*, assumed the lieutenantancy of the kingdom and the guardianship of the king. The provincial governors were not disposed to obey the behests of Kāsim, who issued his commands in the king's name, and whose policy was to maintain his own supremacy by setting them at variance; and in 1490 the late Malik Nāib's son, Ahmad Nizām-ul-mulk, governor of Daulatābād, sent envoys to Yūsuf 'Adil Khān of Bījāpur and Fathullāh 'Imād-ul-mulk of Berar, inviting them to join in asserting their independence of Bīdar. They agreed, and from this may be dated the appearance of the smaller sultanates. Later, in 1512, Sultān Kulī Kutb-ul-mulk of Golconda and, on the death of the last of the Bahmanids in 1527, Amīr 'Alī Barīd in Bīdar, also assumed independence. These were the founders of the five independent houses of the Deccan, known from their titles as the Nizām Shāhī, the 'Adil Shāhī, the Kutb Shāhī, the 'Imād Shāhī, and the Barīd Shāhī dynasties.

Meanwhile Kāsim Barīd incited Ahmad Nizām Shāh and the

regent of Vijayanagar to join him in attacking Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh. Ahmad stood aloof; but though the Hindus captured Rāichūr and Mudgal, Yūsuf defeated Kāsim. Once more, for a time, the powers of the Deccan were united. On the death of Najm-ud-dīn Gilānī, governor of Goa, in 1485, his servant, Bahādur Gilānī, had seized Goa and opened business as a pirate. He enjoyed a successful and profitable career, till in 1493 Mahmūd Begarha of Gujarāt complained that his trading vessels and ports had been plundered. All then united to suppress the pirate, lest the powerful king of Gujarāt should have a pretext for invading the Deccan. The pirate long held the Konkan and much of the country above the ghāts against all his enemies, but was at length driven from the fortress of Panhāla, captured, and slain. It is impossible to unravel here the tangled skein of intrigues among the powers of the Deccan after the suppression of Bahādur. In 1504 Kāsim died, and was succeeded by his son, Amīr 'Alī Barīd, and Fathullāh died, and was succeeded by his son, 'Alā-ud-dīn, who reigned in Berar until 1529. In 1504, too, Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh established the Shiah faith in his dominions, and attempted to suppress all Sunni observances. This step was important, for it was the first attempt to establish in any part of India the Shiah religion, which ultimately became the established faith in the Deccan. But it raised a storm of opposition. All the powers of the Deccan united against Yūsuf, who took refuge first with 'Alā-ud-dīn in Berar and afterwards with Dāūd Khān of Khāndesh. By sowing the seeds of discord among his enemies, he succeeded in separating them, so that Amīr 'Alī and the puppet king, Mahmūd, were left alone. Yūsuf then emerged from Khāndesh, defeated Amīr 'Alī, and returned to his kingdom.

In 1509 Ahmad Nizām Shāh died, and was succeeded at Ahmadnagar, the new capital which he had built for himself, by his son, Burhān, and in the following year Yūsuf died, and was succeeded by his son, Ismā'īl. Shortly after this time Amīr 'Alī appointed a governor to Gulbarga, which was included in the dominions of Bijāpur. In the war which followed this act of aggression, he was defeated by Ismā'īl 'Ādil Shāh, who captured the puppet Mahmūd Shāh, and sent him back to Bīdar with an escort of cavalry; but the weakling again fell into the hands of Amīr 'Alī, and remained a prisoner until his death, in 1518, when his son, Ahmad, was enthroned by Amīr 'Alī. Ahmad died in 1521, and his brother, 'Alā-ud-dīn II, was then set on the throne.

The new king attempted to rid himself of his master, but his plans were detected, and he was deposed. His brother, Valī-mullāh, who succeeded him, likewise attempted to rid himself of the *maire du palais*, and was put to death; and his brother, Kalī-mullāh, the last of the Bahmanids, was placed on the throne. For a time he patiently bore his yoke, but, on learning of Bābur's conquest of northern India, secretly wrote to him, offering to cede to him the provinces of Berar and Daulatābād in return for his aid in establishing his authority over the rest of the Deccan. The letter was intercepted by Amīr 'Alī, and Kalīmullāh fled to Bījāpur, and, on being ill received there, to Ahmadnagar, where Burhān Nizām Shāh received him at first with extravagant demonstrations of respect, but, fearing to compromise his own status as a sovereign prince, suddenly changed his attitude, and Kalīmullāh shortly afterwards died, not without suspicion of poison. With him ended the line of Bahman Shāh.

The rule of the Bahmanids had been harsh, and they showed little regard for the welfare of their Hindu subjects. The Russian merchant, Athanasius Nikitin, describes the poverty and misery of the children of the soil, and the wealth and luxury of the ruling class, and describes Muhammad III, even in 1474, as being in the power of his nobles, who maintained large forces. It was from this thralldom that Mahmūd Gāvān attempted to free him, with the result already recorded. Some of the line were bigots, but their neglect of the welfare of their Hindu subjects is to be attributed neither to their bigotry nor to the apathy bred of habitual drunkenness, for the peasantry of the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar was equally neglected and equally miserable. The tiller of the soil existed for the maintenance of the state, and it was seldom that he was allowed to retain of the fruits of his labour much more than would suffice to keep body and soul together.

In 1565 the allied kingdoms of Bījāpur, Ahmadnagar, Golconda, and Bīdar finally overthrew the great Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar. In 1574 the kingdom of Ahmadnagar absorbed that of Berar, and in 1619 the kingdom of Bījāpur that of Bīdar. Between 1596 and 1600 Akbar annexed the greater part of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and after thirty years of intermittent warfare his grandson, Shāhjahān, finally extinguished it in 1633, leaving the two kingdoms of Bījāpur and Golconda, which were annexed by Aurangzīb, the first in 1686 and the second in 1687.

## CHAPTER VII

### Gujarāt, Mālwā and Khāndesh

The Deccan had fallen away from the empire of Delhi in 1347, but it was not until the complete disruption of that empire after the death of Firūz Tughluk in 1388 that the great provinces of Gujarāt and Mālwā were severed from it. The small state of Khāndesh had ceased after 1382 to hold any communication with the capital, and in 1392 the governor of Mālwā, and in 1396 the governor of Gujarāt assumed independence. No revolt was necessary, for the empire was crumbling away.

The governor of Gujarāt, Zafar Khān, son of Vajih-ul-mulk of Dīdvāna, a Rājput convert to Islam, assumed in 1396 the title of Muzaffar Shāh, and in 1400 reduced to vassalage the Rājput state of Idar. In 1399 Mahmūd Shāh of Delhi and his retinue, fleeing from Tīmūr, arrived in Gujarāt, but Mahmūd, finding Muzaffar Shāh unwilling to treat him with the deference due from a subject to his sovereign, retired to Mālwā.

Dilāvar Khān Ghūrī, who claimed descent from the princes of Ghūr, had been appointed governor of Mālwā by Firūz. He never assumed the royal title, but after 1392 he behaved as an independent ruler. Nevertheless he received Mahmūd as his sovereign, and entertained him with princely hospitality at Dhār until his guest was able, in 1401, to return to his own capital. Dilāvar's son, Alp Khān, disapproved of his deference to Mahmūd and withdrew to Māndū, where he occupied himself in perfecting the defences of the great fortress-city. He had long been impatient for his inheritance, and in 1406 he removed his father by poison, and ascended the throne of Mālwā, adopting the title of Hūshang Shāh. But he did not long enjoy his throne in peace, for Muzaffar of Gujarāt, resenting the murder of his old friend, invaded Mālwā to punish the parricide. He besieged Hūshang in Dhār, captured him, and carried him off as a prisoner into Gujarāt, leaving his own brother, Nusrat Khān, in Dhār as governor of Mālwā. His rule was so oppressive and extortionate that the army rose against him, expelled him, and elected as their ruler Mūsa Khān, a cousin of Hūshang. Hūshang now protested

his innocence of his father's death, and implored Muzaffar to restore him to his throne. Muzaffar sent with him into Mālhwā his own grandson, Ahmad, who established Hūshang at Dhār, but did not attempt to oust Mūsa from Māndū. On his return to Gujarāt Ahmad was designated heir to his grandfather, who died in 1411, when Ahmad was confronted with a formidable rebellion, headed by his four uncles. Hūshang, instead of aiding his benefactor, twice invaded Gujarāt in support of the rebels, but they were defeated on each occasion, and Hūshang was obliged to retire.

The relations between Gujarāt and Mālhwā were at first complicated by the rise of the small state of Khāndesh, founded in 1382 by Rāja Ahmad, otherwise styled Malik Rāja. He had established himself at Thālner, on the Taptī, as capital of the fief granted to him by Firūz, and by 1382 had conquered the surrounding country and ruled his small territory as an independent prince; but he and his successors for some generations were content with the title of khān from which their state became known as Khāndesh, "the Country of the Khāns". His dynasty was distinguished by the patronymic Fārūki, from the title of the second caliph, 'Umar al-Fārūk or "the Discriminator", from whom Ahmad claimed descent.

Ahmad died in 1399, leaving two sons, Nasīr and Hasan, to inherit his dominions. Nasīr took the eastern and Hasan the western districts, and Nasīr founded in 1400 the city of Burhānpur, and captured from a Hindu chieftain the strong fortress of Asīr, while Hasan retained Thālner, his father's capital. In 1417 Nasīr, with the aid of Hūshang of Mālhwā who had married his sister, captured Thālner and imprisoned Hasan, and then, fearing the intervention of Ahmad I of Gujarāt, forestalled him by marching on Nandurbār. A force from Gujarāt drove him from Nandurbār to Asīr, and there besieged him until he sued for peace. This was granted on his promising to refrain from aggression in future, and on his swearing allegiance to Ahmad I, who recognised his title to Khāndesh. Hasan retired to Gujarāt, where he and his descendants found a home and intermarried with the royal house.

Nasīr resented Hūshang's failure to aid him against Ahmad, and the alliance between Khāndesh and Mālhwā came to an end. In 1429 Nasīr entered into an alliance with the Deccan, and gave his daughter in marriage to 'Alā-ud-dīn, later the ninth of the Bahmanids, but the union engendered strife, and Khāndesh, after

a disastrous war with its powerful neighbours, was at length driven into the arms of Gujarāt.

In 1419 Ahmad of Gujarāt, provoked by aggressions, invaded Mālwā, defeated Hūshang in a fiercely-contested battle, drove him into Māndū, and laid waste the country, but retired before the rainy season began, and was dissuaded from returning in the following year only by Hūshang's submissive attitude and promises of amendment.

In 1422 Hūshang, attributing his military inferiority to lack of elephants, undertook a most daring raid. He led a party of only a thousand horse across India, through the forests of Gondwāna, into Orissa, and at Jāipur posed as a merchant and induced the *kēsari* raja of that state to visit his camp in order to inspect his goods. There he seized him and demanded seventy-five elephants as his ransom, and, having received these, returned to Mālwā. On his way to Māndū he surprised Kherla, and carried off its Gond raja, Narasingha, as a prisoner. As he approached Māndū, he found that Ahmad I of Gujarāt was besieging the fortress, but he eluded his troops and succeeded in entering the city. Ahmad then retired into the Sārangpur district, but, being followed by Hūshang, retreated into Gujarāt. After his departure Hūshang captured Gāgraun, and then marched on Gwalior, but retired when Mubārak Shāh of Delhi advanced to the relief of the fortress.

Hūshang's defeat in 1428 by Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī of the Deccan has been mentioned in the preceding chapter. In 1433 he annexed Kālpī, on the Jumna, and, shortly before his death in 1435, founded Hūshangābād on the Nerbudda.

His eldest son, Ghaznī Khān, who succeeded him under the title of Muhammad Shāh, was a confirmed drunkard, and the only part which he took in the government of his kingdom was to put his three brothers to death. His barbarity so disgusted his cousin, Mahmūd Khaljī, that he poisoned him, drove his son, Mas'ūd, to take refuge in Gujarāt, and, after offering the throne to his own father, who declined, occupied it himself.

Mughīs, the father of Mahmūd, was the son of Dilāvar Khān's sister, married to an officer named 'Alī Shīr Khaljī, who claimed descent from Nāsir-ud-dīn, the eldest brother of Jalāl-ud-dīn Firūz Shāh Khaljī of Delhi. Mughīs was thus a first cousin of Hūshang, and Mahmūd was a second cousin of Muhammad



Shāh. Mahmūd founded the Khaljī dynasty of Mālhwā, of which four kings reigned, before Mālhwā was annexed in 1531 by Bahādūr Shāh of Gujarāt.

Soon after the defeat of Hūshang by Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī, Ahmad I of Gujarāt also became involved in hostilities with the Deccan. The aggressor was Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī, who had conceived the design of annexing both Gujarāt and Mālhwā. It is needless to attempt to follow the course of the campaigns and the engagements between the armies of the two states, extending over a period of nearly two years. The advantage lay almost wholly on the side of Gujarāt, and after the last battle, in 1431, Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī retreated to Bīdar, and was obliged to abandon his insane design.

Nasīr Khān of Khāndesh died in 1437, and was succeeded by his son, 'Ādil Khān I, who died in 1441, and was succeeded by his son, Mubārak Khān I, and in 1442 Ahmad I of Gujarāt, having failed to restore Mas'ūd to the throne of Mālhwā, died, and was succeeded by his son Muhammad I, known as Karīm. Ahmad had built, on the site of Asāwal, a city which he named Ahmadābād, and which took the place of Anhilwār as the capital of Gujarāt.

In 1440 Mahmūd I of Mālhwā, as has been mentioned in chapter IV, responded to the appeal of a party among the nobles of Delhi who had invited him to ascend the throne, disgusted with the worthlessness of the ruling king, Muhammad Sayyid. He failed to overcome the party which was loyal to Muhammad, and his return was accelerated by the news that a mob in Māndū had torn the gilded umbrella from the tomb of Hūshang and raised it over the head of a pretender; but on his return he found that the rising had been crushed by his father. Ever since his ascent of the throne, he had been obliged to contend with disaffection, for the other nobles had resented its usurpation by one of themselves. Domestic disaffection had gradually subsided, as Mahmūd proved himself worthy of his station, but his usurpation had served foreign enemies as a pretext for helping those whom he had ousted. Ahmad I had disappointed the elder son of Muhammad of Mālhwā, but Kumbha, rāna of Mewār, who had harboured his younger son, 'Umar Khān, was prepared to attempt his restoration by armed force.

The rāna had aroused the hostility of the rulers of both Mālhwā

and Gujarāt. His support of a pretender and his relations with Rājput chiefs within the borders of Mālwā were a menace to Mahmūd's tenure of the throne which he had usurped; his pretension to the allegiance of the lesser Rājput states on his south-western border, claimed by the sultan of Gujarāt, and his intervention in the affairs of the small state of Nāgaur, ruled by that sultan's kinsmen, more than once led to war. Had the two Muslim rulers acted together, the consequences would have been serious to the rāna, but, though in 1456 they concluded a treaty binding each to abstain from hostilities against the other in order that both might be free to attack the common enemy, they acted independently against him. Each was frequently at war with him, and according to Muslim historians inflicted on him several defeats and extorted from him heavy indemnities, but he never suffered at their hands any reverse which placed either his independence or his authority in jeopardy. It was not until nearly eighty years after this time that their troops fought in alliance, with a result disastrous to the sultan of Mālwā, and it was not until that kingdom had been absorbed by Gujarāt that Bahādur Shāh, for the second time in the history of the Muslims in India, captured the great fortress of Chitor.

A detailed account of the series of campaigns between Mālwā and Gujarāt on the one hand and Mewār on the other would be out of place here, but two may be mentioned. In 1453 Kumbha defeated and nearly destroyed, near Nāgaur, the army of Kutb-ud-dīn of Gujarāt; and in 1455 Mahmūd I of Mālwā, in the course of a long and successful campaign, recovered the city of Ajmir, with the shrine of the Muslim saint, Shaikh Mu'in-ud-dīn Chishtī, captured Būndī, and extorted heavy indemnities from the rāna and from other chiefs.

One of the expeditions of Mahmūd I of Mālwā against the rāna was interrupted by a difference with Mahmūd of Jaunpur in connection with Kālpi, but Nasir Khān, who pretended to independence in that small principality, was reinstated under the protection of Mālwā, and the question of his status was, for the time, settled.

In 1449 Muhammad I of Gujarāt attempted to annex the small state of Chāmpāner. He defeated the raja, Gangadās, in the field, and drove him into his fortress, whence he sent an appeal for aid to Mahmūd I. Mahmūd responded, but, on learning that

Muhammad had advanced to Godhra to meet him, hastily retreated. Muhammad, having contracted a severe illness before Chāmpāner, was unable to continue the siege, and returned to Ahmadābād, where, on February 10, 1451, he died, and his son, Kutb-ud-dīn Ahmad, succeeded him. His death was regarded by Mahmūd as an opportunity for humbling, and possibly annexing, Gujarāt, and he invaded the country; but near Ahmadābād the army of Gujarāt inflicted a crushing defeat on him, capturing eighty elephants and all his camp equipage, and he returned to Māndū in sorry plight.

On May 18, 1458, Kutb-ud-dīn of Gujarāt died, after a short illness, and the nobles raised to the throne his uncle, Dāūd, but the depravity of this prince was such as to indicate a disordered mind, and after a reign of twenty-seven days he was deposed, and his younger brother, Mahmūd, was enthroned in his stead. Mahmūd, a mere youth, was involved on his accession in the meshes of a formidable conspiracy, but, with a courage and acumen worthy of a mature and experienced ruler, detected the carefully concealed design of the conspirators, boldly withstood them, and put them to death. Later in his reign Mahmūd was known as Begarha, an appellation which will be explained later, but which it will be convenient to use now, in order to distinguish him from contemporaries of the same name.

Mention has already been made of the assassination of Nizām-ul-mulk Ghūrī, at the instance of the tyrant, Humāyūn, of the Deccan. The murdered man's wife and family fled to the court of Mālwā, and begged Mahmūd I to avenge his death. In 1461 Humāyūn was dead, and his son, Nizām Shāh, who had succeeded him, was an infant. Mahmūd I, welcoming an opportunity of conquering the Deccan, marched on Bīdar, defeated the army of the Deccan in the field, occupied the city, and opened the siege of its citadel. Meanwhile the child's guardians had appealed for aid to the young Begarha, who marched to Nandurbār, near the northern frontier of the Deccan, and ordered Mahmūd I to desist from the disgraceful act of waging war on a child. The invader, finding his line of retreat threatened, began to retire, and was so harassed by a combined force of the armies of Gujarāt and the Deccan that he abandoned his elephants and his heavy baggage, and attempted to elude his pursuers by plunging into the forests of the Melghāt, where his army was

nearly destroyed. Large numbers died of thirst, and the Korkus fell upon the remainder, of whom very few reached Māndū.

Untaught by this disaster, Mahmūd I again invaded the Deccan in the following year, but found the young king's army drawn up to meet him at Daulatābād, and learned that Begarha was again marching on Nandurbār. On this occasion he retired before it was too late.

In 1465 Mahmūd I was gratified by the arrival at Māndū of an envoy from the puppet caliph in Egypt, al-Mustanjid Yūsuf, bearing for him a patent of sovereignty, an empty but highly prized honour. Three years later he received another mission, on this occasion from Timūr's great-grandson, Abu Sa'īd, king of Transoxiana, Khurāsān and Balkh. The mission was gratifying as a recognition of sovereignty, and he sent an envoy in return to Sa'īd, destined to be the grandfather of Bābur.

After Mahmūd's second discomfiture in the Deccan, an army from that kingdom had captured Kherla. In 1466 a treaty of peace between Mālwa and the Deccan was concluded, and Kherla was surrendered to Mahmūd, in consideration of his agreeing to refrain from future acts of aggression. Muhammad III of the Deccan, who succeeded Nizām Shāh, violated this treaty, and induced Mahmūd's governor of Kherla to transfer his allegiance, but Mahmūd recovered the fortress and thenceforward Kherla was included in the dominion of Mālwa.

In 1468, after an expedition against some predatory Rājputs, Mahmūd I marched to Chanderī, and thence sent a force to besiege Karera, nearly sixty miles to the north of that town. Karera was burned by means of fireballs thrown into it from the trenches, and, when it fell, 7000 prisoners were taken. Having received a mission from Buhlūl Lodī of Delhi, he returned from Chanderī to Māndū. He was sixty-eight years of age, and during a reign of more than thirty-three years hardly a year had passed without his having taken the field. Exhausted by almost unceasing warfare, he suffered severely during the march from the fierce heat of an Indian summer, and on June 1, 1469, shortly after his arrival at his capital, he expired. Almost at the same time died his enemy, Rāna Kumbha, assassinated by his son Ūda, who succeeded him and reigned for five years, but whose name, like that of the treacherous doge in Venice, is blank in the annals of Mewār. In 1473 he was driven from the throne by the rāna,

Raimal, who carried on the line of the Gahlots. Mahmūd I was the greatest of the Muslim kings of Mālwā. He had, indeed, failed to conquer Delhi, Gujarāt, Chitor and the Deccan, all of which he had attempted to annex, but against these failures must be set many successes against the rāna and minor Rājput chieftains, and the kings of the Deccan, and his enlargement of the frontiers of his kingdom. His recognition by the phantom caliph and by Abu Saʿīd proved that his fame had reached Egypt and Samarkand. He was a builder as well as a soldier, and among his many works at Māndū is the Tower of Victory, raised to commemorate his successes over Kumbha. The more famous Tower of Victory at Chitor is said to commemorate Kumbha's victories over Begarha and Mahmūd I, but the successes of the Gahlots were gained by Sangrama Singh against Mahmūd II, not by Kumbha against Mahmūd I.

Mahmūd I was succeeded by his eldest son, Ghiyās-ud-dīn, a most peaceful prince, whose avowed policy was to rest content with the wide dominions which his father had left him, and to live in peace with his neighbours; and to this policy he adhered throughout his reign. He once set out from Māndū in response to an appeal for aid from the raja of Chāmpāner, whose fortress was besieged by Begarha, but withdrew on being advised that it was unlawful to aid a misbeliever against a brother Muslim. He most scrupulously observed all the rites of his faith, and abstained from strong drink and from wearing garments of materials not sanctioned by the sacred law. He was the dupe of every rogue who feigned piety, and at his court beggars of all classes abounded, and the taxes wrung from an industrious and thrifty people were squandered upon vagabonds and idlers. He left his brothers in possession of the fiefs which they had held in his father's reign, and conferred on his eldest son, 'Abd-ul-kādir, the royal title of Nāsir-ud-dīn Sultān, and left affairs of state almost entirely in his hands, while he amused himself with the administration of his vast harem, organised as a miniature state, and wasted in this futile pursuit the time and energy which should have been employed in the government of his kingdom.

The internal peace of the kingdom was disturbed only shortly before his death by a violent quarrel between his two sons, the cause of the younger being adopted by his mother, who desired that he should succeed to the throne. The feeble-minded king

vacillated between his designated heir and his wife's favourite until the elder having left the capital in dudgeon returned, put his brother to death, imprisoned his mother, and on October 22, 1500, ascended the throne with his father's consent. Four months later Ghiyās-ud-dīn died of poison, administered, as was generally believed, by his son's orders. Many of the nobles in the provinces refused to believe that the old king had abdicated voluntarily, and rose in rebellion, but Nāsir-ud-dīn defeated them twice and crushed the rising. Later he led a foray into the dominions of the rāna, Raimal, and sent a force into Khāndesh to the assistance of Dāūd Khān Fārūki, whose territory had been invaded by Ahmad Nizām Shāh of Ahmadnagar.

Nāsir-ud-dīn aggravated by deep drinking the natural ferocity of his disposition, and by his violent temper so incensed his nobles, that when, in 1510, his elder son, Shihāb-ud-dīn, rose in rebellion, many supported him. Nāsir-ud-dīn marched out to Dhār, where his son was encouraged by his numerical superiority to attack him, but was defeated and fled, first to Chanderī and then to Sipri, near Narwar, and his father, after vainly endeavouring to persuade him to return to his allegiance, set out for Māndū. On his way thither he died, according to some authorities of fever, and according to others of poison administered by his nobles, and on May 2, 1511, his third son, who was in the camp, was raised to the throne as Mahmūd II.

Shihāb-ud-dīn, on hearing of his father's death, hastened towards Māndū, but his brother outstripped him, and shut the gates in his face. He retired into Khāndesh and there resided at Asir as the guest of 'Adil Khān III.

It is now time to revert to Gujarāt. The state of Gīrnār, in Sorath or Kāthiāwār, had remained unmolested since Muhammad ibn Tughluk had captured the fortress and punished the raja for harbouring the rebel Taghī. Mandulak Chudāsama was the reigning raja, and in 1466 Mahmūd Begarha invaded his dominions with the object of reducing him to vassalage. The country was pillaged, temples were sacked, Mandulak agreed to pay tribute, and Begarha retired, but in the following year, learning that Mandulak was in the habit of using the insignia of royalty, commanded him to desist, and Mandulak, fearing another invasion, obeyed him. His submission gained him little, for late in 1469 Mahmūd led a great army into Sorath, and, to Mandulak's

protest that he had committed no offence and had regularly paid tribute, replied that he had come neither for tribute nor for plunder, but to establish the true faith in Sorath, and offered Mandulak the choice between Islam and death. The unfortunate raja retired to his citadel, Uparkot, and was there closely besieged. He attempted to purchase peace by the offer of an enormous indemnity, and, when this was refused, fled to his hill-fort in the Girnār mountains, whither Mahmūd followed him. He was again closely besieged, and on December 4, 1470, surrendered and accepted Islam, receiving the title of Khānjahān. With him the long line of Chudāsama rajas of Girnār came to an end, and Mahmūd incorporated the state with his dominions, and at the foot of the hills founded the city of Mustafā-ābād, which became one of his capitals.

The mother of Mahmūd had been a princess of Sind, daughter of Jām Nizām-ud-dīn, and during the next two years he was occupied in Sind, where, as was reported to him, Muslims were persecuted by Hindus. He crossed the Rann with a very small force, and found a large body of men drawn up to receive him, but not to oppose him, for it was composed of Sumras, Sodas, and Kalhoras, who were professing Muslims, but knew little of their faith. They were probably the descendants of Rājputs who had been forced to accept Islam, and who, though excluded from the fellowship of their unconverted brethren, had been neglected by the leaders of their adopted faith, and allowed to lapse into ignorance. Mahmūd invited those who would to enter his service, and many accepted and received grants of land in Sorath, where teachers were appointed to instruct them in the faith.

In 1472 Mahmūd marched to the assistance of his father-in-law, the jām, who was beset by rebels. These dispersed on his approach, and Mahmūd received from the jām valuable gifts, and also one of his daughters, whom he married to Kaisar Khān, of the Fārūki house of Khāndesh. On his return, in 1473, Mahmūd marched to Dwārkā, the Hindus of which town had plundered a Muslim merchant who had been driven ashore. He plundered and destroyed the famous temple, building a mosque in its place, pursued Rāja Bhīm to Bet Shankhodhar, defeated him in a sea-fight, and forced him to surrender. The merchant recovered all that he had lost, and much more, and Bhīm was sent to Ahmadābād, where he was impaled.

In 1482 Mahmūd was able to prosecute an enterprise on which he had long set his heart—the annexation of Chāmpāner. On December 4, he set out from Ahmadābād, and the raja was driven into his strong hill-fortress of Pāvāgarh. Mahmūd occupied Chāmpāner, at the foot of the hill, and began, even before the fort had fallen, to beautify it with buildings. The siege lasted for a year and nine months, and at length the Rājputs, reduced to extremities, resolved to perform the dreadful rite of *jauhar*. The women were burnt, and the men, arrayed in yellow garments, went forth to die. The Muslims met them in the gate, and slew nearly all of the seven thousand who rushed forth; but the raja and two of his ministers were wounded and captured, and having obstinately refused during five months of captivity to accept Islam, were then put to death. Patāi's son accepted Islam, and in the next reign received the government of Idār, with the title of Nizām-ul-mulk, but scions of the family fled to Chota Udaipur and Deogarh Bariya, where their descendants still rule.

It was after the fall of Chāmpāner that Mahmūd received the cognomen of Begarha (*be garha*, "of two forts") as the conqueror of the two great Hindu strongholds of Girnār and Chāmpāner. Chāmpāner was named Muhammadābād, and became one of his chief places of residence.

The Portuguese, who had first appeared on the Malabar coast in 1498, at this time became a factor in the foreign politics of Gujarāt. They had established a great trading centre at Cochin, and in 1507 they formed a settlement on Socotra, near the entrance to the Red Sea. In less than a decade they had diverted the greater part of the lucrative spice trade from the Red Sea and Egypt to the direct sea-route between India and Europe, thus depriving the Mameluke sultans of the heavy dues which they levied, both at Jeddah and Alexandria, on goods in transit. This diversion of the trade affected not only the Mamlūks, but also the Muslim merchants of Indian ports, and the Portuguese, who, with memories of the Moors in their minds, loathed all Muslims, also interfered with the pilgrim traffic between the Indian ports and Jeddah, and thus became obnoxious to all the Muslim powers surrounding the Arabian Sea, who determined to make a combined effort to oust them. It was agreed by Kansauh al-Ghaurī, sultan of Egypt, Mahmūd Begarha, other local Muhammadan rulers, and a Hindu, the Zamorin of Calicut, that a fleet should



be equipped at Suez and dispatched to India, where it would be reinforced by local squadrons, and would attack the Portuguese. The Portuguese viceroy, Francisco de Almeida, unaware of the fleet having left the Red Sea, sent his son Lourenço, with a small squadron, to explore the ports on the western coast of India, north of Cochīn; and in January, 1508, Lourenço encountered the great allied fleet at Chaul. His small squadron was overwhelmed, and he died a hero's death. The allies, however, had no lasting cause of joy in having thus provoked the Portuguese. After the victory Mahmūd Begarha returned to Chāmpāner.

We must now revert to the history of Khāndesh, in the affairs of which state Begarha became, not unwillingly, involved. Since Khāndesh had been overrun, shortly before the death of Nasīr Khān, by the troops of the Deccan, the rulers of Khāndesh had regarded the sultan of Gujarāt as their protector, and had paid him tribute. Nasīr Khān had died in 1437, and had been succeeded by his son, 'Ādil Khān I, who was succeeded in 1441 by his son, Mubārak Khān, an active and warlike prince who had extended his rule over part of Gondwāna and carried his arms as far afield as the region now known as Chota Nāgpur. His son 'Ādil Khān II, who succeeded him in 1457, for a time withheld payment of tribute to Gujarāt, but a demonstration by Mahmūd Begarha sufficed to bring him to his senses and he remained on good terms with his overlord until his death in 1501, when he was succeeded by his brother, Dāūd Khān. When Rāja Ahmad Khān, the founder of the dynasty, died, his younger son, Hasan Khān, on being ousted by his brother, Nasīr Khān, had made his home at the court of Gujarāt, where he was well received, and where he and his descendants were honoured guests. His son, Ghaznī Khān, had married a daughter of Ahmad I of Gujarāt, and their son Kaisar Khān, already mentioned, a daughter of Jām Nizām-ud-dīn of Sind. Kaisar's son, Ahsan Khān, married a daughter of Mahmūd Begarha, and their son, 'Ālam Khān, married a daughter of Muzaffar II, Mahmūd's son. When Mahmūd had marched into Khāndesh to compel 'Ādil Khān II to pay tribute, the latter submitted, and a friendly interview took place. Mahmūd had taken advantage of this interview to persuade 'Ādil to nominate as his heir 'Ālam Khān, who, besides being a direct descendant of Rāja Ahmad, was Mahmūd's grand-son, and had married his grand-daughter. At the time of the

death of 'Ādil Khān II, Mahmūd was not in a position to press his grandson's claim, and 'Ādil Khān's brother, Dāūd, succeeded without opposition. He was a feeble but reckless prince, and embroiled himself with Ahmad Nizām Shāh of Ahmadnagar, who invaded Khāndesh, and could not be expelled until Dāūd purchased the aid of Nāsir-ud-dīn of Mālwa by causing the *khūtba* to be recited in his name. Dāūd's death in 1508 ended an inglorious reign, and his son Ghaznī Khān, who succeeded him, was poisoned only eight days later. Ahmad Nizām Shāh then invaded Khāndesh with the object of enthroning another scion of the Fārūki house, also named 'Ālam Khān, but Mahmūd Begarha drove him from the country and enthroned his own client, 'Ālam Khān, under the title of 'Ādil Khān III. His reign was not marked by any noteworthy event, and on his death in August, 1520, he was succeeded by his son, Muhammad I, usually styled Muhammad Shāh, from his having been summoned to the throne of Gujarāt, which, however, he never lived to occupy. Some time after Mahmūd's return to Gujarāt, an envoy from Shāh Ismā'il Safavī of Persia arrived at Ahmadābād to invite Mahmūd to embrace the faith of the Shiah, but, being rejected as a heretic, he proceeded to Mālwa, where he was more favourably received, but failed to gain a single convert.

Mahmūd's health was failing, and on November 23, 1511, he died, and was succeeded by his son, Muzaffar II. Mahmūd was not only the greatest of the sultans of Gujarāt, but holds an honourable place among the warrior princes of India. He was a prodigy of precocity. Though little more than a child at his accession, he coped successfully with a formidable conspiracy, and thereafter ruled his kingdom himself. In his manhood his appearance was striking. Tall and robust, with a beard which descended to his waist and a heavy moustache, twisted and curled upwards, he struck awe into his courtiers. His brother had died of poison, and of him it is said that he gradually absorbed poisons into his system until he became immune from the effects of any that might be administered to him. This is, of course, a fable, but a convenient fable, belief in which he probably fostered. Lack of space forbids a description of his normal diet, but he is said to have eaten between twenty and thirty pounds' weight of food a day.

The naval victory at Chaul had no lasting results, and before

his death Mahmūd offered to the Portuguese a site for a factory at Diū, but Muzaffar II refused to allow them to fortify it.

The reign of Mahmūd II, which marks the rapid decline of Mālwā, began in widespread rebellion, and ended in disaster. His first minister was a Hindu, who was murdered by jealous Muslim nobles, after which Muhāfiz Khān, governor of Māndū, became dictator, and so angered the nobles that a party of them repaired to Asīr and invited Shihāb-ud-dīn to return to Mālwā and ascend the throne. He died on his way thither, and his partisans proclaimed his son king under the title of Hūshang II, and carried him, after suffering a defeat, to Sihor, whence they sent a message to Mahmūd, assuring him that they were loyal at heart but would not endure the rule of Muhāfiz Khān.

Meanwhile Muhāfiz Khān, unable to bend the king to his will, had rebelled, and proclaimed the eldest brother, Sāhib Khān, under the title of Muhammad II. Thus there were three kings in Mālwā. Sāhib Khān held Māndū, Mahmūd II had retired to Ujjain, and Hūshang II remained in Sihor, but was gradually deserted by his followers, who joined Mahmūd, since he was opposed to Muhāfiz Khān. Mahmūd secured the adherence of Mednī Rāi, a Rājput who held the government of Rāisen, and with his help advanced to Māndū. Sāhib Khān fled to Gujarāt, and, being there subjected to disgraceful treatment by the Persian envoy, fled in his shame to Berar, where he became the guest of 'Alā-ud-dīn 'Imād Shāh.

In Māndū Mahmūd II was the servant rather than the master of the Rājputs who had restored him. Mednī Rāi caused many of the old Muslim nobles to be put to death, and the rest left the capital. The Rājputs scandalised all Muslims by their treatment of those professing Islam, and Mahmūd, having twice failed to master them, eluded his custodians while on a hunting tour, and fled to the frontier of Gujarāt where he was honourably received, for Muzaffar II had long been preparing to intervene in the affairs of Mālwā, and, joining him with a large army, marched on Māndū.

On Mahmūd's escape Mednī Rāi had gone to Chitor to enlist the aid of Sangrama Singh, the rāna who had succeeded his father, Raimal, in 1508, but the Rājput garrison had remained in Māndū, and was twice defeated before the walls of the city. In the siege which followed, the garrison attempted to hold out until the

rāna and Mednī Rāi could relieve them, but on February 23, 1518, Māndū was carried by escalade, the garrison performed the rite of *jauhar*, and the Muslims then massacred all who remained; 19,000 were put to the sword, and the streets ran with their blood.

Muzaffar then turned against the rāna and Mednī Rāi, who had reached Ujjain, but who, on hearing of the massacre in Māndū, had hastily retreated to Chitor. He therefore returned to Gujarāt where he was occupied in a campaign against the Rājputs of Idar, but left a force of 10,000 horse, under Āsaf Khān in Māndū, to assist Mahmūd against his enemies. Mahmūd and Āsaf Khān marched on Gāgraun, held by Hemkaran, a Rājput, captured the town and put Hemkaran to death, and then turned against the rāna, who was marching to attack them. The armies met when the Muslims were exhausted and in disorder after a forced march, and the Rājputs cut their force to pieces. Mahmūd was captured and carried before Sangrama Singh, who received him courteously and sent him back to Māndū with an escort which replaced him on his throne, but the rāna compelled him to surrender his crown-jewels.

After this battle, which, owing to Āsaf Khān's presence, is always represented in Hindu annals as a victory over the combined armies of Mālwā and Gujarāt, Sangrama Singh invaded Gujarāt, plundered some of its towns, and returned to Chitor. In 1521, Muzaffar retaliated by sending a large army into Mewār which ravaged the rāna's country.

Muzaffar II had designated his eldest son, Sikandar, as his heir, and his second son, Bahādur, left Gujarāt in dudgeon and visited Chitor and Delhi, in both of which cities he was well received. He reached Delhi shortly before Bābur's invasion, and is said to have been present at the battle of Pānīpat, but not to have taken part in it. Shortly afterwards he received a message urging him to return. His father had died on April 7, 1526, and Sikandar had been enthroned, but had almost immediately proved his unfitness for sovereign power. The nobles were divided into three factions, supporting the claims of Sikandar, Bahādur, and Latīf, Muzaffar's third son, who was assembling his forces at Nandurbār. Meanwhile 'Imād-ul-mulk Khushkadam, the leading noble, caused Sikandar to be assassinated and raised to the throne Mahmūd, Muzaffar's youngest son, a mere infant, in whose name he

intended to rule. On Bahādur's arrival most of the nobles transferred their allegiance to him, and on July 11, 1526, he was acclaimed king in Ahmadābād. Khushkadam had retired, with the child, Mahmūd II, to Chāmpāner, and Bahādur, pursuing him thither, captured him, and put him to death. Latīf, who was lurking in the town, fled towards Nandurbār, but the governor of that district defeated and wounded him, and he died a prisoner on the way to Chāmpāner. There remained one other candidate for the throne, Muzaffar's fourth son, Chānd Khān, who fled and took refuge with Mahmūd II of Mālwā, who encouraged him to hope for his support.

Late in 1527 Bahādur marched to the assistance of 'Alā-ud-dīn 'Imād Shāh of Berar and Muhammad I of Khāndesh, who had succeeded his father, 'Ādil Khān III, in 1520. Burhān I of Ahmadnagar had annexed the district of Pāthri, on the Godāvārī, which had belonged to Berar, and 'Alā-ud-dīn, with the help of Muhammad I, had attempted to recover it, but had been defeated and driven from his kingdom into Khāndesh. Bahādur marched through Berar on Ahmadnagar, occupied the city, drove Burhān Nizām Shāh and his ally, Amīr 'Alī Barīd Shāh of Bīdar, into the hills, and then formed the siege of Daulatābād. The siege was protracted, and, as the rainy season of 1529 was approaching, Muhammad I entered into negotiations with the enemy, and peace was concluded. The kings of Ahmadnagar and Berar were to cause the *khūtba* to be recited in their capitals in Bahādur's name, Pāthri and Māhūr were to be ceded to Berar, and all elephants taken by Burhān I were to be returned. These terms were never satisfactorily fulfilled, but Bahādur returned to Gujarāt.

In 1530 the Portuguese captured the port of Damān, and in 1531 failed to capture Diū, but left a fleet in the Gulf of Cambay to harass the trade and shipping of Gujarāt.

The authority of Mahmūd II of Mālwā, after his defeat by the rāna, extended little beyond the neighbourhood of his capital, but the rāna's state, Mewār, fell into disorder after the death of Sangrama Singh in 1527. Mahmūd's treatment of his Muslim nobles drove many of them into Gujarāt, where they were received at the court of Bahādur, who was justly incensed by Mahmūd's foolish support of the claims of the pretender, Chānd Khān. Bahādur, with Muhammad I of Khāndesh, then invaded

Mālwā. Mahmūd II was in grave difficulties, for the new rāna, Ratan Singh, was menacing Ujjain. On receiving Bahādur's message, summoning him to his camp, he retired into his seraglio, and told his advisers that all was over, and that he would spend his remaining days in pleasure. Troops could hardly be expected to fight well for such a chief, and on March 17, 1531, Bahādur entered Māndū. Mahmūd and his officers appeared before him, the *khūtba* was recited in his name, and Mālwā was annexed to Gujarāt. Mahmūd and his sons were sent towards Chāmpāner, but on the way, the camp was attacked by tribesmen from the hills, and the escort, fearing a rescue, put Mahmūd to death.

Bahādur and Muhammad I retired from Māndū to Burhānpur, where Bahādur compelled Burhān I of Ahmadnagar to wait on him, and during the next eighteen months their troops were engaged in establishing order in Mālwā, and in expelling Rājputs who had occupied much territory in the north of the kingdom. In 1533 the Muslims appeared before Chitor, and the queen-mother, Jawāhir Bai, purchased peace by surrendering what remained of the spoil taken by her husband, Sangrama, from Mahmūd II, including the jewelled crown of Mālwā.

In 1534 Bahādur again advanced upon Chitor. He defeated the rāna, Vikramāditya, in the field, and proceeded to besiege the capital. He had favourably received in his camp Muhammad Zamān Mīrzā, a rebellious prince of the house of Tīmūr; Humāyūn had written, protesting against such conduct, and Bahādur, when drunk, had dictated a most insolent reply. Humāyūn, much enraged, answered that he was on the point of marching to punish him, but that he would not molest him until the holy war against the misbelievers was ended. Meanwhile Bahādur completed the investment of Chitor. After three months his artillery opened a practicable breach in its defence, and Jawāhir Bai led a *sortie* from the fortress, and was slain at the head of her warriors. The infant heir, Udai Singh, was conveyed to a place of safety, and the surviving Rājputs performed the rite of *jauhar*. Thirteen thousand women, headed by the mother of the young prince, are said to have voluntarily perished in an immense conflagration, and the survivors of the garrison rushed on the Muslims and were exterminated. Bahādur appointed a Muslim governor to Chitor and began his retreat.

He then found reason to repent the folly of which he had been

guilty in insulting Humāyūn. The emperor was awaiting him in Mandasor, and Bahādūr, who dared not attack, entrenched his camp. His troops, beleaguered for two months, suffered grievously from famine, and he basely deserted them and fled to Māndū. Humāyūn followed, and captured Māndū; but Bahādūr escaped and fled to Chāmpāner. Humāyūn again pursued him, and he fled to Cambay, and thence to Diū. But when Humāyūn reached Cambay, he was recalled by the news of disturbance in Ahmadābād, and, returning to Chāmpāner, captured that fortress. He then foolishly began to organise the administration of Gujarāt as though it were a settled province of his empire, despite the need of his presence elsewhere, leading a military promenade through Khāndesh, and then returning to Māndū. But there he received disquieting reports of the activities of Shīr Khān, the Afghan, who eventually drove him from his throne, and he therefore returned with all speed to Āgra. Bahādūr returned to Chāmpāner, expelled Humāyūn's governor from the fortress, and on May 25, 1536, took up his residence in the city.

Bahādūr, while a fugitive in Diū, had appealed for help to Nunho da Cunha, governor of Portuguese India, and in return for a promise of aid had ceded to him the port of Bassein, and granted him permission to build a fort at Diū. He soon repented of his bargain, and sought to expel the Portuguese from Diū. Da Cunha sailed to Diū, but refused to land, mistrusting Bahādūr. Bahādūr lost patience, and, against the advice of all his counsellors, on February 13, 1537, visited da Cunha on board his ship, to inspect the presents said to have been brought. The Portuguese showed some intention of detaining him, whereupon he is said to have lost his temper, and to have cut down a priest. He entered his barge, but the Portuguese boats closed round it, and swords were drawn. Bahādūr leaped into the water and was drowned, as were all his attendants except one, who was saved by a friendly Portuguese.

With the exception of Mahmūd Begarha, Bahādūr was the greatest of the kings of Gujarāt. He disgraced himself by his desertion of his army at Mandasor, but against this error must be set many successes. He annexed the kingdom of Mālhwā, and he was one of the three Muslim sovereigns in India who captured the great Rājput stronghold of Chitor. He left no son, and the

nobles of Gujarāt decided to invite Muhammad Shāh of Khāndesh to ascend the throne. He himself, his father, his grandfather, and two more remote ancestors had married princesses of Gujarāt, and, though descent in the female line seldom counts for much in questions of succession in Muslim states, Muhammad had been for years the loyal vassal and brother-in-arms of Bahādur, whose recognition of his title of shah was understood to signify adoption as heir. He obeyed the summons, and set out from Burhānpur, but on May 24 died before he could reach Ahmadābād.

Latīf Khān, Bahādur's brother, had left one son, a boy of eleven, who was then brought from the fortress in Khāndesh where he had been interned, and enthroned as Mahmūd III. For the first nine of the seventeen years of his reign he was no more than a puppet in the hands of one ambitious minister after another. Ikhtiyār Khān, who had raised him to the throne, was assassinated, but a recital of the feuds, intrigues, and crimes which continued until 1546 would be tedious and unprofitable.

The Ottoman sultan, Sulaimān I, who had made himself master of Egypt in 1517, had learned with indignation of the death of Bahādur and the subsequent growth of the power of the Portuguese in the eastern seas, from which he resolved to expel them; but it was not until 1538 that he took the first step to this end by sending from Suez a large fleet under Sulaimān Pasha to aid the sultan of Gujarāt in wresting Diū from the Christians. The pasha announced that he was setting forth on a holy war against the misbelievers, but the treachery and cruelty with which he treated his fellow-Muslims at Aden rendered him an object of suspicion to Khvāja Safar, appointed by Mahmūd III to the command of his land-forces. Diū was attacked and the Portuguese were reduced to great straits, but the co-operation between the land- and sea-forces was incomplete, and Khvāja Safar, perceiving that the expulsion of the Portuguese would place Diū in the hands of Sulaimān Pasha, a less desirable tenant, falsely assured the pasha that a large fleet was on its way from Goa to the relief of the beleaguered garrison. The Turks therefore sailed away, but left behind several officers who entered the service of Gujarāt. The land-forces, having set fire to the town of Diū, then retired.

In 1546 Mahmūd III, freed at length from the domination of selfish ministers, made another determined attempt to recover



Diū. The Portuguese were again reduced to great straits, but at length a fleet of nearly one hundred sail under João de Castro, governor of Portuguese India, enabled the garrison to take the offensive, and with the loss of no more than one hundred men they captured nearly all the besiegers' artillery and utterly defeated them. In the field 1500 were killed, 2000 wounded, and many taken. On receiving the news of this disaster Mahmūd wept with rage and mortification, and caused twenty-eight Portuguese prisoners to be torn to pieces in his presence. In the following year the Portuguese burned the fort and city of Broach, and massacred the inhabitants, and also plundered and destroyed other ports on the coasts of Kāthiāwār and the Konkan, and in 1548 Mahmūd was obliged to conclude a treaty most advantageous to them.

In 1549 he retired to Mahmūdābād, where he lived in splendour and luxury for the rest of his reign. There he was joined by Kādir Khān, driven from Mālwā by Shujā'at Khān, the governor appointed by Shīr Shāh. His death was due to an act of clemency. He had sentenced one of his attendants, Burhān-ud-dīn, to death by being immured, but, before the man died, relented and had him released. His victim remembered only his sufferings, and on February 15, 1554, slew the king as he lay on his bed, stupefied with drink and drugs. The leading nobles were then summoned to the palace in the king's name, ten of them were assassinated, and Burhān was proclaimed king, but the surviving nobles led their troops against him and he was slain.

Mahmūd III had had a morbid dread of the possibility of a son being set up as his rival, and took the barbarous measure of procuring an abortion whenever a woman in his harem became pregnant. It was therefore no easy matter to find an heir, but the nobles, headed by I'timād Khān, raised to the throne, under the title of Ahmad II, a scion of the royal house named Razī-ul-mulk, a great-grandson of Shakar Khān, who was a younger son of Ahmad I. The great nobles of the state became virtually independent, and the young king remained a prisoner in the hands of I'timād Khān, who was regent. He made one unsuccessful attempt to escape, and, after being recaptured, consoled himself by foolishly boasting to the officers who had access to him his determination to destroy I'timād Khān. The regent knew that he was incapable of any desperate deed, but, fearing

lest he might find a capable confederate, caused him to be assassinated in 1562.

I'timād solved the question of the succession by producing a child named Nathū, who, he solemnly swore, was the son of Mahmūd. He said that Mahmūd had handed over to him a pregnant concubine, with orders that an abortion was to be procured, but that he, finding that the girl was in the sixth month of her pregnancy, had not the heart to subject her to an almost certainly fatal operation, and having left matters to take their course, had secretly brought up her son. The story was improbable enough, but any heir was better than none, and the child was proclaimed as Muzaffar III. The story of his ten years' reign is a record of perpetual strife between the independent nobles of the kingdom, while I'timād Khān retained the regency.

In 1568 I'timād Khān, having been ousted from the regency by another noble, Chingīz Khān, invited Akbar, who was then before Chitor, to invade Gujarāt. Chingīz Khān bestowed extensive fiefs on the Mīrzās, Akbar's rebellious kinsmen, and maintained his position as regent until he was murdered by another noble, Jhujhār Khān, who invited I'timād Khān to return. But the king had fallen into the hands of another noble, Shīr Khān Fūlādī, to whom I'timād Khān wrote, impudently repudiating his own solemn oath, and adding that as Muzaffar was not the son of Mahmūd III he had deposed him, and had invited the Mīrzās from Broach, in order that one of them might ascend the throne.

Shīr Khān was besieging Ahmadābād when Akbar's army reached Pātan, and fled carrying with him Muzaffar III. The Mīrzās fled to Baroda and Broach, and the nobles in Ahmadābād submitted to Akbar and entered his service.

In 1572 Muzaffar III escaped from Shīr Khān, who had not treated him well, and, being found by some imperial officers, was brought to Akbar. Akbar detained him as a political prisoner and annexed Gujarāt to the empire.

Muzaffar was later permitted to live in retirement in Kāthiāwār, and when, in 1583, a rebellion appeared to offer him a chance of recovering his throne, he joined the rebels. After ten years of hopeless adventure, during most of which time he was a fugitive, he fell into the hands of the imperial troops, and committed suicide by cutting his throat.

Bābur, who defeated and slew Ibrāhīm Lodī in the spring of 1526, and reigned in Delhi and Āgra until 1530, had no leisure to attempt the conquest of Mālwā. Humāyūn's rapid expedition through Mālwā to Gujarāt can hardly be described as a conquest of either country. But Shīr Shāh the Afghan, who in 1539 drove Humāyūn from his throne and from India, conquered the province and appointed Shujā'at Khān to its government. When Humāyūn recovered his throne in 1555, Shujā'at Khān refrained from acknowledging him, but died within a year. It was not until 1561 that Akbar's troops wrested Mālwā from Shujā'at Khān's son Bayāzid, known as Bāz Bahādur, and it became a province of the Mughal Empire.

## CHAPTER VIII

### Bābur, Humāyūn and the Afghans

After Timūr's death in 1404 his son Shāhrukh retained much of his father's power and dignity until 1447, but on his death the numerous scions of his great house, beset by many enemies, contended for the fragments of his empire. Timūr's great-grandson ruled Khurāsān and Transoxiana until his death in 1467, and 'Umar Shaikh, the fifth of his nine sons, received as his appanage the small principality of Farghāna, in the mountains of Turkistān, east of Samarkand, and, dying there in 1494, left as his successor his eldest son, Bābur, a boy of twelve. With the young prince's twelve years of strife, with little success and much misery, we are not here concerned. At last, driven from his home by the Uzbeks, he retired in 1504 to Kābul, and there made for himself a small kingdom, and, after one more fruitless attempt to recover his great ancestor's capital, turned his eyes towards India.

We know Bābur more intimately than we know any other eastern ruler, for he has left us in his diary a charmingly frank and human record of the life of a soldier, a poet, a man of letters, a leader of men, an acute observer, and a lover of good cheer.

In 1519 he conquered Bajaur and led a raid into India, but it was not until he had been twenty years on the throne of Kābul that he made a serious attempt at conquest. He was well aware of the disaffection at the court of Ibrāhīm Lodī. The latter's insistence on vexatious etiquette, humiliating to the chiefs and tribesmen of his court, and his degradation of those who resented it in favour of men not of Afghan blood, bred discontent, and his severity to the malcontents bred rebellion. Oudh, Jaunpur, and Bihar were severed from his kingdom under Daryā Khān of the Lohānī tribe of Afghans. Daulat Khān Lodī, governor of the Panjab, was independent, and 'Ālam Khān fled to Kābul and sought Bābur's help against his nephew, Ibrāhīm. His appeal was Bābur's opportunity. No longer content with raiding India, he resolved to conquer it. His counsellors, like those of Timūr, opposed the enterprise. They had no objection to enriching themselves by forays, but they had no desire to exchange the cool

and pleasant air of Kābul for the burning plains of India. Bābur paid no heed to them, but rated them for their meanness of spirit and set forth.

He found the city of Lahore occupied by Ibrāhīm's troops, who had expelled the rebel, Daulat Khān, but Bābur fell upon them, drove them from the city, and plundered and burned its shops. From Lahore he marched on Dīpālpur, carried the fortified city by assault, sacked it, and put many of its inhabitants to the sword. There, for the time being, he established Ibrāhīm's uncle as Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn, and, having placed both the province and its nominal sovereign under the charge of trusty officers of his own, retired to Kābul to assemble his army for the conquest of India. His eldest son, Humāyūn, brought a force from his province of Badakhshān, and Khvāja Kalān another from Ghaznī, but the army which Bābur led into India in November, 1525, numbered no more than 12,000, of whom it has been estimated that 10,000 were fighting men. He had received two invitations to invade India, one from Daulat Khān, and one from the rāna, Sangrama Singh, who wished to engage the rival Muslim powers in a struggle so exhausting as to enable him to restore Hindu supremacy. He had promised Bābur his support, but stood aloof and watched events. Daulat Khān, disappointed by Bābur's establishment of the puppet, 'Alā-ud-dīn, and convinced that he intended to seize the throne for himself, not only withheld his support, but assembled an army of 40,000 horse and took the field against him, girding himself with two swords as a symbol of his resolve to conquer or die. But India had broken the Afghan spirit; Daulat Khān's great force dissolved and fled before the attack of Bābur's hardy warriors; and the old man himself was captured, and shortly afterwards died.

Bābur did not diverge towards Dīpālpur, but marched directly on Delhi, and at Pānīpat, that "historic site" where the fate of India has been thrice decided, came into contact with Ibrāhīm's great army of 100,000 horse and 100 elephants. Of his gun-carriages and baggage-waggon, of which he had collected a great number, Bābur formed a laager, lashing them together with thongs of bull's hide, but leaving gaps through which squadrons of horse could charge. His artillery and his matchlock-men were in the centre of the laager, and behind it his army was drawn up: centre, right and left wings, and reserve. His right was



covered by the town of Pānīpat, and his left by broken ground, trenches, and *abattis*. On the night of April 20 he attempted an attack on Ibrāhīm's camp, but the operation had no other effect than to encourage Ibrāhīm, who, at dawn on April 26, 1526, drew up his army in battle array, and advanced to the attack. The great host was checked by Bābur's defences, and was thrown into confusion by the pressure of the troops in the rear continuing their advance. It suffered terribly from the well-directed artillery fire of the invaders; its languid charges were ineffectual; and its confusion was completed by the manœuvre of the *tulughma*, the attack by bodies of mounted archers who, circling round its flanks, attacked it in rear, first with showers of arrows, and then by vigorous charges, pressed well home. By noon all was over. Ibrāhīm and fifteen thousand of his army lay dead on the field, and the rest were in headlong flight. Ibrāhīm's head was laid before Bābur, and an endless line of prisoners and elephants, and great quantities of booty were brought in. "The sun", says Bābur, "had mounted spear-high when the onset began, and the battle lasted until midday, when the enemy were completely broken and routed, and my men were victorious and triumphant. By the grace and mercy of Almighty God this difficult affair was made easy to me, that mighty army being, in the space of half a day, laid in the dust." Small forces were at once sent forward to occupy Delhi and Āgra, and on Friday, April 27, 1526, the *khūtba* was recited, in the principal mosque of Delhi, in the name of Zahīr-ud-dīn Muhammad Bābur, the first of the "Great Moguls".

That Bābur and his descendants should be known as Mughals, or Mongols, is an irony. They were Barlas Turks. Tīmūr, in his early days, had fierce struggles with the Mughuls before he overcame them, but they eventually succeeded in expelling Bābur from the home of his fathers. "Mughul" had, in fact, become a generic term for warlike adventurers from Persia or Central Asia, and although Tīmūr and all his line loathed the name, as that of their bitterest foes, it has been their fate to be branded with it, and it now seems to be too late to correct the error. The Arabic form of the name is *Mughul* or *Mughūl*, but in India it has assumed, by a change of the second vowel, the form "Mughal". The Portuguese used the form "Mogor", but the dynasty founded by Bābur has long been known in the West as that of the Great Moguls.

Bābur distributed the great spoils of Delhi and Āgra with a bounteous hand, his eldest son receiving the lion's share, but none, even of the traders and camp-followers of the army, was disappointed and to every man and woman in Kābul a silver coin was sent as a token of their sovereign's victory. Humāyūn's greatest prize was the diamond now known as the Kūh-i-nūr, or "Mountain of Light". This he received as a gift from the family of Rāna Vikramāditya, whom he had protected from the spoiler, and offered to his father, who generously returned it to him.

The defeat of Ibrāhīm's army was but the beginning of Bābur's task. He was master of Delhi and Āgra, but of little more. The populace was hostile, the fortresses of the doāb and Mewār were closed against him, a scion of the Lodīs had taken refuge with the rāna, who was preparing to attack the invaders, and the Afghans held Oudh, Bihār, and the country to the south and east of Āgra in force. The summer heat was unusually fierce, the roads were impassable, and almost every village was a hostile camp, so that the conquerors, laden with treasure, were famishing. Nor were these the only difficulties with which Bābur had to contend. Discontent was rife in the army; both officers and men were murmuring. Was it for this that they had left the cool and pleasant air of Kābul? Of what use was treasure which would buy nothing? Why might they not return and enjoy the plunder which their toil had won? But their leader was to be balked neither by the hostility of the people nor by mutiny in his own army. Calling his officers before him, he reminded them of all that they, and he no less, had suffered and accomplished. "A mighty enemy has been overcome, and a rich and powerful kingdom is at our feet. And now, having attained our goal and won our game, are we to forsake all that we have gained and flee to Kābul like beaten men? Let no man who calls himself my friend ever again mention such a thing; but if any one of you fears to stay, let him go." The malcontents were silenced. "There are few acts more splendidly heroic in Bābur's career than this bold resolve to stay where he was—in the middle of India, among hostile nations and a discontented soldiery—and the reward of his firmness soon appeared." Not only was his army pacified, but many of his enemies, convinced of his determination to remain, and conciliated by his clemency and generosity, were won over.



More than one Afghan leader joined him with his troops. His eldest son, more active than at any other period of his life, served him well. Sambhal was taken, and Humāyūn attacked a large army of Afghans which had invaded the doāb from the east, dispersed it, and pursued it. He captured Jaunpur and Ghāzipur, and returned by way of Kālpi to Āgra, in response to a summons from his father, who urgently needed his help.

The rāna, Sangrama Singh, disappointed by Bābur's complete success and the failure of his own scheme, attempted nevertheless to realise his dream of a Hindu empire. Summoning to his standard all the chiefs who acknowledged his right to lead, he took the field. The old hero, bearing the scars of eighty wounds, and wanting an eye and an arm, was able to allay for the moment the feuds of the Rājputs and to place in the field 80,000 horse and 500 elephants, led to his standard by the chiefs of Mārwar, Amber, Gwalior, Ajmir, Chanderī, Kotah and many another. He marched on Bayāna, and Bābur, sending forward a small force to harass, so far as it could, the Hindu host, assembled his army in Āgra, and on February 11, 1527, set forth, for the first time in his life of warfare, on a *jihād*, or holy war against the misbelievers. He encamped at Sīkrī and, having been joined by the garrison of Bayāna, moved forward towards Khānua, and, as at Pānīpat, covered his front with his gun-carriages and baggage-waggons, but here also with trenches. For twenty-five days his position was thus strengthened, and Bābur set himself to inspire his troops, demoralised by reports of the valour and numbers of the Rājputs, with a courage equal to his own. Brushing aside the warnings of his foolish astrologer, he addressed his officers, adjuring them by their faith to quit themselves like men against the misbelievers, and reminding them that every one who should fall would attain the blessings of martyrdom. He then declared his repentance of the sin of drinking wine, to which he had been addicted all his life, and renounced it, breaking all his drinking vessels, and pouring out his stores of strong drink on the ground. All, inflamed with zeal, solemnly swore on the Koran to conquer or to die. The army then moved forward, and, re-forming the laager, on March 16 met the Hindu host at Khānua. His artillery and matchlock-men did fearful execution, but failed to check repeated charges of the gallant Rājputs, and after several hours of close fighting he repeated the manœuvre of the *tulughma*, sending

his mounted archers round the enemy's flanks to attack in rear. At the same time his matchlock-men advanced firing, and his bodyguard charged the enemy in front. The *tulughma* threw the Rājputs into confusion, and "nothing but their indomitable gallantry prolonged a battle which was fast becoming a massacre". The fire of the artillery mowed them down, and at length they broke, forced their way through the Muslims surrounding them, and fled leaving thousands, including several chiefs, dead on the field. Sangrama, once more severely wounded, escaped, but died soon afterwards, and Bābur commemorated his victory by raising a tower of the heads of the slain. But he had not yet finished with the Rājputs. His next expedition was to Chanderī, the stronghold of the powerful chieftain Mednī Rāi, who dominated the Muslim kingdom of Mālwa. The fortress was taken by storm, and its garrison performed the rite of *jauhar*, first slaughtering their wives and daughters, and then rushing forth on the enemy and fighting until they fell. The power of the Rājputs was crushed, but the Afghans of Bihar, who had assumed the offensive while Bābur was engaged with the Rājputs, yet remained, and in February, 1528, he marched against them. They had invaded the doāb, and were encamped at Kanauj, but retired across the Ganges. Bābur crossed the river by a temporary bridge, the construction of which excited their ridicule, but his artillery and matchlock-men covered both the construction of the bridge and the passage of the river, and after a well-contested battle the Afghans retired towards Ayodhyā. But Bābur, pursuing them, inflicted heavy losses, captured their families and baggage, and dispersed their army. He then retired for a brief season of repose to Āgra. Having spent the rainy season in the delightful gardens which he had laid out in the suburbs of that city, he marched to Dholpur, where he was assembling his forces for the purpose of subduing the province of Sind, when he learned, in January, 1529, that the Afghans of Bihar, having recovered from the effects of their disastrous campaign in Oudh, had temporarily composed their feuds, and had assembled, to the number of 100,000, under the leadership of Mahmūd Lodī, the brother of Ibrāhīm, whose authority was acknowledged throughout Bihar and eastern Oudh, and who was besieging a Mughal garrison in the fortress of Chunār. Bābur at once returned to Āgra and marched on Chunār. On his approach

Mahmūd raised the siege and retired, while the great Afghan army dissolved. Bābur marched on to Buxar, and many of the Afghan leaders joined him with their contingents and made their submission, while Mahmūd fled and took refuge with Nusrat Shāh of Bengal, who warmly supported him, less from love of the Lodī dynasty than from fear lest Bābur, having secured Bihar, should invade Bengal as well. The Bengal army assembled on its western frontier, just above the confluence of the Gogra and the Ganges. Bābur could not suffer this great force to remain, menacing his eastern frontier, and, crossing the Ganges, advanced to the Gogra, reinforced by his son 'Askarī, who joined him from Jaunpur with 20,000 horse. Bābur's artillery and matchlock-men maintained a heavy fire on the front and the left flank of the enemy army and on the flotilla which accompanied it, while 'Askarī crossed the Gogra unmolested, above its right flank, and wheeled round to attack it in rear. The greater part of the army of Bengal turned to face him, but a considerable force remained to oppose Bābur's passage of the river. Under cover of the guns and matchlocks he crossed, in spite of the resistance which he met, and the enemy, attacked at once in front and rear and on the flanks, broke and fled, and the Afghan rebellion was crushed. A treaty of peace was concluded with Nusrat Shāh of Bengal, and thus "in three battles Bābur had reduced northern India to submission".

He returned to Āgra, and the brief remainder of his reign was spent in organising the administration of the provinces which formed his new kingdom. His system was purely feudal, and the greater part of his territory was parcelled out into fiefs among his officers, who were responsible, each within the limits of his fief, for the collection of the revenue and for all branches of the civil administration. Much of his territory remained in the hands of native landholders, Hindu as well as Muslim, whose obedience depended on his ability and readiness to punish contumacy. From the provinces "west to east from Bhēra and Lahore to Bahraich and Bihar, and north and south from Sialkot to Ranthambhor" Bābur received the equivalent of £2,600,000 as land rent. He has left us an interesting description of his kingdom of Hindūstān, which he loved little better than those mutinous officers who, after the victory of Pānīpat, had clamoured to be led back to Kābul. He found it uninteresting and monotonous,

with few pleasures to recommend it. Its people were ugly and unsociable, without genius, intellect, politeness, ingenuity, or artistic sense. They had "no good horses, no good flesh-meat, no grapes or melons, no good fruits, no ice or cold water, no good food or bread, no baths or colleges". His strictures are harsh, but his standard was high.

Of his end a touching story is told. His favourite son Humāyūn lay sick unto death, as it was feared, and Bābur, performing a well-known ceremony, walked round his couch, and prayed that his son's malady might be transferred to him. From that moment, it is said, Humāyūn began to recover, while his father sickened, and, on December 26, 1530, breathed his last. We need not believe that he did, in fact, give his life for his son, but that was his desire. He was no more than forty-eight at the time of his death, but he was "a king of thirty-six years, crowded with hardship, tumult, and strenuous energy", and the sufferings of his boyhood and early manhood would have destroyed any constitution less robust than his. His method of alleviating them, by merry drinking bouts and the use of opium, failed, perhaps, to improve his power of resistance to disease. He had probably suffered intermittently from malaria for the greater part of his life, and from this complaint India grants no relief, and his overstrained constitution suddenly broke down. His body, in accordance with his will, was carried to Kābul, and "there lies at peace in his grave in the garden on the hill, surrounded by those he loved, by the sweet-smelling flowers of his choice, and the cool running stream; and the people still flock to the tomb and offer prayers at the simple mosque which an august descendant built in memory of the founder of the Indian Empire".

Humāyūn, at the time of his accession to his father's throne, was no more than twenty-three years of age, but had already had much experience. He had governed the province of Badakhshān, and had been second in command, under his father, in the Indian campaigns. He was courteous, brave, accomplished, and capable, on occasion, of displaying great energy, but not of sustained effort, or of such severity as was necessary to make his throne secure. He was too ready to indulge in opium and enjoy prolonged intervals of relaxation, and he almost invariably chose the wrong time for such indulgence, and was thus incapable of dealing with the numerous hostile forces by which he was sur-

rounded. The Afghans of Bihar, led at first by Mahmūd Lodī, but later by a more formidable enemy, Shīr Khān, whose genius and ambition he failed, until too late, to reckon at their true value; the neighbouring kingdoms of Gujarāt and Bengal; and disaffected landowners within his own dominions were not his only enemies. Of his three brothers Kāmran, the eldest, held the government of Kābul and annexed the Panjab, offering vain professions of allegiance, while he thus cut off the ruler of India from the natural recruiting grounds for his army, and obliged him to rely for his defences on the ever diminishing remnants of the forces which his father had led. The other two, 'Askarī and Hindāl, were weak and vain, without the ability to be personally formidable, but dangerous tools in the hands of ambitious and disaffected officers. Two cousins, Muhammad Zamān and Muhammad Sultān, known as the Mīrzās, put forth claims to the throne. Humāyūn should have crushed them all as dangerous rivals, but he amiably and foolishly tolerated them. Bahādur Shāh of Gujarāt, without the serious designs on Delhi and Āgra with which some historians have credited him, was nevertheless a menace, for he had recently extended his power by the annexation of the neighbouring kingdom of Mālhwā, which marched with Humāyūn's dominions, and by more than one victory over the Rājputs, and shortly afterwards gave grave offence to Humāyūn by harbouring the Mīrzās and returning a most insolent reply to a demand for their surrender. With all these foes Humāyūn should have dealt in order, crushing each one before he turned to the next; but this he failed to do. He suppressed a rising under Mahmūd Lodī in Bihar, but before crushing the Afghan revolt withdrew in order to deal with Bahādur of Gujarāt, and wasted a year in successful but futile campaigns against him. Believing that he had established his authority over that kingdom, he left his treacherous brother as governor of Gujarāt, and retired into Mālhwā, where he celebrated his success with carousals and feasts, while 'Askarī assumed the airs of royalty and caroused at Ahmadābād. Humāyūn was suddenly aroused from his slothful ease by the news that Shīr Khān, having established himself in Bihar, was engaged in bringing Bengal under his sway, and that Muhammad Lodī had been proclaimed king at Kanauj. The retreat was sounded; 'Askarī was recalled from Ahmadābād; and Humāyūn returned

to Āgra, followed by his brother, and leaving both Gujarāt and Mālwa to Bahādur.

The grave perils which had suddenly recalled him from the kingdom which he had conquered should have aroused him from his lethargy, but he lingered at Āgra, indulging in dreams begotten of opium, broken by an occasional carousal, and unable to determine whether he should first attempt to recover Mālwa at least, if not Gujarāt, or deal with the peril which menaced his eastern frontier. A year passed before he reached the right decision, and in July, 1537, he led his whole army towards Bihar. His first task was to reduce the strong fortress of Chunār, held for Shīr Khān, who was engaged in the conquest of Bengal. Chunār was taken, and those of the garrison who fell into his hands were most barbarously treated, the hands of the gunners being lopped off. Shīr Khān's troops had meanwhile captured Gaur, the capital of Bengal, but, on learning of the fall of Chunār, he carried his family, his treasure, his artillery and his plunder into the fortress of Rohtās, which he made his stronghold, and sent his son, Jalāl Khān, to hold the defile of Teliyāgarhi, "the Gate of Bengal". Humāyūn, moved by one of his occasional spasms of energy, pressed on from Chunār, and Jalāl Khān, having defeated his advanced guard, and held the defile for so long as was necessary, retired as the main body of the imperial army came up. Humāyūn advanced and, early in 1538, occupied Gaur. The conquest of a second kingdom was then celebrated, and Humāyūn spent six months in merriment and idleness while his troops and their horses were succumbing to a pestilence bred of the noxious air of Gaur, and Shīr Khān was preparing to cut off his retreat. The capture of Monghyr, and the assumption of the royal title by Shīr Khān, whose troops were besieging Chunār and Jaunpur, and whose authority was acknowledged in the country between these fortresses, aroused him too late, and, with an army no longer fit to take the field, he began his retreat towards Āgra. His movements were slow, and he was not at first harassed by Shīr Khān; but the rebellion of his brother, Hindāl, roused him and the retreat was accelerated until, at Chausa on the Ganges, he found himself confronted by the army of Shīr Khān. The two forces encamped on the opposite banks of an affluent of the Ganges for two months, neither daring to attack the other, and Humāyūn's situation became so desperate that he opened negotia-

tions. The terms to which Shīr Khān agreed were that he should retain Bengal and most of Bihar, and should bear the royal title, while acknowledging Humāyūn as his overlord. The conclusion of the treaty lulled Humāyūn's army into security until, as they were preparing before dawn to move their camp, the Afghans suddenly fell upon them. They were taken completely by surprise, and nearly the whole force was destroyed, but Humāyūn with difficulty made his escape, and in May, 1539, arrived at Āgra with a few followers.

For a year both he and Shīr Shāh were engaged in assembling and preparing their forces for the decisive contest. Shīr Shāh, in Bengal and Bihar, was, as ever, indefatigable, but Humāyūn's efforts were interrupted by fits of lethargy and by vain endeavours to gain the whole-hearted support of his worthless brothers. Hindāl was pardoned, and retained the government of Āgra, but Kāmran stood aloof, hoping that Humāyūn and Shīr Shāh would exhaust themselves and allow the imperial crown to fall into his grasp. He little knew Shīr Shāh. The rivals at length took the field. Humāyūn had succeeded in collecting 100,000 horse, but they were of poor quality, ill-officered, and hampered by an unwarlike host of camp-followers, whose tendency to panic was a grave danger to such a force. Shīr Shāh advanced westward, and encamped at a short distance from the Ganges, opposite Kanauj. Humāyūn foolishly ventured to cross the river, and on May 17, 1540, the two armies met. Humāyūn's tactics little resembled Bābur's. The artillery was hardly employed at all, and the vigorous charges of the Afghans overwhelmed his wretched troops. First his left wing, then his right wing, and lastly his centre gave way, and the disorderly host attempted to flee across the Ganges. Their weight broke the flimsy bridge, and large numbers were drowned. Humāyūn again escaped with difficulty, and fled, with but a remnant of his army, to Āgra. There he could not maintain himself, and, as Shīr Shāh approached, retired on Delhi, but the pursuit was continued, and he was driven first from Delhi and then from Lahore. Kāmran offered no help, and the unfortunate Humāyūn retired into Sind, where he lived for some time the life of a fugitive, and where, on November 23, 1542, his son Akbar was born at the small town of 'Umarkot. Humāyūn next attempted to occupy Kandahār, then held by his brother 'Askarī for Kāmran. 'Askarī refused either to admit or



to assist the fugitive, but his wife received and kindly treated the infant boy, and Humāyūn, continuing his flight, took refuge at the court of Shāh Tahmāsp I of Persia, with whose aid he, in September, 1547, captured Kandahār and received the surrender of 'Askarī, whom he pardoned. Two months later he drove Kāmran from Kābul and occupied that city, where his position was much the same as that of his father when he first turned his eyes towards India.

In the reign of Bahlūl Lodī many Afghans had left their country and entered his service; among them was Ibrāhīm Khān, of the Sūr tribe, who received fiefs in the neighbourhood of Nāgaur. His son, Hasan Khān, placed himself under the patronage of one of his own nation who governed Jaunpur, and himself received Sasarām and other small districts in fee. He neglected his two eldest sons, Farīd and Nizām, in favour of younger sons by a concubine with whom he was infatuated, and Farīd escaped as a boy to Jaunpur, and there, with a zeal for learning rare among Afghans, applied himself to study. His father afterwards placed him in charge of some of his fiefs, and Farīd applying to his task the knowledge which he had acquired, was so successful in the management of the estates, and in suppressing brigandage and maintaining order, as to win the confidence of all; but he again quarrelled with his father, and, fleeing to Āgra, placed himself under the protection of an Afghan noble who obtained for him, on his father's death, a grant of the family fiefs. He returned to Bihar and entered the service of the Lohānī Afghan who assumed independence in that province, and, having slain a tiger in his presence in the hunting field, received from him the title of Shīr Khān. Afterwards, falling into disfavour owing to the intrigues of the Lohānī Afghans, he again visited Āgra, and entered the service of Bābur, but an indiscreet remark on the defects of his system of administration aroused the conqueror's suspicion, and Shīr Khān fled once more to Bihar, regained the favour of his former master and was left by him the guardian of his minor son, Jalāl Shāh. The Lohānīs, impatient of submission to one not of their own tribe, persuaded Mahmūd Shāh of Bengal to attack him, and Jalāl to take refuge in Mahmūd's camp. Shīr Khān defeated Mahmūd's army, and, since Jalāl could not return to Bihar, became the ruler of the province, and acquired the fortress of Chunār by marrying the widow of its



governor. He aided Humāyūn in suppressing the Lodī pretender, but during the expedition into Mālwa and Gujarāt utilised the period of Humāyūn's absence from his capital, and of his lethargy after his return, to extend and consolidate his own power.

After these vicissitudes of fortune Shīr Shāh found himself ruler of an empire far greater than Bābur's, for he had already subdued Bengal, and shortly after driving Humāyūn from India, added to his dominions the kingdom of Mālwa, by expelling thence the governor appointed by Bahādur of Gujarāt, and appointed to the government of the great province a valiant and capable Afghan on whom he had conferred the title of Shujā'at Khān.

The governor whom he had left in Bengal, having married the daughter of its deposed king, showed symptoms of pretending to independence, but Shīr Shāh fell upon him before his plans were ripe, imprisoned him, and reformed the administration of the province by parcelling it out into fiefs, and appointing to their supervision a controller of the revenues, retaining all executive power in his own hands.

Shīr Shāh has received scant justice at the hands of some historians of India, who have relied largely on the records left by the court annalists of the Mughal Empire, to whom he was no more than Shīr Khān, the Afghan rebel. He was, in truth, one of the greatest rulers who ever sat upon the throne of Delhi. No other, from Aibak to Aurangzīb, possessed such intimate knowledge of the details of administration, or was able to examine and control public business so minutely and effectively as he. He restrained the turbulence and quelled the tribal jealousies of the Afghan chiefs, he reformed the land-revenue administration, he introduced a system of great trunk-roads, furnished with caravanserais, wells and every convenience for the comfort and safety of the traveller, and he maintained throughout his dominions such order that "none dared to turn the eye of dishonesty upon another's goods. An old woman with a pot of gold might securely lay herself down to rest beside her burden, even in the desert, and a cripple was not afraid of a Rustam". Himself a pious Muslim, he suffered none to be persecuted in the name of religion, and, far wiser than Akbar, made no attempt to assume spiritual power, but left each to seek God after his own fashion. Budaunī, the orthodox Muslim historian, thanks God that he

was born in the reign of so just a king. Of his wise and judicious measures of administration many were adopted or imitated by Akbar without acknowledgement, and he was far more successful than any who followed him in checking corruption, speculation, and frauds on the public treasury. "It behoves the great", he said, "to be always active", and throughout his life he allowed himself no more rest than was necessary for his health and the preservation of his bodily and mental powers. "All this", says Mr Keene, "has an importance beyond the immediate time. After the Mughal restoration, Shīr Shāh's officials passed into Akbar's service; the faults imputed by the shah to what he called Mughal administration—but which are common to all Turks—were prevented; and this far-sighted man, even after his death and the subversion of his dynasty, remained the originator of all that was done by mediaeval Indian rulers for the good of the people."

Shīr Shāh, like Bābur, found it necessary to curb the pride of the Rājputs, of whom the most powerful was now the Rāthor ruler of Mārwar. Shīr Shāh advanced against him with great caution and overcame the difficulty of entrenching his camp in the desert by filling empty meal-sacks with sand, a device said to have been suggested to him by his small grandson, who may thus be regarded as the inventor of sandbags. The decisive battle was fiercely contested, and though the Rājputs were finally defeated with great slaughter, Shīr Shāh was sensible of the risk which he had run, and, observing the barrenness of the land, remarked, "I had wellnigh lost the empire of India for a handful of millet".

The Rājputs of Mednī Rāi, led by his son Silahdī, had recovered from the crushing defeat inflicted on them by Bābur, and held Rāisen, where they gave great offence to all Muslims by keeping, as dancing girls and concubines, Muslim women whose husbands and fathers they had slain. Shīr Shāh attacked the Rājputs, and induced them to surrender by promising them their lives, but, instigated by their victims, and by the jurists of Islam, fell upon them and put them to death. This breach of faith, the one blot on his character, was excusable in the eyes of orthodox Muslims, owing to the heinousness of the offence of the misbelievers. From Rāisen he marched to Kālinjar, held by a Rājput chief, and opened the siege of the fortress. On May 22, 1545, while standing

by a store of powder which was accidentally ignited, he was so severely burned that he lived only until the evening, but before breathing his last was cheered by the news that the fortress had fallen. His death was the ruin of his house, for he left none fit to succeed him.

The Afghan nobles raised to the throne his second son, who assumed the title of Islām Shāh; but his brief fratricidal contest with his elder brother revived the embers of strife among the factious Afghans, and Islām Shāh not only failed to extinguish them, but, by his foolish conduct, allowed them to burst into flame. The Niyāzīs, a powerful tribe, rose in rebellion against him; his behaviour alienated the powerful Shujā'at Khān of Mālhwā and the feudatories of Bengal; and throughout his seven years' reign he and the chieftains who, despite his injudicious treatment, remained loyal to him, were occupied in repressing rebellions. On his death, in 1552, his son, a boy of twelve, was murdered by his uncle, a nephew of Shīr Shāh, whose sister was married to Islām Shāh, and the murderer usurped the throne under the title of Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh. Islām Shāh had been repeatedly urged by his counsellors to secure his son's succession by removing 'Ādil, but the prince feigned imbecility, and his sister's intercession saved his life. But she had occasion bitterly to repent her regard for him. The new king, contemptuously nicknamed 'Adlī, was a worthless debauchee, and to the indignation of the Afghan nobles, gradually entrusted all power in the state to a Hindu adviser, Hīmū, a *baniya* of Rawārī, who, having been appointed inspector of the market of that town, gradually rose in the royal service, and, displaying considerable political acumen and military ability, became 'Adlī's right hand. Muhammad, a member of the Sūr tribe, proclaimed himself independent in Bengal; 'Adlī spent his time chiefly at Chunār and Gwalior; and two of his cousins, rising against him, assumed royal titles. Ibrāhīm Sūr seized Delhi and Āgra, and Sikandar Sūr, having failed to persuade his brother to divide the kingdom with him, established himself in the Panjab, and then drove him from Delhi and Āgra. Thus, at the close of 1554, there were four Afghan kings in northern India, Muhammad in Bengal, 'Adlī in Bihar, Sikandar in the Panjab and the doāb, and Ibrāhīm, temporarily worsted, but still in the field.

Humāyūn had long been forming vague designs for the re-

covery of his Indian throne, and this was an opportunity such as even he could hardly neglect. Leaving Kābul in November, 1554, at the head of 15,000 horse, he occupied Lahore without striking a blow, and lingered there while his troops, nominally under the command of the young Akbar, on June 22, 1555, gained a decisive victory over those of Sikandar Sūr at Sirhind. Sikandar fled eastward towards the Himālāya, and in July Humāyūn once more entered Delhi, and Akbar, under the guardianship of Bairam Khān Khānkhānān, was appointed to the government of the Panjab and sent in pursuit of Sikandar.

Humāyūn did not long enjoy the throne which he had recovered. On January 24, 1556, overcome by drowsiness as he was about to descend the steep stair from the roof of his palace in response to the call to prayer, he leaned upon his staff, which slipped, and, tripping on the skirt of his robe, he fell to the foot of the stairs, fractured the base of his skull, and died after three days, during which time it is doubtful whether he recovered consciousness.

"His end was of a piece with his character. If there was a possibility of falling, Humāyūn was not the man to miss it. He tumbled through life, and he tumbled out of it." In order to prevent disturbances his death was concealed, false news of his recovery was disseminated, and a man dressed in his robes personated him in public. But the news of his death was sent confidentially to the young prince and Bairam Khān, then engaged in operations against Sikandar, and on February 14, 1556, Jalāl-ud-dīn Muhammad Akbar was enthroned at Kalānaur, in the Gurdāspur district.

## CHAPTER IX

### Akbar

Akbar, at the time of his accession little more than thirteen years old, remained under the guidance of Bairam Khān until 1560, when, in his eighteenth year, he shook off the trammels of tutelage. He was a precocious and self-assertive lad, and neither his tutors nor his father ever persuaded him to learn to read or write; but his intellectual development suffered little from his ignorance of the ordinary apparatus of learning, for he employed readers, and listened always with attention to works on history, philosophy, ethics, and theology, and his memory was so retentive that he could repeat long passages of poetry after hearing them read, and forgot little of what he heard. He loved horses, elephants, and all animals, and was devoted to sport and to bodily exercise of every kind, none the less if it were spiced with danger, and as he grew to manhood he acquired great agility and physical strength.

He remained with the regent at Kalānaur while his troops hunted Sikandar into the mountains, and then moved to Jalandhar, where he remained for some months. Tardī Beg, who had proclaimed him at Delhi, and other officers held Āgra and the intervening territory, but meanwhile Hīmū, who had been too late to arrest Humāyūn's progress, had assembled a great army, with 1500 war elephants, to oppose Akbar's occupation of his capital. Advancing from Gwalior, he drove the Mughal officers from Āgra, and near Tughlukābād routed their forces, capturing elephants, horses, and much booty. They fled, with Tardī Beg, who had failed to support them, and joined Akbar's camp at Sirhind, where Bairam Khān caused Tardī Beg to be put to death for his disgraceful neglect of duty.

Hīmū, who now held Delhi and Āgra, was so intoxicated with his success that he assumed the style of royalty, and the title of Rāja Vikramāditya, conciliating the Afghans of his army by a liberal distribution of spoils, and concealing his usurpation from his master. Meanwhile Akbar had reached the neighbourhood of Pānīpat, and his advanced guard captured Hīmū's artillery;

but even after this loss Hīmū's superiority was so great that on November 5, 1556, he advanced with confidence to the attack. The young emperor was retained by Bairam Khān with the reserves, and Hīmū, having defeated the right and left wings of the army, was advancing, with every prospect of success, against the centre, commanded by the Uzbek, Khānzamān, when he was pierced in the eye by an arrow. His elephant fled, and his army broke and dispersed in every direction. The elephant was captured, and the unconscious Hīmū was brought before Akbar, who, at the suggestion of Bairam Khān, earned the title of *Ghāzī* by striking the unconscious misbeliever on the neck with his sword,<sup>1</sup> after which the officers with him dispatched the dying man. A tower was built of the heads of the slain, and the fleeing host was pursued with great slaughter. On the following day Akbar entered Delhi, Hīmū's family was captured, his vast treasure was taken, and his aged father was put to death. A month later Akbar and Bairam Khān returned from Delhi to Lahore in pursuit of Sikandar, who was driven into the fortress of Mānkot, in Jammū, where, in May, 1557, he surrendered, and was generously treated, receiving a fief in Bihar, where he died two years later. 'Adlī died at about the same time, and Akbar was left without a rival. From Lahore Akbar returned to Delhi, and in October moved to Āgra, which became his principal place of residence. He devoted his time to sport, while his officers, during the next two years, received the surrender of Gwalior, annexed Jaunpur, which had been in the hands of the Afghans, and extended his authority over the reconquered empire. As he grew towards manhood the regent's control irked him. Bairam Khān was haughty and arrogant, obnoxious to the orthodox as an adherent of the Shiah sect, the members of which he indiscreetly favoured, advancing one of them, Shaikh Gadā'ī, to the office of *sadr-us-sudūr*, the highest judicial and ecclesiastical position in the empire; his execution of Tardī Beg had offended many; Akbar himself was kept short of funds, while Bairam's servants grew rich; and the ladies of the imperial harem were impatient of an authority which baulked their ambition to make


<sup>1</sup> According to a later and more courtly version of the incident Akbar magnanimously refused to strike a wounded foe, but this story seems to be an invention, and there is little doubt that the boy fleshed his maiden sword on the dying Hindu.

the youthful sovereign their own instrument. Early in 1560 the court was at Āgra, but the ladies were at Delhi, and Akbar, while out hunting, was induced to ride to Delhi to visit his mother without advising the regent of his intention. The governor of Delhi prepared to hold the city, if necessary, against the regent, and Akbar, at the instance of the ladies, sent an order to Bairam Khān, informing him that he had decided to take the reins of government into his own hands, directing him to make the pilgrimage to Mecca, an honourable form of banishment, and assuring him that a suitable fief should be assigned to him for his maintenance.

Bairam Khān hesitated whether to rebel, as many of his partisans advised, or to submit, but finally bowed to his young master's orders, and set off towards Gujarāt. Akbar, probably at the instance of the ladies, subjected him to a further unmerited humiliation by deputing Pīr Muhammad Khān, a former servant of his, who had incurred his master's displeasure, to follow him and see that he left the imperial dominions without delay. The insult goaded him into rebellion, and he turned back into the Panjab. A force sent against him defeated him near Jalandhar, and he retired into the hills, but was almost immediately captured and brought before Akbar, who pardoned him and allowed him once more to set out for Mecca. He reached Pātan, or Anhilwār, in Gujarāt, but was there assassinated by an Afghan whose father had fallen in a battle fought by Bairam against Sikandar's forces. Bairam's infant son, 'Abdur Rahīm, was brought to court and educated under Akbar's care, and eventually received his father's title and became the first noble in the empire. The post of minister and the title of Khānkhānān were conferred on Mun'im Khān, the guardian of Akbar's younger brother, Muhammad Hakīm, who had been summoned from Kābul when Bairam was dismissed.

Akbar was not yet his own master. He had shaken off Bairam Khān, but was still loth to allow his duties to interfere with his pleasures, and the regent's administration was followed by the "monstrous regiment of women", the most influential and unscrupulous of the ladies of the harem being Māham Anaga, one of Akbar's foster-mothers.

During the reign of Islām Shāh, Shujā'at Khān had become independent in Mālwa, and, on his death in 1555, had been suc-





ceeded by his son Bāyazīd, known as Bāz Bahādur, who after his accession had invaded the kingdom of Gondwāna, but, having suffered a severe defeat at the hands of its noble queen, Durgāvatī, had been so overcome by shame that he abandoned warlike pursuits and gave himself up to a life of sensual pleasure. Akbar decided that the time had come for the annexation of Mālwa, and in the autumn of 1560 Adham Khān, son of Māham Anaga, and the brutal Pīr Muhammad Khān were sent into that province with a large force. Bāz Bahādur was defeated in 1561 near Sārangpur, and fled, leaving much spoil in the hands of the victors. Adham Khān appropriated his harem and his treasure, and attempted to possess himself of the person of Rūpmatī, his best-loved concubine, but the devoted woman frustrated his attempt by taking poison; and he and Pīr Muhammad disgraced themselves by committing the foulest atrocities on the innocent inhabitants, Muslim as well as Hindu. Akbar, incensed by Adham's misconduct, but especially by his retention of the spoils and the women, left Āgra on April 27, 1561, and, outstripping the couriers whom Māham Anaga had sent to warn her son of his approach, surprised the offender. It would have gone ill with him, but that his mother, hastening after the emperor, induced him to accept her son's submission, and, by secretly putting to death two of Bāz Bahādur's concubines whom he had outraged, concealed some of his crimes. Akbar returned to Āgra, Pīr Muhammad Khān was appointed governor of Mālwa, and Adham Khān was recalled.

Akbar, though still much absorbed in hunting and adventure, was gradually acquiring a sense of responsibility to his people. On learning that Khānzamān, governor of Jaunpur, was showing signs of disaffection, he rode against him with a small force, and Khānzamān and his brother Bahādur, alarmed by the news of his approach, repaired to Kara, and did homage to him. These men were Mughals of the Chaghatāy tribe, and, though the victory at Pānīpat was due to Khānzamān more than to any other officer, they were never well-affected towards Akbar, and it was not long before both perished as rebels.

Among the Turks of Transoxiana prolonged lactation is common, and the bond between children and their nurses is very close, the husbands and offspring of the relatives all ranking as foster-relatives. Māham Anaga, though she had never suckled

Akbar, had been the superintendent of his nurses, and ranked as a foster-mother. The most influential of those who had actually suckled him was Jijī Anaga, whose husband, Shams-ud-dīn Muhammad, had saved Humāyūn from drowning after the battle of Kanauj, and was entitled Ataga ("foster-father") Khān. He was the head of the group of foster-relatives known as the *Ataga Khail*, or "foster-father battalion". Their influence, not always for good, was very great until Akbar felt strong enough to break it.

In November, 1561, Ataga Khān was summoned from Kābul and was made minister. His appointment was resented by Mun'im Khān, whom he superseded, and by Māham Anaga, who regarded herself as prime minister *de facto*. Māham Anaga's resentment was increased by the recall of her son, Adham, from Mālhwā. Pīr Muhammad, who succeeded him, was not a fortunate selection, for he was rough, brutal, and arrogant. Bāz Bahādūr had taken refuge in Khāndesh, and Pīr Muhammad, invading that state in pursuit of him, committed horrible atrocities, destroying towns and villages by fire, and massacring or enslaving their inhabitants. Bāz Bahādūr fled before him across the Nerbudda, and Pīr Muhammad pursued him. While he was rashly attempting to cross the river by a dangerous ford, his horse came into contact with some pack-animals, and its rider was thrown, carried away by the current, and drowned. "Thus", says Budaunī, "he went by water to fire; his cruelty, insolence, and severity were punished; and the sighs of the orphans, the captives, and the helpless were avenged." As a result of this monster's death Bāz Bahādūr recovered Mālhwā, but not for long, for in the following year 'Abdullāh Khān Uzbek, who was appointed to the government of the province, expelled him, and again incorporated it in Akbar's dominions. For eight years Bāz Bahādūr wandered as a refugee from one court to another, but at length made his submission to Akbar, and entered his service, in which he held, at the time of his death, the rank of commander of 2000 horse, but he was chiefly distinguished as "a singer without rival".

Early in 1562 Akbar, having heard minstrels sing of the sanctity of Mu'in-ud-dīn Chishtī, the saint whose shrine is at Ajmir, vowed to make a yearly pilgrimage to his tomb, and set out on his first journey thither. The occasion was memorable, for on

his way thither he received Rāja Bihar Mal of Amber, who came forth to do him homage and offered him his eldest daughter in marriage. This may be regarded as the first step in Akbar's attempt to weld the Hindus and Muslims of India into one people. The Hindu princess afterwards became the mother of Jahāngīr, and Bihar Mal's heir, Bhagwān Dās, and Bhagwān's nephew and adopted son, Mān Singh, attained to the highest rank in the imperial service.

In the same year the strong fortress of Mertha was taken from the raja of Mār wār, and the discontent of Māham Anaga, Mun'im Khān, and the harem party culminated in the murder of Ataga Khān, who was slain in his apartments in the palace by Adham Khān and his attendants. Akbar, asleep in an inner room, was roused by the uproar which followed the crime, and coming forth, met the murderer. Infuriated at his threatening air, Akbar felled him with a blow of his fist, and commanded the attendants to throw him from the parapet into the ditch. Being seen to move in the ditch he was brought up and thrown down a second time, and his brains were dashed out. Akbar then retired and told Māham Anaga what he had done. She replied that he had done well, but, already ailing, never recovered, and died forty days later. Mun'im Khān and others implicated in the plot fled, but were captured and brought before Akbar, who did not punish them, but again appointed Mun'im Khān minister. Akbar afterwards confessed that at this period of his life he "experienced an internal bitterness", which may be attributed to the discovery that none in whom he had placed his trust was worthy. Mun'im Khān was re-appointed owing to his experience of the routine duties of office. He was again minister, but he was never again trusted. Akbar was henceforth his own minister, and, though he consulted others, always reserved for himself the final decision of every case. The control of the finances, which had been corruptly managed by Māham Anaga, was taken from Mun'im Khān and entrusted to an able eunuch entitled I'timād Khān, who prevented peculation and introduced a sound system of administration; and, lest the peace should be disturbed by the naturally vengeful feelings of the "foster-father battalion", he dispatched its members on an expedition against the Gakkhars of the Salt Range.

Akbar's liberal views and his leanings towards Hinduism are

commonly attributed to the influence of the free-thinking Shaikh Mubārak and his two sons, Faizī, afterwards poet-laureate, and Abul Fazl, who became the emperor's secretary and historian. But Mubārak does not appear to have come forward at court until 1573; his sons were not presented until a year later; and Akbar had inaugurated his policy of conciliation more than ten years earlier, first in 1562, by marrying the Amber princess and admitting Mān Singh to high office, and in 1563 and again in 1564 by two very great pecuniary sacrifices, the remission of the tax on Hindu pilgrims visiting their sacred places, and the remission of the *jizya*, or poll-tax on Hindus. These measures were most obnoxious to bigoted Muslims, but, with the exception of the marriage, which was regarded with mixed feelings, were most welcome to Hindus of all classes; and it is greatly to Akbar's credit that "the main lines of his policy, directed to obliterating all difference in treatment between Muslims and Hindus, were fixed as political principles while he was still to all outward appearance an orthodox and zealous Muslim and long before his open breach with Islam" in 1582.

Humāyūn had left his younger son, Muhammad Hakīm, nominal governor of the province of Kābul, with Mun'im Khān as his tutor and guardian. When Mun'im Khān was summoned to India, his place was taken by his son, Ghanī Khān, who quarrelled with the prince's mother, and was by her shut out of Kābul. She defeated Mun'im Khān, who was sent to restore peace, and Shāh Abul Ma'ālī, a turbulent noble who had been banished to Mecca for political offences, returned to Kābul from his pilgrimage, married the young prince's sister, and put his mother to death. Hakīm would have been his next victim had not his cousin, Sulaimān Mīrzā of Badakhshān, come to his rescue, and defeated and executed Abul Ma'ālī.

The death of Adham and his mother had broken the power of the harem faction, and, in 1564, another act of violence entirely freed Akbar from its influence. Being warned that Khvāja Mu'azzam, his mother's half-brother, a maniac who had already committed more than one violent crime, was meditating the murder of his wife, Akbar rode out to his country house, in the hope of preventing the crime, but arrived too late, for the bloody knife with which it had been committed was thrown at his feet by the murderer. He threw his uncle into the Jumna, and,

as he did not drown, sent him to the state-prison at Gwalior, where he afterwards died. Thereafter Akbar treated his mother with respect, but no longer permitted her to interfere in matters of state, and his emancipation from harem influence was complete. He now began his career of conquest, interrupted occasionally by serious rebellions.

Āsaf Khān, governor of Kara, had already conquered Panna in Bundelkhand, and in 1564 was ordered to invade Gondwāna. The raja of that country was Bīr Narāyan, but its real ruler was his mother, Durgāvatī, a daughter of the Chandel house of Mahobā, whose father had been obliged by poverty to give her in marriage to the Gond raja. The warlike lady had ruled the Gond kingdom well, and had defeated both Bāz Bahādur of Mālwa and the Afghans. She had never molested Akbar, but the Gond kingdom was both extensive and wealthy, and the attack was an act of unprovoked aggression. Durgāvatī gallantly withstood the invaders more than once, but her troops were no match for those of Āsaf Khān, and in the last battle she was wounded while leading a charge, and "choosing death rather than dishonour, stabbed herself to the heart". Āsaf Khān then besieged Chaurāgarh, the principal fortress of the Gonds, which was gallantly defended by the young raja, who performed the rite of *jauhar* before he fell. Much treasure and many elephants fell into the hands of Āsaf Khān, and Akbar, not being prepared to deal with him, was obliged to leave them in his hands.

The disaffection of Akbar's officers of the Chaghatāy or Uzbek tribe, led by Khānzamān, has already been noticed. They were, in a sense, his natural enemies, for it was their tribe which had driven his house from its ancestral domains in Transoxiana, now ruled by their chief, 'Abdullāh Khān. They were orthodox and bigoted Sunnis, and resented the leaning which Akbar evinced towards the Shiah heresy, the favour which he showed to his Persian officers and, above all, his conciliatory treatment of the Hindus. They were in communication with his brother, Hakīm, understood to be more orthodox than he, and also, probably, with their own chief in Bukhārā. An Uzbek officer also named 'Abdullāh Khān, whom Akbar had appointed to the government of Mālwa, was the first to rebel, and Akbar marched rapidly on Māndū, defeated him, and drove him into Gujarāt; but 'Abdullāh escaped from that kingdom, and joined Khānzamān in Jaunpur.

Early in 1565 the Uzbeks rose in Jaunpur and drove the imperial troops into the northern districts of Oudh. Akbar marched against them and, having been joined by Āsaf Khān of Kara, drove them into Bihar and occupied Jaunpur, but was embarrassed by the defection of Āsaf Khān, who, fearing lest he should be called to account for the treasure of Gondwāna, deserted him, and left him hardly strong enough to attempt to crush the rebels. He opened negotiations with them, and Khānzamān, having expressed contrition, was readmitted to Jaunpur, and Akbar, in March, 1566, returned to Āgra. There he amused himself by founding at Kakrālī, seven miles south of the city, a palatial hunting-lodge. A town sprang up round it, and was named by him Nagarchain, or the "Abode of Ease", and there he enjoyed the chase, and the game of polo, for which he invented a ball of the wood of the *dhāk* or *palās* tree, which when ignited, made it possible to continue the game at night.

These amusements were interrupted by the news that Hakīm had invaded the Panjab and that Khānzamān had recited the *khūtba* in his name at Jaunpur. Akbar was furious, and, in November, 1566, set forth to deal with his brother, but, on reaching Lahore three months later, found that Hakīm, not daring to await him, had fled back to Kābul. Near Lahore he amused himself with a great slaughter of game. For a month hosts of beaters, having encircled a large tract of country, gradually closed inwards, driving all the game into a small area, where Akbar and his favoured courtiers slaughtered incessantly for five days. He was recalled eastward by the news of the rebellion of his cousins, "the Mīrzās", who, having risen in Sambhal, had been driven thence into Mālwā, and, on his way, had an opportunity of enjoying some "sport" even more entertaining than the *battue* at Lahore. Two gangs of *sannyāsīs*, or religious mendicants whose business was the extortion of money from the pilgrims at the holy fair of Thānesar, had quarrelled, one of them having occupied and refused to vacate the more profitable "pitch" of the other. Feeling ran so high that they sought leave to decide their difference by combat, and Akbar granted permission and witnessed the fight. One party, five hundred strong, was pressing the other, numbering only three hundred, very hard, when Akbar permitted some of his troops to help the weaker body. The tables were turned, and "many

of the wretches were sent to annihilation. The emperor greatly enjoyed the sight". His spiritual awakening was, as yet, incomplete.

Early in May, 1567, he left Āgra in order to crush the rebellion of the Uzbegs, who had been in revolt ever since Hakīm's invasion of the Panjab, and had lately marched on Kālpi. He surprised them when the leaders were drunk and their troops in disorder, and in a battle near Allāhābād defeated them, Khānzamān being slain and his brother, Bahādur, captured and executed. Several of the leaders taken were trampled to death by elephants, and a reward of a gold coin was paid for every Uzbeg's head. He then marched to Allāhābād, and thence to Benares, which closed its gates against him, and in order to punish the citizens the troops were allowed to sack the city.

From Benares he marched to Jaunpur, and conferred all the fiefs of Khānzamān on Mun'im Khān. 'Abdullāh Khān having died a natural death, and an Uzbeg force under Sikandar Khān having been driven from Oudh, the whole faction was thus stamped out. In July, 1567, he returned to Āgra, and in the following September set out to humble the rāna of Mewār. He had cause of offence against the rāna, who had proudly refrained from attending his court, had condemned those princes of his race who had besmirched their honour by giving daughters in marriage to the unclean Turk, and had granted an asylum to Bāz Bahādur and to a rebellious chief of Narwar. His son, Sakat Singh, resenting a tactless gibe, had left the imperial camp without permission. Leaving officers to deal with the rebellious Mīrzās in Mālwā, Akbar marched on Chitor.

Sangrama Singh, Bābur's opponent, had died in 1530, and two of his sons succeeded him in turn. There remained a third, Uday Singh, a posthumous child, whose life was saved by the fidelity of a nurse when a bastard relative, having usurped the throne, sought to destroy the heir. In 1542 the Rājput nobles expelled the bastard and enthroned the boy. Uday Singh, says Tod, "had not one quality of a sovereign; and, wanting martial virtue, the common heritage of his race, he was destitute of all". He was then thirty-seven years of age, and when, in October, 1567, Akbar opened the siege of Chitor, its ruler was not within its walls. He had fled and concealed himself in a small palace around which Udaipur, the modern capital of Mewār, has grown up,



and the defence of his fortress was left to the gallant Jaimal, the Rāthor, of Bednor, and the young Patta of Kailwa. The investment of the fortress was completed within a month, and Akbar many times attempted to carry it by assault, but without success. Mines were no more efficacious, but the approach was gradually made by means of a covered way, and Akbar, within musket-shot of the fortress, amused himself by picking off any of the garrison who exposed themselves, and, on February 23, brought down an officer who was directing the defence. Within an hour it was learned that the Rājputs had withdrawn from the ramparts. Fire then broke out in the fort, and Bhagwān Dās, who was with Akbar, assured him that the Rājputs were beginning to perform the rite of *jauhar*, and that the fires were those in which the women were being burned. Early the next morning it was ascertained that Bhagwān had spoken truly and that Akbar's victim had been Jaimal. Akbar's troops then entered the fortress. The eight thousand Rājputs of the garrison came forth, and, fighting desperately, were slain to a man. Among them fell Patta, who was trampled to death by an elephant. About three hundred ladies had perished in the flames. A corps of a thousand musketeers from Kālpī, who had most efficiently aided the gallant Rājputs in the defence, escaped by passing themselves off as part of Akbar's forces carrying off female captives, the captives being their own wives and daughters; and it was well for them that they succeeded, for Akbar, incensed by the obstinacy of the defence, disgraced himself by the most revolting barbarity. Of 40,000 peasants, who had assisted the garrison in defending the fortress, 20,000 were massacred and the remainder enslaved. "From that day Chitor has been held accursed, no successor of Udai Singh has entered it, and 'the sin of the slaughter of Chitor', like 'the curse of Cromwell' in Ireland, has become proverbial."

Chitor had already been twice taken by Muslim monarchs, 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī and Bahādur of Gujarāt, neither specially scrupulous or humane; but it was reserved for Akbar to commit atrocities which are held to this day to defile the ground on which the fortress stands. He seems to have repented of his crime, for he honoured the gallant Jaimal and Patta by erecting statues to their memory. These were originally set up at the gate of his palace at Āgra, were removed by his grandson to the gate of his



palace at Delhi, and were destroyed by the bigot Aurangzīb, who held representations of the human form to be unlawful. Some have conjectured that Akbar intended to insult the dead by representing them as his doorkeepers, but this is unjust. He has enough to answer for in the atrocities committed at Chitor, and he had a genuine admiration for his gallant foes. But he fervently desired, to the end of his reign, to crush the rāna, and was baulked only by the unwillingness of his eldest son and his officers to embark on a difficult and dangerous campaign. The rāna was never subdued.

In March, 1568, Akbar returned to Āgra, but the empire was not yet at peace. The Mīrzās were in revolt in Mālhwā, and he was obliged to send against them the army which he had assembled for the reduction of Ranthambhor, the third great Rājput stronghold. His foster-relatives, after the death of their leader, had been transferred to the Panjab. Since their extensive fiefs menaced his authority, he broke up the confederacy. He allowed his favourite foster-brother, 'Azīz Koka, entitled Khān-i A'zam, to retain the fief of Dīpālpur, but the other members of the group were dispersed and received fiefs in the provinces to the east of the Ganges, and Akbar was then able, at the end of 1568, to open the siege of Ranthambhor, which was held for the rāna by Surjan Hāra, chief of Būndī.

Surjan transferred his allegiance from the rāna to Akbar, surrendered Ranthambhor, and received in return first a command in Gondwāna, and then, as a reward for good service there, the government of Benares and Chunār, and a residence in the holy city with the privilege of sanctuary, retained by the rajas of Būndī until the nineteenth century. Of the manner in which this surrender was brought about a romantic and not improbable account has been taken by Tod from Rājput annals. After the siege had been formed, Bhagwān Dās of Amber and his adopted son, Mān Singh, undertook to seduce Surjan from his allegiance to the rāna, and Mān Singh, as a brother Rājput, obtained access to the fortress in order to discuss matters with Surjan. While the two chiefs were conversing, Surjan's uncle recognised, in one of Mān Singh's mace-bearers, the features of the emperor, "and with that sudden impulse which arises from respect, took the mace from his hand and placed Akbar on the 'cushion' of the governor of the castle". Akbar then asked what was to be done,

and Mān Singh decided the matter by urging Surjan to enter the imperial service, offering him the government of fifty-two districts and liberty to name any other terms. Surjan assented, and the terms which he demanded and obtained were (1) that the chiefs of Būndī should not be required to surrender a bride to the imperial harem, (2) that they should be for ever exempt from the *jizya*, (3) that they should never be compelled to cross the Indus, (4) that they and their kin should never be required to send their wives or female relations to the New Year's bazaar in the imperial palace, (5) that they should be permitted to enter the hall of audience fully armed, (6) that their temples should be respected, (7) that they should never be placed under the command of a Hindu leader, (8) that their horses should not be branded as state property, (9) that they should not be required to prostrate themselves before the emperor, and (10) that Būndī should be to the Hāras what Delhi was to the king, who should guarantee them from any change of capital.

Meanwhile Majnūn Khān Kākshāl had been sent to besiege Kālinjar, the fortress before which Shīr Shāh had lost his life, and which was held by Rāja Rāmchand of Bhatha or Rewa. The fortress was invested, but Rāmchand, having learned of the fall of Chitor and the surrender of Ranthambhor, which set Akbar free to launch all his forces against Kālinjar, surrendered to Majnūn Khān, and in 1569 received a fief near Allāhābād.

Akbar was thus supreme in northern India. The Panjab, the territory now known as the United Provinces, Bihar, and Mālwa owned his sway; the rāna of Mewār and the raja of Mārwar had been humbled; Mertha, Chitor, Ranthambhor, and Kālinjar had fallen into his hands; and the rajas of Amber, Būndī and Bundelkhand were his vassals; but his mind was not at peace. He had many wives, but no child. Children had been born, but had died, and he had prayed fervently at the shrine at Ajmir for a son to succeed him. Shaikh Salīm Chishtī, a follower of the saint of Ajmir, who lived as a hermit at Sikrī, near the field on which Bābur had defeated the great Rājput host, had assured him that his prayers would be answered, and early in 1569 his senior Hindu wife, the daughter of Bihar Mal of Amber, was found to be pregnant. She was sent to the shaikh's cell at Sikrī, in order that her child might be born under his holy influence, and, on August 30, 1569, she gave birth to a son whom Akbar, in

gratitude to the shaikh, named Salīm. Two months later a daughter was born of another wife, and early in 1570 Akbar repeated his pilgrimage to Ajmir to offer thanks for the answer to his prayers. On his return he visited Delhi, and inspected there the splendid mausoleum erected by his mother over the grave of his father, one of the finest monuments left to us by the "Great Moguls". On June 8, 1570, Salīma Sultān Begum, Akbar's cousin, whom he had bestowed upon Bairam Khān, and had himself married after Bairam's death, bore a son who was named Murād, and on September 10, 1572, he heard at Bāgor, on his way from Ajmir to Gujarāt, of the birth to him by a concubine whom he had left in the house of Shaikh Dāniyāl, one of the holy men of Ajmir, of a son, whom he named Dāniyāl after the shaikh. These three sons of Akbar all reached manhood.

On a second visit to Ajmir in 1570 Akbar married princesses of the Rājput houses of Bikaner and Jaisalmer, and on his return lodged with Shaikh Salīm at Sikrī. Thirty years before this time the shaikh had built a hospice and a mosque there, and Akbar had conceived an affection for the spot. He began to erect a town-wall, dwelling-houses, schools, and baths, and to lay out gardens there, and continued to extend and adorn the town for the next fourteen years. Nagarchain was forgotten, and Sikrī, which received after the conquest of Gujarāt the name of Fathābād or Fathpur, was Akbar's favourite abode until 1585, when he was called away to Kābul.

Gujarāt had been independent of Delhi since the decline of the Tughluks, but the dynasty which ruled it had fallen into decay, and Muzaffar III, its nominal sovereign, was no more than a puppet in the hands of ambitious and turbulent courtiers, while all the great feudatories were virtually independent of the crown. One of these, I'timād Khān, sought Akbar's aid against his rivals, and this invitation, and the presence in Gujarāt of the rebellious Mirzās, who had retired thither from Mālhwā, led Akbar to take measures for the conquest of the kingdom. He left Sikrī on July 4, 1572, marching in leisurely fashion by way of Ajmir, Bāgor,<sup>1</sup> and Sirohī. His advance was opposed at Sirohī by 150 desperate Rājputs, whom he cut to pieces, and in November Akbar occupied Ahmadābād without difficulty. Muzaffar III,

<sup>1</sup> Not Nāgaur, as suggested by Vincent Smith and other writers.

having been found attempting to hide himself in a cornfield, was carried before him and made his submission. From Ahmadābād Akbar marched to Cambay, where, for the first time in his life, he saw the sea, and where he first made the acquaintance of the Portuguese, receiving some merchants of that nation who paid their respects to him. He appointed 'Azīz Koka to the government of the new province; but the Mīrzās began almost immediately to give trouble. Akbar, with a small body of horse, at once marched against Ibrāhīm Husain Mīrzā, who was encamped at Sarnāl<sup>1</sup> with a much larger force, rashly crossed the Mahī by a difficult ford in the face of the enemy, and fell upon him. Bhūpat, brother of Bhagwān Dās, was killed, and the lives both of Bhagwān Dās and of Akbar himself were for a time in the greatest jeopardy, but the impetuosity of the attack threw the enemy into a panic, and they fled.

Early in 1573 Akbar, while besieging Surat, received a mission from the Portuguese viceroy, Antonio de Noronha, and concluded a treaty which ensured a safe passage across the Indian Ocean for pilgrims to Mecca. Surat fell in February and Akbar caused the tongue of its governor, Hamzabān, who had formerly been in the service of Humāyūn, to be cut out.

After the battle of Sarnāl Ibrāhīm Husain Mīrzā and Mas'ūd Husain Mīrzā had fled into the Panjab, but were defeated and captured by the governor of the province, Husain Kulī Khān. Ibrāhīm Husain died of his wounds but Husain Kulī Khān caused the eyes of Mas'ūd Husain to be sewn up and carried him, with 300 other prisoners, before Akbar at Sikrī. The stitches in Mas'ūd Husain's eyelids were cut; of the other prisoners many were executed with torture, but some were released. Before defeating the Mīrzās Husain Kulī Khān had compelled Budī Chand of Nagarkot, or Kāngra, to swear allegiance to Akbar, and for his services in the Panjab he received the title of Khānjahān.

But Akbar was not yet finished with the Mīrzās. Within three months of his return to Sikrī he learned that another of them, Muhammad Husain Mīrzā, had risen in Gujarāt, and with Ikhtiyār-ul-mulk, a local noble, was besieging 'Azīz Koka in Ahmadābād. On this occasion Akbar, a powerful and athletic man in the prime of life, performed the greatest feat of endurance which is recorded of him. On August 23, 1573, he left

<sup>1</sup> Situated in 22° 50' N. and 73° 10' E.

Sikrī with a few selected officers and a small picked force of cavalry, having sent in advance another small force, including which his numbers amounted to 3000 in all. Travelling at the rate of more than fifty miles a day in the melting heat of the rainy season he appeared before Ahmadābād within eleven days of his departure. The rebels besieging the city, hearing the blast of his trumpets, sounded for the purpose of encouraging 'Aziz Koka to come forth and join him, could not believe that the emperor, whom their agents had seen in Sikrī but a fortnight before, could possibly have reached Gujarāt; but a force was evidently about to attack them. Ikhtiyār-ul-mulk, with 5000 horse, was left before the gate to prevent 'Aziz from emerging, and Muhammad Husain Mīrzā, with 15,000, turned against the relieving force. He was soon convinced that the emperor was present, for Akbar, with a few followers, crossed the Sabarmati in the face of his large force, and fell upon him. The advanced party with Akbar was checked, but as soon as the rest of his small force had crossed he led a furious charge against the Mīrzā's army. His horse was wounded, and he, pressing forward almost alone, was in the gravest danger, and for a short time was believed to have fallen, but his troops, when they saw that he was yet unhurt, pressed the attack, and wounded and captured the Mīrzā, with the natural result that his army broke and fled. Ikhtiyār-ul-mulk, with his 5000 horse, attempted to retrieve the fortunes of the day, but his troops, having witnessed the defeat of the Mīrzā's much larger force, were so panic-stricken that Akbar's men, pursuing and overtaking them, were able to draw the arrows from their quivers and use them against them. Ikhtiyār-ul-mulk was cut down, and the Mīrzā was slain by his guards. In one day (September 2, 1573) within a fortnight of his leaving Sikrī, Akbar had crushed a serious rebellion and restored peace to Gujarāt. The Mīrzās could trouble him no more. There remained but one, Shāh Mīrzā, who disappeared from the scene. The victor returned less speedily than he had come, but did not loiter by the way, for he travelled at the rate of thirty miles a day, and on October 5, 1573, made his triumphal entry into Sikrī. He had taken with him on this expedition the young 'Abdur Rahīm Khān, the son of his old tutor, Bairam Khān. After his return to Sikrī he was occupied with reforms. The assessment and collection of the land-revenue due from Gujarāt, which for many

troubled years had never been paid, was entrusted to Todar Mal, who, within six months, measured the land, divided the province into nine *sarkārs*, or revenue districts, and settled the revenue at a sum which left five millions of rupees yearly for the imperial treasury, after the payment of all expenses. Todar Mal then rejoined his master at Sikrī, and there assisted him and the revenue minister, Muzaffar Khān Turbatī, in general administrative reforms. These were (1) the introduction of the branding regulation, which had been enforced by 'Alā-ud-dīn and Shīr Shāh, (2) the abolition of the feudal system by resuming fiefs, placing them under the administration of crown officials, and paying both officers and men from the treasury, and (3) the preparation of a graded list of officials, classed as *amīrs* and *mansabdārs*, all, whether civil or military, holding military rank. The first two reforms, intended to remove opportunities for defrauding the state and plundering its subjects, were most unpopular, and Akbar never succeeded in enforcing them on all; but lists of the state officials, with their actual and nominal commands, and the rank of each, are given both in the *Ām-i Akbarī* and the *Tabakāt-i Akbarī*. Muzaffar Khān, a very able official, did not favour those reforms, and for his wilful neglect of orders was removed from office, but meanwhile the whole scheme of reform was interrupted.

After the death, in 1552, of Islām Shāh, the son and successor of Shīr Shāh, Muhammad Khān Sūr, another member of his tribe, had established his independence in Bengal and had been succeeded, two years later, by his son, Bahādur Shāh, who reigned for six years, and was succeeded, in 1560, by his brother, Jalāl Shāh, whose son and successor was overcome by Tāj Khān, a member of the Kararānī tribe of Afghans, who ascended the throne of Bengal in 1564. His son and successor, Sulaimān, laid siege to the fort of Rohtās, held for Akbar, but retired before a relieving force, and afterwards adopted a conciliatory attitude towards Akbar. On his death in 1572 he was succeeded by his elder son, Bāyazīd, who was murdered, after a reign of a few months, by his cousin and brother-in-law, Hānsū, who aspired to the throne. But Hānsū was put to death, and Lodī Khān, who had been Sulaimān's minister, raised to the throne his master's younger son, Dāūd, a vain and arrogant young debauchee, who foolishly abandoned his father's prudent policy, and, not content with otherwise provoking Akbar, captured and occupied

the small town of Zamānia on the Ganges, which had been built as a frontier fortress of the empire by Khānzamān. Akbar had sent orders from Gujarāt to Mun'im Khān, governor of Jaunpur, to punish Dāūd, but Mun'im Khān was old and sluggish, and after a few inconclusive actions made peace with Dāūd, through his minister, Lodī Khān, on very easy terms. Neither Akbar nor Dāūd was content, for each thought that the other had been let down too lightly. Dāūd put his minister to death and Akbar severely censured Mun'im Khān, and, having relieved Todar Mal of his administrative duties, sent him to Mun'im Khān's assistance. Mun'im Khān, goaded by Akbar's reproaches, invaded Bihar, and besieged Dāūd in Patna, but, seeing no prospect of success, begged Akbar to take the field in person. As he, in March, 1574, was assembling his forces and his flotilla of boats at Āgra, Shaikh Abul Fazl and the historian Budaunī were presented to him, but neither seems to have made much impression on him at first.

On June 15, 1574, Akbar left Āgra by boat, his troops marching by land. Leaving the ladies of the harem in Jaunpur, he continued his voyage, and on August 3, appeared before Patna. Finding that the city drew its provisions from Hājīpur, the town opposite to it, on the northern bank of the Ganges, his troops, after surmounting grave difficulties, took the town by assault, and Akbar sent the heads of the officers of the garrison to Dāūd, who, although he had a large force, took fright, escaped from Patna by night, and fled into Bengal. The garrison, attempting to follow him, was pursued with heavy slaughter, and on the next morning Akbar entered the city. He then marched after the fleeing Afghans for fifty miles, but, failing to overtake them, returned.

The rainy season, during which military operations in Bengal are almost impossible, was then at its height, but Akbar would have no delay, and appointed Mun'im Khān to the government of Bengal and the command of the army to which the recovery of the province was entrusted. Todar Mal was appointed second in command, and Akbar retired to Jaunpur, leaving Mun'im Khān and Todar Mal to carry on the campaign against Dāūd. Before returning to Sīkrī, which he reached on January 18, 1575, he resumed Jaunpur, Benares, Chunār, and other fiefs, placing their administration in the hands of his own officers.



Meanwhile the campaign in Bengal was progressing. Mun'im Khān captured successively Monghyr, Bhāgalpur, Khalbān and the Teliyāgarhi defile, and occupied Tānda, then the capital of the province, where he rested, while a force followed Dāūd towards Orissa and occupied Satgāon. Todar Mal also pressed on, but, finding it impossible to induce his officers to persevere in the arduous task of penetrating into Orissa, disturbed Mun'im Khān's repose by calling upon him to join the army in the field and exert his authority. Mun'im Khān joined the army, the road was improved, the advance continued, and on March 3, 1575, the imperial troops met Dāūd's army at Tukaroī, between Midnapur and Jaleswār. Dāūd attacked Mun'im Khān before he was ready to engage, and the old man was so severely wounded that defeat seemed imminent when Gūjar Khān, commanding Dāūd's troops, fell, and his troops broke and fled. In the pursuit many were slain, and all prisoners were slaughtered, eight columns being built of their heads. Dāūd escaped, and Mun'im Khān once more granted him terms, accepting his formal submission to Akbar and allowing him to retain Orissa. Todar Mal, mistrusting the sincerity of Dāūd, refused to sign the treaty, and his mistrust was fully justified by the event. Mun'im Khān retired to Tānda, but the imperial cause in Bengal was weakened by dissensions between him and Muzaffar Khān, who, having regained favour, had been appointed governor of Bihar, his authority extending as far eastwards as Teliyāgarhi.

The Ghorāghāt region, the modern district of Dinājpur, was in great disorder, and Mun'im Khān, partly in order to be near the troubled district, and partly attracted by the buildings of the old capital, resolved to make Gaur his headquarters. His officers opposed this foolish decision, for the climate of Gaur was known to be deadly. Humāyūn and his army had suffered severely there, and the Afghan kings had found it necessary to move to Tānda, but the obstinate old man insisted, and marched to Gaur. What his officers had feared happened. A pestilence broke out, and according to Budaunī, "things came to such a pass that the living were unable to bury the dead, and threw them into the river". Mun'im Khān fled back to Tānda, but not soon enough to save his life, for in October he died there, and affairs in Bengal fell into the utmost confusion. The army, greatly weakened and thoroughly demoralised, began to retire into Bihar, eager to



escape from the pestilential climate of Bengal, and Dāūd, returning from Orissa, recovered his kingdom.

The unwelcome news reached Akbar at Sīkrī, and Khānjahān, governor of the Panjab, was appointed to the government and the command of the troops in Bengal, and set out for that province. At Bhāgalpur he was joined by Todar Mal, who had paid a flying visit to Sīkrī to receive Akbar's orders. Khānjahān and he compelled the troops to return with them, and they recovered Teliyāgarhi and occupied Ākmahal, now Rājmahal, where they were joined by Muzaffār Khān with the army of Bihar, placed at their disposal by Akbar's orders. Dāūd was taken by surprise, but Khānjahān considered the situation so serious that he begged Akbar to come and take command of his army in person. Nevertheless, he and Muzaffār Khān decided to attack Dāūd at once, and on July 12, 1576, the armies met near Rājmahal. Dāūd's two principal officers were his uncle, Junaid, and Kālā Pahār. Junaid died of a gunshot wound which he had received the evening before, and Kālā Pahār was severely wounded. The fight was, for a time, fiercely contested, but at length the army of Bengal gave way, and took to flight. Dāūd's horse was bogged as he was attempting to escape, and he was taken alive and beheaded, his head being sent to court. Akbar, in response to Khānjahān's appeal, set out from Sīkrī on July 22, but he had ridden only one month when Sayyid 'Abdullāh Khān arrived with news of the victory of Rājmahal, gained only eleven days before, and cast down Dāūd's head before him. He then returned to Sīkrī. After nearly two hundred and forty years of independence, interrupted only by the two brief conquests of Humāyūn and Shīr Shāh, Bengal had become part of the great Muslim empire of northern India.

During the conquest of Bengal by his officers Akbar had not been idling in his capital. Almost immediately after his return from Patna and Jaunpur in January, 1575, he had commanded the construction at Sīkrī of his *Ibādat-kehāna* or "House of Worship", afterwards the scene of discussions and disputes on questions of religion and philosophy, to which purpose it was devoted, rather than to what we understand by worship. These discussions will be noticed later, in the course of an account of Akbar's spiritual venture. He was still tolerably orthodox. As late as 1581 he encouraged the pilgrimage to Mecca, and even

proposed to perform it himself, until he was persuaded that a ruler could not safely leave his kingdom to govern itself. He had not yet plunged deeply into religious speculations and discussions, but during the years 1575 and 1576 was completing the administrative reforms which had been interrupted by the campaign in Bilhar. He encountered almost everywhere sullen opposition to and evasion of the branding regulation, which was framed to prevent the production of hired or borrowed horses at musters, and to compel superior officers to maintain the contingents for which they were paid. 'Azīz Koka's opposition to this salutary measure was so determined that Akbar imprisoned him in his garden-house at Āgra. Another unpopular measure was the abolition of feudal tenure, except in newly-conquered provinces. A fief-holder could, without intolerably oppressing landholders and cultivators, enrich himself by extorting from them much more than was required for the maintenance of his contingent, and, if not required to produce branded horses and men holding certificates of identity, could evade the maintenance of his contingent at its full strength; but on becoming a paid official he could draw from the treasury only his own salary and pay and allowances for men holding descriptive certificates of identity and horses bearing the imperial brand. The reason for the unpopularity of these reforms is thus not far to seek; and they were never fully enforced; but Akbar now, besides attempting to enforce them, introduced his new system of land-revenue administration. Those parts of the empire to which it applied were divided into areas, each of which yielded a crore (*karor*—ten millions) of *dāms*, or a sum of £25,000. To each of these areas was appointed an official styled *karorī*, whose duty it was to collect the revenue and remit it to the treasury. Of these officials 182 were appointed, from which it appears that the settled provinces of the empire were expected to yield forty-five and a half millions of rupees in land-revenue. Abul Fazl says of this measure, "Men's minds were quieted, and cultivation increased, and the path of fraud and falsehood was closed"; but Budaunī says, "A great part of the country was laid waste by the rapacity of the *karorīs*; peasants sold their wives and children and fled away, and the revenue was not collected. But the *karorīs* were called to account by Rāja Todar Mal, and many good men died from the severe beatings which were administered,

and from the torture of rack and pincers. So many died from confinement in the prisons of the revenue authorities that there was no need of the executioner, and none heeded to find them grave or shroud". Budauni's standard of morality was not high, his "good men" were doubtless orthodox Muslims who had defrauded the state or oppressed the people, or both, and he was opposed to all reforms; but his criticism, severe as it is, cannot be dismissed as pure invention, and the probability is that it is nearer to the truth than Abul Fazl's adulatory remarks.

The preparation of the graded list of officials, *amīrs* and *mansabdārs*, was a simpler matter. Their rank and precedence were regulated by nominal commands of horse, ranging from five thousand down to ten. These "commands" did not necessarily indicate the number which each was required to maintain. In the case of civil officials, they indicated only their relative rank. The official hierarchy of the empire was easily tabulated, but the other reforms were less successful. So far as they succeeded their tendency was to increase the wealth and exalt the personal power of the monarch, which was the object at which Akbar aimed.

While at Sikrī at this time, Akbar received his cousin, Sulaimān Mīrzā, who had been expelled from Badakhshān, and ordered Khānjahān, governor of the Panjab, to fit out an expedition for the recovery of Badakhshān. On the death of Mun'im Khān, he offered Sulaimān the government of Bengal, and it was on his refusal of it that he recalled Khānjahān from the Panjab and sent him to Bengal, thus interrupting the preparations for the recovery of Badakhshān, which Akbar never resumed. The final conquest of Bengal was not the only campaign in which the imperial forces were at this time engaged. The pusillanimous Udai Singh of Mewār had died in 1572, and had been succeeded by his heroic son, Pratāp Singh. Akbar earnestly desired to conciliate his Hindu subjects, but could not endure the thought that any Hindu should be loth to become his subject. Pratāp, on the other hand, spurned every overture which had submission for its basis, or the degradation of uniting his family with the Tātār, though "lord of countless multitudes", and "singlehanded, for a quarter of a century did he withstand the combined efforts of the empire; at one time carrying destruction into the plains, at another flying from rock to rock, feeding his family from the fruits of his native hills, and rearing the nursing

hero Amar, amidst savage beasts and scarce less savage men, a fit heir to his prowess and revenge". His obdurate pride was sufficient to incense Akbar, and now a deliberate insult so inflamed his wrath as to provoke him to an immediate attack on the dominions of Mewār.

The rāja Mān Singh of Amber visited the rāna, and Pratāp received him courteously, but would not sit at meat with one who was defiled by the union of his sister with the *mlechchha*. This was a personal affront, not only to his brother Rājput, but to the emperor. It was impossible then, as it is to-day, to weld those holding such views into a nation, which was Akbar's aim. Mān Singh was appointed to the command of the imperial forces, which assembled at Māndalgarh and marched on the fortress of Gogūnda, which was their objective. The rāna proposed to hold the pass of Haldīghāt, twelve or fourteen miles from the fortress, and the two armies met in June, 1576, at the entrance to the pass. The historian Budaunī, then *imām*, or leader of the prayers, at court, was present at the battle, being eager to acquire the merit of slaying misbelievers. As the Rājputs in the imperial army and those of the enemy were fighting hand to hand, in a confused mass, the historian, armed with a bow, asked his superior officer how he was to distinguish between friends and enemies, and was advised to shoot into the midst of them. They were all infidels, and whoever fell would be a gain to Islam. The Rājputs fought with desperate valour, but of twenty-two thousand assembled that day for the defence of Haldīghāt, only eight thousand quitted the field alive. Pratāp was wounded, and fled into the hills, but the victors were too exhausted to follow up their victory. On the following day the imperial army marched on to Gogūnda, which it occupied, after slaying a few Rājputs who performed the rite of *jauhar*. Akbar unreasonably blamed Mān Singh for not following up the victory immediately with his exhausted troops, but the displeasure did not last long. The imperial troops followed the rāna and captured most of his strongholds, which, however, he afterwards recovered. The gallant Pratāp lived for several years, and when, in 1597, he died, "worn out in body and mind", left, in the person of his son, Amar Singh, a worthy successor.

In the autumn Akbar marched in person into Rājasthān, visited Gogūnda, and annexed Mount Ābu and the Īdar state. He was

then master of all India north of the Taptī and Mahānadī, and a force was sent to invade Khāndesh, the northernmost state of the Deccan, but was almost immediately recalled to aid in the suppression of disturbances in Gujarāt, to quell which Todar Mal was appointed to the government of the province. Having restored order, he returned, late in 1577, to the imperial camp, and was appointed Akbar's chief minister. The camp had moved towards the Panjab, and in December, near Narnaul, Akbar reformed the administration of his numerous mints. The local mints had been under the control of minor officials subject to no central authority, with the result that the coinage lacked uniformity. The famous artist 'Abd-us-samad was therefore made master of the mint, to exercise a general control over all the mints in the empire, and important officials were appointed as responsible mint-masters at Tānda, Lahore, Jaunpur, Ahmādābād and Patna. The results of this reform may be seen to-day in specimens of Akbar's currency. "Akbar deserves high credit for the excellence of his extremely varied coinage, as regards purity of metal, fullness of weight, and artistic execution. The Mughal coinage, when compared with that of Queen Elizabeth or other contemporary sovereigns in Europe, must be pronounced far superior on the whole. Akbar and his successors seem never to have yielded to the temptation of debasing the coinage, either in weight or purity. The gold in many of Akbar's coins is believed to be practically pure."

Akbar's spiritual experiences and religious experiments will be discussed later, but it is necessary to refer here to a mysterious fit of religious ecstasy which overcame him early in May 1578, at Nandana, while he was encamped at Bhēra, on the Jhelum. Preparations had been made for a huge battue, and the beaters were gradually closing in when Akbar, seated under a tree, fell into a strange state of ecstasy "and was violently attracted by the cognition of God, and an unseemly frenzy overcame him in an inexplicable manner, and every one attributed it to some cause or another, but what is hidden is known to God alone". What actually happened is not clear. He may have slept and dreamed, or he may have had an epileptic fit, but whatever happened he was deeply affected. The battue was stopped, and orders were issued that not a bird or a beast was to be molested. He distributed much in alms, and after his return to Sikrī filled an empty cistern

with money exceeding ten millions of rupees, and distributed this great sum. He did not at once recover from the effects of his vision, and for a time regarded mundane matters with distaste. But he soon brought his mind back to them. He was, for instance, amused and interested by specimens of Western arts and crafts, among other things an organ and several suits of European clothes, brought to him by Hājji Habībullāh, an envoy whom he had sent to Goa. Inspired, perhaps, by his vision at Nandana, he indulged freely in his favourite pastime of listening to and directing debates in the "House of Worship". They had originally been confined to members of the different sects and schools of Islam, but these, and especially the two orthodox parties led by Makhdūm-ul-mulk and Shaikh 'Abd-un-nabī, had disgraced themselves by indulging in personal abuse and threats of violence. Their strife had been fomented by Shaikh Mubārak, the father of Faizī and of Abul Fazl, who became Akbar's secretary. Mubārak was a freethinker, content with no religion. Originally a Sunni, he had become a Mahdist, then a Shiah, and then a *sūfī*, seeking for closer union with God. His religious vagaries had incensed the orthodox, who had sought his life, and he was at last enjoying his revenge. Akbar's excellent tutor, a Persian named 'Abd-ul-latif, had early imbued him with the principle of toleration, and his attitude towards the Hindus proves that he was never a bigot. He had, as a youth, been a tolerably orthodox, though not a strict Muslim, but had always been impatient of formalism, and had inclined towards mysticism. This tendency was fostered by Mubārak and his sons, and Mubārak, who had been among those who welcomed him on his triumphal return to Sīkrī after the conquest of Gujarāt, had then suggested that it was his duty to be the spiritual leader as well as the temporal ruler of his people, and the suggestion, not unwelcome to an autocrat, afterwards bore fruit. In June, 1579, supported by Mubārak and his sons, he took the first step towards adopting the status which Mubārak had suggested was his by right, and on the first Friday in the month of *Rabī'-us-sānī*, ascended the pulpit in the chief mosque in Sīkrī and recited the ritual address, or *khūṭba*, which had been prepared for him, in metrical form, by Faizī:

In the name of the Lord who gave us sovereignty,  
Who gave us a wise heart and a strong arm,

Who guided us in equity, and justice,  
Who put away from our heart aught but equity,  
Whose praise is beyond our understanding,  
Exalted be His Majesty! God is most great!

Akbar's attitude towards the orthodox had already aroused some suspicion, and this new step caused much uneasiness among the faithful, some of whom murmured that it was not clear to them whether *Allāhu Akbar* meant "God is great" or "Akbar is God"; but Mubārak lost no time, and, taking as his text a verse of the Koran which runs: "Obey God, and obey the apostle, and those among you invested with authority", drew up a petition beseeching Akbar to assume the functions of the "Just Leader", whose authority in the interpretation of the divine commands and the decision of religious questions is supreme. The petition, accepted and ratified by Akbar, became a decree constituting him pope as well as king of Indian Muslims, and the rival party leaders and other learned jurists "were induced or compelled to set their seals to a pronouncement which their souls abhorred". The pronouncement, known as the "Infallibility Decree", invested Akbar with authority to decide questions in accordance with the Koran. With questionable honesty, he used it as an instrument for discrediting Islam. The leaders of the two orthodox parties were packed off to Mecca. One died on his return, and his wealth was wrested from his sons by torture. The other was murdered, almost certainly at Akbar's instigation. By January, 1580, Akbar had forbidden the use of the name of Muhammad in the public prayers; he afterwards renounced all faith in the Arabian prophet, refused to allow his name to be used at court, and mocked the ordinances of his religion. His supreme folly was a decree forbidding his subjects to spell correctly. Words borrowed from Arabic, the sacred language of Islam, were not to be spelt with letters peculiar to that language. Being illiterate, he probably did not fully understand the folly of his order, but his advisers were scholars, who should have prevented him from making himself ridiculous. A sovereign once claimed to be above grammar. Akbar was above spelling. Afterwards, when policy demanded it, he was guilty of many acts of hypocrisy in ceremonial matters, but he failed to deceive his subjects, who knew that he had renounced Islam.

After the orthodox had disgraced themselves, Akbar had turned



his attention to religions other than Islam, and had admitted their professors to debates in the "House of Worship". *Sūfīs*, philosophers, orators, jurists, Sunnis, Shīahs, Brāhmins, Jains of both schools, Chārvākas, Christians, Jews, Sabians, Zoroastrians, and others are mentioned by Abul Fazl as taking part in the debates. Not one of these religions satisfied Akbar, but his attitude towards them alarmed his Muslim subjects. His growing hostility to Islam was not the only cause of discontent. The administration of Bengal and Bihar by Muzaffar Khān produced much dissatisfaction. He attempted to enforce the branding-regulation, instituted an enquiry into the titles of fief-holders, resumed holdings for which titles could not be produced, and reduced the field-service pay of the troops, even demanding the refund of payments regularly made at the old rate. But it was the religious question which underlay the unrest which broke out into open revolt. Early in 1580 Mullā Muḥammad Yazdī, *kāzī* of Jaunpur, a bigoted Shīah, delivered an authoritative decree that rebellion against Akbar, as an apostate, was lawful, and at about the same time Wazīr Jamīl and the officers of the Kākshāl tribe rose, and were shortly afterwards joined by Mas'ūm Khān of Kābul, fief-holder of Patna and Mas'ūm Khān Farankhūdī in Bihar. The rebels proclaimed Hakīm, Akbar's half-brother, who was still governor of Kābul. The prince was a cowardly and worthless debauchee, but he had never ventured to question the truth of Islam.

Todar Mal, sent to Bengal by Akbar, failed either to quell the rebellion or to conciliate the malcontents, and Muzaffar retired to the defenceless town of Tānda, which, with all the treasure it contained, was captured by the rebels, and Muzaffar was put to death with a variety of tortures. Akbar's position was critical. His brother might at any moment invade the Panjab, and a party at court, resenting the emperor's attitude to Islam, was in secret correspondence with Kābul. He therefore dared not leave his capital, but he readmitted 'Azīz Koka to favour, bestowed on him the title of Khān-i A'zam, and appointed him to the government of Bengal, recalling Shāhbāz Khān from a campaign in Rājputāna to assist him. Todar Mal was besieged in Monghyr for four months, but held out until the rebel forces melted away for the time. In January, 1581, Shāhbāz Khān defeated the rebels in Oudh, but it was not until 1584 that the



rebellion was finally crushed. Many disaffected ecclesiastics were put to death without trial. Mas'ūm Kābulī was driven into the Sundarbans, Mas'ūm Farankhūdī, having been thrice pardoned, was assassinated under Akbar's instructions, but the other leaders were pardoned. Akbar, confined to his capital, had leisure to supervise administrative reforms. The land-revenue settlement, hitherto made annually, had caused much unnecessary work and allowed opportunities for fraud. A settlement was therefore prepared on the basis of the previous ten-years average, at first by Todar Mal and Shāh Mansūr, and, after Todar Mal's departure for Bengal, by Mansūr alone; and at the same time the empire was divided into twelve *sūbas* or provinces, Allāhābād, Āgra, Oudh, Ajmir, Gujarāt, Bihar, Bengal, Delhi, Kābul, the Panjab, Multān and Mālwa. Later conquests added Kashmir to the Panjab, Sind to Multān, and Orissa to Bengal, and towards the close of the reign three new provinces, Berar, Khāndesh, and Ahmadnagar, were constituted.

Each province was governed by an officer entitled *sipāhsālār* (commander-in-chief) and the other provincial officials were a *dūwān* (controller of finance); *bakhshī* (paymaster and muster-master general); *mīr-i 'adl* (doomster, to pronounce sentence on those condemned by *kāzīs*); *sadr* (controller of ecclesiastical affairs and grants); *kotwāl* (commissioner of police); *mīr-i bahr* (controller of shipping, ports and ferries); and *wāki'a-navīs* (news-writer and record-keeper).

Meanwhile Akbar had detected and frustrated the conspiracy among his courtiers. Its leader, Mansūr, the minister, was suspended. After a while he was reinstated, but, on being again detected in correspondence with Kābul, he was imprisoned. Early in 1581, after dispatching two unsuccessful forays into the Panjab, Hakīm invaded that province, but the governor, Mān Singh, was faithful, and refused him admission to Lahore. Meanwhile Akbar was assembling a great army, and on February 4, 1581, set forth. Mansūr was hanged, as he well deserved to be. Beyond Sirhind Akbar heard of Hakīm's flight but marched on. At Lahore he was joined by Mān Singh, whom he sent in advance with Prince Murād. Murād entered Kābul, Hakīm having fled, on August 3, and Akbar followed him, arriving six days later. He appointed to the government of Kābul his sister, the wife of Khvāja Hasan of Badakhshān, and returned to his capital in December.

But that the embers of rebellion yet smouldered in Bengal, he had then re-established his authority throughout his dominions, and had leisure for his favourite occupation, religious speculation. The Portuguese were firmly established at Goa, Damān, and Diū on the western coast, and were lords of the sea, and able to control the pilgrim traffic between India and Mecca. Akbar bitterly resented their naval supremacy, but, having neither ships nor men able to cope with them, could avenge himself only by instructions to his officers to harass them on land. These were issued secretly, for he depended on the Portuguese for the means of investigating the Christian religion, in which he had begun to take a great interest. A priest from Bengal who had visited his court was a man of greater piety than learning, and, being unable to satisfy his curiosity, had advised him to apply to the viceroy at Goa for the services of more learned ecclesiastics, and in February, 1580, the first of three missions had arrived at Sikrī. It consisted of three learned and zealous Jesuits, Rodolfo Acquaviva, Antonio Monserrate, and Francisco Enriquez, the last being a convert from Islam, who acted as interpreter. The honour with which the mission was received and entertained, and the almost extravagant veneration shown by Akbar for the sacred symbols which it bore, kindled the liveliest hopes in the breasts of the priests, who were further encouraged by Akbar's frank admission that he had ceased to be a Muslim. They soon discovered, however, that in spite of his interest in and respect for their religion, there was little hope of converting him. He encouraged them in their debates with the Muslim doctors, and protected them from the violence which their indiscreet zeal tended to provoke; but he professed himself unable to accept the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Trinity, and the moral demands of the church raised difficulties even greater than her doctrines. The Jesuit fathers were perfectly honest, and did not mince matters. When the question of his relations with women was raised, they bluntly told him that he had but one wife, and that the rest were concubines who must be discarded before he could be baptized. He also learned that he could be received only as a humble layman, a position which accorded ill with his views on his own spiritual importance. He could hardly doubt what the effect would be on those proud Rājputs who had done violence to their principles in bestowing daughters and sisters on him in marriage, if those

ladies were put away as discarded mistresses. Sadly the fathers realised that the honour of converting the "Great Mogul" would not be theirs; but the favour shown to them, and their intemperate language, which sometimes offended even Akbar, did much to influence zealous Muslims against their protector.

Monserate accompanied Akbar to Kābul and had much converse with him. In 1582 he was sent with an embassy destined to Spain, which never reached its destination. Acquaviva left Sīkrī in 1582, and two months later was murdered by a fanatical Hindu mob. Before he left the court Akbar had announced his design of promulgating a new, perfect, and universal religion. He had already reduced the great office of *sadr-us-sudūr* and given its powers to six provincial officials, whose duty it was to control and supervise grants of land for religious purposes, and at the same time he had appointed to each large city a principal *kāzī*, to supervise the work of lesser judicial officers.

In 1583 Muzaffar III, the ex-king of Gujarāt, escaped from custody in that province, and, having assembled a number of followers, rose in rebellion. In 1584 he suffered two severe defeats and fled into Kachch, but it was not until 1591 that the rebellion was finally suppressed by the capture of Muzaffar, who, after being taken, committed suicide by cutting his throat with a razor. Mīrzā 'Abdur Rahīm, the son of Bairam Khān, who, with the help of the historian, Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad, restored order in Gujarāt, was rewarded for his services with his father's title of Khānkhānān.

In 1582 Akbar summoned at Sīkrī a general council, attended by "all the masters of learning and the military commandants of the cities round about", to whom he descanted on the evils of discord between the followers of various religions in the empire, and announced his remedy, which was to unite them all in a new faith, the *Dīn-i Ilāhī*, or "Divine Faith", which he, as their spiritual guide, would propound, "with the great advantage of not losing what was good in any one religion, while gaining what was better in another". He was not prepared with the details of his new religion, and could not answer Bhagwān Dās, who questioned him on the subject, but he sent Shaikh Mubārak on a missionary tour to expound them. The chief tenet of the new faith, which inculcated monotheism, tinged with pantheism, was the acknowledgement of Akbar's supremacy in

spiritual as well as in temporal affairs. The creed, so far as there was one, was based largely on Jainism, Zoroastrianism, and Hinduism, and its doctrines and practices were carefully calculated to give as much offence as possible to orthodox Muslims. The building and repairing of mosques, the name of Muhammad, Muslim prayers, the fast of Ramadān, and the pilgrimage to Mecca were forbidden; beards were to be shaven, golden ornaments and silken garments worn at prayers, and the *sijda*, or prostration before the emperor, due, according to Islamic doctrines, to God alone, was commanded. The slaughter of cattle was prohibited, abstinence from flesh was recommended, garlic and onions were not to be eaten, the sun was to be adored, and respect was to be shown to artificial lights. The disciple was required to abjure Islam, or any other religion previously professed by him, and might then proceed to one or more "degrees of devotion", up to four, the four degrees being—readiness to sacrifice to the emperor property, life, honour and religion. Akbar more than once denied that he believed himself to be divine, but many of his practices justify the accusation that he considered himself to be more than man. The references to his names in the salutations *Allāhu Akbar* ("God is most great") and *Jalla jalāluhu* ("May His Majesty be glorified"), which he substituted for the ordinary salutations of Muslims, and his extravagant definitions of the kingly office, aroused the suspicions of many, and later in his reign one of the nobles of Ahmadnagar, resenting the arrogant tone adopted by one of the imperial officers, observed that he knew that Akbar pretended to be God, but had yet to learn that his officers were prophets. "The whole scheme", says Mr Vincent Smith, "was the outcome of ridiculous vanity, a monstrous growth of unrestrained autocracy. Its ignominious failure illustrated the wisdom of the warning addressed by the *kotwāl* to the sultan of Delhi some three centuries earlier, and the folly of kings who seek to assume the rôle of prophets." The movement was a failure. Abul Fazl gives a list of eighteen of its prominent members, only one of whom was a Hindu, and the disciples never numbered more than a few thousands, most of whom professed the faith for a consideration, either in place or cash. They never knew how they stood, for Akbar promulgated from time to time foolish regulations and prohibitions which they were expected to obey, and their zeal

seems soon to have waned. Akbar was not prepared to countenance all Hindu practices, for when he was over forty he rode a great distance in the hottest season of the year to save the widow of Jaimal, a cousin of Bhagwān Dās, whose son and other relatives attempted to compel her to become sati against her will. The woman was saved, and those who would have murdered her were punished.

In 1584 the embers of rebellion in Bengal were finally extinguished, and in the autumn of 1585 Akbar marched to Lahore, which he made his headquarters until 1598, for there was much to detain him in this part of his dominions. His half-brother, Muhammad Hakīm, had died at Kābul in July from the effects of strong drink, leaving the province in some disorder, and it was feared that 'Abdullāh Khān the Uzbek, who had already annexed the province of Badakhshān, might extend his aggressions. On Hakīm's death Mān Singh had been sent at once to Kābul to restore order and to defend the province if necessary, and Akbar had followed him to Lahore. The country between Kābul and the Indus was in a most disturbed state. To the north of the Kābul river the Yūsufzai and Mandar tribes preyed upon all caravans and travellers unprotected by troops, and plundered the lowlands; and to the south of that river a sect of fanatics had risen under a prophet named Bāyazīd, who, dying in 1585, was succeeded by his son Jalāl, who withstood the imperial forces for many years, and lastly there was the independent kingdom of Kashmīr. Its ruler, Yūsuf Shāh, when ousted by a usurper, had visited Akbar at Sikrī in 1580 and implored his aid. Akbar had sent a force to reinstate him, but his people, rather than suffer a foreign invasion, had restored him to his throne, and Yūsuf, though he had expressed his gratitude by sending his son Ya'kūb with gifts to Akbar, had declined to appear personally before him as a vassal. Akbar therefore decided to annex his kingdom, and operations against the predatory tribesmen and Kashmīr were undertaken simultaneously, the command of the former being given to Zain Khān, one of the emperor's foster-brothers, and that of the latter nominally to his cousin, Shāhrukh Mīrzā, who was placed under the control and tutelage of Bhagwān Dās.

Zain Khān entered the tribal territory, but, finding his forces insufficient to cope with the rebels, asked for reinforcements, whereupon Akbar sent to his assistance two columns, one under

the command of Rājā Bīrbal, the court-poet, wit and jester, and the other under the command of Hakīm Abul Fath, a physician. He soon had reason to repent of the folly of placing men of this sort in military command. The tribesmen having been punished, the force was withdrawn by a pass selected by the two civilians, against the soldiers' advice. The rebels fell on the imperial troops and slew 8000 of them; Bīrbal being cut down as he was attempting to run away, and compelled, in the words of a Muslim historian, "to join the pack of the hounds of hell". Akbar grieved bitterly for him, and for a time refused to see Zain Khān, who was in no way to blame.

In Kashmīr Yūsuf, having failed to dissuade Bhagwān Dās, by concessions, from proceeding to extremities against him, had occupied, and closed to the invaders, a pass from which he could not easily be dislodged. The imperial troops, having advanced far into the country, suffered much from rain, cold, snow, and shortness of supplies, and were disheartened by the news of the disaster in the Yūsufzai country. Bhagwān Dās therefore granted Yūsuf peace on easy terms. The *khūtba* was to be recited and the coinage issued in the name of Akbar, certain departments and monopolies of the government were to be placed in the hands of imperial officers, Yūsuf was to do homage in person, and was to return to Kashmīr as Akbar's vassal. On these terms the troops retired and Yūsuf accompanied them to Akbar's camp. Akbar was much displeased with the terms granted, but ratified the treaty, and, having done so, immediately violated it by detaining Yūsuf as a prisoner. Yūsuf's son, Ya'kūb, had already fled back to Kashmīr, and prepared to hold the kingdom as his father's successor; and Bhagwān Dās, who considered his honour to have been besmirched by Akbar's breach of faith, attempted to commit suicide by stabbing himself, but the wound was not fatal, and he recovered. The imperial army again invaded the country, and occupied the capital, and though Ya'kūb held his own for more than two years in the hills, he finally submitted when Akbar paid a short visit to Kashmīr, and was sent to join his father, then a prisoner in Bihar. Yūsuf was released shortly afterwards, and was appointed commander of 500 horse, in which capacity he served in Bengal under Mān Singh. Akbar's treatment of Yūsuf Shāh and his son is a blot on his character.

At the time of his visit to Kashmīr in 1589 Akbar lost two of

his best and most faithful servants, within five days of each other. Todar Mal was the first to die, and was followed by Bhagwān Dās. Abul Fazl censures them both as bigots, but they were no more than orthodox Hindus who refused to follow Akbar in his religious pranks. Mān Singh, who succeeded his adoptive father, Bhagwān Dās, in Amber, was also stigmatised as a bigot. When urged to join the "Divine Faith", he replied that he had already given sufficient proof of his devotion, that he was a Hindu, and was prepared to become a Muslim if so commanded, but knew no religion other than those. The blunt refusal of his best officers and most favoured courtiers to acknowledge him as the prophet of God was a severe blow to Akbar's vanity, and should have convinced him of his folly.

After his visit to Kashmīr Akbar marched to Kābul, where he spent two months, and on his return sent an expedition into Sind. In 1528 Shāh Husain, chief of the Arghūn tribe, had overcome Husain Langāh of Sind, and the Arghūns had since been lords of that land. They had accepted Humāyūn as their overlord, but, since his expulsion from India, had been independent. Akbar resolved, for two reasons, to annex Sind, first because it was traditionally part of the Muslim kingdom of Delhi, and secondly, because its possession was a necessary step to the conquest of Balūchistān and Kandahār. Mīrzā 'Abdur Rahīm, Khānkhānān, had therefore been appointed governor of Multān, with instructions to annex Sind. He defeated Mīrzā Jāni Beg Arghūn in two engagements, compelled him to submit, and in 1593 brought him to Akbar's feet. On his formally renouncing Islam and accepting the "Divine Faith", he was appointed to the command of 3000 horse, and shortly afterwards to the government of Sind. Early in 1601 he died of *delirium tremens* in the Deccan. Akbar thus became master of the whole of northern India, but there still remained the Muslim kingdoms of the Deccan, dis severed from Delhi since the middle of the fourteenth century. They were four in number. A confederacy of the Muslim sultans of the Deccan had, in 1565, overthrown the great Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar, the lion's share of which had fallen to the kingdom of Bijāpur. In 1574 Murtazā Nizām Shāh I of Ahmadnagar had annexed the kingdom of Berar, partly as a punishment for its not having joined the confederacy against Vijayanagar. In 1565 Burhān-ud-dīn had contested the throne of Ahmadnagar with



his elder brother, Murtazā I, and, having been worsted, had fled, first to Bijāpur and then, some time later, to the court of Akbar, who had welcomed him as a useful pawn in the troubled game of politics in the Deccan. In 1586 Murtazā I was murdered by his son, Husain II, and the latter, four years later, was deposed and murdered by his nobles, who enthroned Ismā'īl Nizām Shāh, the young son of Burhān-ud-dīn. Burhān, seeing his son on the throne which should have been his, sought leave to gain his kingdom, which Akbar gladly granted, pressing on him also the co-operation of imperial troops, which Burhān was wise enough to decline, for such aid would have made him odious to his subjects and to his fellow-sovereigns of the Deccan, as binding him to Akbar. Burhān, after one unsuccessful attempt to invade Berar and raise his subjects, sought the aid of Rāja 'Alī Khān of Khāndesh, with his assistance defeated Ismā'īl and his adherents, and in 1591 ascended the throne of Ahmadnagar as Burhān Nizām Shāh II. He reigned until his death in 1595, and, when missions which Akbar had in 1591 sent to the courts of the Deccan returned to his court in 1593, they reported that Rāja 'Alī Khān of Khāndesh acknowledged his suzerainty, that the sultans of Bijāpur and Golconda had sent gifts which might be regarded as tribute, but that Burhān II had sent a gift so paltry as to be hardly reckoned even as a compliment. Akbar decided on war. He appointed his youngest son, Dāniyāl, to the command of the army of the Deccan, but afterwards revoked his commission and appointed the Khānkhānān to the command. Akbar's second son, Murād, governor of Gujarāt, was ordered to support and assist him. 'Azīz Koka had been appointed to Gujarāt after the Khānkhānān's transfer to Multān, but had, without permission, left the province on a pilgrimage to Mecca, disgusted with Akbar's religious vagaries. There he was so fleeced by the holy men of Islam that after his return, in 1594, he was reconciled to Akbar and embraced the "Divine Faith". But the invasion of the Deccan was not immediately undertaken.

In 1590, at Akbar's invitation, a second Jesuit mission visited Lahore. His invitation had led the priests to believe that he was seriously thinking of embracing Christianity, but after their arrival they soon discovered that there was no hope of his conversion, and in 1592 the mission returned to Goa. In 1594 Akbar again invited to his court a mission, which, expecting less than the others, was less disappointed.



In April, 1595, Muzaffār Husain Mīrzā, the Safavid prince who governed Kandahār, surrendered the city and province to Shāh Beg, one of Akbar's officers. Kandahār was a bone of contention between the Indian and Persian empires. In 1622 the Persians recovered it from Jahāngīr, in 1638 Shāhjahān recovered it from them, and in 1649 the Persians regained it, and it was finally lost to India.

A period of four years of famine and pestilence, which began to devastate Akbar's empire in 1595, did not hinder the outbreak of war in the Deccan at the end of that year. Burhān II had died in 1595, and had been succeeded by his second son, Ibrāhīm, who was almost immediately killed in battle with the troops of Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II of Bijāpur. He left an infant son named Bahādūr. Bahādūr was proclaimed by Chānd Sultān, sister of Burhān and widow of 'Alī 'Adil Shāh I, who had returned to Ahmadnagar after her husband's death, and now took a leading part in the politics of her native land; but the Deccani nobles put forward another candidate, and two factions of the Africans two others, and, while the four factions were quarrelling, Miyān Manjhū, leader of the Deccanis, appealed to the imperial officers to intervene. The Khānkhānān in Mālwa and Sultān Murād in Gujarāt had both been preparing for a campaign in the Deccan, and, on receiving this appeal, both set out, accompanied by Rāja 'Alī Khān, who had sworn allegiance to Akbar, and arrived before Ahmadnagar late in December, 1595. As they approached the city the various factions presented a temporarily united front against them, and were aided by contingents from Bijāpur and Golconda.

The siege of Ahmadnagar was protracted by the quarrels of the prince and the Khānkhānān, by the vigilant defence of Chānd Sultān, and by the secret encouragement from Sultān 'Alī Khān, whose sympathies were with the kingdoms of the Deccan, and in April 1596, Chānd Sultān saved the city by a treaty with the imperial officers, ceding Berar to Akbar.

The peace did not last long. Quarrels regarding the frontiers of Berar and other matters of detail soon led to hostilities, and in 1597 Rāja 'Alī Khān was killed in a bloody battle on the Godāvārī between the Khānkhānān and the troops of Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar, and was succeeded in Khāndesh by his son, Bahādūr Khān.

In 1599 Sultān Murād died in Berar, of drink, and Akbar, who had in the preceding year moved his court from Lahore to Āgra, set out for the Deccan, appointing his youngest son, Dāniyāl, with the Khānkhānān, to the command of the army in the field. When Akbar reached Burhānpur, Bahādur Khān refused to do homage to him, and the army, under Akbar, besieged him in his fortress-capital of Asīrgarh, while Dāniyāl and the Khānkhānān marched on to Ahmadnagar. Here conspirators murdered the "noble queen", and in 1600 the imperial troops carried the city by assault, with the usual results, and the young king, Bahādur Nizām Shāh, was sent as a state prisoner to Gwalior. Asīrgarh held out longer, but Akbar, having lured Bahādur Khān into his camp, and, by breach of faith, detained him there, at length succeeded in reducing the fortress by means of bribing the leaders of the garrison. In January, 1601, it fell into his hands, and Khāndesh ceased to exist as a separate state. The greater part of Ahmadnagar yet owned allegiance to Murtazā Nizām Shāh II, set up by the nobles to succeed Bahādur Shāh, but Akbar had occupied enough of the kingdom to form a province of his empire, and Berar, Ahmadnagar and Khāndesh were formed into three additional *sūbas*, the last being re-named Dāndesh in honour of the prince, Dāniyāl, who was appointed to the viceroyalty of the three provinces.

After the reduction of Asīrgarh and the organisation of the administration of the three provinces of the Deccan, Akbar was obliged to set out for Āgra, for his eldest son, Salīm, was in rebellion, and at Allāhābād, of which province he held the government, maintained a court as an independent sovereign. The emperor was in his fifty-ninth year, his health was beginning to fail, and Salīm had every reason to believe that should his father die while he himself was at a distance from the capital he would not gain the crown without a contest. His brother Dāniyāl was yet alive, but he had a more formidable competitor in the person of his own son, Khusraw, who was a favourite of Akbar's, and whose cause was supported by a powerful faction at court, which dreaded Salīm's brutal cruelty and drunken habits. Salīm had therefore declined to leave Allāhābād for the purpose of crushing a serious rebellion in Bengal, and, after Akbar's return from the Deccan, had marched on Āgra with a large force. He hesitated to disobey Akbar's order directing him

to return at once to Allāhābād, but he paid no heed to an order appointing him to the government of Bengal and Orissa, and, remaining at Allāhābād, assumed the royal title and struck money in his own name.

Akbar refrained from active measures against his undutiful son, but summoned to court for consultation Abul Fazl, who had been left in the Deccan for the purpose of assisting in the pacification and administration of the new provinces. Abul Fazl both feared and disliked Salīm, and the prince regarded him as his enemy, and feared that he would set his father against him and urge him to disinherit him. He therefore entered into communication with Bīr Singh, the violent and unscrupulous Bundela chief of Orchha, and hired him to murder Abul Fazl on his way to court. In August, 1602, the Bundela waylaid and slew him near Narwar, severed his head from his body, and sent it to Salīm, who "received it with unholy joy and treated it with shameful insult".

The murder of his learned favourite enraged and deeply grieved Akbar, who ordered the pursuit and punishment of Bīr Singh, but the Bundela, though long hunted, escaped and lived to enjoy the favour of the instigator of his crime.

Sultān Salīma Begum, wife of Akbar and mother of Murād, visited Salīm at the end of 1602, and persuaded him to submit. He placed himself under the protection of his grandmother, Akbar's aged mother, and visited Āgra, where a formal reconciliation took place between father and son, and Salīm was deputed to subdue the rāna, Amar Singh, son and successor of Pratāp Singh. He set out, but had no intention of pursuing an arduous campaign, far from the capital, and, when he had reached Sikrī, made impossible demands for reinforcements and treasure, and, failing to receive them, returned, with Akbar's reluctant assent, to Allāhābād, where he was grievously afflicted by the loss of his favourite wife, Shāh Begum, the adoptive sister of Mān Singh. After a paroxysm of grief, he resumed his evil courses, and so exceeded in the consumption of opium and strong drink as to become a terror to all around him, and a source of great grief to his father.

Early in 1604 Dāniyāl died in the Deccan, from the effects of strong drink, but Khusraw, Salīm's son, still remained as a possible competitor for the crown. Later in the year Akbar announced

his intention of visiting Bengal, and prepared to set out from Āgra, his real destination being Allāhābād. Accidents delayed him, and his old mother, who fell ill from grief at the failure of her attempts to dissuade him from proceeding against his first-born, became so feeble that Akbar felt constrained to visit her before leaving, and she died shortly after he had seen her. Akbar then reopened negotiations with his son, and Salīm was persuaded that it would be to his advantage to submit. He set out from Allāhābād for Āgra with a large force, but left it at a distance from the city, and approached the palace with a small personal escort. Akbar received him publicly with distinction and affection, but, when his son fell at his feet, drew him into an inner apartment, struck him in the face, and abused and reproached him. He then placed him under restraint as though he were a dangerous maniac, but, having thus humbled him, gradually relented, and by degrees restored him to favour as his heir. Salīm then settled down in Āgra, where he lived quietly for nearly a year until his father's death.

In September, 1604, Akbar fell sick of diarrhoea, or dysentery, and while he was under treatment a quarrel between the servants of his son and his grandson vexed him and aggravated his complaint. During his father's illness Salīm, who was in the habit of visiting him frequently, discovered a plot of some of the nobles to seize him on the occasion of one of his visits, and to remove him in favour of his son; but, warned in time, he withdrew from the palace before the design could be put into execution, and at a general meeting of the nobles the proposal that he should be excluded from the succession was outvoted, but his adherents afterwards judged it necessary to require from him oaths to protect the Muslim faith. Having satisfied them, he visited his father, now almost past the power of speech. The dying emperor signified his wish that his son should assume the royal turban and gird himself with Humāyūn's sword, and Salīm, leaving the palace, was acclaimed by the multitude as his father's successor. Shortly after his departure his father breathed his last. Muslim writers declare that in his last moments Akbar recanted his errors, and died a good Muslim, but he seems hardly to have recovered consciousness after Salīm had left him, and thus, on October 27, 1605, he died.

Akbar was unquestionably the greatest of all rulers of India

of the Muslim period. His age, it has been remarked, was an age of great rulers. His nearest contemporary was Elizabeth of England, but Henry IV of France and 'Abbās the Great of Persia were ruling their kingdoms during a great part of his reign. He was the first, if not the only, Indian monarch to aspire to ruling a united people rather than to leading a dominant race, and his domestic alliances with Rājput families were what is now called a friendly gesture to the subject race, but by degrees he learned that Hinduism and Islam were incompatible, and, though he knew that such alliances as his were regarded by many of the subject race as an indelible disgrace, he laid the blame for this incompatibility chiefly upon the faith of his fathers. Very early in life he adopted and practised the principle of *sulh-i-kull*, or universal toleration, but later there was one creed which he excepted from its benefits, and that one was his own former faith. Many Muslims, eager to claim so great a ruler as one of themselves, contend that Akbar always remained a Muslim, and never went beyond an attempt to reform the faith in the direction of making it less harshly intolerant; but these ignore the undoubted facts that he definitely abjured Islam, and required others to abjure it, and that in the latter part of his life he persecuted its followers and destroyed its places of worship. The exclusiveness and intolerance of Islam was one of the factors in the greatest of his errors, the institution of the "Divine Faith". Another was personal vanity, but the greatest was, perhaps, the idea of founding a faith which all his subjects could accept. This, though an imperial conception, betrayed, besides great vanity, strange ignorance of human nature. Where Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Jainism, Christianity, and Islam had failed, Akbar's "Divine Faith" was not likely to succeed. It was, in fact, an ignominious failure, and made no appeal to Hindus, Muslims, or Christians; but Akbar never admitted failure, and to the end of his life stood forth as the prophet of his new faith. Far more practical, liberal, and modest was the policy of one of his great predecessors, Shīr Shāh, who, regarding religion as a personal matter, retained his own, and refrained from persecuting others for retaining theirs.

Some uncritical writers have written of Akbar as though he were divine, as his enemies said he pretended to be, and his flatterers almost persuaded him that he was; but he was far from perfect. Aggressive land-hunger, political duplicity, and cruelty

were faults of his age and race, and for these it would be unjust to blame one who, though far from guiltless, was not the guiltiest of his line. Incontinence and intemperance, which were among his faults, he attempted to curb, but an attempt on his life in 1564 and one of the conditions attached to the surrender of Ranthambhor indicate that, in early life at least, his fancy ranged sometimes beyond the bounds of his own copious harem; and though he was never, like his sons, a slave to strong drink, and in later life exceeded moderation less often than in his youth, there is evidence enough to prove that he was always what John Evelyn would have styled "a good drinking gentleman".

The fiscal administration for which he and Todar Mal have been so highly praised was based largely on the methods of Shīr Shāh, a born and trained administrator, but Akbar's historians have done scant justice to "Shīr Khān, the Afghan rebel". Its object was the enrichment of the crown rather than the prosperity of the people, and we have no record of effective or widespread measures of relief in the dreadful famines which fell on the land in Akbar's reign.

His illiteracy was no obstacle to his being widely and deeply informed, for he was endowed with prodigious powers of memory, and delighted in listening to readers and disputants; but knowledge acquired in this haphazard fashion was necessarily diffuse and ill-arranged, and left the receptive mind undisciplined. But the Jesuits admit that the range of his knowledge was so wide that none would have suspected his illiteracy.

He was a mystic, and experienced visions which deeply moved him, for he was sincerely religious and devout, and, as his son says, "never for one moment forgot God". As a young man he recited regularly the ritual prayers of Islam, and in later life performed devotions of his own devising, with acts of reverence to the sun, fire and light, as symbols of the divine purity and brilliance. Even when he was not engaged in personal devotions, his chief delight was to listen to discourses on and discussions of religious questions, and to seek the means of closer union with God. His practice fell far short of his precepts but, as Mr Vincent Smith says, "He was a born king of men, with a rightful claim to rank as one of the greatest sovereigns known to history. That claim rests securely on the basis of his extraordinary natural gifts and his magnificent achievements".


## CHAPTER X

### Jahāngīr

On October 27, 1605, Salīm succeeded his father, assuming the title and throne-name of Nūr-ud-dīn Muhammad Jahāngīr, "the Light of the Faith, Muhammad, the World-Seizer". His personal name, as he explains in his memoirs, was the same as that of an Ottoman emperor, and he therefore changed it from Salīm to Jahāngīr. The change caused him no inconvenience, for his name, Salīm, had seldom been used. His father, "drunk or sober", as he says, had always called him "Shaikhū Bābā". He preferred the more arrogant name of Jahāngīr, but to the Persian court, with which he had much correspondence, he was always "Salīm, the ruler of India".

Jahāngīr, like his brothers and all his father's house, was much addicted to strong drink, and though he was far from being the mere sot that some writers have represented him to be, he habitually exceeded the bounds of moderation. His medical advisers prevailed on him to reduce his allowance of double-distilled spirit, and to cease drinking during the day, but he never went to bed sober, except perhaps on Friday nights, corresponding with our Thursdays. Of his character we glean much from his memoirs, which, though less outspoken than those of Bābur, are sufficiently frank, and from the reports of European travellers. Akbar had received Englishmen. Fitch, Newbery and Leedes, the last of whom died in his service, had visited his court at Sikrī in 1585. We learn much of him from the Jesuits, and at the end of his reign he received John Mildenhall, bearing a letter from Elizabeth of England; but of Jahāngīr we have portraits from the pen of the bluff sea-captain, William Hawkins, who for some time enjoyed the honour of being his boon companion, and from that of a very different character, the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, who never forgot the dignity of his country, or of his own position as her representative. Observing the favour shown by Jahāngīr to Hawkins, "the Portugalls were like madde dogges", and, though their intrigues did not avail to diminish his personal regard for the English sailor, they pre-







vented him from obtaining any material advantage for his countrymen.

Hawkins gives an account of Jahāngīr's daily life. "About the breake of day", he says, "he is at his Beades, with his face turned to the westward (i.e. towards Mecca) in a private faire room", in which is "the picture of Our Lady and Christ, graven in stone". He then showed himself to the people at the *jharokha*, or palace oriel-window, then slept for two hours, and afterwards dined and retired to the female apartments. At noon he held levees until three, and witnessed elephant fights and other sports. At this time, too, he heard and decided cases. He then again said his prayers and ate his evening meal, of four or five sorts of well-dressed meats, "of which he eateth a bit to stay his stomach, drinking once of his stronge drinke. Then he cometh forth into a private roome (the *ghusl-khāna*), where none can come but such as himself nominateth (for two years I was one of his attendants here). In this place he drinketh other five cupfuls, which is the portion that the physicians alot him. This done, he eateth opium, and being in the height of his drinke he layeth him down to sleep, every man departing to his own home. And after he hath slept two hours they awake him and bring his supper to him, at which time he is not able to feed himself; but it is thrust into his mouth by others. And this is about one of the clock; and then he sleepeth the rest of the night".

This picture of a ruler, sodden with drink and opium, having food thrust into his mouth by others when he is too bemused to feed himself, is not edifying; but though this was the routine at the capital, Jahāngīr could rouse himself when it was necessary for him to take the field, and, notwithstanding his licentiousness and gross self-indulgence, he was not neglectful of the duties of religion. Like his father, but not to the same extent, he was inclined to dabble in religious speculation, and had cultivated the friendship of the Jesuit fathers, and otherwise behaved in a manner not entirely in accordance with the views of orthodox Muslims. Sir Thomas Roe describes him sharing the coarse meal of a "filthy beggar", doubtless a holy ascetic besmeared, after the Hindu fashion, with the ashes of dung, "taking him up in his armes, which no cleanly body durst, imbracing, and three times laying his hand on his heart and calling him father". Yet he was a better Muslim than his father, for he never renounced

Islam. His chief fault was cruelty. His was a cruel age, and even Akbar was not free from the taint, though he never gloated, as Jahāngīr did, over the sufferings of men impaled, or flayed alive.

The movement to exclude him from the throne in favour of his son, Khusraw, had been very strong, and Akbar's acknowledgment of him as his heir had not crushed the conspiracy. Khusraw was an amiable young man of great personal charm and of high moral character, but weak and accessible to flatterers. The attempt to oust his father in his favour had inflamed his ambition, and his father, on his accession, had taken necessary precautions for the security of his throne. Khusraw, though not actually in durance, was kept under close surveillance in the fort at Āgra. Chafing under restraint, he succeeded, on April 6, 1606, in effecting his escape from Āgra, and many of the younger nobility, including his kinsman, Hasan Mīrzā, son of Shāhrukh Mīrzā, who were warmly attached to him, gathered round him. He made his way towards Lahore, with a view to seizing that city and establishing himself in the Panjab, and on his way was joined by so many that his followers numbered 12,000 when he arrived there. At Tārṇ, Taran Arjūn, the *guru* of the Sikhs, provided him with a sum of five thousand rupees, but Dilāvar Khān, the governor of Lahore, was faithful to Jahāngīr, and, though his troops were few they were more than a match, behind defences, for Khusraw's raw levies; and repulsed their assault. Meanwhile Jahāngīr had followed his son with such forces as he could immediately collect, and Khusraw, leaving a small force before Lahore, advanced with ten thousand men to Sultānpur, near the confluence of the Beās and the Sutlej, and near that place offered battle to the advanced guard of the imperial army, under Shaikh Farīd. Jahāngīr sent an envoy to his son to induce him to submit, but the prince, relying on his numerical superiority, was obdurate. In the battle which followed his undisciplined troops were scattered by his father's, many being taken and many slain. Khusraw escaped with his immediate adherents, and against the advice of many endeavoured to reach Kābul. Jahāngīr made Lahore his headquarters, and a force under Abul Kāsim Namakīn, sent by him in pursuit of the fugitives, captured them on the Chināb and carried them into the town of Gujrāt. An escort sent out by Jahāngīr led them before him in Lahore. He, much grieved by his son's conduct, reproached him bitterly, and his

two chief adherents, Husain Beg and 'Abdur Rahīm, were sewn up in freshly-flayed hides, the first in that of an ox, and the second in that of an ass, and were paraded through the city on asses face to tail. Husain Beg was crushed to death, but 'Abdur Rahīm, after severe suffering, survived, and was ever afterwards known as 'the ass'. Later, an avenue of stakes was set up between Lahore and a garden without the city, on each stake was impaled one of Khusraw's followers, and Khusraw himself, mounted on an elephant, was led through the avenue, while his father brutally mocked him with the taunt that his followers were making obeisance to him. The prince, overcome with grief, wept almost unceasingly for days, and is said never to have smiled again. Many of those known to have been in sympathy with him were punished by heavy fines. Mān Singh is said to have been amerced in a sum equivalent to ten millions sterling, but the Sikh *guru*, Arjūn, was put to death with torture.

Khusraw's rebellion led to other disturbances. Rai Rai Singh of Bikaner rose in rebellion near Nāgaur, but was defeated, and was later pardoned. A petty chief in Bihar also rose, but was defeated and slain. At the same time a Persian army threatened Kandahār, but withdrew on the approach of a relieving force under Mirzā Ghāzi, son of Jāni Beg Arghūn.

Jahāngīr marched to Kābul, where he spent the summer, and on his return to Lahore discovered a plot, to which Khusraw was privy, to assassinate him in the hunting-field. Four of the ringleaders were put to death, and Khusraw was blinded, but his sight was not entirely destroyed, and after his return to Āgra Jahāngīr relented, and caused his son's eyes to be treated, so that the sight of one was restored. But the prince's misfortunes endeared him to the people, and in April, 1610, Kutb-ud-dīn, a Muslim youth, rose in rebellion in Bihar, and, by personating him, assembled so many followers that he was able to gain possession of Patna, the provincial capital, and the treasure which it contained, while the two officials in charge of the city fled without striking a blow. The governor, who was on tour, returned and defeated the rebels, whose leader surrendered and was executed, and many of his followers were imprisoned. The two cowardly officials, their heads and beards having been shaved, were paraded through the streets of Āgra in female attire.

In May, 1611, Jahāngīr married Mihr-un-nissā, who received

the title at first of *Nūr Mahal*, 'Light of the Palace', and afterwards that of *Nūr Jahān*, 'Light of the World', by which she will be described here. Around her name very many romantic tales, too long and too intricate for repetition, have been woven. Her true story is as follows. She was the daughter of a Persian named Ghiyās Beg and his wife, and was born at Kandahār while her father was on his way from his native land to India. Ghiyās Beg continued his journey and entered Akbar's service. He was a learned and cultured man, and in 1595 held the post of controller of the revenues of the province of Kābul. His daughter was married to a Persian adventurer, 'Alī Kulī Istājlu, who had entered the service of 'Abdur Rahīm Khānkhānān and so highly distinguished himself in the campaign in Sind that he was transferred later to the service of Salīm, the heir-apparent. His dexterity and bravery in slaying a tiger gained him the title of Shīr Afkan Khān ('the Overthrower of the Tiger'), and Jahāngīr, on his succession, bestowed on him a fief at Bardwān, in Bengal. Here he fell under suspicion of complicity in the sedition ever rife in that province, and Kutb-ud-dīn Khān, who had succeeded Mān Singh as governor, was ordered to send him to court under arrest. The governor accordingly visited Bardwān with a body of troops, and summoned Shīr Afkan to his camp. Shīr Afkan obeyed, but, observing that as he approached the governor he was gradually surrounded, became suspicious, and, as Kutb-ud-dīn advanced to meet him, drew his sword and delivered such a cut that the bowels gushed out. Kutb-ud-dīn's attendants fell on the assassin and cut him down. Mihr-un-nissā and her daughter were sent to Āgra, where her father now held high office, and the mother was appointed lady-in-waiting to Sulṭān Salīma Begum, Akbar's chief widow, in whose service Jahāngīr met her, fell in love with her, and in May, 1611, married her.

The story usually told is that Jahāngīr had fallen in love with her long before, at his father's court, that Akbar, to prevent a marriage, caused her to be married to Shīr Afkan, and that Jahāngīr, thus frustrated, afterwards compassed her husband's death, after which she for four years repelled the advances of his murderer, but at last relented. From the best contemporary evidence it appears that this story is a fabrication. Shīr Afkan suffered death as any other assassin would have suffered in like

circumstances, not because the emperor loved his wife, and his widow was not unkind to her imperial wooer.

Nūr Jahān was an extraordinary woman. Nearly thirty-four, an age at which most oriental women are in the sere and yellow leaf, her great beauty inflamed the emperor's passion, and her physical charms were the least of her merits. With a commanding intellect, she was most highly educated in her mother-tongue, the most beautiful in the East, and was no mean poetess. She was mistress of most feminine accomplishments, and had great taste in art, which inspired her even to introduce a change in the fashion of female dress. She was well acquainted with public affairs, and her ruling passion was ambition and the love of power, in acquiring and in wielding which she was hindered by few scruples.

After her marriage to Jahāngīr, Nūr Jahān formed a party, which virtually ruled the empire until, in 1622, Khurram's revolt against his father separated him from it, and it was enfeebled by the death of some of its leading members; but Nūr Jahān retained her influence over her husband until his death. The party consisted of her father, Ghiyās Beg, now entitled I'timād-ud-daula, her brother, Āsaf Khān, and Jahāngīr's third son, Khurram, generally regarded as heir apparent, who married her daughter, Arjumand Bānū Begum, and whose claim to the succession she strongly supported.

Jahāngīr was not at first a mere tool of this clique, for they were acquainted with his designs and his policy, and were careful not to thwart him, but as a result of years of self-indulgence he became slothful, and impatient of the tedium of public business. He knew, he said, that his wife was well able to rule, and for his own part he was well content with a bottle and a piece of meat. As for Nūr Jahān, she brushed aside the convention of feminine seclusion, accompanied her husband in the hunting field, showed herself to the public at the *jharokha*, or palace window, issued *farmāns*, and alone among the wives of Indian rulers was allowed the honour of the impression of her name upon the coin of the realm, with that of her husband.

The palace party of Nūr Jahān was not unopposed. The opposition comprised many of the old nobles, headed by Mahābat Khān. The Khānkhānān would have been its natural leader, but he lacked the spirit, and perhaps the disinterestedness, to set

himself in opposition to a clique so powerful. The view of the opposition was that the empire was virtually ruled by a woman, and that Jahāngīr was disgracefully subservient to his wife. Mahābat Khān, though he sacrificed his own advancement, persistently ventilated this view. The bug-bear of the palace party was the much-loved Khusraw, whose sight was not so impaired as to disqualify him for the throne, and whose claim to the succession was strenuously advocated by the opposition. The palace party's dread was Jahāngīr's unconquerable affection for his son in spite of his delinquencies, and no efforts were spared to alienate him from the prince. For a long time Nūr Jahān found her husband inexorable on this point, and in 1613 Khusraw was allowed considerable liberty, and was favourably received at court, but a year later Nūr Jahān succeeded in obtaining the revocation of the orders in his favour, and, late in 1616, persuaded Jahāngīr to commit the unfortunate prince to the custody of her brother, Āsaf Khān. His fate will be noticed later. The palace party was later to be disappointed in its own candidate for the throne, Khurram, the third of Jahāngīr's sons, and the ablest.

Between Khusraw's rebellion, suppressed in 1605, and Khurram's near the end of the reign, the internal peace of the empire was disturbed by various wars and rebellions, of which only the principal need be noticed, the subjection of Mewār, the pacification of the Deccan, and the subjection of the important state of Kishtwār, in Kashmīr. But in 1613 the Portuguese seized off Surat four of Jahāngīr's ships, containing much treasure. The Portuguese, owing to the superiority of their arms and discipline, were usually successful against the imperial troops on land, and on the sea there was no power but the English which could compete with them, for the Muslims were neither seamen nor warriors when afloat. Early in 1615 Mukarrab Khān, the governor of Surat, was gratified by the defeat of the Portuguese fleet under the viceroy, de Azevedo, which was driven from the coasts of Gujarāt by four English ships under Nicholas Downton, but the English were ill-rewarded by the conclusion of a treaty in June, 1615, between the Portuguese and Jahāngīr, the avowed object of which was to keep the English and the Dutch out of India. Its only result, however, was that Jahāngīr remained at peace with the Portuguese for the rest of his life.

Bengal was in confusion during the greater part of the reign. 'Usmān, an Afghan chief, made a determined attempt to restore Afghan rule in that province, but his rebellion was suppressed by Shujā'at Khān, an officer under Islām Khān, governor of the province, who had transferred the seat of the local government to Dacca, which he renamed Jahāngīrnagar. In March, 1612, Shujā'at Khān defeated 'Usmān, who did not survive the battle. The remaining Afghans submitted, and this was the last Afghan rebellion in Bengal. Further operations against the Maghs of Arakan were less successful. But though the Afghans had been finally subdued in Bengal, matters were otherwise on the north-western frontier, where, in 1611, the fanatical Raushanīs rose once more under a leader named Ahdad, and made a surprise attack on Kābul in the absence of the governor, Khān Daurān. The city held out, but Khān Daurān was degraded for his negligence, and the weakness and the dissensions of the imperial officers in the Kābul province encouraged the fanatics, and their rebellion was not crushed for some years. No sooner had it been suppressed than disturbances arose in the trans-Indus district of Bangash. Late in 1617 Mahābat Khān, who, though obnoxious to the palace party, was one of Jahāngīr's best soldiers, was appointed to the government of Kābul to deal with the rebellion in Bangash, but he, though a native of Kābul, had little success in this affair, and Bangash remained in rebellion for the rest of Jahāngīr's reign.

Since the beginning of the reign there had been much desultory warfare in Mewār, the kingdom of the rāna, but without any decisive result. Amar Singh, who in 1597 had succeeded his father Pratāp Singh, would not acknowledge the emperor's supremacy, and Jahāngīr followed his father's policy of harassing him until he should submit. In 1608 Mahābat Khān conducted a campaign in which he was successful in the field, but was unable to reach the remote fastnesses of the Rājputs, who were thus left unsubdued. In 1609 he was succeeded by 'Abdullāh Khān, who pursued a campaign with similar results. Constant hostilities on the borders of the Deccan long prevented the assembly of an army sufficiently strong to reduce the rāna to obedience, but in 1613 Jahāngīr transferred his court to Ajmir, and appointed his third son, Khurram, to the command of the army assembled for the conquest of Mewār. Early in 1614 Khurram, with a large

reinforcement, took command of the army hitherto commanded by 'Azīz Koka. Their relative positions were not precisely defined, and the prince, resenting the old man's assumption that he was his tutor and guardian, at first complained that 'Azīz Koka, notoriously a partisan of Khusraw, was trying to injure his prospects of success, and finally arrested him. Jahāngīr confirmed this action by confining the old man in Gwalior, under the charge of Āsaf Khān, Khusraw was forbidden the court, and although 'Azīz Koka was shortly afterwards released, the family clique was, for the time, triumphant. Khurram proceeded successfully with the campaign, the open country was devastated and laid waste, and supplies were cut off from the gallant Rājputs in their strongholds in the hills. This method of conducting the war produced famine. Amar Singh saw his subjects dying of hunger; he was deserted by many of his followers; and at length his spirit was broken. He offered to acknowledge the sovereignty of the emperor, to wait on Khurram and make submission to him, and to send his son, Karan Singh, to the imperial court. An imperial *farmān* accepting these terms was dispatched to him, and he came forth, made obeisance to Khurram, and was honourably received. Later in the day his son also made obeisance and accompanied Khurram to Jahāngīr's court at Ajmir. Thus Jahāngīr accomplished a task which had defeated Akbar. The rānas of Mewār remained henceforth loyal to the emperors of Timūr's house until Aurang-zīb's bigotry drove them into rebellion.

Jahāngīr received Khurram in a manner befitting his great success, and accorded also a generous reception to the son of his defeated foe, who was appointed to high rank in his service and shortly afterwards permitted to return home.

It was at Ajmir that Jahāngīr received the English ambassador, Sir Thomas Roe, who arrived at his court in January, 1616. Roe's object was a reciprocal treaty, assuring the security and freedom of the English in India, but this he failed to obtain. Jahāngīr's counsellors considered such a treaty beneath his dignity, and thought that Roe should be content to receive imperial rescripts and *farmāns*, but with these he was not content, and in September, 1618, he left the court, having failed in his mission.

Rājasthān having been reduced to obedience, the Deccan next engaged Jahāngīr's attention. After the fall of Ahmadnagar and the deportation to Gwalior of the boy-king, Bahādur Nizām



Shāh, a grandson of Burhān Nizām Shāh I had been raised to the throne under the title of Murtazā Nizām Shāh II, but he was a mere puppet, and the real ruler of the state was Malik 'Ambar, an able, active, and warlike African, who transferred the capital of the state to Khirkī, on the site of which Aurangābād now stands.

Malik 'Ambar was the first to bring against the imperial troops the Marātha light horse, of which he recognised the value against a cumbrous and luxurious army. The Marāthas inhabited the country between the Taptī and a line drawn from Chanda to Goa. They were a dominant tribe of landholders, and a Marātha dynasty had ruled this country from late in the twelfth until the end of the thirteenth century. After the conquest of their country by the Muslims many of them retained their holdings, and those who possessed strongholds in the Western Ghats and between the mountains and the sea submitted only to the most powerful of the Muslim rulers, and when the central authority weakened enjoyed a rude independence. After the disruption of the kingdom of the Bahmanids, many of the greater Marātha landholders entered the service of the Muslim kingdoms, chiefly those of Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar, and rose to high positions in the service of those states. For their troops, chiefly light cavalry, exceedingly mobile and requiring no transport, the unwieldy armies of the emperors were no match. Besides his arms the Marātha horseman carried a blanket, a flap of bread, and perhaps an onion; he had no cumbrous train of elephants, wagons, and pack-animals, nor did his wife and children accompany him. The tactics of the Marātha leaders consisted in the avoidance of pitched battles, but they hung on the flanks and rear of an army on the march, or on the outskirts of a force in camp, or besieging a city, slew stragglers, intercepted convoys and small parties, cut off supplies until the great host was reduced to distress, and dispersed when any attempt was made to force a battle on them. With such tactics the imperial troops were unable to cope.

Malik 'Ambar introduced into the Ahmadnagar kingdom a land-revenue settlement similar to that introduced by Todar Mal into the empire, organised the forces of the kingdom, and freely employed his Marātha auxiliaries. Since the death of Dāniyāl a state of war had almost continuously prevailed between the remnant of the Ahmadnagar kingdom and the officers holding

commands on the southern frontier of the empire. These officers were jealous of one another, quarrelsome, and not always entirely loyal. Military posts in Berar, Khāndesh, and the imperial province of Ahmadnagar often changed hands without apparently sufficient reason, and 'Ambar stoutly held his own. In 1608 the Khānkhānān was appointed to the command of the imperial provinces in the Deccan, but was unable to control the insubordinate local officers, and in 1610 Parvīz, Jahāngīr's second son, then aged twenty, was appointed to the chief command, but contented himself with holding a court at Burhānpur while the Khānkhānān carried on the government. In the same year Pīr Khān Lodī, entitled Khānjahān, was sent to the Deccan with large reinforcements of Rājputs and others, and arrived to find that the Khānkhānān had suffered a severe reverse, and that 'Ambar had recovered Ahmadnagar. The Khānkhānān was recalled to court in disgrace. In 1611 'Abdullāh Khān, recently successful in Mewār, was appointed to the government of Gujarāt, and ordered to co-operate with the troops in the Deccan, but his campaign against Daulatābād was disastrous, and he was obliged to retire into Gujarāt after suffering heavy losses. In 1612 the Khānkhānān, having been re-appointed, captured and burned Khirkī, and to some extent retrieved the disgrace which the imperial arms had suffered, but he again failed to control his insubordinate officers, and was accused, apparently with reason, of receiving gratifications from the enemy. In the autumn of 1616 Parvīz was transferred from the Deccan to Allāhābād, and Khurram, lately successful in Mewār, was appointed to the command in the Deccan, while Jahāngīr moved his court from Ajmir to Māndū, in order to be near the seat of war.

Khurram, after crossing the Nerbudda, sent missions to 'Ambar and his ally, Ibrāhīm 'Ādil Shāh II of Bījāpur, proposing peace on the terms of the retrocession of the imperial territory annexed by 'Ambar, and a promise to pay tribute regularly in future. The approach of Khurram's great army and Jahāngīr's advance to Māndū overawed the allies, each of whom suspected that the other had been corrupted by imperial gold, and in October, 1617, after the conclusion of the treaties, Khurram returned to Māndū. He was then at the height of his fame. He was promoted to the command of 30,000 horse, a rank never before conferred, and received the title of Shāhjahān, or 'King of the World'.

Jahāngīr was thus free to leave Māndū, and set out on a tour through Gujarāt, a province which he had not yet visited. There, like his father, he first saw the sea, but he was not, like Mahmūd of Ghaznī, favourably impressed with the climate of the province, for a severe epidemic of influenza prevailed, and bubonic plague also was rife, and in August, 1617, he set out for Āgra. On October 24, at Dohad, a third son, Aurangzīb, was born to Shāhjahān of his wife, Mumtāz Mahal. Jahāngīr continued his journey by leisurely stages, but, after reaching Āgra, found that the plague was rife there also, and moved his court to Sikrī until the early autumn of 1619.

The district of Kishtwār, geographically a part of the province of Kashmīr, had retained its independence even after the conquest of the former kingdom by Akbar's officers, and more than one governor had failed in the attempt to reduce its ruler to obedience. Dilāvar Khān was governor of Kashmīr, and in 1620, after an arduous campaign, he brought the raja in chains before Jahāngīr. But later in the year the oppression of the governor again roused the people; the imperial garrison was annihilated, and Jahāngīr was obliged to send an army to quell the revolt. The first officer sent in command of the troops was unable to crush the rebels, and Irādat Khān was appointed governor, and suppressed the rebellion for the time, but two years later the people again rose, and it was not until 1622 that the district was finally pacified and effectively garrisoned.

Jahāngīr had for some time contemplated the reduction of the strong fortress of Kāngra, which Akbar had been unable to capture, but Suraj Mal, to whom the enterprise had been intrusted at the instance of the family clique, played him false. Bikramājīt, however, who had been appointed Suraj Mal's lieutenant, captured both Suraj Mal and the raja of Chamba, with whom he had taken refuge, and on November 16, 1620, after a siege of fourteen months, compelled the garrison of Kāngra to surrender the fortress. In 1621 Jahāngīr visited it, and asserted the supremacy of Islam by causing a bullock to be slaughtered and a mosque built within the fortress.

The family clique was now approaching dissolution. Jahāngīr's health was failing, and Nūr Jahān could not endure the thought of surrendering the reins of government, which she had held for some time, to a masterful successor. Originally she and her

brother, Āsaf Khān, had been united in supporting the claims of Shāhjahān, the latter's son-in-law, but the manner of this prince's conduct of the tasks committed to him, the conquest of Rājasthān, and the restoration of peace in the Deccan, had made it perfectly clear that he was not the man to submit to petticoat government, and Nūr Jahān consequently turned her eyes elsewhere. She had a daughter, Lādīlī Begum, by her first husband, whom she was prepared to bestow on the candidate selected by her. She seems to have had some idea at first of choosing Khusraw, but he was a strict monogamist and negotiations never proceeded far with him. Parvīz, the second son, was a hopeless drunkard, without his father's constitution, and it appeared unlikely that he would outlive Jahāngīr. The only son left was the youngest, Shāhryār, a docile and feeble-minded youth of sixteen, just the instrument, in short, that Nūr Jahān needed. This marriage caused a rift in the clique. Āsaf Khān was too astute to quarrel openly with his powerful sister, but he was naturally unwilling, both from personal and loyal motives, to prefer her feeble son-in-law to his own, who had proved his ability to command and rule. Shortly after the marriage the clique was further weakened by the death of 'Ismat Begum and of her husband, the parents of Nūr Jahān and Āsaf Khān.

Three parties thus emerged at court, the partisans of the virtuous Khusraw, still believed to be his father's favourite, those of Shāhjahān, who could count at least on the secret support of the minister, Āsaf Khān, and those of Shāhryār consisting of Nūr Jahān and her personal adherents, who were prepared to sacrifice the interests of the empire to her ambition.

In 1620 the imperial troops were again hard pressed in the Deccan. Ahmadnagar was besieged, and the Khānkhānān was obliged to appeal to court for aid. Shāhjahān was obviously the right man to be sent to restore order, but Jahāngīr was still ailing, and, if he died during the prince's absence in the south, it was almost certain that Khusraw's partisans would succeed in raising him to the throne. Shāhjahān therefore made the delivery of his eldest brother into his charge a condition of his accepting the command. To this Nūr Jahān raised no objection, as compliance with Shāhjahān's demand entailed the absence of her candidate's two rivals; but Jahāngīr must have known that the surrender of Khusraw to his younger brother was almost equivalent to a

sentence of death. The crisis in the Deccan, however, was acute, and Shāhjahān, bidding farewell to his father at Lahore, carried his unfortunate brother with him. He drove the troops of Ahmadnagar across the Nerbudda, caused them to raise the siege of Burhānpur and evacuate all the imperial posts which they had occupied, and to retire to Daulatābād, where Malik 'Ambar submitted to him, and the three kingdoms of the Deccan were obliged to pay an indemnity amounting with arrears of tribute to five millions of rupees.

Shāhjahān was occupied for some months in reorganising the administration of the recovered territories, and in August, 1621, on receiving news of his father's serious illness, caused Khusraw to be strangled at Burhānpur, and, after a time, reported to Jahāngīr that he had died of colic. The emperor affected to believe the falsehood, but Nūr Jahān neglected no opportunity of arousing his wrath against the murderer.

At this moment the empire was attacked from without. In 1606 the Persians had failed to capture Kandahār, but in March, 1622, Shāh 'Abbās the Great marched against that fortress and captured it after a siege of forty-five days. Jahāngīr made strenuous efforts at first to relieve and afterwards to recover the fortress. A mighty army with a siege-train was assembled at Multān, and Shāhjahān was bidden to hasten northwards and assume command. He marched as far as Māndū, but there halted, and perceiving that a campaign in Persia would be more arduous than the operations in the Deccan, refused to proceed farther unless the government of the Panjab were conferred upon him. Meanwhile he sent a force to occupy the fief of Dholpur, for which he had applied some time before, and his officers ousted those of Shāhryār, on whom the fief had already been bestowed. Nūr Jahān was furious, insisted that he was already in rebellion, and caused his fiefs in the north to be transferred to Shāhryār, who had already been appointed to the command of the army of Kandahār. Shāhjahān's agent informed him that Nūr Jahān was supreme at court, and the prince, in despair, rose in rebellion, and marched on Āgra with a view to securing the imperial treasury there. The gates of Fathpur Sikrī were shut against him, but Āgra was plundered.

Nūr Jahān was seriously alarmed. She distrusted her brother, Āsaf Khān, who was Shāhjahān's father-in-law, and caused her

husband to summon from Kābul her old enemy, Mahābat Khān. The imperial army, numbering, with the contingent from Kābul, 25,000 horse, then marched from Lahore to crush the rebellion, Jahāngīr and Nūr Jahān accompanying it. Shāhjahān had marched to Kotla<sup>1</sup> to meet it, and met it at Biloshpur, twenty-nine miles north-east of that town, on March 29, 1623, and although 'Abdullāh Khān deserted to the prince with 10,000 horse, the imperial army under Mahābat Khān was victorious, and the rebels retired towards Māndū. Jahāngīr was joined at Hindaun by his son Parvīz, who had been summoned from Bihar, but it was not until May that two imperial forces, one nominally under the command of Parvīz, but actually under that of Mahābat Khān, and the other nominally under the command of Bulāki, Khusraw's son, but actually under that of his grandfather, 'Azīz Koka, marched, the first against Māndū, where Shāhjahān had taken refuge, and the second into Gujarāt, to secure that province. At the same time Jahāngīr moved his court to Ajmir.

Before Māndū, Shāhjahān was again defeated by Parvīz and Mahābat Khān, and his lieutenant, 'Abdullāh Khān, was driven from Gujarāt. The prince fled across the Nerbudda and found an asylum in the fortress of Asīr, to which he was admitted, but his army gradually dwindled away, and when Malik 'Ambar refused him an asylum, and the Khānkhānān, who had supported him, deserted to Parvīz, he retired into the kingdom of Golconda, marched eastward, and on November 10 entered Orissa. The imperial officers in Bengal and Orissa, unaware of his movements, were unprepared for him, and Ahmad Beg fled from Orissa and joined Ibrāhīm Khān, brother of Nūr Jahān, in Bengal. The Portuguese of Hugli refused to assist the rebel; but some of the landholders and imperial officers joined him; the strong fortress of Bardwān was surrendered to 'Abdullāh Khān; and Ibrāhīm Khān, after holding out for some time at Rājmahal, was defeated and slain. Rāja Bhīm took the fortress of Patna from the deputy of Parvīz, and the landholders of Bihar, among them the commander of the strong fortress of Rohtās, submitted to the rebel prince. Shāhjahān, having thus established his authority in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, prepared to annex the provinces of Oudh and Allāhābād, and 'Abdullāh Khān and Rāja Bhīm proceeded with a flotilla against the fortress of Allāhābād, while Daryā Khān

<sup>1</sup> Situated 28° N. and 76° 57' E.

the Afghan led a force to Mānikpur, higher up the river. The prince occupied Jaunpur, and encamped in the forests to the east of that city.

Meanwhile Parvīz and Mahābat Khān had left Burhānpur during the rainy season, had marched rapidly eastwards to deal with the rebels, and had arrived in the doāb. 'Abdullāh Khān raised the siege of Allāhābād, and the flotilla which had been taken to that place at Mahābat Khān's instigation deserted the prince and returned to Bengal, leaving him without supplies and transport. Shāhjahān's numbers had been raised to 10,000 horse by the arrival of Daryā Khān from Patna, but he was in no condition to meet Mahābat Khān, whose force numbered 40,000, and a rapid retreat into Bihar would have been the only wise course to follow. But the prince, misled by his Rājput commander, Bhīm, sanctioned an attack on the imperial forces, and not only was defeated, with the loss of all his artillery, but narrowly escaped capture. He fled to Rohtās, deserted by Daryā Khān, and having recovered his baggage and munitions from Rājmahal, returned to the Deccan by the route by which he had left it.

Ahmadnagar being again at war with Bijāpur, Malik 'Ambar was glad to obtain the aid of Shāhjahān, both in this conflict and in his renewed struggle with the empire. The prince marched to the aid of Ya'kūb Khān the African, who was besieging Burhānpur, but the return of Mahābat Khān from Bengal compelled the allies to raise the siege, and Shāhjahān, sick in mind and body, and no longer able to continue the strife, retired to Rohankhed, and wrote to his father, beseeching him to pardon him. Parvīz, believing that his brother would never recover his former status, and slothfully eager for peace, and Nūr Jahān, alarmed by the increasing power of her old enemy, Mahābat Khān, did not oppose the rebel's petition; and Shāhjahān, having sent two of his sons, Dārā and Aurangzīb, to court as hostages, and caused his agents to surrender to imperial officers the fortresses of Rohtās and Asīr, was permitted to retire to Nasik.

The civil war had lasted for three years, during which the empire was in confusion, many districts in the Deccan had been lost, and no attempt to recover the important province of Kandahār had been possible; the question of the succession still remained unsettled, and yet more trouble was to follow. Jahāngīr's health was breaking, Shāhjahān's disgrace and humiliation had

removed him temporarily from the field, and the credit gained by Parvīz for the suppression of his brother's rebellion, due really to Mahābat Khān, had brought him temporarily to the front. He was a worthless drunkard, but at the age of thirty-six with much experience of war and administration, he might become, with Mahābat Khān's support, a formidable rival of the weakling Shāhryār. Parvīz was ordered to remain at Burhānpur, as nominal governor of the Deccan, with Khānjahān Lodī as his adviser and preceptor; and Mahābat Khān was summoned to court to render an account of the profit which he had made by the suppression of the rebellion in Bengal. He set out from the Deccan for the imperial court, well aware of the originator of the insulting summons, and he reached the court on the southern bank of the Jhelum, as it was on its way from Lahore to Kābul in the spring of 1626. With him was his force of four or five thousand Rājputs. The imperial army and the leading courtiers had been sent across the river in the daytime, and Jahāngīr, Nūr Jahān, and a small personal escort remained on the southern bank, intending to cross in the morning; but Mahābat Khān sent a force to hold the bridge, and surrounded Jahāngīr with his Rājputs and made him his prisoner. The enraged emperor had no opportunity of escape or resistance; but his wife escaped across the river in disguise, and on the following day drew up the army, and attempted, with her brother, to lead it across the river to the rescue of Jahāngīr. The Rājputs, however, had burned the bridge, the river was in flood, and the attempt failed. The court continued its march to Kābul, but Jahāngīr was closely guarded by Mahābat Khān's Rājputs. Āsaf Khān fled to Attock, and attempted to hold that fortress against Mahābat Khān; but Mahābat Khān had become dictator of the empire, and Āsaf Khān was obliged to surrender, on the promise that his life should be spared. On May 18, 1626, the court reached Kābul. Jahāngīr, Nūr Jahān and Āsaf Khān were prisoners in Mahābat Khān's hands, and the emperor accepted the situation lest worse should befall him. But Mahābat Khān's situation was far from secure. A quarrel occurred between some of the royal troops and his Rājputs, and the royal troops raised the Afghans of the city against the misbelievers. Many of the Rājputs, including their most prominent leaders, were slain, and many more were captured and sold into slavery beyond the Hindu Kush. Mahābat Khān, considerably weakened, was lulled into security by Jahāngīr's assurances that



he was perfectly happy under his charge, and Nūr Jahān intrigued unceasingly for the release of herself and her husband. At Rohtās Jahāngīr ordered Mahābat Khān to precede him by one march, and the dictator did not dare to disobey. From that moment his power was gone, and his brief reign was at an end. After some hesitation he surrendered his prisoners, Āsaf Khān and the sons of Dāniyāl, the emperor's late brother, and, in obedience to Jahāngīr's orders, left Rohtās for Tatta in Sind, then menaced by Shāhjahān, but in fact for Mewār, where he took refuge for some time.

Early in June, 1626, Shāhjahān had left the Deccan with a thousand horse, ostensibly for the purpose of freeing his father, but when Jahāngīr had, with his wife's help, freed himself, he marched on to Tatta, and as he had lost half of his small force on his way, by the death of its leader, he turned his thoughts towards a design of fleeing into Persia and taking refuge with Shāh 'Abbās. He was loth, however, to leave the garrison of Tatta behind him, lest it should pursue him, and therefore made an attempt to reduce that fortress, but its defences had been recently restored, and it was held by a partisan of Nūr Jahān. After a futile attempt to take the fort he retired again to the Deccan by way of Gujarāt and Berar. On his way he learned that his brother, Parvīz, had died of drink, and thus no longer stood in his way. He continued his retreat to the Deccan, and selected Junnār as his residence. There he received from Mahābat Khān, a fugitive in Rājasthān, an offer of support, which he gladly accepted. On receiving this news Nūr Jahān directed Khānjahān Lodī, commanding the imperial troops in the Deccan, to crush the rebellion which she apprehended, but he did nothing.

In March, 1627, the court moved from Lahore to Kashmīr, but Jahāngīr nearly died on the way thither. He recovered for a time, but suffered from asthma, and lost his appetite. At the same time his son, Shāhryār, was attacked by alopecia, and lost all his hair, which rendered him a ridiculous object among men who believed that a man's chief honour lay in the luxuriance of his beard and whiskers. Jahāngīr was advised by his physicians to return to the warm climate of the plains, and set out for Lahore, but grew rapidly feebler, and on November 7, 1627, died near Bhīmbar, in the fifty-eighth year of his age.

The struggle for the throne which then began will be described in the account of Shāhjahān's reign.

## CHAPTER XI

### Shāhjahān

On the death of Jahāngīr, Āsaf Khān, ever a secret partisan of his own son-in-law, whose claim, he discovered, was supported by nearly all the nobles in the imperial camp, placed his sister under restraint and sent an urgent message to Shāhjahān, but as the prince was in the Deccan, and Shāhryār was certain to have himself proclaimed in Lahore, he was obliged, in order to avoid taking up arms against a titular emperor, to raise to the throne the unfortunate Bulāki, son of Khusraw, and, proclaiming him under the title of Dāvar Bakhsh, used him as a figure-head until he should be able to proclaim Shāhjahān. He then, with Dāvar Bakhsh, marched on Lahore a day's march ahead of Nūr Jahān. Shāhryār, as he had anticipated, had seized the imperial treasure in Lahore, caused himself to be proclaimed emperor, and distributed largesse to his troops, whom he sent immediately against Āsaf Khān. They were defeated, and their master retired into the citadel, but was betrayed by his own followers, dragged forth from the female apartments, compelled to do homage to Dāvar Bakhsh, and then imprisoned and blinded. On December 7, 1627, Shāhjahān set out from Junnār, and on January 9, 1628, was proclaimed emperor in Lahore, while, in accordance with orders received from him, Dāvar Bakhsh,<sup>1</sup> Shāhryār, and Dāniyāl's sons were put to death. On February 2, Shāhjahān entered Lahore in state, acclaimed by all as emperor. Āsaf Khān was made minister, and retained that office until his death in 1641. Nūr Jahān was allowed to live in retirement on a sufficiently liberal pension until her death on December 18, 1645. She had ruled the empire for ten years, but on her husband's death her power ceased.

Shāhjahān, all possible rivals having been removed, left Lahore, and in February took his seat on the throne in Āgra. His position

<sup>1</sup> Some years afterwards a man styling himself Bulāki, the son of Khusraw, was generally acknowledged in Persia as the prince who had been enthroned as Dāvar Bakhsh by Āsaf Khān, but there is little doubt that he was an impostor.

was secure and unchallenged, but the affairs of the empire sorely needed attention. The Afghan Pīr Lodī, entitled Khānjahān, who had for some time been governor of the southern provinces of the empire, had displayed hostility to him when he left Junnār on his way northwards to assert his claim to the throne, believing that he would never be able to overcome the opposition of Nūr Jahān. He had since betrayed his trust, in surrendering to Murtazā Nizām Shāh II, for a heavy bribe, the southern highlands of Berar. Shāhjahān had punished him by transferring him from the government of the Deccan to that of Mālhwā, appointing Irādat Khān to the Deccan in his place, and summoning the Afghan to court.

Jhujhār Singh of Orchha, too, presuming on the latitude which had been allowed to his father, Bīr Singh, in consideration of the murder of Abul Fazl, had shown a rebellious and turbulent spirit, and had encroached on the domains, not only of his humble neighbours, but of the emperor himself. He was, after some resistance, subdued, captured, and pardoned. Meanwhile Khānjahān had been detained at Āgra, and, though he had received a formal pardon, he remained conscious of his guilt, and apprehensive of his master's intentions towards him. At length, secretly assembling his Afghan contingent, he fled by night from the capital towards the Deccan. He was pursued, overtaken, and severely defeated on the Chambal, but succeeded in escaping and in making his way, with a considerable part of his force, to the Deccan, where he entered the service of Murtazā Nizām Shāh II, who conferred fiefs upon him and upon his principal followers. This reinforcement enabled Murtazā once more to expel the imperial officers from their posts in the Bālāghāt, and so serious was the situation that Shāhjahān resolved to proceed to the Deccan in person, and, on March 1, 1630, arrived at Burhānpur. Irādat Khān, governor of the Deccan, received the title of A'zam Khān, and under his command the imperial army at once assumed the offensive, and invaded the Bālāghāt in three great columns. Hostilities continued until the rainy season, when they were necessarily suspended, and on their resumption, at the beginning of the cold season, Murtazā, seeing the remnant of his kingdom devastated by the imperial troops, changed his attitude towards Khānjahān, who had brought this misfortune upon him. Khānjahān fled, with his surviving sons, from Daulatābād into Mālhwā, hoping to be able to reach the Panjab and to raise trouble

there. From Mālwa he turned aside into Bundelkhand. Being driven thence, he was pursued by various imperial officers, and was at length overtaken and slain on the banks of the Sind, the principal affluent of the Chambal.

On June 16, 1631, Shāhjahān suffered the great bereavement of his life, when his dearly-loved wife, Mumtāz Mahal, the mother of nearly all his children, died in childbirth. He mourned her deeply, and, wearying of his sojourn in the Deccan, returned early in the following year to Āgra, and there began the erection of the noblest mausoleum in the world, to which her body was removed, and which now covers his remains as well as hers.

Hostilities still continued in the Deccan. Mahābat Khān, son of the old Khānkhānān, was appointed governor of the imperial province, and early in 1633 appeared before Daulatābād, the siege of which had already been opened by Sayyid Khānjahān, who had received the title formerly held by Pīr Lodī. The fortress was held by Fath Khān, who having put to death the *roi fainéant*, Murtazā, had raised to the throne his younger son, Husain III, and endured a siege of four months, though unable to obtain supplies from the famine-stricken land around it. Attempts were made by the army of Bijāpur and by traitors in the imperial camp to save what had become the frontier-fortress of the independent Deccan by conveying victuals to the garrison, but Fath Khān was compelled to surrender, and on June 28, 1633, came forth with his family and the young king Husain, "and the nine forts of Daulatābād, whereof five are on the plain and four on the slopes of the hill, with many guns and other material of war, lead, powder, grenades, and rockets, fell into the hands of the leaders of the host of the glorious empire". No conqueror till then had been able "to cast the noose of contrivance over the battlement of subjection". The young king Husain was conveyed to Gwalior, where he must have met his kinsman, interned there nearly thirty years earlier by Akbar.

While yet in the Deccan, Shāhjahān had ordered Kāsim Khān to drive the Portuguese from their settlement at Hugli. The Portuguese in Bengal had their chief settlements at Chittagong and Hugli, far removed from the authority of the viceroy at Goa; and their conduct did little credit to their nation. Chittagong was little better than a nest of pirates, and the 200 Portuguese at Hugli owned no fewer than 600 Indian slaves, most of

whom they had persuaded or compelled to be baptised into the Christian faith. Over and above these offences, Shāhjahān had personal wrongs to avenge on them. They had refused to aid him when he was in rebellion against his father; they were said to have enticed away two of his wife's serving-maids and converted them to Christianity; and some reverses which his troops had lately suffered from the Bijāpur forces were attributed by him to the assistance of Portuguese gunners from Goa. Kāsim Khān began his preparations in March, 1631, but did not venture to attack the factory until June, 1632. The small body of Portuguese defended themselves valiantly until September 29, when Kāsim Khān carried the place by assault. The survivors of the conflict were sent prisoners to Āgra, to be confined until they accepted Islam; but comparatively few purchased their freedom by apostasy. A few had contrived to escape, and encamped on an island opposite to their old factory. There they remained until 1643, when they were carried away in ships sent by the viceroy from Goa.

In August, 1633, Shāhjahān fell sick at Āgra, and early in the following year left that city for Lahore, visited Kashmīr in the summer, and did not return to Āgra until the spring of 1635, having in the meantime appointed his second son, Sultān Shujā', then seventeen years of age, viceroy of the Deccan, which was divided into the Bālāghāt and Pā'īnghāt, or highland and lowland divisions. Jhujhār Singh of Orchha, who, having done good service with the imperial troops in the Deccan, had received permission to return to his state, took advantage of Shāhjahān's absence from his capital to attack Rāja Prem Narāyan of Chaurāgarh, and, disregarding orders sent by the emperor, compelled the raja to surrender, and then treacherously attacked and slew him. Shāhjahān meanly offered him forgiveness in return for the surrender of his plunder, but Jhujhār rejected the offer, and only when the emperor sent a strong force against him was he intimidated into accepting it. But Shāhjahān's terms had then risen. Jhujhār prepared to resist. But, when the imperial forces, under the nominal command of Aurangzib, Shāhjahān's third son, approached Chaurāgarh, he abandoned the fortress and fled towards the Deccan. Aurangzib was then recalled to court, but his officers pursued and captured Jhujhār, who escaped, but was slain by the Gonds, his head being sent to court. His sons were

forced to accept Islam; his wives were left to the nobles who had captured them; his treasures were unearthened and sent to court; the temples of Bundelkhand were destroyed; and the state of Orchha ceased for a time to exist. Another campaign during this year was less successful, when a large force under Najābat Khān invaded Garhwāl, and was cut off, almost to a man, in the hills.

Despite the successes of Mahābat Khān, Sayyid Khānjahān, and Khān Daurān, things were not going well in the Deccan. The fall of Daulatābād had thoroughly alarmed Muhammad 'Adil Shāh of Bījāpur and 'Abdullāh Kurṭb Shāh of Golconda. The former, who had done his best to relieve the beleaguered fortress, was still at war with the imperial troops, and much disorder prevailed even in the nominally extinct kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Malik 'Ambar had given the Marāthas an opportunity of discovering that their old prowess was not dead; and, on the fall of Daulatābād, Shāhjī Bhonsla, one of the leading fief-holders, produced a scion of the royal house of Ahmadnagar, and proclaimed him king. In 1635, therefore, Shāhjahān decided again to visit the Deccan, arrived at Daulatābād in the spring of 1636, and at once sent envoys bearing letters of warning both to Muhammad 'Adil Shāh and to 'Abdullāh Kurṭb Shāh. The latter sent a submissive reply, which was regarded as satisfactory; but the former, who had annexed some of the southern districts of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar, was less compliant. Four imperial armies then took the field, two against Shāhjī and two against Muhammad 'Adil Shāh. These last two armies devastated the Bījāpur state, menaced its capital, and compelled Muhammad to sue for peace, and, shortly after learning of this, Shāhjī, many of whose forts had been captured, and in one of them his puppet king, offered to enter the imperial service, but was told that he might, if he chose, enter that of Bījāpur. The young prince was sent to join his kinsmen in Gwalior, and Muhammad 'Adil Shāh, on accepting the position of a vassal and promising to pay tribute regularly, was allowed to retain some of the northern districts of the former kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Peace having been thus restored in the Deccan, Shāhjahān left the province, and in July, 1636, reached Māndū, where he spent the rainy season. The unwieldy province of the Deccan was divided into four provinces: (1) Ahmadnagar with Daulatābād, (2) Khāndesh, (3) Berar, and

(4) Telingāna. The viceroyalty of the four provinces was conferred by Shāhjahān on Aurangzib, then eighteen years of age. After the rainy season the emperor left Māndū for Ajmir, and in January, 1637, returned to Āgra.

Early in 1638 a stroke of good luck, little merited by one who had refused to obey his father's command to attempt the recovery of the city and the province of Kandahār, befell Shāhjahān. 'Alī Mardān Khān, the Persian governor of Kandahār, had been summoned to court by his bloodthirsty master, Shāh Safi, and, having learned that the shah sought his life, entered into correspondence with the governors of the Indian provinces of Kābul and Multān, and of the city of Ghaznī; and on March 8, 'Iwāz Khān, governor of Ghaznī, was admitted with his troops into Kandahār, and the *khiṭba* was recited in the name of Shāhjahān. Kilij Khān, governor of Multān, was appointed to the government of the new province of the empire, and supplies, treasure, and reinforcements, under the nominal command of Sultān Shujā', were hastily pushed into Kandahār. An attempt by a force from Khurāsān and some discontented troops of the former garrison to recover the city was defeated. As the reward of his treachery 'Alī Mardān Khān received a hundred thousand rupees, the command of 5000 horse, and the title of Amīr-ul-Umarā, and was ordered to remain at Kābul for the time, and to be ready to march to the relief of Kandahār should any attempt be made to recover it.

Elsewhere the empire was not at peace. The governor of Bengal, through no fault of his own, became involved in war with the Āhom king of Assam, the imperial troops were driven from Kāmrup, and the war lasted for two years, with great loss of life and treasure. In 1639, after Shāhjahān had left Āgra for Lahore, Champat Rai rose in rebellion in the ever-turbulent province of Bundelkhand. Various officers were sent against him, but it was not until 1642, when Shāhjahān sent Pahār Singh, a son of Bīr Singh, into Bundelkhand, and permitted him to take charge of the state of Orchha, that order was restored, and even then but imperfectly. Between Kābul and the Panjab, the Khattaks of the Bangash had been constantly giving trouble, but Jagat Singh of Nūrpur succeeded in repressing them, and later, in 1650, the equally turbulent Yūsufzais were reduced to order, and from that time onward the constant movement of troops between the

Panjab, Kābul, and Kandahār compelled the tribes to keep the peace. After dealing with the Khattaks, Jagat Singh was permitted, in 1640, to return to Nūrpur, where his son, Rāj rūp, was in rebellion, but after his return he himself rebelled, and the imperial officers sent against him were unable to reduce him to obedience. In the same year Murād Bakhsh, Shāhjahān's fourth son, was placed in charge of the operations against him, and in 1642 he submitted, was pardoned, and remained ever afterwards a loyal subject and servant of the emperor.

In 1641 Shāhjahān suffered a severe loss by the death of his minister and father-in-law, Āsaf Khān. Āsaf Khān's sister and Shāhjahān's old enemy, Nūr Jahān, survived until December, 1645, but lived in retirement, and never again caused him trouble.

In March, 1644, a lighted candle caught the dress of Shāhjahān's daughter, Jahānārā, and she was so severely burned that for some time her life was in grave danger. As she lay between life and death, her brothers were permitted to leave the seats of their provincial government and visit her. In view of later events the characters of these brothers, and their relations one with another, begin to be important. Dārā Shikūh, the eldest, was his father's favourite and lived almost constantly at court, being permitted to perform by deputy the duties of the high appointments which he held in the provinces. The favour of his father, who had nominated him as his heir, probably increased the natural violence and arrogance of his temper, and encouraged the airs of superiority which rendered him odious to his brothers. Shujā', the second son, was of a more pleasing and conciliatory disposition, but was devoted to sensual pleasure and lacked determination, promptitude of decision, and force of character. Aurangzīb, the third, unquestionably the ablest of the brothers, was astute, determined, and unscrupulous. Murād Bakhsh, the fourth, was a simple soldier and nothing more. All four were physically brave, but if there were any distinction he was perhaps the bravest. But he was a drunkard, headstrong, passionate, brutal, and brainless. Religious differences aggravated the animosity between the brothers. Dārā, like his father, professed the Sunni religion, and practised its rites; but he was known to be deeply interested in Sūfī-ism; like his great-grandfather, he delighted in religious discussion; and he was suspected of an inclination to Christianity,



to which, according to Manucci, he desired to be converted before his death. Shujā' was strongly inclined towards the Shiah form of Islam, and Murād was suspected of an inclination towards that faith, but seems to have been little troubled by religion in any form. Aurangzīb was an orthodox and bigoted Sunni, who firmly believed and rigidly practised all the rites and ordinances of his faith. To Dārā he was "the prayer-monger", as Dārā was to him "the infidel", and the prayer-monger had little difficulty in persuading his other brothers that Dārā was no Muslim, while Dārā's attitude to all did nothing to conciliate them.

At this time Aurangzīb fell into disgrace, was deprived of his appointment in the Deccan, and retired into private life. The true cause of his father's displeasure has not been disclosed, but it is not true, as has sometimes been stated, that Aurangzīb's retirement was voluntary, and that in an access of religious zeal he resolved to cut himself off from worldly affairs and devote himself to religion. There can be little doubt but that his eldest brother was at the bottom of the trouble, and inflamed his father's wrath against Aurangzīb. Jahānārā, however, recovered from her burns, and on her recovery effected a reconciliation between her father and his third son, but Aurangzīb received the government of Gujarāt, a post far less important than the viceroyalty of the four provinces of the Deccan. He pocketed the slight and left for Gujarāt.

The house of Tīmūr regarded Transoxiana as its ancestral home, and, ever since Bābur's expulsion from Farghāna, had longed to recover the original domain of its great ancestor; but this longing had remained no more than a dream. Bābur had been fully occupied in establishing himself first in Kābul and then in Āgra. His son was driven from his kingdom, and, though he eventually recovered it, left to his son Akbar little more than the ground covered by his troops. Akbar was occupied throughout his long reign in extending and consolidating his Indian dominions. Rājasthān, the Deccan, and his son's rebellion gave the slothful Jahāngīr all the occupation which he needed. An elusive prospect of recovering Transoxiana was reserved for Shāhjahān. The quarrels of the Jānids, who had succeeded the Shaibānids on the throne of that land, tempted him to intervene. Nasr Muhammad, governor of Balkh, had expelled his blind brother from Samarkand, and had, in his turn, been expelled in

favour of his son, 'Abd-ul-'azīz. In 1645 Asālat Khān was sent to Kābul, there to concert with 'Alī Mardān Khān measures for the conquest of Badakhshān and Balkh, with a view to that of Transoxiana. The two officers invaded Badakhshān, and in 1646 Nasr Muhammad unwittingly played into Shāhjahān's hands by seeking his aid to recover Samarkand from 'Abd-ul-'azīz. Shāhjahān consented, and appointed his youngest son, Murād Bakhsh, to the command of the army of the north. The youth was slothful, but, urged on by his father, traversed Badakhshān. As he approached Balkh, Nasr Muhammad, suspecting his intentions, fled from that city into Persia. The prince took the first step towards the recovery of Transoxiana by occupying Balkh, and then, to the disgust of his father, who intended to appoint him to the viceroyalty of Transoxiana, demanded permission to return. Neither he nor his officers could maintain order in their conquests. The tribal organisation of the bitterly hostile Uzbegs was beyond their understanding and control. Nothing was to be gained by keeping the prince in Balkh against his will, and Shāhjahān was obliged to allow him to return. Aurangzib was then summoned from Gujarāt, and appointed to the government of Balkh. His troops were attacked by those of 'Abd-ul-'azīz, but, though he defeated the enemy in the field more than once, his administration was no more successful than that of his brother, and in October, 1642, he too retired from Balkh. Shāhjahān was not yet an old man, but he had more than once been seriously ill, and neither prince wished to be far from the capital in the event of the throne becoming vacant. Nor was this the only reason for their disgust with their surroundings. They were degenerate descendants of the hardy warrior who had led his troops from the north to the conquest first of Kābul and then of India. The icy passes of the Hindu Kush and the bitter cold of the mountain-homes of their fathers had little attraction for "pale persons in muslin petticoats" whose idea of campaigning was leisurely progress over a sunny plain with a city of canvas palaces. The dream of recovering the land of their fathers faded, to Shāhjahān's great disappointment, but he learned at length that the current of the historical stream of conquest could not be turned backwards in its course.

Although Delhi had never lost its official status as the imperial capital, "Abode of the Caliphate", Āgra had been the residential

capital of the Timurid monarchs ever since the days of Bābur. It had been greatly enriched and adorned by Akbar, who renamed it Akbarābād. His temporary capital, Fathpur Sikrī, was a mere whim, and before the end of his reign he had ceased to visit it. Of all the princes of his line Shāhjahān was the greatest builder. Many monuments left by him at Āgra, and, above all, the Tāj Mahal, one of the most beautiful buildings in the world, "a great ideal conception which belongs more to sculpture than to architecture", testify to his taste, but failed to satisfy his ambition, for which he found scope in the restoration of imperial Delhi as the first city in his dominions. He had for some time devoted his attention to the revival of its glories, and had laid out, on the western bank of the Jumna, immediately to the north of the older cities of former dynasties, a new city, to which he gave the name of Shāhjahānābād, or the abode of Shāhjahān, and which he adorned with many magnificent buildings, the most conspicuous of which are the imperial palace, with its splendid halls of audience, and the great "gathering mosque", of red sandstone like the palace, with which it is in harmony, but with white marble minarets. In March, 1648, the new city was inaugurated as the capital, and here, seated on the splendid Peacock Throne, which he had had made for himself, the emperor sought consolation for the failure of his attempt to recover the home of his fathers, but was not long left in peace. Shāh 'Abbās II, who had in 1642 succeeded his father on the throne of Persia, was menacing Kandahār, and Shāhjahān would have set out for Kābul at once to send help to the city, had not his slothful nobles dissuaded him from leaving his new capital so soon. Daulat Khān, the governor of Kandahār, was unable to withstand the army of Persia, and was obliged to surrender the fortress. In November Shāhjahān left Delhi, and early in 1649 Aurangzib, who, after his retreat from Balkh, had been appointed to the province of Multān, was provided with a great army and ordered to recover Kandahār. He claimed one victory over the Persian troops in the field, but on the defences of the city he could make no impression, and in July his father ordered him to retire. In April, 1652, the same prince, at the head of a larger and better-equipped army, was sent to make a second attempt to recover the fortress, but again his artillery was found to be unequal to the task, and in July he retired. These failures embittered the relations

between him and his eldest brother, for Dārā Shikūh taunted him with his lack of success, and in April, 1653, was himself sent from Kābul, with an army larger and better found than either of those commanded by his brother, to make a third attempt. The foolish prince, as a prelude to the siege, sent to the commander of the garrison a vainglorious poem, warning him of his approaching fate, and met with but ridicule in reply. He was no more successful than Aurangzib, and in September was recalled by his father. It was then the younger brother's turn to taunt the elder, and relations between them became so strained that Aurangzib was appointed for the second time to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in order that he might be at a distance from court.

The cause of the three failures of the imperial troops to recover Kandahār was their inferiority to their opponents, who from constant warfare with the Ottoman Turks and from their instruction and reorganisation by the Sherley brothers in the reign of 'Abbās the Great, had learned much of European methods of warfare, and particularly of the casting of guns and the use of artillery. The Indian troops had hardly advanced beyond the use of irregular cavalry, and their cavalry was not fit to face even the cavalry, much less the infantry, of the Persians. They had guns, huge hollow cylinders, with balls of irregular shapes, but they could seldom be fired, their fire was most inaccurate, owing to windage, and the Indian troops relied rather on their moral than on their material effect. Moreover, in each of the successive attempts to recover Kandahār it became more evident that the Indian troops were no match in discipline, physique, or courage for the Persians, and that their artillery, as an engine of war, was contemptible. Aurangzib, on arriving in the Deccan for the second time, took up his residence in Malik 'Ambar's former capital, Khirkī, which he rebuilt and renamed Aurangābād. His policy from now onwards was to encroach upon, and, if possible, to conquer the kingdoms of Bījāpur and Golconda, and so to enrich himself with their resources as to be in a position to contest the succession to the throne whenever it should fall vacant. But grave difficulties stood in his way, for the frontier between the imperial dominions and the two kingdoms had been determined by the treaties concluded with them by Shāhjahān in 1636, which could not be violated without good cause, and Dārā Shikūh exerted all his influence over his father to induce him to curb

Aurangzīb's ambition. It was with difficulty, and only after much delay, that Shāhjahān sanctioned his entering into direct correspondence with the vassal kingdoms, but Aurangzīb, assisted by a most capable Persian financial adviser, introduced into the Deccan those administrative reforms which Todar Mal had, in Akbar's reign, established in northern India, and gradually so restored prosperity to a country which, on his arrival, had been incapable of supporting troops sufficient for the maintenance of order within its boundaries, as to enable it to maintain a force sufficiently strong and efficient to excite the suspicion and alarm of Dārā Shikūh.

It was Golconda that Aurangzīb first attacked. The tribute from that kingdom, which had fallen into arrears, was fixed in gold *hūns*, but was payable in rupees. The exchange value of the *hūn* had risen from four to five rupees, and Aurangzīb demanded immediate payment of the arrears at the higher rate. This was a crushing demand, but in addition to it he took 'Abdullāh to task for having undertaken conquests without the emperor's sanction. The great kingdom of Vijayanagar, after its overthrow in 1565, had dissolved into a number of petty Hindu states, in the absorption of which Bijāpur and Golconda had been competing in the Carnatic, to the south of the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra. The chief share had fallen to Bijāpur, but 'Abdullāh's minister, Muhammad Sa'īd, entitled Mīr Jumla, a rich and capable Persian adventurer, had conquered a considerable tract of very rich territory, which he ruled virtually as an independent sovereign, remitting no tribute to his master. He retained, however, his post at court, in which his son, Muhammad Amīn, acted as his deputy, and treated 'Abdullāh Kutb Shāh with scant courtesy. The feeble monarch endured much, for he feared both father and son, until Muhammad Amīn came to court drunk, and vomited over the king's personal carpet. This was too much, even for 'Abdullāh, and the offender and his family were thrown into prison, his property being confiscated. 'Abdullāh had already contemplated crushing Mīr Jumla, and Mīr Jumla had been in secret correspondence with Aurangzīb. On hearing of his son's imprisonment he offered his services to the emperor, and his letter was forwarded to Shāhjahān, who, at the end of 1655, informed Aurangzīb that both Mīr Jumla and his son had been admitted to the imperial service. 'Abdullāh, unaware of this corre-

spondence, had already refused to release Muhammad Amīn, and Aurangzīb, concealing from his father 'Abdullāh's ignorance of the acceptance of the services of Mīr Jumla and his son, obtained permission to invade the kingdom of Golconda. In January, 1656, he sent his eldest son, Muhammad Sultān, across the frontier with a large force of cavalry, and followed him with the main body of his army. On his way Muhammad Sultān received in his camp Muhammad Amīn and his family, who had been released and sent to him by 'Abdullāh Kutb Shāh, but nevertheless pressed on. 'Abdullāh fled from his capital to the fortress of Golconda, and the prince's army plundered Hyderabad. Aurangzīb himself then appeared on the scene, and prepared to open the siege of Golconda, but meanwhile 'Abdullāh's agent at Delhi had incensed Dārā Shikūh and his sister, Jahānārā Begum, by acquainting them with Aurangzīb's duplicity, and they persuaded their father to issue peremptory orders to Aurangzīb to quit the kingdom of Golconda. He retired in March, but before leaving, had obliged 'Abdullāh to give his second daughter in marriage to his son, and, by a secret agreement, to acknowledge Muhammad Sultān as his heir. Thus the result of the campaign, though bitterly disappointing to Aurangzīb, was not wholly infructuous, for, besides gaining much booty, and the advantages already mentioned, he was joined before he left by Mīr Jumla, with a force of 15,000 cavalry, besides elephants and artillery. Mīr Jumla was sent to court, and after presenting to Shāhjahān most costly gifts, was appointed commander of 6000 horse and chief minister of the empire.

Aurangzīb's return from Golconda was followed by an acrimonious dispute with his father regarding the partition of the tribute, plunder, and indemnity gained from Hyderabad, and the question of Mīr Jumla's conquests in the Carnatic still remained open. 'Abdullāh Kutb Shāh contended that these formed part of his kingdom, but Shāhjahān insisted that they were the personal property of Mīr Jumla, and must be ceded to the empire. The officials of Golconda threw every obstacle in the way of the cession of this valuable territory, from which they reaped much benefit, and the imperial officers were unable to enforce it.

The turn of Bijāpur came next. During the reign of Muhammad, the seventh of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty, this kingdom reached its greatest extent and prosperity. It had received some of the

southern districts of the former kingdom of Ahmadnagar, and had annexed the greater part of the Carnatic, from sea to sea, and was a prize well worth winning. Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh died in November, 1656, and his son, 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh II, a young man of eighteen, was enthroned in his stead. Aurangzīb, whose aggressive policy in the Deccan had gained a powerful supporter in the new minister, reported to his father, without a shred of evidence in support of his allegations, that 'Alī was not a son of Muhammad, but a supposititious child who had been enthroned by the intrigues of the late king's minister and his widow. The quarrels between various parties in the state and the great and powerful fief-holders in the Carnatic were sedulously fomented by Aurangzīb's agents, and disorder became so rife that the prince, at Mīr Jumla's instigation, received permission to invade the kingdom of Bijāpur and to settle its affairs as seemed to him best. He was joined by a reinforcement of 20,000 horse, and Mīr Jumla was sent to his aid, and, having crossed the frontier, he opened, in March, 1657, the siege of Bīdar. The fortress was valiantly defended, but Mīr Jumla's artillery, and the explosion of a powder-magazine, enabled the imperial troops to take it after a month's siege, and to acquire considerable booty. The country was then ravaged to the south and west of Bīdar, and, a fortnight after the fall of the fortress, a large force of the army of Bijāpur was defeated in the field. In April Aurangzīb arrived before Kalyāni, and opened the siege of that fortress. It was stoutly defended by Dilāvar Khān, the African, but two determined attempts to relieve it were defeated by the imperial troops, who on the second occasion put the army of Bijāpur to flight and plundered its camp. Dilāvar Khān was then obliged to surrender the keys to Aurangzīb, and 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh II sued for peace. His agents at Delhi enlisted the sympathy of Dārā Shikūh, and peace was concluded on the condition of the cession of the fortresses of Bīdar, Kalyāni, and Parenda, and the payment of an indemnity of ten millions of rupees. Thus, once more baulked by his eldest brother, Aurangzīb retreated from Kalyāni in October, and, owing to his embarrassment, was not able to enforce the cession of Parenda.

Shāhjahān was now over sixty years of age. Since the death of his much-loved wife he had lived a life of gross self-indulgence, though there is no foundation for the malicious slander repeated

by Bernier that he was guilty of the crime of incest. His health was failing, and in September, 1657, he fell seriously ill. On obtaining some relief from his malady, he left Delhi for Āgra, where his beloved wife was buried. During his illness his eldest son, who carefully tended him, was obliged to exercise much of his authority, and one of his acts was to dismiss from his post as chief minister Aurangzīb's *protégé*, Mīr Jumla. Reports of the emperor's illness, and even premature rumours of his death, reached all parts of his dominions, and gained credence, and his younger sons professed to believe that letters which they received from him, announcing his recovery, were forgeries, executed by their eldest brother. His second son, Shujā', governor of Bengal, was so convinced of his father's death that he assumed the imperial title, and Shāhjahān sent against him an army commanded by Dārā's son, Sulaimān Shikūh. Aurangzīb, as we know, was in the Deccan, and Murād Bakhsh, the fourth son, was in Gujarāt, where, on a false accusation of secret correspondence with Dārā, he had murdered with his own hand 'Alī Nakī, a trustworthy financial adviser who had been sent to him by his father. Early in December he, too, assumed the imperial title. The wily Aurangzīb refrained from committing himself in this manner, but, from the time when he first heard of his father's illness, opened a secret correspondence with Murād Bakhsh, seeking an alliance, and promising to divide the empire with him. In January, 1658, Aurangzīb left Aurangābād on his march towards Āgra, and a month later Murād left Ahmadābād. In April the armies of the two princes met at Dīpālpur in Mālwa, and thence marched together towards Ujjain, but at Dharmat<sup>1</sup> Rāja Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur and Kāsim Khān, who had been sent by Shāhjahān to arrest their progress, barred the way. In the battle which ensued the Rājput troops under Jaswant Singh fought with great valour, but they were ill supported by their Muslim colleagues, were mown down by Aurangzīb's artillery, and were at length defeated with great slaughter. After the battle the two princes continued their march, and in May reached Gwalior, where they learned that Dārā Shikūh had advanced to Dholpur, with a view to holding them on the Chambal. Aurangzīb crossed the river by an unguarded ford forty miles to the east of Dārā's camp, and thus turned his flank, whereupon Dārā retreated to Samūgarh, about eight miles east of Āgra.

<sup>1</sup> Situated in 23° N. and 75° 39' E.



Then were seen the disastrous effects of Shāhjahān's mistaken treatment of his eldest son. The prince's personal faults have already been noticed, but apart from them he suffered from grave disadvantages. His father, in his love for him, had insisted on keeping him always at court, and had thus deprived him of the opportunities which his brothers, and especially Aurangzīb, had enjoyed, of gaining experience of civil and military business.

Aurangzīb and Murād Bakhsh reached Samūgarh on June 7, 1658, their forces weary and spent after a long and waterless march in the great heat. Dārā's troops were fresh, and had he attacked the rebels at once he could hardly have failed to defeat them; but, having watched their dispositions, he retired to his tents, and refrained from attacking them, thus allowing them leisure for refreshment and repose.

The battle began at noon on the following day. It is not possible here to enter into all its details. Aurangzīb's artillery wrought havoc among Dārā's troops, but the Rājputs, as usual, fought with great valour, at times both Aurangzīb and Murād Bakhsh were in grave personal danger, and Murād Bakhsh was wounded, but both exhibited great courage and presence of mind. Dārā Shikūh made many errors which hampered the movements of his own men and the efficient service of his guns, and, finally, when the artillery and musketry fire of the rebels was concentrated on his own elephant, descended and mounted his horse. His elephant's empty howdah convinced his troops that he had fallen; they broke and fled; and nothing was left for him but to follow their example. The wretched prince reached Āgra after nightfall, too despairing even to wait upon his father, and, before dawn on the following morning, fled with his family towards Delhi.

After the battle Aurangzīb visited Murād Bakhsh, saw his wounds tended, congratulated him on the victory, which, he said, was due to his valour and exertions, and informed him that his reign would date from that day. The two princes then reached Āgra in two marches, and encamped before the city, Shāhjahān having striven to put the fort into a state of defence. He begged Aurangzīb to visit him, but the prince, having been warned of a plot for his assassination, declined to wait on his father, sent his son, Muhammad Sultān, to occupy the city, and, as his guns made little impression on the walls of the fort, seized the water-

gate, thus denying those within access to the Jumna. The water-supply from the wells within the fort was insufficient and barely drinkable; most of Shāhjahān's adherents began to desert him for Aurangzīb; and the old emperor begged his son not to allow his father to die of thirst. To this appeal Aurangzīb turned a deaf ear, and on June 21, 1658, Shāhjahān, throwing open the gates of the fort, retired into his harem, which he never again left until he was carried forth to be laid beside his wife in the beautiful tomb which he had built many years before. From this date begins the reign of Aurangzīb, who, on ascending the throne, took the title of 'Ālamgīr. He is, however, more famous under his original name, to which we shall adhere.

Shāhjahān had reigned for thirty-one years, during which time the empire of his house reached the height of its glory and its wealth. He lived for nearly eight years after his incarceration by his son, and before his death pardoned him the wrong he had done. He died in January, 1666, in the seventy-fifth year of his age, and in accordance with his will was buried beside the wife whom he had loved so well.

## CHAPTER XII

### Aurangzīb, 1658-1680

Having secured his father in the harem of his palace at Āgra, Aurangzīb set out with Murād Bakhsh in pursuit of Dārā Shikūh, but, before coming up with him, was obliged to deal with Murād. That prince perceived that Aurangzīb, who had promised to share the empire with him, was gradually usurping all authority, and his followers warned him that his power was waning. He therefore seduced some of the imperial officers and troops from their allegiance to Aurangzīb, added to the numbers of his army, and began to treat his elder brother as an inferior. Matters came to a head at Mathura, on the way to Delhi. There Aurangzīb arranged a banquet to celebrate Murād's complete recovery from his wounds, and Murād was beguiled into attending the feast given in his honour. He was treated by Aurangzīb with the honours due to royalty, and that pious Muslim saw that he was well-plied with the forbidden drink. After the meal he retired, and when he had fallen into a drunken sleep he was disarmed, bound, and sent off at midnight as a prisoner, first to Salimgarh, and then to Gwalior. There he remained for four years until, in an evil moment for himself, he attempted to escape. Aurangzīb then prompted a son of 'Alī Nakī, the man whom Murād Bakhsh had murdered in Gujarāt, to come forward and demand, under the Islamic law of retaliation, the death of his father's murderer. His demand was strictly legal, and Murād Bakhsh was executed.

On the disappearance of their leader, Murād's forces fell into confusion, but none knew what had become of him, and of personal loyalty there was little in his camp. His troops had no choice between entering Aurangzīb's service and losing their employment, and he had no difficulty in gaining their allegiance. Dārā Shikūh, by seizing the treasury at Delhi, was able to raise the number of his troops to 10,000, but as Aurangzīb approached he fled to Lahore. On July 31, 1658, Aurangzīb ascended the throne in Delhi, dispatched Bahādur Khān in pursuit of Dārā, appointed Khalīlullāh Khān to the government of the Panjab, and sent him to support Bahādur Khān in the pursuit of Dārā.

When the troops of these two officers crossed the Sutlej, and Aurangzīb himself left Delhi, Dārā Shikūh again fled from Lahore to Multān. Aurangzīb having followed him to this city, he again fled, first to Sukkur and then to Sehwan. From Multān, Aurangzīb was obliged to turn back, in order to deal with Shujā', but he left a force sufficient to pursue Dārā, who was deserted by all his troops but 3000. The pursuing force overtook him at Sehwan, but owing to its weakness in boats he was able to escape, and fled towards Gujarāt. His pursuers were then recalled to court. From the Rājput chiefs of Kachch and Kāthiāwār he received assistance which enabled him to raise the numbers of his force to 22,000, and, having received an invitation from Jaswant Singh of Jodhpur, marched on Ajmir, in the hope of being able to reach Āgra before Aurangzīb had finished dealing with Shujā'.

Shujā', as has been mentioned, had assumed the imperial title at Rājmahal, and had marched towards Āgra, but early in February, 1658, had been surprised and defeated near Benares by Sulaimān Shikūh and Rāja Jai Singh of Jaipur, who had captured his camp and treasure, while Shujā' made his escape by boat, and his army fled by land to Patna. He then made a stand near Monghyr, and Sulaimān, after having been held up there for some months, retired on receiving news of the battle of Dharmat, but was too late to help his father at Samūgarh, and attempted, by eluding Aurangzīb's army, to join him in the Panjab.

Aurangzīb, after ascending the throne, had attempted to placate Shujā' by recognising him as viceroy of Bihar as well as Bengal and Orissa, and was pursuing Dārā Shikūh in the Panjab, but Shujā', taking advantage of his absence from his capital, had recruited his forces, and in the autumn of 1658 left Patna with an army of 25,000, and by the end of the year had passed Allāhābād and reached Khajwa,<sup>1</sup> but was here confronted by Muhammad Sultān, Aurangzīb's eldest son. Aurangzīb had meanwhile returned rapidly to Delhi, and, before any action had been fought, had joined his son, with Mīr Jumla, at Kora, ten miles from the position taken up by Shujā'. At 8 a.m. on January 14, 1659, the battle began, Shujā', whose troops were outnumbered by three to one, taking the offensive. The result was for a time doubtful, and Aurangzīb was in danger of losing both his throne and his life, but at last numbers and generalship prevailed. Shujā' was

<sup>1</sup> Situated in 26° 3' N. and 80° 35' E.

defeated and fled, leaving both his camp and his guns in Aurangzīb's hands. The pursuit was left to Muhammad Sultān and Mīr Jumla, for Dārā's advance on Ajmir called Aurangzīb into Rājasthān.

Ill-fortune dogged the miserable Dārā wherever he turned. Aurangzīb, with the assistance of Jai Singh, had persuaded Jaswant Singh to transfer his allegiance from Dārā to himself, and then hastened towards Ajmir to meet his brother. Dārā, wisely declining to meet his superior forces in the open plain, held the pass of Deorai, four miles to the south of Ajmir, and commanding the approach to the city. A frontal attack on his lines of trenches was hopeless, and an attempt to drive him from them by artillery fire failed, while his artillery did much execution on the imperial troops. On March 23, another attack, supported by artillery fire, was made, but was merely a feint, for while Dārā was engaged with it the mountaineers of Rāja Kām rūp of Jammū were scaling the heights behind his left flank, and when they reached the summit Dārā perceived that his rear was menaced. His troops still fought bravely for some time, but it soon became clear that the day was lost, and they broke and fled. Dārā and his younger son, Sipihr Shikūh, fled towards Gujarāt, hard pressed by a pursuing force under Jai Singh and Bahādur Khān, and, on learning that they would not be again received in Gujarāt, turned towards Lower Sind, but there too Aurangzīb had forestalled them, and Dārā then turned northwards, crossed the Indus, and took refuge with Malik Jivan, fief-holder of Dādār, near the entrance to the Bolān Pass, whose life he had saved some time before, when he had been sentenced to death by Shāhjahān. On the way to Dādār Dārā's wife died, and when he reached that place not one of his few followers consented to accompany him into Persia. Malik Jivan, forgetful of his obligation to the prince, basely surrendered him to Bahādur Khān, and he, his son Sipihr Shikūh, aged fourteen, and his two daughters were carried to Delhi, where father and son, in miserable guise, were paraded through the streets on a small elephant amid the lamentations of the people. The decision of Dārā's fate was hastened by a rising of the citizens against the traitor Jivan, whom Aurangzīb had promoted to the command of a thousand horse, and had entitled Bakhtiyār Khān. On the night of August 30, 1659, the executioners entered Dārā's prison, removed his son, and cut him down. His corpse was paraded through the streets and was then buried in Humāyūn's tomb.

Sulaimān Shikūh had not succeeded in joining his father, for his troops, on learning of Aurangzib's success, had deserted him in such numbers that he was left almost without followers, and was obliged to seek refuge with Prithivī Singh, raja of Srīnagar in Garhwāl. There he remained in peace until Aurangzib had defeated his father at Deorai, and Prithivī Singh refused to surrender him to Aurangzib's envoys. But the raja's son, Mednī Singh, was more complaisant, and to his father's anger and disgust delivered the prince to an agent of the emperor. In January, 1662, he was brought before his uncle, who assured him that he should be kindly treated. The prince begged that he might be put to death at once if it were intended to destroy him by means of *pūst*, a decoction of poppy-heads which acted as a slow poison. Aurangzib solemnly assured him that he need fear no such treatment, and sent him to the state-prison at Gwalior, where, despite the promise made to him, he died a few months later from the effects of opium-poisoning.

The campaign against Shujā' in Bengal progressed but slowly. His troops were outnumbered, but were better provided with boats than were the imperial troops, whose movements were hampered by the rivers and water-logged country. Muhammad Sultān chafed under the tutelage of Mīr Jumla, and entered into treasonable correspondence with his uncle, who promised him his daughter in marriage, and his assistance in gaining the crown. The prince, who was in an advanced position, took the bait, deserted his troops, crossed the Ganges, and joined Shujā' near Tānda. His flight threw his force into confusion, but Mīr Jumla at once visited it, restored order, and retained the troops in the imperial service. In February, 1660, Mīr Jumla effected the passage of the Ganges near Mālda, between Rājmahal and Tānda, and Shujā', whose line of retreat was threatened, fled towards Dacca, which he reached in April. When Mīr Jumla crossed the Ganges Muhammad Sultān deserted his uncle and rejoined the imperial camp, but his father never forgave him, and he spent the rest of his life in prison.

Shujā' was unable to maintain himself in Dacca, for the local landholders were not prepared to support a fugitive prince against the imperial power, and in May he set sail for Arakan, of the king of which country he had already sought aid. He was met by a flotilla of the Arakanese fleet, and was granted an asylum

in Arakan, but was shortly afterwards detected in a plot to slay his host and seize his kingdom, as a base from which to attempt the recovery of Bengal. On learning that the king intended to put him to death he fled into the forest with a few followers, but was pursued and slain by the Arakanese.

Aurangzīb was thus rid of all possible competitors for the throne, and his reign began indeed. His father yet lived in confinement in the harem of his palace at Āgra, and it was probably for this reason that Aurangzīb chose Delhi as his residential capital, and on June 15, 1659, enthroned himself, with greater solemnity than on the former occasion, and ordered that every regnal year should be reckoned from Ramadān I, afterwards altered to Shawwāl I, the festival at the close of the month of fasting, as the first day of the fast was not suitable for the celebration of a feast. Aurangzīb has already been described as a rigid Sunni. He was no hypocrite, for he observed the commands and prohibitions of the sacred law of Islam throughout his long reign. The religious history of his house is well known. Akbar had abjured Islam, and invented a religion of his own. His son Jahāngīr remained nominally a Muslim, but habitually transgressed the law of Islam, and inherited so much of his father's tastes as to encourage discussion, and to dabble at times in Christianity and Hinduism. Shāhjahān, more orthodox than either his father or his grandfather, persecuted Christians, encouraged, or at least countenanced the destruction of Hindu temples, and abolished Akbar's most offensive institution of *sijda*, or prostration before the emperor, on the ground that prostration was due to God alone. Aurangzīb was a better Muslim than any of his forbears, and therefore a worse ruler, in the eyes of the majority of his subjects. He refrained from stamping the symbol of Islam and the names of the orthodox caliphs on his coins, lest they should be dishonoured and polluted by passing through the hands of infidels; he discontinued the celebration of the pagan festival of the *Naurūz*, or New Year's Day; he appointed a censor of morals to enforce the law of Islam, and to prevent the manufacture, sale, and consumption of intoxicating liquors; he restored ruined mosques, and appointed officials to them; he forbade music at court; he removed the stone elephants set up by Jahāngīr at the gate of the Āgra fort; he discontinued the practice of appearing every morning at the *jharokha*, or oriel

window, as savouring of the Hindu ceremony of *darshan*; he forbade the Hindu form of salute by raising the hand to the head; and, as he grew older, he introduced other rules directed towards the discouragement of Hindu practices and the enforcement of the commands and prohibitions of the law of Islam. He gradually discovered, as others have since discovered, that the legal prohibition of practices not morally reprehensible could not be enforced, and tended only to provoke opposition and to excite contempt for law. Zeal for orthodoxy led naturally to the persecution of the heterodox. Theologians, mystics, and pantheists, among whom were some whom Dārā Shikūh had honoured, were among his victims. One was fortunate enough to die on his way to court; another, Sarmad, a pantheist whose moral character was not above reproach, who was in the habit of going about stark naked, and whose doctrines resembled, in some respects, those of the Dukhobors of Russia, was executed for heresy; a Christian friar, who had embraced Islam and then reverted to his former faith, was put to death for apostasy; later, a Shiah official was put to death for cursing the first three successors of Muhammad; the leader of the Bohras of Ahmadābād, a community of Shiahs of the Ismā'īlī sect, was put to death with 700 of his followers. The Shiah practice of cursing as usurpers the first three successors of Muhammad always aroused the ire of Aurangzīb, as an orthodox Sunni, and provided him with a pretext, if any were needed, for visiting it upon the Kutb Shāhī kings of Golconda, who, as zealous Shiahs, encouraged the practice. It also led to acrimonious correspondence with the court of Persia. Shāh 'Abbās II dispatched to the Indian court a splendid embassy, with rich gifts and a friendly letter, to congratulate him on his success in seizing the throne. To this attention Aurangzīb responded by sending an embassy almost equally splendid, but bearing a letter vaunting his achievements, and declaring that he needed no human aid, as it was evident from his success that God was his helper. He would have done well to beware of the mordant and caustic wit of Persia, for Shāh 'Abbās replied twitting him with his failure to subdue the infidel Sīvajī, and with his assumption of the title of 'Ālamgīr, or world-conqueror, when his only conquests had been the imprisonment of his father and the murder of his brother.

An embassy to Mecca was more successful. Whether Aurang-



zib's conscience pricked him or not is uncertain, but he desired recognition by the sharif of the holy city, and the rich gifts which he sent not only purchased recognition, but also whetted the appetite of the holy man, who thereafter sent envoys to India every year, until Aurangzib was goaded into replying that the sharif seemed to believe that the wealth of India was inexhaustible, and that the money which was sent to Mecca was meant for the poor, and not for him.

Aurangzib's reign of fifty years falls into two equal parts. During the first twenty-five years he resided in the north, chiefly at Delhi, and personally occupied himself with the affairs of northern India, leaving those of the Deccan, which had been his chief interest before his ascent of the throne, in the hands of his viceroys. Late in 1681 he was obliged, by the rebellion of one of his sons, to return to the Deccan, and never again left it. He died, a disappointed and worn-out man, at Ahmadnagar in 1707. The earlier conquests of the reign were of little importance, and some were afterwards abandoned. The first was that of western Assam. The Āhoms, a tribe of the Shān race, whose original home lay between the Irawadi and the Salwīn rivers, had established in Assam, in the thirteenth century, a kingdom which included the greater part of the Brahmaputra valley. In 1612 Jahāngīr's governor of Bengal, in the course of aiding the raja of Kūch Bihar against a rebellious son, conquered that son's principality, and thus extended the imperial dominions to the frontier of the Āhom kingdom, with which the empire was almost immediately involved in a war which lasted for twenty-six years, and ended in the annexation of the principality of Kāmārūp, as far east as the Barnadī. In 1658, after Shujā' had for the first time left Bengal with his troops, in his attempt to reach Āgra, the raja of Kūch Bihar trespassed on imperial territory, and the Āhom viceroy of western Assam invaded Kāmārūp, and occupied its capital, Gauhati; but in 1660 Aurangzib appointed Mīr Jumla viceroy of Bengal, and ordered him to punish the intruders. He made Dacca his headquarters, and after the rainy season in the following year left that city with a force of 12,000 horse and 30,000 foot, and a fleet of 323 boats. He first invaded Kūch Bihar and occupied its capital, which he renamed 'Ālam-gīrnagar, destroyed the principal temple in the town, built a mosque in its place, and annexed the whole kingdom. After a

brief rest he set out early in 1662 for Assam, and crossed the frontier. The imperial troops met with very little opposition from the Āhom army, which was too enfeebled by cholera to withstand them, but their progress was very slow, owing to the density of the forest and the difficult nature of the country, and the army suffered great hardships. The Āhom fleet was destroyed, and in March Mīr Jumla arrived at Gargāon<sup>1</sup> (now Nāzira), the capital of the Āhom raja, Jayadhwaj, having captured a great quantity of spoil in cash, supplies, arms, and elephants, and more than 1000 boats. In this neighbourhood he went into quarters for the rainy season, while the imperial troops held the city, though harassed and attacked throughout the rainy season by the Āhom army. Their sufferings were great. After the opening of the rains in May no supplies reached them, and their horses and cattle died for want of proper food. In August their numbers were greatly reduced by a terrible epidemic, and it was not until late in September that the floods went down and the roads became passable and the river navigable. The troops were then again able to take the field, and the Āhom army gradually melted away before them. One by one its principal officers deserted to Mīr Jumla, but the raja, though deserted in the hills of Kāmrup, was safe, for the imperial troops refused to advance farther into his country.

Through the instrumentality of his own principal lieutenant, Dilīr Khān, Mīr Jumla then concluded a treaty with Jayadhwaj. Under its terms, which were most advantageous to the invaders, the rajaceded to the empire the western provinces of his kingdom, which were exceedingly rich in elephants, and bound himself to send his daughter to the imperial court, to pay a very heavy indemnity in specie and elephants, to surrender hostages as security for its payment, and to pay an annual tribute of elephants.

After the conclusion of this treaty Mīr Jumla led his army from Assam. He had personally undergone all the hardships suffered by the meanest of his troops, and had suffered from fever and pleurisy during the campaign. At first, in January, 1663, he marched with his troops, but was obliged, at length, to embark on a boat in order to reach Dacca with greater ease, but he died in April before arriving at the city.

Of all who served Aurangzib Mīr Jumla was the ablest and

<sup>1</sup> Situated in 26° 56' N. and 94° 45' E.

the most noble. "His character shone with supreme excellence in this enterprise. No other general of that age conducted war with so much humanity and justice." Under the most adverse conditions he not only maintained among his troops the strictest discipline, but retained the affection of his officers and men. By far the wealthiest noble of the empire, he spared himself no toil and no suffering in his master's service, and it was no fault of his that his army suffered as it did or that the fruits of his military success proved to be worthless. In 1667, Chaknadhwaj, who had succeeded Jayadhwaj in 1663, recovered all the territory conquered by Mīr Jumla, and, though Rām Singh of Jaipur attempted to reconquer it for the empire, his attempt failed.

Mīr Jumla had been ordered to punish the ruler of Arakan, as well as the Āhom raja. Arakan was a maritime kingdom inhabited by a people called the Maghs, whose most northerly port was Chatgām, or Chittagong. The Maghs were pirates, whose descents on the coasts of Bengal and raids up the rivers of the deltas of the Ganges and the Brahmaputra depopulated and impoverished Lower Bengal. The Portuguese had established a settlement at Chittagong more than a century before this time and, following their usual policy, had allied themselves with the enemies of the Muslims and had, with their descendants of mixed blood, become partly the servants, partly the partners of the Magh ruler. The Maghs alone had struck terror into the hearts of the people of Lower Bengal, but with their Portuguese allies they were irresistible, for the Muslims of India are not a maritime community, and, with all their wealth, could neither build nor man any navy capable of facing the Portuguese on the sea. The country was ravaged, and both Hindus and Muslims were carried off in large numbers, and either kept as slaves in Arakan or sold to the settlements of English, Dutch, and French merchants.

The grievous loss which the empire had suffered by the death of Mīr Jumla had delayed the opening of a campaign against the pirates, but in 1664 Aurangzīb appointed his maternal uncle, Shāyista Khān, to the government of Bengal with instructions to complete the tasks assigned to Mīr Jumla. Shāyista Khān, who was a most capable and energetic official, governed Bengal for fourteen years (1664-77). He found that the imperial navy of Bengal had been well-nigh destroyed by the pirates and that he would be obliged to build a new fleet. The dockyards of Lower

Bengal were kept busily employed for over a year, at the end of which time a new fleet of 300 sail had been built, equipped and manned.

Just beyond the mouth of the main stream of the Brahmaputra lay the island of Sandwīp, which was held as an independent estate by Dilāvar Khān, an officer who had deserted from the imperial navy. In 1665 this island was captured, and Dilāvar Khān was taken prisoner and sent to Dacca. Sandwīp was an excellent base for an attack on Chittagong, but the Muslims could not have faced the Portuguese on the sea. Fortunately for Shāyista Khān these pirates had quarrelled violently with their masters or confederates, the Maghs, and Shāyista Khān was able to inveigle them by promises into the imperial service. In December, 1665, they fled from Chittagong and crossed the frontier into the imperial territory, and their leaders received high naval commands. At the beginning of 1666 the army of Bengal left Dacca under the command of Buzurg Ummīd Khān, son of Shāyista Khān, and marched along the coast, cutting a road through the jungle as it proceeded, while the fleet accompanied it, sailing close in-shore. At the beginning of February the army crossed the Fenny river, which was the frontier between the empire and Arakan, and a few days later the Bengal navy, led by the Portuguese ships, sailed out of a creek and defeated the light squadron of the Arakanese navy. On the following day it entered the Karnaphālī river, and, after a fiercely contested battle, overcame the fleet of Arakan, capturing 135 ships, and two days later compelled the governor of the citadel of Chittagong to capitulate. A day or two later the army arrived and made a triumphal entry into the city, renamed Islāmābād and made the headquarters of an imperial *faujdar*. The more formidable pirates had entered the imperial service, and the rest were extinguished.

Trouble next arose beyond the Indus, between Peshāwar and Kābul. No power has yet been able permanently to reduce to order the warlike tribes inhabiting the mountainous country on the present frontier between India and Afghanistan, from Dīr to Pishīn, or to induce them to live peaceably under a settled government. Even their own tribal system is often rendered futile by a lawless individualism, and, apart from cultivating such grain as they need for their support, their principal occupations have been robbery and blood-feuds, tribe against tribe, clan against

clan, and family against family. Late in Akbar's reign the Yūsufzais of Swāt and Bajaur and the sect of the Raushanīs had given serious trouble, and Bīrbal and Zain Khān had been heavily defeated, the former being slain. Punitive measures had been taken, but the effect of these never lasted long, and the usual means of keeping the tribes quiet had been to bribe the chiefs to keep the peace and to wink at acts of aggression. In 1667 the Yūsufzais again rose under a chief and a local mulla, crossed the Indus well above Attock, possessed themselves of the district through which ran the main road into Kashmīr, and encroached on imperial territory further south. Three columns were sent against them. One, from Attock, defeated them on the Indus, slew three thousand of them, and drove numbers into the river, where they were drowned; another, from Kābul, invaded their country, destroyed their crops, and burned their villages in the lowlands. Further blows were dealt and their lands were devastated by a large force under Muhammad Amīn Khān, son of Mīr Jumla. These measures cowed the tribes for some years, but in 1672 Akmal Khān, chief of the Afrīdis, irritated by the behaviour of the governor of Jalālābād, rose in rebellion, assumed the royal title, and summoned all the tribes to join him in a war against the empire. Muhammad Amīn Khān, governor of Kābul, left Peshāwar for that city in the spring of 1672. The Afrīdis held the Khaibar Pass against him, but he pressed on and entrenched himself at 'Alī Masjid. The Afrīdis descended on him, cut him off from the source of his water-supply, so that many of his men and animals died of thirst, threw the whole army into confusion by rolling down on them great rocks from the heights, and then charged down on them and plundered their camp. Ten thousand of the imperial troops were slain, the survivors were captured and sold into slavery, and cash and property worth twenty million rupees fell into the hands of the victors. Muhammad Amīn contrived, with some of his principal officers, to escape to Peshāwar, but his family was taken by the Afrīdis, and he was obliged to pay a great sum for their ransom. The Khattaks then rose under their chief, Khushhāl Khān, a noted poet in his own language, and joined the Afrīdis. Never before had the empire suffered so heavily at the hands of the tribesmen, and Akmal Khān's victory encouraged nearly all the tribes, even those usually hostile to one another, to join him, and the rising was general "from Kandahār to Attock".

Muhammad Amīn Khān was degraded, and Mahābat Khān was transferred from the government of Gujarāt to that of Kābul, and was ordered to crush the rebellion. But he feared the fate of his predecessor, and provided for his safety by entering into secret agreements with the tribes, by means of which he contrived to reach Kābul by the Karāpa Pass. The news of his dealings with the tribes angered the emperor, and he placed Shujā'at Khān, a competent officer of humble origin, in command of a large independent force, supported by Jaswant Singh and his Rājputs, to subdue and punish the tribes, but the two generals could not work in harmony, and early in 1674 Shujā'at Khān was defeated and slain in the Karāpa Pass, and his army was saved from annihilation only by the exertions of a band of Jaswant Singh's Rāthors. In the summer of that year Aurangzīb himself moved from Delhi to Hasan Abdal to direct operations. He dismissed Mahābat Khān from the government of Kābul on the ground that he had connived at Shujā'at Khān's defeat, and summoned from the Deccan Aghar Khān, an able Turkish officer, who knew how to deal with the tribesmen, and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mohmands and their confederates. He failed to open the Khaibar Pass, where he was wounded, and suffered heavy losses; but, after this failure, he was uniformly successful against the tribes. Other imperial officers, however, suffered reverses; Fidai Khān in the Jagdallak Pass, where he at first lost heavily, but beat off the enemy, and was relieved by Aghar Khān, who forced the pass; Muharram Khān also was defeated in Bajaur; Hizabr Khān was defeated and slain at Jagdallak, and the commandant of Bārikāb and Surkhāb was driven from his post with heavy losses; but the balance of military success lay with the imperial troops. Military posts were established in the country of the rebellious tribes, and they were severely punished, but Aurangzīb's guile was more effective than his arms. Tribes which were prepared to submit escaped punishment by betraying their confederates, and a section of the Afrīdis under Daryā Khān promised to deliver the head of Akmal Khān to the emperor. Thus, by the end of 1675, the situation was in hand, and Aurangzīb was able to return to Delhi. Rather more than a year later Amīr Khān, son of Khalīlullāh Khān, was appointed to the government of Kābul, and for twenty years maintained order in the province by following Aurangzīb's policy of setting tribe against tribe, and

by paying subsidies to chiefs to induce them to keep their tribes quiet. After the death of Akmal even the Afrīdis came to terms, and Khushhāl Khān, chief of the Khattaks, was betrayed and imprisoned.

The religious policy of Aurangzib was disastrous. His great-grandfather had striven to remove the religious and social barriers which divided the various classes of his subjects, and, though exception can be taken to his methods, none can be taken to the end which he had in view. His grandfather, the son of a Hindu mother, held liberal, even lax views on religion. His father was a better Muslim than either Akbar or Jahāngīr, but, except in the case of political offenders, bridled his zeal. But Aurangzib was a bigot to whom the religion of the great majority of his subjects was anathema, misbelief, and idolatry, which it was his duty before heaven to persecute, and if possible to stamp out. His methods were iconoclasm, sacrilege, economic repression, bribery, forced conversion and restriction of worship. As governor of Gujarāt he had displayed his bigotry by defiling and destroying a Hindu temple and building a mosque on its site. After ascending the throne he commanded the demolition of "all schools and temples of the infidels" and the suppression of their teaching and practices. Under his orders the second temple of Somnāth in Gujarāt, the Vishvanāth temple in Benares, and the Keshava Rai temple in Mathura were destroyed, the name of Mathura was changed to Islāmābād, and on the site of the temple in Benares was raised the mosque which yet towers above all the temples of the Hindus in their most sacred city. Religious grants to the Hindus were resumed, and in 1680 the temples in Amber, the capital of a state which had ever been loyal to the empire, were destroyed. Hindus were, for the first time, debarred from holding the post of revenue-collector, and in those parts of India in which the office was hereditary the holder was not allowed to retain it unless he embraced Islam. Customs-duties or octroi were levied on all goods and merchandise brought for sale, at the rate of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. *ad valorem* from Muslims and 5 per cent. from Hindus, but in 1667 Muslims were exempted from the payment of any duty, while from Hindus it was levied at the old rate. Hindus were persuaded by offers of public office, and even cruder means, to accept Islam; criminals were granted pardons on professing their readiness to embrace that faith; later in the reign

no Hindus but Rājputs were permitted to use palanquins, to bear arms, or to ride on elephants or good horses; religious fairs were prohibited; and the celebration of the principal Hindu festivals was subjected to vexatious control. But Aurangzib's supreme act of folly, exhibiting his ignorance of the principles of his own sacred law, was the imposition of the *jizya*, or poll-tax, on all classes of Hindus. This is a tax levied from all who are not Muslims and in a state governed in accordance with the principles of the law of Islam may be justified, for there none but Muslims are permitted to bear arms, and it is held that those who are exempted under the law from military service may justly be called upon to contribute in cash to the cost of the defence of the state. But the levy of the tax could not be justified in India, where the Rājputs not only bore arms, but were among the best soldiers of the state. The imposition of the tax upon them was therefore not only unjust, but was a gross insult, and as such it was resented.

These measures produced their natural result. The destruction of the temple in the holy city of Mathura caused a rising of the Jāt peasantry. These sturdy tillers of the soil will be remembered as the antagonists of Mahmūd of Ghaznī, first when he crossed the Indus after his destruction of the temple of Somnāth, and again, when he led his last expedition into India to punish them for molesting him on his retreat. A large community of this tribe was settled in the districts to the south of Delhi, and it was Aurangzib's foolish policy that first brought them into political prominence. They rose under the leadership of Gokla, a landholder of Tilpat, about fifteen miles to the south of Delhi, and throughout 1669 the whole district of Mathura was in a turmoil, but in January, 1670, the rebels were defeated in the field and afterwards besieged in Tilpat, which was taken by storm after great slaughter. Gokla was publicly hewn in pieces and the rebellion was suppressed, but in 1686 the Jāts again rose.

The next rebellion had its origin in a purely secular dispute between a sect of unitarians, known as Satnāmis, whose headquarters was at Nārnaul, and an imperial soldier whom the Satnāmis beat nearly to death. The rebellion soon assumed a religious character, and the Satnāmis seized Nārnaul, defeated the local force of imperial troops, and destroyed the mosques in the town. The rebellion in this rich district caused a scarcity



of supplies in Delhi, and an imperial force was sent against the rebels, some thousands strong. In March, 1672, they were defeated after a fiercely contested battle, "very few of them escaped and that tract of the country was cleared of the infidels".

The Sikh community, founded late in the fifteenth century by Bābā Nānak, near Lahore, remained a purely religious body until the death of its fifth *guru*, Arjūn, who suffered at the hands of Jahāngīr for his indiscretion in making a gift or a loan to his son Khusraw when he was in rebellion. Under Arjūn's son and successor, Har Govind, it acquired a definitely military and political character, and defeated near Amritsar, which had then become its headquarters, an army sent against it by Shāhjahān, to punish it for some acts of contumacy. Other armies were sent against the Sikhs and at length Har Govind's house and property were plundered, and he was driven into the Kashmīr hills, where he died. He was succeeded by his son Har Kishan, on whose death, in 1664, Har Govind's youngest son, Tegh Bahādur, was, after a disputed succession, accepted as *guru*. His hostility to Islam and to its champion was aroused by Aurangzīb's persecution of both Hindus and Sikhs. He openly defied the emperor, but was captured and carried to Delhi, where, after refusing to accept Islam, he was first tortured and then beheaded. His son, Govind Rai, was the tenth and last *guru* of the Sikhs. He perfected their organisation as a military brotherhood, the *Khālsa*, and spent his life in conflicts with the hill-chiefs, from Jammū to Garhwāl, and with the imperial troops which were sent to their aid. Ānandpur, his place of residence, was at length reduced; he lost his four sons, and eventually was hunted through the lower Himālāya by Aurangzīb's troops. On the death of Aurangzīb Govind Rai, with a force of cavalry and infantry, accompanied Bahādur Shāh I through Rājasthān into the Deccan, and took up his residence at Nānder, on the Godāvarī, where, in 1708, he fell at the hands of an Afghan assassin. He was the last *guru* and on his death the Sikhs were, for a time, disorganised, but eventually succeeded in establishing a military state in the Panjab.

The pollution and destruction of temples, the general policy of persecution, and above all the emperor's decision that the poll-tax should be levied from Hindus of all classes, seriously agitated the chiefs of Rājasthān, who had served the empire faithfully. But Aurangzīb, not yet content, betrayed an intention of robbing

the chiefs of their ancestral domains, and annexing them to the empire. Late in 1678 Mahārāja Jaswant Singh of Mārṡwār died at Jamrūd, in the Khaibar Pass, leaving no son at the time of his death. His state was in confusion, for no ruler remained, and the best of its troops were serving in the Kābul province. Aurangzīb annexed Mārṡwār, and sent his officers into the state to administer it as a province of the empire, but, in consideration of a bribe of three and a half million rupees, installed Indra Singh of Nāgaur, a grand-nephew of Jaswant Singh, as titular chief of the state. In 1679, however, two of Jaswant Singh's widows gave birth to posthumous sons at Lahore. One child did not long survive his birth, but the other, Ajit Singh, was destined for Aurangzīb's harem, there to be educated, presumably as a Muslim. The widows and the child were brought to Delhi, and, when a party of troops visited their mansion to conduct them and the child to the imperial palace, the spirit of the Rājputs was aroused, and one heroic band fell on the troops, while the gallant Durga Dās, the son of Jaswant, left by another gate with the widows and the child and rode for Mārṡwār. The imperial troops were so long delayed by the attack which the Rājputs made on them that the fugitives were not overtaken until they had travelled nine miles. Then another and again another band of Rājputs fell on them, and at length they gave up the chase and Ajit Singh was carried off in safety into Mārṡwār. Aurangzīb made Ajmir his headquarters and sent an army under his fourth son, Muhammad Akbar, into Mārṡwār, to complete the conquest of the country, and deposed Indra Singh. The Rāthors carried on a guerilla warfare, but their land was parcelled out among imperial officers, Jodhpur and other cities were occupied, their temples were destroyed, and mosques built on their sites. The state was regarded, though it was in great disorder, as an imperial province, and Aurangzīb turned his attention to Mewār, for he had grounds for displeasure with the rāna, Rāj Singh.

Some time before this Aurangzīb had demanded the hand of a princess of a cadet branch of the rāna's house; but the proud Rājput lady threatened to destroy herself if she were forced to become the mate of the "monkey-faced barbarian", and threw herself on the protection of the chief of her race, who responded by cutting up her escort of imperial guards and carrying her off to Udaipur as his wife. When it was decreed that the poll-tax

should be levied from the Rājputs, Rāj Singh had sent a dignified letter of protest to the emperor, and, when Mārṡwār was overrun, he granted to his kinswoman, the widow of Jaswant Singh, her young son Ajit Singh, and Durga Dās an asylum in the hills of Mewār. Aurangzīb therefore invaded his state, and the Rājputs withdrew into the hills, which the imperial troops feared to penetrate; but their advanced guard, in January, 1680, inflicted a defeat on the rāna; the lowlands of the state, from which his troops drew all their supplies of food, were overrun and devastated; the capital, Udaipur, was occupied; and nearly 250 temples were destroyed there and at Chitor. Aurangzīb then returned to Ajmir, leaving his fourth son, Akbar, at Chitor in command of the field operations in Mewār. The rāna, holding the Aravallī Range, which separated Mewār from Mārṡwār, was able to descend on either side of it on military posts isolated among a hostile force, to cut off their supplies, surprise them, harass them, and render outpost duty so arduous and perilous that neither officers nor men would undertake it. Akbar, complaining that his army was motionless through fear, remained inactive at Chitor until his father transferred him to Mārṡwār, and was relieved in Mewār by his brother A'zam, Aurangzīb's third son. A new scheme for the conquest of Rājasthān was then formed. Mu'azzam, Aurangzīb's second son, was summoned from the Deccan, and was placed in command of a force which was to enter the Aravallis from the north, while A'zam entered them from the east, and Akbar from the west; but the scheme failed. A'zam was loth to enter the mountains, and Tahavvur Khān, commanding Akbar's advanced guard, refused to advance. Akbar, urged on by his father, made some slight advance, but was already meditating treason. Using Tahavvur Khān as his intermediary he was in communication both with the Sesodias of Mewār and the Rāthors of Mārṡwār, who had no difficulty in convincing Akbar that his father's policy of subduing the Rājputs was imperilling the empire. They urged him to depose his father, seize the throne, and revert to the wise policy of his ancestors. Aurangzīb was at Ajmir, unprotected but by his personal guards, the bulk of his army having been distributed among the field forces commanded by his three sons. The proposal fell on willing ears; the Rājputs promised their support; and the foolish young man was easily persuaded that he was a match for his father.

Negotiations were delayed by the death of the *rāna*, Rāj Singh, and by the month of mourning which followed his death; but his successor, Jai Singh, concluded the compact, and on January 12, 1681, Akbar set out on his march to Ajmir, accompanied by his allies. He had previously attempted to lull his father's suspicions by reporting that he was escorting the new *rāna* and Durga Dās, the Rāthor, to the imperial camp to make their submission; but two or three days later threw off all disguise by causing himself to be proclaimed emperor, and appointing Tahavvur Khān to the office of minister. Speed was then essential to the success of the enterprise, but the foolish prince loitered on his way to Ajmir and allowed his father time to double his forces by summoning to his aid his second son, Mu'azzam. On January 25 Akbar halted within three miles of his father's camp, which had been moved forward to the pass in which Dārā Shikūh had been defeated, and was prepared to meet his father's army on the following day; but Aurangzīb had obliged Tahavvur Khān's father-in-law to write to him promising him forgiveness if he should return to his duty and warning him that if he hesitated his wives would be publicly outraged and his sons sold into slavery. Tahavvur Khān secretly visited the imperial camp, but was there slain by Aurangzīb's attendants as he was attempting to force his way armed into the presence chamber. Aurangzīb had meanwhile written to Akbar, praising him for having so faithfully carried out his instructions to beguile the Rājput chiefs into accompanying him to Ajmir, and desiring him to place them in the van of his forces on the following day, that they might be hemmed in by his own forces attacking them in front and Akbar's attacking them in rear. By Aurangzīb's instructions the letter was allowed to fall first into the hands of Durga Dās, who at once called upon Akbar for an explanation, but found that he was asleep and had given orders that he was not to be disturbed. He next sought Tahavvur Khān, and, on learning that he had left for the imperial camp, was convinced that the Rājputs had been betrayed. They seized what they could lay hands on in Akbar's camp, and at once took the road to Mārwar. When morning broke Akbar's army had melted away. Only 350 horse remained to him, and with this small body he rapidly followed the Rājputs. Durga Dās, who had almost immediately discovered Aurangzīb's ruse, turned back and met the prince, who was con-

cealed and protected by the Rājputs for four months, while a large force under his brother, Mu'azzam, hunted him through Mārwar. In May he crossed the Nerbudda, then the Taptī, and in June he joined Sīvajī's son, Sambhujī, in the Konkan. Sambhujī received him with royal honours and took him under his protection.

Neither party had then anything to gain by continuing the war in Rājputāna. The imperial troops, scattered over an inhospitable region amid a hostile population, were constantly exposed to the attacks of a valiant enemy whose fastnesses they dared not approach. The Rājputs, free and unconquered in their mountains, were yet starving. After a raid of the Sesodias into the fertile province of Gujarāt, negotiations were opened between the emperor and the rāna. Three districts were ceded by the rāna to the empire in lieu of the poll-tax, from which the rāna's subjects were exempted. The rest of Mewār was restored to Jai Singh, whose title as rāna was recognised and who received the rank of a commander of 5000 horse. Mārwar, however, was not evacuated, and was occupied by the imperial forces for the next thirty years; but the Rāthors gave the troops no rest, and attacked and harassed them until many of their officers purchased respite from constant scarcity, annoyance and danger by secretly paying blackmail, until in 1709 Ajīt Singh regained possession of Jodhpur, and his title and lordship were formally recognised by Aurangzīb's son and successor, Bahādur Shāh I.


## CHAPTER XIII

### Aurangzīb in the Deccan, 1680-1707

The reception of the rebel prince Akbar at the court of the Marātha raja, Sambhuji, obliged Aurangzīb to return to the Deccan, which he had twice ruled as viceroy in his father's reign, but had not visited since his accession to the throne. We must, therefore, revert to the history of the Deccan, in order to explain the situation which the emperor found himself called upon to face. He, it will be remembered, had patched up a peace with 'Alī II of Bijāpur, from whom he extorted a heavy indemnity which materially aided him in his enterprise.

After Shāhjahān's treaty with the kingdoms of the Deccan on the extinction of the kingdom of Ahmadnagar in 1633 Shāhji the Marātha had been permitted to enter the service of Bijāpur, in the northern districts of which he held important fiefs in the neighbourhood of Poona. He afterwards acquired extensive fiefs in the districts of the Carnatic conquered by Bijāpur, and in these fiefs he usually resided with his elder and favourite son, Sambhuji, leaving his northern estates under the management of an agent, to whom was also entrusted the education of his younger son, Sīvaji. On the death of his father's agent Sīvaji assumed the management of these estates as though they were his own, remitting revenue neither to his father nor to the state. He captured a number of hill forts and annexed the districts which they dominated, and the state, too weak to attack him, suspected that he was acting under secret instructions from his father, who was seized and imprisoned. Shāhji appealed to the emperor Shāhjahān, and 'Alī II, fearing lest Sīvaji should transfer his estates and his services to the empire, released Shāhji and permitted him to return to the government of the Carnatic.

Sīvaji, one of the greatest soldiers whom India has produced, was a statesman no less than a soldier. His ambition was to establish in India a great Hindu power, and for the attainment of this object he was most favourably situated. The kingdom of Bijāpur was entering upon the last stages of decay. When Aurangzīb, as viceroy, had invaded the kingdom Sīvaji had stood aloof. After Aurangzīb had left the Deccan for Āgra, 'Alī II attempted



to punish the rebel, but Sīvajī slew, at a private interview, the commander of the forces sent against him, and dispersed his troops. Having eluded another force he encroached on the imperial province of the Deccan, and raided it almost to the gates of its capital, Aurangābād. Aurangzīb then appointed his maternal uncle, Shāyista Khān, to the viceroyalty, and in 1660 he entered into a treaty with 'Alī II for a combined attack on Sīvajī. Of the Marātha's estates some were devastated and of his forts many were captured, but he retained the southern Konkan. In June, 1661, Sīvajī descended from his fortress capital in disguise, entered Poona with a few followers, broke at night into the house occupied by the viceroy, slew his son and his guard, and wounded Shāyista Khān himself, who narrowly escaped with his life. Shāyista Khān was then recalled, and Aurangzīb sent as viceroy to the Deccan his second son, Mu'azzam, an unwarlike prince, with whom Sīvajī, whose funds were now ample, was able to conclude an armistice on very favourable terms. On his father's death in 1664 Sīvajī assumed the title of rāja, struck coin in his own name, and shortly afterwards sacked the imperial city of Surat. Aurangzīb could not ignore these acts of defiance and aggression, and sent against the rebel his ablest generals, Jai Singh of Amber and Dilīr Khān.

The campaign against the Marātha was pursued with great vigour, and Sīvajī was reduced to such straits that he sued for peace. Jai Singh received him with great courtesy, and at Pāndharpur concluded with him a convention under which Sīvajī agreed to attend the imperial court under a safe-conduct granted by the rāna. He left the Deccan in March, 1666, and in May, on Aurangzīb's fiftieth birthday, was presented at court with ten of his officers by Jai Singh's son, Rām Singh. There he was informed that he, his young son Sambhujī, and his master of the horse, Netajī, were appointed commanders of 5000 horse. Sīvajī regarded the association of his young son and his servant with him in the rank conferred on him, and the place assigned to him at court, as studied insults, and was so enraged that he fainted. After being carried out, he protested to Aurangzīb against the treatment which he had received, and was consequently placed under arrest. Rām Singh was ordered to accommodate him in the Amber house at Āgra, and was made responsible for his custody. The Rājput prince regarded these orders as a breach



of the safe-conduct which his father had granted, and Sīvajī was not subjected to any galling restraint. His escort was permitted to return to the Deccan, and shortly afterwards he and his son escaped, hidden in baskets borne on the backs of coolies. Sīvajī made his way to Mathura, disguised as a pilgrim, and thence journeyed to the Deccan by devious routes, reaching his fortress capital, Raigarh, after an absence of nine months. He was joyously welcomed by his servants and his subjects, and lost no time in settling his account with the emperor. He recovered the Konkan and most of the other possessions which he had ceded under the convention of Pāndharpur. Jai Singh was besieging Bījāpur, but with little prospect of success, and, perceiving that his line of retreat was threatened by Sīvajī, retired to Aurangābād, but was recalled from the Deccan. On his way to court he died at Burhānpur, worn out by age and long service. Mu'azzam was again sent to the Deccan, and was again cajoled by Sīvajī not only into making peace, but even into obtaining Aurangzib's sanction to Sīvajī's retention of the forts and lands which he had recovered, and to the revival in his favour of the title of raja, which had been conferred by the Ahmadnagar kingdom on his grandfather, Mālojī.

Sīvajī, at peace both with the empire and with Bījāpur, had leisure to perfect his system of administration. His government was organised in eight departments, each presided over by a responsible minister, the chief minister being dignified by the Persian title of Pēshwā. The machinery of the administration was simple, but efficient; the pernicious old Marātha institution of hereditary office was set aside, and Sīvajī, recognising the danger of a powerful feudal aristocracy, granted no fiefs, public servants, of all ranks, both civil and military, being paid directly from the treasury. All were subject to summary dismissal for misconduct or inefficiency. He was accessible to all his subjects, and commanded such devotion as no other contemporary ruler in India received. The districts permanently occupied by him enjoyed better government than any of the neighbouring provinces, either of the empire or of Bījāpur.

The unusual calm in the Deccan and the growth of Sīvajī's power aroused in Aurangzib's mind the suspicion that Mu'azzam was conspiring with the Marātha to treat him as he had treated his father. The prince was accordingly ordered to arrest Sīvajī

and send him to court, but private information that such orders were being prepared enabled Mu'azzam to anticipate their arrival by privately warning Sīvajī, who accordingly withdrew his representatives from Aurangābād, and the prince was able to report that it was impossible to execute the command. But the issue of these orders again disturbed the peace of the Deccan. Sīvajī captured several imperial forts, once more plundered Surat, and, invading the kingdom of Golconda, extorted from its ruler a large sum of money as the ransom of his capital.

On June 6, 1674, Sīvajī was crowned, and assumed the titles of mahārāja and *chhatrapati*, or "Lord of the Umbrella". This was an act of defiance, and Sīvajī anticipated that Aurangzib, who had hitherto affected to regard him with contempt, might at length perceive that he was a danger to the empire, and put forth his whole strength against him. He therefore formed a plan for the extension of his powers. With this object he prepared to wrest from his half-brother, Vyankojī, the share which he claimed in the rich fiefs in the Carnatic of their father, Shāhjī. He bribed Bahādur Khān, viceroy of the Deccan, to refrain from attacking his northern dominions during his absence, and led an army of 70,000 men through the kingdom of Bijāpur into that of Golconda. There he visited the king, Abul Hasan, at Hyderabad, and gained his active sympathy by entering into an offensive and defensive alliance with him against the empire.

The Carnatic campaign was the greatest military exploit of Sīvajī's life, and marks him as the greatest soldier of his age in India. The Carnatic was part of the kingdom of Bijāpur, of which his brother, Vyankojī, was a vassal, and he overcame both the troops of Bijāpur and those of Vyankojī. As the modern historian of the Marāthas says, "In the course of eighteen months at a distance of 700 miles from his base, he had conquered a territory as large as his former kingdom. While a single reverse would have been fatal, he had not suffered even a single check. Victory had succeeded victory; town had fallen after town. As he went, he organised his conquests, and, when he returned to Raigarh, his new possessions were securely bound together from sea to sea by a line of fortified strongholds held by garrisons brave to the death and devoted to his cause". He allowed his brother to retain, as his vassal, Tanjore and some territory in its neighbourhood.

Bahādur Khān's treachery was discovered, and he was recalled

from the Deccan. His successor, Dilīr Khān, had, in alliance with Bījāpur, attacked the kingdom of Golconda, Sīvajī's ally; but the Bījāpur troops had not been paid and had melted away, and Dilīr Khān was unable, without their help, to cope with the army of Golconda. Mu'azzam was sent again to the Deccan as viceroy, and Dilīr Khān was ordered to invade the feeble kingdom of Bījāpur, on the pretext that Pādshāh Begum, the sister of the young king, Sikandar 'Ādil Shāh, who had been betrothed to one of Aurangzīb's sons, had not been sent to court. The princess surrendered herself, but Dilīr Khān continued his advance, and the regent of Bījāpur appealed to Sīvajī for help. Sīvajī cut the communications of the invading force and sent his son, Sambhuji, to the relief of the city, but Sambhuji deserted to the imperial army, and was rewarded for his treachery with the command of 7000 horse, and the siege continued. Aurangzīb could not trust anybody for long, and ordered Dilīr Khān to seize Sambhuji, who merited the confidence of none, and to send him to court, but Dilīr Khān, more honourable than his master, allowed his guest to escape. Meanwhile Sīvajī had cut off supplies both from the besieging troops and from Aurangābād, their source of supply. In acknowledgement of his aid Sīvajī received a grant of all the territory which he had conquered in the Carnatic, and the Bījāpur state recognised Vyankoji as his vassal, not its own.

Sīvajī had then reached the zenith of his power. "He had freed the bulk of the Marāthi-speaking people. By his new alliance with Bījāpur and Golconda, and still more by the chain of fortresses which he had built from Bednor to Tanjore, he had secured his conquests." His last days were darkened by domestic trouble. His son Sambhuji had proved himself unfit to succeed him; his third wife, Soyara Bai, harassed him to designate her young son Rājarām as his heir; and his brother Vyankoji, neglecting all the public business of his great charge in the Carnatic, was posing as a religious recluse. Sīvajī sent him an affectionate but reproachful letter, the last which he ever wrote, and on April 5, 1680, died, in the fifty-third year of his age.

Aurangzīb had always affected to despise his great opponent, whom he styled "the mountain rat", but was at length compelled to recognise that he was a great captain, and added, "My armies have been employed against him for nineteen years, and nevertheless his state has always been increasing".

His younger son, Rājārām, was enthroned in Raigarh on his death, but Sambhuji, displaying unwonted energy, secured the allegiance of the greater part of the army, entered Raigarh, confined his young brother, and, summoning the boy's mother before him, grossly insulted her, accused her of having poisoned his father, and put her to a cruel and lingering death. He was enthroned as mahārāja in August, 1680, and it was in the following year that the young Akbar sought an asylum with him. Sambhuji, when receiving him, saluted him as emperor and held out some hope that he would help him to dethrone his father, but first occupied himself in an unsuccessful attempt to seize some of the ports of the Konkan. Thus affairs stood when Aurangzīb, at the end of 1681, appeared once more in the Deccan, where he was doomed to spend the remainder of his long reign in the vain attempt to crush the power of the Marāthas. 'Alī 'Adil Shāh II of Bijāpur and 'Abdullāh Kutb Shāh of Golconda had died in 1672 and had been succeeded, the former by his son Sikandar, a child of four, and the latter by his son-in-law Abul Hasan, a weak and worthless ruler. Dilir Khān had been obliged to raise the siege of Bijāpur before Sīvaji's death and had been disgraced and recalled at the time when Mu'azzam was recalled from the Deccan in 1680 to aid his father in Rājasthān. Bahādur Khān was then again appointed viceroy of the Deccan.

For three years after his arrival in the Deccan, Aurangzīb was occupied in the attempt to suppress Sambhuji, now a powerful monarch who raided the territories of the empire and Bijāpur indiscriminately. The course of politics in the Deccan was so tortuous that it is impossible to follow it in detail. Akbar, perceiving that Sambhuji had no intention of affording him such assistance as would enable him to overcome his father, quarrelled with him and left his court; and after a complicated series of intrigues with Marāthas and Portuguese, and a raid into his father's territory, in which he was defeated, sailed early in 1687 for Persia, and in 1688 reached the court of Sulaimān at Isfahān.

Aurangzīb vainly demanded that Bijāpur should join with him in suppressing the infidel, Sambhuji. Sambhuji was indeed a rebel against that state as well as against the empire, but the regent of Bijāpur was not blind to his value as a protection against imperial aggression. While they were fully occupied with him they had no leisure to attack Bijāpur, and should they attack Bijāpur

it was expected that the Marāthas would come to its aid. Aurangzīb's demands were therefore ignored, until, in 1684, Sikandar definitely refused to co-operate with the imperial troops except on the most stringent conditions, and Aurangzīb decided that the time had come to annex the kingdom.

Aurangzīb had two sons with him in the Deccan, Mu'azzam, who had received the title of Shāh 'Ālam, and A'zam. The elder, Mu'azzam, was sent in 1683 to invade the Konkan, and at first had some success, but foolishly quarrelled with the Portuguese, who cut off his sea-borne supplies, so that his army was almost annihilated, first by famine, and then by a pestilence which followed close on its heels, and in the summer of 1684 he returned to Ahmadnagar with nought but a remnant of the army which eight months before he had led into the Konkan.

After Sikandar's refusal to co-operate with the emperor's troops against Sambhujī, diplomatic relations with the empire were broken off and Sikandar openly allied himself with the Marātha. In April, 1685, the siege of Bijāpur was opened and three months later A'zam, the younger prince, took command of the besieging force. The garrison and their allies in the field, Marāthas and others, fought desperately, and not always unsuccessfully, against the prince's army, harassed him, and cut off his supplies, in which they were aided, after the outbreak of the rainy season, by the forces of nature, which closed the road between their camp and Aurangzīb's headquarters. The troops were reduced to such straits that Aurangzīb ordered A'zam to raise the siege and retreat, but A'zam, eager to show his superiority to his brother, refused to retire, and his father sent him a large convoy of supplies which "turned scarcity to plenty" in his camp.

Meanwhile Mu'azzam had been sent to deal with Abul Hasan Kutb Shāh of Golconda against whom Aurangzīb had several causes of complaint. He had sent a field force to the relief of Bijāpur, he paid the Marātha raja an annual subsidy in consideration of his promise to protect the state against the emperor, and he had allowed the administration of his kingdom to fall entirely into the hands of two Brāhman brothers, Mādanna and Ākanna, who persecuted Muslims and insulted their religion. He was, moreover, a Shiah and permitted and even encouraged the practices of that sect most offensive to orthodox Sunnis. In October, 1685, Mu'azzam captured and occupied Hyderabad, the

capital of the kingdom, while Abul Hasan withdrew into Golconda, his fortress capital.

By June, 1686, the siege of Bījāpur had lasted for fifteen months, partly owing to the personal jealousy and quarrels of the imperial officers. Aurangzīb in that month left Sholapur and personally assumed command of the siege. Mu'azzam had been recalled from Hyderabad and virtually the whole of the imperial army in the Deccan, except such troops as were required as convoys and road guards, was engaged in the operations. The siege was vigorously pressed, and, though the besieger suffered severely from scarcity, due to a famine in the Deccan, the garrison was in worse case, and in September lost heart. Sikandar, the last of the 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty, then a young man of eighteen, left his palace and was escorted to Aurangzīb's tent, where he made his obeisance and resigned his kingdom into his hands. He was at first sent to the state prison in Daulatābād, but was afterwards permitted to accompany the imperial camp in the Deccan. He died in 1700, in his thirty-second year, and was buried at Bījāpur.

Before Mu'azzam had left the Golconda state to rejoin his father, the Muslim mob had risen and put to death the two Brāhmans, whom they regarded as the authors of their woes, and their heads were sent as a peace offering to the emperor.

When he had finished with Bījāpur, Aurangzīb was free to deal with Golconda. He set forth, and in February, 1687, arrived before the fortress, and the siege was opened. Again operations were delayed or rendered futile by jealousy and treachery. Mu'azzam, partly from generous feelings towards a helpless foe, partly in hope of receiving a large bribe, and partly in order to forestall a success which might possibly be attributed to his brother and rival, A'zam, entered into treasonable correspondence with Abul Hasan, and, this having been detected, was placed under arrest with his family, and remained in disgrace for seven years. The records of the siege, which are very complete, are a disgrace to the imperial arms. The two heroes were a dog, who, by his barking, gave warning of an attempt at an escalade by night, which was repulsed, and 'Abdur Razzāk of Lār, a gallant Persian who fought almost to his last gasp when, after a siege of nearly eight months, traitors admitted the imperial troops, and afterwards long resisted Aurangzīb's importunate invitations to

enter his service. The dog was ennobled by Abul Hasan, and 'Abdur Razzāk, who recovered from seventy wounds, at length entered the imperial service. Abul Hasan was sent to Daulatābād as a state prisoner, and there spent the remainder of his days.

While Aurangzīb had been engaged in the sieges of Bījāpur and Golconda Sambhuji had not been idle. Besides aiding the two beleaguered cities with field forces, which hovered in the rear of the besiegers and, without affecting the result of either siege, harassed them, cut off their supplies, and reduced them to great distress; his troops had systematically raided all imperial posts within their reach and the surrounding country. After the fall of Golconda the imperial troops were free to deal with the Marātha scourge. Sambhuji was sunk in debauchery and odious to all his leading officers owing to his neglect of public business and to the severity and cruelty with which he treated all suspected, whether with or without grounds, of trafficking with the imperial officers. Among his principal enemies were the Shirkes, the family of his murdered stepmother, who twice rebelled against him. His principal officers constantly conspired against him, and he entrusted the control of his administration to a Brāhman of Oudh, whom he entitled Kavikalāsh. In the autumn of 1688 Sambhuji was obliged to march to the relief of his favourite, whom the rebellious Shirkes were besieging in Khelna, and, having beaten off the rebels, halted, on his return towards his capital, at Sangameshwar, where he abandoned himself to drunkenness and debauchery, believing himself to be secure from attack. Mukarrab Khān, who, having deserted the service of Golconda for that of Aurangzīb, had been rewarded with an important command, made a forced march from Kolhapur to Sangameshwar and appeared before the place at the head of no more than 300 horse. Kavikalāsh, who attempted to defend the place, was wounded, and the imperial troops captured him, his master and twenty-five of his principal followers with their families. In February 1689, the mahārāja of the Marāthas was led into the imperial camp at Bahādurgarh with every circumstance of insult and ignominy. When invited to accept Islam he coarsely demanded one of the emperor's daughters for his bed and foully abused Muhammad and the religion founded by him. He was blinded, and after a fortnight's torture was hacked limb from limb, and his flesh was thrown to the dogs.

After his death his half-brother, Rājārām, was released from prison and enthroned by the Marāṭha chiefs, but led the life of a hunted fugitive until he was able, in November, 1689, to escape to the fortress of Jinji, in the Carnatic, where for a time he was safe. A few months after Sambhuji's death the fortress of Raigarh was captured, and with it Sambhuji's son Shāhji, a boy of seven, and the widows and wives of Sīvajī, Sambhuji, and Rājārām. The boy Shāhji, who was nicknamed Sāhū, received the nominal command of 7000 horse, but was detained as a prisoner in Aurangzīb's camp.

Little was gained by Sambhuji's death, for though, while he lived, he retained the loyalty of some and the semblance of control over others, the government of the Marāṭha nation was already decentralised owing to his neglect of public business, and on his death every Hindu leader became the chief of a force hostile to the empire, and the Marāṭha chiefs were gradually becoming a confederacy of princes. In September, 1690, Zul-fikār Khān, under the order of his father, Asad Khān, Aurangzīb's minister, sat down before Jinji, but was unable for lack of troops to invest it, and five months later Rājārām returned to the fortress. The siege, officially so described, was a mere farce, and in the winter of 1692 a force of over 30,000 Marāṭha horse overran the Carnatic. One division surrounded and captured 'Alī Mardān Khān, *faujdar* of Conjeeveram, with 1500 horses and six elephants, and another attacked the force before Jinji and captured one of its leaders, Ismā'il Khān, with 500 horses and two elephants. The young prince Kām Bakhsh, the child of Aurangzīb's old age, resenting the control to which he was subjected by Asad Khān and his son Zul-fikār Khān, and trusting to a rumour that Aurangzīb was dead and that Mu'azzam Shāh 'Ālam had seized the throne, conceived the design of enlisting the aid of the Marāṭhas for the purpose of ousting his brother, and entered into treasonable correspondence with Rājārām. The plot was discovered, and the prince was placed under surveillance, but later reopened his correspondence with the Marāṭhas. Zul-fikār Khān then with great difficulty raised the siege and retired, after suffering heavy losses from the Marāṭhas, to the camp of his father. The prince was arrested, and the army which had been so lately besieging Jinji was itself in a state of siege. Famine was rife in the camp, and Asad Khān, after bribing the Marāṭhas not to molest him,



withdrew from the neighbourhood of Jinji to Wandiwash, where abundant supplies were conveyed to it, after a severe contest with the Marāthas. There the troops remained until May, 1693, but Kām Bakhsh was taken by Asad Khān before his father, who was encamped at Galgala.

From 1694 until 1697, a confused series of campaigns continued in the Carnatic, the belligerents being the Marāthas, the imperial troops, and the local Hindu chieftains, who had been imperfectly subdued by the kingdoms of Bijāpur and Golconda, and were not disposed to submit to the imperial arms. The imperial forces, under the chief command of Zul-fikār Khān, gained little. They were inferior both in numbers and in mobility to the Marāthas, who cut off their supplies, and Zul-fikār Khān was ill-supplied with money, but succeeded in holding Arcot, where he concentrated his forces. He was long unable to engage the Marāthas, who eluded him when he took the field, but eventually their two leaders quarrelled and one defeated the other, and expelled him from the Carnatic, so that after the close of the rainy season of 1697, Zul-fikār was able to reopen the siege of Jinji. He was at first in no hurry to reduce the place, but soon discovered that unless he captured it he would be disgraced. He then warned Rājarām that he was about to deliver an assault, and Rājarām and his principal officers hurriedly escaped to Vellore; the outer fort was taken, and the citadel surrendered on terms. After the fall of Jinji Rājarām made his way into the Konkan and returned to Satāra, which he made his capital. He fled from that city in the autumn of 1699, on learning that Aurangzib intended to invest it, and removed his family to Khelna, whence he himself marched towards Surat, but was defeated on his way thither. Another Marātha force, however, crossed the Nerbudda for the first time and raided the southern districts of Mālwa.

In the spring of 1700 Rājarām died of fever at Singarh, and his death was followed by a dispute between his widows, the mothers of his two legitimate sons. Tāra Bai, the elder widow, gained the support of the troops, and her son was enthroned as Sīvaji III, but the younger, Rājas Bai, also set up her son, Sambhuji II, as a rival king. Tāra Bai, an able and astute woman, was herself the chief power in the Marātha state, and in 1703 Aurangzib conceived the device of sowing discord in the nation

by liberating the legitimate heir, Sāhū, the son of Sambhujī. He first invited him to accept Islam, but desisted when Sāhū refused to apostatise, and attempted, through his youngest son, Kām Bakhsh, to induce the Marāthas to accept Sāhū, a feudatory of the empire, as their king. The Marātha chiefs were too wary to fall into so transparent a snare. They had practically won the Deccan, where nearly all the imperial officers were on the defensive, and most were obliged to yield to the demand for *chauth*, a payment of blackmail amounting to a quarter of the revenue, or else helplessly to witness the distress of unfortunate peasants who were obliged to pay the land rent or tax to the Marāthas as well as to the imperial collectors. Despite the annexation of the kingdoms of Bijāpur and Golconda, the attempt to subdue the Deccan had ended in failure, and the successors of the "mountain-rat" disputed the possession of every acre beyond the land actually covered by the camps of the imperial troops.

Aurangzib decided that the most effective means of reducing the Marāthas to obedience was the reduction of their strongholds and, having lost faith both in the fidelity and the efficiency of his officers, resolved himself to undertake the task. From the autumn of 1699 until the spring of 1705 the aged emperor was in the field, and the fortresses of Satāra, Pārli, Panhāla, Khelna, Singarh, Raigarh and Toma were successively reduced, but only the last was taken by assault. The others fell by the treachery of their commanders, who accepted the heavy bribes offered by the emperor. Early in 1705 the siege of Wākhinkhera, defended by the Berad tribe, was opened. The fortress held out until May, and the garrison inflicted heavy losses on the besieging force, but at length Pīdia, the chief of the Berads, discovering that the place was no longer tenable, evacuated it secretly by night, and fled with his allies, the Marāthas, leaving to Aurangzib an empty fort, a small quantity of booty, and some powder magazines which exploded during the occupation of the place, causing considerable casualties among the imperial troops. In April Aurangzib retired to Devapur, where he fell sick, but early in November he had recovered his health sufficiently to be able to continue his march to Ahmadnagar, which he reached in January, 1706, declaring it to be his journey's end. Throughout these later years the Marāthas harassed not only all parts of the Deccan, but also the imperial provinces of Berar and Gujarāt, which they invaded

and plundered, and in the latter province they inflicted a severe defeat on the imperial troops in the field.

For nearly a quarter of a century Aurangzīb had devoted his tireless energy and most of his great resources to his vain attempt to subdue the Deccan. He had crushed two kingdoms, but had failed to crush or even to check the growth of the power founded by the "mountain-rat", a power which year by year contested with him, ever more menacingly, the rule of southern India. Meanwhile the northern provinces of his great empire were neglected. The Deccan absorbed all his best troops, and incompetent officers, with insufficient forces and funds, were unable to maintain order in the great cities and fertile and populous provinces of the north. After the departure of Akbar Mīrzā for Persia in 1687, the faithful Durga Dās had returned to Mārṡwār, where warfare continued for thirty years, rendering the cultivation of the soil always difficult and sometimes impossible, and where famine and pestilence were often rife. After the return of Durga Dās the spirit of the Rāthors revived. In 1698 Ajīt Singh received a pardon from the emperor, and some districts of his state as a fief, and in 1705 Durga Dās made his submission, but in the following year both he and the rāja rose in rebellion, and in March 1707 Ajīt Singh expelled the imperial governor and entered Jodhpur in triumph. "Durga Dās's life's work was thus crowned with success."

The rebellion of the Jāts under Gokla had been suppressed at the beginning of 1670, but the tribe was not crushed, and in 1685 two new leaders, Rājarām and Rāmchehra, had risen. Their strongholds were forts in the dense jungle; they plundered all travellers on the roads almost to the gates of Āgra; and Safi Khān, the governor of the city and province, was powerless to deal with them. Soon they ventured to attack imperial officers on the march with their troops; they slew Aghar Khān, on his way from Kābul to Bijāpur, and attacked and robbed Mīr Ibrāhīm, on his way from the Deccan to assume the government of Kābul. Later in 1688 they plundered the splendid tomb of Akbar at Sikandra, burned the great emperor's bones, and scattered the ashes to the wind, but in that year Bidār Bakht, the eldest son of Prince A'zam, was appointed to the government of Āgra, and was less supine than Safi Khān. Rājarām was shortly afterwards slain in a battle between two Rājput clans, and in 1689

an elaborate campaign against the Jāts was undertaken. Bīdār Bakht captured the stronghold of Sinsanī, slaying 1500 of the tribe, and in 1691 Bishan Singh of Jaipur captured Sogar, the other stronghold of the Jāts. Rājārām's nephew, Churāman, succeeded to the leadership, and, though he was forced to go into hiding, improved and strengthened its forces, and after Aurangzīb's death came into prominence. In 1685 Rājput rebels in Bundelkhand raided Mālwa as well as Bundelkhand, and, having later gained a victory of some importance over the imperial troops, in 1690 slew the *faujdar* of Gwalior. It was not until 1692 that these rebels submitted, and were admitted into the imperial army.

Gangarām, a Brāhman who administered the fiefs of Khānjahān Bahādūr in Allāhābād and Bihar during that noble's absence in the Deccan, rose in rebellion, proclaimed as emperor a pretender who personated Prince Akbar, and besieged Patna, but was driven out of Bihar by imperial troops, and died on a plundering expedition into Mālwa.

The English East India Company had in 1633 opened factories in Orissa, and later in Bengal. In 1685 disputes regarding customs-duties led to an outbreak of hostilities between the merchants in Bengal, whose chief was Job Charnock, and the imperial troops. The details of these hostilities will be found elsewhere, but eventually Aurangzīb, having discovered that the English commanded the sea route from India to the Hijāz, came to terms with them, rescinded his orders for their imprisonment, and permitted them to trade.

Such was the condition of the empire when Aurangzīb reached his journey's end, and there are few more pathetic passages in history than the account of the last stages of that journey. On Friday, March 2, 1707, having recited the morning ritual prayer, he became unconscious, and, though his fingers continued to move over the beads of his rosary, at ten o'clock he passed away, in the eighty-ninth year of his age and the forty-ninth of his reign. During his long life he had faithfully and zealously served his god, according to his lights. He had crushed the heretics; he had tortured and slain infidels; to the end of his life he had striven in person against the misbelievers; and he had extended to the sea the great empire which he had received from his father, only to witness, with his own eyes, the unmistakable symptoms

of its dissolution. It was only by bribing the misbelievers, and by sacrificing his subjects to their demands, that his officers were able to hold their posts in the Deccan, and at the end of his long life of toil and self-denial the old emperor had his doubts. His farewell letters to his sons are among the saddest historical documents extant. "My fever has left me", he writes to his second son, "leaving but the skin and the husks behind it. All the soldiers are helpless, bewildered, and perturbed, like me. I brought nothing with me into the world, and am taking from it but the fruits of my sins. I know not what punishment will befall me. Though I have a firm hope in God's grace, yet for my deeds anxiety ever remains with me." Such was the end of a long life of devotion to duty as he understood it. He had certainly earned salvation according to the tenets of his creed, and yet he feared what awaited him.

His body was carried from Ahmadnagar to the hills above Daulatābād, and was there buried in a simple grave near the tomb of the saint, Zain-ud-dīn.

## CHAPTER XIV

### The Successors of Aurangzib, 1707-1719

Of Aurangzib's five sons the eldest had died in prison and the fourth an exile in a foreign land; and there remained but three, Mu'azzam, entitled Shāh 'Ālam, A'zam, and Kām Bakhsh. Shāh 'Ālam, imprisoned during the siege of Golconda, was not pardoned until 1685, when he was released and appointed to the government of the Panjab and Kābul. A week or ten days before his death Aurangzib had appointed A'zam to the government of Mālwa and Kām Bakhsh to that of Bijāpur, but A'zam, aware of the precarious state of his father's health, had marched very slowly towards Māndū, and was able to return to Ahmādnagar very shortly after his father's death and to arrange for his burial. Shāh 'Ālam was in Jamrūd when the news reached him, and immediately marched on Āgra, crowning himself on the way under the title of Bahādur Shāh. Kām Bakhsh also assumed the imperial title in Bijāpur, and A'zam strove to reach Āgra and seize the imperial treasure there before Bahādur Shāh could do so. But Bahādur's second son, who was governor of Bengal and Bihar, forestalled him and seized the city for his father; and on Bahādur's arrival the fort was surrendered to him. A'zam, fearing the ambition of his own son, Bīdār Bakht, had not allowed him to advance on Āgra, and ordered him to await his arrival at Gwalior. Much precious time was thus lost, and, when A'zam and his son advanced on Āgra, they were met by Bahādur, on June 9, north of Jajau and near the field of Samūgarh. A'zam was defeated and slain, and his head was carried before Bahādur and treated with indignity. In October Bahādur led an expedition into Rājasthān against the rāna of Udaipur and Ajīt Singh of Mārwar, but was obliged by the behaviour of his youngest brother to turn to the Deccan. He had already written to Kām Bakhsh confirming him in the government of Bijāpur and adding to it that of Golconda, and all the dependencies of both provinces, on the sole condition that the *khūtba* was recited and coin minted in the emperor's name. Kām Bakhsh refused this generous offer and insisted on contesting the succession with his elder brother.

His folly and barbarous cruelty had alienated from him all his followers, and when, on January 13, 1709, a force of 25,000 troops met him near Hyderabad, he was at the head of no more than 350 horse. This small force was dispersed and he was mortally wounded.

Bahādur was then at leisure to return to Rājasthān, and reached Ajmir in June, 1710. The rāna, Jai Singh, and Ajīt Singh of Mārwār, were, in fact, in rebellion, but a serious revolt of the Sikhs in the Panjab obliged Bahādur to come to terms with the Rājputs—pardons were granted to the rāna and Ajīt Singh, who waited on Bahādur and were dismissed to their states with rich gifts.

Govind, the last *guru* of the Sikhs, had accompanied Bahādur to the Deccan, but had been assassinated at Nānder in November, 1708, leaving no son; but his followers produced a man who closely resembled him and secretly sent him to the Panjab, where he claimed to be Govind, miraculously restored to life for the purpose of leading the Sikhs in a war of independence against the Muslims. He raised a force of 40,000, captured some towns of the Panjab, and, having taken Sirhind, sacked the town for four days, defiled the mosques, slaughtered the Muslims, and outraged their women. The Sikhs enriched themselves by twenty millions of rupees in cash and kind. They plundered many towns and villages, and all the country surrounding them, and attacked Lahore. They failed to take the city, but plundered the suburbs and completely closed the road between Delhi and Lahore.

This was the rising which had compelled Bahādur to come to terms with the Rājputs. The impostor, known as Banda, but styling himself Sachā Pādshāh, the "True King", was holding his court at Sadhaura, in the Ambāla district, where he struck coins and used the royal title. Bahādur left Ajmir at the end of June 1710, but did not reach Sadhaura until December. On his approach Banda withdrew to the fortress of Lohgarh, in the hills near Sadhaura. After some hard fighting the Sikhs were driven out of Lohgarh, but Banda escaped. In January 1711 the imperial troops reoccupied Sirhind, but Banda during the remainder of the reign of Bahādur frequently descended from the hills and ravaged the plain of the Panjab.

After the Lohgarh campaign Bahādur, then seventy years of age, retired to Lahore and encamped in the plain before the city.

There he lived for but six months, concerning himself little with affairs of state, but arousing much resentment by ordaining that the *khūtba*, or Friday bidding prayer, should be recited in the Shiah form. The opposition of the citizens of Lahore and the Afghan soldiery, who were all Sunnis, to this innovation obliged the old emperor, who was peaceably disposed and whose spirit had been broken by the imprisonment which he had suffered during his father's reign, to give way, and to permit the recitation of the *khūtba* in its usual form.

On February 24, 1712, Bahādur fell ill, and died three days later. He was a ruler of feeble character and during his short reign the power of the crown was upheld chiefly by the able officials who had served his father, and whom Bahādur retained in their posts, and trusted; but he was unable to suppress their jealousies and disputes, and it was in his reign that factions were formed resembling those which contended one with another in the reigns of the later Bahmanids and in the five independent kingdoms of the Deccan, and that personal rivalries began to agitate the imperial court at the time when union was most to be desired, if the dominant power were not to lose its dominance. There were three factions, the Turanian, consisting of nobles from Transoxiana, the Persian, and the Hindustani, or native. Of these the first and last generally favoured the tenets of the Sunnis, and the other those of the Shiahs, but there were exceptions which cut across the boundary lines of nationalistic differences. The Sayyids of Bārha, for instance, who had been prominent among the soldiers of the empire since the days of Akbar, and the Sayyids of Bīlgrām, as prominent in literature as were those of Bārha in arms, were Shiahs, yet both families were Hindustani.

Bahādur had four sons, all of whom were with him at the time of his death, Mu'izz-ud-dīn, 'Azīm-ush-shān, Rafī'-ush-shān, and Jahānshāh. The second son, 'Azīm-ush-shān, the ablest of the four, seized Bahādur's camp on his death, but, instead of striking immediately, remained on the defensive, thus allowing his brothers time to recruit their forces, with the result that they besieged him in his camp with their artillery. He was deserted by most of his troops, and, when his camp was attacked on March 17, 1712, his elephant, struck by a gunshot, rushed into the river, and, with its rider, was swallowed up in a quicksand.



Zul-fikār Khān, now supreme in the state, favoured the cause of Mu'izz-ud-dīn, but on March 26 Jahānshāh, the youngest of the brothers, attacked the eldest and in the course of two days' fighting defeated him and put him to flight, but was shot dead while his troops had dispersed in search of plunder. Rafī'-ush-shān, who had refrained from taking the field in the hope of being able to gain an easy victory over the exhausted troops of the victor, then attacked Mu'izz-ud-dīn, but was deserted by most of his officers. His troops fled and he was slain, and the eldest brother was proclaimed emperor under the title of Jahāndār Shāh, and made Zul-fikār Khān his minister.

Jahāndār almost immediately marched from Lahore to Delhi, and, on arriving at that city on June 22, 1712, learned that Farrukhsiyar, the elder son of 'Azīm-ush-shān, who had been left as his father's deputy in Bengal, had assembled his forces and had already reached Patna, on his way to Delhi to assert a claim to the throne. He was supported by two brothers, Hasan 'Alī and Husain 'Alī, Sayyids of Bārha, who, after some vicissitudes, had attained the rank of commanders of 4000 horse, and had been appointed by 'Azīm-ush-shān governors of Allāhābād and Bihar.

Jahāndār was one of the most contemptible rulers who ever sat upon the throne of Delhi. On reaching Delhi he abandoned himself to the grossest debauchery, in company with his favourite concubine, Lāl Kumārī. This woman and her kinsmen plundered and misruled the capital and grossly insulted the principal nobles of the state, and, while the wretched Jahāndār was sunk in sloth and drunkenness, attempted to wield the power which, in Jahāngīr's reign, had been enjoyed by Nūr Jahān. The emperor was too slothful even to attempt to defend the throne to which Zul-fikār Khān had raised him, and sent against Farrukhsiyar his eldest son, A'azz-ud-dīn, an inexperienced and cowardly youth, with a force of 50,000 horse. Meanwhile Farrukhsiyar's forces had gradually swelled, many openly espoused his cause, and on November 24, 1712, he reached Khajwa, where Aurangzīb had defeated Shujā' in 1659, and where A'azz-ud-dīn was encamped. After a few days' bombardment Farrukhsiyar ordered that A'azz-ud-dīn's camp should be stormed on November 28; but it was discovered that during the night the miserable poltroon had fled to Āgra, leaving his camp and his treasure as a prize to Farrukhsiyar. Jahāndār, on learning of his son's flight, marched

from Delhi to Āgra, but the financial condition of the state was such that he could not pay his troops. On December 29, he reached Āgra and was there joined by his wretched son, and by the Jāts under their leader, Churāman. Jahāndār marched out to Samūgarh and on January 2, 1713, Farrukhsiyar approached the opposite bank of the Jumna. His forces forded the river above Samūgarh a few days later, and Jahāndār in alarm retired on the city. On January 10, the two armies met beneath the walls of Āgra. On Jahāndār's side, Zul-fikār Khān displayed none of his wonted energy, the Turānī nobles had been bribed to hold themselves aloof from the strife, and the Jāts plundered the imperial camp. A division of Farrukhsiyar's troops attacked the imperial army in rear and the whole force was thrown into confusion. Zul-fikār Khān withdrew his troops in good order into the city, but Jahāndār fled, in the disguise of a peasant, to Delhi. Zul-fikār Khān reached that city, and he and his father, Asad Khān, inveigled the wretched Jahāndār into their hands and imprisoned him. On February 11, he was put to death in his prison by the orders of Farrukhsiyar. On January 11, after the battle, Farrukhsiyar enthroned himself in Āgra, and, on February 12, entered Delhi in triumph, Hasan 'Alī, entitled 'Abdullāh Khān Kurb-ul-mulk, having already taken possession of the city. Zul-fikār Khān and his old father, Asad Khān, Aurangzīb's minister, were inveigled into the presence of the new emperor, and Asad Khān was allowed to depart in peace, but his son, who had caused Farrukhsiyar's father and brother to be put to death, was strangled, and the property of both father and son was confiscated.

Sayyid 'Abdullāh Khān, the elder of the Sayyid brothers, was created minister by Farrukhsiyar, his brother receiving the title of Amīr-ul-umarā and the post of muster-master general. Muhammad Amīn Khān Chīn, leader of the Turānīs, and his son received high offices, but the new emperor's personal favourites acted as "King's friends" and often thwarted the designs of his official advisers. The Sayyid brothers received the provincial governments of Multān and Bihar, but were allowed to act by deputy, and the viceroyalty of the six provinces of the Deccan was conferred upon Chīn Kilij Khān, entitled Nizām-ul-mulk, a leader of the Turānī faction, cousin of Amīn Khān, and the ablest man in the empire. Many of the adherents of Jahāndār were put to death and some of the imperial princes, including Farrukhsiyar's own brother, were blinded.

Ajīt Singh of Mārwar had expelled the imperial officers from his state during the wars of succession, and had captured Ajmir. Husain 'Alī Khān was sent against him, but the emperor, at the instance of his favourites, who were hostile to the Sayyids, secretly encouraged Ajīt Singh to resist the imperial troops. His resistance was, however, of no avail. Husain 'Alī overran Jodhpur, and Ajīt Singh was obliged to submit, to send his son to court, and to offer a daughter in marriage to Farrukhsiyar. During Husain 'Alī's absence the enemies of the brothers, led by Mīr Jumla, had continued to poison the emperor's mind against them, and Farrukhsiyar even urged Sayyid 'Abdullāh to resign the ministry, which, indeed, he was not competent to fill, being a soldier and no administrator, and habitually leaving his official business to be managed by his Hindu steward, Ratan Chānd. Husain 'Alī then returned to court and found that two nobles, Khān Daurān and Mīr Jumla, had been appointed to posts equivalent to those held by himself and his brother, and that plots against their lives had been formed in the palace. He also gained possession of some of Farrukhsiyar's letters to Ajīt Singh, and the brothers therefore refused to wait on the emperor and stood on the defensive in their own houses. Neither Farrukhsiyar nor his favourites dared to attack them openly and Farrukhsiyar was at last obliged to submit to them, but, nevertheless, continued his intrigues. Under the new arrangement between the Sayyids and the emperor, Husain 'Alī agreed to leave the court for the viceroyalty of the Deccan; but Farrukhsiyar instigated Dāūd Khān, the governor of Burhānpur, to oppose him, with the result that Dāūd was defeated and slain.

In this reign Banda, the false *guru* of the Sikhs, suffered for his crimes. His followers were driven from Sadhaura and Lohgarh, and he was ultimately besieged in Gurdāspur. The Sikhs fought gallantly, but were so closely beleaguered that they were compelled, when nearly perishing of hunger, to surrender unconditionally. They were paraded through Delhi and put to death on refusing to accept Islam. The impostor Banda and his infant son were barbarously cut to pieces on June 19, 1715, and the Sikh rebellion was finally crushed.

Under Churāman the Jāts continued their depredations in the country to the west of Āgra, and Jai Singh of Jaipur unsuccessfully besieged him for nearly two years in his fortress of Thūn.

Churāman opened negotiations with the court, and the siege was raised on his undertaking to pay a tribute of five million rupees.

Farrukhsiyar was too feeble and timid to overcome the Sayyids, whom he regarded as his enemies. Those who allied themselves to him with this object in view soon abandoned the cause of a master whom they could not trust, and Farrukhsiyar's attempts to reform the corrupt administration of the empire only raised up enemies against him. At length at the end of 1718 Husain 'Alī was recalled from the Deccan by his elder brother, and arrived at Delhi in February, 1719, accompanied by Bālājī Vishvanāth, Pēshwā of the Marāthas, with 11,000 Marātha troops. Farrukhsiyar humbled himself before the Sayyid brothers and granted all their demands, but they would no longer trust him, and at the end of February Farrukhsiyar was dragged from the harem of his palace, where he had taken refuge, deposed, blinded, imprisoned, and two months later put to death. "It is not too much to say", says Irvine, "that Farrukhsiyar prepared for himself the fate which finally overtook him. Feeble, false, cowardly, contemptible, it is impossible either to admire or regret him."

The Sayyid brothers raised to the throne the puppet Rafī'-ud-darajāt, the second son of Bahādūr's son, Rafī'-ush-shān, an intelligent youth of twenty; but the garrison of Āgra fort proclaimed Prince Akbar's son, Nikū-siyar, as emperor. Rafī'-ud-darajāt was in an advanced stage of consumption when he was raised to the throne. On June 4, 1719, he was deposed, and died a week later. On June 6, his elder brother, Rafī'-ud-daula, was proclaimed as Shāhjahān II, and the Sayyid brothers foiled a dangerous plot which had been formed for their overthrow. Husain 'Alī then marched to Āgra, compelled the fortress to surrender after a siege of less than two months, and sent Nikū-siyar to a more secure state-prison. His principal partisan, a Brāhman named Mitrasen, committed suicide. The Sayyid brothers were then obliged to take the field against Jai Singh of Jaipur, and met at Fathpur Sīkrī, where they divided the spoils of Āgra. The puppet emperor, Shāhjahān II, died of diarrhoea in their camp on September 17, but they concealed his death for nine days, and then raised to the throne, under the title of Muhammad Shāh, Raushan Akhtar, the second son of Jahānshāh, son of Bahādūr.

## CHAPTER XV

### Muhammad Shāh

Muhammad Shāh proved to be less of a cipher than his cousins who had preceded him on the throne of Delhi, and the party opposed to the domination of the Sayyid brothers was gaining strength. Ja'far Khān was virtually independent in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and Nizām-ul-mulk, one of the two chiefs of the Turanian party, held Mālwa, bitterly resenting the loss of the great viceroyalty of the Deccan, of which he had been deprived by Husain 'Alī, on whose behalf it was held by his nephew 'Ālim 'Alī. Chabela Rām was in rebellion in the province of Allāhābād, and on his death at this time his nephew Girdhār succeeded him, but was induced to surrender the province in exchange for the government of the rich province of Oudh. Meanwhile the brothers had quarrelled over the division of the spoils of Mālwa. They quarrelled again over the best means of dealing with Nizām-ul-mulk, but finally recalled him from Mālwa. Nizām-ul-mulk, instead of obeying the summons, invaded the viceroyalty of the Deccan, and seized Asīr and Burhānpur. He defeated near Khāndwa a force sent against him by the Sayyids. In August he met 'Ālim 'Alī Khān, between Bālāpur and Shegām, and defeated and slew him. The Sayyid brothers were overwhelmed with grief and consternation, and Husain 'Alī, taking with him the emperor, set out for the Deccan, leaving his brother 'Abdullāh Khān as regent in Delhi. But the nobles, both of the Turanian and the Persian factions, were weary of the domination of the king-makers, and formed a plot for their destruction. On October 9, 1720, in the imperial camp near Toda Bhīm, about eighty miles west of Āgra, Husain 'Alī was assassinated by a follower of Amīn Khān, chief of the Turanian party, his tents and treasure were plundered, and Ratan Chānd, his brother's steward, was arrested and imprisoned. 'Abdullāh Khān, who was returning from the camp towards Delhi, hastened on his way and at the capital caused Ibrāhīm, brother of Muhammad's two predecessors on the throne, to be proclaimed emperor on October 18, and assembled what troops he could to withstand the army

with Muhammad Shāh, who was returning to Delhi with the head of Husain 'Alī borne aloft on a bamboo in his cortège. 'Abdullāh Khān's raw levies were defeated by the imperial troops, and 'Abdullāh and his puppet emperor, Ibrāhīm, were captured. On November 23, Muhammad re-entered his capital in triumph, and there received the viceroys and governors who waited on him to congratulate him on his victory over the Sayyids. Amīn Khān, who had been appointed minister on the death of Husain 'Alī, died within three months, and Ajit Singh of Jodhpur, who held the government of Ajmir and Gujarāt as well as that of his own state, and had been a partisan of the Sayyids, refused to recognise the new government and was dismissed from his appointments. Shujā'at Khān, deputy of Haidar Kulī Khān, succeeded him without difficulty in Gujarāt, but it was not so easy to expel him from Ajmir. Ajit Singh, however, on learning that Nizām-ul-mulk was on his way from the Deccan to court, submitted to the authority of Muhammad Shāh, and was allowed to retain the province of Ajmir. Nizām-ul-mulk reached Delhi on January 29, 1722, and within a month was appointed minister. He ordered Haidar Kulī Khān to repair to Gujarāt, of which he held the government; but Haidar Kulī so misgoverned the province that he was dismissed and Nizām-ul-mulk marched to expel him and to seize the government of Gujarāt for himself. Haidar Kulī fled to Delhi, and Nizām-ul-mulk, too, returned to the capital, leaving his uncle Hamīd Khān as his deputy in Gujarāt.

On October 12, 1722, 'Abdullāh Khān, who was still in confinement, was put to death by a dose of poison. The Jāts then again gave trouble. The Persian, Sa'ādar Khān, entitled Burhān-ul-mulk, who had been appointed to the government of Āgra and Oudh, had left as his deputy in Āgra a Hindu named Nīlkanth. Nīlkanth was shot by a Jāt, and Khān Daurān appointed Jai Singh of Jaipur to the government of Āgra, and ordered him to crush the predatory Jāts. Jai Singh attached to himself Badan Singh, Churāman's nephew, with whose assistance he besieged Churāman in Thūn. Churāman poisoned himself, his son Mukham Singh fled, and Jai Singh's troops occupied Thūn. Badan Singh, on undertaking to pay tribute, was recognised as raja of Dīg, where he laid the foundations of the Bhartpur state.

Haidar Kulī was then appointed governor of Ajmir and expelled Ajit Singh's officers from the province. Nizām-ul-mulk

was not happy at Delhi. The emperor was surrounded by younger and more frivolous courtiers, and rejected the advice of his minister, who on December 18, 1723, left Delhi for a shooting tour in the doāb, and thence wrote to the emperor, informing him that his presence was required in the Deccan. He left for the south without the emperor's permission, and his enemies at court easily persuaded Muhammad that he was in rebellion, and induced him to send secret instructions to Mubārīz Khān, governor of Hyderabad, to attack him, promising him the vice-royalty of the Deccan in the event of his defeating the minister.

Mubārīz Khān met his old master at Shakarkhelda in Berar on October 14, 1724, and was there defeated and slain. Nizām-ul-mulk re-named the scene of his victory Fathkhelda, and in bitter irony sent the head of his opponent to court with a letter congratulating the emperor on the victory gained by his troops over the rebel. The wretched emperor was constrained to conciliate him by conferring on him the title of Āsaf Jāh, still borne by his descendant. From the day of the battle of Shakarkhelda dates the virtual independence of the Hyderabad state of the empire of Delhi.

Nizām-ul-mulk held the provinces of Mālhwā and Gujarāt as well as the viceroyalty of the Deccan, and steps were taken to restrict his great power and influence. His nominee was removed from the command of the imperial artillery; Girdhār Bahādur was appointed to the government of Mālhwā, and Sarbuland Khān to that of Gujarāt. Nizām-ul-mulk, to protect himself against these attacks, allied himself with the Marāthas, and his uncle Hamīd Khān, having purchased their assistance by acknowledging their right to levy *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, with their aid defeated and slew Sarbuland's deputy when he attempted to establish his authority in that province. Sarbuland Khān himself, with a large force, defeated Hamīd Khān and his allies, and drove him to take refuge with his nephew in the Deccan. He and the Marāthas were again defeated and expelled from Gujarāt, when they invaded the province in the following year (1726), but, when the Marāthas returned in 1727, Sarbuland Khān, deprived of the subsidy which had enabled him to maintain a numerous army, was obliged to admit their claim to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. This was a pretext for his dismissal from the government of Gujarāt, to which Abhay Singh, who had succeeded to the

state of Jodhpur on murdering his father, Ajit Singh, was appointed. Sarbuland Khān defeated and drove from the province two deputies sent by Abhay Singh to assume its government, and finally defeated Abhay Singh himself, but, finding himself unable to maintain his position, vacated his office, allowing Abhay Singh to assume it. On his way to Delhi, after his retirement, Sarbuland Khān was arrested and was imprisoned in Āgra.

The object of Nizām-ul-mulk's encouragement of the Marāthas to extend their depredations and their power north of the Nerbudda was to free his dominions, as far as possible, of their influence and institutions, but he was unable to maintain peace with both factions of the Marāthas, and in 1727 and 1728 the northern districts of the Deccan were ravaged by Bāji Rāo Pēshwā. The Pēshwā was inveigled into invading Gujarāt when Nizām-ul-mulk had secretly arranged that he should be withstood by other Marātha leaders, and, after a campaign there which was only partly successful, Nizām-ul-mulk pacified him, on his return to the Deccan, by disclosing to him his design for the extension of Marātha influence to the north. Bāji Rāo welcomed the proposal and sent his brother Chimnaji to the help of Malhar Rāo Holkar, who was already ravaging Mālhwā. The imperial governor of that province was slain in battle and the state of the country was appalling. The land was out of cultivation, most of the inhabitants left were in league with marauding parties of Marāthas, and by the end of 1731 nearly 100,000 Marātha horse were in the country, and another body of 25,000 horse was ready to invade it. Muhammad Khān Bangash, a stout Afghan soldier of fortune, who had already been defeated in Bundelkhand by a confederacy of Baghela Rājputs and Marāthas, was appointed to Mālhwā, but received no support from Khān Daurān, the minister who had appointed him, and, being powerless against the invaders, was recalled. Jai Singh of Jaipur, who was appointed in his place, was little more successful, but made a futile and undignified attempt to conciliate the Marāthas. Early in 1733 these marauders raided the neighbourhood of Āgra, but withdrew before the emperor could reach the city. In 1734 they captured and occupied Hindaun, only seventy miles from Āgra, but retired before a force sent against them. A military promenade through Mālhwā was ineffectual; in 1735 they invaded Rājasthān and sacked Sāmbhar; they obliged the emperor tacitly to accept



Bāji Rāo as governor of Mālwa; and later in the year it was only with Marāṭha help that the imperial governor of Gujarāt was able to drive from the province a former imperial governor who declined to vacate his post.

Bāji Rāo Pēshwā was in serious financial difficulties owing to the cost of the enormous army which his ambitious schemes obliged him to maintain; and the weakness of the court, and its conciliatory attitude, so encouraged his impudence that his demands exceeded the bounds of reason. They included the cession to him as a fief of the province of Mālwa and the districts of Allāhābād, Benares, Gāya and Mathura, the recognition of his right as hereditary *sardeshmukh* and *sardeshpāndya* of the six provinces of the Deccan, and an annual subsidy of five millions of rupees. This demand threw the emperor into the arms of Nizām-ul-mulk, who was implored to forget the past and to save the empire from destruction, and in March, 1737, Khān Daurān and Kamar-ud-dīn Khān, Amīn Khān's son, each at the head of a great army, advanced by different routes against the Marāṭhas. Burhān-ul-mulk defeated Holkar, and turned northwards to attack the Pēshwā, but Khān Daurān, jealous of his rival's recent successes, implored him not to be so rash as to attack the Pēshwā single-handed, and promised to join him. He joined him at his leisure, and, while the two armies were carousing together, the Pēshwā evaded them, marched to Delhi, encamped a few miles from its walls, and defeated a force sent out from the city against him. "I was resolved", he said, "to tell the emperor truth, to prove that I was yet in Hindūstān, and to show him flames and Marāṭhas at the gates of his capital." Learning that the forces of Khān Daurān, Kamar-ud-dīn, and Burhān-ul-mulk were closing in on him, the Pēshwā retired unmolested, and Khān Daurān, fearing lest the credit of settling affairs with the Marāṭhas should fall to Nizām-ul-mulk, who was marching northwards, concluded a treaty which conferred on the Pēshwā the government of Mālwa and assigned to him an annual subsidy of nearly three and a half millions of rupees.

Ghāzi-ud-dīn, the eldest son of Nizām-ul-mulk, was then appointed to the government of Mālwa and Gujarāt, on condition of his expelling the Marāṭhas, and Nizām-ul-mulk, avoiding the Pēshwā who was on his way to the Konkan, moved to Bhopāl. There he entrenched himself, when the Pēshwā returned from

the Konkan and invaded Mālwa with 34,000 horse. The Marātha troops beleaguered Nizām-ul-mulk and reduced his troops to such distress that he was obliged to retreat on Sironj, and on January 17, 1738, signed a convention undertaking to secure for Bāji Rāo the government of Mālwa, with sovereignty over the territory between the Nerbudda and the Chambal, and a subsidy of five millions of rupees. These terms, on which he was allowed to continue his march unmolested, were disgraceful, but he gave away nothing which was his own, and the cession of sovereignty in the tract between the two rivers created a buffer state between the empire and his own dominions.

In 1737 Nādir Shāh, who had ascended the throne of Persia in 1736, opened the siege of Kandahār, his object being to punish the Ghilzai tribe which had recently conquered and overrun Persia and which he had driven back to its home with fearful loss. Fearing lest many of the tribe should escape over the frontier into the Indian province of Kābul he had warned Muhammad Shāh, who had promised not to admit fugitives into his dominions. The promise was not kept and many of the tribesmen fled over the frontier into the Kābul province. An envoy who had been sent to complain of Muhammad's breach of faith was detained at Delhi, and after the fall of Kandahār, on March 24, 1738, Nādir crossed the frontier, occupied Ghaznī, and reached Kābul on June 21. The citadel surrendered to him about a week later and he marched on, defeated the governor, who had retired to the Khaibar Pass, and captured Peshāwar. After crossing the Indus at Attock, he brushed aside a force which met him at Wazīrābād on the Chināb, defeated Zakariya Khān, the governor of Lahore, received from him the keys of the city, and marched from Lahore on February 6, 1739.

The news that he intended to invade India had been received at Delhi with ridicule, but, as he advanced, incredulity gave way to panic. Summonses were issued to the provincial governors to hasten to Delhi with their contingents, and to the chiefs of Rājasthān, but the latter paid no heed to the call, and the great-grandson of Aurangzib could not command a single one of those Rājput horsemen who would have given their lives in thousands for Akbar. Muhammad Shāh marched from Delhi and in the latter half of February reached Karnāl, where a defensive position was chosen.

The Indian army was distracted with terror and fervent prayers went up for the speedy arrival of Burhān-ul-mulk, who was bringing his contingent of 30,000 horse from Oudh. Nādir Shāh encamped two leagues to the west of Karnāl and Burhān-ul-mulk joined Muhammad Shāh on February 24, but, on learning that his baggage had fallen into the hands of some of the Persian troops, began the battle by an attempt to recover it. The Indian army was not prepared for action. Burhān-ul-mulk was taken prisoner, and Khān Daurān, who went to his assistance, was mortally wounded. Meanwhile the rest of the army was drawn up in the plain before its fortified camp, and the Persian army fell upon it. Muhammad Shāh had 200,000 horse and foot and 5000 field-guns, outnumbering the Persians by at least two to one, but the Indian troops were no match for the Persians, and the *mêlée* was rather a massacre than a battle. Of the Indian army 30,000 according to one account, 17,000 according to another, were slain, and the survivors took refuge in their fortified camp, where provisions soon ran short. Burhān-ul-mulk persuaded Nādir to allow Muhammad to retain his throne, but, being dissatisfied with the reward which it was suggested that he should receive, urged the conqueror to come to no final settlement until he reached Delhi. Muhammad twice waited on Nādir, who rated him for his cowardice and his mismanagement of the affairs of his empire, and informed him that he possessed but three faithful servants and that all his officers except those three had been in treasonable correspondence with him. Nādir entered Delhi just before March 21, on which day the Persian festival of the New Year and the Muslim feast of the sacrifice coincided. Muhammad had been sent before to prepare his reception, and on that day the *khūṭba* was recited in the conqueror's name in the mosques of Delhi. The next day a few Persians were killed in the course of a dispute, a rumour spread that Nādir himself had been slain, and a tumult arose. The elephant-stables had been seized by a force which was intended to overawe the foreign troops, and on the next morning Nādir rode through the city in order to ascertain what losses his army had suffered. A few hundreds had been slain, and, as he returned to the mosque of Raushan-ud-daula, some stones were thrown at him and an officer by his side was killed by a musket-shot. Retiring into the mosque, he ordered a general massacre, and 470 men who had

seized the elephant-stables were brought before him and put to the sword. The work of blood among the populace lasted from morning until evening, and the tale of the slain had reached 30,000 when Nizām-ul-mulk and Kamar-ud-dīn waited on the conqueror and besought him, in their master's name, to stay the hands of the slayers. The order went forth, and at once the slaughter ceased and the flames were extinguished, but not before a great part of the city was in ruins.

The imperial treasury was at Nādir's disposal, but there remained the task of levying contributions from the great nobles. The treasure collected is described as being beyond computation and included the Peacock Throne, the jewels set in which were valued at twenty million rupees. Nādir's own historian says that his master carried off nearly nineteen millions sterling in coined money. A Scottish writer says that he carried off nearly a hundred and nineteen millions in cash and kind. He compelled Muhammad to cede to him all the imperial territory to the west of the Indus, and the province of Sind, and to give a daughter in marriage to his younger son, and he quitted Delhi on May 16, leaving Muhammad and his nobles stupefied with the blow which had fallen on them. A plot formed by Muhammad with the object of breaking the power of Nizām-ul-mulk and the Turanian faction failed. Safdar Jang was confirmed in the government of Oudh, to which he had succeeded on the death of his father, Burhān-ul-mulk, from a malignant tumour; and Zakariya in that of the Panjab, where he had hitherto acted as the deputy of his father, Khān Daurān. Ja'far Khān, originally the deputy of the king-makers, and afterwards of Khān Daurān, in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, had died in 1726 and had been succeeded by his son-in-law, Shujā'-ud-daula, who died in 1739, while Nādir was at Delhi. The viceroyalty was wrested from his incompetent son, 'Alā-ud-daula, by Alahwirdi Khān Mahābat Jang, deputy governor of Bihar, who defeated and slew his rival, and, on May 12, 1740, entered Murshidābād as viceroy of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.

Bāji Rāo, the Pēshwā, died on April 28, 1740, and on his death the Turanian party appointed one of their own number as governor of Mālhwā. The Marāṭha commonwealth had become a confederacy of hereditary princes. Sivaji's descendant, the mahārāja, was a cipher, the Pēshwā being president of the con-

federacy. Damajī Gaikwar had succeeded his father, Pilajī, in Gujarāt; Rānojī Sindhia was collector of the Marāthas' share of the revenue in Mālhwā; Malhar Rāo Holkar administered territory corresponding nearly to the state now ruled by his descendant; and Rāghūjī Bhonsla, who governed Berar as the Pēshwā's deputy, shortly after this time established himself at Nāgpur. He was at the moment engaged in the Carnatic, where his troops had defeated and slain Dost 'Alī, the nephew and successor of Dāūd Khān Panī, governor of that province. Bāji Rāo was succeeded as Pēshwā by his son, Bālājī Rāo. Nāsir Jang, second son of Nizām-ul-mulk, was acting as his father's deputy in the vice-royalty of the Deccan, but in August, 1740, Nizām-ul-mulk was obliged to leave Delhi to call Nāsir Jang to account for his autocratic measures in a state in which he was merely his father's agent. The son took up arms against his father, and, in August, 1741, attacked him near Aurangābād, but was taken prisoner and confined in the fortress of Kandhār.

The new Pēshwā, Bālājī Rāo, regarded the appointment of a Muslim noble to Mālhwā as an invasion of his rights, and, as 'Azīmullāh's agent failed to expel the Marāthas from the province, or even to check their depredations, the emperor, glad of the opportunity of humbling a Turānī noble, dismissed 'Azīmullāh from the government of Mālhwā and from another lucrative post at court.

Alahwirdi Khān had already established his authority over Bengal and Bihar, and was engaged in driving his opponents from Orissa when a Marātha army under Bhāskar Pant, Bhonsla's agent, so harassed and menaced him that he sought aid both of the emperor and of the Pēshwā, but succeeded in driving Bhāskar Pant's troops from the province without their help. In 1743 Rāghūjī Bhonsla himself, having returned from the Carnatic, invaded Bengal to establish his claim to the *chauth* and *sardesh-mukhi* of the province, but was driven out by Bālājī Pēshwā, who received as a reward the government of Mālhwā and an assignment of the arrears of *chauth* from Bihar.

The empire of the Timurids was now in a condition of disruption. Mālhwā was in the hands of the Pēshwā; no Muslim noble could be induced to attempt to wrest Gujarāt from those of Damajī Gaikwar; Rāghūjī Bhonsla held Berar and the country to the east of that province as far as the frontier of Bengal; and

a great part of the Deccan and of the Carnatic was under the sway of the Marāthas. In 1743 most of the viceroys and provincial governors had excused themselves, or been excused on various grounds, from obeying a summons to court, and for some time a new power had been growing to the east of the Ganges in the province once known as Katehr, but afterwards as Rohilkhand. There 'Alī Muhammad Khān, a Hindu who had been brought up by Afghans, had established himself with an army of Afghans, and had assumed independence. In 1745 Muhammad left Delhi to reduce him to obedience. He surrendered and was thenceforward kept under surveillance.

On the death of Zakariya Khān, governor of the Panjab and Multān, the government of those provinces had been seized by his younger son, Shāh Nawāz Khān, who in defiance of orders from court had ousted his elder brother, Yahyā. Shāh Nawāz Khān entered into treasonable correspondence with Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, founder of the kingdom of Afghanistan. On the death of Nādir Shāh the great Persian empire, restored by him, had dissolved, its northern provinces falling into the hands of the Kūjār tribe, its southern provinces into those of Karīm Khān, a chieftain of the Zand tribe, and the provinces of Herat and Kandahār into those of Ahmad Khān Abdālī, the principal Afghan officer in Nādir's army. Ahmad afterwards seized Kābul and founded the modern kingdom of Afghanistan. Shāh Nawāz Khān first concluded an alliance with Ahmad, but was afterwards persuaded by his uncle, Kamar-ud-dīn Khān, Muhammad's minister, who tempted him with the promise of the government of the provinces of Kābul, Kashmīr, Sind, and Multān, to repudiate this alliance, so that when Ahmad demanded a free passage for his troops through the Panjab, in accordance with the terms of his secret treaty with Shāh Nawāz, he met with a flat refusal. Infuriated by this breach of faith, Ahmad crossed the Indus and invaded the Panjab with 30,000 horse. He defeated Shāh Nawāz Khān at Lahore, and his men sacked the city, while the imperial troops fled to Delhi. There preparations had already been made to repel the invader, and a large army under the nominal command of the emperor's son, Prince Ahmad, but including the contingents of all the leading nobles and of some of the chiefs of Rājasthān, left Delhi on January 19, 1748, and marched to Māchhīwāra on the Sutlej. Ahmad Shāh, eluding this army, marched to Sirhind and sacked

it. Prince Ahmad retraced his steps and marched against Ahmad Shāh at Sirhind, where he entrenched himself. The minister, Kamar-ud-dīn Khān, was killed in his tent by a gunshot, and the Rājput chiefs deserted, but some of the imperial officers, after enduring a fortnight's siege, plucked up spirit and not only resisted the attack of the invaders, but threw their army into confusion. Ahmad Shāh Abdālī withdrew during the night from Sirhind, and began his retreat to Afghanistan, and the news of the victory was received with great joy in Delhi. A Turkish officer, Mu'īn-ul-mulk, was rewarded for his services with the government of the Panjab, and set out for Lahore, while the rest of the army returned towards Delhi.

Muhammad Shāh, having fallen sick of dropsy, grew rapidly worse, and sent messages to his son begging him to hasten his return, that he might see him before he died; but on reaching Pānīpat Ahmad received the news that his father had died on April 26, 1748. On April 29, the prince was enthroned in the Shālīmār garden as Ahmad Shāh.



## CHAPTER XVI

### Ahmad Shāh and the Last Days of the Mughals

The new emperor was a young man of twenty-one, vicious, dissipated, perfidious, pusillanimous, and utterly worthless. His nobles were employed in dividing among themselves the miserable remnant of the great dominions of the House of Tīmūr, and in redistributing, without reference to him, the great offices of state. The vacant post of minister fell to Safdar Jang, viceroy of Oudh, who governed that province by deputy. Nizām-ul-mulk, viceroy of the Deccan, on his death on June 1, 1748, was succeeded, as a matter of course, by his second son, Nāsir Jang, his eldest son remaining at Delhi. Ahmad Shāh's own party, "the King's friends", was a cabal of eunuchs and women. 'Alī Muhammad Khān, governor of Katehr, had been imprisoned in Sirhind, but escaped when that town was captured by Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, and returned to Moradābād, where, on his death, he was succeeded by his son Sa'dullāh, whose father-in-law, Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, governed the province as regent. Kutb-ud-dīn, a rash soldier, was appointed governor by Safdar Jang, but was defeated and slain by Hāfiz Rahmat Khān. Kāim Jang, who had succeeded his father, Muhammad Khān Bangash, as governor of the south-eastern districts of the doāb, with his capital at Farrukhābād, was next appointed governor of Katehr, but fared no better than Kutb-ud-dīn, and was defeated and slain by Sa'dullāh. On the death of Kāim Jang, Safdar Jang annexed most of his territory and placed in charge of it Rāja Naval Rai, his deputy in Oudh; but Ahmad Khān, Kāim Jang's brother, surprised Naval Rai, and slew him, and afterwards, to the joy of Ahmad Shāh and the court party, defeated Safdar Jang himself, and then plundered and burned the city of Allāhābād, while his son, Mahmūd Khān, invaded Oudh and occupied Lucknow, but the citizens rose against his Afghan troops, drove them out of the city, and captured their artillery. The Afghans were driven from Oudh, but were still besieging the fort of Allāhābād when Safdar Jang, heedless of the danger of allowing the Marāthas to concern themselves in disputes in the neighbourhood of the capital, sum-



moned to his aid Malhar Rāo Holkar from Mālwa, Jai Appa Sindhia from Narnaul, and the son of Badan Singh the Jāt, Suraj Mal, who in 1733 had established himself in Bhartpur. Safdar Jang and his allies met at Āgra, captured Koīl from Ahmad Khān's governor, and marched on Farrukhābād, to which town Ahmad Khān, having raised the siege of Allāhābād, had retired. As the minister and his allies approached Farrukhābād, Ahmad Khān withdrew to Husainpur (now Fathgarh), and appealed to Sa'dullāh Khān of Moradābād for aid. Sa'dullāh marched to his assistance, but, by the time that he arrived, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Ganges and the Marāthas, having crossed the river, defeated the allied Afghan forces. The Afghans lost twelve thousand in killed, wounded and prisoners, and fled to the forest at the foot of the Kumāon hills. The Marāthas occupied Rohilkhand through the rainy season of 1751 and were rewarded for their services with the *parganas* of Koīl, Jalwar, Mau, Farrukhābād and Kora, but after the rainy season, when the Afghans submitted, they received the *pargana* of Farrukhābād and fiefs with an annual rental of Rs. 1,600,000. The power of the Bangash nawabs of Farrukhābād was, however, broken.

At the beginning of Ahmad Shāh's reign the provinces of Allāhābād and Āgra had been held by Zul-fikār Khān, Amīr-ul-umarā, but the minister, Safdar Jang, annexed Allāhābād to his province of Oudh, and conferred on the Amīr-ul-umara the province of Ajmir, as compensation. The change suited the Amīr-ul-umarā, for Bakht Singh of Mārwar was in rebellion against his nephew, Rām Singh, who had succeeded his father, Abhay Singh, in that state, and was in rebellion against the emperor. The Amīr-ul-umarā expected to profit by helping Bakht Singh on his way to Ajmir. However, he foolishly embroiled himself with the Jāts and was severely defeated by Suraj Mal, who, after the battle, allied himself with his beaten foe, and volunteered to help him in Rājasthān. They marched together to Nāgaur, but Bakht Singh refused to allow a Jāt to intervene in the affairs of Rājasthān, and Suraj Mal was obliged to return to Bhartpur while Amīr-ul-umarā proceeded to Ajmir, and, after being joined by Bakht Singh, marched against Rām Singh, who was supported by Khande Rāo, son of Malhar Rāo Holkar. In a battle fought at Pipār the Amīr-ul-umarā foolishly exposed his troops, in close order, to the fire of the Jodhpur

army, and, to Bakht Singh's disgust, withdrew from the field and opened negotiations with Rām Singh. He obtained for himself a large sum of money and supplies for his troops, and hastened back to Delhi, hoping to supplant the minister, Safdar Jang, after his defeat by Ahmad Khān Bangash. He found, however, that Safdar Jang's position was unassailable; he himself was unable to pay his troops; his property was confiscated; and he was deprived of his title, which was conferred upon Ghāzī-ud-dīn Khān Firūz Jang, the eldest son of the late Nizām-ul-mulk.

Ahmad Shāh then summoned Nāsir Jang from the Deccan, believing that with his help he would be able to free himself from the control of Safdar Jang; but Safdar Jang seems to have suspected the design, and Nāsir Jang, on reaching the Nerbudda, received an order cancelling the summons. On his departure from Aurangābād, his sister's son, Muzaffar Jang, had risen in rebellion against him. The course of this rebellion will be described in a later chapter. Nāsir Jang was shot by one of his own officers. Muzaffar Jang was proclaimed by the French as viceroy of the Deccan, but lost his life in a mutiny of his Afghan troops before he could reach Hyderabad. The French then proclaimed Salābat Jang, third son of Nizām-ul-mulk, as viceroy of the Deccan.

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī had invaded the Panjab for the second time in 1749, but had been induced by the governor, Mu'in-ul-mulk, to retire on receiving a heavy indemnity. In 1752 he invaded the Panjab for the third time and defeated the governor. Ahmad Shāh of Delhi and his courtiers were overcome with terror, anticipating a repetition of the invasion of 1739. Safdar Jang, who was in Oudh, was summoned to Delhi, but, before he could reach the capital, the poltroon, Ahmad Shāh, had purchased peace by the cession of the Panjab and Multān to the Afghan. Safdar Jang was furious, for he had purchased the support of Holkar by the promise of large subsidies, which he was no longer in a position to pay. Firūz Jang offered a solution of the difficulty. He offered to relieve Safdar Jang of his obligations to Holkar in return for a commission conferring on him his father's vicereignty, the Deccan, to establish himself in which he required Holkar's help. The commission was issued, and, on May 18, 1752, Firūz Jang with Holkar left Delhi for the Deccan, having already received a promise of support from Bālājī Rāo, the Peshwā.

Salābat Jang, with the assistance of the French, marched against the Pēshwā and defeated him, but could not keep the field, as his troops were mutinous for want of pay, and was thus obliged to return to Hyderabad.

Firūz Jang and Malhar Rāo Holkar reached Aurangābād at the end of September, 1752, having been joined at Burhānpur by the Pēshwā. Their combined forces amounted to 150,000 men and Salābat Jang's position, in spite of his alliance with the French, was difficult, until it was relieved by the death of Firūz Jang, who was poisoned by the mother either of Salābat Jang or of Nizām 'Alī, the younger half-brother of both claimants. After his death his titles were conferred on his son, Shihāb-ud-dīn, who allied himself with the emperor against Safdar Jang. He encouraged Ahmad Shāh to deprive the minister of his command of the imperial artillery, and thus drove him into rebellion. Safdar Jang proclaimed as emperor a man of unknown origin whom he represented to be a prince of the imperial house, and on May 4, 1753, a civil war, which took the form of incessant combats in the streets and neighbourhood of the capital, broke out and lasted for six months. Safdar Jang being a Shiah, the religious element was imported into the quarrel and greatly embittered it, but neither party obtained any decided advantage, and both at length grew weary of the strife and came to terms. Safdar Jang was permitted to depart to Oudh and Intizām-ud-daula, the young Firūz Jang's maternal uncle, remained minister. Firūz Jang employed Malhar Rāo Holkar and Jai Appa Sindhia, whom he had summoned to his aid, to punish Suraj Mal, the Jāt; but the fortresses of the Jāts could not be taken without guns, and Ahmad Shāh, on the advice of Intizām-ud-daula, refused to place the imperial artillery at the disposal of the turbulent youth, and the emperor and his minister marched with their troops to Sikandra, to watch Firūz Jang's movements. Firūz Jang resented this, and Holkar, whose son Khande Rāo had been killed in action against the Jāts, marched with his troops towards the emperor's camp, to compel him to place his artillery at the disposal of the army, which was besieging Dīg. On learning of his approach, Ahmad Shāh and his minister, whose cowardice was notorious, fled to Delhi, leaving the army to its fate. Holkar disarmed the troops, took their horses, and captured the ladies of the imperial harem, whom he treated with respect. The siege

of Dīg was then raised, and Fīrūz Jang and Holkar marched to Delhi, and compelled Ahmad Shāh to dismiss Intīzām-ud-daula and appoint Fīrūz Jang minister. On June 2, 1754, they deposed Ahmad Shāh and enthroned 'Aziz-ud-dīn, the eldest surviving son of Jahāndār Shāh, under the title of 'Ālamgir II. A week later Ahmad Shāh and his mother were blinded.

Fīrūz Jang, carrying with him the puppet emperor, next left Delhi for the Panjab, which he hoped to recover. Mu'in-ul-mulk, who had been retained as its governor by the Afghan king, was dead, and under the government of his widow the province was in a state of anarchy, but at Pānīpat the finest corps in the minister's service mutinied, and handled him severely. After escaping from their hands, he caused the corps to be massacred by the troops of Najīb Khān, a ferocious Afghan, and led the army and the emperor back to Delhi. When his troops were again ready to take the field he marched to Ludhiāna, and desired Mu'in-ul-mulk's widow to send to him her daughter, to whom he was betrothed. She sent her daughter, and Fīrūz Jang, having married the girl, sent to Lahore a force which arrested her mother. He then bestowed the government of the Panjab on Adīna Khān, a traitor who had for many years been the evil genius of every governor.

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, incensed by this act of aggression, marched on Lahore, put Adīna Khān to flight, and then continued his march to Delhi. Fīrūz Jang, in great alarm, appeared before him as a suppliant, and was pardoned and allowed to retain his post as minister. Delhi was plundered by the Afghans, and the daughter of the emperor's deceased brother was married to Tīmūr, Ahmad Abdālī's eldest son. Ahmad Abdālī then sent some of his troops with Fīrūz Jang to punish Suraj Mal, the Jāt, and himself followed the army, which passed on from the Jāt forts into the doāb to collect the indemnity demanded by Ahmad. From the doāb the army passed into Oudh, where Safdar Jang, who had died in October, 1754, had been succeeded by his son, Shujā'-ud-daula, who met the invaders at Bīlgrām, where he was supported by Sa'dullāh Khān of Rohilkhand. After one or two unimportant actions the viceroy bought off the aggressors with an indemnity of half a million rupees, and they retired. Ahmad Shāh Abdālī had meanwhile been dealing with the Jāts after his own fashion. Having taken the fort of Ballabgarh, he put its garrison to the sword, and sent to Mathura a force which

massacred there a large number of unarmed Hindu pilgrims. He then retired to Delhi whence, owing to the fierce heat of the Indian summer and a pestilence which broke out in his army, he retired to Kābul, after appointing Najīb Khān, the Afghan, with the titles of Najīb-ud-daula, and Amīr-ul-umarā, guardian of the unfortunate emperor, 'Ālamgīr II, who was apprehensive of violence from Fīrūz Jang.


On the invader's departure Fīrūz Jang appointed Ahmad Khān Bangash Amīr-ul-umarā, and, with the assistance of Rāghunāth Rāo, the Pēshwā's brother, and Holkar, besieged the emperor and Najīb Khān in Delhi. After a siege of forty-five days Najīb Khān left the fort and retired to his estates at Sahāranpur, and Fīrūz Jang and Ahmad Khān entered the fort and assumed charge of the person of the emperor and of the administration of the empire. 'Alī Gauhar, the emperor's son, who had been sent out to collect troops to aid his father, was recalled to Delhi, where he was attacked by Fīrūz Jang's troops, but escaped and made his way to the camp of Vithal Rāo, a Marātha who had remained in the doāb with his troops after the departure of the Pēshwā's brother and Holkar. From that camp he made his way to Lucknow, where he was entertained by Shujā'-ud-daula, and thence went to Allāhābād.

In 1751 the province of Orissa had virtually been ceded to Mīr Habīb, agent of Rāghūji Bhonsla, in settlement of the Marātha claims to the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. On April 9, 1756, Alahwirdi Khān had died and had been succeeded by his grandson Sirāj-ud-daula. The history of this monster will be treated in a later chapter, but the victory of Plassey, won by Clive on June 23, 1757, had established the supremacy of the English in Bengal, and 'Alī Gauhar left Allāhābād in the hope of recovering Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa for the empire. He has been described as a rebel but this description is not accurate. He was in rebellion against Fīrūz Jang, who, as minister, issued commands which purported to be those of the emperor, but there is no reason to believe that the prince was acting against his father's wishes. The prince and Muhammad Kulī, Shujā'-ud-daula's governor of Allāhābād, invaded Bihar and besieged Patna, but Clive despatched from Murshidābād a force of 450 Europeans and 2500 Sepoys which dispersed their army without striking a blow, and caused them to return to Allāhābād.

Meanwhile, on October 10, 1759, Firūz Jang, angered by the emperor's giving what support he could to Najīb Khān when the Afghan was attacked by a force of Marāthas, caused him to be assassinated, and proclaimed, under the title of Shāhjahān III, a grandson of Kām Bakhsh, the youngest son of Aurangzīb, but 'Alī Gauhar, at Allāhābād, assumed the imperial title as Shāh 'Ālam.

The Marāthas had overrun the greater part of Hindustan and Mālhwā and considerable tracts in Rājasthān, and were suspected of the design of overthrowing the pageant of Mughal sovereignty at Delhi. Their pretensions were odious not only to the Muslim nobles of Delhi, but to many of the chiefs of Rājasthān, and Ahmad Shāh Abdālī received letters from many imploring him to free the country of the burden of Marātha oppression. Rāghunāth Rāo, the Pēshwā's brother, had offended the Afghan king by invading the Panjab, then a province of Kābul under the government of Tīmūr, the son of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, and in September 1758 Jānkojī Sindhia insolently appointed Sābājī Bhonsla to the government of the Panjab.

In August, 1759, therefore, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī crossed the Indus, driving the Marātha outposts before him, and Sābājī retreated rapidly towards Delhi. Ahmad, having levied tribute from Ranjit Deo, raja of Jammū, continued his march towards Delhi. Firūz Jang fled and took refuge with Suraj Mal the Jāt, and Dattājī Sindhia crossed the Jumna and advanced with 40,000 horse towards Sirhind to oppose the Afghan's advance. Ahmad Shāh was joined by the Rohilla chiefs, Sa'dullāh Khān, Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, and Dūndī Khān, and by Najīb Khān and Ahmad Khān Bangash. In January, 1760, he defeated and slew Dattājī Sindhia at Bādli, near Delhi, but Jānkojī, Sindhia's nephew, contrived to escape, though pursued, and hastened to the Deccan to raise the Marātha forces. Holkar, encamped in the doāb, failed to persuade Suraj Mal to take the field against the invader, and was himself surprised and routed by a column sent from Ahmad Shāh's army. The Pēshwā, whose cousin, Sadāsiva Bhāu, had recently defeated Salābat Jang and compelled him to cede a large tract of territory, was encamped on the Mānjira river in Salābat Jang's dominions, and nominated his son, Viśvās Rāo, whom he destined for the throne of Delhi, to the command of the Marātha host which was sent against Ahmad Shāh, with his cousin Sadāsiva Bhāu in actual command.



The Marāthas had long ceased to be merely the predatory and exceedingly mobile light cavalry which could harass and starve a less mobile army in the field. They had acquired some of the unmilitary vices of the imperial troops. Their officers were clad in cloth of gold and lodged in splendid pavilions, and the army of 30,000 which left the Deccan under the command of Visvās Rāo and Sadāsiva Bhāu was accompanied by a corps of 10,000 infantry and artillery under Ibrāhīm Khān Gārdī, a Muslim officer who had been trained by Bussy.

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī encamped, at the outbreak of the rainy season, at Sikandarābād in the doāb, and was there joined by Shujā'-ud-daula with 10,000 horse. The Marātha army seized the capital and on October 10, 1760, dethroned and imprisoned Shāhjahān III, and enthroned Jawān Bakht, the son of 'Alī Gauhar. Sadāsiva Bhāu then marched to Karnāl, with a view to cutting Ahmad Shāh's line of retreat. Ahmad Shāh then crossed the Jumna and marched in pursuit of him, on learning of which movement Sadāsiva Bhāu turned back and halted at Pānīpat, where, contrary to Marātha custom, he strongly entrenched himself. Many of the Marātha officers wished to adopt the usual Marātha tactics, but Ibrāhīm Gārdī insisted on entrenchment, for the safety of his guns. The Marātha army, estimated at 55,000 horse and 15,000 foot, with 200 guns and Pindāris and followers numbering 200,000, was cooped up in the town of Pānīpat and its immediate neighbourhood, and experienced the sufferings which the Marāthas had so often, in their palmy days, inflicted on their foes. Their supplies were cut off, and to the misery of famine was added the pestilential stench arising from the accumulation of filth within the narrow limits of their camp. Ahmad Shāh would listen to no terms and the misery of the Marāthas was extreme. "The cup is now full to the brim and cannot hold another drop", wrote the Bhāu despondently, and on the evening of January 12 the troops were ordered to prepare for battle and received all the grain left, that they might have at least one full meal before the fight. Before dawn on January 13, they marched out to attack. Their impetuosity at first threw Ahmad Shāh's army into confusion all along the line, but the Afghans recovered themselves and bore back the Marāthas by repeated charges. Early in the afternoon Visvās Rāo and Sadāsiva Bhāu fell mortally wounded, and Malhar Rāo Holkar and Damaji Gaikwar rode



off while their troops fled towards Pānīpat. Thousands were cut down in the pursuit and perished by suffocation in the ditch of the entrenched camp. The town was surrounded for the night and in the morning the dense mass of the defeated army was led forth, and the captives were divided among the victors. Twenty-two thousand boys and women were retained as slaves, but the men were put to the sword, and it is estimated that nearly 200,000 perished.


This, the most desperate of the three battles fought on the field of Pānīpat, destroyed the great Marātha confederacy, and, for a time, the power of the Marātha chiefs. On the eve of the battle India, from the Indus and the Himālāya almost to the extreme limits of the peninsula, had been forced either to own their sway or to purchase their forbearance. Before twenty-four hours had passed their dominion had slipped from them. Mahādaji Sindhia in Gwalior, Rāghūji Bhonsla in Nāgpur, Malhar Rāo Holkar in Mālhwā, and Damajī Gaikwar in Gujarāt recovered portions of their territories, but the Pēshwā's authority was broken, cohesion was lost, and all hopes of a Marātha empire were destroyed at Pānīpat. The calamity plunged the Marātha nation into grief and mourning, and Bālājī Rāo Pēshwā, who never recovered from the shock, died five months later.

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, before leaving India, nominated 'Alī Gauhar as emperor of Delhi under the title of Shāh 'Ālam. Shujā'-ud-daula was appointed minister, from which circumstance he and his successors in Oudh were known to the British as nawab wazir, or "Nabob-Vizier", until permitted, in 1819, to assume the royal title, and Najīb Khān was confirmed in the rank and appointment of Amīr-ul-umarā.

The third battle of Pānīpat closes the history of the Mughal Empire. The destruction of the Marātha power did nothing to weld together the various states into which it had been broken, or to restore the power and authority of the emperor. Shāh 'Ālam was brutally blinded in 1788 by an Afghan ruffian, Ghulām Kādir, and in 1803 was formally taken under the protection of the power which the victory of Plassey had designated as the successor of the Great Mughals. His son Akbar II (1806-37) lived and died a pensioner of the same power, whose outraged authority sent his grandson, Bahādur II, to end his days as an exile in Rangoon.

Part III

BRITISH INDIA



## CHAPTER I

### The Coming of European Influence

The epochs of Indian history have been determined by the appearance from time to time of foreign influences. At the dawn of recorded events is the coming of the Aryan, whose intermingling with the peoples of India begot the elaborate social system and the philosophy of life which we know as Hinduism. For a thousand years it followed the normal human cycles of development and decay, and then the Muslims burst upon India, first merely touching an outlying province, but later establishing themselves firmly over the north, founding great states, building mosques to the might of Islam out of the stones of desecrated temples, and cleaving the population into two most sharply defined sections, differing profoundly in outlook, in faith, in philosophy, in politics. Lastly, eight centuries afterwards came European influences, unlike the others for they arrived, not by the Afghan passes, but by the ocean, bringing powers yet more subversive than Aryan metaphysic or the Muslim sword.

The coming of the Portuguese marks the first impact of modern western science upon the Indian world. Earlier relations between East and West had produced little but the exchange of goods. Greek and Roman, Genoese and Venetian had bought in Indian markets, pepper and cloves, gaily-dyed calicoes and rich silks; but their intercourse had been politically sterile. Different as were the ideas of European and Indian, the dominion of both the one and the other over the realm of nature was subject to the same narrow limitations. But with the European renaissance Western man became the master of ocean travel. Of all the agents of political and social change none have been so powerful as the inventions which have increased human powers of movement; and politically the great achievement of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries was neither the revolution in political or religious thought, nor the transformation of the European state-system, but the development of the art of guiding ships to unseen points across the ocean and the building of vessels stout enough to brave the storms of the open sea.

In this great work the Portuguese had led the way. A number of causes co-operated. Fronting on the Atlantic Ocean, the country had bred a race of mariners accustomed to the constant risk of life. The history of the kingdom had been in its earlier stages a long crusade against the Moors, and once these had been expelled it was most natural to pursue the attack on the African shore. In 1415 Ceuta was captured. In this exploit a young prince of barely twenty-one took part. He proved to be a man equally great in character and in intelligence. Prince Henry, whom historians have commonly called "the Navigator", grasped to the full the importance of maritime exploration and of nautical skill. The shape of the world was still a matter of speculation. The configuration of Asia and Africa was still uncertain. The existence of the New World was not even guessed. The African coast down as far as Cape Bojador was vaguely known, but the paths beyond were barred not only by shoals and currents, but by yet more terrifying beliefs borrowed from Arab legend, that all who passed beyond would turn black like the inhabitants, that they would be devoured by dragons, that they would be lost for ever in the Green Sea of Night.

It is not easy to understand what stout hearts and strong leadership were needed by adventurers into these regions of unknown peril. Prince Henry set himself to replace fancy by observed fact. At Sagres, close to Cape St Vincent, he built a naval arsenal and an observatory, and devoted his life to improving the rough instruments by which men directed their course at sea, to sending forth missions of exploration, to studying their reports, and plotting out on maps the information thus secured. By the time of his death in 1463 the African coast had been explored as far as Cape Mesurado, trading factories had been set up, the trade in gums and gold and slaves had been established, and the papal bull *Romanus Pontifex* had bestowed on the king of Portugal exclusive rights on the African coast from Cape Non to Guinea.

The voyages by which these results had been accomplished had been mere coasting voyages. But the Portuguese shipwrights were gradually mastering the art of naval construction. Their problems were not simple. Great ships (as men in those days reckoned greatness) were needed, in part the more easily to ride the great waves that came in from the Atlantic, in part to accommodate large numbers of men and the provisions that they

required for voyages of most uncertain length. Under this pressure the art of shipbuilding rapidly improved. By the middle of the fifteenth century, by the time that the Turks had captured Constantinople, the Portuguese had made great strides towards the objects which Prince Henry had set before his countrymen.

His motive had been principally religious. The stars of his horoscope destined him to spread the faith. Azurara, the Portuguese chronicler, describes him as eager to bring Christianity to "the vast tribes lying under the wrath of God", to find out the real strength of the Moorish enemy, and to join hands with Prester John, the fabled Christian prince of the East, so that Islam might be completely and finally overthrown. Closely interwoven with these religious motives were the hopes of national wealth and power, and no doubt in lesser minds mere personal objects were predominant. But for the moment the capture of Constantinople disposed men to set the crusading motive foremost. In easy, tolerant Italy men might jest at the possible replacement of the pope by the sultan, but in Spain and Portugal, where men had fought for the faith, the idea of revived Muslim dominion was an abomination.

King João II, who ruled Portugal from 1481 to 1495, with extraordinary energy and hope, carried on the work that Prince Henry had begun. By his time the African trade had begun to have an importance of its own. In the year of his accession he sent an expedition to found a permanent settlement on the Guinea coast. He built the fortress of St George of the Mine—*São Jorge da Mina*. It soon received the title and privileges of a city, and in its church a daily mass was said for the great prince whose far-sighted efforts had made its building possible. King João at the same time pushed his enquiries by sending expeditions overland. One directed southwards reached Timbuctoo, and another eastwards reached the Malabar coast. In the words of Barros, the king "roared round Africa like a famished lion", in the hope that his vessels would find the southern extremity of the continent, lay open the sea-route to India, and release the Eastern trade from the shackles which Turkish dominion in the Levant had set upon all that passed by the familiar overland ways. The reward of his persistence was that in 1486 Bartholomew Dias was driven by storms far to the southward and discovered what he called the Cape of Storms on his return, the king renaming the dis-

covery the Cape of Good Hope, in allusion to his unfulfilled desire of reaching India.

In 1495 he was succeeded by Manoel, in whom religious zeal burned with extraordinary vigour. The new king even expelled the Jews from his kingdom for the sake of marrying a daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella. But he pursued the same eastern goal as his predecessor. In 1497 he despatched a new expedition, consisting of four ships under Vasco da Gama. Though Vasco's earlier exploits are unknown, he was a born leader of men. His own energy and endurance were extraordinary; his anger terrible, cruel, unforgetting; his courage indomitable. He sailed in the *São Gabriel*, whose figurehead is said still to be preserved in a monastery at Belem; and with him went three smaller vessels. Putting to sea on July 8, he reached the Natal coast at Christmas. He then sailed northwards up the African coast to Melinda, whence information, gathered from traders following the overland route, had assured the Portuguese that they could strike across direct to India. On May 17, 1498, da Gama made his landfall eight miles north of Calicut. The sea-route to the Indies had been made clear by nearly a century of unabating effort.

In four respects the Portuguese were singularly fortunate. Arriving on the Malabar Coast, they found themselves in touch with a multitude of small princes divided by mutual jealousy, so that hostility in one was certain to be accompanied by friendship in another. Furthermore, the country round Cochin and Calicut did not at that time produce enough rice for the needs of the inhabitants, who were supplied by Muslim vessels with grain from the Coromandel Coast; the region was therefore peculiarly sensitive to a blockade by sea. Again, reaching India at the close of the fifteenth century, the Portuguese found no state which could make either great or sustained efforts to prevent their establishment. And lastly the difficulties which they had had to meet and overcome implied that for purposes of war their vessels would be stouter and more formidable than any ships they would meet in Indian waters. This last was of all the most important, for the position which the Portuguese would occupy in the East certainly depended upon naval power. Their nation was too small, in view of the conditions of land warfare, for them to dream of establishing a military empire. They were vowed to the destruction (if they could possibly contrive it) of

Muslim states, and therefore could not contemplate taking up the position of unarmed and helpless traders. Supremacy at sea was the essential condition of success. And the physical circumstances which had fostered the early development of eastern seafaring had not promoted sustained progress. The regular and periodic winds which blow in the Indian seas had permitted men to sail easily and regularly at certain seasons of the year from Aden and Basra to Gujarāt, from Bengal to Malacca, from Malacca to Malabar; but their very strength and regularity had forbidden all attempts to sail against them, while cyclone and typhoon were too awful in their might for primitive sailors to dream of meeting and outliving them. Eastern mariners and vessels were therefore trained and built for voyaging with reliable and favourable winds. Their vessels were frail compared with the ships built to resist Atlantic storms. The consequence was firstly that Portuguese shipping could hold the seas in weather which would send all possible enemies fleeing for the first windward port and secondly that the Portuguese could mount cannon, the recoil of which would have shaken Indian vessels to pieces at the first discharge.

The results were not long in appearing. Da Gama reached Lisbon in August, 1499, with cargoes of spice, which he had obtained at Calicut in spite of the opposition of the Moplah traders. In the following year a new expedition was despatched. This consisted of thirteen vessels, heavily armed and carrying 1200 men, able to meet and destroy any Muslim enemies whom they might find in the Indian seas. Stretching well to the westward, in order to avoid the calms which had prolonged da Gama's voyage, the new expedition made a much more rapid passage, reaching Calicut in only a few days over six months, having touched the Brazilian coast on its way. The leader, Cabral, after long discussions with the Zamorin of Calicut, probably over the admission of Muslim vessels to trade, broke irrevocably with the Zamorin and, with only two of his ships laded, sailed to the neighbouring but independent port of Cochin. There he was welcomed, and found cargoes much easier to procure. Only five of the ships found their way back to Portugal, but their lading sufficed to cover the whole cost of the expedition, and from this time Cochin was regarded as the trading headquarters. Its harbour was excellent, its communications with the pepper country good, and its jealousy of Calicut permanent.



Cabral's expedition led to a great development of Portuguese policy. This was marked by the king's assuming the title of "Lord of the Navigation, Conquest, and Trade of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India", and by the despatch of a great expedition—da Gama's second voyage—to assert the claim. The fleet consisted of twenty vessels, five of which were to remain in Indian waters when the rest returned to Europe. A regular trade was to be accompanied by a permanent force. Da Gama sailed in 1502. His conduct was marked by a consistent and even ferocious hostility towards Muslim ships and traders and the ports which protected them. Falling in with a vessel from Jeddah bound for Calicut, he plundered and destroyed it with all on board. At Calicut, being denied the expulsion which he demanded of every Muslim, he seized a great number of small craft, bombarded the town, hanged his prisoners at the yard-arm, and sent their heads and hands ashore.

In the next year, 1503, more ships were sent from Portugal, with orders to build a fort at Cochin to protect it from the attacks which the Zamorin would certainly make upon it. Though the proposal was unwelcome to some at least of the raja's advisers, "yet", as Albuquerque wrote, "to furnish his estate the more safely, and to preserve the friendship of the king of Portugal, and also to keep the great profit which accrued to him from this commerce, he... was pleased to grant a site for the building of the fortress". Temporary defences of wood and earth were at once thrown up; and though the Zamorin, in 1503 and 1504, repeatedly attacked Cochin with all the forces he could assemble, his attacks were beaten off with the aid of a small body of Portuguese under the famous Duarte Pacheco, who clearly established the military value of the Portuguese as allies. Portuguese power at sea became even clearer in 1506, when the Zamorin and the Moplahs, seeking safety in numbers, prepared a flotilla of between two and three hundred craft for the Red Sea. The flotilla was engaged by four Portuguese vessels, which destroyed the greater part of it without a single Portuguese being killed.

Meanwhile the Portuguese court had taken a further step with its eastern policy. In 1504 Albuquerque, who had held high command in the squadron despatched to India in 1503, returned to Portugal and at once urged the importance of preventing the

Moplah traders from renewing their trade or disturbing the friendly rajas of Cochin and Cannanore during the long interval between the departure of one expedition and the arrival of the next. The question was discussed in the council, which at last resolved upon a definite plan of action. It resolved to avoid all occupation of territory, to build forts only where needed to protect trade, but to maintain on the Malabar Coast as large a squadron as possible and to send a permanent governor to remain for three years in India. Francisco de Almeida was therefore appointed with the title of viceroy. He was sent out with a large fleet and 1500 soldiers. On his arrival he built a second fort at Cannanore and rebuilt the earlier one at Cochin in stone. He made Cochin his headquarters, and aimed at the control of the Malabar Coast, considering that the extension of Portuguese influence into either the Red Sea or the Straits of Malacca could lead only to a weakening of the Portuguese position.

In any case the interests of Muslim traders would have led them to resist the establishment of a new route and a new group of merchants threatening their monopoly of Indian trade westwards. But the bitterly hostile attitude which from the first had been displayed by the Portuguese made a desperate struggle certain. Other interests also were involved. The appearance of the Portuguese and the activity of their squadrons dislocated the trade up the Red Sea to Suez and Alexandria. At the close of the fifteenth century the Venetians were, and had long been, the chief distributors of eastern produce in Europe. In 1498 they had not cared to buy all the pepper that had reached Alexandria that season; in 1502 they had not been able fully to lade their galleys. They had at once urged upon Kansauh al-Ghauri (the last Mameluke sultan of Egypt) the importance of checking without delay this danger to their own trade and to the Egyptian customs. But the sultan's power was threatened by internal dangers, and he had at first contented himself with idle threats to destroy the Christian Holy Places and drive every Christian out of his dominions. At the end of 1505 he resolved on war. Twelve vessels were built at Suez. Early in 1507 they were at last ready. Fifteen hundred fighting men were put aboard them and they sailed for India, reaching Diu in September. Though they displayed no eagerness to seek out and destroy the Portuguese, they met a squadron under the command of Almeida's son off Chaul

in March, 1508, and destroyed the commander's vessel. The viceroy at once set to work to equip a fleet able to destroy the new enemy. After nine months' delay, and having emptied Cochin and Cannanore of every man that could be spared, he sailed northwards with eighteen vessels and 1200 men. On February 2, 1509, he appeared off Diū where the Egyptian squadron lay. The next day the Muslim vessels were destroyed at anchor, and the Portuguese recovered their threatened supremacy. They were indeed fortunate in having to meet the danger only when they had already accumulated considerable resources in India.

Shortly after this event the great Albuquerque arrived on the Malabar Coast. He had been despatched from Portugal in 1506, with instructions to operate against the Muslims in the Red Sea and to succeed Almeida in the chief command on the expiry of his term of office in 1507. Reaching eastern waters in 1507, he had seized Socotra and built a fort there, in order to block up the Red Sea, and had then attacked Ormuz in order to do the like by the Persian Gulf. After sinking every vessel that he found at Ormuz, he had attacked the place itself, and compelled the rais to become tributary to the king of Portugal and to suffer the Portuguese to build a fort on the island. These exploits signified an inclination greatly to expand the sphere of Portuguese operations. When Albuquerque reached Cannanore, Almeida refused to deliver up the government, and imprisoned his successor, on the score of the dangers involved in this policy of expansion. With the arrival of the new shipping in the autumn of 1509, however, the despatches from Portugal made it impossible for Almeida to continue his opposition. On November 4 he resigned and next day sailed for Europe.

His successor gave to the Portuguese position in India its specific form. Almeida had sought to dominate the Malabar Coast. Albuquerque considered that so limited a power could not easily be maintained. Its revenues would be small, its forces slender, its basis insecure. If, however, the Portuguese boldly seized the strategic points from which the whole traffic of the Indian seas could be controlled, and if, moreover, they set up their headquarters in a city of their own, rich, populous, and strong, their revenue would be great enough to maintain an irresistible power, while continuing to feed the wealth of their

mother-country with eastern exports. His policy was therefore an extension of the principles which Almeida had laid down rather than a departure from them.

In 1507 and 1508 his operations at Socotra and Ormuz had partially secured the control of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The next step was the establishment of a Portuguese capital in India. At Cochin authority continued with the raja, who could at any time hinder provisions from coming into the Portuguese fort. But higher up the coast lay an island-town, with an excellent harbour, recently conquered by the Muslim kingdom of Bijāpur from the Hindus. This was Goa. It had lately afforded refuge to a number of Turks who had escaped from the Egyptian fleet when Almeida destroyed it, and these men were reported to be building ships and galleys after the Portuguese style. It was a place of great trade; caravans of merchants came there from the Muslim and Hindu capitals; and the trade in horses from the Persian Gulf was centred there. Early in 1510 Albuquerque assembled twenty-three ships and a force of 1200 Portuguese. His ostensible reason was to attack the Muslim forces in the Red Sea. But off Goa he was joined by a body of Hindu vessels and seamen, and proceeded to attack the place. A fort commanding the entrance to the harbour was stormed, and the town was then abandoned by the Muslims and occupied by Albuquerque. This was quickly resented by the sultan of Bijāpur, and the Portuguese were soon obliged to forsake their new conquest. But before the end of the year Albuquerque attacked it again, stormed it, and exterminated its Muslim inhabitants, in part as vengeance for their having aided the Bijāpur forces, in part "because it was necessary that there should be none but Hindus within it".

Up to this time the Portuguese had troubled little about the eastern division of the Indian trade. But under the influence of the new policy of expansion, of which King Manoel had become as strong a supporter as Albuquerque himself, an expedition was despatched from the Tagus in 1508 to Malacca, the great entrepot of far-eastern commerce with India. The sultan of Malacca regarded the new arrivals with well-grounded distrust, and, after some futile hostilities, the expedition departed. In May, 1511, however, Albuquerque sailed in person with nineteen ships, 800 Europeans, and 600 Indians in the Portuguese service. On the sultan's refusal to give up the Portuguese prisoners whom he

had seized in 1509, the place was attacked and captured after over a week of furious street-fighting. A fortress was at once constructed on the quay-side, at first of timber, then of stone taken from the mosques and the tombs of by-gone rulers. Portuguese power was thus extended into the Malay archipelago.

For the moment this marked the limit of Portuguese expansion. In 1513 Albuquerque failed in an endeavour to secure control of the Red Sea by capturing Aden; and in 1515 he went a second time to Ormuz, where he crushed opposition that had arisen to Portuguese control. He died within sight of Goa on the return voyage, and was buried in the church which he had built there. In many ways he anticipated the qualities which were to mark out the great Englishman, Clive. Both were great military leaders, whose courage and insight rose with danger. Both were men of unshakable constancy, ready to meet any foe however numerous; of a high spirit, which imposed itself on their followers; of a good fortune, which daunted their enemies. Both were capable of acts of treachery; but both resorted to treachery so rarely that they never lost the confidence of other men. Both had the skill to discern essential conditions of success and to ignore all else. Albuquerque seems to have stood alone in his generation in perceiving that "a dominion founded on a navy alone cannot last".<sup>1</sup> He insisted against all opposition from Portugal on the importance of maintaining Goa as the centre of Portuguese power in the east, as a great dockyard in which vessels could always be refitted, remanned, and revictualled, and as a great city whence reserves of troops could always be drawn. In this he was certainly justified. When a century afterwards the Portuguese found themselves involved in a war of life and death, they could not possibly have maintained the struggle for over fifty years but for the resources which had been accumulated at Goa.

On the foundations thus laid by Albuquerque the Portuguese gradually built up a position of extraordinary predominance in eastern waters. The conquest of Malacca led naturally to the conquest of the Moluccas—small islands producing the most precious spices, cloves and nutmeg—to participation in the important trade in silk goods with China, and the establishment of a settlement off the Chinese southern coast at Macao; and to

<sup>1</sup> Albuquerque, *Commentaries*, iii, 260.

trading and missionary activities in Japan. This entrance into the far-eastern trade was important financially rather than politically, for it provided the Portuguese with goods readily exchangeable for Indian commodities, and so relieved them of the need of sending from Europe great quantities of the precious metals. Then again they established a control over Ceylon. The island was too large, and its central areas too difficult, ever to be conquered by the Portuguese with the small forces that could be spared. But they built a fort at Colombo in 1518, and then spread round the coast, occupying the points which enabled them to master the trade of the island and to dominate the cinnamon-growing regions, while the frequent wars between rival Singhalese rajas prevented any persistent endeavour to expel them from the country.

In the course of time a small number of settlements grew up on the Coromandel Coast at Negapatam and St Thomé, in Arakan and Bengal at Chittagong and Hugli, in Pegu at Syriam; but these factories in eastern India never became of great importance. The Portuguese position in Ceylon and the Straits carried with it the mastery of the Bay of Bengal and its trade, and so rendered large establishments unnecessary. Consequently the settlements north of Negapatam were mainly formed and occupied by adventurers under hardly any official control and with little official encouragement. It was indeed more important for the Portuguese to strengthen themselves in western rather than in eastern India; in the latter area no attacks were to be feared, but in the former the Muslim states, with whom the Portuguese were generally on ill terms, might at any time receive help from the arch-enemy of Christendom, the Turks.

When in 1517 the Turks had overthrown the Mameluke rule in Egypt, they inherited the feud which had arisen between the Mamelukes and the Portuguese in consequence of the interference of the latter with the Red Sea trade. Commercial interests thus reinforced religious animosity. The Portuguese leaders were keenly conscious of this situation and eager to prepare against its probable results. Co-operation between the Turks and the Deccani sultanates was unlikely, for the southern Muslim states were under Shiah rulers whom the Turks, as Sunnis, regarded with great distaste. So long too as the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagar continued to hold its own, Hindu-Muslim hostility was a

strong safeguard against attack. But to the northward lay the sultanate of Gujarāt. Not only was the ruling family Sunni, but also the Gujarāti ports—Surat, Bassein, Diū—had always driven an active trade with the Red Sea, which the Portuguese were eager to control and limit, in order to complete their growing dominance of the European markets in eastern produce. The Gujarātis were therefore certain to seek Turkish help and certain of receiving Turkish sympathy. The Egyptian fleet which Almeida had destroyed had found a welcome in Gujarāti harbours. A strong position on the Gujarāti coast was therefore the great object of Portuguese policy in the period following the death of Albuquerque. In 1519 and again in 1521 attempts were made to secure Diū, as the point from which communications with the Red Sea could most easily be commanded. Both failed. Ten years later another attempt was made by Nuno da Cunha, but was checked by the arrival of Turkish reinforcements. However, the pressure of Portuguese sea-power compelled the sultan, Bahādur, to abandon Bassein which the Portuguese had seized, and to agree that all the Gujarāti ships should touch at Bassein to take Portuguese permits and pay customs-dues, and that no Turks should in future be allowed to enter his kingdom.

The rise of the Mughal power in India at last gave the Portuguese their real opportunity. In 1535 Bahādur was attacked and defeated by Humāyūn. In great alarm the sultan applied for help to both the Turks and the Portuguese. The Turks for the moment did nothing. Nuno da Cunha, however, went in person to Diū, where in return for promises of help against the Mughals he obtained the grant of a site on which the Portuguese might build a fortress at Diū. The fortress was begun at once and completed in the next year. But to Bahādur the bargain proved most improvident. The military science of Europe, unlike its naval science, was still very far from being able to confer marked superiority in open warfare. The few men—50 horse and 100 matchlock-men—whom the Portuguese could spare for their new ally were of no material help. Events in northern India compelled Humāyūn to withdraw the bulk of his forces, while Bahādur was able by himself to defeat the detachments which remained. He thus found that he had given away the control of his principal port, and the mastery of his merchants' external trade, virtually for nothing. He began to repent his hasty agree-

ment, and, being much given to liquor, was probably unable always to disguise his feelings. The same weakness in an envoy whom he sent to Goa is reported to have revealed to the Portuguese a design to expel them from Diū. In any case the latter resolved to seize Bahādur on the first chance that offered. One such occurred at the close of 1536, when the sultan with a few followers visited the fort; and the captain of the fort who suffered him to depart, was severely rebuked by Nuno da Cunha for his weakness of heart. Early in 1537 da Cunha himself visited Diū; and a visit which Bahādur paid to the governor of India on board ship concluded with a *mêlée* in which the sultan was wounded and drowned.

For this unhappy conclusion the Portuguese were certainly to blame. But it is certain also that the sultan himself was not guiltless. He had appealed to the Turks for help, and had probably been seeking merely to gain time until they should arrive, while the Portuguese had been bent on provoking a crisis before that should happen. When in the following year, 1538, a Turkish fleet reached Diū, it found the Portuguese in a position of considerable strength.

The Turkish expedition, which had been leisurely got together at Suez, consisted of 72 vessels, with 6500 men. It had paused on its way to seize and sack Aden. Its commander, the eunuch Sulaimān, had been ordered to engage and destroy the Portuguese fleet. He preferred, however, to join the Gujarātis who were besieging the Portuguese fort. The Turkish artillery soon effected a breach; but the Turks quarrelled with the Gujarātis, who withdrew from the siege; the Portuguese resistance was most obstinate; and after two months' persistent attack the besiegers retired just when one more desperate effort might have carried the place. On September 4, when the siege began, the defenders had numbered 1400 men; on November 4, after the repulse of the final attack, only 40 remained fit for duty. The stubborn conduct of the garrison stands out the more strongly because the considerable force collected at Goa to relieve Diū hesitated to set sail until the Turks had withdrawn, and only arrived in January, 1539.

This attack on the Portuguese position by the Turks was alarming enough to produce efforts both in Europe and in India to end the danger. In Europe proposals (which, however, came



to nothing) were made in 1541 for the delivery of fixed quantities of pepper at Basra to be paid for in wheat, on condition that none of the pepper should be re-exported to Europe and that Portuguese ships should have free entrance into Turkish ports on the Red Sea. In the same year in India a strong expedition under Estevão da Gama was sent into the Red Sea. But although da Gama succeeded in plundering and burning Suakim, Suez proved too difficult, and the Turkish vessels there too numerous, to be attacked. A body of 400 men was landed at Massowah to help the Abyssinians who were being attacked by the Turks, and with their aid the king succeeded in recovering his territories. But apart from this the expedition produced no results.

However, from this time the Turkish menace died away, for Turkish ambitions lay rather in the direction of dominating the Mediterranean and extending their power in eastern Europe than in assailing the Portuguese position in the Indian Ocean. Consequently, till the appearance of a European enemy, the Portuguese sea-power remained unassailed, and the only enemies they had to meet were the land forces of the Indian states. In 1546 Diū underwent a prolonged siege, extending over seven months, by the Gujarāti forces under Rūmi Khān. The siege was concluded by a notable victory which Dom João de Castro, the last great governor of Portuguese India, obtained over the besiegers. Another crisis arose in 1570-71, when Goa was unsuccessfully attacked by the combined forces of Bijāpur and Ahmadnagar, and the northern ports, Damān and Bassein, were besieged by the Mughal forces which had under Akbar just conquered the sultanate of Gujarāt. But these attacks lacked the danger involved in the Turkish struggle. The sea remained open; the Portuguese fleets could carry forces and provisions wherever they were needed; and the position established by Albuquerque remained intact.

That position was essentially a maritime dominion covering a commercial monopoly. It rested on the occupation of points by which sea-borne trade must pass, and the maintenance of a naval power sufficient to meet and overthrow any marine enemy. Territorial dominion was never sought. From this point of view Goa was excellently chosen. It lay on the dividing line of Hīndu and Muslim influence and was therefore relatively secure from attack, since each party would view the progress of the other

with great jealousy. It was situated on an island, and was therefore easy of defence. It had a good harbour, and so was well-fitted to be the base of a naval power. It was hedged in to the eastwards by the great wall of the Western Ghauts, and so its possession was not calculated to tempt the Portuguese into schemes of inland conquest. Its position was moreover central. Malacca and Ceylon on the east, Mozambique on the west, Ormuz on the north, could communicate with it more readily than they could have done with any other headquarters established in a different region.

From these fixed points the Portuguese fleets could operate, certain of meeting with any trading ships which the state of the monsoons allowed to put to sea. Of all these vessels they took toll. Any ship found in eastern waters without a pass from the recognised Portuguese authorities was liable to seizure. These passes—*cartas*, they were called—were specific in their terms. They named the port to which the vessel was bound; they enumerated the arms and men that might be carried; they specified the commodities, such as pepper, which the Portuguese reserved for their own trade. Any infraction of the terms of a *carta* might involve the forfeiture of the vessel and all that she carried. By these means the royal monopolies of pepper, cloves, nutmeg, mace, silk and lac, both in the trade from India to Europe and in the port-to-port trade of India itself, were secured from external interference, to the impoverishment of Turk and Venetian, and to the enrichment of Portugal.

Save for a brief period after 1571, when three separate governments of Mozambique, Goa and Malacca were constituted, the general control of the Portuguese establishments and trade was vested in the official who bore the title of viceroy or governor of India, according as he came out direct from Portugal with his patent of appointment, or succeeded to the office by the death or unexpected departure of its holder. His position was one of great dignity. He received the honours of royalty. None spoke to him with covered head. None save the archbishop of Goa ate with him at table. He exercised supreme civil and military authority, though in matters of importance he was supposed to consult his council. He held office for three years. The saying ran that in his first year he learnt his duties, in his second he filled his purse, in his third he visited the subordinate governments to

receive presents from the occupants. The term was certainly too brief for efficiency; but it had two advantages which the home authorities thought outweighed its defects. It made the Goa government more closely dependent upon the government of Lisbon than would otherwise have been the case, and it increased the number of nobles who in a given period of time could be enriched and rewarded by holding the office. The official at Goa next in importance was the *vedor da fazenda*. He was in charge of the arsenal, docks and mint. His was a most profitable office, for he had the disposal of all the goods sent out to India on the king's account, and provided the stores needed in the dockyards, making, it was said, cent per cent on what he supplied. The chief judge was the *ouvidor general* till 1544, when he was replaced by a court of several judges. Criminal sentences needed the viceroy's or governor's approval, and civil decisions of sufficient importance might be reopened before the supreme court at Lisbon. But though the judges were technically independent of the executive, they were generally young, poor and desirous of wealth; and justice is described as having been venal, slow, and ruinously expensive. Within the city itself administration was vested in a corporation entitled to the same privileges and powers as the corporation of Lisbon. The aldermen and other officials were in theory elective; but in practice they soon came to be nominated either by the king or by the viceroy. The chief value of the corporation probably lay in its right to address petitions directly to the king, so that it afforded a channel by which the people might complain against the misconduct of the government.

Under the government of Goa were a number of subordinate governments, usually administered by an official with the title of *capitan*. Like the viceroy, he was the head of both the civil and the military establishments; and in practice he was liable to very little interference from above. The chief subordinate governments were those of Mozambique, Ormuz, Colombo and Malacca. The payment of viceroy and *capitan*, and indeed of all officials, was divided into two parts. One was the *mantimento*—maintenance allowance, to cover expenses such as diet and lodging usually drawn regularly; the other was the *ordenado*—the salary attached to the office, payable only by special warrant and normally in arrears. But besides these there quickly sprang up an endless number of perquisites—*percalços*—vastly exceeding the

acknowledged payments. The salary of the *capitan* of Malacca was about £300 a year; his perquisites were reckoned to be £20,000. He was, however, in a singularly favoured position, owing to the large number of vessels which were obliged by the Portuguese regulations to touch there, and which would certainly be seriously delayed in their voyage if the *capitan* were not satisfied.

The organisation of the Portuguese government at Lisbon was ill-designed to exercise an effective control over its remoter possessions. Till 1591 there was neither a council nor a minister whose special duty it was to watch over colonial affairs, to prepare royal orders, or to secure their due observance. It is true that Indian finance was placed under the management of the *vedores da fazenda* at Lisbon. But their duties were limited to enlisting soldiers for service overseas, and to the purchase and sale of outward and inward cargoes. They had no authority over the Indian government. When Portugal passed into the possession of the Spanish crown, a special section of the finance department was devoted to colonial business, and in 1604 the Council of the Indies was set up. But by that time the Portuguese power in India had already begun to wane and the control of affairs had fallen into the confused corruption natural to a distant and unregulated administration.

Portuguese government can hardly be described as other than weak and inefficient. But the Portuguese, in the east as in Brazil, succeeded in a notable degree in passing on their culture to the peoples under their rule. They effected this by a zealous propagation of Christianity, by promoting mixed marriages, and by encouraging with the prospect of distinguished honours Indians who embraced their faith. The extension of the Christian faith had been the prime condition under which the Church of Rome had recognised the exclusive title which the Portuguese had claimed as the right of the discoverer. But the degree in which this duty was accepted had been a matter of growth. At first ecclesiastics had been few, and the conduct of the Portuguese leaders determined largely by secular considerations. But as their settlements grew, the ecclesiastical element increased swiftly. Goa was made the seat of a bishopric in 1534; in 1560 the organisation was developed by the creation of subordinate sees and the elevation of Goa into an archbishopric. In the same period the religious

orders—especially the Franciscans, Dominicans and Jesuits—became more active in Portuguese India. The Jesuits became specially prominent in the work of education as well as conversion. In 1540 had been founded the Confraternity of the Holy Faith. Its house at Goa had been completed on the Feast of the Conversion of St Paul, in whose name it was dedicated in 1543; and after the death of the founders, the House of St Paul had been taken over by the Jesuits; thence they derived the name of Paulists by which they became commonly known in India. By 1552 complaints were already being made that the religious were absorbing an undue share of the royal revenues, but the cost of religious establishments more than trebled in the following fifty years, while in 1623 it was reckoned that at Goa and elsewhere there were twice as many priests as Portuguese laymen. Under this ecclesiastical pressure the religious policy developed rapidly. In 1567 it was ordered, on the recommendation of the first provincial council held at Goa, that no Christians should keep infidel servants; that the public worship of both Hindus and Muslims should cease; that all heathen residents should attend every alternate Sunday to hear a sermon on the benefits of Christianity; and that children left orphans should be brought up in the Christian faith. In 1575, in consequence of orders from Lisbon, the system was amplified. Where a heathen died without sons, his property could be claimed by the nearest Christian relative; converted members of Hindu families could claim immediate partition of the joint property; female converts could claim the same share as they would have been entitled to had they been males; and converts could claim all the legal privileges of Portuguese nationality. Under the pressure of these rules and the unwearied persuasions of the religious, Goa became a city of Christians.

Though this religious policy certainly impaired the trade of Goa, through the reluctance of great Hindu and Muslim merchants to submit themselves to such regulations, it did not provoke any great resentment. The chief complaint which the Muslim chroniclers make is against the cruelty of educating orphans as Christians. In Bijāpur the sultans endowed several Portuguese missions some of which survived into the nineteenth century. Perhaps this attitude is to be explained by the degree in which the Portuguese settlers became indianised in all but

religion. From the time of Albuquerque mixed marriages had been encouraged. Portuguese emigrants were almost all male. In 1524 three Portuguese women were publicly whipped at Goa for having come out clandestinely. In the second half of the century a few orphans, dowered by the king, were sent out to Goa; but in nearly every household the wife was either Indian or of mixed blood.

The position of Indian converts was decidedly favourable. They could claim the rights of Portuguese blood. They were eligible for honours and distinctions. One Malabar convert, for example, was entrusted with important commands, was made a Knight of the Order of Christ, and when, in 1571, he was killed in action, his body was brought to Goa and buried there with great ceremony.

But by the close of the sixteenth century the Portuguese dominion was fast falling into decay. The officials were corrupt; the fortresses unrepaired and unarmed; trade was declining. Even more significant was the dissolution of Portuguese union and solidarity. When the raja of Cochin had resolved to accept the Portuguese alliance, he had been moved by admiration for their discipline, which was such that, had a cabin-boy arrived with the king's orders to command them, he would have been obeyed. But when Francisco da Gama was viceroy at Goa from 1597 to 1600, he was subjected to the grossest insults. The statue of his great ancestor Vasco was thrown down and broken; and on the day when he embarked for his homeward voyage, forty men went aboard and hung him in effigy from his own yard-arm. Some of the causes of this decline are evident. Portugal was but a small country; she had undertaken two great enterprises—the occupation of Brazil and the conquest of Indian waters. Both took a heavy toll of her manhood. The mortality on board ship and in tropical climates was extraordinary. Few of the gallant, adventurous men who built up the Portuguese position in the east ever returned to their native country. The breed, robbed of its finest elements, decayed; and their successors were not the equals of the early adventurers. Even by 1538 difficulties were found in securing the necessary number of men. Outlaws were tempted by a general pardon to all, heretics and traitors excepted, who would volunteer for Indian service. Criminals sentenced to death were respited and sent out into

perpetual banishment; and lesser criminals were offered pardon in return for three or more years' service. The Portuguese settlements were being reinforced by men bringing little of civic virtue, who would probably mate and breed with the lowest classes of the Indian population.

At the same time the Portuguese were falling into a condition of mental stagnancy. The astonishing progress which they had made in the allied arts of shipbuilding and navigation ceased. They remained supreme in Indian waters, but were doomed to succumb should they be called on to meet men who should have learnt to build or sail or fight their ships better than the Portuguese had learnt to do by the time of Vasco da Gama and the great Albuquerque. Goa was in fact destined to become the burial-place of reputations.

The circumstances which were to lead to this emerged in the last quarter of the sixteenth century. In 1566 the Netherlands had broken into revolt against the Spanish dominion; in 1580 Portugal passed under the Spanish crown; in the course of the two previous generations the Dutch had replaced the Venetians as the chief distributors in northern and western Europe of the eastern produce which they purchased at Lisbon. The establishment of Spanish authority in Portugal gradually brought this most profitable trade to an end. Dutch ships were seized in Portuguese harbours, and from about 1590 the situation had become so difficult as to demand the exploration of new avenues of trade. Attempts were made by Dutch seamen to open a route to India through the Arctic seas. But the obvious dangers of the way, even before its impossibility was recognised, induced Dutch merchants to invade the route which till then had been a Portuguese monopoly. Companies were formed at Enkhuizen and Amsterdam in 1594 to trade to Guinea and the Far East.

The latter, the *Compagnie van Verre*, based its plans on information furnished to it by Linschoten, who had served the Portuguese and even resided for some time at Goa. The command of the fleet was given to Cornelis van Houtmann, who had studied the spice-trade at Lisbon and had himself made the voyage to India. Houtmann sailed from the Texel in April 1595. He was destined for Bantam. Two reasons determined the choice of his destination. The object of the voyage was the purchase of spices, and therefore he aimed at reaching the Malay archipelago rather

than India itself; further the main strength of the Portuguese lay along the western coast of India, and therefore the archipelago was a region where attack in force was less likely. He returned with three out of his four ships in 1597, and immediately a number of new companies were formed to share in the new trade. In the five years 1598-1602 no less than thirteen fleets were sent out to the archipelago. But all this competition proved disadvantageous. It lowered the rate of profit; and it hindered co-operation against Portuguese attacks. Therefore under the guidance of the Dutch statesman, Oldenbarnevelt, the eight existing companies were amalgamated in 1602 into the United East India Company, to which was confided the monopoly of the Indian trade for a term of twenty-one years.

The constitution of the united company was strongly marked by the circumstances of its origin. Great jealousy existed not only among the various provinces forming the United Netherlands, but also among the merchants of the principal cities. In order therefore to conciliate this local patriotism and to secure the advantages of a centralised control, the company was to be composed of six chambers—one situated at each city where one or more of the amalgamated companies had been established. General control was placed in the hands of seventeen directors representing the various chambers. But the seventeen merely laid down general policy, decreeing the number of ships and men, the amounts of the cargoes, and the persons in whom the superior command should be vested; while the individual chambers conducted the detail of fitting out the ships, purchasing the outward cargoes, and disposing of the goods returned, in proportion to their share in the capital of the company. The body thus established speedily became a very powerful corporation. Although the stock was subscribed by a large number of private persons, the stock-holders had little or no share in the management. Almost from the first the directors of the chambers were the nominees of the magistracy of the city where the chamber sat. The governing body of the chamber was thus identified with the governing body of the city, and popular control over the conduct of the chambers was completely wanting. In like manner the seventeen was virtually free from political interference. The states-general, which formed the supreme authority within the United Provinces, was with the possible exception of the Polish



Diet the weakest sovereign body in Europe. It had no judicial power. Unanimity was required for all important decisions. Its financial resources consisted of the subsidies doled out to it by the individual states. The Dutch East India Company therefore speedily became not merely a commercial association but also a political body charged with an almost independent direction of colonial interests in the east. Its policy was necessarily national, for it was directed by the same groups which determined the political conduct of the states. As in Portuguese India the king was supreme, so also in Dutch India was the commercial oligarchy. In neither was there any external body which could enforce reform if and when reform was needed. At any time the Latin tag might apply—*Quis custodiat ipsos custodes?*

These new rivals soon displayed that superiority at sea which was to be decisive in the struggle for the trade of the east. The Dutch vessels were as strong and more manageable than the high-built Portuguese shipping; and their navigators were more skilful. The Dutch had begun where the Portuguese had left off in the matter of naval technique; and the monopoly which European science had enabled the Portuguese to set up was to be broken down not by any eastern hostility but by further developments of that science in which the Portuguese had not participated. The Dutch aimed at the entire control of the Moluccas, Amboyna and Banda, a region where the Portuguese were relatively weak, where they had no fortresses of note, and where they could be overcome by the destruction or dispersal of their squadrons. The local chiefs were ready to enter into alliance with anyone who offered to free them from Portuguese control; and Portuguese commanders soon learnt to dread the fighting capacity of the newcomers, preferring whenever possible to secure safety by flight, even when superior in numbers. Amboyna was occupied by the Dutch in 1605, and they easily established a control over the Banda islands. But in this period all their attacks on the Portuguese strongholds failed, and an attempt in 1603 to enter into an alliance with the Singhalese king Wimala Dharma ended in the murder of the Dutch leader and his companions.

The twenty-one-year truce which was negotiated between Spain and the United Netherlands in 1609 conceded to the Dutch the privilege of trading in the Spanish (and Portuguese) de-

pendencies subject to the king's permission. This agreement, which should have come into force in the east in 1610, recognised the gains which the Dutch had actually secured, but would have greatly limited their further expansion. However, the Spanish officials in the east refused to acknowledge it. The result was thus entirely to the advantage of the Dutch company, which was freed from the dangers of war in European waters and from the restrictions of peace in the spice islands. During this period the Dutch busied themselves almost entirely with Java and the archipelago. However, they established themselves on the Coromandel Coast (where the Portuguese were weakest), founding a fortified factory at Pulicat in 1609, for the provision of cotton goods for which a ready market was to be found in the archipelago.

The Dutch still lacked an administrative centre from which their operations, military, naval, and commercial could be controlled. In 1618 this was at last supplied by the genius and vigour of Coen, who determined the future character of the Dutch position much as Albuquerque had that of the Portuguese. Coen held the view that the company should in the first place secure territory large and populous enough to maintain a considerable trade. He sought centres of production. This constitutes the essential difference between his and Albuquerque's policy. The latter aimed at the naval control of commerce by the occupation of strategic posts; the former aimed at the possession of the productive areas themselves. With this end in view, Coen decided to establish his headquarters at Batavia, a site possessing an admirable harbour near the extreme north-west corner of the great island of Java. There he built a small fortified factory, to be garrisoned by about a hundred men. It was excellently fitted for his purpose. It had all the facilities for becoming a great port. It gave the Dutch a foothold in Java and therefore great scope for territorial expansion. It commanded the western entrance into the archipelago and yet occupied a central position from which the archipelago could be dominated. The Dutch were thus seeking to employ sea-power in a manner essentially different from that of the Portuguese. They were preparing, not to monopolise the whole trade of eastern waters, but to concentrate upon securing the exclusive control of a great series of islands where sea-power would enable them to assume not

merely commercial, but also a political and perhaps even a territorial predominance. Into the detail of their progress it is not necessary to enter. But in course of the next eighty years they achieved the supremacy in the archipelago which they had sought. Batavia grew rapidly into a great city, thronged with traders, strongly fortified, centre of a great military and naval power, mistress of great revenues, and the headquarters of a government far stronger in resources of men, shipping and wealth than that of Goa even in its richest days.

The early stages of this expansion had much engrossed the attention of the Dutch authorities, who paid little attention to India itself save in so far as it would enable them to complete their cycle of trade. With this object they established trading factories, the chief of which were at Chinsura in Bengal, at Surat in Gujarāt, and at Bandar 'Abbās in Persia. In 1636 they renewed their attacks upon the Portuguese settlements, seeking to weaken and destroy them by blockading Goa throughout that part of the year when the monsoons permitted ships to ride off the western coast of India. Their immediate object was to secure the monopoly of pepper in Malabar and of cinnamon in Ceylon. But their blockades of Goa were less effective than they had hoped. Encouraged by the offers of alliance made to the chief of Pulicat by the Singhalese king Rāja Singha, they sent expeditions to Ceylon. In 1638 they took Batticaloa; but the king's friendship cooled when he recognised that Dutch success would merely mean the exchange of one master for another. In 1641 the Dutch captured Malacca after a year's siege.

The recovery of Portuguese independence in 1640 brought a change into the political situation, for the wars with the Dutch had been the wars of Spain, not those of Portugal. Negotiations for peace were at once opened, but the Dutch were unwilling to concede more than a ten years' truce. This was concluded in June, 1641, and was to come into force in the east twelve months later. But the Dutch were making great efforts to extend their power in Ceylon. Intentional delays prevented the necessary authorisations from reaching the Dutch leaders in the island till March, 1643, and even then they refused to cease hostilities, alleging that the Portuguese would not surrender lands which the Dutch claimed to have been mortgaged to them by Rāja Singha. By the time that the Dutch commander, Maetsuycker,

and the viceroy of Goa had come to terms, in November, 1644, the Dutch had added Galle and Negombo to their conquests. The truce expired in 1653, and active operations were renewed in 1655. Colombo was taken in the following year. In 1658 the surrender of Jaffnapatam marked the expulsion of the Portuguese from Ceylon. In the same year Portuguese power vanished from the Coromandel Coast with the fall of Negapatam, which some years later the Dutch made their headquarters in southern India. In 1661 the Portuguese forts on the Malabar Coast were attacked. In Europe the Portuguese succeeded at last in making peace with the Dutch on August 6, 1661. But various pretexts were found to evade its promulgation in India until Cochin and Cranganore had fallen into Dutch hands. Thus by force and guile the Dutch wrested from their Portuguese rivals all the posts which commanded the trade they sought. Goa and the more northerly ports, Bassein, Chaul, Damān, Diū, were valueless from the Dutch point of view.

At this moment the Dutch were incomparably more powerful than any other people in the eastern seas. But there was a great difference between the situation in 1663 and that which had existed at the height of the Portuguese dominion. This was exemplified by the regions which the two had selected as the respective centres of their operations. The Portuguese had established themselves on the western coast of India, ready to meet and destroy any rivals. They claimed the monopoly of the entire eastern waters, and European ships other than their own ran the risk of seizure, while any Protestant adventurers might find themselves handed over to the Inquisition at Goa. The Dutch, however, cast their claims less widely. The spice monopoly they were resolved to hold. So their centre lay not in India but in the eastern archipelago. There they might perpetrate extraordinary acts, as the English knew to their cost, but they laid no claim to a complete monopoly of the Indian trade. The Dutch overthrow of the Portuguese signified the opening of the Indian trade to all the nations of the west.

The system of administration which grew up in the Dutch settlements is interesting, for it exemplified the difficulties which a trading corporation had to encounter and the typical manner in which they were met. The greatest of all, that of exercising due control over the management of remote dependencies, was

and remained without solution among the Dutch as among the Portuguese. The Dutch directors gave comparatively little attention to the administration of their settlements, while the absence of any court of justice in the United Netherlands competent to try men accused of misconduct abroad relieved the Dutch company's servants of any fear of criminal prosecution on their return. While then, as we have already seen, there was no effective political control over the company at home, so also in the east the company's government was a law unto itself.

At first the admiral of the fleet had constituted the chief authority over the Dutch; but in 1609 it was decided to set up a permanent organisation. This consisted of a council of seven members (later increased to nine) presided over by an official designated the governor-general. This body was empowered to deal with all matters of trade, administration, war, and justice, in every Dutch settlement and factory established within the scope of the company's exclusive privileges. By the instructions which were issued, the governor-general enjoyed no special powers except that of giving a casting vote when the council was equally divided. Nevertheless, he soon became the virtual master of the Dutch Indies. The chief reason for this unintended development seems to have lain in the fact that he was the special representative of the directors, who until 1680 appointed him personally, while the vacancies in the council were filled by co-option. In case of disputes with the council his views were usually upheld; and he often held office for a considerable term of years. Maetsuycker remained governor-general from 1653 to 1678. A further reason lay in the power bestowed upon the governor-general in 1617 of sending (with the council's assent) members on special missions, so that the councillors came to be influenced by the fear of being sent on profitless, and the hope of being sent on advantageous, services. His ascendancy over the council became so complete that one governor-general, Camphuis, at the close of the seventeenth century, overruled a hostile majority on the ground that he was specially responsible to the directors, and even refused to be present at meetings of the council. Only one governor-general was ever punished for misconduct, and only one was ever recalled from his office.

Under this "High Government" at Batavia there came into existence a number of subordinate governments, framed on the

same model, under a chief official—styled governor, director, or commander—assisted by a council. Ceylon was placed under a governor and council; so were the Coromandel factories. The Malabar factories were under a commander and council; those in Bengal under a director and council. These councils not only controlled trade and administration, but also constituted the chief local court of justice, though an appeal lay from their decision to the “High Government” at Batavia, and below them were *land-raden*—country courts—which included representatives of the inhabitants of the territory in question. Their distance from Batavia and the difficulty of communications often made uniform control impossible. At one time a plan had been devised for the regular inspection of the subordinate governments by officials from Batavia. But this scheme was never put into operation and the “High Government” in practice did no more than depute one of its members to look into matters when serious trouble broke out.

Administrative and commercial business was carried on by a body of servants, nominated by the directors of the various chambers. They were organised in grades, rising from writer to assistant, and then to under- and upper-merchants, on salaries ranging from about one to twenty pounds a month. Besides this they were entitled to money allowances for food and fixed quantities of liquor, oil, wood, rice, etc. But their chief advantages lay, not in their salaries and allowances, but in the private trade which they conducted. This was from the first prohibited by the company. Great penalties were imposed; a special official was appointed—the fiscal—to see that the regulations were observed; the servants were kept short of money by being allowed to draw only half their salary until they returned home; and they were required to carry all their savings back to Europe in bills drawn on the company's treasury. But all these precautions proved entirely useless. In Bengal, for instance, a private company was formed by the Dutch officials to conduct the large and profitable trade in opium to Batavia. A special inspector—Van Rheeде tot Drakestein—was sent out from Europe to reform these abuses in 1684. He died in 1691 before he had visited all the Indian factories and without having been able to suggest any remedy. The prohibition of private trade was continued; but the directors resigned themselves to the existence of abuses which they could not prevent.

This policy was short-sighted and disastrous, for it bred in the company's servants a contempt not only for the company's orders regarding private trade, but also for all orders affecting their private interests. As the territorial possessions increased, administrative corruption added to illicit trading profits. Presents on various occasions, bribes paid for the adjudication of tax-farms, fraudulent weighments of produce received as part of the company's revenues, all came into frequent use. Usurious loans were made to the principal natives. The mode of appointing the company's servants offered no guarantee against such abuses, and even afforded convincing reason against attacking the guilty so long as their malversations provoked no public outbreak.

The Dutch military forces were ill-recruited, ill-paid, and ill-organised. Their European troops were got together by crimps who gathered the riff-raff of the cities and made up their complements with boys of thirteen or fourteen. Only half their pay was issued to them in the east, for fear they too should trade, and even that was delivered partly in clothing on which the company took 75 per cent. profit, partly in the over-valued currency of the Dutch Indies, on which it gained 33 per cent. The company always distrusted its military servants, did not admit them to its councils till 1786, and for a long time would not admit its officers to any rank higher than that of major, so that the slowness of promotion afforded small incentive to activity.

At the height of its power the company maintained some 8000 or 9000 European troops in the east. These were supplemented by the enlistment of native troops. Of these some were in regular service, but, while they received a certain amount of drill, they were never efficiently organised or trained. A striking illustration is afforded by the Malay troops who accompanied the expedition to Bengal in 1759. They were armed with the old type of screw-bayonet which fitted into the muzzle of the musket and prevented firing as soon as bayonets had been fixed. These weapons had been disused among all European troops for over fifty years.

The Dutch company's administration was probably never strong or efficient. Its seeming power was due to the military weakness of its enemies; and its establishment was brought about, not by military, but by naval strength. Its concentration to the eastward of India left the great sub-continent open to other European powers. The attention of the "High Government",

directed closely to the affairs of the archipelago, missed that critical moment in the affairs of India when it might perhaps have intervened there with prospects of success. Such was the price which the Dutch company was called upon to pay for its initial success in monopolising the spice trade of the east.



## CHAPTER II

### The East India Company, 1600-1740

The East India Company was incorporated by Elizabeth on December 31, 1600. The great discoveries made by adventurers under the Spanish and Portuguese crowns had excited great interest in England as in other maritime states. But the exclusive rights claimed by the peninsular kingdoms had long deterred English merchants from seeking their share in the new trade-routes which had been opened and the new territories which had been discovered. English and Dutch alike had at first sought other routes to the east, the fancied north-eastern and north-western passages, which might be navigated without invading the Portuguese and Spanish zones. But these attempts were foredoomed to failure by the arctic icefields. Under repeated losses the northern mariners began to turn their attention to the southern seas. The union of Spain and Portugal in 1580 and the state of half-war which existed between Spain and England assisted the process. Drake's great voyage round the world was completed in 1580. Open war with Spain, the defeat of the Armada, the spoils of Portuguese carracks, enlisted the rising national spirit and brought to London samples of the riches of the Indies. In 1591 Lancaster sailed for the east and reached Penang. In 1596 a fleet of vessels under Benjamin Wood sailed eastwards. In these years, too, the Dutch became increasingly active, sending out no less than twenty vessels in 1598. When, therefore, negotiations for a Spanish peace broke down, Elizabeth assented to the proposals of the London merchants, many of whom were already interested in the eastern trade by way of the Levant. The new company received a monopoly of the commerce in the great region stretching from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Magellan, and its privileges were to continue for fifteen years.

At the close of the sixteenth century the idea of the joint-stock company was still in its infancy. The great privileged companies of the past had been "regulated" companies. Under these no one who was not a member could share in the branch of trade reserved for the company, and the company enjoyed the power

of laying down regulations to determine the way in which the trade should be conducted, and of appointing officials to enforce its regulations and collect the dues which it imposed. But within the limits of these regulations individual members were free to trade to as great an extent as they chose. A merchant might become a member of such a company, or, in technical phrase, acquire the freedom of the company in a number of ways—by fine (or payment of a fixed entry-fee), by service, or by inheritance. The early organisation of the East India Company closely resembled that of the regulated companies. But in its financial arrangements it differed wholly from them. Its trade was conducted not by individual members employing their own capital, but by servants of the company employing capital which the members had subscribed. In short, while the company's formal organisation was that of the regulated company, its financial arrangements were those of the joint-stock company. Till then the joint-stock company had been mainly employed as the most convenient method of financing short and hazardous ventures, such as privateering voyages, at the conclusion of which the concern would be wound up, and the capital with any profits be distributed among the share-holders. Similar ideas governed the early financial operations of the East India Company. The members were invited to subscribe capital, at first for a single voyage, and later for more prolonged but definitely terminable operations. Hence the bewildering series of joint-stocks which appear in the early history of the East India Company, and the elaborate arrangements, not merely for the division of profits but also for the return of the capital. Not until the Restoration did the company adopt the modern method of securing a permanent capital and of paying to the stock-holders only such profits as the court of directors resolved to divide. In this respect the English company followed, more slowly and reluctantly, the course followed by the United Dutch Company. When the latter was formed in 1602, the capital was declared to be returnable after ten years; but this provision was in fact ignored, and the capital subscribed speedily became a permanent stock. The comparative slowness of the English development was perhaps brought about by the absence of those political responsibilities which the Dutch company was forced to assume in the first half of the seventeenth century and which

rendered uncertainty regarding capital resources highly embarrassing.

The English company's early voyages were directed to Sumatra, Java and the Moluccas, in order to secure a share in the spice trade which formed the predominant element in eastern commerce. In 1608, however, the first attempt was made to establish factories in India itself. For this there were two reasons. Peace had been made with Spain in 1604 without obtaining the desired permission to trade in Spanish and Portuguese possessions, so that political difficulties would follow on further invasions of the Portuguese sphere of control. But probably more powerful than this was the fact that the easiest way of obtaining the spices grown in the archipelago was to lade thither not European goods, which were in small demand, but cotton cloths and opium from India. The company therefore sent out William Hawkins, who was familiar with the Levant trade and could speak Turkish. He reached the Mughal court in 1609. Though at first well received, he soon met difficulties created by the Portuguese, who used every effort to prevent the English from being allowed to settle at Surat. The Surat merchants were warned that the admission of the English would mean war with the Portuguese, and their representations led Jahāngīr to refuse Hawkins's petition. He left Āgra in 1611, and at Surat he met three English ships under the command of Sir Henry Middleton. The latter, on being ordered to depart by the Surat authorities, resolved on a measure of retribution. He sailed to the Straits of Bāb-ul-mandab, and compelled the ships of Dīū and Surat, not only to exchange their Indian for his British commodities, but also to pay a heavy ransom. This closure of the Red Sea trade greatly alarmed the merchants of Surat. When, in 1612, two English vessels under Thomas Best arrived off the port, they were readily admitted to trade. The Portuguese sent a force against them, but this was smartly repulsed by Best, and early in 1613 Jahāngīr sent down orders permitting the establishment of a permanent English factory. This concession provoked the Portuguese to renewed action. They seized a Surat ship in her return from the Red Sea, although she was provided with the regular Portuguese pass. The Mughal authorities retaliated by laying siege to Damān, and, when four English vessels reached Surat in October, 1614, under Nicholas Downton, demanded English co-operation

against the common enemy. Downton was much perplexed. The company's interests demanded, while national policy forbade, an attack on the Portuguese. But the viceroy of Goa delivered him from his perplexity. The viceroy sailed in person with a powerful fleet to destroy the English, but, after an action off Swally Hole, was driven off. This second success strengthened the position of the English at Surat, and in the latter part of 1615 the Portuguese made peace with Jahāngīr.

Shortly before this happened a new English fleet reached Surat with an ambassador paid by the company but duly accredited by the king to the court of Āgra. In this the English were following the established practice of the Levant Company, and hoped to secure similar results. The Levant Company maintained at Constantinople an English ambassador nominated by the English crown on the principle that an eastern court would pay more attention to the words of a personal representative of the king of England than to the requests of a body of merchants; and within the Turkish dominions trade was conducted under the "capitulations", a series of treaties granting special privileges in matters of taxation and the administration of justice. By sending an ambassador to Āgra the East India Company hoped to obtain a treaty with Jahāngīr similar to the Turkish capitulations. The person chosen for this task was Sir Thomas Roe, a man of high character, ability and insight, who had acquired some knowledge of oriental courts at Constantinople. From the end of 1615 till late in 1618 Roe resided constantly at Jahāngīr's court and formed relations with the chief people there. His character and breeding did much to raise the Mughal opinion of the English nation; and, although he found that the court would not hear of any treaty on commercial matters, he succeeded in obtaining grants from the viceroy of Gujarāt, Prince Khurram (Shāhjahān), which secured the position of the English at Surat, and he further brought to punishment local officials who had oppressed English merchants or their agents. In 1618 the organisation of the company's factories was beginning to take shape. The headquarters were settled at Surat, where the company had its president and council, who controlled the up-country factories at Ahmadābād, Broach and Āgra.

About the same time the English were seeking entry into the Persian trade. The Persian kingdom had been much strengthened

and extended by the Safavid rulers, who had carried their conquests down to the shore of the Persian Gulf only to find that the external trade of southern Persia was closely controlled by the Portuguese at Ormuz. This was the more annoying to Shāh 'Abbās, the ruling monarch, because the silk exports of his northern provinces had to pass through the territory and pay the customs-dues of the Turks, his constant enemies. He was therefore predisposed to welcome the English proposals to open a trade with his ports on the Persian Gulf. The Portuguese resented this intrusion as bitterly but as ineffectually as they had resented the establishment of an English factory at Surat. They attempted to keep the English out by force. The first result was a sea-fight off Jask at the end of 1620, in which the Portuguese were worsted. They then attempted to coerce the Persians by attacking their ports. On this Shāh 'Abbās caused an army to be assembled against Ormuz. This was useless without support at sea. So, when in December, 1621, an English fleet arrived in the gulf, the Persian leaders demanded its co-operation against Ormuz under threats of exclusion from the Persian trade if this was refused. The English complied; Ormuz was captured in April, 1622; and the Portuguese thus lost their principal post on the trade-routes to the Mediterranean. In these early years the East India Company had thus been driven into a policy in western India and Persia which corresponded with that which the Dutch were pursuing to the eastward in the archipelago. But this seeming community of purpose in two different areas did not signify any real identity of policy. At first sight one might suppose that the two Protestant nations might have united to overthrow the position of the Roman Catholic and generally hostile power; and in Europe indeed considerable efforts were made to secure this. But the political and European interests of the Dutch were clearly overborne by their economic and Asiatic interests. The great prize of eastern commerce was the spice trade. The Dutch, as has been seen, early established themselves in the spice islands, entering into exclusive agreements with the local princes, and undertaking considerable expenditure on forts, garrisons and fleets, to keep a secure hold on the region from which they had driven their enemies. The English thus found increasing difficulty in procuring spices in the eastern islands, and resented their exclusion. The Dutch on their side claimed that

they had borne all the cost and risk of expelling the Portuguese, and were entitled to the whole advantage of their successes. English attempts to trade among the islands led to fierce disputes, and, on occasion, to actual fighting; and, as the Dutch were strong in the archipelago, while the English were weak, the former got the better of their rivals. In 1619, in consequence of political pressure from both governments, the two companies entered into an agreement which was to regulate their conduct in the east. This provided for the maintenance of a joint fleet, consisting of ten Dutch and ten English ships, to keep the Portuguese in check; for the admission of English factors into the Dutch settlements; and for the division of the trade in fixed shares between the two nations. But this agreement was quite contrary to the policy which, under the inspiration of Coen, the Dutch company's agents were pursuing. Coen judged rightly that the complete control of the spice islands was within the reach of the Dutch, and he was resolved on making that project a reality. The English, too, soon proved unable to maintain their agreed squadron to take part in the active operations which the Dutch launched against the Portuguese. Quarrels then arose about the allotment of the military and naval charges, and English factors disliked their subjection to the Dutch law and Dutch tribunals at Batavia. Finally, just after the English president and council at Surat had resolved to withdraw all the English servants from the Dutch factories, the English agents at Amboyna were seized by the Dutch on a charge of conspiring to capture the fort; and these unfortunate men were put to the torture and then executed. This "massacre of Amboyna" was long and bitterly resented, and in fact ended the alliance. Although further negotiations took place in London, and English factors for a while returned to Batavia, they were withdrawn in 1628 and a separate English factory was established at Bantam under a ruler hostile to the Dutch. The English company, however, was too weak effectually to compete with its great rival in the latter's chosen stronghold. The steady and persistent expansion of Dutch power and influence, always seeking the complete exclusion of foreign interests, barred the possibility of developing an active trade in the archipelago. The English maintained a precarious position at Bantam until 1682, when the factory was withdrawn; but thereafter they possessed in this area only a few ill-controlled and often

mismanaged factories on the island of Sumatra which were exchanged in 1824 for the remaining Dutch interests in India itself. This failure of the English to secure a position for themselves beside the Dutch in the archipelago was accompanied by a similar failure to establish themselves on the adjacent mainland of Indo-China and the Malay peninsula, and also led to the abandonment of the early attempts to open up commerce with Japan. For the moment therefore the Dutch were left to dominate the seas of Further Asia, while the English turned to develop the trade between India itself and Europe, and so compensated themselves for their virtual exclusion from the commerce of the archipelago which they had originally sought. In fact, faced with the alternatives of Portuguese hostility in India and of Dutch hostility to the eastward, they elected to meet the first rather than the second. The prize to be gained might be less attractive; but the policy of concentrating upon the Indian trade meant encountering a weaker enemy, and probably gaining the support of far more powerful princes than were to be found among the eastern islands.

The course of events soon proved the wisdom of this choice. The Portuguese, hard pressed by the Dutch, inclined to abate their hostility to the English. Although the Treaty of Madrid, which in 1630 closed the Spanish war, left the position in India unaltered, five years later the viceroy of Goa and William Methwold, president at Surat, signed an agreement establishing friendly relations between the two nations in India. This was confirmed by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1642; and by Cromwell's treaty with the Portuguese of 1654 the admission of the English into all Portuguese harbours except Macao was formally recognised.

The results of the Anglo-Dutch wars in the time of Cromwell and Charles II confirmed this direction of the English company's policy. Cromwell's victories compelled the Dutch not only to promise indemnities for past injuries, but also to cede the island of Pulo Run in the Banda Islands. This island had been placed by its inhabitants under English protection in 1616, and had been recognised by the Dutch as an English possession in 1623. But the company had been too weak to occupy it, and it had passed under Dutch control. Its cession was most unwelcome to the Dutch, for it would have admitted the English to a probable share in the clove trade. They therefore used every pretext for

delay, and only handed the island over in 1665. In the next year, on the renewal of the Dutch war, the island was at once retaken by the Dutch, and the peace of 1667 transferred the island to them. The trend of European politics thus facilitated expansion of trade in India and enforced withdrawal from the archipelago.

In western India the development under the head-factory of Surat has already been mentioned. It consisted in the establishment of factories in Broach and Baroda, in order to buy at first hand the piece-goods woven in those neighbourhoods, and at Āgra, for the sale of broad-cloth, to the followers of the imperial court, for the sake of maintaining relations with the court itself, and for the purchase of indigo, the best qualities of which were manufactured at Bayāna. Elsewhere a factory had been established at Masulipatam as early as 1611. This place was at the time the chief port on the Coromandel Coast. It supplied piece-goods, plain and chintz, which could be sold to advantage both at the company's factory at Bantam and in the ports of the Persian Gulf. In 1634 the sultan of Golconda granted the company freedom from customs-dues. But this did not exempt the factory from the frequent demands of local officials. The factors soon learnt that the blue and check cloths which found a ready sale in the archipelago could be bought much cheaper to the southward, in areas to which Muslim rule had not yet extended. Already in 1626 an experiment had been made by opening a factory at Armagon, a few miles north of the Dutch settlement of Pulicat. But the roadstead proved shallow and dangerous. In 1639, therefore, when the Convention of Goa had rendered the Portuguese less dangerous neighbours, the company obtained from the nāyak of Chandragiri a grant of the town of Madraspatam, close to the decayed Portuguese settlement of San Thomé. The company was permitted to build a fortified factory, and to exercise administrative authority over the town in return for the payment of a small annual quit-rent. At this time the Carnatic was in a state of great disorder. The small Hindu chiefs, who had exercised authority after the fall of Vijayanagar in the previous century, had been fighting among themselves whenever they were not resisting the raids of their northern neighbours, the Muslim sultans of Bijāpur and Golconda. In 1647 the region round Madras fell into the hands of Mīr Jumla, who at this time was serving the sultan of Golconda. Fortunately Mīr Jumla was



himself a great merchant as well as a soldier and administrator. He was already on friendly terms with the English, and agreed to confirm their privileges at Madras on condition that they would pay to the Golconda authorities half the customs-dues received from strangers. This arrangement proved very unsatisfactory to the company, for it opened the way to demands that it should receive Golconda officials into the settlement. In 1658 it was agreed to commute the sultan's share for an annual payment of 380 pagodas. After prolonged disputes this sum was raised in 1672 to 1200 pagodas a year.

The next stage was English expansion into Bengal. An approach had been made by setting up factories first at Hariharpur and then at Balasore. In 1650-1 a factory was established at Hugli, and soon after others were opened at Patna and Kāsim-bāzār. These seem at first to have been established in the interests of the factors' private trade rather than on the company's account; and some time elapsed before the company's trade in Bengal became unquestionably advantageous.

While the East India Company was thus being compelled by political conditions to develop the trade with India and so to establish factories in the principal trading areas, its privileges were meeting with much criticism in England. It was not possible for it to finance its purchases of Indian goods by its sales of broad-cloths and other European commodities; and it was therefore obliged regularly to export considerable amounts of the precious metals. At a time when men believed that the accumulation of gold and silver was the chief method of increasing national wealth, the company's trade was constantly liable to the attacks of pamphleteers, although Mun's famous pamphlet, *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade*, did something to spread sounder economic ideas. More dangerous to the company's position, however, than the attacks of theorists was the uncertain attitude of the first two Stuarts. James I was at one time induced to contemplate the establishment of a Scottish East India Company, and Charles I was persuaded to authorise a specific infringement of the company's privileges. In 1637 he granted to a group of merchants headed by Sir William Courteen letters patent permitting it to trade to places within the company's limits where the company had no factory, and the new traders failed to observe even these limitations.

The company's position, already embarrassed by this rivalry, was worsened by the civil war which soon followed. With the fall of the king, it was no longer able to claim the exclusive rights bestowed upon it by royal charter, and the new government long delayed to restore it to its old position. It also suffered heavy losses in the course of the First Dutch War, and in 1655 was unable to raise new capital.

This, however, proved to be the last of its misfortunes. In 1657 Cromwell granted it a new charter; and, though the Protectorate was then on the point of ending, the Restoration brought with it a vigorous and consistent policy of extending English foreign trade by the agency of chartered companies. The charters of Charles II and James II confirmed the old privileges and enlarged the company's powers. At the same time the establishment of a permanent joint-stock relieved the company of the recurrent difficulties which in the past it had had to encounter. The thirty years following on 1660 were years of expanding trade and great prosperity.

Among the provisions of the charters of this period were grants of authority to build and maintain fortresses, to enlist and discipline armed men, to maintain vessels of war, to coin money, and to administer justice both civil and criminal. At the same time the company became the formally recognised agent of the crown in the first of English territorial acquisitions in India. It was indeed characteristic of the new policy that Charles II should have been willing to accept as part of his Portuguese bride's dowry the remote island of Bombay. After many difficulties had been raised by the Portuguese officials in India, the place was made over to the English in 1665. In 1668, in consequence of the inconvenience and cost of administering a small, isolated settlement, it was transferred to the company, to be held of and administered for the crown at an annual quit-rent of £10 per annum. Thus the company came to exercise sovereign powers in two of its Indian settlements, at Bombay as representative of the king of England, at Madras under grants from Indian rulers, and questions of administration emerged prominently alongside of matters of trade.

The dominant personality in the company's directorate in the time of the later Stuarts was that of Sir Josia Child, under whose influence broad views of policy began to appear. Though far

from neglecting the commercial interests of the company, and acutely conscious that the company needed the support of English public opinion as well as legal privilege and royal favour, he urged the importance of just government in India and the need of choosing wise governors for the English settlements. In one striking despatch, clearly inspired by his views, the company described the character which its servants should possess to qualify them for offices of political trust. It was not enough, it declared, to have dwelt many years in India, or to be familiar with all the intricacies of trade, or even to be versed in the country languages; these things indeed were needful, but beyond them the servant fitted for the company's highest offices must be a man of parts and education, a statesman as well as a merchant. In this attitude the English company offered a sharp contrast to the contemporary Dutch directors, who fixed all their attention upon matters of trade and left administration to take care of itself. In fiscal matters, however, Child urged that the example of the Dutch should be laid closely to heart. He thought rightly that the company's settlements should establish a regular revenue system, and that the inhabitants should be encouraged not by exemption from taxation but by a fair system equitably administered.

Indeed the latter part of the seventeenth century was a time of considerable growth, both at Madras and at Bombay. Internal wars were beginning again to afflict the country, and the fundamental hostility between Islam and Hinduism was encouraged by the unwise policy of Aurangzib. In western India the Marātha war was throwing the country-side into confusion. The twofold sack of Surat was teaching Indian merchants that even the greatest of Mughal ports was but an insecure place of habitation, while the conduct of Mughal governors led Hindu traders to think of seeking refuge under the foreign rulers of Bombay, especially under the wise and moderate government of Gerald Aungier. At Madras men lived in security while the country round was ravaged by Sivaji's raiders, and while the Golconda government was being overthrown by Mughal armies. These conditions emphasised the wisdom and foresight of Child's demands for increased attention to administrative questions. The purpose of the company (as he viewed it) was "to establish such a politie of civill and military power, and to create and secure such a large

revenue to secure both, . . . as may be the foundation of a large, well-grounded, sure English dominion in India for all time to come."

In fact, however, he judged the future more accurately than the present, and underestimated the effective force of the Mughal empire, misled, perhaps, by the disorganisation of western India and the ease with which Śivajī had swooped down from his mountains upon Mughal garrisons and cities. The English factories in Bengal had always been harassed by demands for land-customs on goods in transit and for presents for leading officials. In this matter the position of the Bengal trade was peculiar. Elsewhere the goods which formed the staple articles of trade were purchased at no great distance from the coast. Indeed the trend of the company's trade in the second half of the seventeenth century displays a growing inclination to avoid transactions at remote inland factories such as Āgra. But in Bengal the great markets lay far up the water-ways of the province. Silk could only be procured to the best advantage at Kāsimbāzār, salt-petre at Patna, muslins at Dacca. The Bengal trade thus lay at the mercy of a multitude of customs-posts, and could be brought to a complete stand-still at any moment by official orders. In 1656 the governor of the province had exempted the English trade from internal dues on condition of a fixed annual payment. But his successors had refused to recognise his grant. In 1678 a new grant from the governor was at last procured; and in 1680 a *farmān* was obtained from the emperor Aurangzib. But neither the governor's nor the emperor's grant ended the demands which were made. The English factors came therefore to the conclusion that they needed a fortified settlement near the mouth of the Hugli, whither they might withdraw in time of trouble, and from which they might blockade the sea-borne trade of the province in case of need. In 1686 the company attempted to put this plan into operation. It sent out a number of ships with a small force of men to Bengal, and the Mughal ports of western India were also to be blockaded. In the war which followed, though the Mughal attack on the factory at Hugli was repelled, the English soon abandoned it and dropped down the river, first to the village where Calcutta was afterwards to arise, and then to a fever-stricken island at the mouth, whence the cool and experienced English agent, Job Charnock, opened negotiations

which permitted the English in the autumn of 1687 to return to Sūtanūṭī. In the next year, however, a fresh naval force arrived from London with orders to attack and occupy Chittagong. Its commander, William Heath, refused to listen to Charnock's arguments for leaving well alone. He insisted on abandoning Sūtanūṭī, sailed to Chittagong which he found too strong to be attacked, and then retired to Madras. These irresolute and foolish proceedings were brought to a close by the peace which was made with the Mughals by the president and council of Bombay, which in May, 1687, had replaced Surat as the headquarters of the company in India. The Bombay factors had hesitated for some time to break their peaceful relations with Aurangzīb. In the latter part of 1688, however, they had seized a number of Indian vessels, in revenge for which the factors at Surat had been imprisoned, and Bombay itself had been blockaded. In 1690 it was agreed to pay a large sum in compensation for the seizure of the Indian ships, and to remove the president himself, Sir John Child, from his office. In fact, he died shortly before the discussions were completed.

It was as well that the company was thus speedily relieved from a struggle for which it possessed neither sufficient forces nor adequate organisation. The restoration of peace was soon followed by the return of the English to Bengal. The Mughal governor, moved probably by the complaints of Indian merchants whose trade was suffering, invited Charnock back. The latter refused to stir until an agreement had been reached on the question of customs-dues. In February, 1691, a *farmān* was granted exempting English trade from these payments in return for Rs. 3000 a year. But before this, trusting in the governor's promises, Charnock had already returned, in August, 1690, to Sūtanūṭī. Guarded by marshes on the east and by the river itself on the west, the place was well suited for defence. Great ships could ascend the river and anchor close inshore. No great Mughal official dwelt in its neighbourhood. It was therefore much better suited for an English settlement than the city of Hugli higher up the river, while the market which would be created by its establishment would soon attract a considerable population. In 1696, when the local zamindars broke into rebellion, leave was obtained to fortify the factory. In 1698 the company was granted the zamindari of three villages—Sūtanūṭī,

Kālighāt, and Govindpur. In 1700 the Bengal factories were placed under the separate control of a president and council, established in this new headquarters called Fort William in Bengal. In one respect at least the settlement thus formed was peculiar. At Bombay the company ruled on behalf of the English crown and no Indian prince could claim jurisdiction there. At Madras it held a position which was more dubious. In fact its agents ruled the city, but some element of Indian supremacy existed, as was shown by the annual quit-rent paid to Golconda and, after the overthrow of that kingdom, to the representative of the Mughal empire in the Carnatic. From time to time claims were put forward by this local authority to jurisdiction over the Indian inhabitants, and, although these claims were in every instance successfully resisted, the independence of the company was incomplete. Its powers at Madras rested upon the acquiescence of Indian rulers, as well as upon its position under its English charters; and the predominance of English authority was in part at least due to the remoteness of its situation and the comparative weakness of Mughal rulers in southern India. In Bengal this dual source of the company's position was much more evident. Over all English subjects its authority was derived from English law and English charters; but over the Indian inhabitants it ruled as zamindar, as the local agent of the *faujdar* of Hugli. To a considerable degree, therefore, the position created later on by the grant of the *ḍāwānī* of Bengal merely extended over the whole province an anomaly which had existed at Calcutta for two generations.

The commercial prosperity which the company enjoyed under Charles II and James II provoked great jealousy of its exclusive trading privileges. The average return which its stock-holders received in the thirty years from 1662 to 1691 was 22 per cent. Private traders began to infringe its monopoly, and, when their vessels were seized in accordance with the rights conferred by the company's charters, tested the matter at law. The courts upheld the validity of the charters, and the company remained strong in the king's favour. But the position was abruptly changed by the revolution of 1688. The interlopers, as the private traders were called, having met with nothing but opposition from the king and his Tory supporters, had turned for assistance to the Whigs, who secured power by the overthrow of James II.

The Whigs themselves were hostile to a corporation which had been closely allied with the fallen government. So private interests and political prejudice combined in an attack ostensibly directed against the company's monopoly. After a series of discussions in parliament, the House of Commons voted in 1694 that all English subjects had an equal right to trade to India unless prohibited by statute. The unreality of this decision was displayed in the following year, when the same House of Commons threatened to impeach the Englishmen who had promised financial help to the Scottish project for a great overseas trading company. Two cross-currents were in fact at work. One was formed by the efforts of those politicians who aimed at reducing the powers of the crown in relation to trade; the other by the merchants who desired not to abolish but to share the monopoly of the eastern trade.

The subsequent course of events illustrates these divergent efforts. In 1698 a bill was passed into law creating a new company in return for a loan of £2,000,000 to the state. This body was framed on the lines of a regulated company, in order to avoid the narrower monopoly incidental to a joint-stock company, while provision was also made for its superintendence by the Privy Council. The old company at once became a member of the "General Society", as this new body was called, in order to preserve the right of trading to India. Shortly afterwards the great majority of the other subscribers were incorporated into a second joint-stock company under the name of the "English Company of Merchants". But this body, though it set out with a great show of activity, sending an ambassador, Sir Henry Norris, to the emperor Aurangzib, and obtaining the title of consul for its principal agents, was from the first embarrassed by a lack of trading capital, for its funds had been lent to the state and its available resources consisted only in the interest which it received. Its rival had large funds in hand as well as long-established settlements and privileges conferred by Indian rulers. But as against this the appearance in the east of agents representing the new company raised many difficulties and disputes. The two joint-stock companies, under some pressure from the ministry, resolved therefore on amalgamation, which was agreed upon in 1702 and completed under the arbitration of Godolphin in 1709. Thus the struggle resulted, not in any relaxation of the monopoly,

but in an extension of the circle which enjoyed its advantages. In 1730 proposals for the establishment of a regulated company were feebly revived but in fact the united company's legal monopoly remained untouched till 1793.

The further development of the company's position in India during the first forty years of the eighteenth century was quiet, gradual, and lacking in dramatic events. Yet it was none the less important. While confusion spread through India, while the imperial power decayed within the Mughal provinces, while the Marāthas widened their financial claims without undertaking the corresponding responsibilities of public order and administration, the company's settlements remained relatively undisturbed. Trade became more hazardous, but the hazards were compensated by a high rate of profit. Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta all grew rapidly, alike in wealth and population. Sir Josia Child's ideal of a regular and certain revenue to support the costs of government was realised. The revenue system corresponded closely to the established rules of Indian finance, save that the scanty territory under the company's rule did not permit land revenue to be the chief source of income. The customs-dues, as was natural in city-states, provided the bulk of the revenue. Octroi-dues were collected on the imports by land, sea-customs and port-dues on the much more important trade by sea. Besides these, quit-rents were levied on the houses of the settlements, and monopoly revenues, on such articles of common consumption as betel and tobacco, were farmed out to Indian contractors. But despite these imposts, the inhabitants of the English settlements were probably the most lightly taxed subjects in India.

It was of course true that they lived under an authority which united the disparate functions of trade and government. At a later time, when conditions had been completely transformed, Adam Smith had small difficulty in demonstrating the incompatibility of commerce and administration. However, it has to be remembered that not the company only, but also its servants, the governors and councillors of the various settlements, were deeply interested in trade. That privilege had been most reluctantly conceded by the East India Company. In the early seventeenth century, great endeavours had been made to prevent the company's servants from trading at all. In this respect, the English were but following the example of the Dutch, who obstinately



refused to allow men to exercise on their own behalf the talents which they were intended to exercise on behalf of their employers. In the case of the Dutch, the result had been that the regulations prohibiting private trade had been wholly ignored. But the English proved more amenable to experience. From 1679 the company's servants were allowed to trade from port to port in India, provided they did not touch those branches of commerce which the company reserved for itself. Private trade thus ceased to be underhand or illicit, and became the open and recognised method by which the company's servants attained to wealth.

It was at this early period difficult for them to use their administrative authority in oppressive support of their trading privilege. Oppression would have speedily driven away Indian merchants to other European settlements. Authority was indeed too narrowly limited in area, and trade too dependent on the support and co-operation of Indian merchants to render such a course profitable. Probably few vessels save those belonging to the East India Company itself sailed from Bombay, Madras, or Calcutta without large Indian interests aboard. Cargo and vessel would be insured by groups of Indian merchants; capital would be provided by loans locally known as *respondentia* loans, or by the direct subscription of shares. The rapid growth of wealth and population of the three chief towns shows plainly that Indians found the rule of foreign traders milder, juster, safer, or more profitable than the government of neighbouring Indian princes, and, as conditions throughout the country became more disturbed, they sent their wealth and their families into the English settlements for safety, or came themselves to live and trade there.

In the early part of the eighteenth century the English began to run swiftly ahead of their former great rivals, the Dutch. About 1700 Negapatam, the principal Dutch settlement on the Coromandel Coast, was probably as large and wealthy as Madras; on the Hugli, Chinsura vied with Calcutta. But in the course of the next forty years Dutch trade at best remained stationary, while the English trade rapidly expanded.

The chief political event of this period was the great embassy, despatched after long correspondence and preparation, to the Mughal court in 1714. Its object was to secure a general grant of privileges throughout Mughal India together with a number of

villages around Calcutta. It was conducted by John Surman, a Bengal servant of the company, assisted by an Armenian merchant who acted as interpreter. After three years *farmāns* were obtained, directing the rulers of the provinces concerned to comply with most of the company's requests. But by this time the imperial authority was rapidly failing. The emperor Farrukhsiyar was himself little more than the puppet of a court clique, and the governor of Bengal flatly refused to make over to the English the additional villages which had been granted to them. The embassy therefore effected little beyond giving the company claims against the empire which the local governors would not satisfy.

At Bombay the most significant development was the foundation of the naval force long known as the Bombay Marine. From early days English trade had been threatened by the attacks of Arab pirates in the Persian Gulf and of small maritime chiefs on the Malabar Coast. In the early part of the eighteenth century the latter were overshadowed by the rise of Kānhoji Angria, who became first the commander of the Marātha fleet and then an independent chieftain. He dominated the coast from Goa to Bombay from two strongholds, Gheria (or Vijayadrug) and Suvarndrug, and plundered vessels of every nationality. Under the government of Charles Boone (1715-22) the armed ships of the company were materially increased in order to deal with this menace. Various attacks were made upon the Marātha pirates from 1717 onwards, but little permanent success was obtained till almost forty years later. Then in conjunction with the Pēshwā a concerted attack was launched against the Angrias. In 1755 Commodore James captured Suvarndrug; and in 1757 Clive and Watson, sent to Bombay to attack the French at Hyderabad with Marātha help, were diverted from their original purpose to attack and capture Gheria.

Meanwhile the company's organisation had changed much from its early form in the seventeenth century. Like the Portuguese and Dutch, the English had begun by attempting to control trade and administration from a single centre. The president and council at Surat had at first been entrusted with the universal management; and this body had later been replaced by the general, or captain-general and council, of Bombay. This centralised control over widely scattered factories carried with it

obvious inconveniences, and from time to time attempts were made to remedy them by investing certain subordinate settlements with powers of local control. For instance, at one time Madras was placed in charge not only of the local factories on the Coromandel Coast, but also of those in Bengal. However, as local jealousies were always obstructing such arrangements, it was decided at the close of the century to vest the government in three equal and co-ordinate bodies, established at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.

These bodies consisted of a president, who also bore the title of governor, and council. The title of governor goes back to the first charter of Charles II, which empowered the company to administer justice in those settlements where it maintained a governor and council. At Madras, therefore, where the chief official had generally borne the title of agent, he now received the designation of agent and governor. A similar office was created at Bombay when that island passed into the company's hands. The title of governor, however, was not merely connected with the administration of justice. It signified also powers of military command within a fortified town. It marked out the holder as head of the garrison, while the title of president marked him out as head of the civil administration. The president and governor, however, was not in theory more than the senior member and chairman of the council to which alone authority was entrusted. His only recognised privilege was that of giving a casting vote where the council was equally divided. But in practice he exerted a wide though undefined influence over the proceedings of the government. The other members of the council were the heads of the various mercantile offices. One was accountant, another paymaster, a third had charge of the goods sent out on the company's account from Europe. Therefore as soon as the council had dispersed, the powers of individual councillors were limited to making entries in a ledger or issuing a bale of goods or performing some other politically insignificant duty. The president was thus the sole political executive. He translated the decisions of the council into action, and he alone corresponded with the neighbouring princes. That position of itself made him something more than the senior member of council. Then, also, his appointment was usually the direct act of the company at home, and he was thus designated as the man

specially trusted by the supreme authority in England. He also enjoyed certain customary privileges of nomination, while his commercial interests made him both useful as a friend and dangerous as an enemy. A similar development appeared among the Dutch. At Batavia the governor-general occupied precisely the same theoretical position as the English president and governor; but he speedily came completely to dominate his council, and sometimes even refused to attend its meetings. But the English president was subject to a curb from which the Dutch governor-general was free. The English company was ever keenly interested in the administrative as well as the commercial conduct of its servants, and sharply watched to see that no infraction of its established system of council-government was allowed. It repeatedly intervened when it thought its presidents were exceeding their due functions, and thus the presidents never succeeded in establishing a predominance such as long prevailed among the Dutch.

The chief administrative difficulties which emerged in the early English settlements arose from judicial questions. From the first some judicial authority had been indispensably necessary to maintain order among the crews of the company's ships. This had been provided by the grant of power to hold courts martial, and to exercise martial law. The charters of Charles II, as has been mentioned, empowered the company to administer justice where it maintained a governor and council, and, under this authority, a court of law for the trial of European offenders came into being at Madras, consisting of the governor and council. When Bombay was transferred to the company, the island was divided into two precincts, with a bench of justices in each, and the governor and council sat as a court of appeal from their decisions. The charter of 1683 authorised the establishment of a court of judicature designed to hear mercantile and maritime suits; and professional judges, trained in the civil law by which such cases were principally decided, were sent out to Bombay in 1684 and to Madras in 1686. But this practice was not kept up, and the settlements speedily lost the advantage of trained lawyers. In 1687 the company set up, under the sanction of a special charter of 1686, a corporation and mayor's court at Madras. The court was to consist of the mayor and twelve aldermen, who included one Frenchman, two Portuguese, three

Jews, and three Indians, as well as three of the company's servants, to represent the principal trading interests of the place. It was to possess both civil and criminal jurisdiction, with an appeal to the governor and council where the amount at issue exceeded three pagodas (about 24s.) or where an offender was sentenced to lose life or limb. The last important charge to be made in the seventeenth century was the issue of letters patent constituting courts of vice-admiralty in the East Indies in accordance with a statute, passed in 1698, for the punishment of offences committed on the high seas.

Such were the arrangements made by the English authorities for administering justice at Bombay and Madras. They proved to be quite insufficient, especially in regard to the trial of criminals. English criminal process was elaborate; any flaw in the proceedings might invalidate the whole process, and so expose the persons acting as judges to heavy penalties in the English courts. The company's servants naturally shrank from exposing themselves to dangers which, in view of their ignorance of legal technicalities, were far from unreal. Moreover, as the attack on the company's privileges began to develop, men questioned the validity of the courts as well as the legality of the trading monopoly; and finally, when the old company surrendered its charters and merged itself in the new, the position became still more uncertain, for the language of the new charter was far less specific than had been the grants of the old ones. The consequence was that the vice-admiralty courts remained the sole criminal tribunals the jurisdiction of which was unquestionable in English law; so that while crime at sea could certainly be punished, crime ashore, when committed by a British-born subject, could only be dealt with by arrest and deportation to England. This most unsatisfactory position was not amended till the issue of a new charter in 1726.

On the Indian side, however, at Madras and Calcutta the company's jurisdiction was on a firmer basis. At both these places it represented autocratic Indian powers as well as the constitutional authority of the English crown. At Madras its servants had maintained the customary court held by the chief executive official, the *adigar*. As other tribunals were established, they inherited the higher jurisdiction of the *adigar*, leaving petty cases to the decision of what was called locally the choultry court.

At Calcutta the company as zamindar set up the zamindar's court, which heard and determined according to local custom all causes, criminal and civil, touching the Indian inhabitants, probably reporting capital sentences to the *faujdar* of Hugli for confirmation.

In 1726 the confusion of the early courts was brought to an end by the issue of new grants in England. These directed the establishment at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta, of a mayor's court with full civil jurisdiction, and of a court of quarter sessions to punish all crimes except high treason. Appeals were to lie from the mayor's court to the governor and council, and thence, when the amount at stake exceeded 1000 pagodas, to the Privy Council. The justices of quarter sessions comprised the majority of the council.

The effect of this change was to establish at Bombay and Madras uniform jurisdiction over Indian and European alike; and, while the new courts were directed generally to conform to English procedure and the principles of English law, they were not bound down to observe the technicalities of the first or to ignore the customary law prevalent in India. When an Indian was indicted for a capital offence, his case was heard before a petty jury consisting of six Indians and six Europeans. The jurisdiction of the mayor's court provoked some complaint among the Indian inhabitants, especially in connection with the oaths required of witnesses; and when these courts were modified in 1753 Indians were exempted from the jurisdiction of the mayor's courts save in disputes under a contract which expressly declared that differences should be referred to these courts for decision.

At Calcutta, however, the establishment of the new courts was complicated by the existence of the Mughal jurisdiction. Although, therefore, the courts were set up in accordance with the letters patent, the zamindar's court continued in existence, and in practice dealt with civil suits and criminal charges in which Indians were involved; and this position continued until 1757, when Mughal authority vanished from Calcutta and the English courts began to operate in the same way as at Bombay and Madras.

### CHAPTER III

## Dupleix and Clive

The French had not taken part in the earlier phases of the European movement to secure a position in the eastern trade. The country was ill-placed to pursue overseas adventures with success. Her long land-frontiers, the continental views and interests of her rulers, and the religious disputes which had convulsed the nation, had made efforts such as those of the Portuguese or the Dutch unattractive and inopportune. Economic causes made in the same direction. The French mercantile classes, in proportion to the wealth and population of the state, were far smaller, poorer and less influential than the corresponding classes of Amsterdam or London, nor was there at Paris or any other French city the like accumulation of liquid funds which might be employed in financing distant and speculative commerce. In the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, therefore, the spirit of adventure carried a few French ships into eastern seas, but no concerted effort, such as the Dutch and English merchants made, could appear among the merchants of France.

Nevertheless leading Frenchmen were alive to the importance of developing an eastern trade; Henry IV attempted to set up an East India Company, and Richelieu, despite his continental preoccupations, believed that the trade should not be neglected. A little later Colbert proceeded to develop a great scheme, by which France was to become a naval and colonising power. He perceived that naval power could only be built up on maritime trade, and that maritime trade demanded overseas settlements. In 1664 therefore he launched a project for establishing a French East India Company to colonise Madagascar, already visited by French ships, and to open up a regular trade with India and Persia. A royal edict was issued creating a company modelled in its constitution on the Dutch company. But from the first, despite the similarity of organisation, there was one profound difference. The Dutch company had been created and financed by merchants. The French company was created and in great part financed by the state. In spite of active official propaganda,

it was impossible to procure the subscription of the fifteen million *livres* announced as the capital of the new company; and it began its operations with only five and a half millions, of which three had been provided by the king. This state interest was soon manifested in another way. In 1670 a strong squadron of royal vessels was dispatched to the east under the command of de la Haye. He was to establish fortified posts, from which the company's trade might be conducted, besides the factories at Surat and Masulipatam which had already been opened. French adventure in the East was evidently going to follow the lines of the Portuguese rather than those of the Dutch and English policy, however much it might appear to be a mercantile concern.

The naval expedition of 1670 was ill-conducted. It attempted in vain to secure possession of Trincomalee. It then seized San Thomé, close to Madras; but the French were speedily besieged there by Golconda troops ashore and a Dutch fleet at sea, and, though de la Haye held out for two years, he was forced at last to capitulate. The one tangible consequence of his expedition was the establishment of the French at Pondichery, a little to the southward of the Golconda frontier. There the French obtained a grant in 1673, and in the next year François Martin took charge of the settlement. A little later he built a small fort for its protection, naming it Fort Louis. Though it could not resist a Dutch attack in 1693, it was restored to the French by the Treaty of Ryswick, and became the headquarters of the French in India.

In this early period the great difficulty which had to be met by Martin and his successors was the feebleness of the company itself. It had needed reconstruction in 1686. Early in the eighteenth century it was reduced to selling permits to merchants of St Malo. It was reorganised by Law and formed a part of his great and over-ambitious scheme in 1719. But with his collapse it fell once more, and emerged in 1721 without liquid funds and under the complete control of the ministry. In the course of the next twenty years it traded on borrowed money, and thanks to the able management of Lenoir and Dumas, who governed Pondichery from 1720 to 1742, its profits rose and its financial position eased. It had, moreover, established factories in Bengal at Chandernagore, and on the Malabar coast at Mahé; while it had also occupied two derelict islands, Bourbon and Mauritius, occupying an important strategic position about half-



way between the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Comorin. In 1742 La Bourdonnais, the governor, was busily seeking to develop the resources of these islands, and especially Port Louis, with its remarkable harbour, on Mauritius, while in that year Dupleix, who had long occupied the position of chief at Chandernagore, was appointed governor of Pondichery.

Meanwhile events in India had been demonstrating how precarious was the political situation. In 1739 northern India had been terrified by the irresistible invasion of Nādir Shāh, by the sack and slaughter which had marked his entrance into Delhi, by the restoration of Persian authority on its ancient boundary of the Indus, and by the impotence of the Mughal empire to defend either its provinces, or its capital, or the remnants of its wealth. In the next year the Carnatic was similarly afflicted, though not by the armies of a foreign sovereign. The Marāthas thought the time ripe to levy plunder in lieu of *chauth*. Fateh Singh and Rāghūji Bhonsla were sent southwards with a host of cavalry. At the entrance to the Carnatic, in the Dāmaleri Pass, they found the nawab Dost 'Alī, seeking to prevent their entrance. Him they overpowered and slew, and then proceeded thoroughly to ravage the province. Many refugees and much treasure passed for safety into the European settlements on the coast, and Dost 'Alī's son, Safdar 'Alī, was obliged to promise the Marāthas a great sum to withdraw. They then moved southwards against Trichinopoly, where Dost 'Alī's son-in-law, Chanda Sāhib, had recently established himself at the expense of a Hindu ruling family. In 1741 they compelled Chanda Sāhib to surrender and carried him off a prisoner to Satāra.


These events shattered public order in the Carnatic. In 1742 Safdar 'Alī was murdered by a cousin; and in 1743 Nizām-ul-mulk, the subahdar of the Deccan, marched in order to re-establish peace. He recovered Trichinopoly from the Marātha garrison, and named an old servant of his own, Anwar-ud-dīn, as nawab of Arcot. But for thirty years the Carnatic had been governed by a single family. Its members had received the command of all the chief fortresses and enjoyed large *jāgīrs*. They viewed the new nawab with jealousy, and he was never strong enough to expel them from their position, while the country was pervaded with rumours that Anwar-ud-dīn would speedily be removed and some member of the old family appointed in his place.

At this time, in 1744, France and Great Britain became involved in the War of the Austrian Succession. That did not necessarily imply war between the two companies in India. During the last war Madras and Pondichery had remained on friendly terms, and the French had received assistance against the blockade which the Dutch had sought to establish, even though vessels of the French navy had captured English vessels in the Bay of Bengal. The troubles which had broken out between the Malabar factories at Tellicherry and Mahé in 1725 had been composed by an arrangement which had stipulated that neither factory should attack the other even if the two nations went to war in Europe. On the Coromandel Coast in 1744 both Madras and Pondichery had small garrisons, but neither had any vessels of war and hostilities therefore appeared unlikely and disadvantageous. Dupleix at once proposed to the English council at Madras to make a neutrality agreement similar to that which had been made in Malabar. But the position had changed considerably. The French company's trade had expanded and become an object of jealousy to the English company. More important than this was the likelihood of French naval action in the east. In the previous war they had sent out a squadron. In 1740, when it seemed likely that France would join in the war which had broken out between Spain and England in 1739, La Bourdonnais had induced the ministry at Paris to dispatch men-of-war. The scare had blown over, the men-of-war had been recalled, but the threat remained. On the instant that war was declared, the English directors approached the ministry with a request for a naval squadron to protect the English and cruise upon French shipping in the east. The request was granted and early in the year Commodore Barnett announced his arrival by capturing the French company's China fleet and a number of richly laden French vessels engaged in private trade.

On this Dupleix appealed to La Bourdonnais at Mauritius to equip a squadron to redress the situation. The latter with rare vigour set to work, and in 1746 appeared off the coast with eight vessels against the English four. The new-comers were not the equals of the English in either speed or weight of guns; but these disadvantages were more than compensated by a superiority of command. Barnett had died, and been succeeded by the senior captain, Peyton, who proved an incompetent leader. An

indecisive action was fought on June 25, after which Peyton gave the French ships leisure to refit and increase their armament of guns at Pondichery. He then refused a further action and sailed off to Calcutta, while La Bourdonnais landed the troops he had brought with him before Madras, which capitulated on September 21 after the feeblest of defences. The place surrendered under an informal promise of ransom. But after La Bourdonnais had signed an agreement, and had received a handsome present in acknowledgement of his conduct, but before the convention could receive its full effect, a cyclone struck the coast, shattering the French vessels lying before Madras. This event obliged La Bourdonnais to withdraw, leaving behind him many men whom he could no longer accommodate on his reduced squadron, and charging Dupleix to give effect to the arrangement which the latter had bitterly opposed. As soon as he had secured control, Dupleix denounced the convention, and officers from Pondichery proceeded to pillage Madras from top to bottom, while La Bourdonnais, on his return to France, was imprisoned for some years on the charges which Dupleix hastened to send home against him.

In these events the Mughal nawab at Arcot had vainly sought to intervene. On the outbreak of hostilities Dupleix had endeavoured to screen French trade behind the nawab's flag; but Barnett had refused to be deceived by such a transparent subterfuge. He had seized French-owned vessels regardless of whether they chose to fly the French colours or the white flag edged with green which purported to stand for the authority of Arcot. The French had complained to the nawab; the nawab had demanded an explanation from the governor and council of Madras; and the latter had made answer that they had no authority over the commodore. With this Anwar-ud-din had remained content, and, when the French had proceeded to wage hostilities ashore, he had at the English instance demanded French withdrawal. Undeceived by the evasive answer returned to him, he sent a force, too late to relieve Madras but charged to expel the French. His troops attempted to blockade the place, but were so roughly handled in two actions that they withdrew and after a while the nawab made peace with Pondichery. The importance of these events lay in their revealing two things—one the incapacity of the local ruler, the other the military superiority conferred on European arms by recent developments in military technique.



Small units of European foot and artillery could now confront and defy the ill-disciplined and ill-conducted cavalry which still formed the only fighting force of an Indian army.

The remaining events of the war were of small immediate moment. In 1748 a considerable expedition arrived under Bos-cawen to avenge the capture of Madras. It laid siege fruitlessly to Pondichery; and early in the next year news came that peace had been determined in Europe. By the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle Madras was restored to the English, and this rendition was carried into effect in the autumn of 1749. But before that had been executed, Dupleix had already begun to forge a new and most momentous chain of events.

Ever since Chanda Sāhib had been carried off a prisoner to Satāra by the Marāthas, negotiations had been going forward from time to time for his release. His wife and family had found refuge in Pondichery, carrying with them considerable wealth in jewels. But they were not able to raise the full amount demanded for Chanda Sāhib's ransom, while the Marāthas were not willing to release their prisoner on credit. At last Dupleix, indisposed to Anwar-ud-dīn by his interference at Madras, agreed to take a hand in the business. He seems to have stood as surety for the payment of Chanda Sāhib's ransom, at the same time promising to send a French force to the latter's aid as soon as he should appear in the Carnatic. On July 16, 1749, the troops marched under d'Auteil, Dupleix's brother-in-law. On August 3 the allies met, defeated, and slew Anwar-ud-dīn at Ambūr. Chanda Sāhib in gratitude at once proceeded to Pondichery. He showered gifts on the French officers who had assisted him, and granted to the French company territory cutting off the English factory at Fort St David from access to the interior, while he also appointed a disreputable connection of Madame Dupleix to the government of San Thomé, only three miles south of Fort St George, Madras.

At that moment the conduct of English affairs lay in feeble hands. The governor, Floyer, was a light, inconsiderate, frivolous man. On the news of Chanda Sāhib's victory he had hastened to write letters of congratulation. But even he could not but perceive the menace to English trade implied in these new grants to the French. A son of Anwar-ud-dīn, Muhammad 'Alī by name, had found refuge in Trichinopoly, and claimed to be

entitled to his father's succession. From him Floyer obtained grants of Bahur and San Thomé, and at once put them in execution, turning out the French agents and replacing them by English forces. He also sought another ally. The great Nizām-ul-mulk had died in 1748. His second son, Nāsir Jang, had succeeded to the rule of his territories. But Chanda Sāhib had been accompanied by a grandson of Nizām-ul-mulk, Muzaffar Jang, who claimed to have been named as heir by his grandfather. Floyer therefore sent agents to Nāsir Jang, urging him in his own interests to march south and extinguish this rebellion before it extended to the region under his direct government.

At the close of 1749 Floyer was replaced as governor by Thomas Saunders. Saunders was in his way a remarkable man. He possessed none of the dazzling talent, the versatility, the inexhaustible resource of Dupleix. He cherished no great designs and contemplated no revolution in policy. But he had a cool, clear brain, strong good sense, a shrewd judgment of men, an inflexible resolution. He harboured no thoughts of empire, but he was fiercely, inalterably resolved that the position of the company he served and of the nation he represented should not suffer through the intrigues of any foreign governor. His firm grasp of realities and his invincible obstinacy of purpose made of him a dangerous enemy, none the less dangerous because his lack of showy gifts might lead to an underestimate of his real quality. He was not a great man. But many great men have been far less effective. He it was, after all, who in defiance of all principles of military etiquette chose Clive for independent command, and chose the very point where a tiny force might exert an influence out of all proportion to its numbers.

At the end of 1749 Chanda Sāhib had moved south, accompanied by his French allies, with the object of besieging Trichinopoly and capturing his rival, Muhammad 'Alī. But he paused on his way to lay siege to Tanjore in the hope of extracting from the raja money with which to refill his treasury, exhausted by his gifts to the French. But before his hopes could be realised, the approach of Nāsir Jang with a numerous army induced Chanda Sāhib to march back hastily to Pondichery. Nāsir Jang was joined by an English detachment; the rival forces met near Valudavūr, west of the French settlement; and a battle seemed imminent when the officers with the French troops, either struck with

panic or dissatisfied with the lack of a new donation at this crisis, abandoned their troops and retired into Pondichery. This not only disorganised the French force but also threw Chanda Sāhib's own followers into the utmost confusion. They sought refuge under the guns of the French fortifications; Chanda Sāhib took refuge with Dupleix; Muzaffar Jang gave himself up to his uncle, Nāsir Jang. The latter, reckoning the person of his rival the main object to be secured, then fell back on Arcot, where he spent the hot weather of 1750. This permitted Dupleix to re-organise his troops and open one of those political intrigues at which he excelled. The chiefs who had accompanied Nāsir Jang were discontented with their prolonged absence from the Deccan. One group in particular, the Pathān nawabs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanūr, was known to be wavering. With them Dupleix opened a correspondence, which led to an agreement to join the French against their master. In September a body of French troops under Bussy stormed Jinji, reputed to be impregnable. Later in the year Nāsir Jang again moved south. On the night of December 16 his camp was surprised by the French under the command of La Touche. Nāsir Jang, in the confusion of the onset, was slain by one of the Pathān nawabs. His army at once broke. Muzaffar Jang was freed and conducted to Pondichery. The great treasure which Nāsir Jang had carried with him fell into the hands of the French. This brilliant success, alike in the disparity of numbers, the treachery of Indian leaders to their chief, and the magnitude of the reward, anticipated in important features the victory of Plassey.

Dupleix now believed that success lay in his hand. He at once prepared to send Muzaffar Jang to the Deccan with a French detachment under the command of Bussy in order that the prince might establish himself as the due and regular successor of his dead uncle. By this means Dupleix hoped to be able to control not only the nawab of Arcot, Chanda Sāhib, but also the subahdar of the Deccan, and thus to secure such a legitimacy for his claims as neither the English nor Muhammad 'Ali would dare to dispute. In this he was guilty of a gross miscalculation. The subahdar might no doubt obtain a formal confirmation of his position at Delhi, and might ratify whatever grants Dupleix desired in southern India. But would the English admit the validity of such grants? All men knew that the power of the empire had vanished.

Could its rights be recognised when they were diverted by French policy into the creation of a French empire, supported by French bayonets? To expect English recognition involved an assumption of such folly in an enemy as could not reasonably be anticipated. The expedition to the Deccan was based therefore on a mistaken estimate of English conduct; and it carried with it a great disadvantage. It involved sending far away to the northward a considerable body of troops under the command of the ablest French officer. Whatever might be the political effects of setting up a French nominee at Hyderabad, they were liable to be wholly overset by the military consequences of dividing a weak French force and entrusting the command against the English to incompetent leaders.

Muzaffar Jang marched northward under Bussy's escort on January 15, 1751. A little later in the year an English force marched southwards to prevent the French from overwhelming Muhammad 'Alī at Trichinopoly. There followed a campaign as futile and uninteresting as a children's game of chess. Both leaders were unintelligent and lethargic. Clive, who burned for action, could not be entrusted with the general command over the heads of officers far senior to him. But Saunders sent him off on an independent command to attack Arcot, which had been left poorly defended. He seized the place. Chanda Sāhib hastily detached a force from before Trichinopoly to recover his capital. But Clive held it triumphantly. This was the first real military success that the English had secured in the struggle. It was followed in the next year by a triumph which had far-reaching consequences. Lawrence, who had already served the company in south India, returned from England as the commander of the company's forces. He was no man of genius, but a sound soldier whom his men followed with confidence, and whose military rank and experience—he had served in the king's army—dominated the senior officers' jealousy of Clive. Early in 1752 he marched with reinforcements to Trichinopoly, taking Clive with him. They found the French troops commanded by Jacques Law, a gallant man in himself but a most timid leader. Muhammad 'Alī's cause was at this moment supported by contingents from two Hindu kingdoms, Tanjore and Mysore, both of which feared the success of Chanda Sāhib. Under Lawrence's control, the allies speedily drove Chanda Sāhib and the French into the



island of Srirangam, formed by the Kāveri opposite Trichinopoly. While Lawrence watched them from the south bank of the river, Clive was sent with a detachment to cut them off on the north. Against an enterprising commander such a division of the English forces might have been fatal. Even as it was, Clive was surprised and almost overwhelmed. But events proved that the English had accurately measured the talent of the French leader, who permitted himself to be shut up in the island. In May, Chanda Sāhib, despairing of his position, surrendered. With singular ill-judgment he placed himself in the hands of the Tanjoreans. He had in his day of power repeatedly ravaged their country. By order of the raja and with the assent of Muhammad 'Alī he was now beheaded. Law had already surrendered to the English, and a considerable body of the French forces thus passed into Muhammad 'Alī's prisons at Trichinopoly.

Nothing so well proves Dupleix's fertility of mind as the fact that even this crushing blow did not bring the war to an end. Bereft for the moment of force, he resorted to intrigue, as he had done in the case of Nāsir Jang. The Mysoreans were easily detached from their alliance with Muhammad 'Alī because he had promised them possession of Trichinopoly, and, when the French had been defeated, refused to make good his promise. Morāri Rāo, the commander of a Marātha force of mercenaries, was also induced by large promises to join the French. So that Trichinopoly was soon blockaded again, though now by forces which had formerly been defending it. Dupleix received reinforcements from Europe and sent them down under a variety of leaders to attack the place. But he could not lay his hand upon a man of outstanding military talent. Though Trichinopoly remained beleaguered all through 1753 and a great part of 1754, and though the French made several desperate efforts to destroy the English covering force under Lawrence and to escalate the town, their attempts all failed, and in August, 1754, news arrived that the French authorities had decided to recall Dupleix. This was in a large degree the consequence of the slow development of his plans. His alliance with Chanda Sāhib in 1749 had been inspired by no ideas of dominion. He had hired out a body of French troops in order to secure large personal rewards for himself and a privileged position for the French East India Company in the Carnatic. The destruction of Nāsir Jang had widened his

theatre of action but hardly changed his aims. Not until he perceived the success of Bussy in the Deccan does he seem to have begun to consider the possibility of a disguised or avowed sovereignty. Then in the course of 1752 and 1753 he began to expound to the authorities at Paris wider schemes, the acquisition of a great revenue, and the financing of the company's trade from Indian resources. Moreover he had consistently represented the opposition of the English and Muhammad 'Ali as a trifling obstacle which would be immediately overcome without cost to the company. At first the French directors and ministers had welcomed a policy which they supposed to be beneficial without serious risk. They sent out to India considerable reinforcements, larger in fact than the reinforcements sent out by the English; but they did not enlarge their supplies of finance, since Dupleix had constantly assured them that his operations were paying for themselves. But on this point Dupleix had deceived both himself and his superiors in Europe. He had expected the English opposition to collapse, leaving him free to collect the Carnatic revenues to pay for his military operations. But the English opposition had proved stubborn. The Carnatic revenues had fallen away while the military expenditure had risen. In these circumstances it had not been possible to maintain the Carnatic investment at its usual figure, and the company found its shipments falling away. This was the first hint that the schemes of Dupleix were not as sound as they appeared on paper. Then, at the close of 1752, came disquieting news from London. The English claimed to have secured a notable success. At first Paris discounted these statements as mere English brag. But when it learnt belatedly from Dupleix that Chanda Sāhib had perished, that a large French force had surrendered, but that he was as optimistic as ever, that he was finding new allies, and that the English resistance would be crushed within a year, Paris began to doubt whether the reports received from Pondichery were in any degree reliable. About the same time Paris received from London copies of letters which Dupleix had addressed to the English governor, Thomas Saunders, putting forth claims in which the English declared they never would acquiesce, while the English ambassador was instructed to inform the foreign minister of France that the policy of Dupleix was manifestly injurious to English interests. At the moment France did not desire war with Great Britain, nor did

the trading interests of her East India Company seem to demand a bellicose policy. There was room in the markets of India for the trade of both companies. In these circumstances the French company and ministry agreed upon recalling Dupleix, whose continuance in office was indeed a strong obstacle to the conclusion of a working compromise with the English in India. Negotiations were begun between the companies in London, and a new agent, Godeheu, was dispatched to Pondichery to replace Dupleix and arrange a temporary suspension of hostilities on the spot. In order the more easily to induce the English to desist from war, Godeheu was accompanied by a large body of troops. He reached Pondichery in August, 1754. Dazzled by the brilliance of Dupleix's projects, historians have usually condemned the action of the French authorities. But the problem was not so simple as has usually been represented. France was not prepared to lavish men and money, or to run the risk of instant war with England, in support of schemes which had never been adequately explained. Godeheu was therefore charged to make the best of the position as he found it, and this he proceeded to do. The influence of the troops he carried with him was neutralised by the arrival on the coast of English reinforcements—a small naval squadron under Admiral Watson, and a royal regiment. But the attitude of the English was not aggressive. They were far more anxious to secure their trading position than to continue an expensive war. A truce was made, and then a provisional treaty was signed at the end of 1754. This latter stipulated for a position of equality between the two nations, alike in the Carnatic and in the Deccan. But the treaty was not to come into force until it had been confirmed in Europe. The immediate effect of the arrangement was therefore very beneficial to the French. They were relieved of the burden of war by the truce, while they still retained the territory and revenues actually in their possession in August, 1754, unless and until the authorities at Paris assented to their relinquishment. Godeheu, so far from sacrificing national interests, secured for the moment all the material advantages which had been won, free at last from the mortgage of a war which Dupleix had not been strong enough to win and which he had not been pliant enough to end by a compromise.

His attitude had doubtless been much stiffened by the successes which Bussy had secured in the Deccan. Bussy had marched

northwards in January, 1751, with Muzaffar Jang. But very soon the Pathān nawabs who had conspired against Nāsir Jang conspired against his successor; and although their troops were routed, Muzaffar Jang was killed in action on February 14. Bussy at once halted and awaited confirmation of his recognising Nizām 'Alī, a younger brother of the dead Nāsir Jang. Dupleix, however, annulled this, and directed his lieutenant to install an elder brother, Salābat Jang. This was done. The army moved onwards. Hyderabad was occupied, and Salābat Jang emptied the treasury to reward the successes of the French officers on his behalf. They then moved to Aurangābād, the traditional capital of the province. This success had inspired Dupleix to dream of yet more extensive operations. He proposed to Bussy that the latter should march with Salābat Jang against Alahwirdi Khān, nawab of Bengal, and establish the new French *protégé* as ruler of that province too. The project, however, was characteristically founded on hopes rather than possibilities. First came an attack from Bālājī Rāo, the Pēshwā, who thought he saw in recent events chances for an expansion of Marātha power. When he made peace on January 17, 1752, Bussy began to find his position threatened by intrigues at the durbar against French influence. The Hindu *dhīwān*, Rāmdās Pandit, who had been chosen by Dupleix, was murdered on May 4. Then Salābat Jang's eldest brother, Ghāzī-ud-dīn, came south from Delhi to claim his father's succession. When he had been removed by poison, Salābat Jang's army, deep in arrears of pay, refused to march against Mysore; and Bussy, weary and in bad health, retired to recuperate at Masulipatam. As soon as he had gone, Sayyid Lashkar Khān, the new *dhīwān*, put in action a scheme to expel the French altogether from the Deccan. A small body remained as bodyguard of the subahdar, but the rest were broken up into parties and sent to collect arrears of revenue. On this news Bussy hurried back from the coast, assembled the scattered troops, and in November, 1753, moved to Aurangābād. There he demanded that the position of the French should be assured by the grant to him as a personal *jāgīr* of the coastal area known as the Northern Circars, stretching from Masulipatam to the Chilka Lake. It was reckoned that the revenues of these districts would provide for the pay of Bussy's troops and so obviate direct demands on Salābat Jang's treasury. During most of 1754 Bussy

was occupied with administrative affairs in the new *jāgīr*. When he returned to Hyderabad in January, 1755, he found his position more delicate than ever. Shāh Nawāz Khān, the *dīvān* who had succeeded Sayyid Lashkar Khān, was obstinately hostile, and took advantage of the easy terms which Bussy allowed to Morārī Rāo, the chief of Goory, to declare that Salābat Jang's interests were being sacrificed. Morārī Rāo had in fact considerable claims on the French; and this was doubtless the reason why Bussy's aid had been demanded for his reduction. On this score Bussy was dismissed, and letters were hurriedly sent to Madras requesting the assistance of an English force to replace the French. Bussy retired to Hyderabad and occupied a defensive position till he could receive reinforcements. The despatch of the English expedition was prevented by news of Sirāj-ud-daula's capture of Calcutta. Shāh Nawāz Khān's blockade of Bussy collapsed, and Bussy resumed his place in the councils of Salābat Jang, and retained it until he was summoned by Lally in 1758 to take part in the attack upon Madras. This brought the French adventure in the Deccan to an end, and the capture of Masulipatam by Colonel Forde with a force from Bengal in April, 1759, marked the end of French dominion in the Northern Circars. The importance of this episode has generally been misunderstood. So far as the French were concerned, it led nowhere. The English refused to be deceived by the shadow of legitimacy which it allowed Dupleix to cast over his projects. Its advantages were private, not public. Bussy and his chief officers, including some of Dupleix's own relations, made large fortunes; but the company received no financial benefit. The Northern Circars did not in fact produce the expected revenues, and Bussy was never able to help the campaigns of Dupleix with either troops or money, while the division of the French forces produced by this northern excursion and the absence from the Carnatic of the one French officer of unquestionably superior talents must be regarded as having materially aided the defeat of the French at Trichinopoly in 1752—the defeat which led directly to the recall of Dupleix himself. An expedition which secured no public advantage and which contributed to the French defeat elsewhere can only be considered a grievous mistake. But Bussy's brilliant though fruitless management of a Muslim durbar provided the English with a notable example of what might be done, and pointed the

way on more than one occasion for Clive in his management of Mir Ja'far in Bengal. Therein lies the real importance of Bussy's short-lived predominance in the Deccan.

The policy of Dupleix indeed lacked the elements of permanent success, and could never have survived a European war. Had he never been recalled, Coote or some other English leader would none the less have besieged, captured, and ruined Pondichery. The indispensable condition of political expansion in the east lay in the eighteenth century, as it had lain in the sixteenth and seventeenth, in predominance at sea. But this condition, as events were to prove, was not possessed by France. Dupleix's success was only obtained under temporary conditions of a most favourable nature. He launched his campaign after the war of the Austrian Succession. The most powerful weapon of the English, their naval power, was for the moment out of action. They could not pursue, intercept, or destroy the vessels which carried out to Pondichery recruits and munitions. Without this advantage it is unlikely that Dupleix would have obtained as high a degree of success as he in fact secured.

As it was, however, the schemes of the great French leader contributed largely to that expansion of English influence which shortly followed. In order to check the plans of the French, the English had been compelled to assemble on the Coromandel Coast a greater military and naval force than they had ever before gathered together in India. There were Admiral Watson and his squadron, a royal regiment, and the company's European troops strengthened not only by the recruits destined for Madras but also by those intended for Bengal. Besides these there was a considerable body of sepoys. The credit of being the first to drill and organise these troops in the European manner has been falsely ascribed by many to Dupleix. But recent research has shown that his English enemies led the way in attaching to them European drill-sergeants and officers, under whose training they became the best body of native infantry in India. In the middle of 1756 a combined force had been destined to march to Hyderabad at Salābat Jang's request, to deliver him from French control. But its march had been prevented by alarming news from Calcutta.

Alahwirdi Khān, who had ruled Bengal in virtual independence after a prolonged struggle with the Marāthas, died in

April, 1756. He was succeeded by his great-nephew, Sirāj-ud-daula, a young man at once inconsiderate and irresolute. His predecessor had favoured the Hindus, and had employed a number of them in high office. Sirāj-ud-daula had reversed this policy, and speedily alarmed and disgusted the principal Hindus of the provinces. Attempts have been made in recent times to rehabilitate his character. But contemporary Muslim writers lend no support to this change of view, and the young nawab seems to have deserved no more sympathy or respect than his own generation bestowed upon him. He had been alarmed by the events which had been taking place in southern India, and had been closely watching the Europeans settled on the Hugli, lest they should attempt to repeat in Bengal operations which had involved the overthrow or death of four Muslim rulers in the Carnatic and the Deccan. The English, the French, and the Dutch alike possessed factories which had once been fortified. Of these, the Dutch and the French were much stronger than the English factory, which was a fort only in name, and had been declared by every military officer who had seen it to be untenable against any sustained attack. But rumours of a new war in Europe with the French had led the president and council at Calcutta to build new batteries on the river-side, lest a French squadron should sail up the river to attack their virtually unprotected settlement. Sirāj-ud-daula at once demanded an explanation, and required the removal of the new defences. The president, Roger Drake, replied that they were necessary in view of a possible French attack. The nawab, who was marching against a rival, Shaukat Jang, in Purnea, at once returned to his capital, Murshidābād. He seized the English factory hard-by at Kāsimbāzār. He then marched against Calcutta. On June 16 he appeared before it; on the 18th the English were driven from their outposts; on the 19th the president and the commandant of the garrison sought refuge aboard ship; and on the 20th Fort William surrendered. The prisoners were shut up for the night in the military prison, the Black Hole, in which a number of them were suffocated. This event does not deserve the title of "massacre" by which it has long been known, for there is nothing to show that the fate of the prisoners was in any way designed. But neither does there appear ground for discrediting the evidence of more than one survivor or for supposing that no such incident occurred.

Despite Sirāj-ud-daula's triumph in capturing Calcutta, he had chosen his time most unfortunately. If he had but waited until the French and English were again at war, he would have been certain of French co-operation had he required it, and would have been secure from the reprisals of the other English settlements in India, at all events for a time. As it was, the presidency of Madras had the means, and, under the inspiration of Orme, the historian, the will, immediately to take up the challenge. The troops intended to join Salābat Jang had not marched when the news arrived from Bengal. Ships were collected. A new expedition was prepared. Its command was entrusted to Clive and Watson, who arrived in the Hugli a few days before Christmas. On January 2, 1757, they reoccupied Calcutta without resistance. The nawab at once returned. But a night-attack directed by Clive, though inflicting no great loss, shook Sirāj-ud-daula's nerve, and he at once made peace, agreeing to confirm all English privileges, to make good all the loss caused by the capture of Calcutta, to permit its fortification, and to allow the coinage of rupees there.

Then emerged the question of the French. At the end of 1756 it was known that war had broken out in Europe. The French at Chandernagore at once made proposals for a neutrality. The subject was repeatedly discussed, but came to nothing, because the chief of Chandernagore could bind only himself and his council and could not limit the action either of Pondichery or of any officers who might come from Europe. Chandernagore was thus exposed to attack as soon as the nawab permitted such a step. The two nations were represented at Murshidābād by William Watts and Jean Law, who used their utmost efforts to induce the nawab to give, or to withhold, his assent. On the whole the durbar favoured the English. Then, too, came an alarm that Ahmad Shāh Durāni meant to advance against Bengal, and Sirāj-ud-daula offered the English a lakh a month for aid against the Afghans. At the same moment came a strong complaint from Calcutta that the treaty had not been carried into effect; and on March 10, the nawab's secretary wrote a letter, which received the nawab's seal, permitting the English to attack Chandernagore. Almost at once Sirāj-ud-daula changed his mind. He ordered a force to march to protect the place; then, on hearing from Nandakumār, his *faujdar* at Hugli, that the



French were certain to be beaten, he cancelled this order; but he also wrote imploring Bussy to march into Bengal and deliver him from the English. Meanwhile Clive and Watson, on receiving the nawab's letter, had moved at once, and the French surrendered after one day's fighting.

The result was that the nawab was deprived of his natural allies against the English, at the very time when he had betrayed his hostility to the latter by summoning Bussy to his aid. His simultaneous abandonment of Chandernagore and invitation to Bussy was the conduct of one who could neither perceive the sound course of action nor persevere in any. It is likely too that the nawab was the victim of treacherous advice received from his own durbar. The Seths hated him. Rāi Durlabh, who had held a great position, had been placed under the orders of a favourite named Mohan Lāl. Mīr Ja'far, the *bakhshī*, had been dismissed with insult. Already at the end of 1756 Omichand, one of the chief merchants of Calcutta, had sounded the English about a plan to replace Sirāj-ud-daula by a new and better nawab. In April, 1757, they were again approached by discontented Hindus and Muslims. The Frenchman, Law, believed, probably with justice, that these projects would have come to nothing without the backing of the Seths. But it was also clear that nothing would be done unless the English acted as the spear-head of the movement. In these circumstances an agreement was framed between the English and Mīr Ja'far. On June 11 the document was delivered at Calcutta, and immediately afterwards Clive set out on the march destined to lead to English dominion in Bengal. His force consisted of 800 Europeans and 2200 sepoy. He had with him no cavalry, and a zamindar who had been invited to join him with a body of horse preferred to wait until he saw how matters went. So did Mīr Ja'far himself. He was to have joined the English on the march. In fact he only gave them promises of help. When Clive reached the point at which he would have to cross the river in order to make contact with the enemy, he hesitated and sought the counsel of his officers. They advised a halt. But reflection quickly restored Clive's confidence, and on the eve of June 23 he encamped at Plassey Grove, close to Sirāj-ud-daula's camp. Many knew or had made a shrewd guess at what was going forward. Omichand, the Calcutta merchant who had taken a share in the early projects,

had demanded a great reward—a quarter of the jewels and a twentieth of the treasure—as the price of his acquiescence. He had been half-silenced by the trick of a forged treaty in which his claims were allowed but which was not to receive effect. Nevertheless, the nawab had had ample notice of the English intentions, and had assembled his forces. But he was as ever hampered by his own indecision and the sinister advice which he received from his officials. He himself was no soldier. He ordered an attack on the English camp. It was feebly led and easily repulsed. Mīr Ja'far, who commanded a division of the nawab's army, drew aside and took no part. Then Clive advanced. Sirāj-ud-daula fled. His troops disbanded. Mīr Ja'far entered the English camp. On the 28th he was formally installed as nawab at Murshidābād, and on July 2 Sirāj-ud-daula, betrayed by a fakir whose ears he had cut off, was brought in a prisoner by Mīr Ja'far's son and at once put to death. These events precisely paralleled the events in the south. Once more an incoherent Indian army had been scattered, and the ruler of a province overthrown, by little more than the resolute advance of a small but well-organised force and its firm front on the battlefield. The people acquiesced in this decree of fate. The new nawab was accepted in Bengal with the same indifference with which Chanda Sāhib had been accepted in the Carnatic and Salābat Jang in the Deccan. Muslim rule was being destroyed as easily as in the day of its power it had established its ascendancy. The people at large remained utterly unmoved.

The new nawab was more humane but hardly more competent than the man he had displaced. He was indeed strong in the strength of his English allies, but he was burdened with the rewards which (like Dupleix's puppets) he had promised in return for assistance. All who had taken part in the revolution had stipulated for ample consideration. Like Salābat Jang, therefore, Mīr Ja'far succeeded to a treasury which was heavily mortgaged. Instead of reorganising and improving his administration, he projected despoiling the Hindu officials who had survived Sirāj-ud-daula's government. The chief of these were Rāi Durlabh, who had been and still was the *dīwān*, and Rāmna-rāyan the deputy of Bihar. The latter had had no part in the late revolution; the former had done his utmost to favour it though he had cautiously abstained from any but verbal engagements.

Within six months Mīr Ja'far was accusing him of plotting to set up another nawab. Watts made strong representations on his behalf and for the moment the matter was smoothed over. But a little later the nawab's son, Mīrān, made a strong attack on him, and he was compelled to take refuge in Calcutta. Rāmnaṛāyan's case was different. He had at first been suspected of favouring Sirāj-ud-daula, and immediately after Plassey Eyre Coote, then a captain of the king's troops, had been sent up to Patna to effect his removal. Coote had been dissuaded from this by Mīr Kāsim, Mīr Ja'far's son-in-law, who seems to have sought a freer opportunity of despoiling the deputy. Later in the year Clive himself, having received assurances of Rāmnaṛāyan's fidelity to the new nawab, changed his attitude and accompanied Mīr Ja'far up to Patna to take part in the Bihar settlement. Rāmnaṛāyan refused to place himself in the nawab's power without a guarantee from the English. This was given, and under Clive's influence the nawab reluctantly agreed to confirm the deputy in his post for 9 lakhs of rupees; and Rāmnaṛāyan was promised by Clive that so long as he did not intrigue with foreign powers and paid the revenues regularly he should not be disturbed. Clive was already therefore checking the nawab in his policy towards his chief Hindu servants.

The recovery of Calcutta had been followed by the resumption of authority by the old governor, Roger Drake, and council. But Clive remained the dominating influence among his countrymen. When in July, 1758, a despatch was received from the company ordering the establishment of four governors to rule each for a month at a time, the council decided that so foolish a plan could not be put into operation, and invited Clive to act as governor till the company should send out orders on the news of the revolution of 1757. Later in the year a despatch arrived formally appointing Clive to the position which he was occupying.

In 1759 Prince 'Alī Gauhar—afterwards Shāh 'Ālam II—appeared on the borders of Bihar. He had fled to Oudh from the confusion reigning at Delhi, and hoped to establish himself in the eastern provinces. But Rāmnaṛāyan refused to give up Patna, and, when English reinforcements arrived, the prince retired to Oudh. His advance had much alarmed Mīr Ja'far, who feared that he would either succeed in his invasion or be joined by the

English. On his withdrawal the nawab bestowed on Clive the quit-rent which he had reserved when he had granted the 24-Parganas to the company in 1757. But he was already weary of the control under which he lay, and had begun to intrigue with the Dutch. The latter had viewed the establishment of English influence in Bengal with the same apprehension as the English had felt regarding the projects of Dupleix. They had lost the saltpetre monopoly which they had formerly enjoyed, and were eager for change. They therefore approached Mirān with offers to set him up in his father's place. A little later they opened communications with Mīr Ja'far himself, proposing to bring a force from Batavia to reduce the English. An understanding was reached. In 1759 the Dutch governor-general sent to India 300 Europeans and 600 Malay troops to carry out the plan. These were directed to proceed first to Negapatam, where they waited a month doing nothing. Moreover, a captain of the Dutch squadron, in hopes of commercial gain, had sailed direct to the Hugli. Clive was thus forewarned. He coolly made his preparations, and, when in October the Dutch troops reached the Hugli, Mīr Ja'far was at Calcutta under Clive's eye. He agreed to forbid his new allies to enter the river. They hesitated for a month. At last they resolved to force their way up. They began by seizing some small English vessels, thus providing Clive with an unanswerable case for hostilities. Their land-forces were scattered and broken by an action at Biderra. Their ships were defeated and captured the same day. Mirān suddenly appeared with a body of horse with which he had hoped to chase the broken English, but which he now set to blockade Chinsura. The Dutch made peace hurriedly. They admitted they had begun the fighting; they agreed to limit their forces; they promised to pay ten lakhs indemnity. Thus once more Clive had made certain that Bengal should not be the scene of a prolonged European war as had happened in the Carnatic.

Immediately after this success, in January, 1760, he resigned and sailed for England. His three years in Bengal had given to the English the position which Dupleix had established for a moment in the south. He had shown a tenacity and political skill equal to that of the great Frenchman; he had shown a vigour and promptitude of action which has seldom if ever been exceeded; he had shown a power of personal influence, a domina-

tion over other men, a gift of leadership, of extraordinary quality. He lacked the foresight of Dupleix; the charm of Hastings; but in the circumstances of the time his gifts had the fullest scope, and neither Dupleix nor Hastings could have accomplished all that he accomplished between 1756 and 1759.

The period of these great changes in Bengal had been marked in the south by the collapse of the French effort inaugurated by Dupleix. The outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1756 had at first made small difference to either Madras or Pondichery. The former had sent all spare troops with Clive to Bengal, the latter to Bussy at Hyderabad. The uneasy truce arranged in 1754 was thus succeeded by a year of eventless war. In the autumn of 1757, however, a French royal regiment arrived, and in April, 1758, this was followed by an expedition comprising a squadron of nine ships under d'Aché, another royal regiment, and Lally as commandant-general of the French settlements in India. The English squadron, now commanded by Admiral Pocock and consisting of seven ships, had already appeared on the coast, but the position in Bengal was judged too uncertain for Clive to return the military forces sent up in 1756. The two squadrons engaged on April 28. The action was indecisive, but the French lost almost four times as many men as the English.

Ashore, however, the English could do little to oppose Lally's operations. They had concentrated their troops, and held only Madras, Fort St David, Chingleput and Trichinopoly. As soon as Lally had landed he hurried on to attack Fort St David, which fell on June 2. Lally then proposed to attack Madras by both land and sea. But in this d'Aché refused to co-operate, and Lally therefore deferred his project till later in the year when the north-east monsoon should have driven Pocock off the coast. Meanwhile he marched against Tanjore, in the hope of compelling the raja to pay the seventy lakhs he had promised to Chanda Sāhib in 1749. His preparations were hasty and incomplete. His men lacked supplies and ammunition. He opened the siege of Tanjore, but had not been able seriously to press the place when on August 8 he learnt that d'Aché had been defeated by Pocock off Kārikāl. He then retired to the coast with great loss of reputation.

The naval action of which he had heard had been fought on August 3. D'Aché in an hour's fighting lost 500 men. He returned to the Pondichery roadstead under the shelter of the

batteries ashore; but was resolved to remain no longer. Councils of the chief military and naval officers were held. The former declared loudly and bitterly that d'Aché would ruin the prospects of the campaign if he left the coast. The latter with one accord declared that they could not again encounter the English. On September 3 d'Aché therefore sailed for Mauritius, and did not reappear till a year later, and Lally was thus left without the assistance of a squadron. He resolved nevertheless to attack Madras. On December 14 he appeared before it and formed the siege. Great preparations had been made for the defence. Provisions and ammunition had been collected in plenty. The works had been skilfully reconstructed. The governor, George Pigot, the commandant, Stringer Lawrence, the engineer, John Call, were resolute and talented; and although the garrison lacked protection from the shells that Lally constantly threw into the place, it never lost heart. The besiegers, too, were harassed by a force drawn from Trichinopoly and Chingleput. In the middle of February, when the defences had been severely battered, a squadron of ships hove in sight. It proved to be English. Lally did not venture to attempt a storm, but abandoned his trenches and retired.

This was the turning-point of the war on land. In the following April Colonel Forde, who had been dispatched by Clive from Bengal to attack the French in the Northern Circars, captured Masulipatam. Later in the year Lieutenant-Colonel Eyre Coote arrived from England with reinforcements which enabled the English to meet the French in the field. On January 22, 1760, Coote defeated Lally severely at Wandiwash. In a third action at sea Pocock had already defeated d'Aché, inflicting on him a crushing loss of men who could not be replaced. D'Aché had thus again been driven off the coast, this time never to return. These naval and military successes enabled the English to blockade Pondichery by sea and land. On January 16, 1761, it was compelled to surrender. The French effort to hold the gains of Dupleix had been completely broken.

The main cause of the English success lay in the supremacy which the English squadron established at sea, permitting them to receive men, money and provisions from Bengal and England, enabling them to transport, and cover the operations of, their forces, and depriving the French of their supplies. This placed

Lally at a grievous disadvantage, and the elusive authority which Dupleix had seized vanished at the first touch of that naval power which had not been applicable when he was projecting his schemes. Then, too, while Bussy's exploits had not contributed a man or a rupee to French aid, the English in Bengal were able at a critical time to send down both troops and money. Lastly Lally himself was hampered by personal defects and confronted by an impossible task. As a leader he was hasty, inconsiderate, violent. He expected others to attend to the detail of supplies, and never reflected on the hindrances which might be caused by the councillors whom he abused. Moreover, no man could at once conduct a war against the English and reform the Pondichery methods of administration. The knowledge that he was charged with the latter duty made every servant of the company desire to see him return to Europe discredited by defeat.

The fall of Pondichery left the English without serious European rivals in India for the moment, and thus enabled them to consolidate their position in Bengal. When Clive had sailed for England in January, 1760, he was succeeded by Holwell. This change increased the immediate difficulties of the situation. The new governor was merely a stop-gap, who had succeeded to the chair by accident and would speedily be replaced by a man with more influential interest. The nawab, whom even Clive had not persuaded to reduce his expenditure, was unwilling to listen to the advice of a new and transient authority. Affairs were further complicated by the reappearance of the prince whom Clive had driven away in 1759. On this occasion he slipped round the forces sent against him and raided Bengal itself, exciting great disturbance and alarm. It was moreover believed that he had been encouraged by the nawab himself. Though he was speedily expelled by the exertions of Colonel Caillaud, relations between Calcutta and Murshidābād were severely strained, and a crisis was precipitated by the death of the nawab's son, Mirān, which raised the question of the succession to Mīr Ja'far.

Holwell, after long discussions, came to the conclusion that the only sound course of action was for the company to assume the direct government of the province. He saw clearly that this was in the long run inevitable, and rightly believed that no good would come of either tolerating Mīr Ja'far's mismanagement or replacing him by another. At the same time, in view of his

approaching retirement he could take no immediate action. Matters were left over, therefore, until the new governor, Henry Vansittart, should arrive.

Vansittart assumed the government in August, 1760. He was a Madras servant of some standing, who had secured the friendship of Clive and who enjoyed a good reputation for character and ability. But he lacked personality, and was much better fitted to carry out the orders of others than to frame and pursue a policy of his own. His appointment was most unwelcome in Bengal. All the members of council regarded it as an unfair supersession and were not likely willingly to co-operate with him in any policy which they disliked. The first question to be decided was that of the nawab's succession. In the interval between Mirān's death and Vansittart's arrival the claims of the nawab's son-in-law, Mīr Kāsim, had been skilfully put forward. The aspirant offered a strong contrast to Mīr Ja'far. He was careful where the other was extravagant, and resolute where the other was timid. He was moreover skilled in playing on the interests of others. This man was bent on securing the support of the Calcutta council. He won over Holwell, promising him a large present if he were named successor to Mīr Ja'far. Holwell, forgetting the policy which he had advocated earlier in the year, espoused his cause, and a number of conferences were held at Calcutta between him and Mīr Kāsim. The latter was willing to promise whatever was demanded of him. On condition of his nomination as heir to Mīr Ja'far, he agreed to cede new territory to the company, to provide immediate payment of the arrears due from the nawab to the company, and to reduce the military forces of the nawab to a specified number. These offers won over the council and it was resolved that Vansittart should proceed to Murshidābād at once to announce the decision to the nawab and obtain his assent. In fact, however, Mīr Kāsim had lured the council into an impossible position. He had returned at once to Murshidābād, and, when Vansittart arrived there, he found the nawab unalterably opposed to the new plan. His life, he declared, would not be worth a day's purchase once Mīr Kāsim had been recognised, and he would rather retire to Calcutta than continue to occupy the carpet of state—the masnad—on such terms. Vansittart, faced with this refusal, decided to install Mīr Kāsim at once as nawab, on condition that he would pay to his



predecessor such an allowance as would permit him to live in comfort at Calcutta. This was done, and Mīr Ja'far was escorted down the river to the English settlement.

This revolution was a great triumph for the new nawab. He must have expected, if he had not inspired, Mīr Ja'far's opposition to his nomination. The issue was a tribute to his own insight and to the blindness of the new governor who had been unable to see through the outer semblance of the proposals laid before him. He signalled his gratitude by promising large gifts to the governor and council, and by carrying into immediate effect the agreement into which he had entered at Calcutta. He made over to the English the three districts of Bardwān, Midnapur, and Chittagong—outlying and disturbed districts of which he was not sorry to be relieved; and he made the payments of arrears which in fact permitted the siege of Pondichery to be carried to its successful conclusion. But the change carried with it the certainty of a new struggle. The old nawab had been replaced by a far better one. The government of the province would be improved. The payments to the company would be made with regularity. But the abler the nawab, the more certain he would be to seek to recover his independence, and the more strongly he would resent the position of superiority which the English occupied. Vansittart's policy was in fact inconsistent with itself. He sought to give Bengal a good ruler; but he was not willing to set his nation back in the position which it had occupied before the battle of Plassey.

From the first therefore subjects of dispute arose. The prince 'Alī Gauhar was threatening Patna once more. Rāmnaṛāyan defended the place with resolution until an English force arrived, and on January 15, 1761, Major Carnac defeated the prince on the river Sōn. The latter, being now refused refuge in Oudh, came into the English camp and for a while abode in Patna. He was anxious to procure English help to establish himself as emperor at Delhi, and at this time assumed the title of Shāh 'Ālam II. Vansittart was inclined to comply with his desires, but Mīr Kāsim viewed the discussions with jealousy and fear. He thought the English might be over-persuaded to accept from this needy monarch territorial rights over Bengal and Bihar. Though these suspicions were entirely baseless, his opposition brought the discussions to an end. He had succeeded in imposing his views on the governor and council of Calcutta.

His success in this matter was followed later in the year by one far more remarkable. Mīr Kāsim desired to get rid of Rāmnaṛāyan, the deputy governor of Bihar. He had for this two powerful reasons. One was that the deputy was believed to have accumulated great sums of money during the course of his rule and Mīr Kāsim hoped by plundering him to make good the sums he had disbursed to the English. The second was that Rāmnaṛāyan had been preserved in his office by English protection in accordance with Clive's policy of watching over the interests of the leading Hindus of the province. His destruction would therefore be a sign to the province at large that English favour was no longer any guard against the nawab's power. For a while Vansittart refused to abandon the policy of Clive, but he gradually weakened before Mīr Kāsim's persistence, and in September, 1761, gave a reluctant assent to the removal of the deputy. Rāmnaṛāyan was at once removed from office, imprisoned, plundered, and subsequently put to death.

At the same time the nawab was busy reorganising his power. He removed his capital from Murshidābād, dangerously near to Calcutta, to Monghyr, on the borders of Bengal and Bihar. He reorganised his troops, and placed them under the command of two Armenian leaders. He set up factories for the manufacture of arms. He ignored the complaints of Vansittart that he was not complying with his promises to reduce his military forces. At last when all was ready, at the end of 1761, he began to stop the trade of the company's servants in salt and betel. If they submitted, they would be reduced to the position which they had occupied before the victories of Clive and the nawab might regard his independence as achieved.

Participation in the internal trade of the province had long been a vexed question. The imperial *farmāns*, under which the trade alike of the company and of its servants had been conducted, had made no difference between goods of internal consumption and goods for export. But the nawabs had always limited the English trade to the latter class, and this had always been resented by the company's servants as a tyrannous exercise of power, exerted not on behalf of the interests of the province, but in the interest of the favourites to whom the nawab gave the monopolies of salt and betel, the chief articles concerned. In 1757 Clive had been instructed by the council to get the matter put right.

In consequence Mīr Ja'far had issued *parwanas* to his servants phrased in universal terms. "Whatever goods the company's *gumastas* [agents] may bring or carry to or from their factories... you shall neither ask for nor receive any sum however trifling." These orders covered all kinds of goods, and applied equally to the trade of the company and of its servants. Moreover, the nawab deprived himself of jurisdiction over any disputes that might arise out of this trade. "Whoever acts contrary to these orders," the *parwanas* continued, "the English have power to punish them." These orders had been duly acted upon. The company's servants had traded in salt and betel duty-free; and, when the internal customs-men had attempted to interfere, they had been punished by the authorities of the nearest English factory.

Though Mīr Ja'far had repented of the extraordinary concession which he had thus made, and had even applied to Holwell for its abolition, the system was certainly in full force in 1760 when Mīr Kāsim accepted the government from Vansittart, nor had he objected to it before his elevation to power. Indeed, it is clear that if he had done so, neither Holwell nor any one else would have dreamt of supporting his candidature. A year later, however, he began to describe the practice as a new and grievous innovation. In principle he was unquestionably right. The privilege which had been extorted from the weakness of Mīr Ja'far was not one which should ever have been demanded. But Mīr Kāsim had unquestionably condoned it. His demands that it should now cease were resented by the council as an attack upon the English. At the same time the latent jealousy of Vansittart was stirred up by the nawab's allowing his private trade to pass untouched, while he stopped the trade of everyone else. After long discussions, Vansittart visited the nawab at the end of 1762 and arranged a compromise with him. This provided for the payment of a small duty on salt and the abandonment of the privilege of punishing the nawab's officials. The change was at once rejected by the council, which sent up two of its members to the nawab to arrange less unfavourable terms. Anger ran high. The hot-tempered chief of the Patna factory, Ellis, alarmed by the increase of the Patna garrison and by the walling-up of the gate close to the English factory, made an unsuccessful attempt to seize the town. At the same time the two councillors who had

been deputed to the nawab were murdered by the nawab's troops on their return down the river. War at once followed.

The campaign was short and completely successful. Major Adams, who commanded the troops which were sent from Calcutta, stormed position after position which the nawab had entrenched in the hope of checking an advance which he had long foreseen. When his capital, Monghyr, fell into English hands, Mīr Kāsim came to fancy that he had been betrayed. He put to death his Armenian commanders. He put to death the Seths. He ordered his unfortunate European prisoners, fifty-six in number, to be slain. Then he fled into Oudh with all the treasure which he had been able to carry away with him. The nawab wazir of Oudh resolved to assist him. In the next year, 1764, a long campaign followed around Patna, chequered by mutinies of the English troops, first of the Europeans and then of the sepoy, due in part to the great numbers of foreign deserters and in part to promises of reward which had been rashly made to the men. But when these difficulties had been dealt with by Major Hector Munro, who succeeded to Major Adams, the battle of Buxar on October 23 brought the matter to a decisive conclusion. The Oudh forces were broken. The conquest of Oudh itself followed. The nawab wazir fled into the Rohilla country. The control of affairs had passed more fully than ever into the hands of the government of Calcutta.

On the outbreak of the war Mīr Ja'far had been sent back once more to Murshidābād as nawab, on terms which had been dictated to him. English-owned salt was to pay no more than  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. The nawab's forces were to be limited. He was to receive a permanent resident. He was to make good all the losses which might be involved in the war with Mīr Kāsim. But he was still left free to choose his ministers. He selected the Brāhman, Nandakumār. The new government gave little satisfaction to the English authorities. It failed to supply the troops with provisions during the war with Mīr Kāsim and Oudh. It was believed to have entered into relations with the nawab wazir. On February 5, 1765, the old nawab died. He left a son, Najm-ud-daula. A deputation of the council proceeded from Calcutta to the capital. It was empowered to offer to recognise Najm-ud-daula's succession on condition that the English were to be allowed to select the principal ministers of the nawab. Inspired by Nandakumār,

the prince made every effort to avoid this demand. But in vain. He was obliged to assent, and Muhammad Riza Khān was appointed deputy to act on behalf of the nawab in all matters. The nawab was installed on March 3, but in fact the council of Calcutta had assumed the supreme authority in the provinces. The nawab was a mere figure-head, able to act only through a minister nominated by and responsible to others.

Meanwhile, on news of the revolution of 1763, which was strongly disapproved at London, Clive had been appointed once more governor of Fort William in Bengal. He arrived in May, 1765, to find a situation open to any political settlement which he might think fit to impose. Fearful of extending too widely the dominions of the company, he resolved to hand back to the nawab wazir the country of Oudh, on condition of his paying an indemnity of thirty lakhs. Shāh 'Ālam was denied the military assistance which he had persistently demanded; nor was he even given the territory of Oudh which it had been in contemplation to bestow upon him. Instead he received the districts of Kora and Allāhābād, with an agreement to pay him twenty-six lakhs a year out of the revenues of Bengal, in return for which he issued a grant to the East India Company of the *dīwāni* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. The decision to restore the nawab wazir to his former dominions was unquestionably wise. It set up a friendly prince on the western borders of Bihar and thus covered the English interests from direct attack. The settlement with Shāh 'Ālam was less satisfactory. It introduced a new element of make-believe into the position of the company in Bengal. The Calcutta government was already exercising supreme control over the nawab, and the grant of the *dīwāni* weakened rather than confirmed its position besides laying it under the obligation of paying a large annual sum for nothing save the dubious advantage of having the nominal and powerless emperor reside under the company's protection. In this matter Clive's action seems to have been inspired by considerations of English rather than Indian conditions. Although in 1757 he had desired to see the English ministry take over the political duties of the company, he had changed his view after he had become the dominant influence in the company itself, and his great aim in 1765 was to make ministerial interference as difficult as possible. That object was well secured by the grant of the *dīwāni*. The ministry might have insisted on assuming the government of territories

which the company had acquired or the protection of princes ruling under the company's control. But it could not assume on behalf of the king of Great Britain the privilege of collecting the revenues of Bengal under the authority of the emperor of Delhi. In fact the consequences of Clive's action at this time are clearly to be seen in the difficulties with which the ministry was confronted when in 1773 it attempted to legislate for the government of Bengal. From both points of view the results of his action were unfortunate, and it would have been better had he been content to leave untouched the supremacy over the nawab of Bengal which he found existing on his arrival.

The remainder of Clive's second period of government was occupied with administrative reforms. The sudden transformation of the East India Company from a commercial into a political body had resulted in a multitude of abuses. The company's servants were infected with the idea of using political methods of acquiring swift riches. In this Clive himself had led the way. He had taken great presents after Plassey and a *jāgīr* after the expulsion of Prince 'Alī Gauhar. In 1760 revolution had again been followed by great gifts to the chief movers. In 1763 Mīr Jā'far had been expected to pay for the privilege of being restored to his former government. In 1765 his son had been required to pay for succeeding to his father's position, and his chief minister had been made to pay for his selection. All this was entirely in accordance with the custom of the country: but the custom was noxious, and was producing the belief that the policy of the council was inspired solely by greed of gain. The presents of 1765 were peculiarly evil because the company had already sent out to India orders forbidding such conduct. These orders had been ignored because it was already known that Clive had been nominated to the government and the council thought it impossible that he would enforce orders of such a nature in view of his own past conduct. But in this it was entirely mistaken. Clive rightly believed that the presents which he had accepted were of a nature quite different from those which had been extorted in 1765. In spite of the strong discontent which the measure excited, he insisted that all the company's servants should sign bonds obliging themselves under penalty to accept no presents whatever. Declaring that none of the Bengal servants were senior enough or of character good enough to deserve promotion into the council, he filled vacancies with servants

from Madras, and by stern discipline did his utmost to restore obedience. He recognised, however, that most of the evils had arisen from the practice of paying the company's servants small salaries and expecting them to make money by other means. He therefore devoted the salt monopoly to provide a fund for the increase of the salaries of the senior servants, both civil and military. This he did under the guise of forming a salt company to be managed by a committee of the company's servants: and, since this appeared to conflict with the company's orders prohibiting privileges in trade, his measure was reversed by the home authorities, although additional allowances of less amount were granted from the territorial revenues.

The question of army pay also offered him great difficulties. In 1763 the company had ordered a reduction of the field allowances paid to the officers under the denomination of *batta*. These were almost twice as high as the corresponding allowances at Madras, but the Calcutta council had shrunk from attempting to enforce the reduction. Clive proceeded to cut down the amounts, permitting the old rates only to be paid when officers were on service outside Bengal and Bihar. Stimulated by the discontent of the civil servants, the officers resolved to lay down their commissions simultaneously, so as to compel the governor to revoke his proposals. But the resignations were accepted; non-commissioned officers were promoted; officers were hurriedly brought up from Madras; the ringleaders were sent down to Calcutta; a few were tried by court martial for mutiny. The net result was that a number of officers were sent to England, and that the remainder submitted and entered into new agreements which for the first time placed the company's officers under military law.

Early in 1767 Clive sailed back to Europe, worn out by the efforts of his second government. He had shown himself to be as direct, as resolute and forceful as ever. He had met and triumphed over each situation as it arose. But the circumstances of the time had offered less scope to his special talents than had been the case ten years earlier. He was at his greatest in times demanding instant and decisive action. But he was a man of insight rather than one of foresight. His administrative settlement bequeathed a crop of difficulties to his successors and soon had to be remodelled.

## CHAPTER IV

### Warren Hastings and the Regulating Act

The return of Clive to England in 1767 was followed by extraordinary activity at the India House. The news of his acquisition of the *dīwāni* was hailed with ignorant enthusiasm. Everyone believed that he had made the fortune of the company, that it would pay huge dividends, that its stock would rise to prodigious heights. Such famous men as Henry Fox and Edmund Burke gambled in the stock, while others like Henry Vansittart and Laurence Sullivan sought to repair their crippled fortunes by buying for control in the hopes of procuring for themselves and their friends lucrative appointments. These activities drew political attention to the affairs of the company. In 1766 Chatham had already informed the directors that Indian affairs must be laid before parliament. But Chatham's health did not allow him personally to deal with the matter, and at last Charles Townshend, as chancellor of the exchequer, compounded with the company for an annual payment of £400,000. In 1769, when the intrigues of Vansittart and Sullivan had borne fruit, the court of directors resolved to send out a commission of reform, to be headed by Vansittart. The ministry, in which Lord Weymouth was then predominant, decided to intervene. It had already been requested to send a naval squadron to the east. When the company refused to join the commander of the squadron in its commission of reform, Weymouth resolved to give the commodore a secret mission. He was to enquire into the treatment of the princes of India by the company's servants. This attempt to secure control over the Indian administration failed before the obstinate opposition which the company's government offered to the commodore's interposition in matters which did not touch naval affairs. Then in 1772 parliament appointed select and secret committees to enquire into the company's political and financial conduct. Though Clive defended himself with success, the select committee elicited much discreditable evidence regarding the actions of many of the company's servants, and finally in 1773 the Regulating Act was passed. In many points it was inspired



by the advice of Clive himself. For the government of Bengal it set up a new council which was named in the act. The council chosen consisted of three members sent out from London, and two company's servants. One of the latter, Warren Hastings, who had been governor of Fort William since 1772, was named governor-general, mainly, it would seem, in order to conduct affairs till the senior councillor should have learnt enough to assume the control himself. To the new council was entrusted the charge of superintending the political conduct of the other presidencies. A special court was to be established by royal authority at Calcutta and empowered to try cases in which the natives of Bengal suffered under the oppression of the government. In future only one sixth of the directors were to be elected each year, instead of the whole body being chosen annually. It would be difficult to exaggerate either the benevolent intentions with which the act was passed or the maleficent consequences by which it was followed.

Meanwhile, in Bengal Clive had been succeeded first by two nonentities and then by a man of genius. Under Verelst and Cartier, who were governors from 1767 till 1772, one at least of Clive's political arrangements had begun to crumble. The emperor at Allāhābād soon wearied of English protection. General Richard Smith, who commanded the troops there, and who was afterwards to take part in the attack on Hastings, was an unaccommodating man who would not allow his morning's rest to be disturbed by the beating of the imperial kettle-drums. The Marāthas, who were beginning to recover from their disastrous overthrow at Pānīpat, and were seeking once more the lordship of northern India, re-occupied Delhi, threatened Oudh, and sent flattering messages to Shāh 'Ālam offering to establish him in the palace of his ancestors. The English tried to dissuade him from accepting. But he, refusing to listen, marched off and joined his new friends. About the same time, the Marāthas, in order more easily to attack Oudh, made overtures to the Rohilla chiefs, and then attempted to coerce them into compliance. The Rohillas in alarm made an agreement with the nawab wazir.

At the outset of his government in 1772 Hastings was thus confronted by two main political problems. The emperor, now under Marātha protection, was loudly demanding the payment of his twenty-six lakhs a year. The famine which had afflicted

the provinces in 1769 had necessitated its suspension; and Hastings resolved to make that an excuse for ceasing altogether to pay out a large sum of money which would have fallen into the hands of the Marāthas and assisted them in their designs on northern India. He took the view that the cession of the *ḍiwāni* had been merely a solemn farce, that the company had in fact conquered Bengal, and that the emperor could not give what it was not in his power to bestow. Hastings had on his accession to office been required to undertake the direct administration of the provincial finances. He had soon perceived that it was not practicable to limit the scope of the company's government to half the administration only. He had therefore deliberately sought to make Calcutta the capital, transferring thither the treasury and centralising there the administration of justice. He aimed at establishing English sovereignty; and his refusal to continue Clive's arrangement with the emperor was in fact but another step in the same direction.

The second problem was that offered by Oudh. Its maintenance as a buffer-state was clearly most desirable; but if it was duly to fulfil its function of sheltering the company's territories, it had to be strong enough to protect itself. Hastings made over to the nawab wazir the two districts which the emperor had abandoned. They lay at a distance from the company's territories, and their retention would have been inconvenient. This was arranged at conferences which Hastings held with the nawab wazir in 1773. At the same time the latter complained that the Rohillas were not keeping the agreement into which they had entered with him, and proposed that the company's forces should assist him in reducing them and adding their country to his own. Strategically the project was desirable, for the Rohilkhand afforded the best route for an invasion of Oudh from the west, and its possession would materially strengthen the nawab. But at the moment no decision was taken. Later in the year the nawab repeated his demands, and the matter was laid before the council at Calcutta. It was persuaded by the arguments of the governor to agree. A force was marched westwards to co-operate in the conquest of the Rohilkhand, which speedily followed. Hastings found it necessary in more than one instance to protect the nawab from the demands which the commander, Colonel Champion, made upon him.

While the English force was still in the Rohilkhand, the new councillors and the new judges reached Calcutta. The first included General Clavering, selected by the personal favour of the king, whose aide-de-camp he had been; Colonel Monson, who had served in south India, and proved himself to be an honest but irascible man of limited judgment; and Philip Francis, who, wearied of his subordinate position in the office of the secretary at war, had been seeking employment outside England. His father was a client of the Grenvilles; he himself was known to them; and probably through that channel he had made the acquaintance of Clive. Whether Clive recommended him to Lord North does not appear; but immediately after his nomination, he visited Clive, and was speedily indoctrinated with Clive's ideas on Indian administration. The fact is important. It meant that the one man of intelligence sent out from England in 1774 carried with him conceptions the exact opposite of those which Warren Hastings had been seeking to put into practice and that the dead hand of Clive would be laid upon the government with all the weight of the majority of the council.

The councillors reached Calcutta on October 19, and within a week had declared war on the governor-general. Their motives have been hotly debated. But there is no doubt that they reached India in a hostile temper, that they complained bitterly of such a trifle as a lack of punctiliousness in their reception, and that before they stepped ashore they had been in communication with men whose interests had been hurt by Warren Hastings's reforms. The responsibility for their action probably lay with Francis. The voyage had afforded him time to judge the capacity of his fellow-councillors and to establish over them the ascendancy of his talents. It rested with him to determine whether they should for a while rest inactive spectators of what was going forward or enter at once upon the fray. His own interests as a mere junior member of council demanded the latter course. In Clive's principles he possessed a whole armoury of weapons for attack. He resolved therefore to drive Warren Hastings from office at the first possible moment, in order to bring nearer the realisation of a dream in which he was already beginning to indulge, that of himself succeeding to the office of governor-general.

The Rohilla War afforded the pretext for their action. Francis denounced it as "the conquest of all the little states about us,

who were our friends, who were our barriers". Champion, whose perquisites had been cut down by Hastings, was ready to denounce the policy which had led to so bootless a campaign. A legend of atrocities was developed, leading men to fancy that peaceful cultivators with their wives and children had been massacred wholesale, whereas Champion himself admitted that not a person had been slain except on the battlefield. The Rohilla chief, Hāfiz Rahmat, had perished in battle, his family for a while had suffered privations, but by the end of the year two of his sons had accepted Shujā'-ud-daula's service, and the narrative afterwards compiled by a member of his family makes no mention of atrocities. The current Indian view is expressed by the author of the *Siyyar-ul-Mutakherin*. Doubtless it was high time, he says, that the Rohillas should undergo the treatment which they had long been meting out to others. But despite all that could be said about a policy which was of course calculated in the interests of the East India Company rather than in compliance with humanitarian ideas, the majority, led by Francis, prepared despatches warning the company that their interests and prospects in India had been jeopardised by the conduct of the governor-general.

Their next step was aimed more directly at the personal conduct of Hastings. Joseph Fowke, a *protégé* of Clavering and a company's servant of dubious character, together with Nandakumār, who was presented to Clavering by Fowke, brought forward accusations of bribery. Nandakumār had a strong grudge against the governor-general. He had hoped that when the company's Indian deputy, Muhammad Riza Khān, was removed from office, he would be chosen as his successor. Instead, under the orders of the company, Hastings had assumed the direct administration of affairs. Nandakumār now accused the latter of having accepted a large bribe from Munni Begum, one of the late Mīr Ja'far's wives, and, without delay, the majority resolved that "there is no species of peculation from which the Honourable the Governor-General has thought it right to abstain". Hastings promptly brought forward a charge of conspiracy against Nandakumār and Fowke, but, while this charge was still pending, a further charge of forgery was brought against Nandakumār. It has generally been surmised that the charge was brought at the suggestion of Hastings himself. This seems unlikely. The

charge of forgery was a revival of a suit which had lapsed owing to the institution of the new court of justice at Calcutta under the Regulating Act, and the accuser is known to have been seeking legal help for his suit before Nandakumār had opened his mouth against Hastings. Nandakumār was committed to prison on May 6. He was tried in the second week of June under an act which made forgery a capital offence, he was found guilty by the petty jury, and he was executed by warrant of the Supreme Court on August 5.

The commentary on these events supplied by Burke and afterwards by Macaulay is well known. Briefly it accuses Hastings of having sought deliberately to put Nandakumār out of the way, and the chief justice, Elijah Impey, of having been misled by his school-time friendship with Hastings into straining justice against the prisoner and wrongfully putting him to death. This explanation seems false, for it ignores a great number of facts. The court by which the accused was tried consisted of all four judges, of whom, if Impey was a friend of the governor-general, another, Chambers, was a close friend of Francis. This friend of Francis declared that he considered the verdict of guilty justified by the evidence. The jury, which returned the verdict, had been empannelled by the brother-in-law of Francis. The applicability of the act under which Nandakumār was tried seemed established by the fact that in 1765 an Indian had been tried under it and sentenced to death by the Court of Quarter Sessions. No reason appears for supposing that the trial was unfair or that any of the judges, including Chambers, doubted the correctness of the sentence. But at that point the court ought to have stopped. It was clearly undesirable to execute the principal witness against the governor-general while the latter's cause was still undecided. The court should therefore have exercised its powers of respite, and kept the accused alive at least until his evidence was no longer required. This step was proposed by Chambers, but rejected by the other three judges. One reason given was that no grounds appeared upon the face of the trial for the exercise of mercy. But their chief motive was afforded by the conduct of the majority of the council. The latter had strongly taken the side of the accused. They had visited him in prison. Reports had spread through the city that if he were condemned they would use force to release him. Worst of all, on the morning on which the trial opened,

the majority had addressed a threatening letter to two of the judges, warning them that they had better be careful what they did. To men brought up in the traditions of the English bar this letter was bound to recall Stuart rule and the vanished supremacy of the executive over the judicature. They knew well that the Supreme Court had been deliberately constituted so as to be completely independent of the government of Fort William. This attempt to intimidate them was certain to incline them to administer the strictest justice to the accused lest they should be themselves accused of truckling to the wishes of the councillors. The majority, having thus indisposed the court against the prisoner, waited patiently for the trial to take its course. On the eve of the day fixed for the execution, Clavering received a letter from Nandakumār. It could have had but one object—to pray the majority to request the court for a respite of sentence. Clavering did not open the letter till after the execution, and did not lay it before the council till the 14th, when on the motion of Francis the majority resolved to burn the letter as a libel on the court and to expunge it from the records of the council. In other words the majority deliberately abstained from asking the court to defer the execution of the chief witness against the governor-general—a request which the court could hardly have refused. It has been asserted that Hastings should have foreseen the consequences of the execution and urged his friend Impey to keep Nandakumār alive. But that duty lay no less clearly upon the majority, whose conduct before, during, and after the trial can scarcely be explained unless they desired to see him safely hanged. After all, the evidence of Nandakumār against Hastings, like the evidence which he had formerly given against his enemy Muhammad Riza Khān, had little corroboration. The case was not likely to be proved. But Nandakumār's death would restore all the venom to his charges against the governor-general.

While these events had been taking place, the majority had given a singular expression to their views of foreign policy. Early in 1775 the nawab wazir, Shujā'-ud-daula, had died, lamented by his subjects. He was succeeded by his son, Āsaf-ud-daula. The majority at once declared that treaties were binding only during the lifetime of the parties, and denounced Hastings's agreements with the late nawab. Āsaf-ud-daula needed the company's assistance and was obliged to accept hard terms. His pay-

ments for military assistance were increased and he was obliged to cede Benares to the company. Thus his charges were raised while his resources were reduced, and the agent whom the majority had employed was voted a reward of a lakh of rupees. This new treaty, signed on May 21, 1775, marks the beginning of the ruin of Oudh. Āsaf-ud-daula was a weak prince, who at once set up in office his own favourites in place of his father's experienced ministers. His treasury was exhausted; his troops unpaid and mutinous. But the late nawab's wives had possessed themselves of the large resources in specie which the nawab had left behind. With the aid of the agent, Bristow, fifty-six lakhs were extracted from these ladies in the five months following on the treaty, under promises that no more should be demanded of them. But disputes between the nawab and the begums, and between the nawab and his ministers, continued unabated. The result of the majority's policy was disastrous. The state which Hastings had tried to strengthen was weakened by the excessive demands which were made upon it, by the promise of protection which Bristow was at last allowed to give to the begums, by the failure to restore discipline in the military forces of the state, and by the consequent spirit of disorder which developed among the great landholders, who refused to pay the revenue till coerced by actual force. This also was the period in which the administration of the Rohilla country fell into confusion, so that what Macaulay represents as due to the conduct of Hastings was rather due to the policy of the majority who wrested power from his hands and reversed his measures.

Whatever may have been the purpose of the conduct pursued by Francis and his associates, Hastings was driven to contemplate the resignation of his office. At first he had resolved to wait and see what the directors and ministry thought of the behaviour of the majority. Early in 1775 he sent to England as his agent an officer named Maclean, to represent his difficulties and try to secure support for him. In a moment of temporary and most unusual hesitation, he even empowered Maclean to tender his resignation if support could not be had. But a few weeks later he retracted this decision and wrote informing Maclean of his change of mind. In London Lord North was fully disposed to back his nominees; the ministerial agent, John Robinson, won over a majority of the directors by promises of patronage and

rewards, so that the ministry and the company seemed to be united in opposition to Hastings. In May, 1776, the directors agreed to move the crown to dismiss Hastings from office. But Hastings's friends hurriedly called a special meeting of the proprietors, who resolved that this proposal should not receive effect. Thus the ministry was itself defeated owing to the provisions of its own act, which, while limiting the number of directors to be elected year by year, had done nothing to meet the case of differences arising between the directors and proprietors. On this check, the ministry decided to modify the act so as to disable Hastings's friends among the proprietors from hindering his removal. Maclean, daunted by the hostility which he found in London, then proposed an accommodation. Hastings was to resign on condition of being well received on his return. Since this would have made way for Clavering's advance to the chair, the sole point in which North was really interested, the suggestion was accepted. The Order of the Bath was conferred upon Clavering as a mark of ministerial favour, and it seemed as though North had reached the object which he had been seeking by his usual devious means.

Events in India, however, moved quite contrary to his expectations. Monson had died in 1776, thus transferring the actual control of government into the hands of the governor-general, who had been consistently supported by Barwell (the other company's servant on the council) and whose casting vote now gave him a majority whenever he desired. He had not used his recovered power to introduce any great changes, conscious that his tenure of office was most uncertain; but he had recalled the majority agent, Bristow, from Oudh. In June, 1777, news reached Calcutta of the results of Maclean's negotiations. Clavering, who thought the game in his own hands, at once began to act as though he were governor-general. He summoned the council to meet, and prepared orders announcing the change of government to the garrison of Fort William. Hastings hesitated. On the one hand his friends had written informing him that they considered the bestowal of the Bath on Clavering with no corresponding honour for himself to be a breach of Maclean's agreement with the ministry and advising him not to resign. Having retracted his authority to Maclean, he certainly lay under no obligation to retire. He was most unwilling to deliver over the



charge of the company's affairs to a man who (he felt sure) would ruin them. But on the other hand he had to recognise the implacable hostility which appeared to have possessed the minds of the authorities in England. In these circumstances the precipitation of Clavering's conduct seems to have determined him to retain his office. He had not resigned; he had not been dismissed; yet the general was assuming the powers of his office. Hastings therefore defied him, and claimed that in acting as governor-general Clavering had tacitly vacated his office of commander-in-chief. On Hastings's suggestion the matter was referred to the judges for their opinion. They held that Hastings was still governor-general and Clavering still commander-in-chief. The latter reluctantly gave way, but could not overcome the chagrin which the turn of events had caused him. Elderly, high-living men almost always found the Indian climate fatal. For some months Clavering had fallen into poor health. He was covered with boils which exasperated a temper naturally violent. In August he was attacked with dysentery, and died on the 30th.

The news of these events reached London in the course of 1778. Since two of the three ministerial nominees had died, the third, Francis, hoped that his chance had come at last. He wrote to all his friends demanding their utmost activity in his favour, and he seems even to have received some sort of promise from North that he should be considered as a possible successor to Hastings's place as soon as the latter should have been removed. But Clavering's death had taken away North's main object in trying to get rid of Hastings. Moreover, public affairs were becoming difficult. To the American rebellion had just been added a war with France. North was unwilling to endanger the British position in India by removing a man of admitted capacity to make way for one who had never held high office and who was supported by no great parliamentary interests. Consequently the enmity against Hastings evaporated, and in 1779 the ministry even entered into an alliance with the friends of the governor-general on condition of receiving their aid in parliament. This arrangement led to the disappearance of Francis from Calcutta. He soon wearied of his fruitless opposition on ground where Hastings had clearly triumphed. He had secured the main purpose with which he had sailed to India, for he had made a large fortune at the whist table, mainly at the expense of Barwell.

But he was not to depart without one more dramatic incident. In 1780 Hastings had come to an ill-defined agreement with Francis in order to permit of Barwell's return to England. In the latter part of 1780, in consequence of differences over the conduct of the war which had broken out, Hastings recorded a minute in which he charged his enemy with an habitual breach of faith, public and private alike. Francis was obliged to respond to this by a challenge. In the duel which followed, Francis fired first, and missed. Hastings, with characteristic deliberation, waited till his aim had steadied, and Francis fell with a wound in the side. As soon as he recovered, he took a passage for England, to continue the struggle on ground with which he was more familiar and where his peculiar talents for intrigue would find freer scope. But for the moment the enemies sent out against the governor-general in 1773 had "sickened, died, and fled".

Nevertheless, it must be remembered that for seven years the chief efforts of Warren Hastings had been diverted by the consequences of the Regulating Act to defending his own position against a hostile element within his own council and against the hostility of the ministry in England, with small leisure to develop and continue the policy of reform which had marked the two years of his uncontested power. Nor was this the only handicap which the act laid upon him. In the field of foreign policy also he found his government invested with responsibility without power. The act was intended to give to the governor-general and council authority over the conduct of relations with the other rulers of India. But their legal rights were limited to the sanction of declarations of war and the conclusion of peace. The subordinate presidencies of Bombay and Madras could legally defy the intervention of the presidency of Bengal in all intermediate relations. They could so conduct their external affairs as to render war inevitable, and so mismanage a war as to render peace on any terms beneficial, while the evil tradition of the political functions of the commanding officer of the naval squadron still permitted the intervention of his authority however unexpected and inexpedient that might be. These difficulties first emerged in connection with the relations of Bombay with the Marāthas. In 1761 the great Pēshwā Bāji Rāo had died heart-broken at the defeat of Pānīpat. He had been succeeded by his son, Madhu Rāo, aged only seventeen, and naturally under guardianship. The

regent was his uncle, Rāghunāth Rāo, a man of unquestioned personal bravery but of a weak, vacillating character. In the next year, however, the young Pēshwā insisted on assuming the authority of his office. Wars followed with the Nizām and with Hyder 'Alī of Mysore, leading to projects of alliance on the part of the English with one or other of the contending parties. Internal difficulties also arose, and Rāghunāth, who had intrigued with other Marātha chiefs, was attacked and made prisoner. But Madhu Rāo's health soon began to fail. He was attacked by consumption, and died on November 18, 1772. He was succeeded by his brother Narāyan Rāo, and Rāghunāth Rāo enjoyed once more the regency of affairs. At the capital, Poona, however, he was opposed by the ablest of all the Marātha officials, Bālājī Janardhan, better known as Nāna Phadnavis, who had been brought forward by the late Madhu Rāo. At the same time affairs were complicated by the hostility which raged between Gopika Bai, the Pēshwā's mother, and Ānanda Bai, Rāghunāth Rāo's wife. As a result of their quarrels Rāghunāth Rāo was imprisoned in the palace. Further intrigues followed. The army was discontented. Rāghunāth sought to take advantage of this to secure his own release, while his wife sought vengeance against the Pēshwā and his mother. On August 30, 1773, a mutiny broke out. A party of infantry forced its way into the palace, and, although Rāghunāth Rāo interceded for his nephew, Narāyan Rāo was murdered, and Rāghunāth Rāo recognised as Pēshwā.

His success was short-lived. At Poona a strong party, headed by Nāna Phadnavis, counteracted his measures, and, when in the following year the late Pēshwā's wife was delivered of a son, the infant was formally recognised and a council of regency formed to conduct the administration. Rāghunāth Rāo, who had been campaigning against Hyder 'Alī, had hastened back to Poona on receiving the news of the probable birth of the child and had defeated a force sent to oppose him. But he had failed to follow up his victory, and so missed his opportunity of turning out the council of regency. Finding that Nāna Phadnavis was too strong for him, he then appealed for English help. Here, as in the Carnatic and elsewhere in India, European intervention was produced not by the aggressive ambitions of the European, but by the decay of the Indian states themselves and the desire of Indian princes for European support.

Bombay at this time was the weakest of the three presidencies. It comprised only a tiny island, facing the mainland where the strongest power in India held control. Under Bālājī Rāo the Marāthas had conquered from the Portuguese the fort of Bassein and the island of Salsette, thus rendering their control of the surrounding territory complete. Good relations with Poona were thus essential to Bombay, and in 1772 the company had wisely ordered the council to maintain a regular envoy with the Pēshwā, in the hope of securing privileges for the company's trade and if possible the cession of Bassein and Salsette, which would make the position of Bombay much more secure. Rāghunāth's overtures seemed to provide the opportunity of obtaining those places. But he, hoping to enlist Sindhia and Holkar in his cause, refused the English terms. Learning that the Portuguese at Goa had lately received large reinforcements and that they were about to use them in recovering Salsette and Bassein, the Bombay council resolved on instant action. One reason was that if the places passed again into the hands of the ancient ally of Great Britain their acquisition would become virtually impossible; the other that the Portuguese possession of Salsette would place all English trade with the interior under their control. Thāna, the chief post in Salsette, was attacked and captured on December 31, 1774. A little later, Rāghunāth, having failed to procure Marātha help from northern India, reopened discussions with the English, and, on March 7, 1775, the Treaty of Surat was signed. By this the English agreed to support Rāghunāth with a force of 2500 men, provided he bore the cost; in return he agreed to refrain from alliance with any enemy of the company, to make over Bassein and Salsette, and to deposit six lakhs as a security. A force under Colonel Keating had already reached Surat on February 27. On May 18 the allies met the Poona troops at Adas and completely defeated them after a prolonged contest. At the same time Commodore John Moore destroyed the Marātha fleet, and, encouraged by these victories, Fateh Singh Gaikwar, a claimant to Gujarāt, allied himself with the Bombay government. At Poona the supporters of Nāna Phadnavis began to desert him, and a resolute advance would probably have established Rāghunāth Rāo as Pēshwā, at all events for the time being.

This war had been begun and the Treaty of Surat had been signed without reference to the governor-general and council.


For this the Bombay council was not without excuse. Events had come to a crisis just before the new government at Calcutta had announced its assumption of office, and therefore before the Regulating Act need be considered in force. The signature of the treaty and the commencement of Keating's campaign were defended on the score of the company's positive orders and the pressing need of immediate action. On the receipt of the news the Bengal government unanimously condemned the conduct of its supposed subordinate. But it was more difficult to decide what course ought to be pursued. Hastings considered that any sudden reversal of policy was likely to cause more evil than good. The abandonment of Rāghunāth would make every Indian prince dubious of English faith. It was undeniable that the company had laid great stress on the acquisition of Salsette and Bassein. He therefore desired to limit and control the future action of Bombay rather than abruptly to denounce the treaty into which it had entered. The majority, however, was resolved to enforce its own views. On May 31 a despatch was addressed to the Bombay council requiring it at once to recall the company's forces "unless their safety may be endangered by an instant retreat". Later in the year it sent Colonel Upton to negotiate a peace with the Poona regency in its own name. Upton was ill-fitted for the duty. Neither he nor his secretary knew a word of Marāthi, and were in fact dependent on the interpreters supplied to them by the Marāthas themselves. Moreover, the Calcutta authorities had shown themselves manifestly eager for peace, and were so misguided as to fancy that they might get Salsette and Bassein in return for their pacific sentiments. Nāna Phadnavis of course sought to take advantage of this attitude. He refused to consider the possibility of any cessions of territory and demanded the surrender of Rāghunāth Rāo. This was more than Upton's instructions permitted, and, when he reported the deadlock, in February, 1776, the council suddenly became bellicose and threatened to resume hostilities. On March 1 the wisdom of this change of front was exhibited by the signature of the Treaty of Purandhar. It annulled the Treaty of Surat; it admitted the retention of Salsette and the cession of the Broach revenues; it agreed to the payment of twelve lakhs of rupees by Poona to cover the costs of the English campaign. Rāghunāth Rāo was to live in retirement in Gujarāt on a pension of three lakhs a year.

But the treaty never took effect. Rāghunāth Rāo, having received some encouragement from Sindhia, refused to accept the terms offered to him. The Bombay government, despite the protests of Upton, gave him shelter at Surat. The Poona regency never made any payments, and in the next year received a French adventurer with distinguished honours and agreed to grant the French a port in western India. Further complications arose from the conduct of the East India Company. Towards the close of 1776 a despatch from England approved the Treaty of Surat, on which the Bombay authorities at once invited Rāghunāth Rāo to take up his residence at Bombay. In the following year a further despatch arrived, regretting the Treaty of Purandhar and authorising the government of Bombay to make a new alliance with Rāghunāth if the Poona government attempted to evade its stipulations. The governor and council at once did so.

By this time the majority had fallen from power at Calcutta, leaving Hastings to meet the difficulties caused both by their own conduct and by the provisions of the act which had placed them in power. In 1778 Hastings learnt from Bombay that dissensions had at last broken out at Poona. The regency had long been divided between Sakharām Bāpu, a wavering and unreliable man, and Nāna Phadnavis, able but unscrupulous. Holkar promised Sakharām his help, and Maroba Phadnavis, a cousin of Nāna, joined him. This new group opened negotiations with Rāghunāth at Bombay, and the government of the presidency promised its support. This corresponded too closely with the orders of the company to be opposed by Hastings. He therefore decided to send a force from Bengal to march overland and join the Bombay troops. But almost at once the party with which the English hoped to co-operate began to dissolve. Nāna, who had for the moment been forced to flee from Poona, bought over Holkar with nine lakhs of rupees, induced his cousin to rejoin him and then shut him up in prison, and thus recovered the headship of affairs. Governor Hornby from Bombay at once called upon him to declare whether he was willing to give full effect to the Treaty of Purandhar and dismiss the French adventurer with whom he was still negotiating. When he refused to give an explicit answer, the council resolved to plunge at once into war. It proposed to establish Rāghunāth Rāo as regent on behalf of the young Pēshwā Madhu Rāo Narāyan. In November, 1778, the

Bombay forces took the field. They consisted of 600 Europeans and 3300 sepoys. The military command was placed in the hands of Colonel Egerton, an officer of indifferent health and no Indian experience, but the control really lay with a committee of three, consisting of the commander and two members of the council. It does not seem to have occurred to the Bombay government that if it could not trust its commander it had better not go to war. Rāghunāth accompanied the expedition. It carried with it an enormous baggage-train of 19,000 bullocks, and could march barely two miles an hour. In January, 1779, Egerton resigned his command and was succeeded by Colonel Cockburn. On the 9th at Talegāon at the top of the Ghauts a large Marātha army was encountered. Cockburn considered that he could force his way to Poona twenty miles off if he abandoned his baggage. But the committee, despite Rāghunāth's entreaties, resolved to retire. The stores were burnt; the guns thrown into a tank; and on the 12th the army marched three miles to Wadgāon, harassed by perpetual attacks. Further retreat being deemed impossible, the committee entered into negotiations, Rāghunāth took refuge with Sindhia, and the Convention of Wadgāon was signed. It promised the surrender of all territory acquired since 1773, the withdrawal of the force advancing from Bengal, the transfer of the Broach revenues to Sindhia, and the giving of hostages as a security for the due performance of the terms. Although Hornby and his council had not authorised and promptly disavowed these disgraceful terms, they cannot be acquitted of having brought about the failure of their enterprise, both by the unwise arrangements made for the control of the expedition, and by the haste with which they had embarked on their action without awaiting the promised support from Bengal.

On January 30 the Bengal detachment marched into Burhānpur, and on February 26 reached Surat. Hastings had rightly calculated that neither Sindhia nor Holkar would care to oppose its movements, since by so doing they would endanger the safety of their own territories. Colonel Leslie, the officer under whose command the detachment had at first been placed, had proved to be slack and unenterprising. But he had died in October, 1778, and the command had then been given to Colonel Goddard, who had thus carried to a successful end the project from which Francis had anticipated nothing but failure. Goddard remained under





the orders of the governor-general and council, but on his arrival he was invested with the command of the local troops and given a seat on the local council by the Bombay government. By this means the operations of the Bombay presidency were at last placed under the effective control of the Bengal government. Circumstances had proved too strong at Bombay, as they were to prove at Madras, for the Regulating Act to receive its full legal effect touching the relations between the Bengal government and those of the subordinate presidencies.

Goddard had been empowered by Hastings to seek an accommodation with the Poona government. But Nāna Phadnavis would accept nothing less than the surrender of Salsette and the handing over of Rāghunāth, who had escaped from Sindhia's custody and taken refuge with Goddard. Towards the end of the rains, however, Goddard heard of a rumoured agreement between the Marāthas, the Nizām, and Hyder 'Ali for a concerted attack upon the English. He then entered into discussions with Fateh Singh Gaekwar. Having crossed the Tapṛī on January 1, 1780, he induced that chief to sign a treaty on the 26th, by which the English were to receive the revenues of certain districts as soon as they had put Fateh Singh in possession of Ahmadābād and other territory of the Pēshwā, and meanwhile to be joined at once by Fateh Singh with 3000 horse. Ahmadābād was captured on February 15, and a campaign followed in Gujarāt, where the Marāthas succeeded in keeping the field. But Hastings, mindful of the need of breaking the confederacy, entered into alliance with the rāna of Gohad, a long-standing enemy of Sindhia, and sent more troops to threaten Sindhia's northern territories. On August 3, Popham captured Gwalior by escalade. The place had always been regarded as impregnable. Sindhia at once abandoned Gujarāt and retired to cover his own revenues. This permitted Goddard to move to attack Bassein, which he took on December 11. He then attempted to threaten Poona itself. But seeking to retire in the face of a superior force he underwent the one serious reverse of his career. The effects of this defeat were, however, more than compensated by the defeat which Camac inflicted on Sindhia's troops at Sipṛī on February 16, 1781. Sindhia now came to the conclusion that his interests lay in an alliance with the English. He had long been aiming at the control of the Marātha Confederacy. His own defeats and the success which

Holkar had just secured meant a set-back in his plans. He therefore opened negotiations, and on October 13 agreed to a cessation of hostilities and undertook to effect a treaty between the English and the Poona government. This led to the Treaty of Sālbaī, signed on May 17, 1782, though not ratified by Nāna Phadnavis till February 26, 1783. At first sight the clauses of the treaty do not seem specially important. All English conquests made since the Treaty of Purandhar were to be restored. Rāghunāth was to receive no more help from the English. Hyder 'Alī, who was not a party to the treaty, was to give up the territories which he had seized from the nawab of Arcot. It thus stipulated for the mere *status quo ante bellum*. But it nevertheless marks a turning-point in the history both of the Marāthas and of the English company. Mahādaji Sindhia, through whose agency the treaty was made, was the greatest Indian prince of his day. He was looking forward to the establishment of a powerful state in northern India, centring round Delhi, fortified with the prestige of the imperial name, and gathering round itself as satellites the other Marātha states, so as to renew the old confederacy under fresh leadership and on fresh terms. His alliance with the English meant that so long as he did not attack their interests he would be free to pursue his plans. On the English side it marked a great triumph for Hastings's skill and tenacity. The year 1780 had formed a tremendous crisis. No man could tell if some powerful French expedition might not arrive in Indian waters, just at the moment when the company was menaced by the two chief leaders of India. The revenues of Bengal were visibly weakening under the strain of maintaining war in several theatres at once. Most of Hastings's advisers and colleagues were clamouring for peace with Poona on any terms. But he, with the same constancy with which he had faced the pistol of Francis, drove on his course until he had wrested from circumstance a favourable conclusion. "If you would employ effectual means for obtaining peace", he had written, "you must seek them in the terrors of a continued war. . . . If you expect to obtain it by concession and entreaty, . . . you will be disappointed." The Treaty of Sālbaī was the vindication of his words.

But if the conduct of the Bombay council had involved Hastings in a policy which he himself had never chosen and which reduced him to the need of making the best of a bad business,

the conduct of Madras affairs involved him in worse difficulties still, for it brought on new disasters at a most critical moment. The fall of Pondichery in 1761 had established in the south a position not unlike that in Bengal following on the battle of Plassey. The nawab, Muhammad 'Alī, was wholly dependent on the English for the maintenance of his position. On his western borders had arisen a new state. A Muslim adventurer of great capacity both in war and in administration, Hyder 'Alī, had overthrown the old Hindu dynasty and set up his own rule. He had on the whole been disposed to cultivate friendship with the English, who were his neighbours on both sides of India. But that design had proved impossible. Hyder, like all newly established and ambitious princes, coveted the lands on his borders. He was always at war with the Marāthas; he was always threatening the Carnatic. But whereas his hostility to the Marāthas might easily have made him an acceptable ally of Bombay, his hostility to Muhammad 'Alī made him an inevitable enemy of Madras. In 1767, by a course of policy the causes of which remain obscure, war had broken out between him and the nawab. The Carnatic had been severely ravaged; and, though Hyder had been defeated in pitched battles at Changama and Trinomalai, he had much the best of the war, which was ended in 1769 by a treaty concluded at Madras. Muhammad 'Alī's finances, which remained under his own incompetent management, had been thrown into complete confusion. The French war had left him with a large debt to the company. In the next few years he had seemed to be paying off this debt, but in fact he was only doing so by borrowing from the company's servants and other persons at Madras at a much higher rate of interest than was due to the company. As soon as the directors learned of this, they prohibited their servants from participating in such loans in future and ordered the rate of interest to be reduced. But the private debt remained the dominant political interest at Madras. Paul Benfield, an engineer in the company's service, who in modern times would have made a great name as a financier, became a most active agent in the matter. At one time he was said to have in his hands the fortunes of everyone in Madras, allowing them 2 per cent. a month, while he was principal manager of the nawab's finances as well. The importance of increasing the nawab's revenues came thus to out-

weigh every other consideration. It furnished the motive for two expeditions against the raja of Tanjore in 1771 and 1773, the second of which ended in the annexation of the state by the nawab. On learning of this, the directors at once ordered the restoration of the raja to his territories, and appointed governor of Madras Lord Pigot, who had formerly held the same office during the crisis of the Seven Years' War. Vigorous rather than tactful, Pigot encountered the bitterest opposition. This was headed by the commander-in-chief, Sir Robert Fletcher. He had already distinguished himself by playing a more than dubious part in the opposition to Clive in Bengal in 1766. He and Benfield's friends succeeded in securing a majority on the council against the governor, and, though they did not dare to refuse compliance with the company's orders, they placed the governor under arrest in 1776, and kept him in confinement till he died a year later. In 1778 this state of internal confusion was ended by the appointment of Sir Thomas Rumbold as governor.

But Rumbold proved neither more honest nor more capable than his predecessors. Madras was poverty-stricken; the nawab's loans had fallen to a great discount; but policy still hinged upon the debt and the possibility of wringing gifts from the nawab. As an example it may be mentioned that Rumbold invited the nawab to act as godfather to a son who was born to him at Madras and who was therefore baptized after his godfather by the name of Anwaer. This and other acts of complaisance are said to have cost the nawab over fifteen lakhs of rupees. These gifts, however, meant that the nawab was not to be pressed more than could be avoided for the payments on which the maintenance of the company's military forces depended. The expedient which occurred to Rumbold to relieve the financial situation was to get rid of the tribute annually payable to the Nizām for the Northern Circars. Those districts had been granted by Shāh 'Ālam to the company at the same time as the *diwānī* of Bengal. But when the Madras government had attempted to act upon this grant, it had found that the *farmān* was valueless without the assent of Nizām 'Alī who actually possessed the Circars. By a treaty with the latter, three out of the four were transferred to the company on condition of an annual payment of five lakhs of rupees. This was already two years in arrears when Rumbold proposed to the Nizām that it should cease altogether. Another

subject of difference had also occurred. It had been agreed that the Circar of Guntoor should be held by Basālat Jang, the Nizām's brother, for life and should afterwards revert to the company. Basālat Jang had agitated the Madras government by taking a body of French troops into his pay. At first attempts had been made to secure their removal. Then in January, 1779, when Basālat Jang was being threatened by Hyder 'Alī, a treaty was made with him by which he ceded the circar to the company. The circar was at once leased out to Muhammad 'Alī and an English force was sent to protect the district from Hyder. These measures completely indisposed the Nizām and Hyder 'Alī against the company. The Nizām contented himself with stirring up discontent. But Hyder, with his usual decision of character, resolved upon war, for which the contest between the English and the Marāthas provided him with a most favourable opportunity. At the same time he hoped to receive the co-operation of the French, who had lately declared war on Great Britain. He steadily prepared himself but for the moment withheld his attack. In the spring of 1780 Rumbold decided to return to England, confident that, since the presidency had lately received a royal regiment from England, Hyder would not dare to risk a war. In July Hyder suddenly invaded the Carnatic, which was wholly unprepared to resist. Hector Munro, the former victor of Buxar, was commander-in-chief. He marched out in full confidence of driving the invaders out of the Carnatic. But a party of English troops moving to join him was severely defeated at Pollilūr. He retired hastily on Madras. The council, at its wits' end, informed Bengal that all was lost unless assistance in men and money could be instantly sent.

In the development of these events the governor-general and council had hardly been consulted. Rumbold indeed held the view that the Regulating Act was to be understood literally and that so long as he neither went to war nor signed a treaty Bengal had no control over his actions. Nor had Bengal interfered until it seemed likely that the Nizām would be driven into the arms of the Marāthas, when it assumed the conduct of political relations with him, and succeeded in smoothing down his ruffled sensibilities. Nevertheless, Hastings found himself in 1780 committed to a new war with which he had had nothing to do. He must either send help from Bengal or allow Hyder to besiege

Madras. In these circumstances he resolved to send Sir Eyre Coote, the commander-in-chief, with as large a body of men as could be spared and a considerable sum of money. But these resources were not to be wasted by the incompetent council. Coote was to procure the resignation of Whitehill, who had succeeded to the chair on Rumbold's departure, assume the whole conduct of the war, and keep the funds under his own management. He was intended to do at Madras what Goddard had succeeded in doing at Bombay—establish the control of the governor-general and council.

These measures secured a partial success. Coote, who enjoyed a deservedly high reputation as a soldier, soon restored the confidence of the Madras army, defeated Hyder at Porto Novo, Pollilūr and Sholingarh, but, like the commander in the former Mysore war, failed altogether to expel Hyder from the Carnatic. The chief cause of this lay in the superior mobility of Hyder's troops. He was strong, Coote was excessively weak, in cavalry. Coote was moreover burdened with an immense transport train. He had to carry with him a disproportionate amount of artillery in order to keep Hyder's horse at a respectful distance; the number of his camp-followers was enormous, and he was not willing to incur unpopularity by insisting on their reduction. The consequence was that his demands on the Madras council for cattle and grain were greater than could be supplied from an area already wasted by war. For this he fiercely blamed the civil authorities, and his vituperations have usually been repeated. The fault, however, lay elsewhere. The plan of the campaign was wrong. The easiest way by which Hyder could have been compelled to withdraw from the Carnatic was not to march after him at the rate of two miles an hour but, as Hastings had done in the case of Sindhia, to carry the war into his territories. He had conquered the districts lying along the Malabar Coast from a number of small Hindu chiefs, and they resented the Muslim domination. Coote should have been content to protect Madras itself and despatch the strongest force he could spare to attack Hyder on the west coast, where the enemy would have been compelled either to lay waste his own territories and destroy his own revenues or meet the invaders in the field. But Coote was probably too eager to multiply his laurels by defeating Hyder in the Carnatic to adopt a plan which would either have removed

himself from the Carnatic or have diminished the forces under his immediate command. He therefore remained in the Carnatic till the autumn of 1782, failing to achieve the purpose of his campaign and seeking to throw all the blame on the civil authorities.

It was not to be expected that this should be borne meekly. In the middle of 1781 a new governor, Lord Macartney, had arrived from England. He was a man of character, with both administrative and diplomatic experience, and had been chosen in order to free the Madras government from its subservience to the corrupt influences of the nawab's debt. The war with Hyder had not been heard of when he had left England, and the position which he found on his arrival was a grievous disappointment to him. The first step which he decided to take was to induce the nawab to make over to the English for the period of the war the administration of the Carnatic revenues. This he succeeded in doing. But the nawab then refused to appoint the agents whom Macartney recommended. The effect of this would have been to nullify the transfer of the management; Macartney therefore insisted on appointing them himself. This action revived the combination which had overthrown Pigot in 1776. The nawab, Paul Benfield, and others did their utmost to cancel the assignment of the revenues. They appealed to Warren Hastings. They sought to lure Coote into the business by offering him an illusory assignment of the revenues in his own name. This quarrel was complicated by disputes which had arisen between Madras and Bengal regarding the conduct of the war. Just before Macartney's arrival Hastings had urged the Madras council to leave the whole management of the war to Coote. The council, overawed, had complied, and Macartney had acquiesced in the situation which he found in being. When Coote reiterated his complaints, Hastings urged Macartney to humour the commander-in-chief. Macartney agreed provided that the responsibility also was to rest on Coote's shoulders. But that was a burden which Coote was not willing to bear. Coote kept his plans entirely to himself, limited his communications to demands for money, cattle, and supplies, and at the same time threatened Macartney with accusations of ruining the campaign. Hastings's position was one of great embarrassment. He did not wish to disoblige Coote, lest he should in a huff return to Calcutta and vote against the measures of the governor-general. He did

not wish to disoblige Benfield, whose friends had greatly assisted in the accommodation between himself and Lord North. He thus found himself obliged to support the nawab's cause and Coote's cause against the governor of Madras. This led to an open breach between the two governments. Bengal ordered Madras to resign the assignment of the Carnatic revenues; Madras refused.

Early in 1783 Coote, who had passed the cold weather at Calcutta, was about to return to the south. He demanded powers to overrule the local council and if necessary to displace Macartney. Hastings favoured compliance with his demands; but in this he was not supported by the other members of his council, and Coote finally sailed without the authority he had desired. On his way down his vessel was chased by a French frigate. The agitation caused by fear of capture brought on a stroke of apoplexy. The old general was carried ashore at Madras speechless, and died almost at once. It was perhaps fortunate. Macartney had determined to resist by every means in his power what he believed to be unwarranted demands which would ruin the British cause in the south. The command of the Madras troops passed into the hands of Major-General James Stuart, as quarrelsome as Coote, but a far less formidable opponent of the civil government. Early in the year a great expedition had at last arrived from France under the command of Bussy, now old and worn out. Bussy had landed and occupied Cuddalore. Stuart was ordered to march southwards and attack him. Resenting orders of any sort, Stuart languidly pursued his march, spending six weeks over the hundred miles separating Madras from Cuddalore. He then attacked the French position, and two stubborn actions followed in which both sides lost heavily. But events at sea had placed the English in a desperate position.

Throughout the war an English squadron had been maintained on the coast, at first under the command of Vernon and afterwards under that of Sir Edward Hughes. In 1782 a French squadron had arrived under the greatest admiral whom the French ever produced. This was the Bailli de Suffren. He was filled with an indomitable energy; and his one thought was not the safety of his ships but the destruction of the enemy. He was moreover a fighter of great intelligence, and was ever thinking out plans for modifying the stereotyped methods of naval manœuvre. A series of engagements followed his arrival.



Hughes at first succeeded in holding his own, though with difficulty. More than once Suffren succeeded in concentrating a superior force of ships against a part of Hughes's line of battle. But the decisive victory which Suffren was seeking evaded his grasp. His subordinate officers were of inferior quality and failed to understand the instructions which they received; and in every circumstance he was encountered by a most obstinate resistance. Nevertheless, he was wearing down the enemy. Finally in June, 1783, he attacked the English off Cuddalore, where they were covering the operations of Stuart, and inflicted on them so much damage that they were obliged to retire to Madras to refit. That event left Stuart helpless. He could receive no further supplies of food, and must have been reduced either to ignominious surrender or to disastrous retreat but for the first piece of good fortune which had befallen the English in the course of the war. This was the arrival of the news of the conclusion of peace in Europe. A suspension of arms followed, and the fruit of Suffren's vigour and skill was lost.

Macartney had been most dissatisfied with Stuart's military conduct. The general was therefore recalled, as soon as news of peace was received. The order was reluctantly obeyed, and, as soon as Stuart reached Madras, he began a series of intrigues, which looked the more threatening since he had been the officer selected in 1776 to arrest Lord Pigot. The real point at issue was whether the military forces should or should not be under the command of the governor and council. Macartney was resolved that his authority should be obeyed, and decided to arrest Stuart and send him off to England. This was accordingly done. But even then his difficulties were not at an end. The officer next in seniority was Sir John Burgoyne, a king's officer. He was offered the command provided he was willing to execute whatever orders he should receive from the civil government. On his refusal, a company's officer was named commander-in-chief. This was a dangerous measure which almost led to a conflict between the king's and company's troops. Burgoyne, however, though unwise, had nothing of Stuart's malignity of character, and the matter was smoothed over, although a mutiny actually broke out among the king's regiments as the result of the unsettlement which these events had produced.

Meanwhile the war had been pursued against Mysore with

better success than had at first attended the British plans. Hyder 'Alī had died at the end of 1782, and had been succeeded by his son Tipu Sultān. Hastings had long been urging on both Madras and Bombay the need of an expedition to attack the Malabar possessions of Mysore. At last in 1783 a force was sent from Bombay under a company's officer named Matthews, who landed at Mangalore and occupied the capital of the province of Bednor. This at once compelled Tipu to recall his forces from the Carnatic, and he himself hastily marched to expel the intruders. Matthews had imprudently scattered his force, and was besides much embarrassed by the jealousy exhibited by the king's officers who had been placed under his orders. He was besieged in Bednor and compelled to surrender. Tipu then marched to recover Mangalore, which was held by a king's officer, Colonel Campbell. The latter defended the place gallantly, but at last agreed to an armistice on very unfavourable terms, under which he was precluded from receiving supplies by sea, the only way by which they could possibly be sent. The consequence was that when supplies arrived by sea and the English insisted on their being admitted into the place, Tipu considered himself free again to carry on his siege-works.

As soon as he had removed Stuart from the command of the army, Macartney had sent a force to attack Tipu's southern possessions. Dindigul had been taken early in 1783. In June Dharapuram was taken, and the English were preparing to advance when they were ordered to halt and await the issue of proposals which had been made to Tipu for peace. One of the terms of the agreement made by Sindhia's means at Sālbāi had been that Tipu should be compelled to make peace with the English. But the Marāthas had been so long without making any move in that direction that Macartney had come to disbelieve in their sincerity. Since the preliminaries of peace declared that the allies of both combatants should be invited to accede, he thought it best to make direct proposals to Mysore, and sent commissioners to confer with Tipu, who was still before Mangalore. In December, on reports that hostilities had again broken out there, Macleod on the Malabar Coast seized Cannanore, while the English in the south captured Palghaut and Coimbatore, before their movements could be countermanded by the commissioners. On January 29 Mangalore was sur-

rendered by Campbell, owing to the sickness which prevailed in the garrison. Shortly afterwards the commissioners reached Tipu's camp. They then negotiated the Treaty of Mangalore, by which each side restored all conquests and agreed to release all prisoners. Military officers, indignant at peace at the moment when success seemed possible, spread numerous stories about the conclusion of this treaty. But there is no reason to suppose that the commissioners were treated with worse than the contemptuous pride which was to have been expected. Tipu believed himself to have won the war and behaved accordingly. A large number of English prisoners were then released. But those who had been coerced into adopting Islam during their captivity were retained. The treatment of the prisoners had been severe, but no ground exists for believing the stories which were told of many having been deliberately put to death. The treaty was strongly disapproved by Hastings, mainly on the ground that it made no reference to the Treaty of Sālbaī. He actually moved that Macartney should be suspended from his office of governor on the ground of his having disobeyed the orders of the Bengal government. But this proposal was not accepted by his councillors, probably for no better reason than that Macartney had influential friends in England.

Amid this confusion of authorities, of quarrels between the civil and military powers at Madras, between the king's and company's officers, between the councils of Madras and Bengal, it had been completely impossible for Hastings to direct the conduct of affairs. They had passed out of his control, but, as in Bombay, he was left to pay the bill. The Marātha and Mysore wars had burdened the Bengal finances to such a point that the company's investment had to be provided by private subscription. Hastings was driven by this state of things to extraordinary expedients which were afterwards made the subject of accusation against him, without sufficient consideration of the difficulties under which he had lain, and without memory of the anarchical conditions created by the Regulating Act. The two famous incidents which occurred in this connection were the affair of Chait Singh and the affair of the Begums of Oudh. Chait Singh was the zamindar of Benares. As soon as the French war broke out, Hastings proposed that he should be called upon for an extra contribution to help meet the costs of the war. In this he was

justified by the well-established practice of India, where the ruler's demands were limited only by his will and sense of the expedient. Later on new demands were made and in 1780 Hastings resolved to visit Benares personally in order to overcome Chait Singh's delays. Chait Singh does not seem to have intended opposition. He met Hastings at Buxar, and submitted to the arrest in which Hastings placed him. On reaching Benares, a tumult broke out, a company of sepoys was destroyed, and Hastings had to flee for his life to Chunār. There he gathered together forces, reoccupied Benares, declared the fugitive Chait Singh dispossessed of the zamindari, regranted it to a nephew of the dispossessed chief, and increased the tribute from two and a quarter to four lakhs of rupees a year. Hastings's enemies attempted to prove that Chait Singh was not a mere zamindar, and that the company had no right to claim more from him than the fixed tribute. The first point seems untenable. Benares was handed over to the company by the ruler of Oudh, whose authority was henceforth exercised by the government of Calcutta; Chait Singh certainly never possessed sovereignty. The custom of India again strongly favoured the contention of Hastings that the tribute payable was unlimited. Hastings acted therefore within the rights which any other ruler of India would not have hesitated to use. At the same time it is clear that Chait Singh was treated with severity, and that Hastings's conduct at Benares in 1780 was precipitate. The fact doubtless was that Hastings was feeling the results of a long period of strife and disappointment, that his judgment was less clear and calm than usual, and that he was urged on by the spur of need. It is likely also that Hastings had never forgiven Chait Singh for having sent a messenger to Clavering in the crisis of 1777, and was not sorry to exhibit to the Indian world the consequences of incurring his displeasure.

Perhaps, however, the chief criticism which should be passed on his conduct towards Chait Singh is that it failed of its immediate object. He was in need of money at once; and the outbreak at Benares disappointed him of the sum which he had hoped to obtain, although his settlement augmented the future resources of the company. He thus found himself obliged to seek out some new source of finance. Āsaf-ud-daula, the nawab of Oudh, owed the company at this time some fifteen lakhs

of rupees. In 1781 in consequence of Hastings's urgent demands, he proposed to resume the *jāgīrs* and seize the treasure of which his late father's wives had improperly possessed themselves. This matter had long been a subject of dispute between the two parties, and at an earlier time the begums had been compelled to disgorge part of their spoils under a promise made by Bristow, the resident appointed by the majority, that no more should be demanded of them. Āsaf-ud-daula, who was a man of feeble character, possibly hoped that the former promise might serve as an obstacle to the acceptance of his proposal, while his offer might relieve him from immediate pressure for money. But since Hastings's need of money was great and growing, the nawab was urged to carry his suggestion into effect. The begums were therefore placed under restraint, and their chief agents were imprisoned for almost a year. In December, 1782, they agreed to pay over a large sum of money and were duly released. The defence put forward for withdrawing the promise of protection from the begums was that they had promoted rebellion in the Benares country. But for this little evidence appears. Like Chait Singh, the begums were treated with severity, although the degree of their ill-treatment was greatly exaggerated by Hastings's enemies, and in their case the matter was darkened by something like a breach of faith.

In February, 1785, Hastings sailed for England, being convinced by the terms of Pitt's India Act that he was not likely to remain undisturbed in the office which he had held for so long. Indeed, for years Francis had been busily employing his matchless talents for slander against the governor-general. He sedulously inflamed the enthusiasm of Edmund Burke against what he declared to be a system of torture and corruption. When Shelburne went out of office and the Coalition Ministry of Fox and North was formed, official hostility reappeared, stronger than ever it had been before. All the Whigs were united against Hastings, while the Tories were languid in his defence. The fall of the coalition and the accession of Pitt to power did nothing to change this state of things. Early in 1786, shortly after Hastings's return to England, Burke brought forward charges on which the impeachment of Hastings was subsequently founded. Then arose the situation which Burke himself had foreseen in an earlier day. "God defend me", he had once exclaimed in the House of

Commons, "from the justice of this house when supported by neither the faction of one side nor the venality of the other." An informed survey of the career of Hastings revealed errors, revealed occasional acts which cannot well be defended, but revealed also a high and noble constancy of purpose, a mind of extraordinary qualities, as hard, as flexible, and as resistant as the finest-tempered steel. Justice would have demanded condemnation of his errors, but recognition of his great and unequalled services. Probably not another man of his generation could have carried the company's government through the period during which the Regulating Act remained in force without incurring great, perhaps irretrievable, disaster. In every other part of the outer realms of George III rebellion, defeat, humiliation had been the national portion. In India alone national interests remained unharmed. And the reward prepared by Francis and Burke was a series of accusations, vague and general, such as no court of law would ever have entertained, accusations supported by an unending stream of eloquence, designed to make the worse appear the better reason.

After long debates the impeachment was resolved on twenty-two articles in May, 1787. The charges involved the violation of treaties with Oudh, the unrighteous sale of Kora and Allāhābād, the oppression of Chait Singh and the Begums of Oudh, the arbitrary settlement of the land revenues of Bengal, and fraud and corruption in general administration. On April 23, 1795, Hastings was acquitted on all the charges which were pressed to a conclusion. The redeeming feature of the trial was the care with which the lords reviewed the evidence submitted to them, and the view which evidently inspired them at the conclusion that Hastings had suffered far more than any mistakes and misconduct of which he had been guilty could possibly demand. It was but just that Burke never recovered from this decisive condemnation of his conduct in the matter. Throughout the trial he had been the leading spirit, and after it he was a broken man. Hastings on the other hand showed his true spirit. He bore his seven years' ordeal as he had withstood the majority in the council-room of Fort William. He believed with reason that he had saved English interests in India, that he had governed the territories committed to his charge with justice, that the inhabitants of Bengal had heard of his departure with sorrow, and that the princes of India would

have welcomed his return to direct the affairs of the East India Company. Indeed, it is hardly less than tragic to think that the one supremely great man whom England sent to rule India was checked in every action either by opposition in his own council, or by hostility of the home government, or by the provisions of the worst piece of legislation which ever passed the British parliament regarding India. If Burke had wished to impeach any one, he would have done well to choose his old enemy Lord North, the author of the Regulating Act, rather than Warren Hastings, its unhappy victim.

## CHAPTER V

### The Establishment of the East India Company as the Supreme Power in India, 1784-1818

The resignation of Warren Hastings marks the end of one and the beginning of a new period in the history of the East India Company. The disastrous experiment of the Regulating Act was brought to a close by Pitt's India Act. As will be shown in the following chapter, an effective system of government was at last established. The political conduct of the East India Company was placed in due subordination to the policy of the national government; and the governor-general and council of Bengal received power sufficient to permit their control of British policy in India. In the previous generation Clive and Hastings had led the way in a great experiment. With imperfect powers and insignificant resources they had established the company as a vital force in Indian politics. Clive had seized a lucky opportunity; and Hastings had maintained the company's position in defiance of difficulties created principally by the folly and ignorance of London. His successors were now to enjoy advantages which he had never known—consistent support, freedom from interference, untrammelled authority.

Hastings had been ignorantly supposed to pursue a policy of aggression. Such conduct was specially disliked at London. The directors feared that it might endanger the advantages which had been obtained; the ministry feared that the resources of the nation might be involved in some great struggle. Therefore the India Act sought to prevent the future representatives of the company from following Hastings's supposed example. It specifically declared that wars of aggression were contrary to the wishes, the interests, and the policy of the nation. But this attempt to regulate the conduct of external policy by moral maxims was foredoomed to fail. Wars of aggression are probably the most exceptional events in history. One state attacks another because its rights have been injured, because its interests are threatened, because it fears that unless it attacks it will itself be attacked at a disadvantage. Almost



all wars, in the eyes of both parties, are wars of defence. The period ushered in by this pacific declaration was therefore as militant as that which had preceded it.

Some have put forward the view that this was due to the brutal and ferocious policy of the governors-general. But this facile explanation takes no account of the state of India. The country remained in the state of flux to which it had been reduced by the collapse of the Mughal empire. A number of new states had emerged, but none of them recognised any natural boundaries, and every prince was eager to extend his territories. But their position varied greatly. The Rājput states, the Carnatic, Oudh, Hyderabad, feared their neighbours, and were prepared to take any measures and to welcome any allies promising even a temporary relief from their immediate dangers. Two of these, Oudh and the Carnatic, had already accepted the alliance of the East India Company, and in fact depended for their continued existence on the military support of their ally. Hyderabad was at constant war with its Marātha neighbours at Poona, and was usually worsted. The Rājput princes feared the advance of the Marātha chiefs who had established themselves in northern India and who threatened to reduce them to tributary subordinates. On the other side there were two states which clearly aspired to greater power than at the moment they possessed. One of these was Mysore under the rule of Hyder 'Alī's son, Tipu Sultān. Tipu lacked his father's capacity for government, but inherited all his ambition. He had declared himself king in his own right, thus expressly disclaiming any dependence on the Mughal empire, still recognised by every other prince and ruler of India with the exception of the Marātha Holkar. He was extremely orthodox, and afflicted his Hindu subjects, especially on the Malabar Coast, where they were newly conquered and unsubmissive, with forced conversion and the destruction of temples, like another Aurangzīb. Like the Nizām of Hyderabad, he was constantly at war with the Marāthas on his northern frontier: but, unlike the Nizām, he was able to meet them on equal terms. He also yearned to redeem the Carnatic from its subservience to the infidel authority of the English, whom his father had reduced to such straits in 1780. Beside him was the group of states known as the Marātha Confederacy. This formed by far the most powerful political unit in India. The confederacy was composed of that part of the Deccan under the direct rule of

the Pēshwā from Poona, of Baroda under the Gaekwar, of Nāg-pur under the Bhonslas, of two groups of territory round Ahmadābād and round Gwalior under Mahādaji Sindhia, and of Indore under Holkar. Of all these the Pēshwā was the nominal head. But his effective authority had already begun to break. Princes who had willingly obeyed Bālājī Rāo or Bāji Rāo at an earlier time, when the Pēshwā's power was great and their own small, had adopted more independent views when the power of the Pēshwā had been reduced by the struggles centring round Rāghunāth Rāo and when their own power and dominions had increased. Now Mahādaji Sindhia aspired to succeed to the headship of the Marāthas. He had widely extended his dominions in northern India; he had occupied Delhi and taken the emperor under his protection. From his protégé he had required the appointment of the Pēshwā as the chief lieutenant of the empire, with himself as the Pēshwā's deputy. As has been seen in the previous chapter, he had intervened in the war between the Pēshwā and the English, and had agreed with the latter to bring it to a conclusion. But his ambitions were viewed with great jealousy. Holkar was always ready to support the ministers at Poona if Sindhia attacked them. Great as the confederacy still was, it was seamed with divisions, no longer capable of common action, and ready to break asunder under the pressure of conflicting interests.


After a short interval during which John Macpherson acted as governor-general, Cornwallis arrived as his successor. He reached Calcutta on September 12, 1786, bent on giving the fullest effect to the acts of parliament and on abstaining from all interference in the politics of India. So far as northern India was concerned he succeeded. The only event of note in which he was involved in that area occurred when Sindhia, having become the emperor's deputy chief-lieutenant, thought of claiming the annual twenty-six lakhs of rupees which Clive had agreed to pay for the *dāwāni* of Bengal. Cornwallis promptly and firmly warned Sindhia that any attempt to promote that claim would be treated as an unfriendly act. The warning was sufficient. Sindhia, who was only testing the attitude of the new governor-general, dropped the matter immediately. But affairs in the south were less easy to manage. Tipu's attitude was definitely hostile. The Treaty of Mangalore had named the raja of Travancore as one of

the allies of the company whom Tipu agreed not to threaten or attack. The raja had lately purchased from the Dutch certain factories and forts which, in the decaying state of their trade, they no longer wished to retain. Tipu claimed that these places were dependencies of chiefs who had recognised his own supremacy, and demanded that they should be handed over to him. On learning of this, Cornwallis at once ordered John Hollond, the governor of Madras, to inform Tipu that any attack on Travancore would be deemed an attack on the East India Company. The governor, however, was not willing to carry out the order. He belonged to the old, bad generation which had been deeply interested in the nawab's debts. He feared that a war with Tipu would mean the ravaging of the Carnatic as in the time of Hyder 'Alī, and that the nawab would be unable to pay his private creditors. Tipu therefore was not warned as early or as firmly as Cornwallis had intended. He attacked Travancore, commanding in person the troops who were employed; and this action led at once to the Third Mysore War. But the circumstances of the moment were very different from those in which Hyder had attacked the English in 1780. Tipu had cherished hopes of overthrowing first the Nizām, then the Marāthas, and finally the English. He had sent embassies to Paris, and, although the French government was not prepared actively to assist his plans, it was not at all unwilling to see its old European enemy opposed and thwarted in the east. Tipu received encouragement which he was unlucky and unwise enough to take at its face-value. In 1785-87 he was engaged in war with Poona and Hyderabad, leading to an inconclusive peace. Cornwallis, judging from Tipu's embassy to Paris, concluded that war with France would mean immediate war with Tipu, and that the company's safety demanded an alliance with Tipu's late enemies. The India Act precluded him from entering into treaties with them at once, for it forbade any alliance in preparation for war. But he took care to cultivate a good understanding with Nāna Phadnavis, who still controlled affairs at Poona, and, when he arranged with the Nizām a settlement of the Guntoor question, he gave him an informal promise of support provided he refrained from attacking any ally of the English. A list of the English allies given to the Nizām did not include the name of Tipu Sultān. This was certainly a violation of the spirit of the India Act. That so honest and moderate a man as

Cornwallis should have deemed such a course necessary displays the impossibility of conducting foreign policy in accordance with general maxims. But when war broke out, Cornwallis had already provided himself with allies who threatened the long line of Tipu's northern frontier. The war began in May, 1790, and treaties for common action by the English, the Nizām, and the Marāthas, were signed in June and July following. The position of 1780 was exactly reversed. The Carnatic lay untouched, while the English and their allies invaded the Mysore territories.

Their initial operations were not marked by success. In 1791, therefore, Cornwallis came south to take the command in person. He succeeded in taking Bangalore, but although he advanced towards Tipu's capital of Seringapatam he was prevented by a shortage of supplies from laying siege to it. In the next year, however, he advanced again, besieged the place, and compelled Tipu to accept severe terms. Tipu was to cede to the allies most of the conquests which his father and himself had made, and he was to pay a great indemnity. As security for the due execution of these terms, he gave two of his sons into English keeping. By this settlement Cornwallis hoped that he had established peace on a firm basis in the south. He considered that he had cut down the power of Tipu to the point at which he would not dare again to attack the English, and that the cessions made to the English allies would enable them to meet any attack which Tipu might launch against them. In short he attempted to apply the principle of the balance of power, strengthening the weak and reducing the strong.

Such calculations, however, took no account of the ever-shifting character of Indian alliances. Cornwallis's departure in 1793 was soon followed by a war between his late allies, the Nizām and the Marāthas. Shore, the new governor-general, refused to take part in the struggle, which ended in the defeat of the Nizām, in the battle of Kharda. The Nizām, who already had a considerable force in his service under the command of the famous Frenchman, Raymond, then proceeded to increase this branch of his troops. French influence thus threatened to become predominant not only at Seringapatam but at Hyderabad as well. In 1793 war had broken out again between Great Britain and the revolutionary French government. The possibility of French interference in Indian affairs had thus again become a question of importance. When in



April, 1798, Richard Wellesley, Lord Mornington, arrived as governor-general, he found the balance which Cornwallis had tried to set up already overturned. In the middle of October, when he learnt of the French invasion of Egypt, he resolved that Tipu must either renounce the French alliance or be destroyed.

Tipu had in fact welcomed the Anglo-French war as promising him his revenge for the defeat of 1792. He had opened negotiations for help from France both with the governor of the French island of Mauritius and with the Paris authorities. Shortly after Mornington's arrival, the latter had heard of a bombastic proclamation in which Malartic, at Mauritius, had called for volunteers to aid Tipu to destroy the English power, and of the arrival at Mangalore of a small party of Frenchmen who had in consequence joined Tipu's service. The conduct of the sultan in thus seeking the aid of the French was singularly unwise, and betrayed a deplorable lack of information. It was not in Malartic's power to give Mysore any material help. Tipu's mission to Mauritius and the landing of the small body of men whom he obtained warned Mornington of his intentions without strengthening himself. Tipu did his utmost to counteract the effects of his own conduct. But the governor-general interpreted his smooth letters as designed to allay English fears until arrangements for effective French support should have been completed.

In Mornington's eyes the first step to be taken was to root out French influence from Hyderabad. In this he soon succeeded. The Nizām accepted his offers to maintain a force of company's troops at Hyderabad on condition of the Nizām's providing for their pay and of conducting his foreign policy in accordance with English wishes. The French force which Raymond had formed was thus broken up. The officers were carried off to Calcutta as prisoners of war and sent back to Europe, while the sepoy for the most part took service with the English. This danger removed, the affair with Tipu was brought to an issue. Mornington calculated that no French force could arrive from the Red Sea until the middle of 1799. At the close of 1798 therefore he moved south to Madras, and required from Tipu categorical answers to the demands which he had made. Tipu played for time. But Mornington would not wait till circumstances should favour the sultan. On February 22 he ordered the invasion of Tipu's territories by the army which had been assembled. The campaign

was marked by unbroken success. Tipu was defeated in the field at Sedasere and Mallavelly. In April, Seringapatam was again besieged. On May 4 it was stormed and Tipu perished in the defence. The generation of conflict between the Muslim rulers of Mysore and the company had come to a close. Mornington's services were recognised by the bestowal of an Irish marquissate, and he was thenceforth known as the Marquis Wellesley.

His settlement was characteristic. On this occasion the Marāthas had refused to co-operate with the company in the war, and even massed troops as though preparing to assist Tipu. Wellesley therefore needed to consider no other interests than those of the company and of the Nizām. He decided to reduce Mysore to its old boundaries, within which a representative of the Hindu ruling house was to be set up. Most of the territories thus cut off were to be divided between the Nizām and the company, and shortly afterwards the Nizām handed over his share to the company in return for the abolition of his annual payments for the maintenance of the subsidiary force. Certain districts were set aside to be offered to the Pēshwā, Bāji Rāo II (son of the old English ally Rāghunāth Rāo), whom Nāna Phadnavis, after a period of bitter conflict with Sindhia, had established at Poona. These districts were to be the price of the acceptance by the Marāthas of an English alliance similar to that which had been made with the Nizām. With the new Hindu prince a treaty, till then without parallel, was signed. Wellesley was resolved that, if it could be avoided, the company's alliance should not be disgraced by the evil consequences which had followed in the Carnatic and in Oudh. The prince was given his principality, not only on condition of military and political subordination to the government of Calcutta, but also on condition of following such advice on administrative and financial matters as the governor-general might offer him. A neglect of these conditions might be followed by the English resumption of the raja's territories.

The effect of these arrangements was to establish the company as the unquestioned arbiter of affairs in the south. Wellesley himself cherished the hope of securing a similar position for the company in the north as well. This depended upon inducing the Marāthas to accept a subsidiary alliance. Nāna Phadnavis had rejected Wellesley's offer of part of the conquests made from Tipu. But he had died in 1800, and there followed a struggle for

supremacy at Poona, between Holkar and Daulat Rāo, who had succeeded Mahādaji Rāo Sindhia. The Pēshwā found himself helpless between the two rivals. He was himself a man possessed of neither wisdom nor good faith. He made an alliance with Sindhia in order to wreak vengeance on the friends of the late Nāna who had held him in tutelage. Jaswant Rāo Holkar marched south, defeated Sindhia's army, captured Poona, and plundered it from top to bottom. Bāji Rāo fled to Bassein. He begged for English help. Wellesley agreed to give it provided he would accept English mediation in his disputes with other Indian princes, and provided he would accept a subsidiary force such as the Nizām had received. Bāji Rāo consented to these terms, and on December 31, 1802, signed the Treaty of Bassein.


The effect of this treaty was to establish English influence at the very heart of the Marāṭha Confederacy. This was not likely to be accepted by the Marāṭha chiefs with calm. In London this seemed a reason for disliking the policy which had brought it about, because it would involve the company in "the endless and complicated distractions of the turbulent Mahrattah empire". To Wellesley, however, the continuance of the wars in which the Marāṭha princes had been constantly engaged appeared a far greater danger. It would accelerate the growing poverty of the country; it might lead to the formation of a single Marāṭha state under an ambitious leader with whom the company would have to fight for its existence; above all, the existence of strong states unconnected with the company meant the existence of openings into which French influence might intrude. Like the Nizām, Sindhia had employed French officers to organise and train his army. First de Boigne and then Perron had commanded large bodies of his troops, and had received *jāgīrs* from the revenues of which the sepoys were paid, so that the commander was, or at any time might become, independent of his employer and free to promote his national rather than his employer's interests. From all these points of view Wellesley judged the establishment of English influence among the Marāṭha states a matter of the first importance. He did not believe that the Marāṭha princes could unite against any enemy. English control at Poona would deprive them of their common rallying point. The treaty, he supposed, might perhaps lead to war with individual chiefs, but not to war with the Marāṭhas as a whole. The event was to prove the accuracy of his judgement.



It soon became evident that small reliance could be placed on the fidelity of the new English ally. Bāji Rāo desired only to be freed from the domination of Holkar, and at once sought to free himself from the new bonds which he had so lightly accepted. He tried to form a combination of all the chiefs. But Holkar was too disgusted with Bāji Rāo to co-operate. Complaining that the Marātha power had been sold to the English, he withdrew sullenly to his possessions in Mālwa. The Gaekwar, too, refused to participate in any scheme against his ally the company, whom he feared much less than he feared the Pēshwā. Daulat Rāo Sindhia and the raja of Nāgpur alone assembled their troops and crossed the Nerbudda. Wellesley desired them to separate and withdraw their forces. On their refusal, war was declared in August, 1803. Arthur Wellesley was placed by his brother in political and military control of the operations in the Deccan; Lord Lake received the like authority in Upper India. Arthur Wellesley defeated the combined armies of Sindhia and the Bhonsla at Assaye; Sindhia then agreed to a truce, during which the Nāgpur forces were beaten at Argāon. Nāgpur then made peace at Deogāon, agreeing to cede to the company the district of Cuttack, thus completing the company's command of the eastern sea-board of India, besides making other cessions to the Nizām. Meanwhile, Lake had captured Aligarh, on which Perron had resigned Sindhia's service and taken refuge in British territory, being no longer able to command the obedience of his French subordinates. Delhi had then been taken, the emperor had passed from Marātha to British custody, and in November Sindhia's remaining forces had been scattered at Laswari. Sindhia then made peace, surrendering much territory and transferring his political rights in Upper India to the company. The war thus appeared to have ended as triumphantly as the war with Tipu. But Holkar, who had looked on contemptuously while his rival Sindhia was being beaten, resolved to teach the English what a Marātha war was like. He rejected the proposals which Lake made to him at the end of 1803, and invaded the territory of the raja of Jaipur, an ally of the company. A new war therefore broke out in April, 1804. The English hoped to hem him in in western India, but their plans miscarried, and one of their detachments was overwhelmed and beat a disorderly retreat to Agra. Holkar, however, could not repeat this success. He was repulsed in an attack on

Delhi. Later in the year his troops were defeated at Dīg and again at Farrukhābād, and Holkar himself was chased by Lake across the Sutlej into the dominions of the rising Sikh chief, Ranjit Singh. While these events had been in progress, Sindhia had shown signs of wishing to renew the struggle, but had thought better of it. So in 1805 the company retained the position of supremacy which had been claimed by the Treaty of Bassein and asserted by the campaigns against Sindhia and the Bhonsla raja.

But at the moment when Wellesley seemed about to reap the harvest of his policy, he learnt that he had been recalled and Cornwallis reappointed governor-general. The directors at London were on principle opposed to a policy of expansion. When Henry Dundas had left the Board of Control in 1801, he had been succeeded first by Lord Lewisham and then by Castlereagh; and his departure had been marked by a diminution of the support which the governor-general had till then received from the cabinet. Castlereagh thought with the directors that Wellesley's policy had been unduly adventurous. Like them he had been alarmed by the outbreak of war with Holkar into thinking that the struggle with the Marāthas would never be brought to a successful conclusion. Cornwallis, though sixty-seven and infirm, was therefore induced to return to India to make peace with the Marāthas. He arrived on July 30, and died at Ghāzīpur on October 5 following, before he had carried his instructions into effect. The senior member of council, Sir George Barlow, took his place. This man had earned a great reputation as a covenanted servant. Under Cornwallis he had been employed to draft that ill-omened code by which it had been hoped to bestow justice on Bengal. To Wellesley, just before the latter sailed for India, Cornwallis had recommended Barlow as a man to whom to turn for advice in a difficulty. Barlow had supported Wellesley's policy consistently. But now, seeing into what trouble with London it had brought the late governor-general, he hastily made peace with Holkar and concessions to Sindhia, convincing the Pēshwā, Sindhia and Holkar alike, that war with the English carried with it small hazard, since such irresolute enemies were sure to resign the fruits of victory. Holkar recovered his territories. Sindhia received back Gohad and Gwalior. Barlow further declared that the company had no interests in the region west of the Chambal. This policy was not only foolish but also



unjust. It abandoned the Rājput states which had entered into alliance with Wellesley and the Sikh princes east of the Sutlej to whom Wellesley had given the company's protection. It renounced the responsibility for the well-being and public peace of India which Wellesley had been first among the governors-general deliberately to undertake.

Indeed, Wellesley was the first English ruler to foresee and accept the full consequences of the unstable conduct of Indian princes and of the military superiority of the company. Just as in the administration of Bengal he insisted on the company's servants being trained and educated not as merchants but as statesmen, creating the College of Fort William not merely to teach them the languages of the country but also to provide them with the liberal education which many of them lacked; just as in his external policy he sought to bring the principal Indian states into alliance with the company in order to check the constant flux of power and end a whole century of ceaseless war; so also in his relations with the allies of the company he was most averse from the system of blind, irresponsible support to which he found himself committed both in the Carnatic and in Oudh. In both cases the ruler was a client of the company; in both cases the company declined responsibility for its client's conduct. In the Carnatic several attempts had been made to bring order into the nawab's administration. The enquiries which had been made in Macartney's time had revealed an extraordinary wastage of the public revenues. At Trichinopoly, for instance, the disbursements amounted to a lakh of rupees more than the revenues of the district, owing chiefly to a multitude of pensions charged upon them. Then, too, the practice of assigning whole districts to the management of creditors meant that the revenues would be managed in the worst possible way by men who had no interests beyond the early realisation of their advances. In 1787 the nawab had agreed to pay nine lakhs of pagodas to the company and twelve to his creditors. But this arrangement fell at once into arrears. In 1792 Cornwallis attempted a new settlement. It was based on the optimistic view that if the nawab's obligations were reduced, he would be able to restore order in his administration. Under the scheme the nawab was to pay nine lakhs as before to the company but only six to his creditors. If his payments fell into arrears, certain specified districts, over which he promised no

longer to grant assignments, were to be taken over by the company. If he were involved in war, the whole administration of the Carnatic was at once to be assumed by the company for the duration of the war. But even this treaty was not kept. Assignments were in fact granted on the districts specified. In 1795 the governor of Madras, Lord Hobart, desired to take advantage of the old nawab's death, which occurred in that year, to impose new terms on his son and successor, 'Umdat-ul-'umara. Hobart proposed to bring the treaty into action by taking over the direct administration of the "mortgaged" districts. But the governor-general, Shore, disclaimed in the most emphatic terms the least responsibility for the state of the nawab's territories. Hobart then resigned, and was succeeded by Lord Clive, son of the victor of Plassey. The new governor was a man of less energy of character than Hobart, but at almost the same time Shore was displaced by Wellesley. The British authorities then attempted once more to induce the nawab to modify the method of his government. But 'Umdat obstinately refused all concessions. The war with Tipu strengthened his opposition, for either the company would be beaten and he would be relieved for the moment from further pressure, or Tipu would be overthrown and the danger of war, and the risk of the Carnatic administration being assumed, would disappear. Unluckily for the nawab, the victors found at Seringapatam papers which rendered the traditional fidelity of Muhammad 'Ali to the company at least suspect. These papers proved that the nawab and both his sons had been in correspondence with Hyder 'Ali and Tipu, that arrangements had been made for a secret cypher, and that the nawab had expressed himself bitterly on the subject of his English allies. Probably this exchange of letters and passing of messengers signified no more than the customary instability of Indian rulers at this time. But it was fatal to the old nawab's character as the company's unalterable friend. The company had repeatedly refused to allow pressure to be put upon him on the score that his loyalty was unimpeachable. That defence could no longer be made, and all reason for continuing past policy disappeared. Wellesley referred the question to England. He received authority to settle the Carnatic. About the same time 'Umdat-ul-'umara died. Wellesley offered to recognise the succession of his son if in return for one-sixth of the net revenues of the Carnatic he would make over the entire

government of the province to the English. The son refused. The same offer was then made to a nephew of the late nawab. The nephew accepted. So in 1801 the company "assumed" the administration of the Carnatic, and the disastrous plan of separating military control and civil administration was brought to an end. Here, as in Mysore, Wellesley carried into effect his deliberate policy of undertaking the responsibility for the government in regions which had been placed by political developments under the company's power. In Mysore he set up a prince who was to rule in accordance with English advice. In the Carnatic he would have been content with an arrangement of the like nature. But being defeated in this by the refusal of the nawab, annexation remained the only method by which responsibility could be assumed.

In Oudh events followed a course not at all dissimilar to that just described. English policy followed the same development; but the nawab in Oudh proved more flexible than the southern ruler had been. The result therefore lay midway between the settlement in Mysore and the settlement in the Carnatic. In Oudh there emerged under the feeble conduct of Āsaf-ud-daula the same financial disorder, the same public debt to the company and private debt to individuals, the same disorder in the government, the same refusal to pay the revenues except under compulsion. The nawab of Oudh, like the nawab of Arcot, could not have maintained his position for a year without the armed help of the company. He was threatened by the insubordination of his unpaid troops, by the disobedience of his turbulent land-holders, and by the ambition of his Marātha neighbours. The English defended him against these enemies, but did nothing to re-establish order in his dominions. On Cornwallis's arrival, an attempt was made to apply the same fallacious remedy as was applied in the Carnatic. He reduced the company's demands on the nawab by fifty per cent. But affairs continued in their old course. At last in 1797 Āsaf-ud-daula died. He was at first succeeded by his reputed son Wazir 'Alī. But after a short period of hesitation Shore, departing from his usual policy of non-intervention, declared the new nawab spurious, declared all Āsaf-ud-daula's other reputed sons spurious likewise, and installed Sa'ādāt 'Alī, the late nawab's brother, in Wazir 'Alī's stead. In return for this Sa'ādāt 'Alī agreed to increase the annual payments to a trifle more than the

amount payable before Cornwallis's reduction, to reduce the number of his own undisciplined troops, and to receive a larger garrison of the company's forces as a measure of protection against the anticipated invasion of northern India by Zamān Shāh, the ruler of Afghanistan. Such was the position on Wellesley's arrival as governor-general. The nawab, however, demanded an increase of the English forces as a protection against his own people. Wellesley increased it to 20,000 men and for this required an increased subsidy of fifty lakhs of rupees. Sa'adat 'Alī, too, proved to be the most inconsistent of rulers. He would not reduce his troops though he needed protection against them. Under pressure, he demanded to be allowed to resign. When Wellesley agreed, he withdrew his offer. Wellesley sent to Lucknow first Colonel Scott, and then his own brother, Henry Wellesley, destined to make a reputation in Europe as a diplomatist. A treaty was to be made which would settle the Oudh question definitively. Wellesley desired in the first place no longer to be dependent on the nawab for the payments due to the company, since his financial management was entirely unreliable. In the second place, since the defence of Oudh depended on the company, he desired the cession of a tract of country which would prevent any enemy from attacking Oudh without coming into direct conflict with its protector. In the third place he felt that the company was disgraced by maintaining so disreputable a government, and that the nawab should be made to listen to the advice of the governor-general. In November, 1801, a treaty embodying these points was forced upon Sa'adat 'Alī. The first two objects were secured by the cession of lands forming "a barrier between the dominions of the wazir and any foreign enemy". Thus Oudh ceased to be the buffer state, which it had formed in the days of Clive and Warren Hastings. The change marks clearly and emphatically the alteration which had occurred in the political situation of India. Under the guidance of its representatives at Calcutta, and very much against the wishes of the directors at London, the company was standing forth as the leader of the Indian political world. The third point was covered by the nawab's promise to set up in his country such a government as should conduce to the happiness and prosperity of his people. This clause did not in fact secure the purpose with which it was drafted. But that was not the fault of the treaty or of the policy

which had inspired it. It was brought about by the fact that Wellesley's successors cherished a more confined conception of the company's duties in the regions under its influence but outside the sphere of its immediate authority. Here, quite as much as in the exact foresight displayed in his military and political arrangements, Wellesley showed himself possessed of great qualities. He approached the problems of the company's position in India in the same spirit as that displayed by Lord Grenville in his speech in 1813 in the House of Lords. Wellesley, like Grenville, was convinced that the interests of India and Great Britain were interlocked, and that by establishing peace in India and by promoting good administration, not only in the British provinces but also in the provinces ruled by the company's allies, he was securing the welfare of a multitude of men. The courage with which he faced the responsibilities of the task marks him out as a great leader. If Clive created the British-Indian empire, and Hastings maintained it through a period of extraordinary difficulties, Wellesley may claim to have been the first to recognise its moral and political significance.

Unfortunately other men were unwilling to shoulder so great a load as responsibility for the entire sub-continent. Wellesley's supersession in 1805 has already been mentioned, together with the reversal of the policy which he had followed. The set-back, however, was not long-continued. In 1807 the first Lord Minto succeeded Barlow. As Sir Gilbert Elliot he had taken a prominent part in the impeachment of Hastings and the attempted impeachment of Impey. In 1805 he had been appointed president of the Board of Control, though without a seat in the cabinet, and then was chosen to replace Barlow, whose administration had provoked great discontent in India, culminating in the mutiny of a large number of military officers at Madras. Minto devoted himself in the first place to the task of excluding French influence from the east. On the outbreak of the Revolutionary War, Pondichery and Chandernagore had at once been occupied, and Wellesley had evaded their restoration to the French during the short truce opened by the Peace of Amiens. But the French still held the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon. The first of these formed a centre from which numerous privateers preyed upon English shipping, inflicting very serious losses upon private merchants and the company itself. Moreover, the establishment of



French influence in Holland threatened to extend French power into the Dutch colonies, especially the Cape, Java, and Ceylon. During Shore's government Ceylon had been captured by a force from India, and the Cape by an expedition sent from Europe. About the same time certain islands in the archipelago, Amboyna and the chief spice islands, had also been seized by the English. But the government of Java passed under French control, so that British enemies were entrenched in positions east and west of India. This position meant the possibility of French intrigue with discontented Indian chiefs and of the sudden appearance of a French force on the coasts of India. In 1807, too, the French threatened to approach India by way of Persia. In that year Russia was at war with both Persia and France. In order to alarm Russia, Napoleon entered into a treaty with the shah, and sent a French general to Teherān with instructions to collect all possible information about the routes through Persia to India. Minto did not credit the stories of a French advance in force. But the appearance of even a small body on the Indian borders would certainly excite much alarm and trouble in the country. He therefore sent embassies to Persia, to Afghanistan, and to Lahore. They were to obtain promises of co-operation against the French if any advance overland should be attempted. For the moment the mission to Persia, conducted by Malcolm, failed. But the Persians soon found that Napoleon had been concerned solely with his own political interests. The French embassy was dismissed, and after long delay, due largely to squabbles between representatives of the government of Bengal and of the ministry at home, a treaty was signed between Great Britain and the shah. At Peshāwar, whither Elphinstone, the future historian, was sent, the ruling prince was Shāh Shujā', who had displaced Zamān Shāh, who a few years earlier had been a serious danger to the peace of northern India. But Asiatic kingships decay with extraordinary rapidity. The Afghan kingship was falling into the ruin of family feuds, and, though Shujā' was willing to make a treaty, he was too distracted by rebellions to make an effective ally. At Lahore, however, Minto's envoy, Metcalfe, found a ruler of a different stamp. Ranjit Singh, head of one of the chief *misls*, or groups, into which the Sikhs were divided, had gradually extended his authority over the Panjab, and had organised a strong military state. In 1807 he was busily seeking to establish his power over

the Sikh chiefs on the east bank of the Sutlej. In the days of Mahādaji Sindhia they had been reduced to recognising his suzerainty. Wellesley's treaty of 1803 had transferred Sindhia's political rights in that region to the company, and Minto was determined not to allow Ranjit to substitute himself for the company as the overlord of the Cis-Sutlej states. Metcalfe's mission thus was difficult. He was required to obtain Ranjit's promise of co-operation against the French if they made any attempts against India, and at the same time to induce Ranjit to desist from a project on which he had set his heart. His negotiations were prolonged and delicate. At one moment he even had to inform the prince that any movement of his troops across the Sutlej would be resisted by the company's forces, and Ranjit hesitated between peace and war with the English. At last he decided to ally himself with the strongest power in India. He signed a treaty of friendship, agreeing to recognise the Cis-Sutlej states as under the protection of the company and to regard the friends and enemies of the company as his own friends and his own enemies. Minto was thus relieved from fears for the security of the English position on the north-west.

His next step was to attack the French islands in order to end the activity of their privateers and to deprive them of a possible naval base from which an attack on India might be launched. The islands were first blockaded. Then in 1810 an expedition from India captured Bourbon and Mauritius, so that a French squadron reaching eastern waters would find itself deprived of any place where it could revictual or refit after its long voyage. Finally in 1811 an attack was made upon Java, where a French regiment had been landed. For two centuries Dutch influence had been supreme in the archipelago. The Dutch company had made a great number of treaties with the local chiefs, binding the latter not to admit foreign vessels to their harbours. On the strength of these agreements the Dutch had claimed the right to exclude foreign, and especially English vessels, from the free navigation of the neighbouring waters. They had reluctantly abandoned these exclusive claims by the treaty ending the war of the American Revolution, but nevertheless they had continued to punish the chiefs who dared to admit the English to trade. The commerce of the archipelago, however, was far too valuable an adjunct to the trade of India, affording a profitable outlet for the sale of opium

and cotton goods, for the English company easily to acquiesce in this position. It retained a few small factories in Sumatra, formed mainly for the supply of pepper. In the time of Cornwallis English interests had been extended by the acquisition of the island of Penang in the Straits of Malacca. It had been hoped that the island would form a naval base as well as give the English access to the trade of the archipelago. But these hopes had hardly been realised. The eastern settlements remained unimportant. They were peculiarly unhealthy, and were avoided as much as possible by the company's servants. By accident a man of great ability, Stamford Raffles, was included in the Sumatra establishment. He was known for his familiarity with the languages and peoples of the archipelago, and, when Minto proposed to turn the French out of Java, he was summoned to Calcutta to advise the governor-general. The expedition, which sailed in 1811, met with speedy success. The French were ill-led and unpopular even with the Dutch. Their defeat was followed at once by the surrender of the island, which was entrusted to the management of Raffles as lieutenant-governor. For the moment English naval influence was supreme from the Cape of Good Hope eastwards as far as Canton.

The settlement which followed the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1814 and 1815 somewhat reduced this position of monopoly. The French were readmitted to their old settlements on the Indian mainland. They recovered the island of Bourbon, which from its lack of a harbour could not be made into a naval base. The Dutch recovered their eastern possessions. But Great Britain retained the Cape of Good Hope. Her sovereignty over the possessions of the East India Company was for the first time recognised by both the Dutch and the French. Though Java was restored to Holland, Raffles's activity and foresight speedily secured for the English, by his occupation of Singapore in 1819, a stronghold in the very centre of the archipelago, thus effectively breaking the monopoly of control which till 1811 the Dutch had enjoyed. Moreover, although the French were readmitted to India, they returned under the obligation of limiting their military forces to the needs of their settlements for internal police, so that they were no more to form a political danger. Finally, in 1824, the Dutch exchanged their remaining Indian factories for the factories which the English company still held on the island of

Sumatra, while in 1845 the Danes sold to the English the settlements of Tranquebar and Serampore. These subsequent changes thus emphasised the predominance of English interests over those of all other European nations established by the treaties of 1814 and 1815. Politically neither the French at Pondichery nor the Portuguese at Goa could attempt to rival the position of the East India Company or to undermine its authority. This consequence resulted, not from the successes which Cornwallis, Wellesley, and Minto had obtained in the east, but on the overwhelming supremacy which the British navy had established on the oceans of the world. The triumphs culminating in the victory of Trafalgar and the blockade which the English fleets had thereafter applied to the coasts of France, alone had prevented the appearance in the east of French forces which would have set all India ablaze. As supremacy at sea had transferred the dominion of Indian waters from the Portuguese to the Dutch, and produced the downfall of the Portuguese power and the establishment of the Dutch empire in the archipelago, so now supremacy at sea had determined the prolonged struggle between the French and the English for predominance on the Indian mainland. The validity of victories in India depended on the issue of the naval war. Had Nelson failed, neither the fall of Seringapatam, nor the victories of Assaye and Laswari, could have produced more than the most transient results. But his success permitted the company to consolidate its power.

As has been seen, Wellesley had sought to establish a position of supremacy in anticipation of these events, but had been frustrated by the narrow views and reluctance to accept responsibility displayed by the home authorities. His work was now to be completed. In 1813, the year in which the British parliament first asserted the sovereignty of the crown over the company's territories, Lord Moira was appointed governor-general in succession to Minto. Moira was by profession a soldier and received like Cornwallis the combined offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief. He speedily found himself involved in troubles with the Gurkhas. In the course of the eighteenth century these hardy hillmen had conquered a wide stretch of the Himalāyan tract. In 1768 they had conquered the Nepāl valley and gradually expanded until they ruled from the Sutlej as far eastwards as Sikkim. They touched English territories for over

700 miles, and the border districts constantly suffered from their incursions. Barlow offered concessions. Minto remonstrated. Moira decided to garrison the disputed districts. The Gurkhas slew the garrisons. In November, 1814, Moira declared war upon them. The British officers in India had at that time small experience of hill-fighting or of the organisation of hill-transport. Against the fine fighting qualities of the Gurkhas they met at first with numerous reverses. Moira, who had personally planned the campaign, was much disconcerted by the tactical failures which occurred. But his military talent soon discerned that his subordinates were not making proper use of their advantages. He insisted that mortars, which till then had been little used except in siege-operations, were as effective against an enemy who sheltered himself from direct fire behind a hill as against one who sheltered himself behind walls. The instructions which he issued, coupled with the appearance of a new and most competent commander, Colonel Ochterlony, led to a rapid reversal of the position. The Gurkhas were defeated in the field. Kumāon was captured in April, 1815; their stronghold of Malāon was taken in the next month. In consequence the Gurkhas sued for peace. By the Treaty of Sagauli, concluded in 1816, after unsuccessful negotiations and a brief renewal of the war, the Gurkhas ceded Garhwāl and Kumāon together with a large part of the Tarai; they withdrew from Sikkim; and they agreed to receive a permanent British resident at their capital of Kāthmāndu. This settlement proved definitive, and the alliance between them and the English has never since been broken.

The Gurkha War, however, was but in the nature of an interlude. The far more serious question of the Marāthas had still to be determined. Barlow's conduct after the death of Cornwallis had convinced them that the British were as stupid in negotiation as they were formidable in the field. But they lacked leaders. No Marātha prince appeared capable of giving them guidance. The Pēshwā, Bāji Rāo II, was one whom no man could wisely trust. He endeavoured to crush his own feudal nobility, the *jāgīrdārs*, in order to increase his own revenues; with the result that he was hated throughout the territories under his immediate control. At Indore the peaceful rule of Ahalya Bai, who had governed from her husband's death in 1766 till her own death in 1795, had been followed by confusion and chaos. Jaswant Rāo, the rival of

Daulat Rāo Sindhia, had died mad in 1811. He had been succeeded by Malhar Rāo, under whom the state had been torn to pieces between two factions, the Marāṭha under his mother Tulsi Bai, and the Pathan under Amīr Khān, a leader of mercenaries. Revenue was gathered at the point of the sword, and appropriated by the gatherer. Sindhia's dominions were hardly better off. Daulat Rāo had been greatly weakened by his war with the English. His lands had been overrun by Holkar's troops in search of plunder. His own army was unpaid. Independent bodies of troops, well known under the name of Pindāris, established themselves under him with his half-willing consent, on the understanding that they would serve him in case of need in return for finding with him a place of shelter. The Gaekwar was distracted by differences with the Pēshwā over claims which the latter had upon him. Nāgpur was barely able to maintain a settled administration.

From the point of view of Calcutta the most pressing problem was offered by the activities of the Pindāris. These freebooters, composed of both Muslim and Hindu bands under rival commanders, formed a growing menace to the whole of India. They would gather at the festival of the *Dasara* in the autumn when the rains were over, and march whithersoever they chose, plundering as they went. Central India and the domains of the Nizām were repeatedly pillaged, and in 1812 they began to attack the company's possessions. In that year they harried Mīrzāpur and the southern districts of Bihar. In 1816 they invaded the Northern Circars. In one village which they approached, the inhabitants preferred to burn themselves with their wives and children rather than fall into the hands of these savage enemies. Those who shrank from so extreme a measure had small cause to congratulate themselves on their wisdom. These outrages in the latter part of 1816 at last compelled the company to permit its government in India to take measures to bring them to an end. Out of this sprang the Pindāri War, which extended to all the Marāṭha states except Baroda and concluded with their complete overthrow and the final consolidation of the East India Company's power in India.

For some time the position at Poona had been most uncertain. Political relations had been conducted by two very able servants of the company, first by Barry Close, and then by Mountstuart

Elphinstone. Neither had been able to induce Bāji Rāo to forsake his perpetual intrigue. The Pēshwā hoped once more to head a confederacy against the English and was constantly seeking to incite the chief Marātha princes to attack them, but he was unwilling to commit any overt act of hostility till he should be assured of a general support. His intrigues were betrayed, and he was therefore closely watched; but matters did not come to a head till 1814. In the hope of settling the disputes between the Pēshwā and the Gaekwar, the latter was induced to send his principal minister, Gangadhar Sāstri, to Poona under the Pēshwā's safe-conduct. The Sāstri was a strong adherent of the English alliance. He even borrowed English ways, walking fast, speaking broken English, given to calling the Pēshwā and his people "dam' fools". He was consequently much disliked in Marātha circles. He accompanied the Pēshwā to Nasik, to take part in a religious festival. He was murdered there, apparently by agents of the Pēshwā's favourite, Trimbakji Danglia, and probably with the Pēshwā's connivance. In punishment for this breach of faith, the Pēshwā was compelled by Elphinstone to surrender Trimbakji after prolonged delay. But in 1816 he escaped, it was believed with the assistance of the Pēshwā. Matters were then looking most threatening. Bāji Rāo was certainly seeking to stir up the other Marātha chiefs, and the Pindāri inroads proved that the chiefs were making no attempts to restrain the actions of their dependents.

The governor-general, now relieved of the Gurkha war, prepared to meet this combination of dangers. His first measure related to Nāgpur. The late ruler, Rāghūji Rāo, had been succeeded by an imbecile, Parsaji. Parsaji had a capable but unscrupulous cousin, Appa Sāhib, who aspired to the government and desired as a preparatory measure to be invested with the regency. In 1816 he was recognised by the company in return for the signature of a subsidiary alliance. This meant the establishment of a strong force of company's troops at Nāgpur. Moira's immediate object was to check any possible movements of the Pindāris or other Marātha troops to the south-eastwards, and to detach Nāgpur from any possible league of the Marātha states. The next measure related to the Pēshwā. In 1817 Bāji Rāo was compelled reluctantly to sign a new treaty by which he renounced the headship of the Marātha confederacy, acknowledged the

independence of the Gaekwar, and ceded to the English the Konkan and other districts. Later in the same year, having assembled an overwhelming force on Sindhia's frontiers, Moira compelled him to sign the Treaty of Gwalior. This bound him to co-operate in measures against the Pindāris and released the company from the obligation, into which Barlow had so lightly entered, of abstaining from political activity beyond the Chambal. This permitted the conclusion of a number of treaties with the Rājput states, which had been threatened with extinction by the attacks of their Marātha neighbours. Having blocked Pindāri movements into the Nāgpur territories and westwards into Rājputāna, Moira then began to attack the Pindāris themselves. For this purpose he had assembled a force of over 100,000 men and 300 guns. Had the Marātha chiefs been content to watch the destruction of the Pindāris, and sink without another effort into dependence upon the company's government, no general war need have followed. Had they been wise enough to combine their forces and act together, they might have fallen gallantly. But once more, as after the Treaty of Bassein, they were to fight one by one. Perhaps nothing illustrates more forcibly the political imbecility into which India had fallen than that the one Hindu power which had arisen after the fall of the Mughal empire should have proved to be utterly incapable of uniting in the face of a foreign power. In fact the eighteenth century, marked by the establishment of European predominance, merely repeats the history of those earlier centuries in which the pre-Āryan states fell before the Āryans, and in which the Hindu princes submitted to the Muslims. While Holkar's durbar was still undecided and while Sindhia was signing the Treaty of Gwalior, the Pēshwā and Appa Sāhib resolved to attack the company.


The Pēshwā attacked and burnt the residency at Poona, and then with 27,000 men attacked 2800 under Colonel Burr at Khirkī. Even his enormous preponderance of men did not save him from a heavy defeat. Two more battles followed, at Koregāon and Ashti. In the second the Pēshwā's general, Bāpu Gokhala, was killed, and in both the Marāthas were defeated. In the middle of 1818 Bāji Rāo, tired of being hunted all over his territories, surrendered to Sir John Malcolm, under promise of personal safety and of a pension of eight lakhs of rupees a year. His dominions were annexed and placed under the administration



of the presidency of Bombay. Meanwhile in Nāgpur Appa Sāhib had attacked the resident, had been defeated like Bāji Rāo, and had fled to the Panjab. A boy belonging to the ruling family was established as raja of Nāgpur, and the districts north of the Nerbudda were annexed to the company's territories. Holkar's durbar had refused all offers of peace, but, unable to give help to, or to receive any from, the other Marātha rulers, it had been completely defeated at the battle of Mahidpur by Hislop, who commanded the southern portion of the company's army, and compelled in January, 1818, to sign the Treaty of Mandasor, by which it surrendered all districts south of the Nerbudda, abandoned all claims on the Rājput chiefs, recognised one of its mercenary commanders as nawab of Tānk, and accepted a permanent resident at Indore. Sindhia, who had proved unable to assist the English against the Pindāris, agreed to a fresh treaty ceding Ajmir to the company and making a certain readjustment of boundaries. The Marāthas had vanished as a political power.

The settlement of 1818 marks the beginning of the paramountcy of the East India Company. No state remained which could challenge its supremacy. No state remained which could reject its alliance. The project of Wellesley had been realised. All the principal states of India had been brought into agreement with the company, and had placed in its hands the conduct of political relations. Many had accepted a subsidiary force, which implied a position of dependency. The peace of India had been assured. The wars which for a century and a half had desolated India had been brought to an end. But if the political project of Wellesley had been completed, one aspect at least had been neglected. The treaties into which Moira had entered had not been treaties such as Wellesley would have ratified, for they all omitted those stipulations on which he would have set a high importance. Moira's treaties all included some clause intended to avoid all possibility of interference on the part of the company's government in matters of internal administration. Unlike Wellesley, Moira limited his views to the regions under the direct control of the East India Company, while Wellesley had envisaged the good of India as a whole. Consequently the company found itself committed to a number of alliances by which it was bound to support the reigning prince without much regard for the quality of his administration. The relations which

SKETCH MAP  
ILLUSTRATING  
INDIA,  
in 1818  
Protected territories  
shaded



had characterised the alliance with the nawab of Arcot or with the nawab of Oudh were perpetuated over a wide field. The governor-general, to whom it was given to establish the paramountcy of the company, did not choose with it to recognise the responsibility of the company for the general well-being of India. While, therefore, Moira's conduct of relations with the Marātha princes was marked by an exact and vigorous estimate of political forces, he shrank from the more extended responsibility which Wellesley sought, and which, if Wellesley had been left for another year in power, he would probably have assumed. In short, the settlement of 1818 imposed upon the company all those ambiguities and uncertainties which were afterwards to mark its relations with the native states.

## CHAPTER VI

### The Growth of the Company's System of Government

In a previous chapter some reference has already been made to the results of the Regulating Act on the position of Warren Hastings. The matter must now be considered from a more general point of view, and some attempt made to sketch the growth of the company's government, alike in its higher organisation and in the subordinate branches which brought it into direct contact with the peasantry of the country. It will be most convenient to deal first with the home government, then with the governments of Bengal and of the subordinate presidencies, and lastly with the district administrations which grew up in Bengal and Madras, Bombay being reserved for later consideration, since that presidency in its territorial form was scarcely constituted till 1818.

Down to 1773 the home government had consisted solely of the directors and proprietors of the East India Company. The former had been annually elected by the latter, and the two had constituted the only body authorised to issue orders to the governments in India. No prolonged conflict between the two parts of this body had been possible, because the policy desired by the proprietors was necessarily reflected every year in the choice of the directors. The Regulating Act laid down that of the twenty-four directors only six should be chosen in each year. The power of the proprietors to overrule decisions of the directors was left unchanged. Thus it might come to pass that the proprietors desired one thing and the majority of the directors another, for an indefinite period, and in that case the directors could be prevented from carrying out the policy of their choice by resolution of the lower body. The act thus gave an opening, in the home as in the Indian governments, for prolonged and bitter strife, as actually came to pass. The directors, under the corrupt influence of the ministry, desired to remove Hastings from office, while the proprietors resolved that he should not be removed. Nor did the

act give to the ministry power of interfering in the company's transactions. Despatches relating to the political and administrative affairs of India were to be sent to one of the secretaries of state; but no power of control was taken. North evidently looked to managing the directors as he managed the House of Commons.

Ten years later in 1783 Fox introduced his famous bills which proposed the complete supersession of the company. Seven commissioners were named in the bill to administer Indian affairs, holding office for a fixed term of seven years. This proposal was strongly attacked on constitutional grounds. The commissioners would have exercised all patronage; they were nominees of Fox; and Pitt described the bill as bestowing the patronage of India on Charles Fox whether in or out of office. This criticism has usually been ignored as dictated solely by party purposes. But a great jealousy of the executive was felt at that time. It was expressed by Dunning's famous motion, "That the power of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished". If to the ordinary patronage of the crown were added the patronage of India, would not the Coalition fix its power in parliament for at least a generation? And was it desirable to increase the ministerial powers of corrupting members of parliament? These doubts were widely and deeply felt, and materially contributed to the decisive overthrow of the Coalition at the general election of 1784. That election placed Pitt firmly in office, and in the same year he introduced and carried his famous India Act, which settled the main lines of the home and Indian governments for over seventy years.

This act set up a Board of Control, which was at first meant to be a cabinet committee. This was to receive copies of all despatches received from India and drafts of all orders proposed to be sent out. No orders could be sent without its approval, and, in matters of secrecy or urgency, the board could draft orders which had to be forwarded at once to India by a committee of the directors known as the Committee of Secrecy. The new body differed from Fox's commissioners in two important respects. It represented the government of the nation and was variable by ordinary constitutional methods. Save in a limited class of matters, which in practice was confined to questions of external policy, it had no powers of initiation. It had no powers of patronage. Pitt himself described his object as "to give to the

crown the power of guiding the politics of India, with as little means of corrupt influence as possible". In this he had clearly succeeded. At the same time the possibility of the company's action being hindered by internal conflict was avoided by a clause which declared that the proprietors could not veto a proposal made by the directors and approved by the Board of Control, while the creation of the board itself prevented the recurrence of the position which had developed under Lord North, when the ministry had been unable to carry into effect its policy on Indian subjects.

At the same time the company retained far more than nominal power. Its right of initiating despatches on ordinary subjects meant that while it might be restrained from acting, it could hardly be compelled to act against its will. It would be entirely wrong to suppose that the government of the company's territories was transferred by Pitt's India Act to the ministry. A system of control was established, by which for the first time the East India Company was brought into organic connection with the sovereign power of Great Britain. The board, however, evolved in a manner somewhat different from that which had been anticipated. Pitt had expected that the Indian business would not be more than ministers could consider in the leisure which their other offices afforded them. But it soon proved to be far too voluminous and far too complicated for a secretary of state or a chancellor of the exchequer to be able to master in the spare time at his disposal. Consequently Dundas, who had devoted more study to Indian affairs than any other member of the cabinet, first took the lead, then became president of the board, and at last monopolised its business.

The structure of the government of Bengal was reformed by Pitt and Dundas with equal thoroughness. But here the changes introduced by the India Act were more tentative. All that was done at first was to reduce the size of the council from five to four inclusive of the governor-general. By the exercise of his casting vote the latter could always secure the adoption of his policy provided he could obtain the support of a single member. But the governor-general remained merely the head of the council with no special powers. Hastings had repeatedly urged the importance of investing his office with superior authority. Macartney, to whom the office had been offered on Hastings's

resignation, refused it unless he should receive specific powers of over-ruling his council. Cornwallis, to whom the government was then offered, made the same demand, and added to it the requirement that he should be appointed commander-in-chief as well. The cabinet desired his acceptance too much to refuse his terms. The directors appointed him governor-general, and the cabinet brought in an amending bill to permit the union of offices and the bestowal of the powers demanded. The choice of Cornwallis and the changes connected with his appointment constituted a reform of the utmost importance. In the first place the governor-general would no longer find himself in the position of impotence to which Warren Hastings had been reduced. In the second place the conflict between the civil and military authorities was ended when the head of the state became the head of the army too. It is true that after Cornwallis's government some recrudescence of military insubordination did occur; but by then the civil government had been reorganised and strengthened, so that the position was far less dangerous than before. In the third place the selection of the head of the government from London, while the remainder of the council was formed from the company's civil servants, showed that Pitt and Dundas had learnt at least one of the lessons provided by the Regulating Act. To nominate a majority designed to supervise and if necessary check the action of the governor-general was to establish faction in the heart of government. If Hastings deserved the office to which North had named him, he should have been trusted not to abuse his powers. Pitt's method was wholly different. He united power and responsibility in the same hands, while giving Cornwallis the advisers who could make good his ignorance of the technicalities of Indian administration. Moreover, once the custom of naming English noblemen to the office of governor-general had been established, another great source of weakness vanished. The company's servant who had spent all his life in India could never rely on finding support on either side of the House of Commons. That was the reason why Hastings's position from first to last had been so extraordinarily precarious. But the new practice meant that, so long as the governor-general behaved like a gentleman, he was sure of the support of his party in London. He was able therefore to approach his work with that confidence in the future which Hastings had never possessed.

In another point also the India Act introduced a much-needed change. In the recent past the power of superintendence vested in the Bengal government had done as much harm as good. No effective central power had been created, and the subordinate presidencies had been able to defy all attempts to co-ordinate British policy. But the India Act gave to the Bengal government power of control "over all transactions with the country powers" and over the entire conduct of any war that might break out. Nor could the subordinate presidencies excuse themselves from obedience on the plea that the orders of Bengal exceeded their legal powers. That point was to be determined by the Bengal government itself and by the home authorities. The sole case in which obedience might be delayed was when contrary orders which had reached Madras or Bombay from England were still unknown in Bengal.

Before Cornwallis had left India, a final change was made in the governor-general's position. This was designed to meet difficulties caused by the great distance and slow communications of India. Cornwallis had thought fit to assume the command of the war which broke out with Tipu Sultān. His council passed a resolution enabling him to act separately from it with as much authority as if he were acting in council. This was held in England to exceed the powers legally granted, and a special act was passed in 1791 to validate whatever he had done under those defective powers. In 1793, when the privileges of the company were extended for twenty years, provision was made to enable the governor-general to visit any part of the company's dominions, to act with the local council with as much authority as he possessed when acting with the council of Bengal, and to issue orders to any of the company's servants without consulting the local council at all.

By these various measures an effective central government was at last built up in British India. The changes made in the subordinate governments were less important, but were still considerable. In them also the councils were reduced by the India Act to four members, inclusive of the governor. In 1793 the governors received powers of over-ruling their councils. From the appointment of Macartney as governor of Madras in 1780 the custom of selecting provincial governors from the political world of London instead of from among the company's servants came into force, although it was never so



rigid as in the case of the governor-general, and occasional exceptions were made for the benefit of specially eminent members of the administrative services, such as Malcolm, Munro, and Elphinstone. The chief defect in this organisation certainly lay in the provision made for the administration of the province of Bengal, and the dual task imposed upon the government of managing local detail and controlling general policy. The consequence was likely to be that whatever system of administration was adopted for Bengal would tend to be thrust upon the other provinces, because the central government would be slow to admit the existence of fundamental differences between the province with which it was familiar and the provinces with which it was not.

From the beginning the administration of Bengal offered peculiar difficulties. The system of government had fallen into great confusion. A powerful class, known locally as *zamindars*, had sprung up between the government and the cultivators. These zamindars were derived from two distinct sources. Some of them, such as the zamindars of Bardwān or Rājshāhi, represented old Hindu families which had formerly borne sway in the country and had submitted to the Muslim conquerors on condition of retaining a position of dignity and paying annual tribute. Others were descended from farmers of the land revenue and other officials who had acquired hereditary status. These persons claimed to represent the government within the areas committed to their charge. They collected the land revenue and other dues, as well as a number of unauthorised cesses; they administered justice; they represented the only police and magisterial authority. Under the Mughal government nobody had troubled to define their rights over the soil. As was usual in India, such matters had been left to the determination of custom. But the amount of revenue which they should hand over to the treasury had been a cause of unceasing dispute. In order to keep a check over their payments, officials called *kanungos*, or declarers of custom, had been instituted. These were supposed to keep exact registers of each zamindari, showing the amounts of revenue which ought to be collected. But the *kanungos* had gradually slipped from the control of the government and had become the servants of the zamindars themselves. The official organisation had thus broken down before the company was in any way

interested in the administration. Then too the province had fallen as a whole into English hands. In 1765 the company suddenly became master of the revenues, with great responsibilities for the maintenance of the government and the payment of forces large enough to protect Bengal from external invasion and internal rebellion. Its servants had indeed attempted to administer certain limited districts, which had already been granted to the English; but they had hardly learnt more than that the task was complex and difficult. The prime need, before which all else fell into insignificance, was to secure the regular payment of sums sufficient to maintain the military forces. Clive had therefore made no attempt to modify the mode of administration, but had handed over the company's duties to the charge of Muhammad Riza Khān, who, he hoped, would be able to keep matters on at least their old footing.

This plan, like the similar attempt of Dupleix to collect the Carnatic revenues through Pāpayya Pillai, proved a failure. Muhammad Riza Khān received a huge salary, but his administration was lax, while the decisions in the courts of justice were asserted by Verelst, a well-informed and honest if not vigorous man, to be corrupt bargains with the highest bidders. Since the resident at Murshidābād could not exercise sufficient supervision over the conduct of the company's deputy, supervisors were appointed in 1769, with orders to investigate the revenue position and above all to ascertain the amounts which the zamindars collected from the cultivators. But such attempts were frustrated by the passive opposition of the zamindars and their servants the kanungos. In 1772 Hastings was ordered by the company to remove the deputy and undertake the direct administration of the company's duties as *ḍiwān*. With these orders the English administration of Bengal begins.

It was determined to reappoint the supervisors, under the new title of collectors, to each district, to give them the assistance of Indian officials called *ḍiwāns*, to farm out the revenues for a term of five years, and to create a Committee of Circuit to tour the province and suggest a suitable organisation for adoption by the council. On the proposal of the committee it was resolved to set up two courts of justice in each district. The civil court consisted of the collector with a number of Indian officials, and was called the *mofassal ḍiwāni 'adālat*. The criminal court, the *faujdari*

'*adālat*, consisted of Muslim law officers, whose decisions were to be revised by the collectors, and submitted for the approval of an Indian official stationed at Calcutta and appointed by the nawab on the nomination of the governor. This official was known as the superintendent of the court—*daroga-i 'adālat*.

The five-year settlement of 1772 proved to be much higher than could be realised. Speculators desirous of the dignity of association with the land, and zamindars fearful of being dispossessed of their old position, bid up the farms recklessly. The collectors reported their opinion that the settlement could not be maintained. But the governor and council resolved that every effort should be made to prevent arrears. One reason was that they fancied that the farmers were deceiving the collectors; the second, that if the terms were rigorously enforced, it would be possible at the end of the settlement to make a good guess at the revenues which could normally be obtained. In 1773, on the private advice of Hastings, the company decided to withdraw the collectors from the districts, and a new system was introduced, by which the collectors were grouped into a number of provincial councils, charged with administering civil justice and with supervising the *ḍiwāns*, who were left in executive control of the various districts. But a new influence was destined to throw the system into confusion. In the next year the councillors and judges appointed under the Regulating Act reached Calcutta. Francis brought with him the administrative ideas of Clive, and the judges the legal ideas of England. Francis was convinced that every attempt to manage directly the administration of Bengal was doomed to failure, and was eager to see Muhammad Riza Khān restored to his old position or one as like it as possible. He also soon developed the theory, borrowed from some of the company's servants who had been employed in district administration, that the land revenue ought to be settled permanently and never varied. These ideas led to great controversy whenever the council proceeded to the discussion of revenue business; but Francis had not developed his theories in time to make use of the majority opposing Hastings before its disappearance with the death of Monson in 1776, and consequently the discussions led to no practical results. The interference of the Supreme Court, however, was a different matter. The judges held the view that every person concerned with the collection of the revenues must

be deemed to be in the service of the company, and, therefore, under the Regulating Act, subject to the jurisdiction of the court; that it had been constituted in Bengal in order to check oppression; that persons wrongfully imprisoned were entitled to appeal to the court for interference by seeking a writ of *habeas corpus*; and that such writs should be granted on the filing of an affidavit such as would authorise the issue of the writ in question in England. The result was that many renters, imprisoned by order of the provincial councils for non-payment of revenues, and ryots imprisoned at the suit of renters for the same reason, applied to the court for redress; the court issued writs accordingly; and the imprisoned persons were in fact released. This interference threatened to bring the revenue collections to a standstill. Similar action on the part of the Supreme Court dealt an equally severe blow to the operations of the provincial courts of justice which Hastings had set up. In what was called the Patna Case, for instance, the Muslim law officers of the Patna Provincial Council were cast in heavy damages in consequence of a sentence given by the council. In 1780, in order to bring the deadlock thus created to an end, Hastings invited the chief justice, Sir Elijah Impey, to accept the presidency of the appeal court at Calcutta, the *sadr dīwāni adālat*. This arrangement permitted the Supreme Court, now feeling sure that improper sentences delivered by the district courts would receive due correction by a trained and expert judge, to abstain from further interference. The arrangement was, however, disallowed by the company, and Hastings's enemies made of it a charge against Impey. They represented the affair as a bribe to the chief justice for ceasing to inconvenience the administration, and as a violation of the Regulating Act, which forbade the acceptance of salaried office by persons appointed under the act. They attempted to impeach Impey on this and other grounds. But their efforts broke down completely before the defence which Impey made before the House of Commons. Indeed, the partisan nature of the accusation was clear from the fact that they sought to impeach Impey, Hastings's friend, for accepting a paid office, while they said nothing of Mr Justice Chambers, the friend of Francis, who had likewise accepted the paid office of judge at Chinsura.

In 1776, when the five-year settlement was drawing to an end, Hastings proposed the formation of a new commission intended

to tour through Bengal and collect information on which a new settlement could be based. This was appointed accordingly, in spite of the strong opposition of Clavering and Francis. It became known as the *Amini* Commission, and its report is justly described as the most important document relating to the revenues of Bengal at this period. It bears striking evidence of the alienation of lands and of the oppression of the ryots under the influence of the settlement of 1772. In 1781 it was followed by a re-organisation of the revenue machinery. The collectors were to be re-established in the districts, acting under a central Committee of Revenue set up at Calcutta: but they were not invested with effective power. This involved a greater concentration of authority than the plan adopted in 1773. The settlements were made by the Committee of Revenue, not by the collectors, who were not allowed to interfere with such matters. The farmers were thus left without any local control, and did not hesitate to flog ryots presumptuous enough to complain of oppression or extortion.

Shortly after Hastings's departure from Bengal, a new scheme was introduced by his successor, John Macpherson. The provinces were to be divided into thirty-five districts (reduced in the next year to twenty-three). The collector in each district now became the authority by whom the settlement was to be made, and his conduct was supervised by the central committee, now called the Board of Revenue. On Cornwallis's arrival, the collectors once more received the office of head of the *ḍiwāni* 'adālat, with an Indian assistant to hear the smaller cases. Thus, the system of 1772 was for a while restored. But great changes were made in the mode of paying the collectors. In 1772 they had possessed the privilege of private trade, which had provided the chief reason for Hastings's dislike of their employment in the districts. They were now to receive 1500 rupees a month, besides a commission on the revenue which they collected, and this was expected to afford them an addition of about as much as their fixed pay. They were also given two covenanted servants as assistants. Criminal justice remained under the management of Muhammad Riza Khān, who had been restored by the majority in Hastings's government to his former office of *naib nāzīm*, deputy for the nawab in that branch of government not covered by the *ḍiwāni*.

Cornwallis's first measures were only temporary expedients, which had been chiefly dictated by the company's desire for

economy in the administration. An entirely new system was introduced between 1790 and 1793. The basis of this was a new settlement of the land revenue. When Cornwallis arrived, he found two schools of opinion on revenue matters. One was headed by James Grant, who had explored a quantity of ancient revenue accounts. These led him to the view that the zamindars had long succeeded in secreting a vast proportion of the revenues of the country, and that the actual collections fell far below the amount that ought to be realised. The second was headed by John Shore, who was probably the most experienced revenue servant in the presidency, and who believed that Grant's researches bore no relation to the actual facts of the time. Matters were further complicated by the ascendancy which the ideas of Francis had obtained in England for the time being, and that Cornwallis's instructions required him to effect a permanent settlement as soon as possible. In 1787 the Board of Revenue was ordered to prepare to settle the revenue for a long term of years. Two years later, when the necessary reports had been received from the collectors, Cornwallis came to the conclusion that nothing would be gained by a longer delay, and that, if the home authorities approved, the long-term settlement ought to be made permanent. In 1790 the long-term settlement came into force; and in 1793, with the approval of the company, it was declared unalterable. Even Shore, Cornwallis's most trusted adviser, was opposed to this measure. But the governor-general was convinced of its necessity, not from the revenue point of view but from that of general administration. So long as settlements were made annually, so long the zamindars would have the strongest possible incentive to corrupt the revenue officials. The stake was large, and the bribes offered would be great. But if the revenue demand were settled once and for all, this source of corruption would vanish. The permanent zamindari settlement thus came into being.

This change made way for the transformation of the system of district administration. On principle Cornwallis had disliked the concentration of revenue and judicial powers in the hands of the collectors. He considered that it gave too much authority to individuals, whose character would form the sole security for the due exercise of their functions. Moreover, the traditional Indian system of government, in which the executive official played so large a part, was wholly unfamiliar to him. He was accustomed

to a mode of government under which the law was administered by a series of courts, and the duties of executive officials were reduced to a minimum. This was in his eyes the best method, and the one which he resolved to set up. Since it was in every point utterly different from that which he found in use, he thought that the conduct of the new system must be confined entirely to the English servants of the company. Hence that exclusion of Indians from responsible employment which marked the Cornwallis method of administration.

Henceforward the collectors were to be only fiscal agents, required to collect the fixed revenues from the zamindars. They would need for their duties only a small number of subordinates, who would be employed in the collectors' offices at the district headquarters; and they would have no possible reason for travelling about the area entrusted to their fiscal charge. It would not matter whether they knew much or little about the condition of the people, about the extent of cultivation, or the economic resources of the country. It was not their business to redress any wrongs. It was not their function to rule. In future the head of the district and the real representative of government was to be the district judge. To him, or to those acting under him, complaints for redress were to be preferred. Should a ryot be wronged by a zamindar, the ryot was to sue the zamindar in one of the courts of justice which were to be set up, in accordance with a new code of laws which was to be enacted. The judge was moreover to be head of the police and magistrate, responsible not only for the administration of civil justice, but also for the maintenance of public peace and the prevention or punishment of crime.

For the administration of justice a complete chain of courts was established. The district, or *zillah* judge, as he was called, was entrusted with the determination of all civil suits of importance and revenue suits, with the help of a registrar who was empowered to try cases referred to him by the judge. Suits for small amounts might be heard by Indian judges, *munsiffs* and *sadr amins*, who were to be paid by fees in order that they should seek to attract suitors to their courts by the impartiality of their decisions. In his magisterial capacity, the *zillah* judge could commit persons accused of crime for trial by one of the four courts of circuit which were established for the punishment of crime. These courts of circuit were also to serve as courts of



appeal from the civil decisions of the zillah judge, and consisted of three English judges. In civil cases a further appeal lay to the governor-general in council, who formed the *sadr diwāni 'adālat*.

As regards the police, the districts were to be divided into several areas, each in charge of an Indian official called the *daroga*, who had under his command a body of salaried police, and who could also require the assistance of the village-watchmen. The darogas were responsible to the zillah judge in his capacity as magistrate.

In order to complete the system a series of regulations was passed in 1793, drafted mainly by the chief secretary, Barlow. These enacted a measure declaring the land revenue settlement permanent and unchangeable, laid down a form of procedure for the courts of justice, defined the qualifications of the law officers, Hindu and Muslim, who were attached to the courts, and dealt with a considerable variety of other matters.

This system was evidently inspired by a spirit of true philanthropy. It set up a great ideal, the supremacy of the law and the authority of the courts of justice. But in a large number of respects it was most unsuited to the needs of the province, and, like the revenue settlement which formed an integral part of the system, was full of unexpected evils. In its benevolent intentions and its unfortunate results it bears a marked affinity to the Regulating Act, and for the same reason. Both were founded upon ignorance. Ignorance was indeed the chief feature of the revenue settlement. No collector knew the resources, the rights, or even the limits of the zamindaris which he was required to settle for ever. The grants which were issued to the zamindars showed the names of the villages included in their estates, but the boundaries were undefined and unknown. Great areas of uncultivated waste were thus signed away without the government's possessing any idea of the magnitude of the gift it was making. That affected merely the rights of government. But the rights of the villagers were affected also. No attempt was made to define the rights of the customary tenants, who were entitled to cultivate their holdings at fixed rents. It was expected that such matters would be cleared up by the gradual operation of the courts. This proved to be an entire miscalculation, and the general effect was to bestow on the zamindars the fee simple of large areas in which a multitude of peasants had enjoyed extensive rights. And, based



as it was on ignorance, the system made no provision for the future acquisition of knowledge. The collector, tied to his office at headquarters, had neither authority nor opportunity to learn the condition of the people. The judge, in like manner, could learn nothing but the affairs of the suitors who appeared before him. Yet the administration was, and was intended to be, a foreign administration. Cornwallis would have no Indians in high office. But if there is one thing above all which a foreign administration needs it is knowledge of the economic and social condition of the people over whom it rules. That was removed from all possibility by the revenue and administrative methods established in Bengal.

Nor were the endeavours made to provide the people with justice marked by success. New laws were made, but no means existed by which they could be brought to the knowledge of the people at large. They were framed in English, of which only a few Indians living in Calcutta itself could read a word. They were translated into Bengali and posted at the district headquarters; but how many peasants would tramp thither to read them? How many could read them if they tramped thither? Above all, how many could understand their elaborate verbiage when they had done so? The consequence was that the legislation benefited the few persons who could become aware of its contents, a group of sharp-witted Calcutta *banyans* and *sarkārs*—agents and head-servants—who studied them closely and made great advantage of their knowledge. Nor was real justice to be expected from the courts themselves. Their procedure was imitated from the complex and interminable procedure of the English courts. Witnesses were examined on oath. But the taking of oaths was a thing which the respectable Hindu had never been able to stomach. The consequence was that even a good case had to be supported by false witness. Men had to be hired to declare they had seen what they had not seen. The fact, says John Shore's son after long judicial experience, that a Hindu gave evidence in a British court was presumptive evidence against the respectability of his character. Then, too, law was costly. Pleaders had to be employed, because the procedure was elaborate. The great liberty of appeal permitted the man with funds to wear out the man without. The advantage lay altogether with the rich against the poor. Nor were the courts numerous enough to cope with the cases which were

brought. Arrears increased to enormous proportions. It came to be a saying that with luck a decision might be reached in the life-time of the grandson of an original suitor. In fact Cornwallis had confounded law and law-courts with justice.

Nor must the police be omitted from this tale of woes. The darogas, under the supervision of a sedentary judge who could be trusted never to pay them a sudden visit and who in any case was much too busy to attend to them, enjoyed a most enviable position. They were empowered to arrest on suspicion. All they had to do therefore was to inform a well-to-do person that they proposed to lay him under the social stigma of arrest, unless he dissuaded them with gifts, to obtain whatever they liked to ask in reason. The office of daroga of police became the most sought-after of all the places open to Indians under British authority.

Cornwallis's successors sought to remedy some of the evils which began to emerge from this unsuitable mode of conducting the business of government. The permanent settlement was heavy, and at first the zamindars had great difficulty in meeting their obligations. Shore therefore increased their power of coercing the ryots, and Wellesley increased those powers and permitted the zamindars to seize the lands of defaulting ryots. These measures, designed to facilitate the collection of the revenues, emphasised the position of dependence in which Cornwallis had in effect placed the cultivator. To meet the evil of delay, the number of judges was increased, the duties of the governor-general and council as the supreme appeal court were transferred to three judges who in future formed the *sadr dīwāni 'adālat*, freedom of appeal was limited, and the payment of fees was required before a suitor could file a suit. But all these changes only palliated the evils of a system fundamentally unsuited to the circumstances of the time.

Until 1808 the home authorities had approved without any hesitation the system established by Cornwallis. But in that year Thomas Munro went to England on leave. He had acquired a great knowledge of district administration, not indeed in Bengal but in Madras, and was a strong critic of the Bengal methods, above all of the ignorance of the Bengal collectors and of the complete supremacy of the zillah judges. He was called upon to give evidence before a select committee of the House of Commons, and made a deep impression upon all who heard him. His energy,

knowledge and character carried conviction. The directors began to wonder why the system which Munro had employed in Madras had never been adopted in Bengal, and how it was that their collectors there knew so little of the condition and occupations of the people placed under their charge. They noticed too that when a collector was called upon to manage a zamindari during the minority of the zamindar or on its resumption by government for the non-payment of rent, he found insuperable difficulties in executing duties which Munro and others discharged with ease in the south. They therefore ceased to desire the extension of the Bengal system to the other provinces under their rule. This was fortunate. The Bengal government was still convinced that its methods were the only sound methods of managing the land revenues and was bent upon establishing them in every region under its authority. But for the conversion of the directors, the influence of the Cornwallis system would have been much more extensive and injurious than was actually the case.

In Madras early revenue management had followed much the same methods as in Bengal. The company's servants knew little of the languages of the people or of their customs. Farming the revenues had appeared the easiest and best course to follow. In the Northern Circars, for instance, where the company had exercised control since 1767, the councils at Masulipatam and Vizagapatam had let out the farms, sometimes to local chiefs, sometimes to prominent Indian merchants, as ignorantly as had been done in Bengal. A committee of circuit had been appointed, as under Warren Hastings, to gather information; but, though it succeeded in its task far better than its Bengal counterpart, its reports had led to no change of management. Nor had any steps been taken to set up an adequate system of justice. That function had been confided to the renters and zamindars of the region. Even in the area surrounding Madras itself, which had been bestowed on the company as a *jāgīr* by the nawab Muhammad 'Alī, the revenues had been rented out either to the nawab himself or to one of his nominees.

In southern India as a whole conditions varied greatly. In some regions, such as the hilly portions of the Northern Circars, the southern hills of Tinnevely and Madura, or the hilly region lying due west of Madras, hereditary chiefs existed who had been wont to pay such tribute as the nawab's power permitted him to exact

from them. Elsewhere no hereditary middlemen intervened between the government and the cultivators. The nawab appointed *faujdars*, or commandants, and *tahsildars* or collectors, to manage the affairs of the state. The first were military officers intended to support the authority of the tahsildars and compel a reluctant people to pay what was demanded of them. The lands were classified as wet and dry, according as they had or had not a perennial supply of water from one of the numerous tanks which constituted the main source of irrigation. The wet lands, which grew rice, were assessed at a proportion of the crop; and the officials insisted on selling the state-share in the markets before the ryots were allowed to dispose of any of their own grain. The dry lands, and garden lands where betel or tobacco was grown, were assessed at a money-rate, which was based on the amount which could be extracted from the ryot in a good year. Here, as in other parts of India, the authority of the state had fallen so low as no longer to command the voluntary payment of the taxes. The realisation of the revenues was always a matter of violence. The ryots of a group of villages would be gathered together; they would declare their complete inability to pay what was demanded of them: they would then be beaten, or stood in the burning sun with a heavy stone weighing down their heads, until they reluctantly produced the coins which they had brought with them. It was a point of honour never to pay on demand, and he was reckoned a leader among them who endured longer than his fellows. In most of the villages there was a headman, nominated by the government from among the members of a particular family, who was held responsible for the maintenance of cultivation and public order in his village. In some districts, however, especially in Tanjore and the Arcot country, there was a superior class known by the Persian term *mirās-dars*, claiming exclusive rights over the waste-lands of the village and often entitled to a share of the produce of the lands occupied by others than themselves. In most parts of the country, however, individual families owned specific plots of land, over which no other possessed rights apart from the demands of the state and the customary shares of the crops due to the village temple and the village craftsmen.

Towards the close of the century the financial distress of the nawab introduced great confusion into a country already disorganised. Numberless pensions were granted to individuals as

the reward of their services; these pensions took the form of an assignment of the land revenues of a certain area. Creditors were given assignments of the revenues over large districts as security for their debts; and where this was done, the whole administration of the district passed into their hands. Village officials and persons in favour with the higher officers of government saw to it that their own lands were lightly assessed, and that the deficit was made up by imposing heavier burdens on the lands of less fortunate men. Under the name of *moturfa* a great variety of impositions was established, of ever varying amount, levied on artisans and other persons believed able to pay even the smallest sums. In these ways the task confronting the company's servants was more difficult than in Bengal, because the old system had fallen into a state of greater confusion. But as against this must be set the fact that no established class of middle-men had come into being, except in certain limited areas, and that, as soon as the company's servants began to assume the responsibilities corresponding with their power, they would find no concerted opposition to their enquiries and no great difficulty in reaching direct contact with the cultivators themselves. This difference, fundamentally a difference between the landed tenures of south India and those of Bengal, implied different methods and a different attitude of administration.

In 1786, under instructions which the company issued after Pitt had passed his India Act, a board of revenue was established at Madras. It consisted of three company's servants under the presidency of a member of the council. Much needed reforms were introduced by this new authority. In 1794 the old chiefs and councils in the Northern Circars and elsewhere were abolished and their administrative duties were given to collectors. But at this time the centre of interest lies outside the old possessions of the company. In 1793 Tipu Sultān had been compelled to cede to the English the districts known as the Bārāmahal, which now form the districts of Salem and Coimbatore. Cornwallis had taken a close personal interest in forming the administration of the new acquisitions. He had himself chosen the men to whom the charge was to be confided. Deeming that familiarity with the languages of the people formed an indispensable qualification, he had ruled out all the covenanted servants of sufficient standing not otherwise employed: and at last he had selected Alexander Read,

a lieutenant-colonel of the Madras army, to serve as the head of the administration. Read was a man of great talent. He was entirely honest. He had no skill in expressing his ideas upon paper, but his ideas themselves were clear, vigorous, and sound. He was convinced that knowledge formed the foundation of all good administration, and set to work, with his assistants, to acquire it. Among the latter was another officer of the Madras army, Thomas Munro, equally honest and hard-working, but possessed of an imagination and the gift of clear and forcible expression which Read lacked. These two men laid the foundations of the Madras revenue system in accordance with the custom of the country. They resolved to get rid of the traditional English method of employing renters of the revenue and to manage it directly. That meant the formation of a multitude of assessments on small patches of land, and therefore a revenue survey was the first condition. This step, the lack of which had vitiated all the revenue work in Bengal, was undertaken and carried out. It was found that much cultivation had been concealed by fraudulent exclusion from the revenue accounts. Adopting the rate of assessment current under Tipu's government, half the gross produce, they succeeded in drawing from the districts about the same amount as had been drawn in Tipu's time to cover both the demand of the state and the defalcations of individuals. This demand was, however, heavier than could be paid in any but a good season. Like other early settlements, Read's in the Bārāmahal was heavier than the country could bear. But Read's method of careful and persistent enquiry carried with it the seeds of improvement. Munro in particular came to form a theory of the system which would be appropriate to the country in general. He thought that the revenue should be permanently fixed on each holding, that the ryot should be left free to cultivate his customary fields as he chose, and even to take more if any fell vacant, and that the traditional practices of compelling the ryot to cultivate a certain area and of making additional assessments to cover failure on the part of any cultivators should be abandoned. Later experience in Canara and the Deccan confirmed him in his opinions.

The governor-general and council, however, had long been pressing Madras to introduce the system which had already been introduced into Bengal. In 1798 formal orders were sent down to do this without further delay. A permanent zamindari settlement

was therefore begun. This was easy in those parts of the country where a zamindari class existed. The zamindars of the Northern Circars and the poligars, as they were called in the other districts, were invested with the same rights as had been bestowed in Bengal. In many cases the settlement was based, not on any calculation of what the estates could reasonably pay, but on a commutation of the zamindars' obligation of maintaining military forces to keep the public peace. But where no zamindars existed, they had to be created. Villages were grouped together, and the right of collecting the revenues was put up for sale. At the same time attempts were made to introduce the Bengal system of justice. Zillah judges were appointed, invested with the control of the police, and the collectors were for the moment reduced to the same position as they occupied in Bengal. Since in 1802 the territories of the nawab of the Carnatic were annexed, the area over which these revolutionary changes were enforced was very extensive.

Save where zamindars existed already, the Madras permanent settlement did not last long. The *muttahdars*, as the new zamindars were called, soon found their position untenable and the revenue demands higher than could be met. They abandoned their rights, and a new plan had to be devised. In 1808-9 an experiment was made of leasing out villages either to the *mirāsḍars* or to the village headmen. These at first were to be made for a term of three years and, when that had expired, a further term of ten years was ordered. These village leases, however, also failed. The revenue demand was too high, the village officials abused their position, the collectors and their staffs lost touch with village conditions. In 1812 the Madras government was required by the company, under Munro's influence, to abandon the Bengal system, to re-introduce the ryotwari settlement, as the assessment of small individual holdings was called, and to reduce the authority of the zillah judges. Munro himself was sent back to Madras as a special commissioner to carry these orders into effect.

In 1816 a series of regulations was passed into law establishing these changes. The collector became a magistrate and recovered the control of the district police. A considerable number of subordinate Indian judges, under the title of district *munsiffs*, was appointed: and the village headmen were empowered to try petty suits, and, at the request of the parties, to constitute boards



of arbitrators, known as *panchayats*, to determine causes of whatever amount. This attempt to revive the traditional mode of settling differences failed completely, mainly, it would seem, because of the popularity enjoyed by the district *munsiffs*. In 1818 the Board of Revenue ordered the re-introduction of the ryotwari system.

Thus the attempt to extend the Cornwallis system to Madras failed completely. In fact what was destined to become the characteristic mode of district administration developed, not in Bengal, but in Madras. There the collector emerges for the first time invested with a detailed control of the land revenue, possessed of an extensive revenue staff, spending much of his time touring through the villages of his district investigating conditions and hearing complaints, responsible for the public peace, but leaving to the district judge the determination of civil disputes and the punishment of serious crime. He was neither the unquestioned autocrat nor the unimportant tax-gatherer who had alternately appeared in Bengal. But he was the local representative of the government; it was his business to know all that could be known about his district; on his annual settlement of the land revenue depended the well-being of every villager; on his activity depended the execution of the wishes of government. Many of the men who filled this position in such a manner that their names are still remembered in their districts, would have cut but a poor figure in a competitive examination. They knew the vernacular in no scholarly way. But they could converse familiarly with the ryot about the matters which most nearly touched his interests and did not live in the isolation of a Bengal cutchery. The courts did not rank so high as in Bengal. It was characteristic that the designation of the Madras collector was "collector and magistrate" whereas, even when Bentinck had to some extent brought the Bengal system into line with the practice of the subordinate presidency, the Bengal collector was a "magistrate and collector". In short, under the influence of Munro the English at Madras wisely abandoned the attempt to subordinate the position of the executive official to that of the judge. The Madras system was in fact a middle way between the old Indian plan of making the executive official the sole agent of government, and the English plan of subordinating all to law and law-court.



## CHAPTER VII

### The North- Western Approaches to India

From the beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century, the nations of Europe had sought to approach India from the south-west, by way of the Cape of Good Hope. The conclusion of the Napoleonic wars had left Great Britain in firm occupation of that route. Rivals began therefore to seek out some alternative way of reaching the great dependency which had been built up under the protection of the British navy. Indications of the coming change had already been given. Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, and still more the plans which had been formed both by him and by Russia for military expeditions after the manner of Alexander the Great, showed how European policy was moving. Accordingly the nineteenth century was marked by the development of new approaches by the north-west; and the intermediate regions, Persia, Irak, Egypt, and the tangle of mountains on the frontier of India itself, acquired a new and dominant influence on the foreign policy of the Anglo-Indian government. These regions included three possibly vital areas. The farthest away was Egypt, commanding the neck of land which parted the Mediterranean from the Red Sea; then came Irak, through which, if the upper reaches of the Euphrates could be attained, an enemy could drop down the river to the head of the Persian Gulf; and nearest of all was Afghanistan, the age-long key to India, from which an enemy, neglecting Suez and Basra, could attack the Panjab and thence spread over the valley of the Ganges. These possibilities complicated the problem of Indian defence, and destroyed the all-sufficiency of maritime power, although through the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf the water-ways bit so deeply into the land.

With those water-ways the vessels of the Presidency of Bombay had been long familiar. It had been obliged, for the protection of its local trade from Marātha pirates, to build a fleet organised for police and war under the name of the Bombay Marine. Its shipping was mostly built at Bombay itself, and when, in 1759, Surat was taken by the forces of the company, the latter became admiral of the Mughal empire and undertook the duty of con-

voying Indian vessels plying to the ports of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. For the next seventy years the officer appointed to act as deputy for the company flew the company's colours at the peak but the Mughal flag at the main. The duties of convoy brought this force into conflict with the pirate tribes of the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, and a number of officers were employed in surveying and charting the coasts. The alarm created by the French occupation of Egypt suggested the expediency of blocking up the Red Sea. An attempt had been made to occupy Perim, and, when that was defeated by lack of water, the English had been welcomed at Aden by the sultan, with whom the naval commander made a treaty in 1802. In the early years of the nineteenth century various expeditions were directed into the Persian Gulf. Alliances were made with some of the chiefs, notably the *imām* of Maskat, and in 1819, after the pirate stronghold of Rās-ul-khāima had been captured, the principal maritime tribes had been compelled to enter into a league with the company, renouncing both piracy and the slave-trade. For the second time in history, fleets directed from India were controlling Arabian waters.

In both cases the motives were the same. The Portuguese and the English alike were interested in maintaining peace and order on the great trade-routes; both were concerned to guard their position against possible attack by Mediterranean powers. The developments of the nineteenth century were to render these regions more critical than ever. Two causes in particular contributed to this result. One was the rising power of Muhammad 'Alī in Egypt, the expansion of his authority, first into Arabia and then into Syria, and the likelihood of his establishing his rule over all the coasts of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The other was the invention of the marine steam-engine, which made the navigation of the Red Sea possible at all seasons of the year instead of being narrowly limited by periodic winds as in the past. The ocean-sailing ship had brought India into effective contact with Europe; the development of the fire-arm had subjected India to European domination; the development of steam-power, abolishing the slow travel of the past, and destined ultimately to unify India, at the moment was to transfer the control of India from Calcutta to London and interlock the external policy of India and England.

The first effect of these changes was to revive projects for

opening a trade-route to Europe by way of Suez. Earlier attempts had been frustrated by the confusion which had reigned in Egypt in the eighteenth century. But now that it was clear that letters, if not goods, could be conveyed much more safely and rapidly by Suez than by the Cape of Good Hope, merchants set actively to work. Committees were formed at the presidency towns and in London. Bombay took the lead in a matter in which it was vitally interested, and the government of Bombay, under Elphinstone and Malcolm, proved by experiment that the route from Bombay to Suez could be used at all seasons of the year, even by the feeble steam-ships of the period. Muhammad 'Alī was eager to co-operate in a movement which promised him wealth and influence. Under the pressure of public opinion, the English government and the East India Company organised a system of monthly steamers between England and Alexandria on the western section of the route, and between Suez and Bombay on the eastern section. In 1837 the sultan of Aden was unwise enough to seize and plunder the cargo of a Madras-owned vessel which was wrecked off that port. The steam-ships of those days could not carry coal enough for prolonged voyages, and Aden was by nature marked out as the ideal coaling-station on the eastern run, apart from its strategic value as commanding the entrance to the Red Sea. The company's government demanded reparation; the sultan promised and then retracted; in January, 1839, therefore, Aden was captured by the Bombay marine and military forces. The treaties with the tribes of the Persian Gulf together with the occupation of Aden gave the company's government control of the two avenues of approach towards India from the north-west by way of the sea.

Similar, if less successful, activity had been displayed along the continental approach to India. The alliance of Persia had been sought and obtained. But it was still important to learn the geographical conditions, the routes, their passibility for wheeled traffic, the supplies of water and provisions, the things which would hinder or facilitate military movements through this north-west zone. In 1809 and 1810 three officers, Grant, Pottinger, and Christie, explored the ways through the Makrān and Balūchistan into Persia, and Christie was the first Englishman to visit Herat and call attention to its military importance. Only a little later Moorcroft crossed the Hīmālāyas and visited Ladākh. Thence he

penetrated to Bukhāra, and was seeking to return by Herat when he died of disease. In 1830 Arthur Conolly, setting out from Tabriz, attempted to reach the khanate of Khiva in the hopes of learning its military strength. He was captured and held to ransom. He then passed back into India by way of Kandahār, where for a while he had to lie in hiding, amusing himself by hunting hyenas with the boys of the village where he found refuge. In 1832 Alexander Burnes, with the approval of the governor-general and the financial support of the government, set out in the reverse direction, from India to Kābul and Bukhāra. His purpose was two-fold, to survey the possible routes of an advance towards India and to test possible friendships which the British might form in that region. He concluded that Herat, being covered on the north by extensive deserts, was not likely to be attacked save from the side of Persia, but that any movement on India would be likely to follow more than one road, and to the eastwards he indicated the possibility of an advance by way of Chitral and Kashmīr. He hoped that the states on the Oxus might be brought into political and commercial relations with British India and that an alliance might be formed with Dost Muhammad, the ruler of Kābul. In 1836 he was sent back to Kābul as commercial agent.

To some extent adventure had been the motive of these explorations. But adventure had been reinforced by political aims. The projects of Napoleon and Paul had directed attention to Central Asia, and the development of Russian policy in Persia had invested the matter with a more pressing interest. The decay of Turkish power in the eighteenth century had laid Persia open to Russian aggression, and, as soon as Russian power was well established in the Caucasus, Russian forces began to press southwards. The Persians had attempted to persuade the French to come to their help. In 1807 Napoleon by the Treaty of Finkenstein had guaranteed the integrity of Persia and had sent a military mission to Teherān. But immediately afterwards he had made peace with Russia and refused even to act as a mediator on behalf of the shah. The Persians had then hoped to get help from England. After long negotiations the Treaty of Teherān was signed, by which protection was promised in case Persia were attacked by any external power. In accordance with this arrangement a body of officers of the company's armies was lent to

re-organise the military forces of Persia. This treaty had been negotiated by a representative not of the company but of the crown, so that it was clear that the policy of Wellesley and Minto of covering the routes to India by an alliance with Persia was supported by London as well as by Calcutta. It seems, however, that the policy had been adopted without counting the cost. The only power likely to attack Persia was Russia. Was England prepared to go to war with Russia for the protection of the shah? Was she prepared to send into Persia such a force as would enable Persia to meet her invaders on equal terms? These questions either had never been considered or must have been answered in the negative. It is true that the Treaty of Teherān gave a loop-hole by which actual war might be avoided. In the first place the obligation did not arise except in the case of foreign aggression. It would not be difficult to jockey the shah into military movements constituting Persian aggression. And even if the aggression came unquestionably from the other side, England still had the choice of giving military or mere financial assistance. For some years nothing happened. But in 1826 the Russians and Persians went to war again. The shah, Fath 'Ali, began the attack on the sound principle that aggression is the best form of defence. But Canning, who was at the time secretary of state for foreign affairs, and much engrossed with questions arising out of the Greek war, was not prepared to sacrifice the success of his policy in Europe by supporting the shah in circumstances in which no formal treaty obligation had arisen. He therefore compounded with the shah by giving him a moderate subsidy. The Persians were defeated. In 1828 they were reduced to making more territorial cessions by the Treaty of Turkomanchai, and concluded that their interests would best be served by cultivating the friendship of the Russian emperor.

The establishment of Russian influence at Teherān was followed by disquieting events. The Russians encouraged the Persians to seek expansion eastwards. The advice jumped with the shah's inclinations, while it promised to Russia the extension of her own influence through that of her client. In 1831 an expedition against Khiva was planned. In 1832 Khurāsān was overrun. Next year an expedition against Herat was only interrupted by the death of the shah's heir. In 1834 the shah himself died and was succeeded by his grandson, Muhammad, who leant heavily on his Russian

advisers. He projected not only the renewal of the expedition against Herat but also the capture of Kandahār. In 1837, in spite of strong representations made by the British envoy at Teherān, the shah laid siege to Herat. Persia under Russian control was seeking to recover the provinces which had formed the empire of Nādir Shāh and from which he had sallied out to conquer Delhi.

While Persia was pushing out towards long-lost frontiers, not in her own strength, which was small, but in reliance on Russian power, which was great, the position in Afghanistan was most uncertain. After the murder of Nādir Shāh in 1747, Ahmad Shāh Durāni had built up a strong power stretching northwards to the Oxus, westwards to Persia, eastwards to the Sutlej and the Indus. Under his son Tīmūr Shāh, who reigned from 1773 to 1793, the state began to decay. Ten years later it fell into the hands of Shāh Shujā', a thoroughly incapable prince, who was driven out in 1809, and, after some years' wandering, found refuge under British authority at Ludhiāna. In Afghanistan itself prolonged civil wars followed, first between princes of the reigning Sadozai family, then between them and a new family, the Barakzais, and then among the Barakzais themselves. The upshot of these conflicts was that the Sadozais, represented in 1830 by a prince named Kāmran, retained Herat; while the triumphant Barakzai, Dost Muhammad, established himself as amir of Kābul. The Indian provinces had been completely lost. Sind, never very closely attached to the Durāni empire, had become virtually independent under the amirs of the Tālpura family. In the Panjab had arisen the power of Ranjit Singh and his Sikhs, who had taken advantage of the civil wars in Afghanistan not only to establish their own independence but also to conquer from the Afghans Kashmīr and Peshāwar. In these circumstances Dost Muhammad was uncertain which way to turn. In 1834 Shāh Shujā', with the countenance of both Ranjit Singh and of the English, had made an unsuccessful attempt to recover his vanished kingdom. In the hope of obtaining aid from one quarter or another, Dost Muhammad made overtures to the Persians, to Russia, and to the English.

In 1835 Lord Auckland had been appointed governor-general in succession to Lord William Bentinck, and assumed his office on March 4, 1836. The views of the British cabinet, in which Palmerston had charge of foreign affairs, were inspired by the desire of checking the progress which Russia had made in the

regions bordering on India. In 1836 Palmerston appointed McNeill, a prominent Russophobe, minister to the shah; in the same year instructions were addressed to Auckland, pointing out the need of securing the north-west frontier and of counteracting "the progress of Russian influence in a quarter, which, from its proximity to our Indian possessions, could not fail, if it were once established, to act injuriously on the system of our Indian alliances, and possibly to interfere even with the tranquillity of our own territory". He was given entire discretion to select his mode of action, as soon as he should be convinced "that the time has arrived at which it would be right for you to interfere decidedly in the affairs of Afghanistan".

Auckland's position was most embarrassing. He was separated from the area in which he was to act by the interposition of independent though allied states; and the treaties did not contemplate the use of the territories of Sind or of the Panjab either as a base for war or even for the passage of armies. Worse than this was the irreconcilable hostility of Sikh and Afghan. They were divided by religion, by a long course of merciless war, by an obstinate determination on the one side to retain, and on the other to recover, the spoils of conquest, especially Peshāwar and its dependencies. Burnes, at Kābul as commercial agent, soon found himself involved in political discussions. Dost Muhammad leant towards a British alliance. He had written to St Petersburg, and, in December, 1837, Vitkevitch, a Russian agent, was sent in answer. But the amir still would have chosen the British side could he but have obtained from them the terms on which he had set his heart. One was not a matter over which Auckland would have hesitated for a moment. It was a promise of protection from any attacks by Persia. But the other was the transfer of Peshāwar to Afghanistan. This would have involved the abandonment of the long-standing alliance with Ranjit Singh. That prince was already stricken in years and could not be expected much longer to rule at Lahore. It was not unlikely that on his death much confusion would arise, for it was clear that he had no son, genuine or supposed, able to carry on his work. War with the Sikhs in that contingency was not improbable, and then the alliance of Dost Muhammad would be most valuable. But, as things stood, nothing could more contribute to such a war than a formal alliance with the ruler of Kābul; and, were the surrender of



Peshāwar to be one of the terms of the alliance, nothing could be more certain to bring that war about. Auckland had therefore to choose between alienating the Sikhs or the Afghans, between abandoning an old, sensible, and honest ally of the company, and throwing Dost Muhammad into the arms of Russia. The first would mean war on the Sutlej; the second would mean either the tolerance of Russian influence at Kābul or the removal by force of arms of a ruler with whom the English had no quarrel save that he would not ally himself with them on their own terms.

Auckland judged that the arrival of the Russian envoy at Kābul had created the situation in which interference in Afghanistan had become necessary; and that a vigorous attempt to remove Dost Muhammad from his throne was a lesser evil than to antagonise Ranjit Singh. He still acted with great deliberation. In May, 1838, he sent his foreign secretary, Macnaghten, to frame an arrangement with Ranjit Singh. The outcome of this was the Tripartite Treaty which was signed on June 26. This treaty seems to have gone farther than Auckland had intended. He had meant to revive the projects of 1834 for the re-establishment of Shāh Shujā' at Kābul without doing more than making a military demonstration, or alternatively to promote hostilities between Ranjit Singh and Dost Muhammad. Ranjit, however, was not willing to attack Afghanistan without much more than the passive support of the English. Finally a joint attack was decided on in the name of the old shah. Then, when detailed arrangements for the actual operations began to be made, it became clear that if anything effectual was to be done the English would have to take the lead. Orders were issued for the assemblage of a great army to invade Afghanistan by way of the Bolān Pass and to establish Shāh Shujā' as ruler of Kābul and Kandahār. Thus Auckland had gradually drifted into a far more extensive action than he had contemplated. His excuse was that the establishment of a friendly prince at Kābul, the assurance of peace with the Panjab, and the creation of a controlling influence in Sind were worth the risks which he knew he was running.

In October, 1838, it became known that the Persians had given up the siege of Herat. By some Auckland has been criticised for not having then abandoned his projected attack on Dost Muhammad. But that criticism seems to overlook the fact that Auckland and Dost Muhammad had been unable to agree on terms of



alliance and that the Afghan ruler was thought to have committed himself to friendship with Russia. Auckland therefore made no change in his plans beyond reducing the force with which he proposed to invade Afghanistan. The Army of the Indus, as it was called, was to march through Sind, the Bombay and Bengal detachments assembling at Bukkar, where the river was to be crossed. The amirs of Sind had in the first instance to be coerced into permitting the passage of the company's troops through their territory. When that had been done, the army moved onward, and, after a march of great hardship, it entered Kandahār in April, 1839. Shāh Shujā' was at once proclaimed. A move was then made against Kābul. On the way Ghaznī was stormed by a brilliant feat of arms. On August 2 Dost Muhammad, who had marched out to defend his capital, finding his army unwilling to fight, was compelled to flee. He took refuge first in Bāmiān and later in Bukhāra, where the amir shut him up in prison. Shāh Shujā' made a triumphant entry into Kābul, and was installed once more in the Bālā Hissār, the "high fortress", overlooking the city. At this moment it looked as if Auckland's policy had completely succeeded. In reward he was made an earl, the commander, Sir John Keane, was made a baron, and Macnaghten, who was in political control, was made a baronet and a little later named governor of Bombay, an office which he did not live to hold.

The success, however, was entirely superficial. Shāh Shujā' was as incompetent as ever. His own troops were worthless. His ministers were untrustworthy. It was soon clear that he would only remain at Kābul as long as the English kept him there. On Macnaghten devolved the task of settling the administration of the country. He was a good Persian scholar, and a man of quick wit, but he was incurably optimistic, of uncertain judgment and small administrative knowledge. The first need was to provide the shah with a regular revenue. This provoked the liveliest opposition. The tribes did not greatly care who called himself amir of Kābul so long as he did not attempt to levy taxes on them. Sporadic troubles occurred all over the country, and a number of chiefs were only kept quiet by receiving monthly allowances which for the time being had to be paid by the Government of India. Before long Auckland found the establishment of Shāh Shujā' was going to cost much more than he had reckoned.

Moreover external troubles multiplied. News came that the Russians had sent out a great expedition to attack Khiva. The expedition failed, but the alarm which the news caused spread far and wide. Worse than this, Ranjit Singh died, and no reliance could be placed on Nau Nihāl Singh, who had succeeded him. Then Dost Muhammad escaped from his prison at Bukhāra, and appeared in Afghan territory at the head of numerous followers, including troops who had been raised in the name of Shāh Shujā'. The ex-amir was indeed defeated in September, 1840, and in the following November surrendered himself to Macnaghten. But this success was followed within a year by overwhelming disaster.

In 1841 the company, shocked at the cost of occupying Afghanistan, ordered economies to be introduced. The military force was therefore lessened, and the stipends which had been paid to some of the chiefs were cut off. Local discontent spread as acquiescence became less profitable and the means of punishing disturbances weakened. In the latter part of the year few districts remained quiet. At Kābul itself was a brigade consisting of one queen's regiment of foot, three of sepoys, with a proportion of cavalry and artillery, in all 4500 combatants and 12,000 camp-followers. It was commanded by a queen's officer, Elphinstone, of undoubted personal bravery, but old, inactive, and sick. The brigade was quartered in cantonments outside the city, while the stores were in the city itself and the cantonments were untenable against any serious attack. On November 2 a riot broke out in the city. Alexander Burnes, who had been nominated to succeed Macnaghten as soon as the latter should go down to take up his government at Bombay, was murdered, with his brother Charles and another English officer, in the house which they occupied. The shah's treasury, which was in the city instead of in the Bālā Hissār, was plundered. Shāh Shujā' sent one of his regiments to suppress the tumult, but it did nothing, and Macnaghten and Elphinstone did nothing either. At first they seem to have thought the matter a mere riot of no importance. The next day a feeble attempt was made to suppress the movement, but failed. The city at once passed altogether out of control, and the tribesmen rapidly gathered. Dost Muhammad's son, Muhammad Akbar Khān, soon arrived to take the lead.

Elphinstone's position had been difficult. He had had to choose

between suppressing the riot with severity, in which case partisan historians would doubtless have held him up to execration, and leaving the shah to deal with his tumultuous subjects. In view of the disturbed state of the country, and the indefensible nature of the cantonments, he ought certainly to have chosen the method of severity. But the responsibility does not rest with him alone. Throughout the expedition control had sedulously been kept in the hands of the civil authorities and exercised through the political officers with Macnaghten at their head. This arrangement recalled the unfortunate campaign against Hyder 'Ali in 1767, or that still worse campaign against the Marāthas in 1779, when the councils of Madras and Bombay had so distrusted the conduct of their military officers that they had saddled them with a committee. In Afghanistan the political department had enjoyed exclusive control. Its local representatives had decided when, and where, and how many troops should be employed. Generals had been placed under the orders of lieutenants invested with superiority by employment in the foreign department. This measure had been taken under colour of maintaining the supremacy of the civil government. But Auckland and Macnaghten had forgotten that their supremacy should not be pressed too far in matters of war, that the position in Afghanistan remained fundamentally a military position, and that the first need was to maintain the military control of the occupied country. Difficulties had perpetually arisen in consequence of the interference of the political officers in the disposition and conduct of troops. The military officer commanding at Kābul would have been, not merely a strong man, but an insubordinate one, had he insisted that the military measures necessary for the safety of his troops should be taken in defiance of the opinion of Macnaghten.

A fortnight elapsed, while Macnaghten gave money to some and promised it to others, in the vain hope of buying back the security which had been established only by force of arms. The cantonments were surrounded and attacked, and the measures taken in their defence were feeble and never more than partly successful. A proposal was made that the brigade should retire into the Bālā Hissār, which could at least have been defended against any Afghan attack; but Macnaghten, supported by the second-in-command, rejected the proposal. When the troops, disheartened by the evident incompetence of their leaders, showed

themselves reluctant to go into action, it was resolved to negotiate. Akbar Khān, who had assumed the leadership on behalf of his father, a prisoner in India, was not unwilling to come to terms, and on December 11 he and Macnaghten agreed that the English were to evacuate the country, that Shāh Shujā' might go with them or remain as he chose, and that, as soon as the English reached Peshāwar, Dost Muhammad was to be permitted to return. At this time the roads were still clear, and, if the English were going to march, they should have done so at once before the snow began to fall. But Macnaghten still delayed. He seems to have hoped by bribery to divide the chiefs and re-establish the English position. Renewed conferences were held. On the 23rd he with one of his companions was murdered by Akbar Khān and the remainder of the party became prisoners.

On this event the demands of the Afghans redoubled. The treasure, the guns, the ammunition, of the brigade were to be handed over. Elphinstone was ready to agree to almost anything. On January 1, 1842, a fresh capitulation was made. The troops were to march down to Peshāwar under the escort of a body of Afghans. On the 6th, finding that the escort did not appear, the soldiers, completely demoralised by the incapacity of their leaders, insisted on setting out. The cold was intense. The Afghans hung upon their flanks, and followed up their rear. After a while the enemy began to fire down upon them from the hills. Frozen, starved, and hopeless, the brigade soon lost every vestige of military order. In the first two days' march it covered only ten miles. The attacks became closer and more persistent. In the long Khurd-Kābul Pass, running for five miles between high hills, 3000 men are said to have been killed with scarce an effort at resistance. The wives of the officers were given up to Akbar Khān as the sole means of saving their lives. Elphinstone concluded his active service by surrendering himself. At Jagdallak a barrier lay across the road. Of the few who passed it some reached Gandammak. Six arrived living at Fathābād. One man alone, the surgeon Dr Brydon, escaped to Jalālābād. This needless massacre of brave men with weapons in their hands was the greatest catastrophe that ever befell the forces of the East India Company. A whole European regiment was destroyed. But what was far worse, the sepoys and the camp-followers whose lives were thrown away bequeathed to their brothers-in-arms a distrust of the leadership

which till then had been marked by conspicuous and almost unbroken success. The Sikh soldiers at Lahore began to say that if the Afghans could slaughter English armies like a flock of sheep, the time was coming when the army of the Khalsa might march down to Delhi and sack it as Nādir Shāh had done. Elphinstone's military incapacity, Macnaghten's political blindness, Auckland's foolish deference to London opinion and inability to choose able men to execute his policy, had contributed much to bring nearer the Sikh wars and the incomparable disaster of the Indian Mutiny.

The destruction of the Kābul brigade had not exterminated the British forces in Afghanistan. At the time of the Kābul outbreak Sale had been engaged in withdrawing from Afghanistan a brigade which Auckland had supposed to be no longer needed there. Sale, thinking himself unable with any prospects of success to attempt to march back to Kābul, had thrown himself into Jalālābād, and had prepared to hold that place until reinforcements should arrive from India. In January a message was received from Kābul ordering Sale to evacuate it. Sale refused. On the 13th the solitary survivor of the massacre arrived. For some eight weeks the town was besieged by Afghan tribesmen. For a moment, in February, its abandonment was considered. But this idea was put aside mainly owing to the determination of Havelock. On the 19th the walls were severely shaken by earthquake: but they were repaired, and on March 11 a sortie drove the Afghans away. Besides Sale's force, a small garrison had held Ghaznī, while Nott with a brigade was at Kandahār. The Ghaznī detachment surrendered and was massacred. Nott was strong enough and resolute enough to hold his ground. But the future evidently depended on the policy of the governor-general.

Auckland belonged to that large class of men who are easily elated by success and pass swiftly from confidence to despair with the first change of fortune. The terrible news from Kābul inspired him with a frantic desire to get out of Afghanistan at the earliest possible moment. He issued a spirited proclamation; but neither courage nor decision lay behind his brave words. Half-hearted attempts, inspired principally by Clerk, the political agent at Peshāwar, and other local officials, were made to rescue the beleaguered garrisons. One force attempted to move by way of the Khaibar, but for lack of transport had to fall back on Jamrud;

another attempted to reach Kandahār by the Bolān Pass, but fell back with much loss of reputation on Quetta. On February 28 Auckland was at last relieved of a task far exceeding his capacity by the arrival of a new governor-general.

Towards the close of 1841 a change of government had taken place. The Whigs' long tenure of office came to an end and Sir Robert Peel became prime minister. Lord Ellenborough, who had already served at the Board of Control, at first was re-appointed to that office; but shortly afterwards he had been offered the government of India. His virtues and failings were almost the exact opposite of Auckland's. Auckland was always ready to carry out his party's policy; Ellenborough insisted on determining his own. Auckland was a man of sober mind, never rising above mediocrity; Ellenborough was capable of deep insight and puerile extravagance. Auckland was slow, timid, irresolute; Ellenborough was hasty, rash, and obstinate. Auckland's charming manners made official business with him pleasant; Ellenborough was overbearing and lacked the art of managing men. Only two of Auckland's predecessors would ever have brought the national interests in the east to such a pass; Ellenborough was the very man for a situation demanding instant decision and resolute action. The change produced by his determined control of affairs soon became apparent. Preparations for the relief of the British garrisons in Afghanistan were pushed on with vigour. Pollock, with adequate transport and artillery, forced the Khaibar and marched on Jalālābād; and a concerted movement of the forces at Kandahār and at Quetta enabled the latter to march through the Khojak Pass. These successes induced Ellenborough to modify the views which at first he had entertained. On his arrival he had decided that the first necessity was to withdraw the troops from Afghanistan. In this he was overruling the advice of the foreign department, which was pressing for the re-occupation of the country. But he had from the first seen that a considerable latitude must be left to the local commanders in the execution of his orders. He was very much afraid that he might suddenly find himself on the verge of war with the Sikhs, and therefore was resolved against any prolonged operations in Afghanistan. But he also felt that anything which would make the Sikhs think twice before attacking the company would be of great political advantage. If such a defeat could be inflicted on the

Afghans as would make the withdrawal from their country appear a voluntary action, the Sikhs would probably feel less bellicose. Ellenborough therefore issued to Nott and Pollock discretionary instructions, permitting them, if they thought it expedient, to join hands at Kābul and return together by way of the Khaibar.

This decision has been grossly misrepresented. Kaye, the leading historian of the First Afghan War, describes the instructions to Nott as calculated to throw the responsibility for any misfortunes that might occur on him instead of on the governor-general. But Ellenborough was never guilty of shirking responsibility; and Wellington, than whom no man alive was more competent to judge, considered the orders wise, appropriate, and proper. Another point of Ellenborough's instructions was for political reasons made the butt of unending ridicule. He authorised Nott, if he should march by Ghazni, to carry away with him the club hanging over the tomb of the great Mahmūd and the gates which were traditionally believed to have been stolen from the Temple of Somnāth. In this Ellenborough desired to strike the imagination of the people of India. House of Commons speakers made great fun of this idea. But though Ellenborough's language was pompous and on the whole ridiculous, the idea was not nearly so incongruous as Whig speakers pretended. The plan did not originate in the hot brain of the governor-general. It had first appeared in discussions of the terms on which Ranjit Singh had been willing to help Shāh Shujā' to recover Afghanistan. Ranjit is said to have demanded that the shah should pledge himself to deliver those very gates, and the shah is said to have refused on the ground that the Afghans would never forgive him for doing so. Ranjit was no sentimentalist; Shāh Shujā' was not likely to quarrel with a possible ally over a trifle. What Ranjit thought worth asking, and what Shāh Shujā' thought he could not grant, would form an undeniable trophy of success. For other reasons the project came to nothing. The club had been looted by some former conqueror; and the gates proved to be the work of mere local craftsmen, made to replace Mahmūd's mouldering spoils.

Apart from this, however, the Afghan War was concluded in accordance with Ellenborough's plans. Pollock and Nott advanced on Kābul from Jalālābād and Kandahār respectively.

Pollock met with considerable opposition; but at Tezin, near the Khurd-Kābul Pass, he drove Akbar Khān before him in headlong flight and on September 15 he entered Kābul. Two days later Nott arrived, having destroyed the fortifications of Ghaznī on the way. A relief party was sent out to rescue the prisoners who had fallen into Akbar's hands during Elphinstone's fatal march. The news of the reappearance of the English had filled the Afghan chiefs with dismay. The prisoners had already recovered their liberty, and met the rescue party on the day on which Nott appeared before Kābul. Troops sent out under McCaskill to disperse a hostile concentration in Kohistān found the enemy at Istalif and inflicted on them a severe defeat. In revenge for the rising at Kābul and the massacre which had followed, the Grand Bazaar was blown up, and on October 12 the English forces marched away, no one daring to hinder their going. They left as purely nominal ruler of Afghanistan one of Shāh Shujā's sons. Shāh Shujā himself had been murdered after the collapse of the English authority at Kābul.

The armies then withdrew through the Khaibar, destroying the fortifications of Jalālābād and 'Alī Masjid as they passed. In December they were met and welcomed at Firūzpur, in British territory, by the governor-general and the army of reserve which he had prudently collected in case the Sikhs should attempt to take advantage of British embarrassments. The Afghan prisoners in India, including Dost Muhammad, were released, and Ellenborough declared himself ready to recognise any government accepted by the Afghans themselves and ready to live at peace with its neighbours. The result was the restoration of Dost Muhammad, probably the only man capable at the time of imposing himself on the Afghan tribes. In all his operations Ellenborough's chief object had been to re-establish the prestige of the company's arms, and to concentrate its forces once more before any Indian enemy could be tempted into an attack. Nothing more could wisely have been attempted, and Ellenborough certainly secured these purposes as far as was possible. But this foolish adventure into Afghanistan had weakened the company's position and lowered its reputation, both with other states and with its own sepoys. It was perhaps fortunate that the development of affairs in Europe and some experience of the difficulties of operations in Central Asia indisposed the Russians to continue the provocative policy



which had lured Palmerston and Auckland into their Afghan adventure. In 1844, in the course of a visit which the emperor Nicholas paid to Queen Victoria, an informal agreement was reached relieving the English from anxiety regarding the immediate future of Central Asia. Afghanistan on the south bank of the Oxus, and the khanates on the north of the river, became in effect a neutral zone in which neither the English nor the Russians were to undertake political operations. This understanding was maintained until the Near East once more provided the two empires with a subject of quarrel, and the Crimean War brought the informal agreement to an end. Then once more the Russians sought to influence British policy in Europe by threatening the security of British interests in Asia.

## CHAPTER VIII

### The Company's Last Conquests

From the death of Ranjit Singh in 1839 Indian politics had been dominated by the problem of the Sikhs. Until the early years of the nineteenth century the Sikhs had possessed no leader whom they were prepared to follow as a body since the time of Banda. They were ranged in groups called *misls*, under the hereditary leadership of certain families. From time to time these leaders had met together to concert a common policy, but their efforts at united action had seldom met with great success. They had submitted reluctantly to the supremacy of the Durāni empire, and the Panjab continued to be at least in name a province of the Afghan government. The Sikhs themselves were a formidable military body, but they disdained every kind of service except the cavalry. In 1791 Ranjit Singh had succeeded to the headship of the Sukarchakia *misal*, and in 1797 he had accepted the governorship of Lahore from Zamān Shāh. He had employed this position to extend his authority over the whole of the Panjab, and in 1806 he was seeking to bring the Cis-Sutlej Sikhs under his authority also. This project brought him, as has already been noted, into conflict with English policy, and the outcome was the Treaty of Friendship of 1809, by which he agreed to limit the troops maintained by him on the east bank of the river to the number required for the maintenance of internal peace, and not to encroach upon the territories of the Sikh chiefs established there. He then turned his restless arms in other directions. In 1809-11 he was at war with the Gurkhas, taking from them the district of Kāngra. He then engaged in a constant war with his Afghan neighbours. At first he did not meet with great success. He failed to take Multān; he failed to occupy Kashmīr. But the domestic troubles of the Sadozais at last gave him his opportunity. In 1818 he captured Multān. In 1819 he conquered Kashmīr. In 1823 he annexed Peshāwar, which he had taken in 1818, though then he had not thought it wise to retain it in his own hands. These military successes were the fruit of the vigorous military policy which he pursued. The Sikh customs had been devised in order to make the

Sikhs good soldiers and to avoid the disadvantages imposed on Hindu troops by caste and other religious observances. Ranjit possessed therefore admirable material. But until his time Sikh fighters had been notably impatient of discipline and disdainful of all but their customary mode of fighting. They had despised the infantry and artillery, and had always refused to serve in them. But under the pressure which their ruler now placed upon them, and their trust in his ability, they came to enlist freely in all three arms. Ranjit Singh's army thus was homogeneous in a degree peculiar in Indian armies. Not that it was exclusively composed of Sikhs, for it included many Muslims and Hindus, but that in all three arms the Sikhs were predominant and gave the tone. Other Indian armies were far less united. In Sindhia's, for instance, the cavalry was Marātha; the infantry was mixed; the artillery was mainly Goanese. Nor was it only in composition that the Sikh army differed from the others. Ranjit Singh, like other Indian princes, was convinced of the superiority of European military methods. Like other Indian princes he employed Europeans to train his men. But unlike his fellows, he kept his European officers in strict subordination to his own authority. Under him no officers were to be found in the semi-independent position enjoyed by Raymond under the Nizām or by Perron under Sindhia. The Sikh army thus remained unbroken by sectional interests or by divided command. It was a national army in the sense in which the Marātha army under the early Pēshwās had been; and while the Marātha army had been positively weakened by the introduction of European instructors and methods of war, the Sikh army was strengthened.

Ranjit Singh had thus forged a weapon of great strength. But it was the only institution which he endowed with vigour enough to survive him. His government was a purely personal rule. His political advisers were his personal servants, whose wealth and position depended on his good will. No member of his durbār had any rights as against the mahārāja. The administration was conducted by his personal agents, in accordance with his personal instructions; and though they enjoyed much discretionary authority, and were allowed a large measure of perquisites, they were inspired at best by personal devotion to their master, and at worst by personal ambition for themselves. The maintenance of such personal rule depends on the chance that one great man will be

followed by another. Ranjit was succeeded by his son, Kharak Singh, an imbecile, with a reputed brother, Shīr Singh, who hoped to displace him; and a son, Nau Nihāl Singh, bold and vicious, who wished to succeed him. At the durbar the wazir, Dhiān Singh, and his brother, Gulāb Singh, known as the Jammū rajas, hated Kharak Singh because he preferred his favourite, Chet Singh, to them, and hated Nau Nihāl Singh because he was seeking to displace them. The two heads of the Sindhianwala family, Atar and Ajīt Singh, were the chief rivals of the Jammū brothers. None of these men seems to have been inspired by any higher motive than that of getting as much wealth and power for himself as he could. The inevitable consequence was a series of personal intrigues carried to murderous lengths. Chet Singh was killed a few months after Ranjit's death. In the next year Kharak Singh died. His son, returning from the funeral rites, was killed by the fall of a gateway through which he had to pass. No one knows whether this was accidental; but few Sikhs believed that it was. The Jammū brothers had too much to gain by his removal. For the moment Kharak Singh's widow became regent, with Shīr Singh as her deputy and Dhiān Singh as wazir. But in January, 1841, Shīr Singh seized Lahore, and was proclaimed mahārāja. This left the Jammū brothers still in power, and the Sindhianwalas took to flight. In 1843, however, the Jammū brothers and their enemies came to an agreement, with the result that in September Ajīt Singh murdered Shīr Singh and his son, and then, turning on his new allies, murdered also Dhiān Singh. Dhiān's son, Hīra Singh, then came forward, overthrew the Sindhianwalas, slew two of them, and proclaimed Dalīp Singh mahārāja. Dalīp was a supposed son of Ranjit by Rāni Jindan.

Amid this confusion of change and murder, while every aspirant looked to the army for assistance, the soldiery found itself the real repository of power. The discipline of the army vanished. *Panchayats* were formed in every unit, and nothing could be done without their assent. Repeated demands were made by the troops that their numbers should be raised and their pay increased. Their demands could not be resisted, although the resources of the state were rapidly declining. The army fell into heavy arrears of pay. It became ever more insubordinate. Sooner or later some desperate politician as his last gamble with fate, or some group of moresober men perceiving that order could not be restored till the army had been destroyed, would throw it upon the English.

In 1842, while these events were still developing but when their probable outcome was already clear, Ellenborough was deeply concerned at the political position which he had inherited. He had succeeded in withdrawing the troops from Afghanistan without a breach with the Panjab. But it was necessary to bear in mind the probability of a future war with the Sikhs, and the need of placing the company in the strongest possible position to meet such a contingency. From that point of view, it would be advantageous if the company were enabled to attack the Sikhs, not merely along the line of the Sutlej but also on another front. The occupation of Sind became therefore a desirable object. Moreover, various difficulties had arisen with the amirs of that country. When the development of commercial relations with Central Asia had been in the forefront, Lord William Bentinck had made a treaty with the amirs, designed to liberate the Indus as a channel of trade from the numerous tolls which were imposed on boats passing up and down the river. The amirs had agreed to set up a fixed tariff on condition that no military stores should be allowed to pass. In 1836, when Ranjit Singh had been preparing to attack Sind, Auckland had intervened to prevent this expansion of Sikh power and at the same time had made a new treaty with the amirs by which the latter agreed to accept a permanent British resident. When, in connection with the invasion of Afghanistan, Auckland decided to make use of the Sind route, he had demanded that the amirs should show themselves friends of the British by co-operating with them in the war. They were required to allow the Bombay troops to pass up the river, and to make over the island of Bukkar as a depot on the British line of communications. The amirs were most reluctant to concede these points. But they were forced to consent, and in 1839 Karāchī was occupied. When the Afghan disasters became known, they thought that the time had come for their revenge. They began to intrigue with the Afghans and with Persia. Their intrigue did not amount to much more than declarations of hostility against the infidel and of desire to see his power destroyed. They would have done better to keep these natural but imprudent views to themselves. They had not adhered to the fixed tariff which had been set up on the Indus; and their administration was such as to shock any European observer. Ellenborough came to the conclusion that the position in Sind must be cleared up, and that the British forces there should not be

withdrawn until the amirs had accepted the company's suzerainty in the clearest terms.


He appointed Sir Charles Napier to command the forces in Sind, and at the same time empowered him to conduct the political negotiations with the amirs. At this time the amirs formed two groups, governing Upper Sind from Khairpur and Lower Sind from Hyderabad. Both groups agreed verbally to accept a treaty which Napier proposed to them; but both proceeded to collect troops, with the intention of resisting. At the end of 1842 a number of the Khairpur amirs fled to Imāmgarh, a desert fortress about halfway between Khairpur and Hyderabad. It was difficult of access and enjoyed the local reputation of being impregnable. Taking this as a defiance, Napier marched against the place in January, 1843, and on his appearance it surrendered and was promptly blown up. More discussions followed. Outram, the resident, believed that he could settle everything if Napier would allow him to go down to Hyderabad. There he got the signatures to the treaty of all but one of the amirs. But when he seemed to be on the verge of a peaceful settlement, he was beset in the streets and then attacked in the residency. Napier, with 2800 men, was moving down towards Hyderabad. The amirs had assembled a force of over 20,000 at Miani. They certainly thought they could overwhelm the English. Napier attacked. A fierce battle followed in which the Balūchis were completely defeated. Six of the amirs at once surrendered, and Hyderabad was occupied. A second battle followed a month afterwards at Dabo, six miles from that city. The Balūchis were again beaten, and Napier hastened to occupy the chief places in the province. These events led to the annexation of Sind.

In this Ellenborough's policy has almost universally been condemned. The directors of the company made it a pretext for an embittered attack on a man who had offended them in other ways: and the Whigs naturally were glad to attack the man who had not hesitated to expose Auckland's misconduct. Napier's phrase, "a good, honest, useful piece of rascality", represents the common judgment. But the notion that the amirs were attacked and their country annexed simply because they were weak is scarcely tenable. The main culpability lies with Auckland. Ellenborough's responsibility is limited to his treatment of the situation which he inherited. He found the rulers of this frontier state

engaged in intrigues which were hostile though certainly not in themselves dangerous. He was clearly entitled to decide whether or not to exact the penalty. That was a question not of political morals but of political expediency. The size of the state, the immediate danger of its intrigues, are not relevant matters. Viewed broadly, the annexation of Sind seems comparable with the assumption of the Carnatic. In both cases advantage was taken of foolish and hostile conduct to secure a considerable political advantage. Ellenborough, like Wellesley, was more concerned to consolidate and strengthen the position of the East India Company than to make benevolent gestures in the idle hope that others would follow so futile an example.

The annexation of Sind was followed by the establishment of a simple and direct administration closely modelled on that which it displaced. Napier remained in civil charge of the province which he had conquered; and for some years the management of Sind was conducted, not by the Government of India and the dual government in England, but by the governor-general in correspondence with the secret committee of the court of directors, that is, with the president of the Board of Control. Sind therefore escaped the elaborate administration, with its long chain of courts of justice and careful division of functions, which had grown up in the older provinces. In each district Napier appointed an officer, more often chosen from the army than from the company's civil service, to exercise revenue, police and judicial authority. This system was naturally and strongly disapproved by those who had been brought up in the system of Bengal. But Henry Lawrence, who had at first condemned Napier's administration, on learning more of it confessed that he had been mistaken. The simple system worked well and effectively. When the Indian Mutiny broke out, Bartle Frere, who was in charge of the province, was able to denude it of troops in order to assist the Panjab on the one hand and Bombay on the other, without in any way endangering the peace and security of the country. The people apparently did not desire the restoration of their fallen rulers.

As has already been pointed out, relations with the Sikhs at this time were most uncertain. They could only be viewed, as Ellenborough wrote, "in the light of an armed truce". Nau Nihāl Singh had been violently anti-British. Dhiān Singh had hated the resident, Wade, almost as much as he had hated his





rivals at the durbar. Hīra Singh had secured the support of the army by telling it that the Sindhianwalas had relied on English help. The failure of the civil government added to the difficulties. Although the Sutlej had roughly defined the limits of political influence, it had never formed a true political boundary. In 1809 Ranjit Singh had possessed districts on its eastern bank, and in them his sovereignty was unquestionable, although he had agreed to maintain in them only such a number of troops as was required for the preservation of order. Some of the minor Cis-Sutlej chiefs were feudatories of Lahore as well as being under the company's protection since they held lands on both sides of the river. In other cases it was uncertain under whose political authority they rightly fell. This interlacing of rights had in the past led to numerous discussions which had been settled with small regard for consistency but rather in that spirit of compromise which had ever marked the relations of the company with Ranjit Singh. But now both Lahore and Calcutta were inclined to stand upon their respective rights. Moreover there was the question of what number of troops might be kept by the Sikhs on the eastern bank of the river. The British frontier authorities were afraid of being caught napping. Every movement of troops near the Sutlej was regarded with great jealousy; and when the Sikh army was paying little obedience to the orders of the durbar, the general position was full of danger.

Until 1838 the troops maintained by the company on the Sikh borders had been few. In order to facilitate his Afghan campaign Auckland had increased them to some 8000, mainly at Ludhiāna and the new station which he created at Firūzpūr. Ellenborough, in view of the threatening situation, had placed troops in reserve behind the frontier posts, raising the force to 14,000 men and 48 guns. In 1844 he was recalled by the company and replaced by Lord Hardinge, who followed the same policy, and within a twelvemonth the concentration which would be available at once in the event of war had been increased to 40,000 men and 94 guns. These troops were massed, however, behind rather than on the frontier.

While such threatening relations existed between the Sikh government and the English, the Sikh government itself had fallen into a condition of extraordinary confusion. Hīra Singh had been unable long to retain power. Rāni Jindan, under the

influence of her brother, Jawāhir Singh, and her lover, Lāl Singh, won over the army. Hira Singh, finding his position undermined, fled from Lahore, but was pursued and slain at the end of 1844. The rāni then attempted to attack Hira Singh's uncle, Gulāb Singh, in Jammū. Gulāb, finding himself too weak to resist by open force, bribed the troops sent against him, and submitted so far as to proceed to Lahore and promise to pay a fine of nearly seven lakhs, besides surrendering certain districts. Jawāhir Singh was then, in May, 1845, formally installed as wazir. For the moment the rāni's party seemed supreme. But it was divided. Lāl Singh, the favoured lover, aspired to the post of wazir himself. The army, too, had never trusted Jawāhir Singh. Before he had succeeded to the semblance of power, he had only been restrained by force from fleeing to the English with the young mahārāja. As soon as he had become wazir, he had punished the commander who had made him a prisoner by cutting off his ears and nose. In the middle of 1845 Peshāwara Singh, a son of Ranjit living in his *jāgīr* of Sialkot, and encouraged by Gulāb Singh and other enemies of the wazir, surprised Attock and proclaimed himself mahārāja. The rebellion was immediately crushed. Peshāwara Singh submitted and was at once put to death. This finally disgusted the army, which still nourished a strong respect for the blood of their late master. The *panchayats* of the regiments gathered together and resolved that the wazir should be put to death. This decision was carried out on September 21. For several weeks no new wazir was appointed. Then in November Lāl Singh was installed, and Tej Singh named commander-in-chief. But their real authority was small. Many leading Sikhs had long felt that the reduction of the army was the first need of the state. But that could not be accomplished by any internal means. It might be secured by directing it against the English. The Sikhs had watched the increase of military forces beyond the Sutlej with suspicion, and feared that it preluded an invasion of the Panjab. The army and the durbar came therefore to the same conclusion, and the army took the offensive by crossing the Sutlej on December 11, 1845.

The English forces were commanded by Sir Hugh Gough. The first encounter took place at Mūdki, where the Sikhs were defeated with the loss of seventeen guns. This was followed by the great battle of Firūzshāh on December 21-22. After a fierce and

most obstinate fight the Sikh camp was taken, seventy-three guns were captured, and several thousand Sikhs slain. But Gough had lost one man out of every seven, and the spirit of his army, and especially the spirit of his sepoy troops, was shaken. After this came a pause while the English gathered reinforcements. Then, on January 28, one Sikh force was driven across the Sutlej at Aliwāl, and on February 10 their main body after another fierce and bloody battle at Sobrāon was driven, not across but into the Sutlej with enormous loss. Gough and Hardinge hastened to cross the river and march on Lahore before the Sikhs had recovered from the effects of this crushing blow. On February 20 the capital was occupied.

Hardinge had neither sought nor desired the conquest of the Panjab. He did desire a well ordered and friendly state upon his north-western frontier. This evidently excluded all idea of annexation. In Hardinge's view it also excluded the traditional policy of a subsidiary alliance, which would have made the company in fact if not in name responsible for the good government of the territory. By the treaty which was signed on March 9, 1846, Dalip Singh was formally recognised as mahārāja; the Sikhs were to surrender all lands and claims to the southward of the Sutlej; they were to pay an indemnity of a crore and a half of rupees, but of this only the half crore was to be paid in cash, the balance being liquidated by the cession of the Jalandhar doāb and the province of Kashmīr; the army was to be reduced and reorganised, and the arrears due to the soldiers who should be discharged were to be paid in full. By supplementary articles signed two days later Hardinge agreed to leave at Lahore till the end of 1846 troops sufficient to protect the person of the mahārāja and to maintain public order, but the governor-general was at liberty to withdraw the troops if the durbar did not proceed at once to the reorganisation of the army. By a separate treaty with Gulāb Singh Kashmīr was assigned to him for a payment of seventy-five lakhs of rupees. Both Gulāb and the durbar agreed to refer to the governor-general any disputes which might arise between them.

Hardinge's purpose in making these arrangements was to give the Sikh government a breathing space in which it might set its affairs in order, and Henry Lawrence was appointed British agent at Lahore. But effective reform was virtually impossible. The

darbar itself, under Lāl Singh as wazir, was composed of men who cared for nothing but their personal interests. The army could not be paid off and reorganised because there was no money. There was no money because great tracts of country had been assigned as *jāgīr* to various chiefs, who would not submit to any reduction of their privileges. Great difficulties arose in connection with this fundamental matter, and in fact Lawrence was allowed to advance money from the company's treasury for the payment of arrears to permit the disbandment of a number of men. Nor was the transfer of Kashmīr to Gulāb Singh carried out without much trouble. Although the darbar had agreed to recognise his independence, this went sorely against the grain with men who had always been his rivals and enemies. Long delays occurred. Then an insurrection broke out. It had to be suppressed by force of arms, and, when it appeared that Lāl Singh had been at the bottom of the movement, the resident demanded and the darbar agreed to his removal from the office of wazir. By this time the year was drawing to its close, and little had been done in the way of reformation. The darbar, certain that it could not maintain its position when the English had withdrawn, demanded that the English forces should be left at Lahore for a further term.

At a darbar which Hardinge had held on the day on which the Treaty of Lahore had been signed, he had declared to the assembled chiefs that success or failure was in their own hands; that he would co-operate with them; but that, if they lost their present opportunity, no aid from external friends could save the state. He had soon perceived that the Sikh government was not in the least likely to profit by the respite which he had given it, and had begun to consider what course of action he should pursue when the expected crisis should arise. By September he had begun to entertain the idea of undertaking the administration in Dalip Singh's name during his minority. Some eight years would elapse before the mahārāja could exercise power in person, and meanwhile the government might be carried on by a British minister assisted by a Sikh council. "By British interposition", he wrote, "justice and moderation are secured by an administration through native executive agency in accordance with the customs, feelings, and prejudices of the people." At the request of the darbar for the continuance of the British garrison, Hardinge revisited Lahore. He was ready, he said, to withdraw the garrison

in accordance with the treaty; but if it was to be continued, conditions must be accepted. The durbar was in no position to bargain. Hardinge's terms were accepted, and a new treaty was signed on December 16. This was signed by thirteen chiefs "acting with the unanimous consent and concurrence of the chiefs and sardars of the state assembled at Lahore". It provided that "a British officer with an efficient establishment of assistants shall be appointed by the governor-general to remain at Lahore, which officer shall have full authority to direct and control all matters in every department of the state". The administration was to be conducted by local officials appointed and superintended by a council of regency of eight members named in the treaty and not subject to change without the consent of the resident and the orders of the governor-general. This council was to act "in consultation with the British resident, who shall have full authority to direct and control the duties of every department". The arrangement was to continue till Dalip Singh came of age on September 4, 1854, and the durbar was to pay twenty-two lakhs a year for the maintenance of the army of occupation, while the governor-general was to be free to garrison any fortresses he chose within Sikh territory.

This second treaty in effect recognised that the first had failed of its purpose. Left to itself with a minimum of interference and even a certain measure of financial help, the durbar had reformed nothing, and the wazir had even sought to counteract the treaty under which he had been continued in office. Hardinge's new plan was to place the Sikh government under British superintendence. This, he hoped, would provide a driving power towards reform which had been lacking under the former régime. If this too failed, annexation was still held in reserve as a last resort. Hardinge desired above all that his policy should be free from all taint of haste or aggressiveness.

Lāl Singh had been deprived of his office as wazir and removed into British territory as a preliminary condition of the treaty of December 16. His removal was intended to exclude Rāni Jindan from farther participation in the management of affairs. Vexed by the exile of her lover, and humiliated by the reduction of her importance, she strove to avoid her political extinction. The result was that she was removed from Lahore to Benares. Henry Lawrence, who was continued as resident, was nevertheless faced

with a task of extraordinary difficulty. He enjoyed the assistance of the ablest men Hardinge could find for him, and it is noteworthy that the leaders of that remarkable group which Dalhousie afterwards employed to govern the Panjab had already been employed in the province by Hardinge and Lawrence. They included Henry's brother, George Lawrence, Herbert Edwardes, John Nicholson, Lumsden of the Guides—men of great energy and talent. A deliberate part of the new plan had been to maintain the native character of the administration, to act only through the customary channels, and to veil as completely as possible the reality of the resident's predominance. The task was therefore not that merely of reforming the government, but the much more delicate one of reforming as well the practices of men bred in the traditional methods of squeeze and graft. Lawrence was called on to effect the political education of the governing class, and through them to introduce into the country that regularity, honesty, and justice which formed the ideal of the company's administration. His strong sympathy with the Sikh aristocracy, his knowledge of the people, the union of gentleness and force which marked his character, gave him unrivalled qualifications for such a business. Yet he failed completely. As soon as one of the resident's assistants was sent into a district to investigate complaints and advise reforms, he was besieged by men demanding his direct interposition in their affairs. In the frontier districts especially, distracted by the century-long feuds between Muslim and Sikh, something very like direct British authority was established. It was impossible to conceal British control. The durbar's agents were ignored, the resident's assistants were sought after and obeyed. This experience under Lawrence in the Panjab is perhaps the best answer to the critics who enquire why reformer after reformer in British India refused to employ Indian agency in the superior offices of government.

This position enjoyed by the resident and his officers did not pass unresented. The chiefs who were not members of the council of regency and whose influence and profits were curtailed by reforms which Lawrence tried to introduce, were urged to opposition by both pride and interest. The Sikh soldiery, too, were full of desire to try conclusions once more with the men whom they had almost overthrown at Firūzshāh. Some event or other was sure to set fire to the people of the *Khālsa*, as the Sikhs

called themselves. The spark actually came from Multān. The governor, Mūlrāj, had succeeded his father, who had been murdered in 1844, and regarded himself as something more than a mere agent of the durbar. The new régime was more exact than the old in the matter of accounts, and demands were made on the governor for large arrears. Mūlrāj offered to resign his office. A new governor was appointed, and two of the resident's assistants were sent to install him. On their entry into the city they were beset by an excited crowd and murdered. Mūlrāj promptly prepared for a siege, gathering troops and strengthening the fortifications of Multān.

This murder occurred on April 20, 1848. Early in the year Lawrence had gone to England on leave with Hardinge, who had been succeeded by Lord Dalhousie as governor-general. Sir Frederic Currie, who had become resident at Lahore, reported the untoward development to the Government of India, requesting immediate help to suppress the rebellion of Mūlrāj. Dalhousie and Gough, who was still commander-in-chief, agreed that the hasty despatch of small bodies of troops would be a mistake. The hot weather was just approaching, and would make military movements difficult and costly of life. That, however, was not the principal consideration. It had long been apparent that the Sikhs were discontented with the control which was being exercised over their administration. If, as Dalhousie believed, the rebellion of Mūlrāj was only the prelude to a general revolt, a small force sent against Multān might be destroyed, while the despatch of a large force might prevent the Sikhs from breaking out without in any way improving the general situation. It was therefore decided to take no immediate steps, but to prepare a strong force which should be ready to operate against any enemy who should appear when the hot weather was over, when the rains had fallen, and when military operations would be feasible. This decision was certainly wise. If the Sikhs wanted a renewal of the war, it had better be such a war as they would not wish to repeat, a war which would convince them of the military strength of the company.

The situation developed in accordance with Dalhousie's expectations. Herbert Edwardes under Currie's orders got together a small force which marched on Multān and attempted vainly to besiege it. Meantime excitement among the Sikhs rose high.

Troubles broke out on the Afghan frontier. A Sikh chief obtained a promise of help from Dost Muhammad in return for the agreement to give back to him the city of Peshāwar. Sikh troops gathered. The siege of Multān had to be abandoned. By the middle of October Dalhousie informed the resident at Lahore that he considered the Sikh government to be virtually at war with the company. On November 9 Gough, with the army which had been assembled, crossed the Sutlej into Sikh territory, on the 13th he reached Lahore, and on the 22nd forced the Sikh army, under the command of Shīr Singh, across the Jhelum. In December the siege of Multān was reformed, and on January 22 the place was captured. But before this, on January 13, Gough had fought another of those bloody and expensive battles for which he is remembered. After a four hours' march, he had come upon the Sikh army at Chilianwāla, had attacked it, had driven it from its ground with heavy loss, but had himself lost many men, four guns, and the colours of three regiments. Like Hardinge after the battle of Fīrūzshāh, Dalhousie concluded that Gough was too wasteful of his men to be left in charge of the campaign. He applied to London for his recall, and Gough was accordingly superseded by Sir Charles Napier. But before Napier could arrive, Gough as in the former war redeemed his reputation as a general by the complete triumph of Gujrāt. The Sikhs were scattered and could never form again. Within three weeks of this victory they had surrendered, the Afghans had withdrawn hurriedly from the Panjab, and Peshāwar had been occupied by British forces. The Second Sikh War was over.

Dalhousie now put into force the policy towards which Hardinge had reluctantly drifted. He annexed the province. Dalip Singh was deposed, given a pension, and required to reside outside the Panjab. Attempts were made to represent him as ill-used. He had had nothing to do with the second war. But neither could he hold out the faintest probability of his being able to control the Sikhs and transform them into the friendly neighbours of whom Hardinge had dreamed. The policy of friendship had been tried; the policy of guidance had been tried; and at last remained only the policy of annexation. Thus the company took control of one more of the provinces of the Mughal empire. Military superiority was once more consolidating the fragments into which the country had broken up in the eighteenth century.



The whole country from Peshāwar to Cape Comorin now lay under the control, in one form or another, of the East India Company. Either the direct government of the company had been set up or the rule was in the hands of princes who were bound both by treaty and self-interest to comply with the demands which the company might make upon them.

Kābul was the one province which had not been recovered. But in other directions the company had exceeded the boundaries of the Mughals. Owing to its combination of predominance ashore and afloat, it had found no difficulty in bestriding the barrier which the Vindhya and Sātpura hills cast across the peninsula. The Mughal empire had broken down under the strain of holding both northern and southern India; the Marāthas had lost their union of purpose in the effort to expand northwards; but the company, with its alternative routes, its power of landing troops at any point of the Indian sea-board, its communications unthreatened by an enemy save at two brief moments, had found no difficulty in establishing its authority over India as a whole. This same union of military and naval power facilitated its expansion into a region into which the Mughals had never penetrated. From the first appearance of the Europeans in the east they had attempted without much success to trade with the kingdoms established on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal. Portuguese, Dutch, and French had each in turn opened factories and abandoned them when they found that foreign trade was looked on as a royal monopoly and foreign settlers as an increase in the king's people. The English from Masulipatam and Madras on the other side of the Bay had been more persistent but hardly more successful than their rivals. Addison, the essayist, had hoped to inherit a great fortune from the trade to Syriam of his brother, a company's servant at Madras, but had been grievously disappointed. In 1753 a factory was opened on Negrais Island, but six years later the inhabitants were massacred by the Burmese. What trade there was consisted only of private ventures, and the company took no interest in a commerce which promised neither profit nor advantage commensurate with its risks. A few vagrant Englishmen were to be found at Rangoon, but they were men of neither wealth nor influence. Under a vigorous king, Alaungpaya, the Burmese in the middle of the eighteenth century overcame the Talaiings in the Irawadi delta and Tenasserim. Under his successor,

Bodawpaya, they expanded northwards, conquering Arakan in 1785, Manipur in 1813, and Assam in 1816. In 1818, remembering that some centuries earlier Arakan had received tribute from the Ganges delta, they demanded that the British should surrender to them Chittagong, Dacca, and Murshidābād. For years, owing to the Burmese operations, the regions lying on the borderlands had been most unsettled. Fugitives from the conquered lands had taken refuge in British territory. Fifty thousand Arakanese had fled to Chittagong, and some under a spirited leader, Nga Chin Pyan, had made raids upon the Burmese. The British had seized a number of his chief followers, but had refused to hand them over to the Burmese to be tortured to death. The Burmese conquest of Assam had been followed by great massacres, while 30,000 had been driven in slave-gangs down to the conqueror's capital at Ava. The more fortunate found shelter in Bengal, and attempted reprisals. Every endeavour was made to prevent hostile excursions from leaving British territory, but the British were not willing to give the Burmese the only satisfaction with which they would have been content, the unconditional surrender of men whose only crime was that of seeking to recover their country.


Several attempts had been made to establish regular political relations with the Burmese court at Ava. Symes was sent in 1795, Cox in 1797, Symes again in 1802, and Canning thrice between 1803 and 1811. They were received with contempt, after the Chinese manner. They were made to live on an island in the river reserved for scavengers. They were told that they represented no one more important than a servant and that no envoy could be received unless he came direct from the king of England. In 1823-4 the Burmese, confident in their power, invaded the company's territories in force. Their orders were to capture Calcutta. Amherst, who was then governor-general, contented himself with checking their advance on the land frontier, but at the same time he sent an expedition, drawn mainly from Madras, under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell and Captain Marryat, the novelist. They occupied Rangoon on May 11, 1824. It had been expected that the Talaings would rise in their favour: but the Talaings had been deported, and the country round was left deserted. A long and ill-conducted campaign followed. The English had poor information, bad medical arrangements, ineffective supply. Whenever the Burmese attacked, they were

routed. But the fighting was for the most part jungle fighting, in which regular troops lost much of their technical advantage. However, after making prodigious efforts to destroy the invaders, the Burmese were compelled to make peace in February, 1826. The king agreed to give up Tenasserim in the south, and Arakan, Assam, Cachar, Jaintia, and Manipur, in the north. He was also to pay an indemnity of ten lakhs of rupees, and receive a British resident at Ava as well as maintaining one at Calcutta.

This agreement, known as the Treaty of Yandabo, brought peace but no permanent settlement. The Burmese king, Bagyidaw, would not maintain a resident at Calcutta; and on his death in 1837, the new king, Tharrawaddy, refused to admit that the treaty was binding on him at all. "The English beat my brother, not me", he declared. In 1840 consequently the residency was withdrawn. From this time onwards the position of the few English inhabitants of Rangoon was extremely precarious. But the company's government generally refused to consider their complaints, on the ground that anyone choosing to live under Burmese government did so at his own risk. But in 1850 matters came to a head. In that year was appointed a governor of Rangoon who when drunk used to threaten to torture and behead the whole population of the town. A British barque ran aground near Rangoon. The pilot jumped overboard and swam ashore. The governor accused the captain of throwing the pilot overboard, detained him and his crew for eight days, and fined him 1005 rupees. In another case a lascar died on board a British vessel on the day she anchored off Rangoon. The governor accused the captain of murder, threatened to behead him, detained him for three weeks, and at last fined him 700 rupees. Dalhousie sent a King's ship, the *Fox*, frigate, under Commodore Lambert, to request the removal of this unjust governor and compensation for the two English captains who had suffered from his exactions. King Pagān, who was then ruling, was willing to accommodate matters, appointing a new governor with authority to settle the dispute. But the officers sent by Lambert to welcome the new governor were not admitted to his presence; the new governor had come down accompanied by a large force of men; and Lambert, mistaking these portents, declared a blockade of Rangoon and seized one of the king's ships. On this the land batteries opened fire on the *Fox*. This event led to the Second Burmese War.

This new war was in every way except its termination a complete contrast to the first. Under Dalhousie's superintendence careful arrangements were made to supply the men with food and the hospitals with medicines. The Talaings in the delta rose in favour of the English. The Shāns refused to send levies to help the Burmese king. Rangoon and Mārtabān were occupied at once; then Bassein was taken, followed by Prome and the Pegu country. The campaign ended by Dalhousie's refusing to allow his commanders to advance farther and annexing Pegu by proclamation on December 20, 1852. He left it to the king to accept a treaty or not as he chose, but warned him that, if again he provoked hostilities, they would end in the complete subjection of the Burmese power.

The Second Burmese War thus ended in giving the company the complete control of the shores of the Bay of Bengal, together with the port of Rangoon, while the Burmese monarchy was driven back into the interior whence it had emerged in the middle of the eighteenth century.



## CHAPTER IX

### The Growth of British Sovereignty and the Company's Relations with the Indian States

When the company set out on its career of expansion in the years following on the battle of Plassey, various circumstances combined to conceal the political significance of its action. The company itself, fearing lest the national government should seize its acquisitions on behalf of the crown, disliked the idea of territorial gains, which could only be made in the name of King George III. The result was the establishment of the system of dual government, by which everything was to be done in the name of some powerless and dependent prince by the servants and for the benefit of the East India Company. Despite the efforts of Warren Hastings to get rid of this legacy imposed upon him by Clive, the position in Bengal long remained most anomalous. In theory the company was only the *diwān*; in practice it exercised full authority. But that authority was asserted only by the refusal to continue the payment to the emperor Shāh 'Ālam of the annual tribute promised by Clive and by the transfer of the districts of Kora and Allāhābād from the emperor to the nawab wazir of Oudh. In other formal respects the company's government continued to recognise the authority of the emperor. The seal of the governor-general purported to be that of a servant of the Mughal. The coinage was still struck in Shāh 'Ālam's name. In international discussions the English did not claim sovereignty except in Calcutta and the surrounding region, posing elsewhere as the influential adviser of the nawab who reigned, but did not rule, at Murshidābād. The French and the Dutch could thus avoid all public recognition of the supreme position which the company occupied throughout the province.

It has been thought that this obscure position was designed to conciliate Indian sentiment and to conceal foreign dominion. But for that view small justification exists. The leading men of the province knew well who exercised authority; the people neither knew nor cared who governed so long as they were not

taxed beyond customary limits. Wars and revolutions were affairs in which they took no interest, in which they had no concern. No one had raised a finger to aid Sirāj-ud-daula after his defeat; no one had sought to bring back Mīr Kāsim after his expulsion; no conspiracies were formed against the English company. Had popular feeling been the sole factor to be taken into consideration, the vicious system adopted by Clive need never have been set up and would never have been perpetuated. It was directed not to deceive the Indian inhabitants of the province, but to prevent probable encroachments of the ministry at London and probable complaint from the capitals of Europe.

This extraordinary position continued for a long period of time. Neither the Regulating Act of 1773, nor the India Act of 1784, nor the act extending the company's privileges in 1793, made the least attempt to assert English sovereignty over the company's possessions. They legislated for them, altering the form of the company's administration, setting up a Supreme Court of Judicature, defining the powers which the company's government might exercise, but nowhere asserting that the inhabitants of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa were the subjects of King George. In fact the position in India was to be wholly transformed before the great revolution was recognised in English law. Cornwallis was the first governor-general to object to the empty formulas in which the company's government was accustomed to protest obedience in its letters to the emperor. Wellesley, who indeed projected the establishment of British predominance in India, carried matters much further. By Lord Lake's victory at Delhi, the person of the emperor passed into the custody of the East India Company. By the arrangements which Wellesley then made, the administration of Delhi was to be conducted in the imperial name, but the only spot in which the imperial orders were really effective was the palace and its precincts. Following on this, the act of 1813, while renewing the company's privileges for another twenty years, declared that its authority was "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of the crown of the United Kingdom...". The conclusion of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 led to the recognition of the new position by the states chiefly interested in the Indian situation. The treaties of 1814 and 1815 expressly recognised British sovereignty within the Indian possessions of the East India Company. These

legislative and diplomatic facts gave an added impulse to the movement in India. Lord Moira, who arrived as governor-general in 1813, brought out with him a fixed determination to make an end of "the fiction of the Mogul government". The phrase denoting the imperial supremacy was removed from his seal. No more ceremonial gifts were offered to the emperor in the governor-general's name. He refused to meet the emperor, Akbar II, Shāh 'Ālam's son, unless he waived all authority over the company's possessions. This suggestion was refused. But in 1827 the emperor consented to meet Moira's successor, Amherst, on equal terms. The meeting took place in the *Diwān-i khās* at Delhi. The two entered from opposite sides at the same instant. They sat down, the emperor on his throne, the governor-general on a chair placed on the right, simultaneously. No gift was offered by the latter. From this time onwards, though all letters from the governor-general to the emperor were addressed as to a superior, they avoided all those terms which would have implied vassalage on the part of the company's government. In 1835 the coinage of Bengal ceased to be struck in the name of the dead emperor, Shāh 'Ālam, whose titles had continued to appear on the company's rupees till that year. Then it was resolved to induce the imperial family to remove from the old palace at Delhi to a new residence which was to be built for it near the Kurīb Minār, and at last Canning decided no longer to recognise the imperial title after the demise of the existing emperor, Bahādur Shāh. Immediately after this the Mutiny broke out. After the fall of Delhi, the emperor was placed on his trial for complicity in the murders which had taken place at Delhi and, more doubtfully, for rebellion against the East India Company. He was declared deposed; he passed the rest of his days as a state-prisoner at Rangoon, and the British government became both in form and in substance supreme as well as sovereign in India.

This development had a considerable reaction upon the relations of the East India Company with its Indian allies. From the time of Clive onwards, those relations had been very different from those of equals. The nawab wazir of Oudh and the nawab of the Carnatic had speedily become dependent on the military support of the company and had therefore tended to fall into the class of political clients. For their protection, alike from foreign enemies and from their own subjects, detachments of the company's troops



were stationed in their territories; but, although these subsidiary forces were paid for by the prince in question, they remained under the orders of the company's government. From the company's point of view such subsidiary alliances had great advantages. They rendered the princes who accepted them allies who could never afford to break their alliance; and they provided the means for an increase of military force without casting any burden on the resources of the company's territories. Wellesley, who first formulated the idea of uniting all India in a league under the general direction of the company, naturally developed into a formal policy what had begun as a casual expedient. He made subsidiary alliances with three of the major states of India—with Hyderabad, with Poona, and with Mysore. In the first two cases the princes who accepted a subsidiary alliance did so as a defence against external dangers in no way caused by the company: the Nizām accepted a subsidiary force as a protection against his over-powerful Marāṭha neighbours, and the Pēshwā accepted one as a protection against the attacks of his nominal subordinate, Holkar. At Mysore the treaty was part of Wellesley's scheme for the reorganisation of the state after the overthrow of Tipu Sultān. In two respects these treaties contained new features. They all bound the princes to settle foreign disputes in consultation with the governor-general; and they all bound them not to admit to their service any foreign Europeans without the governor-general's consent. But from Wellesley's stand-point this did not go far enough, for it offered no guarantee for a good administration within the territories of the company's allies. The condition of Oudh and of the Carnatic afforded striking examples of the evils which might arise out of the protection of the company. Wellesley was therefore eager to engraft on the subsidiary policy further provisions which would obviate this evil. He desired that the company should become guide as well as protector, and that the allied princes should be bound to accept such advice as might be offered to them by the governor-general. Naturally, though unwisely, the princes shrank from admitting this right of interference in their internal affairs. In two cases only was Wellesley able to give effect to his desires. In Mysore he was able to dictate the terms on which he was willing to restore the Hindu royal family to the throne from which it had been expelled by Hyder 'Alī. In Mysore therefore the governor-general's right to give

advice to the prince, and, in case of need, to re-enter on the Mysore territory, was fully admitted. In Oudh too the position of the nawab wazir was so precarious, and the need of casting the protecting arm of the company around his dominions so undeniable, that Wellesley was able to insist on a promise that an improved system of administration should be adopted and attention paid to British advice. Elsewhere this policy was not practicable; and the most that the governor-general could do towards freeing the company from responsibility for corrupt and inefficient administration was to procure grants of territory to be placed under the company's administration instead of the periodical payments due for the support of the subsidiary forces.

Unhappily neither Wellesley's successors nor the directors of the East India Company were disposed to accept the responsibility which he alone among the company's governors-general was prepared to recognise as incumbent upon the predominance towards which the company was evidently moving. In this respect the treaties which Lord Moira concluded at the end of the Marātha War in 1818 offer a remarkable contrast to those which Wellesley arranged. In 1818 Moira had a great opportunity. His victory was complete, and no prince was prepared to question the power of the company's government. The predominance which Wellesley had foreseen had come to pass. In such circumstances Wellesley would almost certainly have made the privilege of the company's alliance depend upon the princes' willingness to accept political guidance, not only in matters of external policy, but also in those of internal administration. But Moira, like the directors, shrank from assuming so great a responsibility, and his treaties followed the usual lines of the subsidiary system, with the formal addition that neither the company nor its officials should interfere in the internal government of its allies. Thus a principle was laid down that the company was in no wise responsible for the administration of the Indian states, so long as their mismanagement did not lead to disorders within the company's own possessions, and that all interference in the internal affairs of the states was as far as possible to be avoided.

This position was, however, extraordinarily difficult to maintain. The company's government controlled by far the largest group of territories in India, and it was in military power the equal of all the other states combined. These facts alone made it

something different from the equal ally of the treaties. Its wishes carried all the influence of power and the prestige of victory. The very constitution of its government, confined as that was to a single class of men from a distant country, was, in the ideas of the time, likely to invest it with the respect due to a caste specially given to war and statecraft. This strange, efficiently organised and closely united power was unique in India, and offered the greatest possible contrast to the position of the other Indian states. They were not merely disunited among themselves, but their governments were cleft by a thousand internal differences. No prince could rely upon the whole-hearted support of all his subjects, on the unhesitating allegiance of all his troops, or on the confidence of the bankers of his state. Moreover the establishment of the company as the common ally of them all, with the consequent disappearance of war, created an artificial situation, in which political vices ceased to exercise their normal effects. Each prince was secure on his throne, notwithstanding the discontent of his people or the jealous eyes with which he was regarded by his abler neighbours. He lacked that most powerful motive, self-interest, which in other circumstances would have compelled him to keep his government sound under pain of destruction if he failed. While, then, the company's government, under pressure of English opinion, was all the time seeking to improve its administrative system, the Indian princes were sinking into a swift decay, and the same causes which had secured the political predominance of the company rapidly gathered weight and momentum.

The material superiority of the company thus grew swiftly in the forty years which followed on the victories of Lord Moira, and constantly tended to pass into political control. In regions such as Kāthiāwār and Central India, divided among a great number of petty chiefs, close control proved to be a political necessity. It was needed to prevent ceaseless squabbles among neighbours or the encroachments of the overlord. In Kāthiāwār, under the management of Colonel Walker, famous for his campaign against female infanticide, an active supervision was established over the conduct of the lesser chiefs. In Central India, which was placed under the management of Sir John Malcolm, the British government not only guaranteed the settlement of the tributes due to Sindhia but also recognised a carefully graduated scale of powers which might be exercised by the tributories. Nor

was the tendency confined to the smaller states. At Baroda, for instance, where difficulties arose over the debts due from the Gackwar to the bankers of his state, it was found necessary to guarantee a settlement of their claims, leading in fact to much supervision of the internal management of the prince. In Hyderabad revenue maladministration produced interference. The vicious practice of farming out the revenues was carried there to extraordinary lengths. It was currently said that a newly appointed revenue-farmer, setting out from the capital to take up his charge, always rode facing his horse's tail in order to watch whether he was followed by some rival who had displaced him either by superior favour or by larger bribes. Metcalfe, when resident with the Nizām, made a strong attempt to introduce reforms into this branch of the Nizām's administration, although this policy was not persisted in. In the same state difficulties arose over the Arab mercenaries who formed a considerable part of the forces of the state. These men always insisted, as part of the terms of their enlistment, that they should not be subject to the law of the state but only to their own tribal law, enforced by their own tribal courts. They followed the frugal custom of saving a great part of their pay and entrusting it to their officers who used it to buy revenue farms in the districts in which they were quartered. The consequence was that in certain areas of the state the authority of the Nizām counted for nothing, and that the Arab troops lived in virtual independence. The assistance of British troops was required to reduce the Arabs to obedience. Here too the finance of the contingent which the British government required the Nizām to maintain, was a constant source of trouble, and led to the accumulation of heavy claims for arrears which were at last only liquidated by the lease of the Berars to the British government in 1853. In Mysore the financial mismanagement of the raja provoked a rebellion in the state in 1830. Here the treaty of Wellesley had provided the company with ample authority to interfere in case of need. But the prevalent views of policy had led to a neglect of the duties imposed by the treaty. The raja had been suffered to persist in his system of government long after he should have been called to an exact account. The rebellion brought matters to a head; and Lord William Bentinck, who was then governor-general, decided to relieve the raja altogether of his powers and appointed Mark Cubbon to administer the state. At

Gwalior during a minority the parties at the durbar quarrelled bitterly among themselves and the army of the state, some 40,000 strong, passed out of control. Ellenborough decided to intervene, and moved with a strong body of troops across the Chambal. The state army resisted and was defeated at the battle of Mahārājpur in 1843, when new terms were imposed on the state, including the limitation of the military forces maintained by it. Thus in a large number of cases the declared policy of non-intervention broke down and was replaced by active interference. As Elphinstone observed in 1832: "This has arisen from the weakness and bad reputation of the native governments. They have often been obliged to request our support against insubordinate chiefs or other subjects...and they have also been obliged to solicit our guarantee to pecuniary arrangements and other settlements where the other contracting party could not depend on their faith".

It had at first been hoped that the practice of having a large voice in the selection of the chief ministers of the major states would obviate the need of further interference. From 1810, for example, the governor-general had insisted that the chief minister at Hyderabad should be a person enjoying his confidence as well as that of his master, the Nizām. Chandu Lāl, who held office for over thirty years, owed his prolonged tenure of office entirely to the support of the resident. From a narrowly political point of view the plan was successful. The minister who rested upon British support was not likely to countenance intrigue hostile to the British government, and his overthrow would be a clear signal of political danger ahead. Ellenborough's campaign in Gwalior was brought about by the violent overthrow of the minister in office. Nevertheless, the system had many disadvantages. The most that can be said for it is that it was imposed on the British government in consequence of its declared policy of non-intervention. Metcalfe, recalling the sound doctrine of the school of Wellesley in which he himself had been brought up, wrote with profound truth, "If possible, I would leave all native states to their own government without interference. But we are always dragged in somehow, and then it is difficult to say what should be done. The worst plan of all, I think, is to keep in a minister against the will of the prince, and to support the man without regard to his measures. Yet this is the mode we have generally slidden into; and as it has been adopted by wiser heads

than mine, it is probably right or inavoidable. I would prefer leaving the minister to the choice of the prince, and interfering only as to measures”.

In any case, the general effect of the policy of avoiding interference was contrary to the interests of the princes themselves. If the authority which Wellesley had taken in Mysore and Oudh had been exercised with ordinary wisdom the administration of the first need not have been assumed for forty years, and the territories of the second need not have been annexed at all. But from about 1832 a new spirit seems to have entered into the policy of the East India Company. Till then every accession of territory had been regarded as a matter of the most dubious advantage. Indeed, until a workable system of administration had been devised, the transfer of an area from Indian to British control was no very obvious advantage to its inhabitants. But with the formation of a regular system of government, with the improvements which the needs and circumstances of the other British provinces introduced into the system devised by Cornwallis for Bengal, with the growing knowledge of the customs and life of the people which the company's servants were acquiring everywhere outside that unfortunate province, with the increasing activity of missionary effort, and with the formation of an educational policy, large and influential classes in England, which till then had rejected with horror every suggestion of an increase in the company's power, began to hold that India would benefit by every extension of British authority. Therefore, the dislike with which all annexations had been regarded did not indeed vanish but unquestionably began to abate. The future continuance of the Indian states thus became uncertain. Men began to argue, with Elphinstone, that the Indian governments, like every despotism, were essentially ephemeral, and that any stable government founded in their midst must sooner or later swallow them all up.

This change of view was exemplified in two ways. In the first place the company formally declared that in future no just and honourable opportunity of acquiring territory was to be rejected. In the second place, and in consequence of this declaration, it began to take an active interest in the question of successions. At first this matter had been considered to lie outside the scope of the company's interests. So late as 1829 it had taken Metcalfe severely to task for having ventured in a minute to assert a claim to deter-

mine the succession in Bhartpur. That attitude was now abandoned. All successions were examined, and the new position was adopted that no succession was valid until it had been recognised by the company's government. The claim was not unreasonable, though unsupported by the letter of the treaties. In the event of a demise, the successor inherited the treaty obligations of the late ruler, so that it was a subject of the company's concern that the power of the state should not pass to one unlikely to observe them. Moreover the Indian rules of succession were extraordinarily lax in European eyes. Among Muslim ruling families the will of the late ruler was usually the only criterion by which one son was preferred to another. Among Hindu chiefs, the rule was that where there was no son, the throne passed to an adopted son, who might be adopted either by the chief himself or after his death by his widow. In both classes therefore the lack of clear and definite rules was likely to produce much intrigue leading possibly to open war. The decision of some external authority was on general grounds most expedient. Nor was the exercise of such authority in any way alien to Indian custom.

The chief difficulty emerged in the matter of adoptions. The company developed the view that its approval was necessary for an adoption to carry with it the political consequence of succession to government. The Indian practice in regard to subordinate chiefs, as for instance in Central India under the Marāṭha states, was to demand that permission should be sought before the adoption took place, and that otherwise it was invalid. The company was thus assuming that it occupied towards the Indian states the same position that Sindhia held as regards a Rājput feudatory. However, it did not precisely follow Indian precedent. Indian rulers seldom refused permission to adopt, but they almost invariably imposed terms, such as a reduction of territory or a special payment known as *nazarāna*. The company never demanded such concessions, but on some occasions it refused permission altogether, and where it refused permission it annexed the state.

An analysis of the cases which occurred before the time of Dalhousie does not disclose any principles on which permission was given or refused. But Dalhousie endeavoured to introduce consistency into this practice of escheat. In a series of minutes he discussed the position of the various classes of states. These he considered were three in number. In the first class were those

which were in every respect independent when they entered into alliance with the company. Such were the old Rājput states of Jodhpur or Jaipur. In the second were those which were dependent on some other prince before they fell within the company's orbit. Such were the Cis-Sutlej chiefs who had been dependent on Sindhia, or the Bundelkhand chiefs who had been dependent on the Pēshwā. In the third were those which had been created by the company's government. Such were Mysore, Satāra, or Nāgpur. He considered that the chiefs of the first class should receive permission to adopt in every case in which they applied for it; that the chiefs of the second class should receive permission if on any ground it appeared expedient to give it; but that chiefs of the third class normally should not receive such permission. This was what became known as "the doctrine of lapse". It will be noticed that comparatively few states, and very few major states, were threatened with extinction by the principles thus defined. They affected no Muslim ruling family and no major state except Mysore and Nāgpur. On these grounds he recommended the annexation of a small group of states. They included Satāra, Nāgpur, and Jhānsi.

More generally dangerous to the preservation of the states was the doctrine that a persistent course of maladministration might lead to their annexation. This doctrine was the correlative of the principle of non-intervention. That policy had a pleasing air of leaving the Indian princes free to do as they liked; but it carried with it the disagreeable risk of leaving them to run into such confusion as would threaten the peace of their great neighbour or at least demand a choice between interference and the disorder which would follow the withdrawal of the company's protection. When Dalhousie went out to India, the condition of two of the great states was regarded with considerable apprehension. In both Hyderabad and Oudh the government was extremely bad, the land revenue systems in disorder, the taxes collected only by military force, and the amounts due from the states to the company running into great sums. In both cases Dalhousie was authorised to annex the state if he thought that the proper course to take. His conduct shows how far he was from pursuing such a policy of general annexation as is usually ascribed to him. Instead of annexing Hyderabad he came to an agreement with the Nizām's government by which, as has already been indicated, the difficulties



were smoothed over by the assignment of Berar to the company on lease. In Oudh previous governors-general, instead of acting on the treaty which Wellesley had made, had contented themselves with warning the king, as he had styled himself since the time of Moira, that if he did not reform his government they would have to interfere. In 1837 Auckland had made a new treaty empowering the company if necessary to assume the administration; but this treaty had not been confirmed by the company. It was not therefore valid. But that did not affect the position that the king was obliged by the earlier treaty to reform his administration. In 1847 Hardinge warned him that he must introduce reforms, a demand amply justified by the later reports of Colonel Sleeman, who was charged by Dalhousie with the task of investigating the condition of the country. After careful consideration Dalhousie concluded that it would be improper to require the king to abdicate, partly because he and his predecessors had been consistent supporters of the company's government, partly because a share in the responsibility for the condition of the kingdom must be laid at the company's door for its earlier failure to enforce reform. But since reform was now imperative, the administration should be taken over by the British government with the king's assent. The council desired to see stronger measures taken than Dalhousie had proposed, and the court of directors took the same view, ordering the province to be annexed to the British possessions. The execution of these orders was among the last duties of Dalhousie, who can in no degree be held responsible for the course adopted. Indeed, although he added extensive territories to the company's dominions, to annexation for its own sake he was strongly opposed. It has already been pointed out how carefully he defined and limited the claims of the company to acquire territory by escheat. At Hyderabad he had refrained from taking advantage of the discretion with which he had been invested. In Oudh he was opposed to annexation. It is clear that he sought accessions of territory only where they were to be desired for specific reasons, where, as in Nāgpur, acquisition would consolidate the company's possessions and facilitate communications between the various provinces, or as in the Panjab, where the establishment of British rule would strengthen the strategic position.

Meanwhile every accession of territory had increased the

general influence which the company's government exercised over the governments of the Indian princes. The equal alliances which the treaties appeared to establish were obviously purely fictitious. The claim which the company had set up to regulate the matter of successions formed a long step towards the assumption of superior powers and a superiority of status. The fact that in important states such as Hyderabad no minister had for fifty years held office without the approval of the resident weighed down the scales on the same side, for what so large a state as Hyderabad had submitted to could hardly be refused with prudence by any lesser state. Thus had come into being a series of powers exercised by the company for the preservation of the general peace, and reluctantly acquiesced in by the princes. These powers constituted the paramountcy of the East India Company in India. They rested on no documentary basis. They could be justified only on consideration of the general well-being of the country. Who was sovereign in India? Or was sovereignty split up among a great number of rulers? The powers which the company claimed were clearly infringements of the sovereign powers of the princes. But since conquest and treaties had not only established the company as the direct ruler of two-thirds of the country but had also made it the arbiter of foreign relations throughout the whole land, it may be argued that the political unit which it had brought into being extended beyond its own borders, that it constituted the supreme power in India, and that the question of the authority which it should exercise was a constitutional, not a diplomatic question. From that point of view the development which has here been sketched is to be compared not to the assumption of authority by one equal state over another, but to the struggle between the English king and the English parliament for ultimate control of the administration. The weakness of the company's position lay not so much in the defect of treaty power as in the reluctance of the company, and of almost all its governors-general, to undertake that general responsibility for the well-being of India which would have placed its claims over the Indian states on a constitutional basis.

## CHAPTER X

### The Company's Administrative System and Policy, 1818-1858

The early period of the East India Company's dominion in India was above all a time of experiment. The parliament and the court of directors in England, Clive, Warren Hastings and Cornwallis in India, had been feeling their way amid great uncertainty towards a system of administration which would work. British sovereignty had been asserted; the last great external enemy had been overthrown; a district administration had been outlined; land revenue enquiries had begun in earnest. But none could pretend that the political structure was in any way complete, and the following period was one of great development. It will be most convenient to deal first with the changes in the home government and in the superior governments in India, then with the growth of the district administration, and lastly with the changes in general policy, both social and administrative.

#### I

The outstanding anomaly in the character of the company in 1818 was its continued union of commercial and administrative duties. The statute of 1813 had abolished its monopoly of the trade between India and Great Britain. But it still continued to monopolise the trade with China and to maintain large commercial establishments in India. The situation was already becoming complicated by the progress of the industrial revolution. The application of steam power to the spinning and weaving of cotton, and improvements in the process of stamping them with designs, was making the import of Indian piece-goods a profitless business. In 1818 the directors were already seeking some more beneficial employment for their commercial funds. In the next year they had lying unsold in their warehouses Coromandel piece-goods which had cost them over a million pounds sterling. In 1822 the commercial establishment was cut down. In 1828 the directors were hesitating whether to carry on the trade at a great

and increasing loss or to abandon it altogether. On the other hand the growing consumption of tea was rendering the Chinese monopoly a valuable commercial asset. But this latter fact rendered the monopoly the more distasteful to dealers in eastern produce, for they desired a direct share in the profits of the trade. The combination of commercial opposition with the political dislike of the company's united functions produced in 1833 the complete abolition of its commercial privileges. It was required as soon as possible after April 12, 1834, to close down its commercial business and to pension or otherwise provide for its commercial servants. In consequence of this act the company became a purely administrative body.

The act of 1833 continued with small change the existing dual organisation of the home government. A number of critics like Lord Ellenborough were eager to place India at once under the immediate government of the crown. But the Whigs who were at this time in office were still inspired with their old jealousy of the executive. Authority, Macaulay declared in the House of Commons, ought not to be vested in the crown alone, for in such matters parliament could not provide the necessary criticism and control. "What we want", he said, "is a body independent of the government and no more than independent—not a tool of the treasury, not a tool of the opposition....The company is such a body." Its administrative functions were therefore continued for another twenty years.

To some extent it lost ground in this period to the Board of Control representing the ministry of the day. As Sir Charles Wood stated in the debates of 1853, the responsibility for foreign policy lay exclusively with the president of the board, and through him with the cabinet. But in fact this was the branch of policy in which home control was least effective. Macaulay's phrase—"India is and must be governed in India"—was particularly true of foreign affairs. So that the province of government in which the authority of the board was supreme was also that in which home authority could be least exercised. And even here the company could exert considerable influence in extreme cases by its unrestrained power of recalling the governor-general. In 1825 the ministry had had much ado to persuade the directors not to recall Lord Amherst; in 1844 the cabinet had been unable to prevent the recall of Lord Ellenborough. With such a weapon in

their armoury the directors could always exercise considerable influence even where they had no direct power. In the sphere of general administration their position was stronger, for here they possessed the power of initiating proposals, and it was difficult for the board to carry through a measure from which the directors were really averse.

However, although in 1853 the company's powers were continued, this time without the customary limitation of twenty years, the statute passed in that year marked a growing disposition to strengthen the position of the ministry as against the directors. The new act provided for a reduction of the directors from twenty-four to eighteen, and for the immediate appointment of three (rising gradually to six) by the crown. Since at the same time the quorum for business was lowered from thirteen to ten, it would be possible, when the scheme was in full operation, for the crown nominees to constitute a majority. The intention (as was stated in the debates) was to prepare for the time when the directors might be reduced to a mere consultative council advising a minister of the crown.

The changes made in the Indian governments were more considerable. The original bill introduced in 1833 proposed to vest "the whole civil and military government...in a governor-general and counsellors". This would in effect have annihilated the presidency governments. It was argued that the central government would be overwhelmed with unnecessary detail, and the clause was therefore modified so as to substitute "the superintendence, direction and control" for "the whole...government". However, this alteration probably made small difference, for the government had ample authority to enforce its will upon refractory subordinates. More important was the abandonment of another proposal. It had been intended to add another covenanted servant to the governor-general's council, and to divide the Bengal presidency into two. This (it seems) was meant to permit the appointment of a covenanted servant from each of the four contemplated presidencies. It seems a pity that this proposal was dropped. It would have given the governor-general councillors personally acquainted with the whole of British India; whereas the continuance of the former practice of selecting the governor-general's councillors entirely from Bengal meant that his advisers would continue to know nothing about

any other province, and, it must be added, not too much about their own. The only practical result was the formation of the Āgra (or North-Western) Provinces as a separate government under a covenanted servant as lieutenant-governor, instead of the creation of a new presidency with a governor and council. Although, too, the central government received the new designation of "the governor-general and council of India", the governor-general still remained directly responsible for the administration of Bengal. This most serious defect in the governmental machine persisted till the act of 1853, which authorised the appointment of a lieutenant-governor of Bengal.

But in the matter of legislation the act of 1833 introduced sweeping changes. Till then the governor-general and council had legislated for the Bengal presidency, and the provincial governments for the others. Thus three series of regulations (as their enactments were called) had come into existence. These were frequently ill-drawn, having been drafted by inexperienced men; frequently conflicting, in some cases as the result of varying conditions, in others merely by accident; and in all cases enforceable only by the company's courts of law and outside the limits of the presidency towns. Besides these regulations existed uncertain and ill-defined bodies of Hindu and Muslim law and custom. Lastly the English statute and common law and equity were within certain limitations applied by the Supreme Courts in the presidency towns themselves. These diverse systems of law were enforceable by two different and often hostile judicatures—the king's or Supreme Courts and the company's courts—with ill-defined jurisdictions. The legal position was thus not only full of defects in a theoretical sense but also about to become a matter of great practical importance. The abolition of the company's trade was to be accompanied by the withdrawal of the right to license British-born subjects proceeding to India and summarily to remove them if they had no licence or if the provincial government pleased to cancel it. Large numbers of merchants and traders were expected to settle in India. It would be most inexpedient to permit such of these as chose to reside outside the presidency towns to be perpetually appealing to the Supreme Courts from the jurisdiction or the decisions of the company's tribunals. For these reasons it was resolved to extend and to concentrate the legislative authority in India. Law was in future to be made solely by the

governor-general and council; and the need of special laws to suit local peculiarities was met by empowering the presidency governments to submit draft laws for enactment by the central authority. The powers of legislation granted to the Government of India were much wider than any till then entrusted to an Indian legislature. It could repeal or alter any laws or regulations then in force; it could make laws for all persons, British, foreign or Indian; it could regulate the jurisdiction of all courts, whether set up by the crown or otherwise; it could not modify the new act, the Mutiny Act, any future act of parliament relating to India, or the sovereignty of the crown; but apart from this its acts should possess "the same force and effect" as an act of parliament and be enforced by all courts of justice, king's or company's. Till then the king's courts had lain under no obligation to enforce the enactments of Indian legislatures; and still less had the latter possessed power in any way to touch the jurisdiction of the king's courts.

In connection with these changes in the legislature two further innovations deserve mention. One was the inclusion of an additional member in the Council of India. The definition of his qualifications was purely negative. He was not to be a member of the company's civil or military service. It was also laid down that he was entitled to speak and vote only at meetings held for the consideration of legislative business. The office thus obscurely defined speedily became known as that of law member. He was intended to devote himself particularly to the consideration of legislative proposals and to the drafting of acts, and to provide the council with that qualified technical criticism, lack of which had marred many of the earlier regulations. Macaulay was the first to hold this new office; and though he was far from being an eminent jurist, his appointment was undoubtedly a great success. The creation of the law member is further noteworthy since it represents the first step taken to differentiate the council in its executive from the council in its legislative capacity. The governor-general in council was further directed to appoint "Indian law commissioners" to consider and report on the changes desirable in the jurisdictions of the various courts and above all the codification of the disparate bodies of law recognised by the various Indian tribunals. The body, largely under the inspiration of Macaulay, did much preliminary work facilitating the preparation of the

codes which became law soon after the assumption of direct government by the crown.

The act of 1853 revised and considerably improved the legislative organ created by the act of 1833. For one thing the governor-general, who had enjoyed merely a casting vote in legislative business under the earlier act, was given a specific power of veto, which till then had been lodged in the home government alone. For another the law member became an ordinary member of council, entitled to speak and vote at all its meetings. For a third the differentiation of the legislative body was carried a long step onwards. Certain additional persons were to be added under the statutory title of "legislative councillors". These were to consist of a covenanted servant nominated by each governor or lieutenant-governor, together with the chief justice of the Supreme Court of Calcutta, one of the puisne judges of the court, and two other covenanted servants. These changes increased the legal element and introduced a new and much needed provincial element. But they also produced a very unexpected consequence—the relaxation of executive control over the legislature. The judges were obviously independent members; and the provincial members, though covenanted servants, were always men of considerable seniority who regarded their legislative councillorships as the last office they would hold in India and who did not look to the Government of India for promotion of any sort. The result was that the enlarged council of 1853 proved to be an independent and very troublesome body, far from what the president of the board, Sir Charles Wood, had intended to establish.

At the same time the structure of the Government of India was materially altered—not for the better. Until 1853 membership of the Council of India had been the highest office within the reach of covenanted servants. But by the new act the salaries of councillors were reduced to 80,000 rupees a year while those of lieutenant-governors were raised to 100,000. In effect the latter office was elevated above the former. The governor-general was thus deprived, or relieved, of that independent, disinterested advice which might be expected so long as his council did not look to him for further promotion and dignity. But now the councillors were provided with a motive for acquiescing whenever possible in the governor-general's views, and the supreme



council lost the supreme position commensurate with its dignity and duties.

The acts of 1833 and 1853 introduced one other most important administrative change. The covenanted servants, who by the act of 1793 could alone be named to any civil office in the regulation provinces carrying a salary of over £800 a year, had always been nominated by the court of directors; and consequently had always been chosen from among their relations and friends. In 1813 Lord Grenville had suggested that it would be better if the service were recruited according to the results of a competitive examination. In 1833 an attempt was made to introduce a modification of this idea. The act of that year directed that the directors should annually nominate three times as many candidates as there were places to be filled, and that one-third of their nominees should be selected by competition. This plan if enforced might have combined the merits of nomination with those of competition. The candidates, as before, would have sprung from families connected with India, would have carried out with them family traditions, and would have been welcomed in India by family friends, Indian and European. At the same time competition would have weeded out the bad bargains. But the directors were too tenacious of their patronage easily to give way. In the next year they induced the easy-going president of the board to introduce an amending bill permitting the introduction of the new measure to be deferred. It was in consequence never brought into operation. But in 1853 Macaulay, who had been the prime mover in the earlier proposal, delivered a most eloquent defence of competition as a means of selecting public servants. The plan was adopted, and the directors' patronage thus vanished altogether. Here as elsewhere it is difficult not to regret Macaulay's success, however much the motives underlying his policy merit sympathy. The system certainly secured for India the services of a greater number of brilliant men than could have been obtained in any other way. But it may be doubted whether it provided her with as many devoted and understanding servants. And it carried with it another disadvantage. The act of 1833 had declared that high employment in India should not be a matter of race or creed or colour. But the establishment of competition involved in practice the exclusion of Indians from high office for many years. Lord Stanley was in the right when he opposed the proposal in 1853.

It was, he declared, a step back, not a step forward, for "while the old system could not have been permanent, the present plan would not be felt as an abuse in this country, whatever it might be in India, and it would therefore be allowed to continue without improvement". Lord Stanley's forecast was fulfilled to the letter. But here, as in other points relating to the structure of the Indian government, the main outlines were fixed in the period 1818-58 in the form in which they were to continue for another half-century.

## II

In the sphere of district administration the forty years following 1818 were strongly formative. The earlier years had been experimental. But with experience certain methods of district organisation developed as most suitable and effective, and mark a considerable change of conception from that underlying the district system originally established in Bengal. That had been founded on the permanent zamindari settlement of the land revenue. It had been hoped that, as the settlement would reduce the labour of collecting the land revenue to a minimum, it would therefore enable the foreign administrators to devote themselves to the more important aspects of government, to the suppression of crime and to the hearing of civil suits. But it was found to involve one most grievous disadvantage. The collector had no need to know more of his district than that certain zamindars were annually liable for certain sums of money. The judge could merely hear such suits as were brought before him. Neither had any need, and neither was in fact permitted, to tour his district except in very special circumstances. Neither learned to know the people entrusted to his control. No general survey was attempted, although Lord Hastings in 1822 had dwelt upon the importance of surveying Bengal and Bihar and placing on record the various rights of individuals to the soil. Thus the permanent settlement was not only the fruit of ignorance, but the perpetuator of ignorance.

By good fortune the land tenures and therefore the land revenue settlements in the other provinces were of a wholly different nature. In most of Madras, in Bombay, in Āgra, in the Panjab, the land-holders were generally peasant-proprietors, either owning their fields individually, or forming communities of

collective owners. In either case a revenue settlement could not be accomplished without going into great detail. So from the first the company's servants were forced into learning all they could about the economic condition, the social organisation, the customs and languages, of the people. Again the amount of detail involved in the revenue collections made a large revenue staff necessary. Whereas in Bengal a collector for long had no assistants beyond the clerks at his headquarters, elsewhere in each *taluk* or *tahsil* (as the sub-divisions of a district were variously called) the collector had a *tahsildar* (in Madras or *Āgra*) or a *māmlatdar* (in Bombay), and under them a host of village headmen, all of whom could be required to furnish him with information. The consequent difference was remarkable. In 1824 the court of directors was already calling pointed attention to the fact that in Madras a competent collector could manage the revenue detail of a whole district, but if in Bengal a small tract or two had to be managed directly instead of through a zamindar, it was "almost always managed ill".

It should not, however, be supposed that the provincial settlements outside Bengal were from the first satisfactory. They were not. But constantly accumulating information permitted and even promoted their improvement, while the only change for the better in Bengal lay in a growing, uneasy sense of the ignorance amid which the administrator worked. In Madras, for instance, the period begins with the restoration of a ryotwari system instead of the village leases by which the former had been for a while displaced. But the assessments under this "middle ryotwari", as it is technically called, remained heavy and unequal. They were heavy, because they were largely based on old assessments framed in Mughal days when the ideal was a maximum rate—the "perfect assessment"—which could indeed seldom be realised but towards which the *amlah* were expected to strive. They were unequal, because the village accounts had generally been manipulated to favour some at the expense of others, and because no complete and professional survey had been attempted. Neither was there as yet any standard method by which assessments were made. A field might be measured; or its crop roughly estimated; or a lump sum might be imposed on a village and then roughly divided among the cultivators. But even so a number of reforms were gradually made. The ancient custom of compelling the other

inhabitants of a village to make good the arrears of one of their number was abandoned. So was another ancient practice—that of compelling ryots to cultivate a larger area than they wished. So also was the long-established use of levying increased rates on the more valuable crops which were grown if the owner sank a well to irrigate his land. Finally in 1855 a professional field-to-field survey was determined on; and in the same year began a prolonged discussion of the principles on which the revenue ought to be assessed, leading at last in 1864 to the adoption of the principles which characterise “new ryotwari”—that not more than half the net produce should be taken and that the assessment should remain unchanged for thirty years.

The history of ryotwari in Bombay is not dissimilar. There the company's government inherited from the Marāthas a *kāmil* or perfect assessment which could hardly ever be realised. After some years of a desultory farming of the land revenue, and a projected introduction of village settlements suggested by the existence of joint villages in Gujarāt and traces of a joint village system in the Deccan, a ryotwari survey and settlement were attempted, but proved worse even than the previous mode of collection. The survey was rough and inaccurate. The classification of the soils was over-elaborate. The assessment was impossibly onerous, and could never be realised. But this proved to be no worse than a bad beginning. In 1835 a revision was begun, and by 1847 the well-known *Joint Report* laid down the principles of modern assessment for the presidency. Whatever may be said of its initial stages, the ryotwari system proved to be singularly capable of improvement and reform.

In Āgra the land tenures demanded a different treatment. Wellesley had wished to apply the Bengal system there, just as he had attempted to do in the Madras presidency. But the unsuitability of that system was so evident that the commission appointed to introduce a permanent settlement reported that it was impracticable. A similar view was taken by the Court of Directors, who had been considerably impressed by the evidence of Munro on the subject of land revenue management. Āgra therefore escaped a permanent settlement, although the earlier assessments were often nothing better than the acceptance of the bids of revenue farmers. In 1822, however, the foundation of a better system was laid. Holt Mackenzie, a distinguished cove-

nanted servant on the Bengal establishment, secured the adoption of a law known as Regulation VII of 1822. This laid down certain fundamental principles for the revenue settlement in Āgra. These included the execution of an exact field-to-field survey, and the preparation of registers showing all existing rights over the soil. Areas were only to be assessed after a local enquiry had been held, and tenant-right was to be recognised and protected. The standard rate at which the revenue was to be assessed was fixed at five-sixths of the rental. A good deal of difficulty was found in determining rental values. Money rents were most unusual, and rental values generally depended on estimates of crop-values. The system was therefore modified. Under Bird and Thomason rules were at last prepared by which the demand was reduced from five-sixths to two-thirds of the rental value, and the process was simplified by framing the aggregate demand on a tract of country and then distributing it in detail. The cadastral survey, as it proceeded, threw much light on the organisation of the village communities of the province. These were bodies much more closely knit than the villages of South India and the Deccan, where the village lands were commonly divided out into separate and individual holdings. The Āgra villages were mostly "joint" villages—owned in common by a family or group of families holding a superior position, but tilled by an inferior group. The latter, however, often claimed occupancy rights over the land they actually cultivated, and the extent to which such rights should be recognised was very difficult to determine. In a practical sense this matter was settled by adopting a rule originally proposed by Lord William Bentinck in 1832, recognising persons who could prove a continuous occupation for twelve years as possessed of heritable rights to cultivate the land in question at a rent which in case of dispute was to be determined by a court of law.

The prevalence of the "joint" village in the Panjab led naturally, when that province passed into the company's possession, to the application of the revenue system which had grown up in Āgra. Tenant-right was recognised in the Panjab from the first. The twelve-year rule was commonly applied. The settlements were made on special local enquiries, and moderation in assessment was urged from the first.

The mode of land settlement thus corresponded with the characteristic land tenures. In Bengal the existence of great zamindars

led to a zamindari settlement marred by a practical neglect of tenant-right; in Madras and Bombay the prevalence of small individual holdings produced a ryotwari system; while in Āgra and the Panjab the existence of a strong village system led to a method of village settlements. In Bengal the zamindari system made a detailed survey appear needless; in the other provinces a minute survey was found to be the indispensable basis of a settlement.

It followed that the executive officials at the head of the districts played a far larger part in the administration of the other provinces than was the case in Bengal. Not only was the collector elsewhere responsible for all the detail involved in village or ryotwari assessments, but he was in charge also of other administrative work that closely touched the ryot. He decided boundary disputes, disputes about the sharing of water, disputes about rents or customary payments. He directed the repair of water-channels and the clearing of irrigation tanks. Such matters necessitated constant relations, wholly unknown in Bengal, between the peasant on the one side and the collector and his revenue subordinates on the other.

In all the older provinces the administration of justice and the management of the police were more nearly assimilated to the system established in Bengal than was the case with the revenue administration; but even here remarkable differences long continued to exist, and here it was the Bengal system which came ultimately to be modified. In Bengal in 1818 civil justice was administered by district judges, with a considerable number of subordinate Indian judges under them. Reforms introduced by Bentinck improved the status of the latter by the creation of a new and superior grade entitled "principal sadr amins", who could try cases involving values up to 5000 rupees. On the criminal side the district judges were also magistrates, who might deal with cases summarily or commit the accused for trial by courts of circuit presided over by members of the four provincial courts which heard appeals in civil causes from the decision of the district judges. For police purposes the districts were divided into fifteen or twenty circles called *thānas*, each under the control of a *daroga* who directed the activities of a number of paid police and who might call upon the services of the village-watchmen—*chaukidars*. The police-force was under the general control of four super-

intendents, stationed at Calcutta, Dacca, Patna and Murshidābād; but in each district responsibility lay with the civil judge in his capacity as magistrate. The underlying principle of these arrangements was the complete separation of revenue functions from those of justice and police.

Precisely the same organisation had at first been established in Madras, but there, as in Bengal, produced a host of evils. The district judges, oppressed with heavy judicial duties, could not even attempt to supervise the police. Judicial processes were elaborate and expensive. The regulations which they administered were unknown to the peasant, and in fact could not be made known to him in the existing state of communications and illiteracy. The great opponent of this system was Thomas Munro. "It has left the ryots in a worse state", he wrote, "than under any native government".<sup>1</sup> In consequence of his criticisms the control of the police was transferred from the civil judge to the collector, who became the collector and magistrate, with the tahsildar in charge of the police-force within the *taluk*. Similar arrangements were adopted in the Bombay presidency and later in the Āgra province. The change was an undoubted improvement. The union of revenue and police control in the hands of a collector who was accustomed to tour his district, see things for himself, and discuss local affairs with the villagers, meant that his means of information would be greatly increased, along with his powers of action, while he would also be better able to estimate the accuracy or falsehood of the reports which came to him from either department. The control of the police still remained very inadequate. The first steps to amend it were taken in Bombay in 1852, when the system of semi-military police established by Sir Charles Napier in Sind was extended to the rest of the province. In Madras a prolonged and exhaustive enquiry into the misconduct of the police—the Torture Commission of 1855—led to the reorganisation of the department under an inspector-general, with a special superintendent in every district. In the North-Western Provinces—as Āgra came to be called—no change was made till 1861.

But in spite of these defects the administrative superiority of the system operating outside Bengal was sufficiently marked to induce efforts to reform conditions in Bengal itself. In 1829 Bentinck

<sup>1</sup> Gleig, *Life of Munro*, I, 460.

attempted for a while to restore the vigour of the administration by creating commissioners, with general authority over both revenue and judicial functionaries in groups of districts. These commissioners replaced the provincial courts of appeal. They were to hold assizes for the punishment of serious crime, and to supervise the conduct of both the collectors and the judge-magistrates. In 1831, since these duties were found to be beyond the powers of a single person, the duty of holding assizes was transferred to the district judges. Soon afterwards experiments were made in the direction of creating separate magistrates in each district, so that for a while the normal district control was vested in a judge exercising both civil and criminal jurisdiction, a magistrate controlling the police, and a collector. But at last on the urgent recommendations of Halliday, the first lieutenant-governor of Bengal, of Dalhousie, and of Canning, it was decided in 1859 to invest the collector with the control of the police-establishment. This meant the adoption in Bengal of the district-organisation which had grown up, a generation earlier, in Madras, Bombay, and Āgra, though the Bengal collector remained shackled by the zamindari settlement and bereft of the revenue subordinates who were the eyes and ears of the collectors in other provinces.

The history of district-administration from 1818 to 1858 thus displays the escape of the other provinces from the thralldom of the Cornwallis system, and the way in which the permanent zamindari settlement obstructed the attempts made in Bengal in the same direction. The stagnancy of the administration in Bengal as compared with the progress made in the other provinces illustrates the same truth. In 1810 Minto when governor-general had lamented the prevalence of dacoity, and complained that the dacoit leaders were known popularly as *hakim* or governor, and that the district authorities could not secure the least aid for their apprehension. In 1852, despite the passing of two special acts in 1843 and 1851, the magistrate at Hugli reported the existence of 35 gangs of dacoits operating round Calcutta. In 1856 the lieutenant-governor could still assert that the conduct of criminal justice was popularly regarded as a lottery, and that while the people thought a dacoity bad they regarded the subsequent police-enquiry as worse. Education only touched the inhabitants of Calcutta itself. The province was left virtually without roads.



Cultivation had undoubtedly expanded, but this had weakened the position of the tenant by depriving him of the power of migration which in the past had always limited the zamindar's power of extortion.

In contrast with this, the other provinces exhibit considerable efforts to improve the condition of the people. In Madras, for instance, ever-increasing attention was given to the maintenance of the irrigation-tanks. In 1819 a special department (the *maramat* or repair department) was organised under the collectors. In 1825 it was placed under the superintendence of the Board of Revenue, under which civil engineers were placed in charge of groups of districts. In 1852 a committee of enquiry sat, in consequence of which the modern Public Works Department was set up in 1858. Much was also done to extend irrigation. Under the conduct of Arthur Cotton the repair and extension of the Kāveri works was begun in 1836; the same engineer began the Godāvārī dam in 1846; in 1850 the Krishnā delta system was begun. In Bombay the Bombay Education Society and the Bombay Native Education Society opened and maintained primary schools in various districts. In 1840 a Board of Education was formed, consisting of four European members nominated by government and three Indian members nominated by the Native Education Society; when in 1852 government increased its subsidy from one-and-a-half to two-and-a-half lakhs of rupees, the board undertook to open a school in any village where the inhabitants would provide a building and the necessary books, and agree to find half the schoolmaster's salary. In Āgra, where the population was specially exposed to famine, irrigation received much attention. Between 1815 and 1827 military officers restored the canal dug by Firūz Shāh, now known as the West Jumna Canal. Then a smaller canal—the East Jumna Canal—was restored. In 1836 a new project—the Upper Ganges Canal—was proposed, and completed by Cautley in 1854.

All these provinces were what were technically known as "Regulation" provinces. These were marked by being ruled under definite bodies of enactments—the regulations passed by the company's presidency governments up to 1833, and the legislation passed by the Government of India after that date. For the enforcement of these laws there was an elaborate chain of courts with strict and elaborate rules of procedure. The judges were

entirely separate from the revenue and executive officials; and by English statute both judges and revenue officials could be appointed only from the ranks of the company's covenanted service. At first this method formed the standard pattern of administration. Originating in Bengal, it was extended as a matter of course to Benares, to the Madras Presidency, to the Bombay Presidency, and to the territories which were to form the North-Western Provinces. But even in Bengal it soon became apparent that this was too elaborate and mechanical a system to be universally applicable. In Bengal for instance the districts fringing the north-east frontier—Rangpur, Assam, Arakan—were inhabited by or in close contact with primitive tribes for whom complicated forms and procedure were strange and incomprehensible. The same was the case with parts of Orissa. A striking illustration of the futility of hoping to provide justice by making law and setting up courts was afforded by the Santhāl rebellion in 1835. The Santhāls, a numerous group of primitive tribes, being oppressed by Bengali and Bihari landlords, never thought of appealing to the courts of law but broke into rebellion, torturing and exterminating all the Bengalis they could find. Regular troops had to be sent against them, and, when the rebellion had been reduced, the Santhāl country was made into a separate district in which, as in Rangpur and Assam, the Regulation system was declared not to apply. A similar course was found necessary in the Madras Presidency in the hill tracts of the Northern Circars, and in Bombay in the Bhil country, where a special agency was established in 1825 and furnished occupation to the young Outram.

The special features of these "non-regulation" areas were that ordinary law did not apply unless specially extended. The governor-general, or the governor, in his executive capacity would issue as orders such rules as he desired to be observed. He could, moreover, select to conduct the administration persons whom he judged to be particularly suitable, irrespective of their belonging to the covenanted service. The mode of government was personal and paternal, all authority, executive, revenue and judicial, being usually concentrated in the same official; and the general purpose was to disturb tribal or local custom as little as possible, and to make changes only with the greatest caution and on some evident necessity.

The earliest acquisition thus to be dealt with was the Delhi

territory. But the reason for this was political rather than administrative, for the government, though conducted by the authority of the governor-general, was carried on in the name of the Mughal emperor. Sind afforded the earliest illustration of the non-regulation system applied on a considerable scale. There the reasons were partly personal. The conqueror of Sind, Sir Charles Napier, had conceived a strong distaste for the civil government of the Bombay Presidency. The hot-headed Ellenborough distrusted his members of council, his foreign secretary, and many others of the covenanted servants with whom he came in contact. Both therefore preferred to staff the province with military officers, and consequently the form of government was inevitably non-regulation. Napier divided the province into three collectorates with a head-collector in each, and a number of deputies. All were magistrates as well as collectors, with limited powers of punishment. Ordinary civil disputes were referred to a *panchayat* constituted by the collector-magistrate, the members receiving a small payment to compensate their loss of time. The *kārdars*—or village headmen—were maintained in their former functions; and a body of police under military discipline was organised, directly commanded by their own officers but at the disposition of the collector-magistrates. This system at first provoked much criticism; but its successful working came gradually if reluctantly to be recognised, and when Dalhousie conquered and annexed the Panjab, he followed the precedent set by Napier and Ellenborough. The country was organised in eight divisions, each under a commissioner, and twenty-four districts, each under a deputy-commissioner, and placed under the management of a peculiarly able group of men. They included the two Lawrences, John Nicholson, Robert Montgomery, Herbert Edwardes, Robert Napier, and Donald Macleod, and thus represented both the covenanted and the military services. There were no separate courts. The commissioners and deputy-commissioners exercised full criminal jurisdiction, and in civil causes made much use of panchayats. The law administered was at first customary law and a rough equity. But rules were gradually laid down by executive order. In 1855 a civil code was issued embodying a great amount of the customary law of the province. A Public Works Department was immediately organised, and set to work to make roads and improve the irrigation-canals, not only cleaning and extending

the "inundation" canals which filled only in the flood season, but also constructing the first perennial canal—the Upper Bāri doāb Canal—between 1851 and 1859.

### III.

While the mechanism of district management was thus being elaborated, the spirit of the government was also being transformed, so that the new efficiency was being applied to new purposes. From 1818 until the close of the century British rule in India remained virtually unassailed except by the catastrophe of the Indian Mutiny; and that event being mainly military in its detail if not in its causes, one is apt to look back upon the period as one in which the government rested upon unassailable foundations. But that was not the view of contemporaries. So early as 1794 Shore doubted whether the English government in Bengal would last another fifty years. Wellesley within a month of overthrowing Tipu Sultān was demanding increased military forces lest his countrymen should "suffer the fate of those whose minds are unequal to the magnitude of their fortunes and who are afraid of their own strength".<sup>1</sup> Elphinstone was alarmed by "the great strides we are making towards universal dominion", and likened the empire to steel "which cuts through everything if you keep its edge even, but is very apt to snap short if it falls into unskilful hands".<sup>2</sup> Metcalfe was "ever anxiously alive to the instability of our Indian empire". The British provinces, he believed, held many internal enemies, "ready for change if not ripe for insurrection". John Shore's son declared that the constant presence of troops alone prevented disturbances.

The strength of the British dominion resided in positive and negative groups of factors. The positive group included such obvious things as British naval supremacy, uncontested since the battle of Trafalgar; British military skill and obstinacy, proved on battle-field after battle-field, and ultimately victorious in the hills of Nepāl, as in the jungles of Burma; and British solidarity, attested equally in parliamentary debate and in the obedience shown in India to the commands of the governor-general in council. The negative group consisted in the complete lack of union among Indians, Muslim and Hindu, Brāhman and out-caste,

<sup>1</sup> Wellesley, *Despatches*, II, 42.

<sup>2</sup> Colebrooke, *Life of Elphinstone*, II, 167.

Rājput and Bābu, being wholly unable to find any common cause against the foreigner; in the weariness of everlasting war, pillage, and unsettlement, which had been the general lot outside the British provinces for half a century and more; and above all in the political apathy which for ages had characterised the bulk of the population. "They take no interest", wrote Thomas Munro with complete truth, "in political revolutions; they consider defeat and victory as no concern of their own, but merely as the good or bad fortune of their masters; and they only prefer one to another in proportion as he respects their religious prejudices or spares taxation".<sup>1</sup> But it could not be supposed that these negatives offered a permanent foundation. Political apathy might wear away; the terror of marauding armies would gradually be forgotten; religion might offer a cause which could unite, if not the general body of the people, at least great sections of them.

The company's government was at first deeply conscious of all this, and most reluctant to do or suffer to be done anything which could appear like an attack on social customs or religion. But gradually its attitude changed. Under the impulsion of liberal ideas in politics and evangelical ideas in religion, under the guidance of Whig governors-general like Bentinck, Auckland, and Dalhousie, missionary activities developed, an educational policy was adopted, humanitarian ideals were pursued, in a manner which would have shocked and alarmed an earlier generation. The *laissez-faire* of the Cornwallis régime gave way to the paternalism of the 'non-regulation' system in the moral as well as in the administrative sphere.

The change was demonstrated by the admission of new missionary bodies to India, and by a growing support of them by members of the company's services. Early in the eighteenth century the Danish missionaries, established at the Danish settlement of Tranquebar on the Coromandel Coast, had received considerable financial help from the English Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, and from time to time members of the mission had been employed as interpreters and chaplains by the Madras Government. But this was at a time when the company was not a great territorial power in southern India. In Bengal for many years after its acquisition missionary activity was strongly discouraged. A Bengal regulation passed in 1793 declared that

<sup>1</sup> Gleig, *op. cit.* I, 203.

Hindu and Muslim law should be upheld, that all religious rites and customs were to be allowed, and all religious endowments maintained. In the same year the company successfully resisted the efforts of Wilberforce and the Clapham Sect to impose upon it missionary responsibilities. In the same year again William Carey, the famous Baptist missionary, was compelled to sail to Bengal by a foreign ship and to establish himself under the Danish flag at Serampore, where he and his companions, Marshman and Ward, taught, preached, and laid the foundations of Bengali prose by their translations from the Bible. Though the Serampore missionaries were countenanced and encouraged by Wellesley, difficulties arose with his successors, and on various occasions missionaries were deported from British India or not allowed to land. In 1813 the act continuing the company's privileges not only authorised the appointment of a bishop and archdeacons in India but also gave the Board of Control the power of reversing any refusal by the company to allow individual missionaries to proceed to India. After 1833 no licence at all was required. As a result of these changes and the growth of the Evangelical Movement in England, a considerable number of missionaries, both Scotch and English, went to India, where they preached Christianity with great zeal and did much to promote the cause of western education.

In other respects too their presence in India produced important changes. The company's government had inherited from the past customs such as that of turning out troops and firing salutes on certain Hindu festivals, taxes such as the pilgrim tax levied for the maintenance of certain temples, duties such as the administration of endowments bestowed upon temples, mosques, and tombs. All these were capable of being represented as unworthy support accorded by a Christian government to heathen worship. The missionaries did so represent them, and received sufficient support in England to secure the writing of a despatch in 1833 requiring their abandonment. For some years nothing was done. But (again in consequence of missionary representations) another despatch was sent in 1838 demanding immediate compliance with the previous orders. These were at last put into effect, save that in some places no suitable trustees could be found to manage the endowments, which therefore continued under the control of the revenue authorities till 1863. The government was, and on the whole remained, decidedly averse from any encouragement of

proselytism. But it was scarcely possible to resist the rising tide of sentiment. Two of the most eminent of the Panjab school—John Lawrence and Herbert Edwardes—leaned strongly to the view that Providence had placed India in British hands in order that the people might be Christianised; more than one colonel of the Bengal Army preached the gospel zealously between parades; and even Lord Palmerston, at a banquet given to Canning on his appointment as governor-general, observed that “perhaps it might be our lot to confer on the countless millions of India a higher and nobler gift than any mere human knowledge”.

Parallel with this movement went the development of an educational policy. Here, as elsewhere, Bengal followed a special, and, as might be expected, a faulty policy of its own. The men of the eighteenth century, such as Warren Hastings and Jonathan Duncan, and those who had inherited their tradition, had sought to revive and strengthen the classical cultures of the Hindu and the Muslim. Hastings had founded a school for the study of Persian and Arabic; Duncan one for the study of Sanskrit. With Hastings's support, Sir William Jones had founded the Bengal Asiatic Society. When in 1813 the British Parliament authorised expenditure on the promotion of useful learning in India, the money was mainly used in printing in Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic original works and some translations of English text-books, and in providing scholarships for promising students of Indian classical literatures. But already a strong contrary current of opinion had arisen. David Hare, the free-thinking watchmaker of Calcutta, planned a school where young Indians could be taught western literature and science. In this scheme he succeeded in interesting Europeans like Sir Hyde East, the chief justice, and Indians like Rām Mohun Roy, with the result that an institution called “The Abode of Learning”—*Vidyalyaya*—was set up, known subsequently as the Hindu College and then the Presidency College. The Serampore missionaries established a college under the patronage of the king of Denmark and the governor-general to teach western knowledge. In 1820 missionary bodies founded the “Bishop's College” at Calcutta; in 1823 a college was founded and endowed at Āgra by Pandit Gangadhar. These new institutions were designed to spread western knowledge and languages, not to promote oriental studies. Rām Mohun Roy and his friends indeed presented a petition to Lord Amherst, criticising the

orientalist policy of teaching "what was known two thousand years ago with the addition of vain and empty subtleties since produced by speculative men". Much anxiety was displayed by a wide circle of Indians to learn English, and Bishop Heber noticed a strong tendency to imitate English ways. It became increasingly evident that English studies were popular and that oriental studies were not. The Committee of Public Instruction, to which the administration of public funds had been entrusted, was rent in sunder between the two policies. Charles Trevelyan, a brilliant but erratic young covenanted servant, pointed out that while a private society had sold over 31,000 volumes of English text-books in two years, the committee had not sold enough of its Sanskrit and Arabic volumes in half as long again to meet its warehouse charges for two months; he added that the young men at the Sanskrit College had petitioned, representing that the knowledge they had acquired would not enable them to earn a living. The cause of western education was also strenuously advocated by a Scotch missionary, Alexander Duff, who had opened a secondary school at Calcutta with the assistance of Rām Mohun Roy. He argued that all save the literate castes were prohibited from learning Sanskrit. Even were modern works translated into that language (he added), every term in it was so saturated with Hindu philosophic ideas that the translation must fail altogether to convey the thought of the original.

In the autumn of 1834 Macaulay reached Calcutta as the first law member of the governor-general's council. He was at once appointed president of the education committee, and within a few months of his arrival was urging upon the governor-general, Bentinck, with all the force of his specious rhetoric, the wholesale adoption of the English policy. He recommended that the printing of Sanskrit and Arabic texts should cease, that the Muslim and Sanskrit colleges should be closed, that the scholarships to students of Islam and Hinduism should be discontinued, and that all the available state funds should be devoted to promoting the study of English and English literature. This, he supposed, would produce a class of persons "Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals, in intellect". Not many months later he had convinced himself that within a generation all the respectable classes of Bengal would have ceased to be Hindus.

These ideas were adopted and recommended by Bentinck, but



were strenuously opposed by H. T. Prinsep, who pointed out that the Muslims had as yet exhibited no inclination to study English, and that, even among the Hindus, only those who had had connections with the English through public or private service really regarded the study of their foreign tongue and alien literature as indispensable. But his opposition was unheeded. The proposal to abolish the government teaching of Sanskrit and Arabic was indeed dropped; but it was resolved to make English literature the main subject of instruction. The possibility of instruction in such subjects as science and agriculture was virtually ignored. The decision to make English the basis of Indian education was inevitable. It complied with a strong local demand; it was backed by missionary opinion; it fell in with the views of the government, both in Calcutta and in London, which desired to extend the range of appointments open to Indians; above all it was a necessary measure if British rule was to do more for India than establish internal peace and secure her from external invasion. But as a policy it was too limited. It left out of account the Muslims who believed no education of the least value unless based on Arabic, and women, who in the existing state of society never dreamed of attending schools and colleges. Essentially literary, it provided no corrective for the prevalent faults of classes whose education had always been of a literary nature. And the fact that it would be applied to boys and not to girls meant that it would be ineffective; the future mothers of the classes that embraced it would remain wedded to the old ideas; and what a boy learnt at school would therefore conflict with the atmosphere of the home.

Soon afterwards, in 1842, the Committee of Public Instruction vanished. In Calcutta it was replaced by a Council of Education, on which a number of Indians sat. Outside Calcutta the government undertook the direct responsibility. Hardinge announced in 1844 that candidates with a knowledge of English would be preferred for public appointments. This step was doubly unfortunate. Young men who had sat successfully for examinations held by the Council of Education were registered as eligible; but eligibility and appointment were different things; and great heart-burning was caused. What was even worse, it invested western education with adventitious attractions, leading men to seek it, not because they set any special value on western know-

ledge, but purely as a passport to government service. Little was done to promote the efficiency of indigenous schools, and about 1853 while government was assisting thirty schools and colleges in Bengal, where English was the chief medium of instruction, it was maintaining only thirty-three where the vernacular was in use. The Bengal educational policy was thus wedded to what was known as the "filtration" policy—of leaving elementary education to care for itself and concentrating on English and especially higher education in the hope that western culture would gradually permeate the whole population.

Authorities in the Āgra province had followed a wholly different course. James Thomason, the lieutenant-governor from 1843 to 1853, was above all anxious to promote rural education. A plan was at length formed to group villages in circles of five and set up a school wherever the land-owners were willing to pay an additional cess of one per cent. on the land-revenue. In 1852-3 the scheme was brought into force in eight districts, and was afterwards extended. Another development of great importance was the establishment of the Thomason College of Engineering at Rūrki. In Bombay too the "filtration" theory of education had been set aside. Elphinstone, the first governor of the presidency in its modern form, had done much to promote classical and vernacular studies. He had continued the custom followed by the Pēshwā, of granting allowances to distinguished Sanskrit scholars; and after a time this had led to the foundation of a Sanskrit college at Poona. He had also attempted to encourage and increase the vernacular schools of the presidency. But he had as well set up in Bombay a school for English, an engineering school, and a medical school. Malcolm, his successor, reckoned a knowledge of English as a very trivial qualification for service under government. While missionary enterprise, as in Bengal, had been active in providing English education, the government had rather applied its funds to vernacular schools, of which in 1853 it was maintaining 233 against the thirty-three so maintained in Bengal. In Madras, Munro, like Elphinstone, had been anxious to improve vernacular teaching, and had framed a plan for setting up two high schools in each district, together with a normal school for the training of teachers. But these proposals had been abandoned at his death in 1827. A government high-school was founded at Madras, but a very large number of missionary

institutions grew up—more indeed than were to be found in all the rest of India.

Educational policy had thus exhibited great diversities of aim and method. To Dalhousie and Wood belong the credit of framing a general policy, which after long correspondence between the two was embodied in the educational despatch of July 19, 1854. It declared the need of "a properly articulated scheme of education from the primary school to the university". The vernacular schools were no longer to be neglected, and the method devised in the Āgra province was proposed for adoption elsewhere. Secondary schools were to be encouraged, and in general the system of making grants-in-aid was to be employed to encourage institutions maintained by missionary and other voluntary bodies, irrespective of their religion. Universities were to be established at Calcutta and Bombay, and perhaps at Madras as well, not indeed to teach, but to conduct examinations and award degrees; and the whole system of primary schools, secondary schools, and colleges was to be linked up by a series of scholarships, to enable persons of special talent to pursue studies from which they would otherwise be debarred by poverty. These orders were carried into execution. The various governments organised departments of public instruction to give effect to a scheme (as Dalhousie described it) "far wider and more comprehensive than the supreme or any local government could have ventured to suggest". But in practice the new policy proved to have inherited more of the emphasis on English studies and on higher education than the despatch itself would suggest. It stood, alongside of missionary effort, as the outstanding challenge of British influence to that old world into which the British had intruded.

The educational ideals thus adopted were purely secular and were in no wise designed as a direct attack upon Hinduism or Islam. They were indeed, as experience has shown, ill-calculated to promote the spread of Christianity. But there were certain social customs much interwoven with Hinduism which a western government could not easily or even honestly tolerate. After a great struggle the British had resolved in 1807 to abolish the slave-trade and in 1833 to emancipate all slaves in British territory. In 1833 when the company's privileges came again before Parliament for renewal, the Indian government was required to take measures for the suppression of slavery in India. To some extent

this direction had already been anticipated. In 1789 Cornwallis had forbidden the purchase of slaves for transport to other parts of India or elsewhere. In 1811 the importation of slaves into India had been prohibited. But the institution of slavery was a more difficult thing to abolish. It was an ancient custom for men to sell themselves and their families into slavery in time of famine in order to escape from starvation; and in many parts of India there were whole classes of labourers bound to the soil and in many ways resembling the serfs of medieval Europe. In 1832 the sale of a slave brought from one district to another had become an offence. In 1843 an act was passed directing the courts no longer to recognise the status of slavery. Under the Penal Code of 1860 all keeping of or trafficking in slaves became punishable at law. In practice the status of slavery long survived; and it was not really brought to an end until the spread of education and the improved position of the labourer at the close of the century gave reality to the pious enactment of 1843. The fact illustrates the extreme difficulty with which a closely organised and most conservative society can be modified by law unsupported by economic or moral pressure.

Slavery in India had generally been so different a thing from the slavery of the West Indies that the British government had not felt any great need of rapidly sweeping it away. Other prevalent customs met with less tolerance. There was a practice of casting children into the sea at Sāgar Island in accomplishment of a vow. This was prohibited by Wellesley in 1802. An allied custom was female infanticide as practised by the Rājputs. Jonathan Duncan, when resident at Benares, had discovered its existence among the Rāj Kumārs and had induced them to forswear it. Custom, however, proved stronger than promises. Although the practice had been declared to be murder, the Rāj Kumārs were killing their infant daughters as freely in 1816 as they had been in 1795. Walker, political agent in Kāthiāwār, discovered the practice among the Rājputs of western India, and obtained from some of them a covenant such as the Rāj Kumārs had given to Duncan, but with little more success. The method followed—of refusing to suckle the child—was most difficult of proof. Constant pressure was put on the Rājput tribes both within and without British India by district officials and political agents. But no coercive measures were taken until 1870, when an act was passed permitting rules

for the registration of births and verification of the survival of girls to be applied to such districts as seemed to require it.

The practice of burning the widow on her husband's pyre was one which had shocked all foreigners in India. It had been forbidden by the Muslims and by the Portuguese, though the prohibition by Muslim rulers had not been very rigorous or effective, and that by the Portuguese had been too limited in territorial scope to have any effect. While always barbarous in essence—perhaps the last relic of the massacres with which the obsequies of the kings of Ur were celebrated—individual cases varied greatly. If on the one side we have the widow who importuned Colonel Sleeman till at last she wrung from him a most reluctant assent, on the other we must set Rām Mohun Roy's sister-in-law—"an hysterical and unhappy sacrifice"—and the latter case appears to have been the more frequent of the two. Though stated to have been enjoined by a passage in the *Rig-Veda*, it had never been an integral part of Hinduism; and the earliest text cited in support of it has been proved to be a perversion of the original. But it was so closely associated with Hindu practices and so loudly applauded by popular opinion that British administrators long hesitated to interfere with it. Cornwallis in Bengal, Elphinstone in Bombay, would not assent to positive official suppression. It was, indeed, hoped that with the spread of British influence the custom would disappear. Various company's servants and the Serampore missionaries drew the attention of the Bengal government to its prevalence. Wellesley directed the chief criminal court, the *nizāmat 'adālat*, to report on the religious basis of the custom and the possibility of prohibiting it. The judges reported that it was permitted but not enjoined by the *shāstras*, and that it might be abolished in the districts where it was unusual and checked or prevented elsewhere. This report, dated in 1805, long lay unanswered. At last in 1812 the government ordered that all compulsion, intoxication or drugging of the victim should be prevented, and that sati should be allowed only where the case fell within the rules laid down by the *shāstras*. Further rules, intended to prevent the rite except when clearly within the accepted religious limits and requiring relatives to give notice of intended sati to the police, were issued in 1815 and 1817. In the circumstances it would perhaps have been better to do nothing than to issue rules which were interpreted as conveying at least a partial

approval. The number of reported *satit* rose considerably, especially in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, where English opinion might have been expected to exercise most influence, and it was believed by the chief judge of the *nizāmat* 'adālat that many women were burned without the knowledge of the police. In view of the unsatisfactory state of police organisation, it seems more likely that police subordinates were often bribed not to report cases that took place. Much criticism was directed against the government both by missionary bodies and by its own officials, who urged that the rules were authorising widows to be sacrificed by their husbands' families. It was a singular fact that more than half the reported cases occurred in five districts of Bengal. At last, in 1823, the court of directors was moved by the pressure of public opinion in England to suggest to Lord Amherst the desirability of further action. But nothing was done. Amherst himself was an irresolute man, and his councillors were averse from action which might raise the cry of "Religion in danger" and which in any case seemed inconsistent with Cornwallis's regulation declaring that Hindu and Muslim law should be upheld. But when Bentinck arrived as governor-general, he resolved to enquire into the question of total prohibition. He found official opinion sharply divided. Even Rām Mohun Roy, who had organised a counter-petition against one which had been presented complaining of the increased stringency of the rules, advised him to wait a while. But relying mainly on the unanimous opinion of the *nizāmat* 'adālat, Bentinck decided on immediate action, and in 1829 passed a regulation declaring the act to be illegal, abetment to be punishable as culpable homicide, and compulsion a capital offence. This was the most daring interference with religious and social customs undertaken by the company's government. A considerable group of Hindus appealed to the Privy Council in the hope of getting the regulation declared invalid. They claimed that it interfered with their most ancient and sacred rites, violated the conscientious beliefs of a whole nation, and infringed the promise to maintain the Hindu religion, laws and customs. But the appeal was emphatically rejected. In the Rājput states the practice continued for a while but vanished before the insistence of Dalhousie and the gradual spread of knowledge among Rājput ladies that it was no longer permitted in British India. In the Panjab it lasted till Dalhousie conquered and annexed the province.

Of much the same nature was the suppression of human sacrifices among the Khonds of the Ganjam and Orissa hills, since that also was a barbaric custom conducted under religious sanction. But in this case the religion was primitive, the custom followed by only a small group of tribes, and its suppression did not carry with it the possibilities of political danger which had made the government hesitate so long in the case of sati. In the course of suppressing a rebellion that had broken out among the disorderly hill zamindars of that area, British officers discovered that the primitive Khond tribes performed an annual sacrifice designed to ensure the fertility of their fields. They kept a class of victims termed *meriahs*, consisting either of unfortunate persons kidnapped from the plains and sold to the Khonds, or of the children of victims so acquired. A number of *meriahs* were chosen yearly and hacked to pieces, every cultivator seeking to obtain a shred of flesh to bury in his field. In 1841 a single tribe sacrificed 240 victims in this manner. The area concerned lay partly in the presidency of Bengal, partly in that of Madras. For some time difficulty was found in co-ordinating the efforts of the two governments; but in 1845 a special agency was constituted under the governor-general. A military officer, Colonel Campbell, who had already served in that part of the country, was appointed agent with special instructions to wean the Khonds from their unpleasant ways; and in the long run he induced the people to substitute buffaloes for human beings, and released a large number of *meriahs*.

In this same period the crime of thagi was suppressed. This offered perhaps the most remarkable example of organised crime on record. Every autumn at the *Dasara* festival, the auspicious time at which to commence a campaign, the thags would assemble in bands ranging from a dozen men to a large company, conduct their operations over a great tract of country, and return about the beginning of the next hot weather to their homes, where they usually followed some ostensible occupation. The gangs were elaborately organised. Some were chosen as spies to go ahead of the rest and find out travellers with property or goods of value. Others again were appointed to prepare graves for the selected victims near the place designed for their murder. The most expert were the men who strangled the victims with a handkerchief—only on the rarest occasions was any other instrument employed. The

thags plied their trade under the special protection of the Hindu goddess known variously as Bhowānni or Devi. At the commencement of each campaign propitiatory ceremonies were conducted and recruits initiated; and whenever a likely victim came under consideration the omens were carefully observed. If these were favourable, the traveller was regarded as delivered over by the goddess to death, and the thags believed that if he were not killed the goddess never again would be propitious. The customary process was for the band to fall in as it were by accident with parties of travellers selected by the spies; the place of murder would be chosen and grave-diggers sent on in advance; when nearing it the thags would distribute themselves so that a strangler would be posted beside each victim, and on the appointed signal all would be put to death. Within a few minutes the corpses would be buried. No witnesses would survive to tell the tale; no traces would remain on the road to betray to after-comers the tragedy that had occurred.

Such bands had existed in India for many centuries. As far as is known, no particular effort had ever been made to root them out, and they seem to have been regarded with resigned fatalism, like famine or cholera, to be feared, to be avoided, but not to be resisted. Their existence was well known to the company's governments years before any decided action was taken. The great difficulty was the question of evidence. Eye-witnesses were seldom to be found; and bankers who had lost money, and the relatives of victims, alike were reluctant to appear before distant courts which could restore to them neither their money nor their friends, but merely punish those popularly viewed as the instruments of God. Bentinck resolved to create a special agency for the suppression of thagi, to be placed under the management of Sleeman and other specially competent company's servants. Special courts were formed. Indian rulers like the Nizām and the king of Oudh were induced to waive their jurisdiction over men accused of thagi. Under promise of life a number of thags turned approvers. Their evidence was collated. Places where they said victims had been buried were examined. Thus a mass of evidence was collected, corroborated by statements taken locally from persons who had lost money or friends; and the bands were gradually broken up. Those against whom specific murders could be proved were hanged; the greater number, however, were



transported under a special act of 1836 which had made membership of a thag band a criminal offence.

The concluding part of the period exhibits no measures so striking as Bentinck's war upon sati and thagi, or his adoption of English as the basis of Indian education. But Dalhousie passed one act and introduced another which in principle went much further than the suppression of sati. Sati was not, and never had been more than a permissive rite. Strongly encouraged as it had been by vicious social influences, in itself it had ever been a work of supererogation. But the re-marriage of a widow was utterly prohibited by Hindu law. A bill declaring such re-marriages legal was introduced under Dalhousie in 1855 and passed into law by Canning in 1856. Hindu sentiment seems however to have been more deeply affected by an earlier piece of legislation. In 1832 a regulation had been passed by the Bengal legislature relieving persons who should change their religion from any consequent loss of property. This had been enacted under missionary influence. Missions had undoubtedly found their success impeded by the existence of the Hindu joint family system, under which ancestral property was owned in common by the family as a whole; and conversion to Christianity had entailed not only the social consequences of exclusion from the family circle but also the economic results of a forfeiture of all right to share in the family estate. In 1845 the Bishop of Bombay had complained that the Bengal regulation did not extend to Bombay; and in 1850 Dalhousie passed an act, valid for the whole of British India, directing the courts of law to cease to give effect to any laws or usages inflicting forfeiture of property or affecting rights of inheritance in the case of persons changing their religious faith or being deprived of their caste-rights. This act, like the regulation suppressing sati, produced considerable alarm among orthodox Hindus. Petitions were presented against it signed by 60,000 persons from Calcutta and its neighbourhood. Sixteen years earlier a retired covenanted servant, who had more than once occupied the chair of the Court of Directors, had lamented the rising enthusiasm for conversion which had "already done much to alienate the attachment of the people, to shake their confidence, and to produce uneasiness and alarm". Circumstances were to lend great support to his views. It is clear that the forty years following the overthrow of the Marāthas introduced many most disturbing influences. The

activity of missions, the evangelical spirit exhibited by many of the company's civil and military servants, educational activity, and the social reforms enforced with unexampled vigour, method and success upon an apathetic and reluctant people, of necessity carried with them a challenge to Hinduism none the less agitating because it was less direct than that which Aurangzib had given to the Hindu world. It was evident that the foreign government was no longer content, as it once had been, to leave affairs to follow their traditional course, that it was being driven forward by ideals and purposes unquestionable by the modern world but strange, dubious, and alarming in the eyes of a people belonging to the world of the past. Two things should be evident to us who can look back with the knowledge of what was to come. One is that the British government was by its nature, its ideas, its western outlook, bound to give a series of shocks to the world of Hinduism; the other, that the Hindu world was bound to react sharply and convulsively to these external impulses.

## CHAPTER XI

### The Company's Armies and the Indian Mutiny

In one sense the mutiny of the company's Bengal Army was an inevitable consequence of previous developments; in another it was a mere unlucky accident. It was inevitable because the old Indian world was certain to react against the influence of a more efficient, more interfering, and more systematic government than the country had ever known before, inspired alike by views of social and legal obligation and by conceptions of economic and political progress utterly different from those current among Indians. Until 1818 India had felt little but the political effects of European dominion. She had changed masters with no more concerted opposition than she had offered to the establishment of Muslim domination. The ryot or the Brāhman cared little whether he tilled his fields or performed his rites under the rule of Mīr Kāsim or of Clive; the merchant and the banker definitely preferred the stronger, more efficient rule of the East India Company, though unprepared to risk anything to effect a change. The soldier was more ready to serve the English than any other employer, for their pay was regular and certain, they respected his caste and religious prejudices, and, though they would never suffer him to rise to high rank, their military superiority had been attested on a score of battle-fields and their ascendancy was accepted as a thing of course. So long as the company's government continued to be merely an Indian power, and even when Cornwallis introduced his administrative reforms, this situation persisted. Foreign dominion was nothing to peoples with no consciousness of nationality. But from 1818 the position began to change. This new and strong government proved to be associated with active missionaries who challenged the very foundations of Hinduism and Islam. It interfered to prevent sati, to permit the re-marriage of widows, to save converts from losing their interest in family property. It ceased to take that active and paternal interest that it once had shown in the celebration of

festivals and the management of temple funds. It promoted a new type of education which made light of ancient learning. It began to build railways, in the carriages of which the Brāhman might find himself polluted by the touch of Pariahs. It constructed telegraph-lines which carried messages by magic. In what manner could a respectable Hindu consider this impingement of a new world upon his own which had remained unchanged so long? The answer is provided by a great variety of sources. The idea spread abroad that the whole country would soon be westernised and Christianised. At Bombay Parsis and Hindus were made to study Butler's *Analogy of Religion*. At Madras over-zealous missionaries taught Hindu boys to answer questions relating to the Christian faith in language which might have become a Christian but which sounded even to good Christians revolting when put into the mouths of orthodox Hindus. In Bihar the educational inspector's office was popularly known as the "Devil's Office"—the *Shaitani Daftar*. When it was resolved that prisoners might no longer carry their own water-vessels with them to gaol, this was taken to be the opening act of a general scheme to break all caste and convert the whole population to Christianity. Canning believed that "heads of families, and men of wealth and good position, are generally persuaded that their grandsons, if not their sons, will renounce their religion for Christianity". The belief spread from the populace to the sepoy. Before the outbreak of the Mutiny, Henry Lawrence had a long conversation with a Brāhman jamadar of excellent character belonging to the Oudh Artillery, and was quite unable to dissuade the man from believing that the government had been seeking for the previous ten years to break down the system of caste. These ideas were manifestly false; but the importance of a belief has no relation whatever to its truth. Such notions, false as they were, spread alarm, anxiety and distrust through large masses of the population.

Political affairs added to the general disquietude. The Afghan war had doubtless ended with a triumphant vindication of British arms. But the success of Nott and Pollock was far from having obliterated memories of the disaster at Kābul, the massacre of sepoy and Briton alike, and the bondage into which the sepoys' wives and families had fallen. The great strength of the Indian government had lain in opinion—the opinion of its invincibility. That had been rudely shaken. The conduct of more than one

sepooy regiment in the Sikh wars suggests that it had not been restored. Then came the wars with Russia in 1854 and with Persia in 1856. The latter was unwelcome to the Muslims in India—even to the Sunnis, for the progressive decline of Islam was already inclining the Muslims to close their ranks and forget even the bitterest sectarian differences. The Russian war produced serious evidence of unrest. The general Indian belief, Dalhousie declared, was that Great Britain would be beaten. He found an uneasy feeling abroad, partly alarm, partly indefinite expectation. A rumour suddenly spread through Calcutta that a Russian fleet had reached the Sandheads; the bazaars closed; and men began to bury their money and jewels for safety.

All this was eagerly canvassed and exaggerated by certain sections of Muhammadans. The Wahhabīs, who had their centre at Patna, had ever been an element of disquiet, in communication with fanatical groups on the North-West Frontier, at Swāt and Sitāna. Besides that they had sent preachers into many parts of India, especially the south, where they had provoked sedition at Hyderabad, inveigled the Nawab of Kurnool into the enterprise which cost him first his country and then his life, and preached rebellion at Vellore, the scene of a former bloody, though localised, mutiny in 1809. Even apart from them, the more zealous Muslims had marvelled how Shāh Shujā' could accept infidel help for the recovery of his kingdom of Afghanistan, and about 1852 a ballad had been secretly printed at Calcutta exhorting the faithful to rise and overthrow the infidel government. In 1855 the celebration of Muharram at Hyderabad had been marked by a disquieting incident, in which the resident had been attacked and wounded—it was thought, with the purpose of embroiling the Nizām with the British government. And while the Muslim population included these explosive elements, there were Muslim centres which might at any time serve as detonators. Of these Delhi was the principal. Its imperial traditions, though dimmed, were still unbroken, owing to the facility with which the company's government had suffered the forms of imperial authority to continue; while the recent decision of Canning's government to discontinue the recognition of the imperial family made Delhi abnormally sensitive. As Napier had written in 1850, "The Delhi king within the palace is a mere effigy; yet he forms a moral rallying point, round which gather the dreams of dis-

contented princes, feeding upon prophecies. Such prophecies and traditions as those about Delhi oftentimes work out their own fulfilment”.

Besides the descendant of Tīmūr surviving in mock majesty within the Fort at Delhi, there was yet another discontented inheritor of fallen imperial traditions. The Chitpāvan Brāhmans who had borne the title of Pēshwā had in the middle of the eighteenth century almost laid their hands upon the empire of India. They had failed, partly by reason of the strength and vigour of Afghan invaders, partly because they could not retain the loyal obedience of their own lieutenants like Sindhia and Holkar, partly because they had sunk before the waxing power of the East India Company. When the last Pēshwā, Bāji Rāo II, had died a pensioner of the company, Dalhousie resolved that his pension should die with him. In this there was no great injustice. Bāji Rāo had died son-less. His adopted son, Nāna Sāhib, was suffered to inherit Bāji Rāo's savings and estates. He was wealthy, and gave no hint of his discontent, living in friendly intercourse with the British officials. But he was an active, ambitious man, who dreamed if occasion ever served of reviving Brāhman rule. We may suppose him keenly alive to the alarm produced among orthodox Brāhmans by the company's new social and educational policy, and he may well have played a part in propagating and spreading that alarm.

Lastly there was the newly annexed province of Oudh. Probably few cared much for the fate of the deposed king. He and his family had done little for fifty years and more to earn the respect or affection of either his countrymen or his co-religionists. Orthodox sympathy had been alienated by the imitation of foreign ways which had long prevailed in the palace of Lucknow, and his royal title was derided as a sham, made evident by the forms of respect still shown to the company's resident. But the annexation had been grievously mismanaged. Oudh had become a country of great talukdars who corresponded in theoretical position with the great zamindars of Bengal, but who were practically much stronger, for they could command the services of a warlike and turbulent peasantry. Under the king they had lived in a state of perennial rebellion. They had their mud forts and armed retainers, and had been accustomed to defy the government. Dalhousie had resolved that, like the Panjab, the

province should be disarmed and the forts rendered untenable. But Canning not only disregarded this decision but also gave the talukdars the most serious reasons for discontent. The first land-revenue settlement was made with the definite intention of restoring the old village communities, strong there as in the neighbouring province of Āgra, to a position of independence wherever there was reasonable ground for considering them entitled to it. The result was that many talukdari estates were materially cut down. The natural leaders of the people were thus provided with a good excuse for resentment and left in possession of the means to make their resentment felt.

Incidentally the annexation of Oudh affected the sepoy of the Bengal Army, largely recruited from that region. This was not because the sepoy felt special sympathy with the king or grievances against the revenue settlement. But annexation deprived them of the privileged position which till then they had enjoyed. In the past whenever the family of a sepoy had had a complaint to make against the king's government, the complaint had been laid by the sepoy before his commanding officer, who communicated it to the government of Calcutta, who instructed the resident at Lucknow to make enquiries, with the result that sepoys' families had found justice more easily than any other subjects of the king. But annexation reduced the sepoy and their families to the same level as other persons, and was therefore resented by them.

Thus in 1857 India was afflicted by a considerable number of causes all making for unrest and uncertainty: schools and mission-houses, the maintenance or disgrace of undesired widows, family bitterness over conversions followed by an enforced partition of the family property, Muslim discontent, the Oudh talukdars' bitterness—none of these by itself of great moment, none likely to produce more than a sporadic movement, but collectively making up a situation full of alarming possibilities. Yet any rebellion among the civil population was most unlikely, despite Muslim sermons, or the talk of Hindu agents, for there was no organisation, and no possibility of organisation in a land so seamed by age-old divisions of race and creed and caste. But the organised body lacking in civil life existed in the military sphere. In what circumstances was this body likely to catch the infection of popular feeling and turn against the government which had

created it? Thomas Munro a generation earlier had, with rare insight, pondered on this problem and had reached a conclusion which circumstances were to prove unhappily correct. "The spirit of independence", he wrote, "will spring up in this army long before it is ever thought of among the people." And again: "All that is necessary is that they [the sepoys] shall have lost their present high respect for their officers and the European character; and whenever this happens they will rise against us, not for the sake of asserting the liberty of their country, but of obtaining power and plunder".

The history of the company's sepoy forces was long and honourable. The earliest English forts had been garrisoned by small bodies of European troops. But the struggle which Dupleix had precipitated produced a swiftly growing need of men. European battalions were supplemented therefore by bodies of Indian troops. The credit of this has falsely been ascribed to Dupleix. But both Portuguese and Dutch had freely entertained large numbers of sepoys. Dupleix did no more than they had done. He enlisted companies of men under their own leaders. The English at Madras did the same. But they soon introduced a change which no one else had thought of making. They began to provide these auxiliaries with European drill-sergeants; they then went on to organise them into battalions on the European model; and completed their work by providing the battalions with English officers. Under this new discipline the sepoys in the English service acquired a facility and steadiness of manoeuvre which Indian troops had never before displayed. Under this new leadership they developed a new cohesion and confidence. French observers noted with dismay that the English sepoys would face French regiments while the French sepoys would not even face English sepoys. The latter thus became by far the most efficient body of Indian troops in the country, and, as war after war proved, in conjunction with the European troops were far more than a match for Mysorean, Marātha, or Sikh.

The company's forces were organised in three presidency armies, each under its separate commander-in-chief. In 1824, when they underwent re-organisation, the Bengal army included sixty-eight sepoy infantry regiments, the Madras army fifty-two, and the Bombay army twenty-four. Besides these, there were thirteen native cavalry regiments in Bengal, eight at Madras, and



six at Bombay, with considerable bodies of native artillery as well. In normal times these forces were balanced by European troops in the usual proportion of one to three. The latter consisted partly of company's troops, partly of queen's regiments. But the exigencies of the Crimean War had led to the reduction of the latter. Dalhousie was most indignant. Ministers justified the recall of troops from India by quoting his assertion that India was tranquil. "So it will be," he commented, "if we are left strong. But if we are weakened, India cannot be warranted to continue either tranquil or secure." Despite his protests three regiments were recalled in 1854, and in 1857 still had never been replaced, and the proportion of European troops had thus fallen to less than one in six. Owing to the concentration of over a quarter of these troops in and about the Panjab, the strength of the European element elsewhere was much less even than one in six. If therefore the sepoy forces were disposed to mutiny, the years 1854-7 presented to them an opportunity of exceptional advantage.

Moreover, sepoy discipline had been decaying for at least a generation, especially in the Bengal army. Several causes had been operating to produce this effect. The growing centralisation of control had deprived commanding officers of much power. They were no longer competent to redress grievances or reward merit; and their influence with their men therefore declined. But what was much worse than this was the decay in the average quality of the officers, European and sepoy alike. Promotion by seniority produced commanding officers of long experience but little talent, exhausted by a long term of service. "Commanding officers are inefficient", wrote Dalhousie in 1851; "brigadiers are no better; divisional officers are worse than either because older and more done; and at the top of all they send commanders-in-chief seventy years old." Lord Roberts's father was appointed to command a division on the frontier; the authorities prided themselves on the youth and activity of their choice; General Roberts was at that time a mere sixty-nine years of age. But this was not all. Long-standing regulations permitted an officer to spend long periods of time in staff-employment and then to rejoin his regiment with a rank determined by his total service, not by his regimental experience. A man might serve twenty years in the Pay or Stud Department, and then, when he was a lieutenant-colonel, be appointed to command a regiment. The demands of

the civil administration too had been severe and exhausting. In every government that Dalhousie organised, Nāgpur, Burma, the Panjab, he was bent on securing the finest personnel within his reach. Men were sought out who possessed special knowledge of Indian languages and customs, who cherished special sympathy with Indian peoples. Many such were found serving in the company's armies. Outram, Havelock, Henry Lawrence, John Nicholson, to name but a few, were withdrawn from military to political or administrative service. The result was that of a nominal establishment of twenty-five officers to a sepoy regiment, few units had more than a dozen actually serving. Nor were the consequences limited to a mere question of numbers. The system unhappily weeded out many of those best fitted to command the respect and affection of their men. This evil fell especially upon the Bengal Army, for its officers were in a special manner under the governor-general's eye and specially liable to selection.

The quality of sepoy officers in the Bengal Army was affected by the severity of the Bengal promotion rules. At Bombay and Madras selection by seniority was tempered by selection on merit. In Bengal the strict rule was regularly applied. The sepoy officers were automatically chosen, not from the gallantest, the most enterprising, the most intelligent, but from the longest-lived. In Bengal therefore the sepoy officers were not the natural leaders of the men; gallantry in action could hardly win for a private non-commissioned rank; the subadars of companies were usually aged, toothless, and incapable of keeping up with the troops on the march. As Outram declared before the outbreak of the Mutiny, they possessed no control over their men and owed gratitude for their promotion neither to their officers, nor to the government, but only to their own longevity.

Another influence making for laxity of discipline in the Bengal Army in particular lay in its comparatively high-caste character. In Bombay and Madras recruits were drawn from a great diversity of castes and peoples. In Bengal the predominant element consisted of Brāhmans and Rājputs from Oudh. The regiments were honey-combed with family groups; and classes which in the eighteenth century had been willing to ignore caste-scruples had come to be pertinacious in putting forward caste as a reason for avoiding unpopular duty.

While the bonds of discipline had thus loosened, causes of

discontent, both just and unjust, were operating. The recent expansion of the empire had widened the sphere of garrison-duty, increased the distances to which the sepoy could be sent from home, and diminished the possible enemies against whom he might be sent to fight. While his service was becoming more irksome, his importance was diminishing. Small matters like the new post-office rules affected him. In the old days his letters had passed under the frank of his commanding officer; this privilege disappeared with the reorganisation of the post-office. More important still in the sepoy's eyes was the general enlistment oath. Until Canning's time sepoys on recruitment had been sworn to service anywhere within the presidency of their enlistment. This led to various difficulties and Canning decided that in future recruits should be sworn to serve wherever needed. This change was most distasteful. It not only kept many out of the service, and so created dissatisfaction among families accustomed to rely on the company's armies for the employment of their sons, but it also alarmed the whole body of sepoys already serving, for they feared that the new conditions would apply to themselves as well as to the men who had taken the new oath.

Thus it happened that while anxiety pervaded many most influential classes of the people, the Bengal Army had for years stood on the brink of mutiny. Neville Chamberlain, one of the ablest of the company's officers, declared that the sepoys were becoming worse than useless. Between 1844 and 1856 no less than four times had large bodies of Bengal sepoys refused to obey orders. These outbreaks were smoothed over rather than suppressed. The evil continued. The time had come which Munro had foretold, and Dalhousie had feared, when the professional Indian soldier was no longer dominated by the European element. Any spark might produce an explosion.

Chance produced the necessary combination of circumstances. Excited minds dwelt upon the old prophecy that the company's rule would end in bloodshed and tumult a hundred years after the battle of Plassey. A Hindu almanack for the *Samwat* year, of strangely ill-omened number, 1914, reproduced and emphasised it. Throughout northern India the prevalent agitation was indicated by the mysterious passing from village to village of flat, unleavened cakes known as *chupattis*. The village watchman would receive one from a neighbouring village with a message

directing him to prepare five more and send them on with like messages. No explanation of this has ever been discovered; but it both occasioned and displayed great alarm in the native mind. At the same time the sepoy were convulsed over the cartridge question.

The company's troops were being re-armed with the Enfield rifle in place of the old smooth-bore musket. The new weapon required a much closer fit of cartridge and ball to the barrel than the old one had done; and consequently the new cartridges needed to be heavily greased to permit their being rammed down the barrel; and sepoy were being sent in parties to camps of exercise where they were taught the new drill. The cartridges issued to the Bengal Army were prepared at the arsenal at Dum-Dum. One day in January, 1857, a low-caste lascar employed there demanded the use of his water-vessel from a high-caste sepoy. The latter refused with disgust. The lascar then taunted him with being already defiled by cartridges, which, he declared, were greased with the fat of the sacred cow. The incident has all the appearance of having been deliberately planned. The story ran through the army like wild-fire. A new version, that the grease contained pig's fat, was used to excite the Muslim sepoy; men began to refuse to touch the cartridges; and the wild belief spread abroad that government had laid a deep plot to destroy Islam and Hinduism at once. Disorder followed. Huts were fired. The adjutant of the 34th Native Infantry was cut down while the quarter-guard looked on. The mutinous sepoy and the officer commanding the quarter-guard were tried and hanged. At Meerut eighty-five men of the 3rd Native Infantry were condemned to a long term of imprisonment for refusing to accept the cartridges. A punishment parade was held on May 9. One by one the delinquents were stripped of their uniforms, fettered, and marched off to prison, where they lay under a sepoy guard. The next evening a regiment of native cavalry broke into open mutiny. It dashed off to the jail, released the prisoners, and was joined by two battalions of native infantry. European officers were cut down, houses fired, bazaars looted, and the sepoy in confusion and alarm marched off along the Delhi road. In the knowledge of what was to follow, critics have usually demanded why the general officer commanding at Meerut did not instantly gather together the European troops—a regiment of dragoons, the 60th Rifles, and a strong body of horse

and foot artillery—and pursue the mutineers. The general was undoubtedly unfit. He had in 1855 been transferred from Peshāwar as being too inactive. But no one knew whither the mutineers had gone or what might next happen. There were many scattered European women to be protected. The general therefore chose what seemed the safest course—he stood on the defensive and did nothing. It is but fair to add that Lord Roberts believed that pursuit could have secured no good effect.

The story of the cartridges that precipitated the general unrest into open mutiny is probably a fable with the slenderest possible foundation in fact. Animal fat had doubtless been used at Woolwich, where the earliest Enfield cartridges were made up. But those issued to the sepoy troops had all been prepared at Dum-dum, where Brāhman workmen had handled the fat without question. As soon as difficulties emerged, strict orders were given that nothing but mutton-fat and wax were to be used. At some stations in the hope of smoothing matters over the men were ordered to grease the cartridges themselves, so that they should have no possible pretext for suspecting the materials used. But in the excitement of the time these measures had small effect, and as often as not were interpreted as showing that the original story had been true. The more active minds behind the whole movement no doubt perceived that the new cartridges provided a good rallying cry on which to raise the whole sepoy army; and had not the Enfield rifle been introduced, some other incident would have been employed to give the necessary stimulus. As Dinkar Rāo observed later, the cartridges provided merely the occasion of the mutiny. The real cause lay in popular discontent, reflected in the army.

Munro had not been alone in anticipating that one day the sepoy forces would break into revolt. Some ten years earlier, in an article on the tragedy of Kābul, Henry Lawrence had asked whether any of the more important military stations in India was better prepared than Kābul had been against a sudden up-rising. The position at Delhi, he thought, was closely similar to that at the Afghan capital. Suppose, he wrote, three hundred men seized the Delhi magazine and treasury; that the troops in the cantonments merely strengthened the guard in the palace; that the palace commandant (like Colonel Skelton at Kābul) merely opened fire from the walls; and that this befell on June 2. In a day

the rebels would swell into thousands, plough-shares would be beaten into swords; and the leader of any force that could be sent against the enemy would have to strike for very existence, at the most inclement season of the year. But suppose too, he continued, that the commandants of the neighbouring stations hesitated to spare troops and that movements were hindered by a lack of transport, "should we not have to strike anew for our Indian empire?" But while men like Lawrence and Dalhousie were certainly alive to the general possibilities of danger, no one seems to have perceived the ferocity and extent of the coming storm, until it was close at hand. Even in March, 1856, Lawrence himself does not seem to have thought that within fifteen months his guesses were to be fulfilled to the letter. Both the government and the high command believed that they had time in which gradually to carry out the reform of distribution, the development of railways, the removal of abuses, with nothing worse to fear than such local troubles as had already been met and reduced.


Consequently government was ill-prepared to suppress the mutiny on its first outbreak. The withdrawal of European troops for the Crimean War had never been made good, for the home authorities had first ignored and then forgotten Dalhousie's remonstrances. Of the European troops attached to the Bengal Army, most were concentrated on the frontier or in the Panjab. The valley of the Ganges was almost bare of them. None were at Allāhābād, a magazine and strategic centre of great importance, for it commanded the route from Calcutta up the Ganges valley. None were at Delhi, another great magazine, which had been the base of the troops operating in the Sikh wars. The arsenal stood within the city walls, and had long been regarded as unsatisfactory. Lord Gough in particular had urged the importance of its removal. Dalhousie had hoped to be able to deal with this question. His agreement with the emperor's heir for the transfer of the royal family from the fortress-palace to a new building near the Kutb, would have placed the fort in British hands and permitted the transfer of the arsenal from the city to the fort. Military opinion was agreed on the soundness of this plan. But the death of the Mughal's heir endangered the proposal. As a temporary measure Dalhousie reduced the arsenal from a first-class to a second-class magazine; but it still contained some 300 pieces of ordnance and a vast amount of percussion-caps, while the chief powder-

magazine, though lying in the cantonments outside the city walls, remained under the guard of sepoy troops alone. At Allāhābād likewise the arsenal in the fort was protected only by a few European invalids. Outram, just before the Persian war, had urged on Canning the need of a British garrison; but nothing had been done. In fact the one precautionary measure of any value which had been taken was the recent treaty with Dost Muhammad of Kābul. So far as this was observed, no danger was to be feared on the north-west frontier. But, in the event of serious trouble arising in India itself, the troops in the Panjab could not be transferred elsewhere, until it was clear that the amir intended to abide by his agreement.

The difficulties of the position were for the moment enhanced by the character of the governor-general. Canning possessed many noble qualities. He was just, clear-minded, and resolute once he had adopted a course of action. But he was not the man to face a crisis, because he could not swiftly decide on any course of action. He saw all the sides of a complicated question, and could not without long delay determine what was, and what was not, essential. Dalhousie would have acted strongly and decisively the moment he judged a serious movement impending. Canning feared to precipitate a mutiny by preparing to crush it. He hoped to coax the sepoys back to discipline, at a time when coaxing was too late.

The morning after the outbreak at Meerut, the fugitive cavalry reached Delhi, and were admitted into the palace. Late the night before a messenger had arrived from Meerut with news of what had happened. The letter had been safely delivered to the commissioner, Simon Fraser. But, heavy with sleep, he had taken it from the servant's hand, mechanically put it into his pocket, and fallen asleep again. The mutinous cavalry were therefore their own heralds. They were soon followed by the infantry regiments. The sepoys in the cantonments joined the mutineers. The jail was thrown open. The arsenal in the city was attacked; and though the small magazine which it contained was blown up by its defenders the great magazine outside was plundered, part of its contents being carried off by marauders, the remainder being brought into the city. The troops declared allegiance to the emperor. His sons endeavoured to assume command of a movement which they hoped would lead to the restoration of Mughal

SKETCH MAP  
ILLUSTRATING  
THE MUTINY OF THE  
BENGAL ARMY





government; and such Europeans as failed to escape at the outset were shot or cut to pieces in the streets, or else herded into the palace where they were speedily put to death. This massacre at Delhi gave the tone to the pitiless struggle which was to come. It meant that there could be no peace until one side or the other, the British in India or the mutineers and those who joined them, had been exterminated.

The news of the revolt at Delhi had been forwarded to Lahore by two telegraphists just before they had been forced to flee for their lives. But it was not until two days later, on May 13, that Canning learnt of the catastrophe. He at once empowered John Lawrence at Lahore and Henry Lawrence at Lucknow to take such measures as they thought best. But elsewhere nothing was done. No transport was ready, no stores collected; the English troops at Ambāla were detained by the presence of suspected sepoy regiments which the commander-in-chief hesitated to disarm. A force was at last assembled at Karnāl; the commander-in-chief died of cholera; on June 8, no less than four weeks after the outbreak, a force composed of the Karnāl troops, the Rifles from Meerut, and a Gurkha battalion, drove in the mutineers' outposts and camped on the Ridge looking down from the northward over Delhi.

The royal family had beyond doubt hoped for and encouraged the spirit of revolt. Before the end of April one of the princes had dismissed the European groom employed to exercise his horses, with a message that ere many days had passed every English infidel should be put to the sword. On the arrival of the mutineers various princes assumed command of the several regiments. But they spoke only the corrupt Persian used in their phantom court, and could not communicate with their men except through an interpreter. Their command, like the authority of the aged king, Bahādur Shāh, proved a mere thing of words. The day after the arrival of the Meerut mutineers, a high-sounding proclamation was issued in the king's name, directing his ever-victorious armies to advance and destroy his enemies. Bahādur was carried in triumphal procession through the city. But the same day witnessed a scene betraying the emptiness of all these solemn pretensions. The sepoys crowded on the king in his durbar, shouting at him, seizing his hand or touching his beard to attract his attention. At last he was permitted to withdraw,

shocked, alarmed, and lamenting the evil days which had come upon him. A week later the mutineers declared the king to be too old and infirm, and chose one of his sons in his stead. Presently they tired of the prince and recognised his father once more. But what authority existed lay with a *junto* of sepoy officers constantly split by jealousy and mistrust. Nor was the imperial city much happier than the imperial court under its new masters. The men were demanding pay. On May 21 the palace was crowded by a howling mob, whose attitude was so threatening that the bankers raised a lakh of rupees to satisfy them. Long before the siege was over, the wealthier citizens had gone into hiding to escape the contributions constantly demanded under threats of plunder. The Muslims hoisted the standard of the *jihād* on the Jama Masjid; the Hindus complained and insisted on its being pulled down. Communal feeling became so strained that, when Bakr'Id approached, the death-penalty was proclaimed against any man who should sacrifice a cow.

The appearance of the English force before Delhi produced wild confusion in the city. Fugitives came pouring in through the Kashmīr, Lahore, and Kābul gates, and, could the English troops have advanced at once, they would have found the gates open, and the mutineers in panic. But the men were exhausted and the risk appeared too great. The walls were no longer the thin, ruinous, mud-patched defences which the English had found in 1803, but had been repaired with stone by English engineers. On the following day an attack was proposed; but the plan was rejected as desperate, probably with good reason. The assailants therefore fortified themselves upon the Ridge and there remained for some three months. The mutineers then recovered their courage. The English were constantly harassed by attacks, a prey to cholera and sunstroke, incapable of doing more than hold their ground.

The delay in recovering Delhi was in all respects disastrous. Every day that passed increased the strain upon the sepoy troops that had not yet joined the mutiny. Messengers from the revolted regiments were constantly beseeching them to join their brethren or taunting them with cowardice for their delay. Knowledge of the distrust with which they were regarded by the British authorities set a keener edge on their uneasiness, while the position at Delhi suggested to wavering minds that the prophecy of the

company's fall was about to be fulfilled. So regiment after regiment broke, until the sepoy portion of the Bengal Army had almost wholly vanished. During the fatal four weeks that dragged so slowly out between the mutiny at Meerut and the occupation of the Delhi Ridge other mutinies occurred at Firūzpur, at Aligarh, at Nasirābād, at Āgra, at Lucknow, at Bareilly, at Allāhābād and Benares, at Nīmach, at Jhānsi, at Cawnpore. As June and July passed with Delhi still unsubdued, sepoys had to be disarmed at Multān and Barrackpore; Sindhia's and Holkar's contingents mutinied at Gwalior and Indore; and the troops at Fatehgarh, at Mhow, at Sagar, at Sialkot, at Dinapur, broke from their allegiance. Preparations for a strong mobile force at the end of April, when the position was known to be full of danger, and swift action on the first outbreak, would have prevented many, if not all of these disasters. For there was no common and agreed plan throughout the army. Schemers had no doubt done all they could to produce a universal revolt; but the regiments broke piece-meal, and many might have been saved. Even as it was, some units were held fast by the resolute wisdom of their commanders, some by the unwavering spirit of the men themselves. The 47th Native Infantry, for instance, posted at Mīrzāpur, was kept with its colours by Lieutenant-Colonel Pott, who ward off attempt after attempt and at last persuaded his men to volunteer in a body for service in China; while a large body of the 13th at Lucknow joined with a devotion far beyond all praise in the defence of the Residency, and, when their commander Major Bruere was killed, carried his body to the grave regardless of pollution. But such fidelity could be secured only by men of strong, commanding character. A striking contrast is afforded by other regiments whose steadiness was regarded by their officers with the fullest confidence. In some cases the men mutinied and killed their officers; in others they were only prevented by being disarmed, and in at least one instance the colonel shot himself for grief and shame. Such blind trust is the poorest possible substitute for discernment.

The only bright feature of the situation consisted in the fact that the mutinies were almost wholly limited to the Bengal Army and concentrated in northern and central India. The Madras population, less emotional than their northern brethren, remained quiet; and the discipline of the Madras Army held good. Muslim

agitators brought about a riot at Hyderabad, but the attack which the rioters made on the Residency was easily beaten off, and, under the influence of the rising statesman, Sālar Jang, the power of the Nizām's government was used vigorously to prevent any repetition of the event. The Madras Army was thus able to spare a considerable proportion of its European troops, who reached the valley of the Ganges under the command of Neill early in June. In Bombay the situation was more unsettled. Many land-owners in the Marātha country had been aggrieved by investigations into the validity of their exemption from the payment of land-revenue. Marātha sentiment was strong, and sympathised naturally with the efforts of Nāna Sāhib to revive Marātha power. His emissaries brought about a local rising; and a mutiny occurred at Kolhapur. But these movements were speedily suppressed. The Bombay sepoy, though restive, were kept under control. Sind, under the government which Napier had set up and at this time in the able hands of Bartle Frere, remained notably quiet, and spared troops for service elsewhere. After a while the Bombay government was able to organise the column which under Sir Hugh Rose restored British supremacy in Central India.

In Bengal and Bihar the situation suffered from the ill-grounded optimism or unwise hesitation of Canning. He refused the offers of volunteers, made immediately on the outbreak at Meerut, because he fancied that the evil had been checked. He refused at first to disarm the sepoy at Barrackpore, although he distrusted them with good reason and kept to watch them two European regiments whose services were most urgently required elsewhere. At last on June 14 the Barrackpore sepoy were disarmed. But the spirit of unjustified confidence still prevailed. Though Patna was the headquarters of the Wahhabī sect, well known to have been active in intrigue in many parts of India, Halliday, the lieutenant-governor, objected to the precautions which Tayler, the commissioner, wished to take and ridiculed the possibility of a mutiny at the neighbouring station of Dinapur. Tayler on his own responsibility arrested three leading Wahhabī moulvis, and suppressed a riot which broke out on July 3. On the 25th half-hearted measures at Dinapur produced the expected mutiny, and the sepoy marched off to join a Rājput zamindar, Kunwar Singh, who had risen in rebellion. They attacked Arrah, the headquarters of the most troubled district in the Patna division; but were kept

at bay until Major Vincent Eyre scattered them on his way to Allāhābād, with the help of a small body of troops of which he assumed the command. Apart from this episode, the discredit of which must lie mainly on the lieutenant-governor, the province remained undisturbed.

At Āgra too the conduct of affairs was marked by unfortunate indecision. The lieutenant-governor, John Colvin, a sound administrator in untroubled times, was swayed alternately by hope and fear. First he proposed to take refuge in the fort. Then he persuaded himself that no real danger threatened, and would not disarm the sepoys at Āgra till May 31. The result of this inaction was the mutiny of every sepoy regiment in the Rohilkhand, where a Muslim pensioner, Khān Bahādur, proclaimed himself viceroy of the king of Delhi.

The situation in the Panjab was at once more dangerous and better managed. The recent conquest of the country, the possibility that the Sikhs would use the crisis to recover their independence, the neighbourhood of Afghanistan and the uncertain attitude of the frontier tribes, demanded the utmost vigilance. Luckily the telegraph line was broken, for the provincial government was composed of Dalhousie's picked men. John Lawrence was at its head. Under him were Robert Montgomery as judicial commissioner, and Herbert Edwardes, commissioner at Peshāwar. At the moment when the news of the revolt at Delhi reached Lahore, Lawrence was absent on leave. But Montgomery instantly took action. On May 13 the four sepoy regiments at Miān-mīr were disarmed. At Firūzpūr the brigadier imitated the hesitation of the commander at Dinapur, with the result that a regiment mutinied the day before it was to have been disarmed. But even there the magazine was secured. At Peshāwar Herbert Edwardes, on John Nicholson's advice, had instantly ordered the formation of a movable column, to be ready to march wherever danger might appear. The sepoy troops outnumbered the British by almost three to one. The closest watch was kept. Intercepted letters proved communications with the Hindustani fanatics of Sitāna, and on the night of May 21/22 news came that the 55th Native Infantry at Nowshera had mutinied. Next morning four regiments at Peshāwar were paraded and disarmed. On the 23rd Nicholson led a party to disarm the remaining companies of the 55th at Mardān. They fled at his approach, were pursued into the hills,

wandered miserably and precariously there for a while, and at last those who had not surrendered themselves as slaves to the tribesmen surrendered to the British. Such vigorous action was reinforced by the enlistment of local levies. At first the Peshāwar chiefs had refused their aid, telling Edwardes bluntly that he must show them that he was the stronger. But after the events just noted, no further reluctance was shown. In the following month at Multān two sepoy regiments were disarmed by some Panjabi cavalry and infantry backed by a troop of Native Horse Artillery. It was clear that Panjabis, whether Sikh or Muslim, felt not the least sympathy with the *Purbiyyas*, the Easterners, as they called the sepoys of the eastern provinces.

Thus in northern India, while the central government was unprepared and irresolute, and the provincial governments of Bengal and Āgra were hampered by the consequences of their own indecision, the Panjab alone could strengthen the scanty and inadequate force which was all the governor-general and commander-in-chief had been able to assemble for the recovery of Delhi. In this task Lawrence was greatly aided by the attitude of the Cis-Sutlej chiefs. From the very first, under the leadership of Patiala, they never hesitated but offered all their resources for the suppression of the mutiny. This did much to clear the road. The Guides who marched from Mardān under Daly as soon as the revolt at Delhi was announced, covered twenty-seven miles a day for three weeks, arrived on the Ridge only a day after the Karnāl troops, and engaged the mutineers within three hours of their arrival. As soon as the crisis in the Panjab began to ease, Lawrence prepared to follow them up with large bodies of additional troops—British and Panjabi. Thirteen battalions of infantry, four regiments of horse, 8000 auxiliaries supplied by local chiefs, stores of all kinds, and the siege-train that at last broke down the defences of the city, all came from the Panjab. At one moment Lawrence had judged the position so desperate that he had proposed to facilitate the despatch of reinforcements by abandoning Peshāwar to the Afghans. But this proposal, which Edwardes judged to be a disastrous confession of weakness, was rejected by Canning on Edwardes's vigorous remonstrance, and Lawrence was thus saved from the one serious error into which he had been in danger of falling.

Meanwhile at Delhi the British troops had maintained and

even strengthened their position on the Ridge, despite the constant attacks of the mutineers. The city formed a natural focus, and band after band of sepoys marched thither as the mutiny spread from unit to unit and from station to station. Their practice was to move out to engage the British immediately after their arrival. Within six weeks more than twenty assaults were delivered against the Ridge. These were steadily repulsed, but by the end of July the recovery of the city appeared as remote as ever, and even the Panjab was beginning to waver in its belief in the ultimate victory of the English. Early in September, however, the siege-train under the escort of Nicholson with the Panjab movable column arrived. The mutineers still outnumbered their assailants by about two to one, but an assault was planned. Breaching batteries were opened on the bastions and curtain of the northern wall. On September 14 the storming columns were assembled, a party of most gallant men blew in the Kashmīr Gate, and that day a lodgement was made in the city with the loss of about a quarter of the assailants. After some five days of bloody street-fighting, the mutineers were completely driven out, the fort captured, the emperor and four of his sons made prisoner at the Tomb of Humāyūn, and the latter shot by their captor, Major Hodson. The greatest British loss was the death of John Nicholson, who had commanded one of the columns of assault. Before the mutiny he had proved himself a most vigilant, fearless and successful frontier administrator. On its outbreak he had played a leading part among John Lawrence's lieutenants in maintaining order in the Panjab. As resolute and swift in action as Clive, he had, what Clive had not, the stern Hebraic piety of a seventeenth-century Puritan, and knew that to him the victory would be given. Men followed and obeyed him without question. He was beyond doubt the most heroic of a group of men all distinguished by their endurance, courage and resource.

The recovery of Delhi in September, 1857, was the turning-point of the mutiny. When the news reached Peshāwar, the townsmen thronged Edwardes's house with congratulations. The merchants apologised for their late reluctance to raise a loan of five lakhs, and government bonds which had been selling at 25 per cent. discount rose rapidly. But the four months' delay in its recovery had been dearly paid for by the course of events at Lucknow, Benares and Cawnpore. At Lucknow Henry Law-

rence had done all in his power to conciliate the chief people of the province; but, since he could not undo the revenue settlement, the talukdars still had a material grievance to nurse. He had already decided to defend the Residency, should affairs compel him to stand on the defensive. On May 25 he warned the women and children to take refuge there. On the 30th mutiny broke out in the cantonments, followed by riots in the city. But over 500 sepoy refused to follow their comrades, and played a great part in the subsequent struggle. Besides these, Lawrence had one queen's regiment—the 32nd Foot. The mutiny at Lucknow was followed during the next few days by mutinies at every other station in the province, and the complete collapse of all civil administration in the districts, though most of the talukdars contented themselves with resuming their lands, and some even sent promises of help to the Residency. Within Lucknow itself Lawrence succeeded for a while in maintaining his authority, although the mutineers were assembling in the neighbourhood. All available hands were kept hard at work preparing the Residency for a defence which every day made more inevitable. On June 30 an attempt was made, against Lawrence's own inclinations, to disperse the sepoy who had gathered at Chinhat, four miles away. The troops, exhausted by continuous labour on the fortifications and by the heat of the season, were compelled hurriedly to retreat with a loss of one third of their number. The mutineers at once entered and plundered the city and the siege of the Residency began. On July 2 Lawrence was mortally wounded by a bursting shell. Two days later he died, leaving about a thousand English soldiers and civilians and seven hundred loyal sepoy to defend the Residency against about 10,000 mutineers.

At Cawnpore were stationed four sepoy regiments, with about four hundred British gunners and invalids. On the news from Meerut, the commander, Sir Hugh Wheeler, resolved, like Lawrence at Lucknow, to secure a defensible position. The magazine offered by far the best. But Wheeler hesitated to withdraw the sepoy guard posted there lest he should precipitate a rising, and contented himself with throwing up a breastwork near the north-east corner of the town. On June 4 the native cavalry and one infantry regiment mutinied. On the 5th a second infantry regiment went over, and the third broke when Wheeler hastily fired into them with his artillery. Eighty still clung to their



colours, but all the rest joined their revolted comrades. The mutineers gathered round Nāna Sāhib at his palace near Cawnpore. After some hesitation, he resolved to besiege Wheeler's feeble entrenchment. For three weeks the defenders held their ground, lacking food, lacking water, lacking shelter from the enemy's fire and from the heat of the day. On June 26 Wheeler surrendered, under promise of safe-conduct to Allāh-ābād. The survivors went aboard the boats provided for them early next morning. But as soon as they had got on board, the thatch-shelters of the boats were set on fire, while a hail of grape-shot and bullets was poured upon them by the sepoys who crowded round. Only one boat got away, and of those upon her only four men escaped with their lives. While this was going forward, orders came from Nāna Sāhib forbidding further massacre. The survivors were then imprisoned in a large building within the town. But the men were speedily taken out and killed. Later on the women and children were removed to a small house called the Bībigarh, and after some days of the utmost misery, on news of an English advance up the river, were cut to pieces by the Nāna's orders on July 15. This slaughter displayed in its extreme form the ferocity with which the struggle was being fought out. The murder of English women at Meerut and their wholesale massacre in the *Dīwān-i-'am* of the Delhi palace, had in the first place sharpened the determination of the English to punish the mutineers with a deterrent severity. Death was the accepted punishment for mutiny. A large number of mutineers had been hanged. This was the severest form in which death could be inflicted on high-caste men, for they were sent into the next world indelibly polluted by the touch of a low-caste or caste-less hangman. In some cases the authorities in the Panjab and elsewhere had adopted a mode of execution which had long been practised by Indian rulers, which had probably been introduced into India by the Mughals and which had certainly been employed by the Marāthas. It consisted in blowing the condemned men from guns. This more spectacular punishment has usually been regarded as indicating a peculiar ferocity on the part of the British. But unlike hanging it was instantaneous, unlike hanging it involved no inevitable pollution. The caste-sepoy would almost certainly have chosen it in preference to the rope. In any case every sepoy knew that he would be liable to death in one form or another if

he broke into mutiny. Wholesale execution is the appropriate punishment of wholesale mutiny; and we must regret that the sepoy risked his stake rather than that he lost it, for his success could only have restored in India that welter of unending war in which the country had lain miserably in the eighteenth century. The blot on British conduct does not lie in the military punishments which were exacted, but in the conduct of a number of officers who took a bloody revenge upon guilty and innocent alike. Indiscriminate executions had accompanied the suppression of the mutinies at Benares and Allāhābād. They help to explain the pitiless slaughter of Cawnpore, and both miserably prove how cruel men are made by fear.

Weeks passed before any serious attempt could be made to recover Cawnpore and relieve the defenders of the Lucknow Residency. But Neill with the Madras Fusiliers reached Bengal from Madras; and the disarming of the sepoys at Barrackpore in the middle of June set other troops free. On June 3 Neill reached Benares on his way up the river with a detachment of his regiment. There an ill-managed disarming of sepoys led to mutiny which was immediately and severely repressed. Neill at once pushed on to Allāhābād, where he arrived on the 7th. Possession of that place was crucial, for, unless it was securely held, no attempt could be made from Bengal to maintain British authority at Cawnpore and Lucknow, known to be trembling in the balance. Mutiny had broken out at Allāhābād the day before Neill's arrival. But the fort was saved by Captain Brasyer and a company of the Ludhiāna Sikhs, though other companies of that regiment had mutinied at Benares. Neill had first to restore order among the volunteers who had seized the liquor in the fort, and he then swept the surrounding country of all elements of opposition. Many villages were burnt for harbouring sepoys who had mutinied, and many villagers were cut down at sight by the Sikh and volunteer parties which were sent out. Preparations were then made to relieve Wheeler at Cawnpore. Major Renaud, to whom the command was to be entrusted, received instructions for the extermination of every mutinous sepoy he could find.

When he was on the point of marching, Havelock reached Allāhābād to take over the command of the forces which had gradually assembled there. Havelock was another man of the type which emerged so prominently in this crisis. He was not

only a soldier of long experience and deep study, but also, like Edwardes and Nicholson, he was a devout evangelical, constant in prayer, convinced that his cause was the cause of God as well as of his country. In fact the qualities of the rulers which had done much to bring about the mutiny aided strongly and resolutely in its suppression.

Renaud had moved off on June 30. On July 3 the surrender and destruction of Wheeler's force was known at Allāhābād. On the 7th Havelock advanced with about 1000 British troops, 130 Sikhs, twenty volunteer troopers and six guns. On the 12th he overtook Renaud. In the four following days he fought four actions, in the last defeating 5000 sepoy under the command of Nāna Sāhib in person. On the 17th he entered Cawnpore, two days after the slaughter of the women and children in the Bibīgarh. The sight of its blood-stained walls and its floor littered with shreds of muslin and long tresses of hair produced a terrible reaction. The fury of vengeance flared up into an intense burst of passion. Neill, to whom the command of the city was entrusted, resolved to punish such sepoy as he deemed particularly guilty not only with the physical pains of death but also with the highest degree of spiritual torture which he could inflict. Each of these was to be forced, if necessary with the lash, to lick the bloodstains from an appointed space: "After properly cleaning up his portion", the order concluded, "the culprit is to be immediately hanged".

After receiving reinforcements, Havelock advanced again with some 1500 men, leaving but three hundred to hold Cawnpore. He twice met and defeated the enemy; but his force was so wasted by cholera and by loss in action that he was obliged to fall back again, convinced that he could not yet accomplish the relief of the Lucknow Residency. Having been reinforced by a company of British infantry and half a battery of guns, he made another attempt, but once more, after meeting and driving back the sepoy at a point about half-way between Cawnpore and Lucknow, he was obliged to retire. Though he dispersed a body of 4000 sepoy who were threatening Neill in Cawnpore, the Oudh talukdars, encouraged by his inability to advance, began to comply with the demands of the mutineers for help.

Meanwhile the government had resolved to re-appoint Outram as chief commissioner of Oudh in the place of Henry Lawrence. The choice was questionable, for Outram seems to have owed his

reputation to timely measures of self-advertisement. With still more doubtful wisdom, he was given the command of the relieving force, though as a soldier he lacked the experience, knowledge, and resolute skill which marked out Havelock. With characteristic caution, however, which was meant to be and in fact was hailed as noble self-sacrifice, Outram refused to exercise the military command, preferring to serve as a somewhat indocile subordinate to the older and better soldier. With him came substantial reinforcements. On September 21, a few days after the recovery of Delhi had been completed, Havelock marched for the third time towards Lucknow, with something over 3000 men. At 'Ālambāgh, two miles from Lucknow, he learnt of the recovery of Delhi. On the 25th the attack was made on a scheme dictated by Outram. The resistance proved stubborn. Outram hesitated and would have halted. But in this he was overborne by Havelock, and, after severe losses, the relievers forced their way through into the Residency. But though the besieged garrison was thus saved, the available forces were still unable to evacuate the women and children, or recover control of the city, still less of the province, for the mutineers had been strengthened by numerous bands which had fled from Delhi. The completion of the task had therefore to await a new commander and the forces which were at last beginning to arrive from Singapore, whence troops destined for the China war had been diverted to Calcutta, and from England, whence reinforcements were tediously travelling by way of the Cape although the Khedive had offered facilities for the much more expeditious route by Alexandria and Suez.

Sir Colin Campbell had been appointed commander-in-chief by the home authorities. He had risen from the ranks, had fought when scarcely more than a boy in the Peninsular War, and had commanded a division in the Crimea. He was beyond the custom of the time careful of the lives and comfort of his men, and, though no great general, was a sound and practical soldier. After completing his preparations for transport and communications, he moved up the river and reached Cawnpore on November 3. The place was threatened by Sindhia's revolted contingent, which had joined Tantia Topi, the ablest of Nāna Sāhib's commanders. Sir Colin therefore left a detachment to hold Cawnpore, and himself pushed on towards Lucknow. On November 16 and 17 he fought

his way through the city and joined hands with the garrison. The Residency was evacuated; the women, children and wounded removed; and Outram was left with 4500 men to contain the mutineers in the city until Sir Colin could return to crush them. On November 27 the latter counter-marched towards Cawnpore, where Tantia Topi had scored two successes against the detachment defending it. He arrived in time to prevent any considerable mishap, and on December 6 engaged Tantia's forces. But, though he defeated them, his victory was far from decisive, for an opportunity of cutting off two-thirds of the mutineers was missed by his chief of staff.

However, from this point onward the ultimate issue was never in the smallest doubt; operations were no longer limited to the relief of small groups struggling against greatly superior numbers, but could be directed towards the re-establishment of British power over wide areas. The first object was the complete control of the Ganges-Jumna doāb. Converging columns were therefore directed on Fatehgarh, situated on the Ganges due east of Āgra. These drove large numbers of sepoys across the river into the Rohilkhand, and on their expulsion the villagers hastened to support the re-established civil administration. A force was then concentrated on the right bank of the Ganges to prevent the sepoys from re-entering the doāb, while Sir Colin himself proceeded to the re-conquest of Oudh.

At the end of February, 1858, he was able at last to march again on Lucknow, where 120,000 men had been attacking Outram at the 'Ālambāgh, which the British had occupied on the evacuation of the Residency. His attack succeeded after some days of severe fighting. But, as at Cawnpore, large bodies of the enemy, numbering at least 30,000, were suffered to escape; so that the recovery of Lucknow, on March 21, left the province still in the hands of the rebels, and their resistance was stiffened by the proclamation in which Canning announced the policy which he intended to follow. It declared all lands confiscate, save those of a few individuals who had aided the government. At Outram's pressing request, a clause was added to the effect that those who immediately submitted might expect a large measure of indulgence. But the vague terms of this promise, coupled with the nature of the original British land-revenue settlement, did not conciliate the talukdars. Accordingly a long struggle ensued, in

which the rebel parties were invariably scattered when encountered, only to re-assemble at some other place. In October, 1858, however, Sir Colin was induced to employ mounted infantry. Their mobility enabled them to take much more effective action, and before the end of the year the surviving rebels were driven into the Raipur hills, while the talukdars were reassured by Montgomery, who succeeded Outram as chief commissioner, regarding the government's intentions.

In the region to the south and west of the doāb and Oudh operations had been conducted by forces organised from Bombay. Sindhia's contingent at Gwalior had mutinied in the middle of June, 1857. The widow of the late raja of Jhānsi had already raised a revolt in the hope of recovering the state which had been annexed in the time of Dalhousie. On July 1 mutinies broke out among the company's sepoys at Mhow and Sāgar, and in Holkar's contingent at Indore. As soon as the local troubles had been suppressed, Sir Hugh Rose with a Bombay column took the field. He marched from Mhow on January 6, 1858, and moved on Jhānsi, reducing rebel forts on his way and driving before him parties of mutineers. On March 22 he laid siege to Jhānsi. Tantia Topi with the Gwalior contingent attempted to raise the siege but was defeated, and on April 3 the place was carried by assault after a desperate resistance. The rani escaped and joined Tantia Topi. After a pause to rest his men and gather supplies, Rose moved against Tantia and defeated him at Kunch and Golauli. The latter success gave Rose possession of Kālpī, and he hoped that his campaign was virtually completed. But Tantia and the rani suddenly marched on Gwalior. Sindhia's wavering army joined them. On June 1 they occupied the fortress and proclaimed Nāna Sāhib Pēshwā. Rose immediately took the field again. On the 17th and 18th he defeated Tantia outside Gwalior, and restored Sindhia's authority, while Tantia fled with some 4000 men into Rājputāna. For eight months he succeeded in evading his pursuers. But at last his followers wearied and dispersed, while he himself was captured early in 1859, tried by court martial on a charge of rebellion, and hanged at Siprī, in Sindhia's territories, on April 18.

Thus northern India was re-conquered. In this operation the great mass of the population, save in Oudh, looked on with the same apathy with which it had witnessed the gradual extension of

the company's authority. When civil government vanished, the villagers had plundered and sometimes murdered local money-lenders and grain-dealers, paying off old scores, and falling cheerfully into anarchy. But when the mutineers were beaten and the district officials reappeared, they were met with the old respect and obedience. The sole organised body of Indians had been the army. The army alone therefore responded to the atmosphere of alarm and anxiety which had prevailed early in 1857. The minor chiefs, too, had naturally provided a more turbulent factor. Especially in Central India and Oudh, they had been disposed to assist the mutineers rather than the government, which was lowering their dignity, their importance, and their wealth. But the princes had on the whole stood by the company, whatever grounds of complaint individuals among them might have had. Some had written messages of good-will to the old emperor in the first flush of the outbreak; but their words had not been followed up by action.

The Bengal sepoy had thus stood alone; and their mutiny of itself dissolved the organisation which had made them capable of common action. They did not trust their new leaders. In the early stages of the desperate struggle the Europeans, ever outnumbered, speedily recovered the prestige which for the moment they had lost. Soon the sepoy went into action expecting to be beaten. The individuals of a battalion might fight to the death, but the battalion had lost its military virtue. It speedily broke, and the sepoy perished in groups or fighting man by man. The mutiny was in fact foredoomed to failure, however overwhelming it appeared when station after station was bursting into revolt. Victory in the sepoy war, as in those which had preceded it, was determined by the greater vigour, the union, and the resolution of the victors. Caught in the early stages at a great disadvantage, they had done much to retrieve their position before reinforcements had even begun to arrive, and owed their success to a superiority of moral against a vast preponderance of material force. With the gradual recovery of power the vindictive indiscriminateness of punishment which had been shown in some (not in all) of the areas of conflict gave place to more measured action. Men remembered once more that co-operation had been and still must be the keynote of Indian government, and heeded Canning's wise resolve not to rule in anger. The net results of

those two years of dreadful turmoil were the reassertion of British power, and the complete defeat of a convulsive effort to throw off the growing influences of the west. Two events notably typified the issue. The last shadow of the Mughal court vanished. Bahādur Shāh was tried for rebellion, condemned, and removed a prisoner to Rangoon. And with the court of Delhi the East India Company vanished also. By an act of 1858 its powers were cancelled, and direct government over the territories which it had acquired was henceforward vested in the queen.



## CHAPTER XII

### Crown Government and the Government of India after the Mutiny

The constitutional result of the Indian Mutiny was the abolition of the Mughal Court at Delhi, the disappearance of the last vestiges of sovereignty other than British within British India, and the termination of the powers and privileges of the East India Company. For a century the company had exercised political authority, despite the arguments of theorists like Adam Smith and the efforts of intemperate politicians like Charles James Fox in the eighteenth and Lord Ellenborough in the nineteenth century. But when in 1853 Macaulay had succeeded in substituting competition for the patronage of the directors as the method of recruiting the company's covenanted service, the company's real safeguard had vanished. Direct crown government would no longer invest the executive in England with new and extensive sources of patronage. Whig support, which had kept the company alive for over a generation, vanished. The Mutiny produced a widespread but unjust opinion that the company was specifically to blame for that great misfortune. In 1858 therefore both political parties were agreed that the company should be abolished and that thenceforward the government of British India should be exercised in the name of the queen.

But though parliament therefore paid small attention to the company's petition that no change should be made in the mode of government "without a full previous enquiry into the operation of the present system", the arguments of the petition itself exerted considerable influence on the new form of government which was actually adopted. The company had urged that any crown minister charged with the government of India would himself be unacquainted with India, and incapable of judging the solicitation of men either equally ignorant with himself or knowing enough to impose on others less informed, and in any case liable to seek party objects rather than the good government of the country. Such a minister would therefore need a council

composed of men experienced in Indian affairs, and personally independent of the minister, in order that they might be able effectively to oppose proposals founded in ignorance or self-interest. Such a council could not be made up entirely of crown nominees, but must include a large proportion of men who owed their seats to no ministerial influence. Nor should any proposals seek to establish the executive government of India in London. The executive government must remain situated in India itself. The business of the home government was not to conduct the details of administration, but to revise past conduct, to lay down principles, to issue general instructions. Such functions demanded a deliberative rather than an executive body, and resembled those of parliament rather than those of the cabinet or of any administrative board.

The various schemes put forward, as well as that ultimately adopted, show how generally these conclusions were accepted. The bill introduced by Disraeli and inspired by Ellenborough, proposed to attach to the Indian minister a council partly nominated by the crown, partly elected by persons who had served in India, who had financial interests in that country, or who were parliamentary electors resident in the leading commercial cities of Great Britain and Ireland. This was speedily laughed down. But the bill which was substituted and which was passed into law in 1858 made careful provision for a council able to supervise the conduct of the minister. The new body was to be called the Council of India—a title till then borne by the executive council of the governor-general. It was to consist of fifteen members, a majority of whom must have served or at least resided in India for ten years at least. Eight members were to be nominated by the crown and the other seven were to be elected in the first instance by the members of the Court of Directors. Vacancies in the latter group were to be filled by co-option. All members were to hold office, like judges of the English bench, during good behaviour, and were removable only on an address of both houses of parliament. These provisions ensured that the new council would include a considerable element entirely independent of the minister, while the exceptional tenure of office enjoyed by every member permitted an expression of the frankest opinion on every question laid before him. The powers bestowed on the council illustrated similar views of the functions which it was designed to

discharge. It could not indeed take any business into consideration except under a reference from the minister, its decisions might be overruled by him, and he might despatch to India without its concurrence orders which he ruled to be either urgent or secret. But all other proposed orders had to be laid before it for its opinion; where the minister refused to accept the council's opinion, he had to record reasons for his refusal; and in a wide variety of matters, especially all financial questions, the concurrence of a majority of the council was indispensable. In all matters excepting those of high policy it was thus deliberately intended that the minister's proposals should be submitted to a critical and effectual review.

Such limitations on the Indian minister's powers were undoubtedly sound and proper, for a House of Commons elected primarily to control the conduct of British affairs could not be expected to develop either the active interest or the informed criticism which influenced the management of the other great departments of government. The degree in which parliament was expected to participate in the business of Indian government was indicated in the act itself. Every year the minister was to submit the accounts of India for parliamentary approval with a statement showing "the moral and material progress" of the country. Besides this, aspects of policy likely to escape the criticism of the Council of India by being dealt with as urgent or secret were also to be discussed in parliament. Any declaration of war was to be laid before parliament within a prescribed period, and any military operations beyond the Indian frontiers, save for the purpose of repelling invasion, could not be paid for out of the Indian revenues without the approval of parliament.

For the actual conduct of affairs a new secretary of state was created to take the place of the former president of the Board of Control. This involved no fresh expense, for the salary attached to the latter office had already been raised in 1853 from £3000 a year to £5000, in view of its growing importance. But the change carried with it a rise in status. Future ministers for India would be men of greater political weight than the long succession of mediocrities who had sat at the Board of Control.

The net effect of these clauses in the Government of India Act of 1858 was an extension of the changes already introduced in 1853. In 1853 the crown had received the right to nominate six

members out of the eighteen who formed the Court of Directors; it was now to nominate nine out of the sixteen members composing the new council. This new body was also much less powerful than the old one had been. The council could not initiate correspondence; it lacked the company's power of obstructing indefinitely administrative measures of which it disapproved; it could not recall a governor-general, and so lost a powerful lever for influencing the cabinet's policy. And while the successors of the directors were weaker, the successor of the Board of Control was stronger, holding higher rank in the cabinet and enjoying greater influence in the House of Commons. In fact the old system, under which the government of India had been managed by an independent body under the general control of a minister of the crown, had at last been replaced by a new system, under which a minister of the crown was to administer Indian affairs under the partial control of a semi-independent body.

On the formation of the new office the queen looked forward to participating as actively in its transactions as she was accustomed to do in those of the other departments of her government. She directed that its procedure should be based on that of the Foreign Office, that all important despatches should be submitted to her on their receipt, and that no important orders should be sent off without her previous approval. But this proved too much for even the tenacious industry of Queen Victoria. The volume of Indian business far exceeded her expectations, while its technical difficulties made much of it difficult to follow. Coupled with the fast-growing correspondence of the other public offices, these facts speedily led to a revision of her earlier intentions; and by the 'seventies the India Office was being required to communicate to her only outstanding information regarding Central Asia and the Indian states. She was, however, kept informed of the general situation by the regular correspondence which she maintained with the governor-general. This was a new feature, at all events in its regularity. Lord Ellenborough, when governor-general, had excited sharp jealousy in the minds of the directors by corresponding with the queen. Such objections now had disappeared. But constitutional considerations still demanded circumspection in the exercise of the privilege. On at least one occasion Lord Curzon greatly irritated the cabinet by appealing to King Edward VII in a dispute which had emerged between himself and the

secretary of state. The assumption by the queen in 1877 of the title of Empress of India was, so far as the home government went, a matter of form, without constitutional significance.

The main question which the act of 1858 left uncertain as regards the home government was that of the relations between the secretary of state and his council. For this there existed no precedent. None of the principal secretaries had ever been limited in the discharge of his duties by the existence of such a body, while the council itself was disposed to magnify its importance. In the very early days of its existence it had laid claim to the directors' old privilege of initiating correspondence, and had submitted to the first secretary of state, Lord Stanley, a draft despatch. This had been immediately checked. Stanley had torn up the draft, and substituted another of his own. But section 41 of the act, requiring the council's assent to financial proposals, offered more lasting difficulties. The council was at times disposed to use its power of vetoing expenditure in order to secure control of policy. This was a natural consequence of the wide powers which the act of 1858 had conferred. In 1858 parliament had certainly considered that the council should be invested with real and effective powers, in order, as Sir Charles Wood afterwards stated, "to give the secretary of state the support requisite for resisting party-pressure, a pressure not always applied in a manner beneficial to India". But the limit of these powers was not defined, and the different sections of the act were liable to conflicting interpretations. In 1869 it was decided to modify the council's position. A bill was introduced which struck at the root of its independence by modifying the tenure from that of good behaviour to a fixed term of ten years, with a possible extension for special reasons for another five years. Lord Salisbury, who as Lord Cranborne had had much difficulty with the council, proposed an amendment, which was accepted, abolishing co-option and giving to the crown—which would act on the advice of the secretary of state—the right of nominating to all vacancies that should arise. Another amendment took away from the council its voice in appointing persons to the executive councils in India. By these changes the independent position of the council was visibly weakened. It was becoming not so much a controlling as an advisory body.

The question of its financial powers still remained. This was not determined by any alteration of the law. But in 1869 and 1880

the position was discussed in parliamentary debates which had the practical effect of regulating usage if not of defining the constitutional position. The opinion which prevailed was that while parliament had certainly intended to impose checks on the financial powers of the secretary of state, it had never intended to enable the council by its financial control to hamper the execution of policy involving imperial interests. The secretary of state was a member of and represented the cabinet. As such he was supreme over the council, not the council over him. The fact was that difficulties of drafting or negligence in expression had seemed to invest the council with far greater power than a small body of Indian specialists could conceivably exercise. Maine justly observed that "any such power given to the council and exercised by it would produce before long a combination of both the great English parties to sweep away the council itself". When this had been recognised, causes of friction between the secretary of state and the council tended to disappear.

The subsequent developments of the home government down to 1918 were almost negligible, and at no point touched important constitutional principles. In 1878 the secretary of state was permitted to appoint a limited number of special experts on the old tenure of good behaviour; in 1889 he was allowed to leave vacancies unfilled till the council should be reduced to ten members; in 1907 he began the practice of nominating members of Indian birth, and about the same time the size of the council was increased to fourteen members while their tenure of office was cut down to seven years and their pay from £1200 to £1000. In 1913 and 1914 Lord Crewe, on the inspiration of Mr Edwin Montagu, attempted to remodel the council; but in this he met with such opposition in parliament that the proposal was abandoned.

The transference of government to the crown made no considerable alterations in the form of the Government of India. The governor-general in council retained "the superintendence, direction and control" of administration. The Government of India was still regarded as unquestionably the executive government of the country. It was indeed required to pay due obedience to all orders which it might receive from the secretary of state, but this was no more than had formerly been due to the orders of the Court of Directors. But although no changes were made in the form of government by the act of 1858, important changes

speedily followed in the substance. The governor-general, Canning, who continued to hold office, preferred the new title of viceroy, as the personal representative of the queen in India, although "governor-general" continued to be his sole statutory designation. He seems to have considered that he was needlessly hampered by his executive council, and at once made proposals for its abolition. Since he was personally responsible, he wrote, he should be relieved of the necessity of discussing matters with a council. He therefore urged that the council should be abolished, that the government should vest solely in the governor-general, and that the appointment of secretaries in the various departments would provide him with all the assistance he required. These proposals were discussed at the India Office in 1859 and 1860, and it was agreed that they should be carried into effect, in spite of the criticisms levelled at them by H. T. Prinsep. Once again, therefore, the abolition of the executive councils was sanctioned by the home authorities. But when the reports adopted by two committees of the Council of India reached Calcutta, Bartle Frere, the first Bombay covenanted servant ever appointed to sit on the governor-general's council, succeeded in persuading Canning of the unsoundness of his views. He put forward particularly cogent arguments. The governor-general would have much more to do, and have less assistance in doing it. Moreover, since a council had been established in London, the abolition of the council at Calcutta would make the governor-general more dependent than ever before on the home government, for unless the Council of India agreed with his proposals the secretary of state would hesitate to assent; he would therefore still have to reckon with a council, and that no longer one with which he could discuss matters in person and which he could in the last resort overrule, but one on the other side of the globe, not only remote from but also independent of his authority. India too was changing with extraordinary rapidity. It would be most unwise to enhance the influence of the Council of India, which knew only the India of the past, in order to get rid of a council which knew India as it actually was. The remedy, Frere urged, was not the reduction of councillors to secretaries, but the introduction of the portfolio system, which would make the individual councillors more responsible and hasten the despatch of public business. These remarks appealed the more to Canning since he had already begun

to experience the inclination of the new home government to interfere more actively in Indian administration than the old one had done, and had already experimented with introducing the portfolio system from the arrival of James Wilson, a financial expert nominated from London to reform Indian finance. Early in 1861 he withdrew the proposals which he had formerly sent home, and demanded instead that he should receive legal authority to establish rules for the conduct of business by his council. In consequence the bill prepared for the abolition of the executive council was abandoned; and clauses were introduced into another bill, primarily dealing with the legislative council, to define the composition of the executive body and to give the governor-general the powers he sought. By these clauses the executive council was fixed as before at five ordinary members, but now two instead of only one need not have been in the service of the crown or of the company in India for at least ten years. The service members consisted of a soldier of high rank as military member, and two covenanted civil servants. The other two ordinary members usually consisted of a financial expert and the law member. Besides them the commander-in-chief might be (and in practice always was) appointed an extraordinary member.

Under the clause which empowered the governor-general to make "rules and orders for the more convenient transaction of business in his council other than the business at legislative meetings", Canning proceeded to make permanent the distribution of business which he had already introduced. Until the Mutiny the council had dealt as a whole with all affairs laid before it. As administrative business grew, its meetings had lengthened out, its discussion of detail had become more unreal, its waste of time greater. Every paper that came in was circulated to all the members, who found each other's minutes provocative of further comments. But now a department or a group of departments was assigned to each. Papers in the first instance would be considered by one member only. Unimportant matters would be determined by him without reference to anyone else. Important matters would be discussed at the weekly meetings which each member held with the governor-general. In order to guard against the improper disposal of important questions without reference to the head of government, similar meetings were to be held weekly with the secretaries of the various departments. Questions of



sufficient moment and those on which the governor-general and the member in question could not agree, were considered and discussed at meetings of the whole board.

The effect of these changes was two-fold. In the first place business was greatly expedited. A great mass of comparatively trivial detail was withdrawn from the consideration of the council as a whole and dealt with by men enjoying a special familiarity with the business of the department in which it arose. Much useless and often irritating writing of minutes was avoided. In the second place the responsibility and importance of the governor-general was enhanced. He himself in practice always took the portfolio of the Foreign Department. This was a continuance of the custom which had always closely identified him with foreign policy and had placed in his hands exclusively the duty of corresponding with the princes of India and of its borders. But in the past the methods of business had compelled him to pick out of a great and growing mass of correspondence the matters to which he would give special attention. Now all major affairs were automatically picked out, and discussed with him by individuals, each a master in his own sphere. The great majority of decisions was thus taken after discussion between a specialist in Indian administration and a man of wide and general political experience. The governor-general was, moreover, guarded from being misled by technical detail, for, if he were dissatisfied with the explanations of the member, he could discuss the matter further with the secretary. In this way he became the centre of all administration in a degree which had been altogether impossible for more than a generation. The power of making rules of business thus provided Canning with the advantages which he had expected from the abolition of the council while avoiding the evils which would have followed on his original proposals.

Few alterations were made in this system of government down to 1918. In 1874 an additional service member was appointed, who represented the Public Works Department till 1904 and thereafter the new department of commerce and industry. A more important change was made in 1905. Army affairs had been represented on the council by the military member as the head of the Military Department of the civil government and by the commander-in-chief as executive head of the army itself. The latter was responsible for the organisation of the army, discipline

and promotion, and preparation for war. In this capacity he required a considerable establishment, called Army Headquarters. The former was in special charge of military finance, preparing the military budget, entering into contracts for military supplies, such as victuals, clothing and medical stores, and maintaining transport, ordnance, and military works. Proposals for expenditure or reform were usually prepared in the commander-in-chief's office, and were presented to the governor-general by the military member with his comments. Thus in army matters the principle of providing the governor-general with two technical advisers was even more definitely established than was the case in the other departments of government, a position justified alike by the civilian's difficulty in forming a sound judgment on military questions and by the extreme importance of Indian defence. When Lord Kitchener became commander-in-chief during Curzon's term of office, the former attacked this dual organisation on two main grounds. He argued that the existence of the Military Department side by side with Army Headquarters involved a useless duplication of staffs and repetition of work, and should be abolished for the sake of economy. He further claimed that the commander-in-chief ought to be the governor-general's sole adviser in all military matters, declaring that the commander-in-chief's proposals could not properly be communicated and criticised by an officer junior to and less experienced than himself. Curzon and his council rejoined that this proposal was dangerous and unwise. It would leave the civil government with only a single military adviser, would invest the commander-in-chief with an undue preponderance, and would lay upon him a multiplicity of duties which he would be unable to discharge in time of war. But these weighty arguments were disregarded in England, where Kitchener's reputation stood high, and where Curzon's vigorous assertion of his rights as the head of the Indian executive had excited much opposition. Kitchener appears also to have made use of irregular and improper channels in order to procure the approval of his plans. The outcome was that Curzon was thrown over. The military member was replaced by a military supply member of inferior status and powers; and in 1909 the latter was abolished to make way for a new civil member for education and sanitation. No one can criticise the provision of a representative of those important departments, but the mode in which the

provision was made was unfortunate. The mismanagement of military affairs in 1914 and 1915 in Mesopotamia showed that Curzon's anticipations had been justified.

The council as reconstituted by Canning worked more constantly and regularly with the governor-general than had sometimes been the case in the immediate past. A weak governor-general, Auckland, had made a practice of betaking himself to the heights of Simla, then recently discovered, for long periods of the year, leaving his councillors to stew in the moist heat of Calcutta while he himself arranged his foreign policy to his liking without the trouble of discussing it with them. The relief of escaping from the plains in the hot weather had been too great for his successors not to follow his example. Fortunately they had been better able to manage the affairs of India than he had been; but the regular period of separation had been much resented by the council, which found itself excluded alike from the discussion of important public questions and from the amenities of the hills. Canning's re-arrangement of council work made such a divorce between the head of the government and his legitimate advisers inconvenient as well as undesirable. The governor-general need now bring nothing under the general discussion of the council which he did not choose to refer to it; while the portfolio system rendered the presence of all the individual members necessary for the prompt despatch of business. Consequently in the time of John Lawrence's government the existing practice was changed. Henceforth the councillors accompanied the governor-general to Simla when the hot weather drew near.

While Canning's rules of business, coupled with the mistaken policy of 1853 in reducing the status of councillors below that of lieutenant-governors, rendered the governor-general able the more easily to maintain his predominance in the Government of India, and to play a greater part than ever before in the general administration of the country, the governor-general came to perceive more clearly the advantages of the council form of government. Canning's projects of abolition vanished not to be revived; and complaints of opposition in the council almost wholly disappeared. John Lawrence indeed fancied that there was some secret, underhand resistance to his measures; but he set out as governor-general under the disadvantage of lacking the prestige conferred by the wide experience and high rank which nearly all

his predecessors and successors enjoyed. Lord Minto complained that the members chosen by Lord Morley were worse than useless; but this criticism was levelled at individuals rather than at the system. In general we find a chorus of approbation. Northbrook seeks to defend the statutory rights of his councillors; Ripon observes that they are easily manageable when allowed "to blow off steam"; Curzon declares their value to a governor-general of action. Indeed, it appears likely that their fault has lain rather in over-pliancy to the wishes of their political head than in any inclination to resist his policy. So far as is publicly known, on two occasions only since 1858 have they compelled the governor-general to bring into action his powers of overruling the decisions of a majority of his council. Lytton was forced to overrule his council in order to remove the import dues on cotton piece goods; and Elgin had to do the same in 1894 in order to establish a counter-vailing excise duty on cotton goods manufactured in India. The latter case was marked by a notable ruling by the secretary of state, Sir Henry Fowler, as a member of Gladstone's last cabinet. He declared that once policy had been decided, the members of the governor-general's executive council must either assist in carrying that policy into operation or resign their seats, and that in the legislative council they must vote for all government measures.

At the same time as Canning was empowered to make rules of business for his executive council, alterations were made in the machinery of Indian legislation. As has been shown above, the changes of 1853 had provoked much dispute. Two judges had been added to the legislative council in order to strengthen the legal element in the council and improve the technical character of the laws passed by it. Other foreign elements also had been introduced in the form of representatives of the subordinate governments. These new members had proved unexpectedly intractable. The judges were members of the Calcutta Supreme Court—a bench hostile by training and tradition to the autocratic Government of India, which was exempt from customary English limitations and paid small heed to the elaborate technicalities of unreformed English law. The provincial representatives were mostly covenanted servants of high standing, who were either not able enough or not accommodating enough to be promoted to the local executive councils. They were thus at the end of their

service, with no further promotion in prospect, with their full pensions assured, and consequently without inclination to discuss matters except on their merits, irrespective of the desires of the Government of India or of the home authorities. Under Dalhousie's guidance the council had adopted a procedure and rules of discussion largely borrowed from those of the House of Lords. Its sittings were public. Its discussions were, if not lively, at all events extempore, for it had from the first prohibited the reading of those elaborately prepared essays in eloquence which made the proceedings of later councils so dreary and unprofitable. Nor was the governor-general invested with the power of overruling its decisions as in the executive council. He could refuse his assent to a bill, but he could not amend a bill or declare a rejected bill to be law. Disputes speedily arose, not with the Government of India but with the home authorities. Sir Charles Wood, who, as president of the Board, had formed the act of 1853, was surprised and shocked to find he had created a body with legislative independence, when he had meant to create merely a legislative adjunct to the executive government. Dalhousie, on the contrary, pointed out that the statute had undoubtedly conferred sole legislative authority in India on this body of men, and that no one could legally dictate what laws it was to pass. When it attempted to interfere with executive matters by calling for papers, he checked it sharply enough, but otherwise he would make no effort to coerce it. The climax was reached when the company disallowed part of an act fixing the allowances payable to the administrator-general from the estates of deceased persons. It was, however, argued that the company could only accept or disallow an act of the Indian legislature, that it could not amend an act, and that it could not dictate the terms of legislation. Under Canning the difficulties were accentuated. The governor-general who had proposed abolishing his executive advisers was not likely to sympathise with a legislature that claimed independence. It was therefore decided in 1861 to remodel the legislative council, and restore to the executive government the full power of controlling legislation, inadvertently abandoned in 1853.

It was, however, felt that it would not do to return to the old system by which executive and legislative power had been absolutely united in the same body. Frere strongly expressed this point of view, much as he disliked the composition and inde-

pendence of the existing body. It was of no use, he declared, to discuss whether external elements were useful or injurious. "The days are gone", he wrote to Sir Charles Wood, "when you could govern India without caring what the Europeans and the Europeanised community say or think of your measures, and unless you have some barometer or safety-valve in the shape of a deliberative council, I believe you will always be liable to very unlooked-for and dangerous explosions." These views were generally accepted. But it was decided that the new legislature should be a barometer and nothing else. Wood harked back to the old position of 1833. Then the legislature consisted in the executive council with an extraordinary member; now the additional element was to be more numerous, so as to provide for a wider expression of opinion; but the legislative power was in fact to be exercised by the executive body. The governor-general was to have but one council. When he wished to make laws he was to summon at least six but not more than twelve additional members, who would hold office for two years. But though half of these at least were not to be the servants of government, the latter would constitute a majority ranging up to two to one should all twelve additional members be appointed. There was thus to be no separate legislative council. "You have no *legislative* council", Wood wrote at a later time to the governor-general, meaning that the legislature had ceased to have any existence apart from the executive. Further precautions were also taken. The chief justice of Bengal had raised an awkward doubt regarding the validity of the rules and regulations in force in the newer provinces, since they had been established by order of the governor-general in council instead of being passed by the competent legislative authority. A clause declared the validity of such rules. Moreover, the governor-general in person was authorised in case of emergency to frame and issue ordinances which would remain in force for six months. When the enlarged council met, it could consider nothing but legislative business. It could not move or adopt resolutions. It could not ask questions. It could not touch finance. It was a body through which the public might make its voice heard on legislative proposals. But, as the liberal Duke of Argyll declared in 1870, it did not enjoy independent power; it could not refuse to pass a legislative project laid before it. Supreme control lay with the secretary of state, and his directions must be

obeyed no matter whether they related to legislative or executive action.

While in this respect the statute of 1861 constituted a reaction from the position established in 1853, in two other respects it marked an appreciable advance. The secretary of state refused to introduce a clause making the nomination of Indian members obligatory, on the ground that statutory distinctions should not be made between different classes of Her Majesty's subjects; but it was well understood that Indians would be included among the additional members. The advisability of this had long been urged. Dalhousie had recommended it to Wood when the bill of 1853 was under discussion. After the Mutiny Frere advised it as necessary to prevent serious legislative mistakes. Sayyid Ahmad, a Muslim of good birth who had long served the government and had distinguished himself in the Mutiny, produced a pamphlet in which he argued that many unpopular measures might have been avoided had Indians sat in the legislative council. The change was at last adopted. The nominees of 1862 included the Mahārāja of Patiala, the Rāja of Benares and Sir Dinkar Rāo. These were succeeded by three great zamindars. After a while representatives of this class were mingled with retired officials like Sayyid Ahmad, and later still with members of the English-educated professional classes gradually rising into prominence.

The other advance made in 1861 consisted in a beneficial reversion to conditions abolished in 1833. The legislative centralisation was relaxed, and provincial legislatures were set up in Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, and afterwards extended to other provinces. No attempt was made to draw the line between the functions of the central and the subordinate bodies; the central legislature retained its competence to pass acts relating to the whole of India, and in a number of important subjects, such as religious and social customs, no bill could be introduced into a provincial council without the previous consent of the governor-general, while all bills were subject to a triple veto—that of the head of the province, of the governor-general, and of the home authorities. The powers of the new provincial legislatures were thus confined within very narrow limits. They recovered nothing of the general competence which they had enjoyed before 1833, when a central legislature did not exist in India. But the change facilitated the adaptation of existing law to local needs while

preventing local acts from developing into antagonistic systems of law. Indian members were nominated on the new provincial bodies as on the central legislature.

One other important topic remains. While the changes described above were being introduced into the structure of the home and Indian governments, the law regarding the relations of these two bodies remained unchanged. The act of 1858, as has been already noted, merely substituted the secretary of state for the Court of Directors and enjoined the same general duty of obedience to the former as had been the legal right of the latter. The new minister of the crown possessed the same legal powers over the Government of India as had formerly been possessed by the East India Company. His commands carried no higher degree of legal authority than those of his predecessors. Both were entitled to implicit obedience. But new and changing circumstances were to produce great alterations in the degree in which the law actually operated. Some writers seem to have believed that no material change took place. Sir John Strachey, for instance, writing in 1888, rejected the view that the home government had come to engross a larger share of Indian administration. But the weight of evidence against this view is overwhelming.

The changes in the form of the home government itself made for a great and growing degree of interference. The directors might have been entitled to implicit obedience, but they had to reckon with the Board of Control, which might intervene to support its nominee, the governor-general, in the event of serious disputes, while the company's power of recall, though a formidable weapon, was ill-adapted for constant and regular use. In general administration the home authorities were indeed able to lay down and maintain general principles; but the Indian governments were left to settle the detail by which they should be carried into operation, while foreign policy was determined more by the governor-general than by anyone else. Down to 1858 the Government of India was undoubtedly the real executive government of the country. The statute of that year certainly contemplated the maintenance of this position. But the secretary of state enjoyed a freedom of action which the company had not possessed. Parliament left him alone. His council could be cajoled or overruled. His rank and weight in the political world ensured a preponderance of political support for the measures which he decided to



adopt. A member of the executive government of his own country, he was not unlikely to forget that in constitutional theory he was not the head of the executive government of India. He was almost invariably a more prominent man than the governor-general of the day, whereas in the past the governor-general had with rare exceptions been a man of much greater political consequence than any of the directors or even the president of the Board. While the home authorities before 1858 had been inclined to defer to the judgment and experience of the governor-general, after 1858 the governor-general was disposed to defer to the secretary of state, backed as he was by the authority of the cabinet.

The establishment of the Council of India made in the same direction. The councillors all enjoyed experience of Indian administration. They were tempted by the fallacy of age to look upon their successors in India as men of less experience and weaker judgment than themselves. They had nothing to do but to attend to their duties, and were not distracted, as many of the East India directors had been, by the need of conducting large private mercantile affairs. They could not sit in parliament, as numerous directors had done, and so were not absorbed in party strife. They formed, therefore, a more active, better informed, and more opinionated body of supervisors than the directors of the company. The private correspondence of the early years of the new régime, notably that of Bartle Frere, abounds in complaints of their undue activity, of their insistence on initiating measures, of the way in which they hampered the wonted liberty of the Government of India.

Political interests also were enabled to act with greater force on Indian policy. The president of the Board had always been able to shelter himself behind the Court of Directors against the pressure of political groups. The secretary of state was in a weaker position, for his possible shelter was less effectual, while he himself was more directly and personally concerned with questions of parliamentary tactics and political exigencies.

Within a few years these tendencies were most powerfully reinforced and stimulated by one of those changes in general circumstances which constitute the most formative agents of political change. Though several proposals for the opening of telegraphic communications between India and London had been

put forward before the Mutiny, none had been adopted when that cataclysm befell. However, it so sharply pointed the disastrous consequences of medieval communications that much further delay became impossible. India was first linked up with the European telegraph system by an overland line through Persia connecting with both the Russian and the Turkish lines. Though a great improvement, this route was in many ways unsatisfactory. Sections of the line were often broken by the unsettled tribes of southern Persia who found copper wire useful for a thousand domestic purposes. Again the changes of jurisdiction and administration, from Persian to Turkish or to Russian, were found to occasion manifold delays, while the expediency of depending upon foreign states for the security of communications with India was more than doubtful. A project was therefore brought forward to lay a submarine cable by way of Bombay, Aden and Suez; this would be entirely under British control and afford a swifter and more regular service than the overland telegraph. Initial difficulties were met with. The sharp rocks of the Red Sea bottom frayed and broke the early cables that were laid. But at last the work was successfully completed. From 1870 the Government of India was in effective telegraphic contact with the India Office.

This achievement at once modified the actual position of the Government of India. A wide discretion had always been exercised by the governor-general, especially in matters of foreign policy. But the appearance of the telegraph at once reduced his discretionary freedom. He could, and therefore he was obliged to, take the secretary of state's orders even in matters where formerly he would have acted on his own opinion. With this change in practice went a change in constitutional theory. In 1858 the received view had been that the executive government resided in India. Frere could tell Sir Charles Wood bluntly that his business as secretary of state was to represent the governor-general in the cabinet and in parliament. But later secretaries of state like Lord Salisbury held that the governor-general occupied a position similar to that of an ambassador under the Foreign Office. When the governor-general, Lord Northbrook, contested this view and opposed the foreign policy which Salisbury wished him to carry into operation, the latter drove him from office and secured the appointment of a successor more in harmony with his

ideas. When Lord Ripon became governor-general, he was astonished at the change which had occurred since the time a few years earlier when he had been under-secretary of state for India. He did not enjoy nearly that degree of freedom which he had expected, and doubted whether he would have accepted the governor-generalship had he known the actual state of affairs.

Thus the telegraph brought an ever-growing control of the Government of India by the secretary of state. This was often accentuated by the personal equation. Lord Elgin in the late 'nineties seems to have been reluctant to do anything without seeking the permission of Whitehall, and the only governor-general who succeeded in making even a temporary stand against these encroachments was Lord Curzon. His strong personality, his range of knowledge, his vigour of opinion, for a while succeeded in checking, if not reversing, the tendency, and, could he have ruled India before the days of the telegraph he would have left a reputation which might have been set beside those of Wellesley or Dalhousie. He claimed as the expert on the spot the right of taking decisions; where he could not secure the secretary of state's approval, he claimed a right of appeal to the cabinet; and where he could not persuade the cabinet, he might even invoke the influence of the crown. Mr Balfour's cabinet humoured him for a long time and to a remarkable degree. The secretary of state, Mr St John Brodrick, asserted in words which oddly recall Bartle Frere's exhortation to Sir Charles Wood, that he was acting as Curzon's ambassador in England. But this triumph was too contrary to the broad trend of events to be durable. The forces making for increased control from London were too strong permanently to be diverted from their normal action. Personal friendships, which had made Curzon's domination possible, were strained and weakened. In the end, as has been seen, the cabinet threw over Curzon in a controversy where he seems to have been entirely in the right, and he soon resigned his office. The next governor-general found himself confronted by a minister as domineering as Brodrick had been complaisant. With Morley the India Office resumed its earlier attitude, and the governor-general was regarded as the secretary of state's agent. Though Morley did not himself use the term in public, and even half-apologised when it dropped from the lips of his under-secretary, his language showed that he approved the sentiment even when he disowned the expression.

This tendency was natural and inevitable so long as the Government of India remained a bureaucracy. But it is clear that every step taken to invest the latter with a constitutional character brought into action forces which would weaken and ultimately arrest the prevailing current. Every expansion of the governor-general's council, every measure to associate non-official Indians more closely with the administration, made the governor-general the mouthpiece of opinions with which the home authorities could not be in touch but to which they were more and more disposed to defer. Such were the influences which were to reverse the tendencies introduced by the change of government in 1858 and the laying of the Red Sea cable.

## CHAPTER XIII

### Provincial and District Administration after the Mutiny

The general scheme of provincial government was even less affected by the act of 1858 than the Government of India itself. The executive councils of the two presidencies were modified in 1861 in the same way as the executive council of the governor-general; and in that year, as has been already shown, some degree of legislative power was restored to the chief provinces. Apart from these changes the structure of the provincial governments remained unaltered. However, a good deal of re-distribution of territory took place. The over-grown province of Bengal, for example, was reduced in 1874 by the creation of Assam as a separate province under a chief commissioner. Thirty-one years later two provinces—one Western Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, and the other Eastern Bengal and Assam—were formed, each under a lieutenant-governor. In 1911 this arrangement was abandoned. Assam reverted to the separate charge of a chief commissioner. Bihar and Orissa were placed under a lieutenant-governor. Bengal was re-united and entrusted to a governor and council, thus recovering its former status as a presidency. In 1877 the North-Western or Āgra Provinces were united with Oudh, and in 1902 received their modern name of the United Provinces. In 1861 the Central Provinces were formed by the union of the Nāgpur with the Sāgar and Nerbudda territories, and to these Berar was added in 1902 when it was leased in perpetuity to the Government of India by the Nizām. In 1902 the North-West Frontier Province was formed out of the Panjab territories beyond the Indus, and in 1912 the city of Delhi, on becoming the capital of British India, was formed into an "administrative enclave" under a separate chief commissioner.

The legal relations between these provincial administrations and the central government remained unchanged. The two presidencies in some respects enjoyed special privileges, derived from their original independence of the presidency of Fort William in

Bengal. They could correspond direct with the home government on matters not involving finance; they could appeal to it against the orders of the Government of India; they enjoyed the right of appointment to important provincial posts. But from 1833 complete financial control over all the provincial administrations had been vested in the Government of India. No attempt had ever been made to define the powers which should be exercised by the provincial governments, which had in law become the local agents of the central power.

This excessive centralisation had been tempered by two influences. The great extent of the country, the diverse social and economic conditions prevailing in the various provinces, linguistic differences which produced distinct technical vocabularies in the different provinces, first in the important matter of trade, then in the yet more important matter of land revenue, made it as difficult to rule India from Calcutta as it would be to rule Europe from Constantinople. The governor-general in his short term of office could not be expected to master such an array of disconcerting detail. His council, drawn exclusively from the Bengal services down to 1858, knew nothing of the southern and western provinces, into which their duties never led them, and little even of their own province where they were hampered by the consequences of the permanent settlement. Ignorance, therefore, went some way towards limiting the legal control of the governor-general in council. The other influence was the limitation of time. When all business was laid indiscriminately before the council as a whole, many points of detail had of necessity to be passed over with small consideration.

In these respects the system introduced by Canning brought about a considerable change. It not merely strengthened the control of the governor-general over the general conduct of the Government of India, but also strengthened the control of the Government of India over the provincial governments. The portfolio system multiplied the capacity of the central government for transacting business, and thus sharpened the scrutiny which could be given to provincial proposals. Then too the financial reorganisation begun by James Wilson, the first finance member, produced a closer and more systematic inspection of provincial finance. Stringent rules were adopted, requiring a preliminary sanction for all expenditure, involving a multitude of references

on details much too minute for the consideration of the Government of India, and producing great friction with the subordinate governments, which felt themselves aggrieved at the limitation of their powers.

Some relaxation thus became necessary, in the interest of smooth working as well as efficiency, and from 1872 onwards a process of financial decentralisation was begun, the object of which was to free the provinces from needless control and to classify the revenues of the country into central and provincial. In the earlier days no distinction had been recognised. All taxation was collected on behalf of the Government of India, which annually assigned specific sums for the requirements, real or supposed, of the several provinces. No attempt had even been made to limit provincial expenditure to a certain proportion of the revenues raised within each province. The result had been an unfair allocation of funds as between the several provinces. The most clamant governments received more than their fair share; those which sought to practise economy suffered by this exercise of virtue. Funds were allotted in proportion rather to demands than to needs. The different systems of land revenue increased the inequality. The permanent settlement of the Bengal land revenue precluded the rising costs of administration from being met by increasing collections from this, the most prolific source of taxation within the province itself. The other provinces were therefore required to pay more in order that the land-owners of Bengal might continue to enjoy the benefits of a fixed assessment.

Lord Mayo began by assigning to the provincial authorities certain services, such as education and roads, for which they were to be responsible, providing additional money that might be needed beyond the fixed budget grants by savings or by local taxation. Under Lytton and Ripon, the work was carried on. Provincial governments were allowed to transfer savings in one section of their budget for expenditure under another. Certain small sources of income were transferred to their management, and they were to keep part of any net increase they could obtain from them. The vicious system of annual settlements with each province was abolished. Under this method of control all unexpended grants lapsed to the Government of India at the close of the financial year, so that in the last quarter of the year much needless expenditure was often incurred merely in order that

grants might not lapse and that the Government of India might have no excuse for cutting down the ensuing annual budget on the ground that the scale of the former grants had been evidently excessive. In place of this was established a quinquennial settlement, under which balances could be carried forward and provincial governments could plan their expenditure over a period of years, instead of confining their outlook to twelve months only. Finally under Lord Curzon a great advance was made by the establishment of what were called "quasi-permanent settlements". These were based on a real attempt to classify revenues as central and provincial. It was imperfect, in that it was still found necessary for the provinces to assign a proportion of their land revenue and excise collections to the central treasury; but it was declared that the distribution of revenues between central and provincial needs would not be altered save in the event of some great calamity such as war or famine, which would imperatively require a temporary readjustment. These changes were accompanied by a progressive relaxation of control over financial detail. The limits of expenditure which might be sanctioned by provincial governments were raised, and appointments might be made and posts created by them which at an earlier time would have required the formal approval of the Government of India. The thirty years which closed in 1904 thus materially increased the authority of the provincial governments in matters of detail. Their formal power unquestionably rose.

But at the same time their degree of influence over the general course of policy tended to weaken. The growth of communications, which subjected the Government of India to the secretary of state, subjected the provincial governments to the Government of India. The centralisation of the period before 1858 had been a matter of law rather than one of practice. Provincial governors, lieutenant-governors, and high commissioners had all enjoyed large though varying powers of discretion. Varying systems of district administration and land-revenue collection had developed in the various provinces, usually justified by special local conditions. But now the influence of the telegraph, the spread of education, the growth of the press, the development of political interests, all tended to produce a growing uniformity of policy. Local differences were not indeed obliterated but they were reduced. The new period was one of constant reports, statistics,



office work. Supervision was incomparably closer. Organisation came to be moulded rather on the theoretical perfection begotten of files in the pigeon-holes of Calcutta than on what the individual administrator thought to be indispensable. So that while the Government of India was surrendering its right to say whether a collector in Bombay or Madras should add a new clerk to his office establishment, it was laying down principles for universal application and earnestly pressing the provincial governments to put them into practice. This pressure, like that of the secretary of state, increased as the century waned. It reached its climax with the appointment of inspectors-general by the Government of India, designed to visit the provinces, to "advise" provincial officials, and to inform the Government of India of the extent to which its views were being carried into effect. Matters went so far that Bombay could not set up a university course of studies in agriculture because other provinces were not sufficiently advanced for such a step, and Burma had to stand perpetually on guard lest one of the revenue systems of northern India should be thrust upon the province. Curzon might complain that he knew less of what was going on in Madras than what was going on in Egypt. But the complaints of a tired man must not be taken too seriously; and if his language corresponded with the fact, that was because he lacked time or inclination to read the inexhaustible stream of papers which the central government exacted from every province.

A like tendency was illustrated by the reform of the law courts and the development of Indian law. A reform in this direction was long overdue, and had constituted one of the main purposes which were to have been secured by the reforms of 1833, although unexpected difficulties had prevented action for another generation. In 1858 the old evils still persisted. At the three presidency towns sat the three Supreme Courts, mainly administering English law and having no relation with the company's courts which operated everywhere else in British India. These latter administered strange and diverse mixtures of English, Muslim and Hindu law, more or less amplified and modified by the regulations and acts passed by the company's governments. The result was that the presidency towns had different systems of law from those of the countries of which they were the capitals. The first essential step to get rid of these anomalies was the amalgamation of the two sets of courts. This was much facilitated by the

establishment of direct crown government, for it was manifestly absurd to replace two groups depending one upon the crown and the other upon the company, by two groups each depending upon the crown. In 1861 therefore the Indian High Courts Act was passed to fuse the two groups into one. The Supreme Courts were united with the company's courts of appeal—the *sadr 'adālat*s—at each presidency town, the new courts receiving the new title of High Courts. These inherited the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Courts within the presidency towns and the appellate authority of the *sadr* courts over the territory dependent on each. Thus proposals for which Hastings and Impey had been violently assailed were at last, eighty years later, effected with the approval of all. The judges of the new courts, like those of the Supreme Courts, were to be appointed by the crown and hold office during pleasure. A third of each bench was to consist of members of the English, Irish, or Scotch bars, one third of covenanted servants, and the remainder of persons who had held judicial office or practised in the High Courts. An opening was thus made by which eminent Indian lawyers without European qualifications could be promoted to the bench. The constitution of these High Courts has remained unchanged; but a fourth was set up at Allāhābād in 1866, and a fifth at Patna in 1912.

The jurisdiction of the new High Courts was limited to the older or "regulation" provinces in which alone Supreme Courts had been created, and where no change could be made but by the legislature. In the other, more recently acquired provinces, a similar organisation was gradually established by the authority of the governor-general in council. Chief Courts, as these new bodies were called, were introduced in the Panjab in 1866, and later on in the Central Provinces, Sind, and Burma. Judges of the Chief Courts were appointed by the governor-general and held office during his pleasure.

The main cause which had delayed this judicial reorganisation had been the need of simplifying the law and determining the mode of procedure which was to be adopted, it being agreed by all except practising lawyers that some way out of the existing confusion must be found. It had been declared by a judge of the Calcutta Supreme Court in 1829 that "no one could then pronounce an opinion or form a judgment, however sound, upon any disputed right, regarding which doubt and confusion might not

be raised by those who might choose to call it in question". In 1835 a law commission had been constituted with Macaulay as its president, to attempt a codification of the existing law. It had prepared the first draft of the Penal Code. In 1853 another law commission had been formed. This had sat in London instead of Calcutta, and had first produced the Code of Civil Procedure, passed into law in 1859. In 1860 the Penal Code as revised by later lawyers was passed. In 1861 a Criminal Procedure Code, prepared by the second law commission, was adopted. The way had thus been opened for the reform of the law courts by providing common procedures to be followed in civil and criminal causes throughout British India, although several revisions of each were afterwards found to be necessary, and other branches of law were codified at a later date. No doubt can be felt that the new laws were a great improvement on the incoherent mass of rules which they displaced. At the same time codification has not been found entirely free from disadvantage. The augmented certainty of the law has not diminished the frequency of appeal; and it has been acutely remarked that under the codes cases have come to be argued on over-subtle interpretation of the wording of the statutes or on points of perhaps minute procedure rather than on broad principle and the merits of the individual case.

Under British administration Muslim criminal law has ceased to operate. In the time of Warren Hastings the reform of Muslim criminal law began. It involved many points which were repugnant to western legal ideas. The rule that a murdered man's next-of-kin might choose the death of the murderer or a sum of money, the rule that the murderer could only be put to death by the murdered man's next-of-kin, the rule that an accused could be convicted only on the evidence of two eye-witnesses, or the rule that infidels could not be admitted as witnesses against Muslims, were easily evaded by orders to the courts. In 1793 the punishment of an eye for an eye was prohibited. In 1825 women were exempted from flogging. From 1849 the perjurer was no longer branded. At last in 1860 the Penal Code wholly replaced the criminal law which had been introduced into India by the Turks of Ghūr.

Family law, however, whether Muslim or Hindu, was scarcely touched. The Muslim law of divorce and successions remained substantially unaltered, while there was no sharp conflict between

Muslim and English conceptions of landed rights such as distinguished Hindu law from English. English knowledge of Hindu law had grown up slowly. Warren Hastings had led the way by causing a group of pundits to compile a digest of the recognised texts, which was translated into Persian and thence into English under the title of the *Gentoo Code*. A generation later this had been superseded by the *Digest* of Colebrooke, who was at once a sound lawyer and a Sanskrit scholar. The influence of such works, however, was to invest ancient Sanskrit texts with an authority which perhaps they had never before enjoyed, for the changes made by customary and local use were wholly ignored. The pundits who were attached to each court as expounders of Hindu law were also inclined to stand upon their texts and to dispute the validity of custom where the latter differed from the former. In northern India this tendency was in part counteracted by the growing practice of taking evidence of prevalent usage; but in the south the text locally recognised—the commentary on Yajñavalkya known as the *Mitakshara* compiled in the eleventh century A.D.—long continued to enjoy absolute authority.

These texts confronted English lawyers with principles of ownership wholly strange to them. In England ownership was “simple, independent, and unrestricted”. But in the Hindu world this was an exceptional condition. Property of all kinds normally vested, not in the individual, but in the joint family; and though each male member could at any time demand his share, which would become his sole property, it would almost at once become the joint property of a new family composed of the owner and his descendants. Thus individual rights were in a perpetual state of flux, and, although they could be determined for the instant by a division, such temporary settlement would be at once upset by the birth of children. The individual was thus seldom entitled to alienate on his own behalf any specific piece of property. This system, while in general recognised and maintained by English courts, has in modern times been modified in two respects. The individual has been invested with rights to sell or charge his share in joint property and to dispose by will of property which he has acquired independently, and with which under Hindu law he could deal by gift.

The growth of commerce rendered the first of these changes almost indispensable. Economic activity would be greatly stimu-

lated by allowing a man to deal with his share in family property. Between 1855 and 1872 the courts came to hold that a creditor might recover a judgment debt by bringing to sale a debtor's share in family property, the purchaser becoming entitled to the items representing that share when ascertained by a division. In the west and south it then came to be held that the individual himself might sell what might be sold under a decree against him. In the north and east, however, this logical development was not followed. In the matter of wills the pundits, following their texts, considered such a right as an innovation which should not be permitted. But as against this was the fact that from 1758 Hindus began in increasing numbers to make wills. In Bengal the right was formally acknowledged in 1792 in regard to property of which a man could dispose by gift in his lifetime. In Bombay an anomalous position developed. In the presidency town, under the influence of English legal ideas, such wills received effect, but elsewhere in the province they did not. In Madras the *sadr* court had at first been inclined to follow the precedents established in Bengal. But a regulation of 1829, declaring that wills of Hindus should have no force save in so far as they might be valid under Hindu law, produced an entire change of attitude. Such wills, therefore, remained wholly inoperative till 1862, when the High Court at last recognised their validity, following a decision of the Privy Council in 1856. Later legislation of 1870 and 1881 applied to such wills certain general conditions regarding the exercise of testamentary power.

In certain other directions the enactment of the codes and the reorganisation of the superior courts produced important consequences. They led for instance to the disappearance of the main differences between the regulation and non-regulation provinces. Those had consisted in the methods of legislation and the modes of district organisation. Law in the non-regulation provinces had been provided by executive order; and the district officer had united in his own hands executive and judicial functions. In a province like the Panjab a large body of law was in force; but, unlike the enactments prevalent in the older provinces, it had not been the work of the legislative council, and was not distinguished by special legislative form. It consisted in the orders of the governor-general, under whose personal direction the new provinces had been administered, and the orders of the principal

authorities whom he had set up. One disadvantage was that the lack of legislative form gave rise to uncertainty, since, as Maine noted, it was not always easy to discern which orders were, and which were not designed to have legislative effect. Another was the dubious legality of the system. It had been called in question by Sir Barnes Peacock, chief justice of the Supreme Court at Calcutta. The Councils Act of 1861 therefore included a section declaring valid the rules actually in force, although they had not been made in the manner laid down by the statutes. This necessitated an enquiry as to what rules actually were in force in Oudh or in the Panjab; and thenceforward legislative methods followed the statutory processes. The union also of executive and judicial power was modified, and district administration, in part at least, was assimilated to the typical organisation elsewhere. The deputy-commissioner, as the head of a district was called in the non-regulation provinces, had originally exercised the combined authority of revenue collector, head of the police, and chief civil and criminal judge within his district, while the commissioner in charge of a division or group of districts supervised his executive and revenue work and heard appeals from his judicial decisions. Gradually these judicial functions were transferred to separate officials. The deputy-commissioner retained as magistrate a limited criminal jurisdiction, but he was gradually relieved of the task of hearing civil suits save those arising between landlord and tenant; the commissioner's jurisdiction in like manner was transferred to divisional judges, who came in course of time to correspond closely with the district and sessions judges of the regulation provinces. Thus the personal administration which had been the mark of the non-regulation provinces came to an end and was replaced by much the same rule of law as had been established elsewhere. The principal surviving distinction was that the higher administrative posts long continued to be open to men who were not members of the covenanted civil service.

However, though personal rule vanished from wide areas as a whole, it was neither practicable nor desirable for it to disappear altogether. There were numerous tracts in the various provinces, consisting of hilly or jungly regions, inhabited by primitive tribes wholly unaccustomed to regular administration. Earlier governments had ignored their existence except when raids of the hill-men upon the plains had called for punishment. The Santhāl

*parganas* in Bengal, the Mahī Kanta in Bombay, the hill tracts of the Northern Circars, and many other areas, were all unsuited for the elaborate system of government which had been established in the older provinces, with their separation of functions, complicated laws, and endless series of appeals from court to court. Where primitive tribesmen, as in the Santhāl *parganas*, had been subjected to the general plan of government, the plain dwellers had taken advantage of this to exploit the hill tribes, with injustice and rebellion as the consequence. A statute of 1870 and an Indian act of 1874 permitted a certain elasticity in the system. The first permitted the secretary of state to "schedule" tracts within which the governor-general in council should have authority to make binding regulations. The second enabled the government to declare in cases of doubt the law in force in such "scheduled tracts". In these restricted areas the system of personal rule and united powers which had characterised the non-regulation provinces persisted in all its force, despite its disappearance as a mode of provincial government.

In its main principles the mode of district administration had been already settled, and, except for the modification in the newer non-regulation provinces already noted, the formal changes made in the period after the Mutiny were not great. The collector or deputy-commissioner continued to be the chief agent of government in his district; he continued to be responsible for its general order and well-being. But as time passed, those objects came to be pursued in a different manner and by changed methods, which, in the restricted area of the district, corresponded with the assimilation of non-regulation to regulation provinces. Government was becoming more a matter of method, of statistics, of general rules pressed into force over ever-widening areas, than of personal judgment and influence. The district officer gradually came to pass more of his time at headquarters, less on tour. Tours themselves became more hurried, as the motor car superseded horse and ox-cart and elephant. The telegraph cut down the collector's discretionary powers, just as it cut down the local governor's and even the governor-general's.

The elaboration of public business led to the division of administration among a number of new departments, usually of a highly specialised nature, tending to absorb part of the duties for which the district officer had been exclusively responsible. Public works,

for instance, acquired a new importance. Before the Mutiny, except for the building and repair of public offices and the maintenance of the few public roads, little had been done. But the new period was one of great expansion. Especially in the Panjab, new irrigation works on a large scale were planned and carried out, bringing under the plough wide areas which till then had lain barren and uninhabited. New roads were cut; new bridges made; railways were built. These new activities demanded a technical knowledge which could be acquired only by special training, and so the control which the collector had formerly exercised over the public works of his district was in part replaced by that of a Public Works Department, composed of engineers, military and civil, and represented in each district by an official called the executive engineer, who was responsible to the provincial head of the department. The collector was still consulted about operations in his district, for they would certainly affect the important question of revenue; and his opinion continued to carry great weight on all questions of general policy within the district; but there had come into existence an organised department owing obedience to another authority.

Much the same happened with the forests. Till the time of Dalhousie hardly anything had been attempted in the way of conservation, and great areas had been damaged or destroyed by indiscriminate cutting and grazing. In 1856 Brandis was invited from Germany to advise on the policy to be followed in the Burmese forests, and he with two other German experts organised the Forest Department, formed in 1869. A conservator of forests was appointed in each province, with deputies in charge of the "circles" into which the forest lands were divided. Under acts passed in 1865 and 1878 the forest lands were classified as "reserved", "protected" and "unclassed". The first are maintained under strict rules of scientific forestry; the second are subject only to rules designed to increase their value to the neighbouring inhabitants or to permit their subsequent reservation if that should become desirable; the third are virtually open. The chief difficulties which arose in this branch of administration resulted from the uncertain and ill-defined rights of user which the neighbouring inhabitants, whether settled villagers or primitive tribes, claimed to possess. The extension of cultivation in the course of the nineteenth century absorbed in certain provinces



lands which had lain waste and had been employed for pasture. This led to a growing pressure upon forest areas, threatening widespread destruction, with the accompaniment of a diminished rainfall and extensive denudation. The act of 1878 therefore laid down methods by which public and private rights in forest lands were to be determined, and provided for the extinction of private rights by compensation or exchange where they endangered areas which it was judged necessary to "reserve". As was the case with public works, these forest operations also closely affected the interests of the agricultural population; while, then, the technical operations of the forest conservators were withdrawn from the collector's management, rules for the control of grazing or the levy of fees required his approval.

A further development intimately touching the welfare of the rural population was the appearance of an agricultural department. From the early days of the company's rule sporadic efforts had been made to improve agriculture and introduce new and profitable crops. At the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries attempts were made to introduce cinnamon from Ceylon and cloves from Amboyna. Cotton seed was imported from Bourbon. Prickly pear was planted to feed the insect which produces cochineal. At Madras an experimental farm was instituted in 1865, developing later into an agricultural school, and in 1886 into an agricultural college. In 1882 an agricultural expert was appointed to advise the officers concerned with the land-revenue settlements. At Bombay and elsewhere departments of land records and agriculture were formed between 1880 and 1884. But these attempts led to little, mainly because such experts as there were lay under the control of the non-expert revenue department. Curzon, however, inaugurated a most fruitful change. In 1901 he appointed an inspector-general of agriculture with a small staff of experts. This was followed in 1905 and 1906 by the organisation of provincial departments. Agricultural colleges were opened; research was undertaken; methods of exterminating pests were discovered and recommended; the improvement of crops was zealously sought after. Here as elsewhere development required the supersession of non-expert by expert control.

The organisation of the provincial departments of education worked in the same direction. The collector in early days had

exercised a paternal if vaguely informed supervision over the schools maintained within his district, occasionally visiting them and questioning teachers and pupils. When the educational departments were formed in 1856, this work was taken over by the inspectors of schools and their subordinates. But beyond the appearance in the districts of a new official responsible not to the collector but to the head of the department, the change scarcely affected the collector's position because the rural population took and continued to take no interest in education, since it was, even in its simplest and most elementary forms, in no wise connected with the daily business and vital concerns of agriculturists.

For a different reason the reorganisation of the police departments also affected but little the collector's position. An act of 1861 introduced extensive reforms in the provincial police, which had been entirely controlled by the collectors and deputy-commissioners in their capacity as district magistrates acting under the orders of the provincial governments. The district officers had in fact insufficient leisure to maintain an adequate control over the police of their district, and investigation had brought to light cases in which Indian police officials had employed the methods familiar to earlier Indian governments but inconsistent with western ideas. No one under the rule of the nawab of Arcot had been astonished or shocked when a prisoner was stood in the sun with a heavy stone on his head to make him confess to a crime which he was thought to have committed. But such practices assumed a different complexion under the Presidency of Madras. The police of each province were therefore placed under an inspector-general, with deputy-inspectors-general in charge of areas corresponding with the revenue divisions. In each district a superintendent was placed in charge of the local police establishments. But the maintenance of public order was too important a matter to be withdrawn from the head of the district. The district superintendents were therefore placed under a dual control. They were responsible to their departmental authorities for the internal management and discipline of their police-force; but in regard to its distribution, the preservation of peace and the suppression of crime, they followed the directions of the district magistrates, so that the authority of the collector was little affected. The change certainly produced improvement. But the pay and qualifications, especially of the lower Indian ranks, remained poor; and the

police commission appointed by Curzon recommended numerous reforms which were gradually introduced as financial conditions permitted.

The net result of all these changes was to set up within the district agents of numerous departments owing but a limited obedience to the collector, whereas in the past he had been the channel by which all government orders had been carried into operation. This did not greatly affect his pre-eminence within the area of his authority, but it enormously increased his office-work. Matters which would previously have been settled by the drafting of an order to the appropriate official became the subjects of voluminous correspondence, not merely with the district representatives of the various new departments, but also, in consequence of proposals submitted by the heads of these new departments, with the provincial government itself. This certainly reduced the capacity of the collector to deal directly and personally with the affairs of his district. Government was becoming a matter of memoranda, minutes, letters and statistics instead of personal inspection and decision. The change involved greater method, greater regularity, a tighter control by the central bodies, a more efficient administration. But it also carried with it the loss of that close personal touch between the head of the district and the villagers in which had lain the real strength of the company's government in every province but Bengal.

In some respects this more systematic government carried with it great advantages. General measures adapted to the special needs of various provinces, were taken to protect the interests and rights of the cultivators. In Bengal they had been most grievously neglected. The zamindars and their agents had succeeded in hiding the agrarian position. Cornwallis had hoped that the operation of his new courts would disentangle a problem which he thought too intricate for executive solution; but the advantage which his elaborate judicial procedure and its freedom of appeal from court to court bestowed on the rich land-holder as against the poor cultivator, had completely falsified his expectations. The zamindars claimed under the permanent settlement to be entitled to the fee simple of their estate except where tenants could prove customary rights; and the large class of customary tenants had undergone grievous diminution. In 1859 the first act was passed to remedy this injustice. This declared that certain classes of

tenants were entitled to occupy their holdings at fixed rentals, and that occupancy rights should be presumed where tenants had held the same lands for twelve years or more, while it also limited the zamindars' powers of distraint upon the ryot. But the burden of proof still lay upon the latter, and no provision was made to ascertain and record existing rights. In 1872 agrarian trouble arose out of the additional demands made upon the cultivators in certain districts. After long discussions a new tenancy act was passed in 1885. This checked the practice, introduced after 1859, of moving tenants from holding to holding in order to prevent their securing occupancy rights, and enabled a survey and a record of rights to be prepared in any area by direction of the Government of India, or in any estate where either the zamindar or the ryots petitioned the provincial government for such action. In this way after the lapse of three generations part of the injustice of the permanent settlement was undone.

The problem of occupancy rights had been far more acute in Bengal than in any of the other provinces, because there alone a system of large estates coincided with a permanent zamindari settlement. But questions of tenant-right emerged in the Āgra or North-Western Provinces, in Oudh, and in the Panjab. In the first the Bengal act of 1859 applied until it was replaced by special acts of 1873 and 1881, which maintained the same general principles but also gave to the collectors and subordinate revenue officials the power of settling disputes between tenants and their landlords. In Oudh, where the talukdari settlement had recognised subordinate rights, by acts of 1868 and 1886 such occupancy rights were admitted as had been enjoyed within thirty years of the annexation, and non-occupancy tenants were protected against any increase of rent at intervals of less than seven years. In the Panjab, where the prevalent land-tenures were different, an act of 1868, passed after much controversy, defined the classes of tenant entitled to occupancy rights but abolished future acquisition by mere lapse of time.

Economic development led to evils of a different kind. One of the major consequences of the stability of British rule and the growing precision of rights over the soil was a great rise in the marketability of land. A buyer could rely, in a degree which had never before existed, on knowing what rights he was purchasing and on finding full legal support for the rights he had acquired.

At the same time the development of the world-markets for Indian produce, the expansion of the legal profession, the rise of a middle class possessed of great wealth, produced a large number of individuals ready to lend money on landed security or to buy land outright as the safest of all possible investments. What had happened in England in the half-century following on the confusion of the Wars of the Roses happened in India in the second half of the nineteenth century. The mortgage and sale of land increased with extraordinary rapidity. In so far as this affected the landlord class, it mattered comparatively little. But over great tracts the land was divided out into the tiny holdings of peasant proprietors. Their extrusion from their holdings and their reduction from the position of land-holders to that of agricultural labourers was a matter which could not be viewed with unconcern. In 1875 considerable agrarian trouble broke out in the Bombay Deccan; riots took place; the village money-lenders and grain-dealers were attacked, their houses burnt, their accounts destroyed. In Madras a large amount of land gradually passed out of the possession of the non-Brāhman peasant into that of the Brāhman professional class. In the Panjab the cultivating class was being ousted by traders and money-lenders. In order to meet this social evil two remedies, direct and indirect, were gradually applied. The direct remedy lay in legislation. In consequence of the Bombay troubles, and the recommendations of a commission appointed to investigate their causes, an act was passed to prevent money-lenders from acquiring land by fraudulent claims. But, as this failed to attain its object, a different principle was adopted in the Panjab, where an act of 1900 placed under severe restrictions all transfers of land from the ownership of the agricultural into that of the non-agricultural classes of the province. The indirect method consisted in the establishment and development of a system of co-operative credit. The value of this, both moral and economic, would be hard to exaggerate.

India has suffered for untold generations from two economic vices. One has been the reluctance of all but the banking and commercial castes to employ savings in any productive way. They have been either hidden in the ground or spent upon the purchase of personal ornaments of gold or silver. The consequence has been that a great proportion of the wealth of the country has increased only in arithmetical instead of geometrical progression.

This medieval characteristic has been accompanied by another even more injurious. Social custom has been allowed to dictate the expenditure of relatively huge sums on the ceremonial occasions of marriage and death. Expenses amounting to two or three years' entire income have been virtually inevitable at such times, because individuals feared lest their fellow-villagers or caste-men would despise them if they kept their outlay below the customary standard. But since their actual savings often would not cover such extravagance, the aid of the money-lender was sought. Indian capital being scarce and ill-organised (another condition which assimilates India to medieval Europe), the rate of interest was usurious, and would run from 18 to 24 per cent. per annum. These peculiarities explain why the Indian cultivator was remarkable among all the peasant proprietors of the world for the extent of his indebtedness.

A real remedy for this evil demanded not only the provision of cheaper credit but also a measure of practical economic education. Cheaper credit by itself would be a mere palliative. Men needed to learn the practical disadvantages of borrowing for even the most solemn of religious rites, the practical advantages of borrowing and lending for productive purposes. In 1904 Curzon resolved to apply to India methods which had produced most fruitful results in not dissimilar conditions in Germany and Italy—the methods of co-operative credit. An act of that year provided for the establishment of co-operative credit societies under due supervision. In 1912 the law was revised in the light of Indian experience and widened so as to include societies for co-operative purchase and marketing. The local societies are managed by committees of the villagers themselves; their funds are in part provided by the subscriptions and deposits of the villagers. Under due supervision and control the movement, which has spread steadily, carries with it the most valuable educative influences; and the act of 1904 will perhaps rank with the organisation of the agricultural department as the most enduring and valuable monument of Curzon's rule in India.

The definition of landed rights and the provision of co-operative credit formed two developments of great importance to the peasantry of India. A third was the formation of regular and systematised methods of dealing with famine. The failure of the periodic rains in India had much the same effect within the area

concerned as a prolonged general strike would have in the industrial countries of the West. The ryot could not till his land or feed his cattle. The cities ceased to receive their accustomed supplies of food. The industries lacked their raw materials. Everyone was thrown out of work. Inland transport ceased, for pack-oxen could not be fed and watered. At intervals of a generation or so this terrific calamity had fallen upon wide tracts of India, leaving them wasted, impoverished, dispeopled. The traditional methods of relieving famine had consisted in forbidding the export of grain, in suspension of the revenue demand, in making advances to distressed cultivators, and (in extreme cases) in the bestowal of charity by the ruler and his chief officers. Similar methods were adopted by the company's government. But they were obviously inadequate. When in 1837 the upper provinces were smitten with famine, the Āgra government laid down the principle that the state should find work for the able-bodied, but that charity must provide for those incapable of working. The result was the same in 1837 as it had always been. Many perished.

The change in general conditions, however, permitted the development of more effectual methods of dealing with famines, while the extension of humanitarian ideas made such a development a matter of urgency. The areas liable to famine were contracted by the new irrigation works, begun by the company's government and continued with ever-growing vigour and more liberal finance by its successor. The building of railways aided the solution of the problem with even greater power, though in another manner, for it solved the problem of transporting food-stuffs into the afflicted regions. The Orissa famine of 1866-67 laid a sharp emphasis on this aspect of the matter. The Orissa districts were notably lacking in means of land transport, and the coast was inaccessible after the breaking of the south-west monsoon. The consequences were exaggerated by the ignorance in which the Bengal system of administration had involved the local government. The magistrate of Cuttack was almost starved within a few days of reporting that no need for anxiety existed. In the ensuing famine a quarter of the population was believed to have perished; and though, as is usual in such cases, the estimate probably exceeded the fact, the suffering was great. However, a committee was appointed to enquire into the causes of the failure to anticipate

and remedy the evil. Under the acute and vigorous guidance of George Campbell, its report led to a great development of policy. When famine appeared again in 1868 Lawrence, then governor-general, declared that the district officers would be held responsible for seeing to it that no preventable deaths occurred. In 1873 the Bihar famine exhibited the opposite extreme. Relief was extravagant. Famine was acute in two districts only; but 6½ millions was spent on relief and 800,000 tons of unneeded grain were carried into the affected area. After the lack of preparation for the Orissa famine and the excessive relief of the Bihar famine, policy took on a more exact and foreseeing character. A severe famine raged in 1876-8, caused by the failure of two successive monsoons, and covering an area stretching from Madras northwards as far as the North-Western Provinces and Oudh. The governor-general, Lytton, toured through the famine-stricken districts, closely observing the methods of relief in force. He found great divergencies. In Bombay, for instance, a greater saving of life had been secured than in Madras, though Madras had spent ten millions as against Bombay's four. He therefore appointed a commission, under Sir Richard Strachey as chairman, to examine into the whole question. Its report, which appeared in 1880, laid the basis of a new and efficient famine policy.

The main points of the report dealt with the need of properly compiled statistical information on the condition of agriculture, with the preparation of local schemes of relief-works which would absorb such proportion of the population as would probably be thrown out of employment, and with the financial measures necessary as a regular annual provision against the possibility of famine. This led to the preparation of a Famine Code issued in 1883 and to the appearance in the Indian Budget of a head called "Famine Relief and Insurance". Under the famine code schemes were to be prepared for relief-works, the larger ones by the Public Works Departments, the smaller ones by the district officials, so that, whenever famine appeared, there should be a maturely considered programme of suitable projects ready to be put into immediate operation. As regards finance, it was reckoned that famine had cost in recent years an average of a crore and a half of rupees. It was therefore resolved to budget for this sum as part of the regular expenditure. In normal times it was to be employed either on schemes of irrigation designed to protect



areas specially liable to famine against its occurrence, or on the construction of railways and canals which would otherwise have been financed by loans.

This new system was bitterly tested by two great famines in 1896-7 and 1899-1900, in which devoted efforts were made by the whole power of the administration to minimise suffering. Each was followed by a commission of enquiry; and while both generally endorsed the findings of Lytton's former commission, the second suggested a number of points in which the methods of combating famine might be improved, laying particular emphasis on the importance of a more careful preparation of district schemes and on the early announcement of suspensions of the land revenue and of the grant of advances. The changes then introduced by Curzon were put to the test of experience in 1907-8 when famine again visited the United Provinces. The failure of the autumn and spring harvests was as great as it had been in 1896-7. But its effects were far smaller. Railway extensions, canal extensions, a higher range of prices and wages, a growing variety of employment, a more mobile population, had at last enabled the efforts of policy successfully to cope with the strain of famine, and in this most important respect medieval conditions had disappeared in India.

The organisation of the civil servants of the government still remains to be described. In 1854 they were classified into two groups—the covenanted and the uncovenanted servants. The first formed the administrative aristocracy. They and they alone could legally fill any civil office in the regulation provinces that carried a salary of £800 a year and upwards. They had been the personal nominees of the directors of the company. But in 1853 Macaulay succeeded in carrying into effect the plan, which seems to have been first proposed by Lord Grenville in 1813, to provide for their future appointment by open literary competition. Macaulay's skilful pleading persuaded almost everyone that the change was a great and unassailable reform. It had many advantages, especially in that it prevented dull or vicious lads being thrust into the covenanted service by family interest. It also ensured that future entrants would be quick-brained, well-read, good pen-and-ink men, like Macaulay himself. After a little while the same system of recruitment was applied to the civil services in England, and its undeniable success in the public offices of London was

thought to confirm the suitability of such selections for the public offices of Calcutta, and the head-quarters of every district in British India. But in fact the principal duties of the higher civil service in England and of the covenanted service, or Indian civil service as it came to be called, were fundamentally different. In England the civil servant is the servant of the political head of his department, in whose name and by whose orders alone he communicates with the general public. His responsibility is limited, his discretionary powers small. The English administration is, and has always been, controlled in part by the politicians of Westminster, in part by prominent local men, justices of the peace, county councillors, borough and district councillors, and the like. Such amateurs have benefited incalculably by the clever and trustworthy assistants provided for them by competitive methods. But, although the civil servants have always believed it, it is not at all certain that the country would have been better governed had they been entrusted with the whole power and responsibility of administration. For centuries a like method of recruitment had been in force in China, where men who had competed successfully in difficult literary examinations were entrusted with the principal offices of the state.

The defects of this system as applied to India were three-fold. Engrafted on a bureaucratic government, it ensured a supply of clever men, while bureaucracy ensured that the cleverest should rise speedily and constantly into the secretariats and thence into the councils. But the qualities which India required of her foreign rulers were not mere cleverness. Her own people were not lacking in quickness and subtlety of mind. On that side Britain had nothing to contribute. What was wanted was honesty of purpose, independence of judgment, freedom from the disturbing influence of caste and creed, absence of self-seeking. But the men possessed of these were not those whom the system raised most readily into high places. The best men remained long in the districts and only rose with difficulty or by good fortune to high office. On the whole the system probably improved the district administration, improved the secretariats, but did not improve the general control.

The second defect of the new system lay in its weakening family connections with the Indian administration. It was all to the good that when a young man arrived in India he should find

friends, both English and Indian, ready-made, that he should carry out with him the intimate tradition of family service and be inspired by obligation not only to the people of the country but also to his father and grandfather. He came to India not as a stranger to a strange land, but as one fulfilling an ancestral destiny. The competitive system weakened this beneficent influence and often replaced it by feelings of mere personal advantage.

The third defect was that pointed out by Lord Stanley, though quite fruitlessly, in the debates of 1853. The competitive examination was based on western knowledge. Though Indians might be eligible to compete, they could not compete on anything like equal terms. Their schools, their traditions, their family life, all forbade their acquiring such a knowledge of Latin and Greek as would allow them to rival English competitors. The examinations were held in London; and Indian candidates were thus required to undertake a long and expensive voyage, to live among people of utterly different habits, and to endure the quick changes of a different and most volatile climate. They could not but break solemn rules of caste if they came to England. They might fall sick amid the fogs of London. And even when they had run all these social and personal risks, they would still have hardly the faintest chances of success. It is true that the rules of the examination were later on modified so as to include Sanskrit, Persian and Arabic, and to permit Indian candidates to offer them instead of the classical languages of the West. Other oriental languages were introduced. But the fact remained that, unless an Indian boy spent several years in an English school and college, far from home, and incurring what in India was considered an enormous expense, his chances of success were very poor. The system ensured that the higher posts of the British-Indian government should be filled by Englishmen or Indians of English training, so as to preserve the English character of the administration. But this object, valuable as it was, was secured by a side-wind. It was secured by a system which professed to offer an equal opportunity to all. Indians therefore resented it with a bitterness which would not have been provoked by the creation of a *corps d'élite* publicly declared to consist of Englishmen alone. In 1914 only twenty-six Indians competed out of 183 candidates. The remedy demanded by Indian political bodies such as the National Congress was that simultaneous examinations should be held in India and England.

But to this there was a great obstacle. In the existing state of education it was certain that Hindus alone would succeed among the Indian competitors, and that large and powerful sections of the population, such as the Muslims and the Sikhs, would remain completely excluded; the proposal was therefore rejected, until the reorganisation of recruitment following on the reforms of 1919, and even then it was still apparent that the principle of open competition could not be applied without restriction.

In view of the practical working of the competitive system, a number of experiments had been made in order to modify the virtual exclusion of Indians from the posts open to members of the Indian civil service. The first was a proposal by Lawrence to establish a number of state-scholarships, in order to enable Indians to pursue their studies in England. But almost as soon as this scheme began to work, it was suspended by the Duke of Argyll, then secretary of state. He desired a completer plan, and in 1870 passed an act through parliament enabling the Government of India with the secretary of state's approval to make rules under which Indians might be appointed to posts usually reserved for covenanted civilians. The subject was then actively discussed, but nothing was done till Lytton framed a scheme for the nomination of Indians to one-sixth of the reserved posts. His hope was that the nominees would consist mainly of young Indians of distinguished family, and that the "Statutory Civil Service" (as the new group was to be called) would bring the old Indian aristocracy into closer and more effective relations with the administrative machine. These expectations were not realised. The provincial governments, in recommending persons for the governor-general's nomination, found themselves obliged to choose between young men of good family but of meagre educational attainments, and older men of the professional groups qualified by administrative experience. Their recommendations came to be more and more limited to persons of the latter class.

Below the covenanted service was a large subordinate service recruited in India and known as the "Uncovenanted Service". In the regulation provinces its members could not rise to superior posts, and in the non-regulation provinces they were seldom suffered to do so. They included men of pure and mixed English blood, and Indians; and they provided most of the persons nominated to the Statutory Civil Service. In consequence of the

report of the Public Services Commission appointed in 1886, it was resolved to abolish this long-standing classification. For it was substituted an imperial service, recruited in England, and two others, one provincial and the other subordinate, recruited in India. No more appointments were to be made to the Statutory Civil Service; but specially recommended members of the provincial civil services were to be eligible for appointment to a fixed proportion of the posts reserved for the Indian civilians.

A similar organisation was adopted for the services employed under the specialised departments which had come into existence. Here too, as in general civil employment, the chief posts had been usually reserved for persons recruited in England, while the remainder were filled in India. However, special circumstances had demanded special treatment. The Public Works Department, for instance, had been staffed partly by officers of the Royal Engineers, partly by civil engineers selected in London, and partly by men who had qualified at the Indian engineering colleges—Rūrki, Poona, and Madras. In 1871, however, the Royal Engineering College at Cooper's Hill was established to provide civil engineers, and a fixed proportion was adopted, Cooper's Hill providing half, the Indian colleges three-tenths, and the Royal Engineers one-fifth of the recruits to the department. For a while too Cooper's Hill provided a training for the candidates selected as probationers in the Forest Department.

The general system adopted all through the administration was thus Indian agency under English supervision. This persisted in spite of a slow infiltration of Indians into offices of superior rank, and undoubtedly produced a government more honest and efficient than had previously existed in India. The price paid for this development was discontent, growing with the spread of education in India, at the exclusion of Indians from the higher grades.

## CHAPTER XIV

### Central Asia and the Routes to India

In a previous chapter some attempt has been made to sketch the growing importance of Central Asia and the Mediterranean avenues of approach to India. The other ways to India were securely held by the British navy, with its outposts at the Cape of Good Hope to the west, and at Singapore to the east. But the eastern ends of the Mediterranean routes were less completely held; Gibraltar closed the western entrance to the Mediterranean itself, and Malta lay full in the path of French fleets aimed, as Napoleon had aimed them, at Alexandria. But French influence was strong in Egypt; and Russian predominance at Constantinople had been avoided only at the cost of the Crimean War. If the long-discussed project of cutting through the isthmus of Suez were ever realised, then both France and Russia might find entrance through the Red Sea into Indian waters; and though Aden had been occupied in 1839, it could not seal up the southern exit. If the Suez Canal were cut, the duties of the British navy would be greatly increased, and a more effective control over Egypt would become indispensable to the security of India. And besides these considerations the Crimean War had brought the understanding between England and Russia about Central Asia to an end. Unless some influence could be found to make abstention worth Russia's while, she would almost certainly renew the policy which had alarmed Great Britain in the 'thirties, either extending her influence in Persia or advancing her frontier towards Afghanistan, or following both lines of development. In the middle of the nineteenth century these were the problems dominating the external policy of the Government of India. From the British point of view, was British foreign policy to become liable to deflection by Russian pressure on India? From the Indian point of view, was India to remain secure from external attack or were the conditions of the past to be revived? These considerations had already led to one ill-calculated and mismanaged war. They were now to produce fierce controversy and violent alternations of policy. Moreover, in this more than in any other aspect of policy

was the growing control of the home government to receive its fullest effect. Auckland had entered on the First Afghan War in the belief that he was pursuing the desires of the English ministry, and Hobhouse boasted that he had dictated the conduct of the governor-general. This boast had not been wholly true; but within forty years it was to be realised, and a governor-general was to resign because he disliked the foreign policy of the secretary of state. The world was in fact shrinking, and action which in the past would have produced a mere local disturbance was now liable to bring about important reactions in all the capitals of Europe. India could no longer have a foreign policy of its own.

The annexation of the Panjab had at least simplified the position, for it had brought British India into direct contact with the area from which invaders had ever been wont to set out for the conquest of the country. In 1855 a treaty of friendship had been made with Dost Muhammad, the amir of Kābul, who had been driven into alliance with his former enemy, the Government of India, by the renewed ambitions of the shah of Persia. In 1852 the latter had seized Herat and had relinquished it only under British threats. In 1856 he again attacked Herat and boasted that he would conquer Kandahār as well. This led at once to war. An expedition was despatched from Bombay under the command of Outram; and aid in arms and money was sent to Dost Muhammad. These vigorous measures soon brought the Persians to terms. In the course of the next six years Dost Muhammad was busy consolidating his position in eastern and southern Afghanistan. In 1862 he resolved to add Herat, then under an independent Sadozai prince, to his dominions. Elgin, the governor-general, protested against this action, and recalled the Muslim agent whom the Government of India had maintained at Kābul since 1857. But Dost Muhammad persisted, and in the next year captured the place, but died shortly after at the age of eighty. His death involved the country in a long and confused war of succession. It lasted from 1864 to 1868. First one son and then another gained the upper hand; and each party applied to the Government of India for assistance. But John Lawrence, who was then governor-general, refused to take any part in the matter. He belonged to the generation which had drawn natural but mistaken conclusions from the lamentable war of 1839. He held strongly that Britain

had no interests beyond the line which the Sikhs had formerly held, and that the defence of India should be based on the Indus. He had tried to prevent the conclusion of the treaty with Dost Muhammad; he had, in the crisis of the Mutiny, proposed to give away Peshāwar to the Afghans; and now when he had attained to power, he persisted in his former views. He assured each applicant that if he could establish himself as the ruler of Afghanistan, he should be recognised by the Government of India. This attitude, which its friends described unwisely as "the policy of masterly inactivity", was well calculated to induce the rival claimants to seek aid elsewhere. They approached Persia and Russia. This brought the policy of Lawrence to a hasty end. He at once gave a subsidy to Shīr 'Alī, whom Dost Muhammad had formerly designated as his heir; and with this help Shīr 'Alī soon succeeded in establishing himself as the ruler of Kābul, Kandahār, and Herat. But great harm had been done. Shīr 'Alī believed that "the English look to nothing but their interests and bide their time". Everyone had come to regard the English as unreliable friends and impotent enemies.

While Lawrence had been looking on at the Afghan situation, the Russians had been advancing swiftly in Central Asia. Their expansion had begun soon after the Crimean War. In 1864 they touched on the borders of Khokand, Bukhāra, and Khiva. In 1865 they occupied Tashkent. In 1867 they formed the new province of Russian Turkestan and reduced Bukhāra to the position of a vassal state. In 1873 the same fate befell Khiva. The ostensible motives for this advance were the difficulties which were always arising with the Turkmān tribes, the need of suppressing the slave-trade, and the encouragement of commerce. English opinion was divided between the acceptance and the rejection of these explanations. But we now know from undeniable Russian authority that the real motive was political. The imperial Russian government argued that since Britain could attack Russia through continental alliances, as had happened in the Crimean War, Russia should secure in Turkestan "a military position strong enough to keep England in check by the threat of intervention in India". Against this action England had two possible remedies. One was to occupy advanced stations in Central Asia and secure a commanding influence in Afghanistan, in order to convince Russia of the futility of advance in that direction. The



other, which Lawrence recommended, was to reach a diplomatic agreement. If that could have been attained, it might have proved to be the cheaper way. But it was liable to one disadvantage. Russia clearly would not assent to any such proposals unless they were beneficial to herself; and the only bribe which Great Britain could offer would have been British support for Russian interests on the continent. But neither of the great English political parties would have dreamed of pursuing such a policy. What in fact happened was that diplomatic discussions were conducted without ever bringing the matter near a real settlement. The utmost that emerged from the conversations between Clarendon and Gortchakoff were Russian assurances of pacific intentions.

Meanwhile in India endeavours were made to form a closer union between Britain and Afghanistan, in order to preclude the establishment of Russian influence there. In accordance with the later policy of Lawrence, his successor, Lord Mayo, had a conference with Shīr 'Alī at Ambāla in 1869. But the net result was small. The amir only received a letter couched in encouraging but non-committal terms. In 1873, after the absorption of the khanates on the Oxus by Russia, Shīr 'Alī made an endeavour to secure a real alliance with Great Britain. He sent an agent to Simla, and proposed to Lord Northbrook that the British government should promise him help in case of any unprovoked aggression on the part of his northern neighbour. Northbrook was willing to accede to this request. But the Duke of Argyll, then secretary of state for India in Mr Gladstone's first cabinet, would allow him to go no further than to declare that "we shall maintain our settled policy in Afghanistan". To Shīr 'Alī this could mean nothing but a continuation of the Lawrence policy of helping those who no longer needed assistance. Argyll's decision marks a turning point in the development of the Central Asia question. Its ill effects were accentuated by two other events. The British government had agreed to arbitrate on the long-standing disputes between Afghanistan and Persia on their boundaries in Seistān. The decision in some points went against the amir, who complained bitterly of its injustice. In the circumstances it would have been wiser to allow the Persians and Afghans to settle the matter as best they could than to indispose both parties by a decision which if just would displease both. The second was the request of Shīr 'Alī for British recognition of 'Abdullāh Jān, whom

he had installed as his heir. The answer which was sent to this proposal was intentionally phrased in the same terms as had been used in 1858 when Dost Muhammad had sent a similar request on behalf of Shīr 'Alī himself. From this Shīr 'Alī must have drawn the conclusion that his son would be recognised as amir only when he had destroyed or exiled every possible rival.

In these circumstances Shīr 'Alī seems to have concluded that for his own security he must make terms with Russia. General Kaufmann, the governor-general of Turkestan, was delighted at this development, which fitted in admirably with the purposes of the Russian Foreign Office. In 1870 he had opened a correspondence by assuring Shīr 'Alī that 'Abdur Rahmān, his nephew who had taken refuge at Tashkent, would receive no help to wage war against his uncle. This letter had been forwarded by Shīr 'Alī to the Government of India for advice regarding the answer which he should return. The latter merely informed him that "such letters should be looked on as an additional ground of confidence". When Shīr 'Alī asked for the recognition of 'Abdullāh Jān by the British, he made the same request to the Russians, who, instead of reminding him of his own struggles to secure his succession, blandly stated that "such nominations tend to the comfort and tranquillity of the kingdom". From 1875 the exchange of letters between Kābul and Tashkent became frequent. Such as transpired were mere letters of compliment; but no one in India knew what the others might contain. London suggested to St Petersburg that the correspondence might be brought to an end; but St Petersburg ignored the request. Yet, as the Government of India asked, what would have been thought at St Petersburg had the British entered into similar relations with the khans of Khiva or Bukhāra?

While affairs were thus developing in Central Asia, the position in the Mediterranean had been transformed. After long delays, and in defiance of all the obstacles which the British Foreign Office under Lord Palmerston could put forward, de Lesseps had obtained support and approval for his plan to cut the Suez Canal. That great work had been carried through, and was at last opened in 1869. Almost immediately afterwards the telegraph line which had been erected by way of Persia and Asia Minor was replaced by a submarine cable running from Bombay to Aden, thence up the Red Sea, and so to England through the Mediterranean. This cut

out the long delays which the despatch of messages through several foreign jurisdictions had involved, and placed India in direct communication with London. For the first time the India Office could telegraph its orders to Calcutta or Simla in the certainty that they would arrive in time to be acted upon. From that moment the home government's control of foreign policy became unquestioned, and the discretionary authority which the governor-general of India had long enjoyed began to disappear.

In 1874 also the Gladstone government was replaced by the first Disraeli ministry, with Lord Salisbury at the India Office. The new government was eager to redeem what it regarded as the great errors committed by its predecessor in the matter of foreign policy. In particular it thought that Gladstone's government had acquiesced far too easily in the explanations of Central Asia policy which had been offered by the imperial Russian government. Salisbury feared that unless something were done, Great Britain might suddenly find herself in a position of great strategic and political disadvantage. At Kābul the Government of India was represented only by a Muslim agent, who wrote (Salisbury thought) just what the amir chose to tell him, and whose reports did not tally with other reports received. The India Office therefore proposed that the amir should be invited to receive a British agent who should be stationed at Herat, in order that full and accurate information should be available regarding developments on the Russo-Afghan frontier. The governor-general, Lord Northbrook, disliked this proposal, and virtually refused to give effect to it. Soon afterwards he resigned his office and was succeeded by Lord Lytton, who was specially charged to carry out Salisbury's policy.

The new plan was not so unreasonable as has been supposed. It was based upon the terms which Shīr 'Alī had been willing to concede in 1873 in return for a conditional guarantee. It was asserted that Shīr 'Alī had never given any formal promise to receive a British agent at Herat. That was true, but it was not the whole truth. Northbrook himself was driven to admit that the amir "had appeared to consent", in return for the agreement which Argyll had compelled Northbrook to refuse but which Salisbury was now prepared to give, together with the acknowledgement of his son 'Abdullāh Jān as his heir. The real trouble was not that the proposals were bad but that they came too late.

What Shīr 'Alī would have given in 1873 he would not give in 1876, when his relations with Kaufmann had become closer and more intimate. At the same time Salisbury authorised a movement of great importance, the occupation of Quetta. This step had long been advocated by men like Jacob, Rawlinson, and Frere, who argued that the defence of India could not be conducted adequately without a strong post on the farther side of the hills separating Afghanistan from India. The line of the Indus was impossible partly from the defects of a river as a line of defence, partly from the political consequences which would follow immediately on the invasion of India by a foreign enemy. The administrative line, which roughly followed the boundary which the British had inherited from the Sikhs, possessed no military value whatever, and was, like most Indian frontiers, more likely to provide subjects of dispute than to secure a clear-cut division of interests between two neighbouring states. The advocates of an advance therefore claimed that the proper course was to occupy Quetta, under the existing treaty with the khan of Kalāt. This step would open the road to Kandahār, and permit the out-flanking of any enemy seeking to advance against India by way of the northern passes. So long as Lawrence's influence had been supreme, this course had been reprobated as improper. But the advance of Russia and the growing correspondence between Shīr 'Alī and Kaufmann had led many to change their views. In 1876, therefore, a new treaty was made with the khan of Kalāt, and shortly afterwards Quetta was occupied. In a military sense the step had everything to recommend it. For the first time since the days of Aurangzib the Indian frontier was no longer liable to attack with all the advantages on the side of the assailant. In a political sense also it was sound, although at the time it was regarded with much misgiving. It was said that it would alarm Shīr 'Alī and drive him into the arms of Russia. But that judgment ignored the fact that Shīr 'Alī had already been alienated by the policy of Argyll, and was already in communication with Russia. The occupation of Quetta was undoubtedly regarded by him as a threat. But it was the sort of threat which, had he not been deceived by the attitude of Mr Gladstone's government, should have made him think twice before committing himself to the friendship of Russia. Unless Great Britain was willing to allow the establishment of Russian predominance in Afghanistan,

and concede to Russia the power of intervening in India at moments of European crisis, she was obliged to take action, and the conduct of Salisbury and Lytton, while certainly aggressive, compelled Shīr 'Alī either to give up his relations with Kaufmann or to embark on war in a position of relative disadvantage.

Therefore for the first time Shīr 'Alī found himself confronted by a British government which recognised that its own political interests were involved in Central Asia. He did not, however, understand the position in which he stood. He was probably much misled both by the past conduct of the Government of India and by the attitude of the Russian authorities. He seems to have hoped that he could balance between the two rivals, committing himself to neither, and protecting himself from inconvenient entanglements by their common fears. Long negotiations, lasting from October, 1876, to March, 1877, regarding Salisbury's proposed mission led to no conclusion. The chief argument against agreeing to this proposal was that if a British mission were accepted, the amir would be unable to avoid receiving a Russian mission, were one despatched. This argument was most unlucky, for almost at once a crisis arose in Europe. Rebellions broke out in European Turkey: Russian and British policies were antagonistic; and when Russia went to war with the sultan, the British attitude became definitely hostile to Russia. Both parties sought to employ every possible means of limiting and controlling the action of the other. Indian troops were sent to Malta. The Russians demanded of Shīr 'Alī a specific treaty of alliance. In these circumstances Shīr 'Alī's hopes of being able to follow a policy of balance were doomed to disappointment.

In June, 1878, Kaufmann wrote to the amir informing him that his external relations required "deep consideration" and that he was sending a Russian officer "to inform you of all that is hidden in my mind". He calculated wisely that Shīr 'Alī was unlikely to turn his mission back at the frontier. His envoy, Stolietoff, bore with him a draft treaty, offering much the same terms as Lytton had just offered, the recognition of 'Abdullāh Jān as heir and assistance against any foreign aggression. At the same time three columns of troops marched from Tashkent towards points on the Afghan frontier, and, in case by chance Shīr 'Alī refused the offer, Kaufmann entered into discussions with 'Abdur Rahmān, the amir's fugitive nephew, with a view to a possible revolution at

Kābul. On the border Stolietoff met half-hearted orders forbidding his admission into Afghan territory. These he of course ignored, and moved on to Kābul, where he arrived on July 22. In the course of the next four weeks he negotiated a treaty with the amir ready for signature and ratification.

Lytton was well informed of these events. He had learnt of Stolietoff's mission before that officer had actually left Tashkent. It seemed to him that the time had come to recall to the amir's mind the arguments which he had so lately used against accepting a British mission. Having received a Russian envoy, he could hardly refuse to receive a British one without displaying a marked hostility which no one could mistake. With the English cabinet's approval, therefore, Lytton wrote demanding that an English mission should be received. His letter reached Kābul on August 17. No answer was returned, on the score of the death of 'Abdullāh Jān, who died that same day; but the letter was read in durbar and Stolietoff's advice taken. He urged that the answer should be delayed, that if any British mission were sent it should be stopped by force, while he would hasten to Tashkent to communicate with the Russian authorities, who would compel the English to withdraw their demands. The amir followed this advice to the letter. He delayed giving any answer, and when Neville Chamberlain was sent as envoy from Peshāwar, he was met with threats of being fired on if he attempted to pass 'Alī Masjid.

Shīr 'Alī would hardly have done this but for the trust which he placed in the promises of the Russians. But the latter had shown more zeal than discretion. Kaufmann, perhaps on the orders of the Russian War Office, had acted as though war were certain between Great Britain and his own country. But the expected war did not come to pass. Instead of that the Congress of Berlin reached a peaceful settlement. Kaufmann had received this news while Stolietoff was still on his way to Kābul, and seems to have written warning him to give the amir no specific promises of help against the English; at the same time he recalled the columns which had set out from Tashkent. But the mischief had been done. Lytton had been given the best possible excuse for demanding the reception of an English mission; and Shīr 'Alī had been encouraged to defy the English. The Russians had thus fallen into the trap which they had set for others. All Kaufmann could say in reply to the amir's urgent demands for help was to advise him

to come to terms with the English as best he could. One is reminded of the fate of the Indian princes who in the previous century had been encouraged by French intrigues to give overt proofs of their hostility to the East India Company.

The cabinet in London viewed the swift development of the Afghan crisis with some alarm. Salisbury, who had been moved to the Foreign Office, feared lest the Russians might find in it an excuse for not withdrawing their troops from Turkish territory in accordance with the Treaty of Berlin. He and the prime minister, Lord Beaconsfield, blamed Lytton for sending his envoy by the Khaibar Pass, where he was not unlikely to be stopped, instead of by the Bolān Pass, where such an event was more improbable. Attempts were made to smooth over matters for a while. But these plans failed through the strong defence which Lord Cranbrook, the new secretary of state for India, made on behalf of Lytton. On November 2, therefore, with the cabinet's reluctant assent, an ultimatum, expiring on the 20th, was sent to Kābul. No answer being received before that date, British forces invaded Afghan territory. Lytton had succeeded in taking full advantage of the Russian blunder.

The Second Afghan War opened by an advance through the Kurram and the Khaibar Passes. A month later Shīr 'Alī issued a *farmān* in which he recounted the innumerable victories which he had achieved over the invaders and announced his retirement into Russian territory. Negotiations were opened with his son Ya'kūb, with whom in May, 1879, the British signed the Treaty of Gandammak. Ya'kūb assigned the districts of Kurram, Pishīn, and Sibi to the British; he agreed to conduct his foreign relations in accordance with the governor-general's advice; and he accepted a permanent English agent who was to be established at Kābul. The Second Afghan War was as successful in its first stage as the first had been. But inevitable difficulties loomed ahead. The new amir was believed to be fickle and weak. Nor was the establishment of the agent at Kābul entirely in accordance with English desires. Herat had been the place where they thought an agent would be most useful. But Ya'kūb had urged Kābul so strongly that it had been felt undesirable to insist on the other course. Cavagnari was therefore selected as envoy. He was an active, energetic man, who had conducted the Gandammak negotiations to a successful conclusion; but he was scarcely tactful enough for

a post demanding great delicacy. He reached Kābul in July, 1879, and though well received, was regarded from the first with great suspicion. He found himself isolated. No nobles were allowed to visit him. He tried to counter this restriction by setting up a dispensary to serve as a cover for persons who wished to communicate with him. But this device was of doubtful advantage. Early in September a real or pretended mutiny broke out among the troops at Kābul. The residency was attacked, and its inhabitants massacred. Ya'kūb's complicity was and still remains uncertain. Roberts believed, probably with reason, that he knew of and favoured the projects of a mutiny, in the hope that it would allow him to represent to the Government of India the difficulties which the presence of a British resident involved and would enable him to request the agent's withdrawal. Indeed some such ideas may well have underlain the proposal to station the envoy at Kābul instead of at Herat. But it is not likely that Ya'kūb either expected or desired the death of Cavagnari. His Afghan advisers, however, probably did.

This event led to a re-opening of the war. Once more a brilliant opening had been followed by the murder of the unfortunate man chosen to represent British policy at a ferocious capital. But now the sequence of events was to diverge sharply from the earlier example. Roberts promptly occupied Kābul, where he established himself securely, and throughout the following winter resisted with ease the attempts of the tribesmen to expel him. Ya'kūb himself had abandoned his precarious position and joined the English camp, declaring that he would rather be a grass-cutter with them than attempt to rule the ungovernable Afghans. He was sent down into British India, where he lived on a government pension till his death in 1923. But his disappearance left for a while no satisfactory candidate for the government of the country. In these circumstances the British authorities turned naturally towards partition. The Foreign Office even began to discuss with Teherān the terms on which Persia might be allowed to occupy Herat; and a member of the old ruling Sadozai family was recognised as ruler of Kandahār. Such arrangements would, it was thought, make it a small matter what became of Kābul.

At this moment, however, a new candidate stood forward. 'Abdur Rahmān, who had been living under Russian protection, thought the time had come to claim the succession of his uncle



Shīr 'Alī, who had died soon after his flight into Russian territory. 'Abdur Rahmān was now a man of forty, and had inherited much of the vigour and ferocity of his grandfather, Dost Muhammad. In 1880, after long discussions with the Russian governor-general, he was allowed to return to his native country. The Russians undoubtedly hoped by this to embarrass the English and to secure a friend at Kābul to replace the dead amir. But in this they miscalculated. 'Abdur Rahmān had seen much of them, and had meditated long on the causes of his uncle's fate. He had come to the conclusion that friendship with the English was worth having, thus reversing the sentiments with which he had fled to Tashkent sixteen years earlier. As soon as Lytton heard of his appearance, he sent orders to the English agent to enter into discussions with him. But at that moment negotiations were interrupted by the arrival of a new governor-general, Lord Ripon.

In the spring of 1880 a general election had taken place in which the foreign policy of the Beaconsfield government both in Turkey and Afghanistan had become the object of violent and indeed dishonest attack. Mr Gladstone's success led at once to the resignation of Lytton and the appointment of Ripon, pledged to carry out a policy of withdrawing altogether from beyond the hills. With this policy Ripon had been in the fullest possible agreement. But after his arrival in India, he found that much more was to be said for the late Conservative policy than he had imagined. Indeed he came speedily to the conclusion that the execution of the policy of withdrawal which had been promised in the queen's speech at the opening of the new parliament would infallibly lead to a new war, and insisted with a covert threat of resignation that Pishīn and Sibi should be retained. Meanwhile he took up the discussions with 'Abdur Rahmān at the point at which Lytton had left them. 'Abdur Rahmān had already given proof of his desire to be friends with the English. When Ayūb Khān, Shīr 'Alī's son, inflicted a sharp defeat on the English at Maiwand, 'Abdur Rahmān had materially assisted Roberts in the great march which the latter made on Kandahār, leading to the complete overthrow of Ayūb Khān's forces. Ripon therefore reached an understanding with him, by which he was to be allowed to establish his authority over the whole of Afghanistan, Pishīn and Sibi being retained by the British, and soon afterwards 'Abdur Rahmān agreed in return for an annual subsidy to place the conduct of his foreign relations

under British control. Thus the settlement at which Lytton had aimed was largely secured. The hostile amir had been replaced by one friendly to Great Britain; the fear of having an ally of Russia on the immediate frontier of India was removed; the control of the amir's external relations was secured; and above all a position was obtained on the further side of the hills from which any hostile advance towards India might be met and checked before the Indian territories were reached. The main point which still awaited settlement was the delimitation of the new amir's dominions. Except towards Persia they were as yet undefined. Between them and Russian Turkestan on the north, and British India on the east, lay belts of territory under no settled government. This was a not uncommon feature of political Asia. It carried with it what had long been regarded as a distinct advantage, a standing pretext for a declaration of war. Until that question had been cleared up, Central Asia was still likely to give ground for international dispute.

The matter became the more urgent because the Russian government speedily began to take advantage of the numerous difficulties in which Mr Gladstone was involved by his conduct of foreign policy. Russian documents (for instance the correspondence of the Baron de Staal who was the Russian ambassador at London at this period) prove how greatly Russia valued his tenure of office as providing a favourable opportunity of extending its power in Central Asia. The Merv oasis formed the first step. It was a region the importance of which had been exaggerated. It was, however, not far from Herat, and the Russians had repeatedly disclaimed all intentions of advancing thither. But while the Russian foreign minister was seeking to reassure the British ambassador on this point, Russian agents were urging and bribing the chiefs of Merv to submit themselves to the emperor. At last in 1884, when Mr Gladstone was embarrassed by the Sudan question, the allegiance of the chiefs was formally accepted and the Russian War Office prepared a map showing the new Russian boundary stretching south to touch the Hari-rūd near Herat. Fresh remonstrances led to a proposal that the Russo-Afghan boundary should be defined and laid down. The British ministry eagerly took up the idea, and at once appointed a commission to act with the Russians in the matter. It was suggested that the two missions should meet at Sarakhs on October 1, 1884. But the

Russian advance had not yet been sufficiently developed to make so early a meeting convenient. A general was therefore named head of the Russian mission, but he was at the same instant smitten with sickness, and it was evident that his diplomatic recovery would be followed by a lengthy period during which he would be diligently studying the problem and the Russian forces would be occupying the posts on which the Russians desired their frontier to rest. The chief point at which they aimed was Panjdeh, which the English had always regarded as lying well within the amir's territories. The Afghans sought to defend the place. Early in 1885 the respective forces were face to face. The English boundary commission was also present. On March 30, when the only line of telegraph by Mashhad was conveniently interrupted, the Russians took advantage of an incautious movement of the Afghan troops to attack and expel them from Panjdeh.

This news did not reach London till April 9. The Irish question was acute. The ministry's policy in the Sudan and the death of Gordon had involved it in deep unpopularity. The Afghan question also had excited much attention; and acceptance of the Russian action would be deemed a new humiliation. In these trying circumstances Mr Gladstone found it necessary to make a show of spirit. He called up the reserves and moved a vote of credit for special military preparations. De Giers, the Russian foreign minister, had reckoned on carrying his point by bluff. He had even ordered the ambassador to inform the English cabinet that the Afghan commandant admitted that he would have retired but for the pressure of the English boundary commission. But the vote of credit looked too like business and he at once cancelled his instructions to de Staal. The Russians wanted two things. They wished to avoid war; and they wished Mr Gladstone to retain office. A suggestion was put about that the matter might be referred to arbitration. The cabinet eagerly snatched at the idea, hoping that the German emperor might be named arbitrator. The Russians refused emphatically to submit the conduct of their general to discussion; but were willing to arbitrate on the question whether they had kept their engagements with Great Britain, provided that the arbitrator was the king of Denmark. These points were conceded, and the Russians, having obtained their main point, permitted the delimitation of the frontier, which took place in the course of the following year. The arbitration lapsed,

indeed it had never been more than a pretext under cover of which Mr Gladstone might retire from his bellicose position. After somewhat similar though less provocative events, the boundary through the Pāmirs was formally laid down.

In Afghanistan itself, the amir had been gradually building up his position. He was excellently fitted for the difficult office which he held. He ruled the Afghans with a rod of iron. Rebellions were crushed with traditional vigour and commemorated by the erection of great pyramids of skulls. 'Abdur Rahmān's administration of justice was personal, and marked by the fantastic but striking methods of Jahāngīr in Mughal India. He was perhaps the most absolute ruler of his day. His rigid orthodoxy carried with it the support and sympathy of the mullahs; and he enjoyed a great and deserved reputation in the world of Islam. With the English he maintained generally good relations. But the later part of his reign was marked by periods of coolness, of distrust, and frontier intrigue. Indeed the incident of Panjdeh seems to have given him a lesson. Misled by the experience of Shīr 'Alī and the assurances of the boundary commission, he seems to have believed that the Russians would never dare to attack his territory so long as he was sheltered by British arms. At the moment at which the incident occurred, he was paying a visit to Lord Dufferin at Rawulpindi. The governor-general had at once assured him of arms, ammunition, and possibly money should war with Russia follow. But Great Britain evidently had thought Afghanistan not worth going to war over. 'Abdur Rahmān probably concluded with wisdom that just as Russia had not been willing to fight for Shīr 'Alī, so, too, England would not fight for him. He could hardly be expected to relish the position of his country as the region in which the security of India from invasion was to be defended.

However, the chief difficulties arose not out of any leanings towards Russia but out of questions of frontier policy. The frontier problem was exceedingly complicated. It involved political, military, and administrative questions. The political question was to define the proper division of rule between India and Afghanistan; the military to find the line from which India might best be defended; and the administrative to determine the point to which control of the frontier tribesmen should be assumed. The military question had already been determined by the Second Afghan

War. Quetta was occupied and developed; it was linked up with the Indian railways; it was designed to permit the speedy occupation of Kandahār, in order to meet and repel any attack, whether Russian or Afghan, coming from the north-west. The political question still had to be answered. Along what line was the authority of the amir on the one side and of the governor-general on the other to terminate? The British had inherited from the Sikhs an undefined border beyond which lay a tangle of great hills, cut by deep winding valleys, and occupied by a great number of tribes. Further to the south, where the conquest of Sind had carried British authority on to the edge of Balūchistan, the political position was much the same. But the whole frontier had fallen under two provincial authorities. The Sind frontier was under Bombay, the Pathān frontier under the Panjab. This fact had led to the development of two distinct methods of administering the frontier and conducting relations with the trans-border tribes. On the Sind frontier, where the valleys were broader and less tortuous than in the Panjab and where the cultivated land pressed less closely on the tribal areas, the "closed frontier system" was in force. Under this, the frontier was patrolled, and no tribesman from beyond was allowed to enter British territory without a pass. The Panjab frontier was an "open frontier". Its protection was based upon forts and garrisons. In the fruitless hope of winning the tribesmen to forsake their immemorial habits of plunder, they were encouraged to trade within British territory. Raids, however, were frequent, and the only practicable punishment consisted in punitive expeditions. The frontier officials were strongly discouraged from visiting the tribal region. Down to about 1890 the Sind system was working incomparably better than that of the Panjab.

This result, however, was due to local circumstances rather than to anything else. The physical differences of the two frontiers have already been noted. But there existed political differences as well. Major Sandeman, who was appointed to the Balūchistan agency in 1877, was able to enter into comparatively close and friendly relations with the principal Balūch chiefs, and Lytton withdrew the prohibition which had limited the activities of English agents to British India. But Sandeman's success was only possible in a region such as the Balūch region, where the chiefs possessed a high degree of influence over their fellow tribesmen.

The Pathān tribes were real democracies. The *jirga*, or tribal council, in the Balūch country was a small group of leaders; in the Pathān country it might consist of the whole tribe. Agreements with the Pathān chiefs therefore did not and could not possess the value which agreements with the Balūch chiefs carried. All attempts to extend Sandeman's methods to the Pathān tribes were foredoomed to failure. While then Sandeman could establish a vastly improved order in the south by agreeing with chiefs for the guarding of the passes and the execution of the decisions of the *jirgas*, in return for the grant of allowances, Bruce's attempt to introduce the same plan into British relations with the Mahsud tribesmen proved useless.

The early history of the Panjab frontier was thus a series of raids interspersed with expeditions into tribal territory intended to bring the tribesmen to reason and teach them that raids were disadvantageous. At the same time a tendency existed towards the extension of British authority. After difficult negotiations in 1893, Durand induced the amir to accept a formal boundary, known as the Durand line, intended to mark out the political jurisdiction of the amir on the one side and of the British on the other. The British government was disposed to take its new responsibilities seriously. The Chitrāl campaign of 1895, the extensive frontier risings of 1897, were the result, assisted by the intrigues of the amir, who might have agreed to renounce his authority over certain tribes but who was not willing to honour his pledges. Lord Curzon did more than any other individual to bring order into the confusion of frontier politics. In the first place, despite the protests of the Panjab government, he created the North-West Frontier Province, reaching from one end of the frontier to the other, and replacing the divided authority which had till then existed by the power of a single group of individuals. In the second place he withdrew the British troops whom he had found established in forward positions, where they were not only exposed to tribal attacks but also were a constant source of irritation to the tribes. Instead of regulars, he set up groups of *khas-sidars*, or militiamen, drawn from the tribes themselves, and supported by regular troops who were concentrated in positions in the rear, and enabled by new roads and railways to move laterally with a speed till then impossible. These changes greatly improved the situation; but the temper of the tribes still remained uncertain,

owing partly to their fanatical religious ideas, partly to the efforts of the amir, who hoped that if he induced the tribes to give sufficient trouble the English sooner or later would cease to dominate them and leave them to his management.

Meanwhile troubles had arisen with the scarcely known and seldom-visited state of Tibet. This country was nominally a dependency of China, Chinese troops having been invited in to save it from Gurkha occupation. But by the close of the nineteenth century this dependence was scarcely more than nominal. The Chinese maintained a resident, the *amban*, at Lhasa, and demanded that all Indo-Tibetan relations should be conducted through him. But he had become virtually powerless, and was most unwilling to do anything which would reveal his impotency to the external world. The country was really controlled by a council of regency, acting in the name of the Dalai Lama, one of the two religious heads of Buddhism in Tibet. The Dalai Lama was regarded as an incarnation of the Buddha, an emanation of whose spirit was thought, immediately on the lama's death, to be reincarnate in some child born at the same moment. But throughout the greater part of the century successive lamas had perished on approaching maturity, and the iniquity of man had thus limited the abode of the divinity to a person incapable of exercising government. Towards the close of the century, however, the existing Dalai Lama had come of age instead of being quietly put to death. This change of policy was probably due to the influence of a Russian Buriat named Dorjief. This man seems to have persuaded the council that Russia was a Buddhist country, and that, if matters were rightly handled, the Dalai Lama might become head of a consolidated Buddhist church under the military protection of the Russian emperor.

The relations of this region with British India had been scanty. The roads leading into it were difficult and unfrequented, and, although in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries British agents had been received at Lhasa, the Chinese spread distrust of the motives and policy of the rulers of British India. In 1886 a commercial mission had been dispatched, but recalled in deference to Chinese protests, and its withdrawal had been at once followed by a Tibetan invasion of the protected state of Sikkim. Two years later, after numerous efforts to induce the Chinese government to compel the invaders to withdraw, the Tibetans were expelled

by force, and in 1893 a trade agreement was adopted. But every article of it was ignored by the Tibetans. It had been negotiated with the Chinese alone, and their dependents destroyed the Indian boundary-pillars, and again invaded Sikkim. These causes of offence were emphasised by reports of Tibetan missions to Russia. These were sent in 1898, 1900, and again in 1901, when Dorjjeff was received in audience by the emperor. Rumours spread that China had been induced to cede to the emperor her rights over Tibet; and, although the Russians emphatically denied that the Tibetan missions had any political significance or that they had negotiated with China about Tibet, none but the simplest-minded Briton could give full credit to such assertions. Lord Curzon, then governor-general, resolved that the position could be cleared up only by the dispatch of a mission to Lhasa. After prolonged discussions with the home government, and a most provocative complaint from Russia against British intervention in Tibet, Colonel Younghusband was sent at the head of a mission. The Tibetans attempted to prevent his advancing into the country; but their efforts were brushed aside with considerable loss to them, and the mission advanced, first to Gyantse, and then to Lhasa; the Dalai Lama fled; and at last an agreement was negotiated with the Tibetans themselves, who agreed to open trading-posts and to pay an indemnity, much reduced by the decision of the home government. Thus in Tibet, as in Afghanistan, British-Indian interests had been protected at the cost of military action.

In the early years of the present century the various branches of policy here reviewed underwent considerable changes. German policy was becoming particularly active, seeking to set up definite communications with the near and middle east. Of the German projects the most notable was the construction of a railway to link up Constantinople with the Persian Gulf. This was regarded with the greatest suspicion by the Russians, who thought it designed to dispute with them access to India. The English attitude was less hostile, at all events in official circles; but none the less agreement on joint action proved to be impossible, and the whole plan was found to involve too much international jealousy to be executed. With this should be set the attempts of various powers, Russia, France, and Germany, to secure bases on the Persian Gulf. These attempts were sharply resisted by Great Britain, and Lord Lansdowne, when foreign minister, declared that any such



acquisition, in the light of special British interests in the Persian Gulf, would be considered an unfriendly action. It was fortunate for India that neither the Berlin-Baghdad railway, nor the desired German base on the Persian Gulf, had come into existence when war broke out in 1914, for they would have greatly complicated the problems of the defence of the country.

The development of these German views, coupled with the disappearance of the understanding between that country and Russia which had enabled the latter to play so large a part in Central Asia at an earlier time, greatly modified Anglo-Indian policy. The home government, finding Britain menaced by the expansion of the German navy, set to work to clear away ancient misunderstandings with France and Russia. With the first, agreement was reached on the subject of the Burma frontier; with the second, a convention was signed dealing with the Asiatic interests of the two empires. This was exclusively the work of the government in London. Any agreement with Russia was regarded by Lord Minto, who was then governor-general, as likely to produce danger rather than security. But despite his protests, the convention was signed in 1907, without giving him any opportunity to secure the assent of the amir of Afghanistan. By this convention Russia recognised for the first time in any formal document that Afghanistan lay beyond her sphere of interests. At this time the ruler of Kābul was Habībullah, who had succeeded his father, 'Abdur Rahmān, in 1901. He himself was inclined to friendly relations with Great Britain; but he found difficulties in the activity and influence of his very orthodox brother, Nasrullah. He refused therefore to recognise the convention, which was unpopular in the world of Islam owing to the division of Persia into spheres of influence, generally but mistakenly thought to portend a real partition of that country. But, so long as the entente between Great Britain and Russia lasted, no ruler of Afghanistan could venture to break with British India. The effects of the convention were therefore less than Minto had expected. Even the outbreak of the war with Germany in 1914, and the attempts which were made to use Kābul as the starting point of an attack on British India, proved failures. But the revolution which broke out in Russia in 1917, and the consequent disappearance of the friendliness which had marked Anglo-Russian relations since 1907, transformed the position. In 1919 the amir was murdered,

and his successor, Amānullāh, thought he might strengthen his position by an attack on British India. Thus the Third Afghan War came about. This attempt to invade Indian territory showed at once the need of strong defences on the frontier, and the difficulty of controlling Afghan policy so long as Russia and Great Britain remained enemies. The peace which concluded the war in 1921 restored to Afghanistan freedom of conducting its foreign relations, and it still remains precariously perched between two great states, much as was the case in the days of Shīr 'Alī.

## CHAPTER XV

### Burma, 1852-1918

The kingdom of Burma offered a notable instance of the difficulty of maintaining friendly relations (in the European sense of the term) with an Asiatic state. The diplomatic traditions of the kingdom had been formed by its relations with the empire of China and its age-long rivalry with the neighbouring Siam. The decay of Chinese imperial pretensions in practice if not in theory, coupled with the successes which the rulers of Burma had obtained against the Siamese, had firmly established the belief that Burma was great and powerful. Nor had that belief been much shaken by the first, badly managed, war between Burma and the East India Company. When a new king, Tharrawaddy, ascended the throne in 1837, he had refused to recognise the Treaty of Yandabo as binding, since in accordance with general Asiatic tradition he regarded treaties as mere personal agreements between sovereigns which lapsed with the death of either signatory. Nor would he even receive the English resident in his representative character, since the latter was commissioned by a dependent government instead of the sovereign of Great Britain. In consequence the resident had been withdrawn in 1840.

No local means remained to smooth away the difficulties which arose from time to time at the port of Rangoon. The Burmese governor there in 1850 was a man given to liquor, who in his cups would threaten to behead the whole population of the city. According to Burmese custom, he regarded his government as his estate, to be made the most of while he continued to hold it. He extorted 1005 rupees from the commander of one British-owned barque on a false charge of throwing his pilot overboard, and 700 from another with threats of flogging and beheading on an equally false charge of murdering a lascar. Dalhousie therefore sent a queen's frigate, *Fox*, under Commodore Lambert, to seek reparation—the removal of the governor and the payment of compensation. Pagān, who had become king in 1845, was quite willing to accommodate matters. He despatched a new governor to Rangoon with orders to arrange a settlement. Lambert, who

knew little of eastern uses, quarrelled with the new governor on a point of etiquette. He blockaded Rangoon and seized one of the king's vessels. In return the Burmese batteries opened fire on the *Fox*. Dalhousie very reluctantly sent an ultimatum. The Burmese court ignored it, and the Second Burmese War began on April 1, 1852, when Dalhousie's forces under Admiral Austen and General Godwin reached Rangoon.

Their organisation was good. Dalhousie had paid special attention to matters of transport, commissariat and medical supplies, taking prudent warning by the difficulties of the former war. Rangoon and Mārtabān were taken in a fortnight. Bassein followed. Then Prome was captured and Pegu occupied. The Burmese had gathered together 30,000 men to oppose the 8000 British troops, but they only succeeded in killing and wounding 377. Pagān was not in fact vigorously supported by his people. The Shāns refused to send levies, the delta population welcomed the English, the Talaings rebelled against their Burmese king. As the Burmese court refused to come to terms, and Dalhousie had occupied as much territory as he thought prudent, Pegu was declared by proclamation on December 20, 1852, to be British territory and a letter was written to Pagān warning him that if he provoked another war it would end "in the ruin and exile of yourself and your race".

Almost immediately afterwards Pagān was deposed and imprisoned by his brother Mindōn, who ruled the remaining Burmese territories from 1853 to 1878. Like Tharrawaddy, in 1837, he refused to accept the consequences of his predecessor's foolish management. But he made no attempt to disturb the new frontier. In 1854 he sent agents to request of Dalhousie the rendition of Pegu. Despite Dalhousie's emphatic answer that the new province should never be restored, Mindōn next endeavoured, though in vain, to induce the missionaries to intervene; but when the Mutiny broke out, he would not listen to the advice of his court, that the time had come when Pegu might be recovered by force. His political conduct was thus notably peaceful and conciliatory. His great interests in life were trade and religion. He summoned a Buddhist council to his new capital at Mandalay in 1871, and presented a new spire, plated with gold and set with precious stones, to the Shwēdagōn Pagoda at Rangoon in the same year. As a trader he not only enforced the customary royal

monopolies, but was the largest dealer in all kinds of produce in his kingdom. He encouraged English merchants, partly in the hope that they would succeed in developing the trade with the neighbouring Chinese province of Yunnan. He sent envoys to Europe in order to open direct relations with the west; and though disappointed by the refusal of the English ministry to deal with him except through the Government of India, he welcomed the governor-general's agents when the residency was re-established in 1862. The Burmese court had always insisted that the residents should comply with local etiquette, and appear before the king kneeling and unshod. But in 1876 the governor-general forbade the continuance of this practice, on the ground that Burmese had gone to Europe, had witnessed the ceremonies of European courts, and knew that it was not customary to exact humiliating ceremonial. This attitude might be supported by much argument, but it involved many regrettable results. Mindōn refused to give way. The resident was no longer admitted to the king's presence; he transacted business merely with the ministers; and the English influence at once began to decline.

Among other political defects the Burmese kingdom suffered from ill-regulated customs of succession. The king was entitled to nominate his successor from among his sons or brothers. Mindōn had forty-eight sons, and shrank from nominating any for fear that the favoured one would be immediately poisoned. At last, on his death-bed, he nominated three who were to divide the kingdom between them. The ministers disliked this decision, and rightly, because it would have meant civil war. They therefore supported a project of the queen dowager, to set up a younger son, Thibaw, who was married to her daughter, Supayālat. All the other sons and daughters were imprisoned, and for the traditional act of allegiance was substituted a new oath promising obedience, no longer to the king alone, but to the king acting with the *Hlutdaw*—the council of ministers.

However, this attempt to borrow western political ideas speedily collapsed. The custom of ministerial obedience was too strong to be abandoned. Thibaw was a feeble creature, much given to strong liquor; but he was ruled, not by the wisdom of the *Hlutdaw* but by the wiles of Supayālat. Under her influence the new king refused to marry the numerous queens regarded as the necessary appendages of royal state; and then, fearing a movement

in favour of one of the other princes, Thibaw ordered seventy members of the royal family to be put to death. In the middle of February, 1879, these unfortunate persons were strangled or beaten to death, and their bodies flung into a trench within the palace enclosure. Although this practice had not been followed in the previous four reigns, there were numerous good precedents for the massacre from the thirteenth century onwards, nor did it shock Burmese sentiment. The ministerial view was that it was better for the princes to perish than that the country should be laid waste by rebellion and dacoity. After much indecision, it was resolved to withdraw the British resident, lest he too should be murdered. In any case he exercised no influence and could do little good.

British policy in the years immediately following was markedly unsteady. Four of Thibaw's brothers had escaped from Burma, and sought to raise rebellions. One or other would have succeeded in overthrowing the king but for the action of the Government of India in interning them whenever it could lay hands on them. Commercial and especially missionary opinion ran strongly in favour of annexation. In 1884 English and Chinese merchants in Rangoon joined in subscribing funds to assist one of the princes, Myingun, to invade Burma by way of Siam; while the English chief commissioner considered that in view of Thibaw's misrule another prince, Nyaungyan, should be assisted to set himself up as king. But the Calcutta government, torn between moral disapproval of Thibaw and moral disapproval of intervention, would do nothing.

The French were less squeamish. They had in recent years established an empire in Indo-China and desired to extend their influence into Upper Burma. From the time of Mindōn the Burmese court had been seeking an alliance with a first-class European power. In 1885 Ferry, who was pursuing an aggressive policy, signed a commercial treaty with the envoys whom Thibaw had sent to Europe, and at the same time gave them a letter agreeing, though reluctantly, to permit the import of arms through Tonkin as soon as order was regularly established there. He had assured the British ambassador that he would never allow the import of arms, and had insisted that his discussions merely related to trade. Six months later, in July, the British chief commissioner at Rangoon procured a copy of Ferry's letter. The

falsity of Ferry's assurances led the Government of India to regard French policy in Upper Burma with much suspicion; and it was further alarmed by the activity of French finance in that country. The French government had established a consul at Mandalay. Through him and a Burmese envoy at Paris a number of important concessions were negotiated. The French were to establish a bank at Mandalay, to build railways, to place a fleet of steamers on the Irawadi, to manage the royal monopolies of teak and petroleum. These projects, however, overran the policy of the state. Great Britain had repeatedly and publicly claimed special interests in Upper Burma. On her remonstrances the French disavowed their consul's acts, while reverses in Tonkin at once restricted the French power, and cooled their desire, to interfere in Burma. As had happened in the previous century, the unconsidered policy of the French had encouraged an eastern prince in hostility to England, had persuaded him that French help would be forthcoming in the event of trouble, and so had nourished a policy which they were unable or unwilling to support by force of arms.

Thibaw undoubtedly fancied that French friendship would relieve him of all need to conciliate the English, and he unwisely proceeded to give them an opportunity of action. His finances were shamelessly mismanaged. The revenues were misappropriated. The royal jewels were pledged. State lotteries were tried and failed. Loans were raised from all willing to advance money. At this time the Bombay-Burma Trading Corporation was the largest English firm established in Burma. It drove a great trade in teak which it cut and sold under a royal concession. It had already advanced Thibaw £100,000. He demanded a further advance of twice that amount. The company refused. It was then accused before the *Hlutdaw* of not paying its employees and of cheating Thibaw of his royalties. The *Hlutdaw* condemned the company to pay a fine exceeding the amount originally demanded as a loan, cancelled its leases, and prepared to grant new ones to French merchants. On this the governor-general, Lord Dufferin, demanded that the case should be submitted to his arbitration. The Burmese court refused. (On October 19, 1885, an ultimatum reached Rangoon to be forwarded to Mandalay. It required the reception of a permanent resident, with free access to the king without humiliating ceremonies, the submission of the Bombay-

Burma Corporation's case to the viceroy's arbitration, the management of Burmese foreign relations through the Government of India, and assistance in developing the trade with Yunnan. On November 9 Thibaw's rejection was received. Three weeks later he was a prisoner.

Annexation was the only practicable course. Thibaw's massacres had destroyed most of the possible claimants to the throne, and the only survivor thought to possess the necessary character was under French influence. But annexation involved, as had been expected, great and prolonged difficulties. The country was disorganised and demoralised. Dacoity had long been prevalent. The troops whom Thibaw assembled to repel the English scarcely fired a shot, but disbanded and joined the dacoits. They could hardly ever be brought to action, and spent their time evading the British troops and plundering their own countrymen. Their reduction took five years, and at one time 32,000 men were employed against them.

The annexation of Upper Burma was the last example, in the expansion of British India, of the misfortunes which have commonly followed on a refusal to intervene at the appropriate moment. It was generally agreed that a small amount of countenance and help would have permitted one of the rival princes to overthrow Thibaw early in his ill-starred reign. There would then have possibly arisen a friendly Burmese state under acknowledged British protection, and that would have offered the best solution of the Burmese problem, for the country would have been spared the consequences of unskilful endeavours to treat it as an Indian province. The refusal in 1887 to accept the assistance voluntarily offered by the heads of the Buddhist priesthood was perhaps the greatest blunder that was committed, for it not only threw away a most valuable link between the people and the government but also led to the disintegration of the ecclesiastical organisation.



## CHAPTER XVI

### The Crown and the Indian States

The change in the form of government in 1858, although leaving the relations of the British government with the Indian states seemingly untouched, laid the foundation of the considerable developments which were to follow in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The act transferring the functions of the East India Company to the crown expressly confirmed all the treaties which the company had made; and the proclamation in which the queen announced her assumption of control declared that she held herself bound by those obsolescent documents. These announcements seem to have been made without due consideration. Taken literally, they appeared to mean that the treaties were to possess a force which they had long lost, and that the princes were to enjoy the status of equal allies of the British crown. But it was not the intention of either the home authorities or the Government of India to introduce any such revolutionary change into Indian political relations. The queen and the ministry meant that the princes should be treated fairly; the governor-general meant that the government should, as he expressly declared, continue to exercise the power of interference when needed to prevent abuses. Moreover, the government of the crown was not averse, as the company's government had been, from recognising its responsibility for India as a whole. In that respect a marked change took place. Responsibility was asserted firmly and consistently. The queen was regarded as the sovereign, not merely of the possessions formerly held by the East India Company, but of the whole country. The princes were expected to show her not friendship alone but also allegiance. The change was indicated by new phrases which appear in the documents relating to the states. They were expected to show "loyalty to the British crown", which the *sanads* of adoption lay down as a condition of the privilege which they conferred, and "allegiance to Her Majesty" which was an express condition of the rendition of Mysore. The princes were thus deemed to have become members of an empire, whose boundaries were no longer limited to the provinces directly

administered from Calcutta. The assumption of the new title of Empress of India, announced at the great durbar of 1876, was an outward sign of the change which had taken place. So was the assumption of the power of bestowing orders and titles upon the princes. In 1861 a new order, the Star of India, was created specially to provide a means by which the crown could reward the princes for their services during the Indian Mutiny. As Canning, the governor-general, said, "There is a reality in the suzerainty of the sovereign of England which has never existed before, and which is not only felt but is eagerly acknowledged by the chiefs".

Nor were the latter without good reason for acknowledging and acquiescing in this change, despite the effects which it was to have upon the theory, and the practice, of the predominant power in India. Under the company the states had been threatened with extinction. A failure of heirs, a decadent administration, a quarrelsome resident, might involve any of them in annexation. But such a fate was now formally, explicitly, and effectually ruled out. The queen's proclamation of 1858 declared, in striking contrast to the declaration of the East India Company in 1832, that "we desire no extension of our present territorial possessions". These were mere words. But they were speedily followed by a measure which set the hearts of many princes at rest. In 1860 a number of special grants were issued under the name of "*sanads* of adoption." The chiefs to whom they were addressed were informed that "the doctrine of lapse" had been brought to an end. The *sanads* ran in two forms, one for the Hindus, the other for the Muslims. The first were assured that adoptions on a failure of natural heirs would be recognised and confirmed; the second that successions in accordance with Muslim law would be upheld. If then the princes had in fact lost their status as separate and individual sovereigns, if they had become subordinate members of an empire, they had also been recognised, not as transitory, but as permanent members of that empire.

But annexation was the only point in which the crown receded from the position of the company. In all other matters it accepted and developed the position to which it succeeded. Though annexation on a failure of natural heirs had been abjured, successions remained subject to the confirmation of the Government of India. "No succession is valid until recognition has been given." The military strength of the states was still closely watched. For

this the company had had two motives. One was the fear, needless in fact, of any prince becoming inconveniently powerful; the other was the desire to prevent princes from wasting on unnecessary military display money which was more urgently required for administrative improvements. Under the crown this second motive certainly became much more powerful than the first; yet perhaps it was not the dominant factor when in the 'sixties Jayaji Rāo Sindhia was required to reduce his forces to the limits laid down by treaty; and even Lord Kitchener's re-organisation of the Indian Army took into account the possibility of troubles from the Indian states as well as external invasion or internal disturbance. No relaxation in the control of political relations was made; nor was the isolation of the individual states modified until the formation of the Chamber of Princes in 1921.

While in these respects the crown maintained the practice established by the company, in the matter of internal interference usages grew up far exceeding those of the former régime. The company had refrained from accepting a general responsibility for the whole of India. The government of the crown did not. On the contrary it emphasised its responsibility. In the face of the administrative disorder of the Nizām's dominions Dalhousie had formally disclaimed all concern for the administrative well-being of Hyderabad. But the later governors-general assumed a different attitude. Elgin, for example, in 1862, observed, "If we lay down the rule that we will scrupulously respect the right of the chiefs to do wrong, ... we may find that it may carry us somewhat far—possibly to annexation, the very bug-bear from which we are seeking to escape". Accordingly, from the first, the former hesitation to interfere vanished. The rule of the mahārāja of Alwar was replaced by a council of regency after he had provoked his nobles into rebellion. The nawab of Tānk was deposed for being concerned in an affray in which the family of one of his dependent chiefs was almost exterminated. The nawab of Kalāt was deposed for inflicting barbarous punishments. But the leading example was afforded by the case of the Gaekwar of Baroda. Malhar Rāo, who had succeeded in 1870, was a man of low character and mean intellect. He had on his accession imprisoned and destroyed the chief agents of the late ruler. He had provoked great discontent among the subjects of his state, and within three years the Government of India appointed a commission of enquiry to

examine into his administration. Malhar Rão was required to introduce a number of reforms. He did nothing, but instead quarrelled with the resident, a man of small judgment and little tact. Finally he was accused of attempting to poison the resident. A new commission was then appointed. On this occasion the political department was represented by only one member. The others were the chief justice of Bengal, another judge, two ruling princes, and Sir Dinkar Rão, who had shown great ability in re-organising the administration of Indore. The Gaekwar was arrested and placed on his trial before this body. After hearing voluminous evidence and the prolonged addresses of counsel, all the members agreed that an attempt had been made to poison the resident by two members of his household, and that the guilty men had been in communication with the Gaekwar; but the Indian members found the charge against the Gaekwar himself unproven, while the two judges and the political official considered that it had been established. On this report, the Government of India concluded that, although the commission had not found the Gaekwar guilty of attempted murder, yet the presumptive evidence was so strong, coupled with his previous misconduct, as to render him impossible as a ruling prince. It decided therefore to depose him, and to recognise as his successor a young member of the family, not directly descended from the accused man. During his minority the state was placed under the management of a council of regency over which a distinguished Indian administrator, Sir Madhava Rão, presided. Some such decision had been a foregone conclusion. But the procedure adopted had been unprecedented. Till then the decisions of the Government of India had been taken in the secrecy of the political department; and this was the first attempt to constitute anything like a judicial tribunal to decide on an accusation against a ruling chief. This action was possibly due to the views which Queen Victoria had formerly expressed in regard to cases concerning the princes of India, and it is closely similar to the procedure laid down for future guidance in 1921. It clearly marked a great advance on previous practice. But it was an advance in more directions than one. It promised to the princes the advantage of not having the Government of India acting as judge and party in the same suit; but it also manifested in an unmistakable manner the suzerainty claimed on behalf of the crown. But for the policy of the crown

in refraining from annexation, such a step would perhaps have provoked great discontent on the part of the princes as a whole. Holkar, who had been invited to serve on the commission of enquiry but had declined, probably expressed the general view of his fellows when he said, "The person for the time being is little; the state with its rights is the point for consideration". Under the company Malhar Rão would not have been brought to public trial; but none the less he would have been deposed, and in all probability his state would have been added to the British dominions.

The rendition of Mysore furnished another striking illustration of the new policy of the crown. The state had fallen under British administration in 1831. The mahārāja, who had then been removed from the exercise of authority, had survived till 1868. He had repeatedly sought permission to adopt a son, but this had been consistently refused; and at one time it had been generally expected that on his death the state would pass formally under British sovereignty. So in fact it did, but not in the expected manner. After the mahārāja's death, it was resolved that after all the son whom he had adopted to carry on the religious rites of the family and to inherit his private estate should be recognised as his political heir and be invested with the government of the state, provided that on coming of age the boy gave promise of becoming a satisfactory ruler. In accordance with this decision the state was made over to him in 1881. But it was not made over absolutely. The instrument of transfer did not confer sovereignty. That word, where used, refers to the sovereignty of Queen Victoria. The prince is given "possession" of the territories. He is to "administer" them. He is to "remain faithful in allegiance and subordination to Her Majesty". The state coinage is not to be revived. Its military forces are not to exceed the limits fixed by the Government of India. The law in force in 1881 is not to be changed without the approval of the governor-general in council. Lands needed for railway development are to be made over free of charge, and the Government of India is to enjoy full jurisdiction over them. Thus the state of Mysore is clearly not an independent state, even in regard to internal administration. It is a province of the empire of India. The administrative policy of its ruler must correspond with the policy of the country as a whole. Its prince exercises a trust on behalf of the British crown; and although his


rights depend on an agreement between himself and the crown, instead of on statutes passed by the British parliament, his position is not dissimilar from that formerly enjoyed by the East India Company. He exercises sovereign powers, but his exercise of them is liable to control, and he is politically dependent on a superior authority.

The differences between this settlement of 1881 and the treaty by which the state was constituted by Wellesley in 1799 are most instructive. Under Wellesley's treaty Mysore was undoubtedly dependent. The company could garrison at its pleasure any fortress within its borders; any advice which it offered the prince was under an obligation to observe; it maintained a large force within his territory; it entirely regulated his foreign relations; and it had the right of re-entering on the territory and assuming the administration if the payments to which the prince was bound fell into arrears. The prince was thus a dependent ally of the East India Company. But the duties which he owed to it could hardly be brought under the term of allegiance. Wellesley's treaty in fact was mainly designed to secure two purposes. One was the adequate protection of the state from attack; the second was the maintenance of a stable financial system. Those had ceased to be the main purposes to be secured by the instrument of transfer. External danger was no longer to be feared. Financial stability had merged in the wider question of the maintenance of a sound system of administration. The suzerainty of the crown had to be placed beyond doubt or question.

The cases of the Gaekwar and of Mysore thus exhibited in a strong light the policy inaugurated in 1858. In both opportunities of annexation were deliberately passed by; in both the suzerainty of the crown was asserted in a striking manner. The terms on which the Mysore state was given back to princely rule offer a clear example of what the government of the crown considered should be the relations between itself and the princes of India. Moreover at this time a tendency prevailed for similar ideas to be applied in some degree to all the other states. The main cause lay in the higher consciousness of responsibility in the imperial as opposed to the company's government. But many other causes concurred. The development of communications within the country, the spread of railways and the swiftly-growing use of the telegraph, coupled with the growth of educa-

tion and of the public press, brought news to the Government of India much more rapidly than had formerly been the case, and increased the amount of news which it received. Under the company a chief might cut off a delinquent's hand or foot, but such an episode might never come to the ears of the government, or only reach them weeks after the punishment had been inflicted. Interference would then either be impossible or appear useless. When, however, the government might be informed of the chief's intention before it had been carried out, interference was not only possible but beneficial. Then, too, the standpoint of government in regard to administrative misconduct changed greatly. Standards of judgment rose. Uses which had been tolerated in the old days were now rigorously prohibited. The custom of the country, which had once been a universal excuse for misconduct, was now no longer admitted. Princes whose private conduct had been regarded as exclusively a matter of their own concern were now liable to paternal advice. At the close of the century the ruling chiefs were circularised with an expression of the governor-general's opinion of the inexpediency of their making prolonged and repeated visits to Europe. The same governor-general, Lord Curzon, claimed them as his partners and colleagues, adding that they could not be at once loyal subjects of Her Majesty and frivolous or irresponsible despots. The prince "must be the servant as well as the master of his people".

Under the pressure of these moral considerations, the Government of India began to formulate a series of precedents which would normally be followed in certain cases with the Indian states. Some provisions in certain treaties were stressed, others were suffered to fall into oblivion. A body of rules was emerging for the coherent management of the relations with Indian India. Despite the variations in the terms of the treaties, a uniformity of treatment was beginning to emerge. The practice of "reading the treaties together" was coming into vogue. The result was that at the end of the century Lord Curzon could speak of the relations with the states as having "grown up under widely differing historical conditions", but having in process of time "gradually conformed to a single type". The objections to such a practice are clear. It tends to invalidate individual treaties; and if the states are regarded as really possessing an international status, the impropriety is unquestionable. But states which have surrendered either



# THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER

- Durand and Outer Boundary of India
- - - Russo-Afghan and Russo-Persian Frontier
- ..... Sandeman Line
- Other Boundaries
- Scientific Frontier
- Railways



by formal grant or acquiescence all power of control over their external relations, which have submitted for a long period of years to a constant supervision of their internal administration, and which have constantly acknowledged the supremacy of the king-emperor, do not in fact enjoy any international status, and international rules of conduct do not therefore apply to them. They are provinces of a united India; and from that point of view general rules, however cautiously applied, are indispensable. Even the late advocate of the rights of the princes before the Butler Committee found it impossible to avoid admitting that certain uniform rights were vested in the British crown; yet, it seems, the validity of those rights must rest upon cessions made by the greater states. But if the rights of small states can be modified by cessions made by larger ones, it is difficult to argue that a cession on the part of one large state cannot affect the rights of another large one. The fact is that a position has gradually developed which finds no place in treaties framed a century or more ago in circumstances differing completely from those of the present day. Nothing can be more idle than to attempt to restore the conditions of 1818. What is really needed is a new definition of the relations which shall exist between the states and the Government of India.

As a matter of fact the importance of this question has only emerged in comparatively recent times. Until about the close of the century the princes were on the whole disposed to acquiesce in the action of the Government of India, wisely perceiving that they were on the whole benefiting far more than suffering by the policy of the crown. But with the development of a policy of constitutional reform the position began to change. The princes began to ask themselves what would be their position when a new government might come into being responsible to the people of British India. They could see no reason why they should acquiesce in subordination to any Indian cabinet. It was Britain, not India, who had deprived them of their former sovereignty. Left to themselves they might well have established their own rule over the regions which had become British India. Thus democratic possibilities began to raise hostility against a body which might one day be radically transformed, just as within British India itself like hopes and fears excited an antagonism such as had not been known for generations between the Muslim and the Hindu.

It is noteworthy that the same period brought a reversal, in part

at least, of the policy of uniformity which had been actively pursued until the close of Lord Curzon's administration. Lord Minto deliberately changed the emphasis of British policy when he declared that he would avoid the issue of general instructions. But even he recognised that the treaties had to be interpreted in the light of actual fact and established usage, and did nothing to detract from that paramountcy of the crown which had gradually grown up.

Thus the course of policy since 1858 has been marked by two great changes, the first being the maintenance of the states and abstention from annexation, the second the extension of the practice of interference in matters of internal administration. But two other important changes have to be noted as well. One was in regard to the military forces of the states. The suspicion with which the princes were regarded by the company's government gradually gave place to a well-founded confidence. They had been looked on as allies who had been driven reluctantly into an alliance by the force of circumstances. But in times of external danger, when for instance the Panjdeh crisis threatened a war with Russia and when war broke out with Germany in 1914, the princes gave striking evidence of their desire to stand side by side with their suzerain. No observer could doubt that their alliance had ceased to be a galling bond which they desired to break at the first favourable opportunity. Sir Mortimer Durand, who was secretary of the Foreign Department in 1885, strongly urged the expediency of finding employment and recognition for the state troops. He discussed the question with the commander-in-chief, Sir Frederick Roberts, with the lieutenant-governor of the Panjab, with Lord Dufferin, the governor-general. The result of his persuasive advocacy was the formation of the Imperial Service Troops. Certain bodies of the state forces were to be placed for training under British officers, but were to remain entirely under the control of the states which raised them and were only to fall under the orders of the commander-in-chief when they were employed on active service. The maintenance of such bodies was a matter entirely at the discretion of the princes themselves, the chief condition being that they should always be kept effective and ready to serve whenever called for. They were first employed in the Hunza campaign in 1893. In 1914 they numbered 22,000; in 1923 they had risen to 27,000 men. This new policy offers a

most remarkable contrast to that of Wellesley, who sought to hold the states in check by imposing on them bodies of foreign troops paid for by the princes but controlled by the company. It indicates a clear departure even from the policy of 1867 when Sindhia had been required to reduce his forces.

The other great change was the relaxation of the policy of keeping the states in strict isolation. Every treaty had placed the management of foreign affairs in the hands of the governor-general. No two states could communicate except through the Foreign Department. No two princes could converse on matters of common interest save through the agency of that department. The object of this had been to prevent as far as possible the formation of any league hostile to British supremacy in India. This practice persisted until a surprisingly late date. Lytton was the first governor-general to propose any relaxation. His general policy was directed towards securing a more active co-operation of the Indian aristocracy with the British government. That was the purpose underlying the formation of his Statutory Civil Service; that was the purpose of his proposed Indian Privy Council. He was eager to announce at the great durbār at which Queen Victoria was to be proclaimed Empress of India the creation of a council to be composed of a certain number of the greater chiefs, to consult with the governor-general on matters of common interest. Had this proposal been accepted, it would have led necessarily to the disappearance of the old isolation to which the princes had been politically condemned. But the project was viewed in England as dangerous, and the only step taken was to bestow the empty title of "councillors of the empress" on some of the princes. Curzon and Minto were the next to revive the idea. The latter desired the reforms of 1908 to be accompanied by the formation of a council on which the princes were to be represented. But the opposition of the home government and other influences defeated the proposal. Nevertheless, the same governor-general did begin a new practice, that of collective consultation. Lord Hardinge followed the practice and widened it. At last the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 recommended the formation of machinery for a regular collective consultation between the Government of India and the states, and this led to the establishment of the Chamber of Princes inaugurated in 1921. This brought to a close a stage in the

development of the relations between the princes and the central government of British India. For the first time the princes were linked up with the central government by something more definite than a series of treaties which had in some respects lapsed into disuse almost as soon as they had been signed. It was a constitutional, not a diplomatic, link. It was a sign-post pointing to a united India as the goal of British policy, and thus formed a natural sequence to the course of events which has made the paramountcy of the king-emperor the outstanding feature of the last sixty years.

## CHAPTER XVII

### Educational and Political Development, 1858-92

Although the financial disorder brought about by the Mutiny had of necessity cut down the resources of the government, the development of educational policy continued unchecked. With a constancy of spirit as noble as that with which the defenders of the Delhi Ridge were holding their own against the mutineers' ceaseless attacks, Canning in the latter part of 1857 introduced and passed through his legislative council a bill establishing universities at Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. Regular educational departments were organised in each province under a director of public instruction, who on the one hand corresponded direct with the provincial government and on the other controlled a swiftly growing establishment. This comprised inspecting and teaching officials, who were soon classified into superior or "graded" and subordinate or "ungraded". The first were normally Englishmen, the second Indians and Eurasians. At first the superior posts had been filled by covenanted servants, chaplains, military officers, or any other officials thought likely to prove competent. But in 1859 the secretary of state had laid it down that educational appointments should usually be filled by persons not members of the covenanted or military services. Although the rates of pay were much lower than those of covenanted servants, a number of distinguished men, such as Edwin Arnold, were attracted to the new service.

The universities which had been set up in 1857 had been intended to supervise and control higher education by means of examinations and courses of study conducted and laid down by the universities themselves. The faith thus placed in examinations as a method of testing ability and educational progress proved the dominion still exercised by the ideas which in 1834 had replaced Sanskrit and Arabic by English and twenty years later had established open competition as the sole method of admission to the covenanted service. The university bodies consisted of vice-chancellors and senates, mainly filled by government servants, which drew up regulations subject to the approval of government.

The three universities divided the whole of India between them. The university of Calcutta was supposed to be responsible for northern India, the Central Provinces, and British Burma, as well as for the Presidency of Bengal. Those of Bombay and Madras were limited to their own presidencies. To these bodies were affiliated a growing number of colleges, maintained by government itself, by missionary societies, and by private bodies; all these were devoted to literary or legal studies except a couple of engineering and three medical colleges. Many of the colleges were really schools which had formed classes for instruction in the subjects required for the lower university examination; and admission to a university class was limited to students who had passed the matriculation examination conducted by the universities. This unfortunate system took too much for granted. In 1854 it had been suggested that a number of university chairs should be established. Dalhousie had opposed this on the ground that the universities would be ill-qualified to supervise actual teaching. Yet functions of a far wider kind—the supervision of widespread groups of colleges—were actually confided to them. No steps were taken to secure adequate staffs, a sufficient rate of pay, classes of not more than manageable size, class-rooms well-lit and ventilated, libraries well equipped for the study of the subjects taught. Colleges dignified their chief lecturers with the title of professor, with small regard to attainments or salary; so that there came into being a multitude of professors whose work was judged solely by the percentage of students whom they managed to squeeze through the university examinations. This evil was accentuated by two others. Only through the matriculation examination could the universities influence the high schools from which all candidates for university learning were drawn, so that here the universities were as educationally noxious as the colleges. And only through university examinations could aspirants for government service secure success. This involved extraordinary pressure on the schools and colleges teaching for university examinations. Ill-qualified students besieged these institutions for admission and crowded the university examination-halls. When they were rejected, loud outcries arose against the authorities. Against the ceaseless pressure for a lowering of standards never high, no existing authority was able to oppose a firm enough resistance.

The colleges and high schools, forming a closely connected group and exposed to similar influences, had been designed to spread a knowledge of the English language and of western culture. But the students whom they attracted were drawn from narrowly defined classes of society. The castes with literary traditions—Brāhmans and Kayāsth in Bengal and northern India, Brāhmans elsewhere—showed the same eagerness to learn English as under Mughal rule they had already shown to learn Persian. In great part this zeal was due to the fact that English formed an indispensable qualification not only for government employment but also for professional work—the law, medicine, the press, education itself. In part, especially in Bengal, this interested motive was reinforced by a real and lively interest in western knowledge. In Bengal too, where the literary castes were interwoven with the class of landowners to a far greater degree than elsewhere, English education came to be widely diffused. But the structure of Indian society opposed an obstacle, which should have been foreseen but had in fact been ignored, in the way of “filtration”. It had been hoped that western knowledge would gradually but surely penetrate downwards by way of the middle classes. It threatened, however, to become the monopoly of certain castes, just as Sanskrit had done. The castes without literary traditions, the castes whose *dharma* did not include study, took small interest in the movement. Very few girls were educated. Muhammadan boys were seldom to be found in schools or colleges.

The cause of this lay very largely in the literary and non-practical form which this education assumed. English language and literature, philosophy, history, politics, economics, mathematics, were the subjects mainly taught and studied. Science was almost entirely ignored; technical education was neglected. What nine-tenths of the educated classes learned was in fact useless for all the practical purposes of life except conducting public business in English and pleading in the courts of law. How partial the effects of the educational system were is shown by the fact that at the close of the century among the castes ranked as clean Sudras, who formed about half the Hindu population, only one in fifty could read and write, while of the polluting castes, who formed a quarter of the Hindu population, hardly one in a thousand was literate.

While higher and secondary education had made rapid pro-

gress, elementary education had languished. At first the officials of the education departments had been expected to induce villagers to promise the contributions without which elementary schools were not to be opened; but this task had been difficult and invidious. The villagers were poor and set small store by school-learning. If one of them wished to write a letter he would hire a scribe; if he wished to prosecute a law-suit he could retain a pleader. In 1883 an inspector in the United Provinces claimed with reason that the elementary education provided was useless to such a man. Most of the pupils, he said, in less than ten years after leaving school could neither read, write, nor cipher. "Having nothing to read, having no occasion to write, and no accounts to keep, they gradually forget whatever they learn." Nor did it offer any real avenue of escape from the degraded position marked out by ancient social custom for the polluting castes. An inspector found a boy of the "sweeper" caste, in an essay on the comparative advantages of trade and service as an occupation, preferring trade. "Yet", he asks, "who would enter into mercantile relations with a sweeper, even if a man of that caste could be started in such a calling? Everything that he touches would be considered as polluted." Moreover, the greatest difficulties were raised by the higher-caste Hindus against the admission of the lower castes to the schools at all.

In 1882 a commission was appointed to enquire into the means by which elementary education could be extended and improved. This body, which consisted of both Indian and European members under the presidency of Sir William Hunter, recommended that in future elementary education should possess "an almost exclusive claim" upon provincial and local revenues, and that, while in future secondary schools should be opened only where local co-operation could be found, elementary schools should be established wherever they were judged necessary without requiring private co-operation as a preliminary. Secondary schools ought, it was thought, to be made over wherever possible to private control. The commission also recommended the introduction of a text-book embodying "the fundamental principles of natural religion" and the delivery of lectures upon civic duties. The last eccentric proposal was rejected by the government; the others were in the main adopted. But the results were bad. The withdrawal of control from secondary schools led to the multipli-



cation, especially in Bengal, of private schools conducted in the hope of profit, thus increasing the pressure upon the existing frail defences of sound education; and the increase in the number of elementary schools was idle, so long as they continued to teach nothing which the villagers valued.

Meanwhile under the wise inspiration of Sayyid Ahmad Khān some provision had been tardily made for Muslim education. He induced a number of prominent Muslims of the United Provinces to join with him in a campaign to break down Muslim antipathy to western knowledge. Mayo, the governor-general, sympathised with and promoted the projects. Funds for a Muslim college were collected; in 1875 a high school for Muslims was founded at Aligarh; and in 1878 the high school was developed into a college teaching up to the university intermediate examination. The college was divided into two departments, English and Oriental. In the former English was the language of instruction with Arabic or Persian as a second language; in the latter Urdu was the language of instruction, with Arabic or Persian literature as the chief subject, and English as a second language. But here as elsewhere the popular branch was that most likely to be of practical use, and the Oriental branch attracted few students as compared with the English branch.

Desultory beginnings were also made with female education. In Bengal a member of council, Bethune, had established a girls' school with funds privately subscribed. In Madras missionary societies had led the way. In Bombay the same had been done, and there the missionaries had found a greater response than elsewhere, the cause being taken up by the Parsis and the Gujarātis. But even in Bombay not one girl in fifty of those of a school-going age was being educated in 1882, and elsewhere the proportion was even lower. The purdah system, the marriage system, the lack of economic motive in a country where prostitution offered women the only means of independent livelihood, were the principal obstacles. But there was also the difficulty of gathering together a sufficient staff of female teachers. An unmarried woman was in the opinion of orthodox Hindu society suspect and almost certainly disreputable.

Little had thus been done to counteract the unbalanced tendencies of the system set up in 1854. New universities, but of the old pattern, were established in the Panjab in 1882 and at Allāhā-

bād in 1887. But the University of Calcutta, in spite of this relief, was still overburdened with a multitude of students. In the last fifteen years of the century the number of students in colleges rose from 11,000 to 23,000, and of pupils in secondary schools from 429,000 to 633,000. But while numbers were rising, the quality of the education was tending to fall. English, for instance, was being taught by an ever-increasing proportion of men to whom it was a foreign tongue. Students were relapsing into the ancient Hindu mode of study, memorising their text-books as pandits of old had memorised the Vedas. Elementary education was not progressing, and, instead of carrying useful knowledge to the masses, was only enabling a few of the more intelligent boys of the villages to earn a scanty living by clerical drudgery in the cities.

In 1901, nearly three years after his arrival as governor-general, Curzon resolved on introducing reforms, and convened a conference of the principal educational officials, to whom he pointed out the chief defects as he saw them—the predominance of examinations, the lack of university organisation, the unpopularity of primary schools, the neglect of technical and vocational instruction. He also called deserved attention to an important social aspect of the matter. A large number of students in the great cities lived in miserable lodgings, amid insanitary and undesirable surroundings, and untouched by the corporate influences which form a large and most important element in school and university education. As regards general policy he suggested that central control had been inadequate, that the provincial governments had been left too much to their own devices, that expert direction was needed, that the subject had been approached with too little consideration. It must be remembered, he said, that they were “handling the life-blood of future generations”. After this conference reforms began. Enlarged grants were made to the provincial governments for educational purposes. An agricultural college was opened at Pūsa. An inspector-general of education was appointed, to tour the provinces and advise the Government of India on matters of policy. A universities commission was appointed to inspect the working of both universities and colleges, and on its recommendations was framed the Universities Act of 1904.

The aim of the new act was to strengthen the control over and

raise the standards of university education. The senates were to include majorities of educationalists, and to be responsible for courses of studies, text-books, and standards of examination. Colleges were to be inspected and certified as competently housed, equipped, and staffed, before they were affiliated. Vice-chancellors would in future be appointed by government. Moreover, the universities themselves should provide post-graduate instruction, and to that extent at least become teaching bodies, setting up new and higher standards of attainment and thus exercising a new and most necessary influence upon higher education as a whole. As regards secondary schools the senates were to recommend to government the conditions under which high schools should be allowed to prepare boys for admission to colleges.

These reforms were in themselves most desirable. The tightening of control and the raising of educational standards were long over-due. The development of scientific and technical instruction was urgently needed to promote the search for occupations other than an over-crowded bar and press. Higher literary education had far out-run the economic development of the country, and there were no means of absorbing the numerous arts graduates who poured annually from the colleges. Bengal had as many university students as England, without a tenth of the posts to offer them. Nor had Indian public opinion proved itself capable of wisely influencing educational policy. That public opinion was the opinion of the literary castes, apparently eager that every boy born in them should secure the dubious advantages of a university degree. Curzon had even been urged to commemorate Queen Victoria's reign by a general lowering of examination standards. If matters were to be mended, government must of necessity exercise more direction and control. But unfortunately the proposals came at least a generation too late. Could the clear, incisive mind of Curzon have replaced the cloudy and confused ideas of Ripon, and had the commission in 1882 been set on its way with an allocution as direct, poignant, and unmistakable as that which Curzon delivered twenty years later, a real turn for the better might then have been taken. As it was, his proposals met a most bitter opposition. It was feared that his underlying purpose was to curb the political activity of the educated classes, to lessen their numbers, to diminish their importance. The owners

of private schools and colleges in Bengal felt that their interests were threatened, which was indeed the fact. The partition of Bengal created an angry atmosphere in which the real interests of education vanished.

The result was that in spite of the desperate efforts of individuals, both Indian and English, to give reality to Curzon's educational proposals, they produced comparatively small results. Education continued to expand and to deteriorate. Expenditure from public and private funds was more than doubled, while the numbers of students went on rising. Persevering efforts were made to broaden the educational basis by establishing new agricultural colleges, and by opening technical schools for weaving, for carpentry, for commerce. But these efforts were frustrated by the lack of sound training in the primary and secondary schools.

It is not difficult to find the fundamental defects from which modern Indian education has suffered. Government has almost always pursued the idle hope of producing a good system with cheap and often inefficient instruments. For decade after decade swelling numbers have been hailed as proof of progress. Yet the multiplication of pupils meant that the demand for efficient teachers was out-running the supply. In founding a new educational system the provision of teachers should have been the first consideration. Normal schools should have engaged the closest attention of government. Suitable men should have been attracted by good prospects of pay and promotion; and the schools recognised and supported by government should have been kept down to the level at which it was possible to staff and equip them adequately. This would have placed secondary education on a sound basis, and have permitted the gradual development of universities above them and of elementary schools below. But instead of this government complied with the public demand for English education, irrespective of quality. Educational salaries were kept low in order to make education cheap. Secondary schools multiplied and worsened. They sent up ill-prepared students to the colleges. College standards fell as numbers rose. So the vicious circle was completed. The ablest students naturally preferred well-paid administrative to ill-paid teaching work. The schools could not be improved owing to the lack of a sufficient number of able teachers; the colleges could not be improved because of the overwhelming numbers of ill-taught students

pressing up to them. Nor did the influence of the educational departments counteract this unfortunate tendency. Everyone soon came to be over-worked, while the failure to divide the departments into distinct teaching and administrative sections emphasised the consequences. The ideal recruit, from the departmental point of view, was not the specialist but the man of all work, who could be sent to inspect schools, or to teach English in a college, or at a pinch to teach science or mathematics. The result was that the outstanding personalities in the world of Indian education were missionaries rather than government servants; and the Europeans who rose to eminence from the ranks of the educational service, like the talented Indians who emerged from the system of education itself, could only achieve this after overcoming grave and needless disadvantages.

The general position was well summed up by the recent Interim (Education) Report of the Statutory Commission. The difficulties of developing elementary education still persisted. It was easy to increase the number of pupils in primary schools; but few remained long enough to attain any certain and well-established literacy. The majority either never attained literacy, or else, under the conditions of rural life and owing to the lack of suitable vernacular literature, speedily relapsed. The secondary schools and colleges were still overcrowded with students not naturally gifted for literary education, as was shown by "the immense numbers of failures at matriculation and in the other university examinations". In spite of the recent movement to make the universities real teaching bodies, the theory was still generally held that they existed mainly to pass students through examinations, instead of training men to become "broad-minded, tolerant, and self-reliant citizens". But, as Curzon himself pointed out, the severest critics must recognise the important results that followed from the working of this imperfect educational system. It brought a large number of persons into pregnant contact with western ideas. Of late years it has been asserted by the extremer nationalists that it produced (and was intended to produce) a "slave-mentality". But in so far as a slave-mentality is discernible among the educated classes of India, it would seem to be inherited from the past rather than inspired by modern conditions and methods. Under favourable conditions western education emancipated rather than enslaved. It inspired a habit

of questioning that the ancient culture had lost, and it set up assimilation as the purpose of study instead of the traditional memorisation. It also gave to the social classes peculiarly associated with it a common language and a common stock of ideas.

From this certain social and political tendencies inevitably flowed. The broad basis on which Hindu society had rested for many centuries was silent, undoubting acquiescence in the customary. The whole influence of religion, the idea of transmigration, the system of caste, all made in the same direction. It was the business of one group of castes to fight, of another to propitiate the gods, of a third to till the fields. He who held the sword not only ruled, but was entitled to rule so long as he upheld ancient custom. The prudent Indian ruler might have grievous cause to dread his neighbours, but not to fear his subjects. But it was certain that if a neighbouring prince invaded his territory and overthrew his army, the people would submit and accept the new dominion as submissively as the peasants of Aquitaine accepted the dominion of Edward III. But western education rudely disturbed these medieval conditions. The activity of missionaries in early educational enterprise led naturally to the earliest movements occurring in the closely related social and religious spheres. In Bengal Rām Mohun Roy founded the *Brāhmo Samāj*. This was a deist sect inspired largely by the free-thought of the eighteenth century, which had been propagated in Calcutta by David Hare. The *Brāhmo Samāj* exhibited its social tendencies by supporting the abolition of sati. At a later time it was sharply divided over the question of tolerating other Hindu usages and customs vigorously attacked by Keshub Chandra Sen. Finally the latter was expelled from the society, and established a new body which championed the reform of the marriage-system, and advocated female education.

The spirit of criticism spread inevitably from social to political questions about the middle of the nineteenth century. The writings of Burke, overloaded with image and simile, for that very reason appealed to a people whose literature had been almost exclusively poetic, who were still in the process of developing a prose style, and who in general preferred a striking metaphor to a sound argument. English history, especially as represented by Whig theorists, and the political writings of the younger Mill abounded in suggestions that the natural development of political

societies was from despotism to liberty. The career and writings of Mazzini, equally widely studied, offered an example of a nationalist movement directed to the overthrow of foreign dominion. Under these western influences small groups of educated Indians began to set before themselves as an ideal the transformation of the basis of government and the gradual extrusion of foreign control.

This was far from having been entirely unforeseen. Munro, Elphinstone, Malcolm, Lord Hastings, and others who had thoughtfully surveyed the prospects of the Indian empire which their generation had consolidated, had all looked forward to the day when it would be expedient for Great Britain to withdraw from the task of administering that great and perplexing dependency. But their anticipations had not taken all the factors into account. They had expected their successors to be called upon to deliver Indian rule back to the princes, the nobles, the warriors, whom they regarded as the natural leaders of the country. But the nationalist spirit was developing, not among these but among castes which, with a few notable exceptions, had always held a subordinate place in Indian governments, and among races which had been notably unwarlike. Could these new claimants impose themselves on grounds of intellectual superiority alone upon classes which in the past had relied upon the judgment of the sword and the shrewd manipulation of purely material factors?

The distrust thus inspired by the new movement was emphasised naturally if irrationally by the eccentricities of style in which the claims of the educated class were being advocated. Just as true Persians had mocked the phraseology and pronunciation which had passed for Persian in India, just as in medieval Europe the French of London had been a marked and inferior variety of the language spoken at Paris, so now Indian English had developed peculiarities of its own. The misuse of subtle English idiom, the appearance in English dress of idiom borrowed from Indian vernaculars, the use of grandiloquence on quite ordinary occasions, the laborious research for the poetic and the resonant, afforded easy subjects of ridicule. Englishmen doubted whether western ideas had been any better apprehended than the usages of English speech, and whether the democratic ideals of universal equality could be sincerely adopted by a society founded on the principles of caste. The administration considered that it was

being invited to deliver over its functions to a minority scarcely more considerable than the civil services, and incapable of maintaining itself in power except by the constant support of British troops.

The political movement had originated in Bengal, where the literary castes were stronger, wealthier, and more widely affected by English teaching than elsewhere. The zamindars for instance set up the British Indian Association to support their interests, menaced by what they regarded as infractions of the Permanent Settlement, such as the levy of additional cesses for local purposes and the protection of tenants by the Bengal Tenancy Act. Then Surendranāth Banerji, who had taken up educational work, set out (as he says) "to kindle in the young the beginnings of public spirit and to inspire them with a patriotic ardour, fruitful of good to them and to the Motherland". In 1876 he founded the Indian Association, intended to spread the same spirit through the middle classes as a whole. When the age of admission to the Indian Civil Service examination was lowered from 22 to 19, delegates were sent to northern India, to Bombay and to Madras, to obtain signatures for a memorial declaring the change to be hurtful to Indian competitors and praying for the restoration of the former age-limit and for simultaneous examinations to be held in England and in India. The delegates were also to establish branch-associations wherever this could be done. These endeavours to introduce changes by argument and persuasion were accompanied (as is usually the case) by attempts of the more angry and hasty to spread hatred of the government by charging it with injustice and tyranny. The vernacular press, which had sprung up in the third quarter of the century, consisted of a large number of very ephemeral periodicals, often edited by college students who found in their columns an opportunity of practising their talents for invective. In 1878 the Vernacular Press Act was passed in order to restrain these activities. It empowered the government to demand securities from such vernacular journals as were thought to calumniate the administration. About the same time, in connection it would appear with alarms concerning the revival of Wahhabī activity among the Muslims, an Arms Act was passed to limit the possession of fire-arms. These measures provided the occasion for further criticisms of government policy.

In 1880 Lytton was succeeded by Ripon and policy was



sharply reversed. He repealed the Vernacular Press Act, announced his intention of developing the system of local self-government, and thus secured great personal popularity. Towards the close of his government this was enormously increased by his unintentionally becoming involved in the Ilbert Bill controversy. The Indians who had competed successfully for the Indian Civil Service had generally been posted to the judicial branch of the administration, and the more senior had reached the stage where they were eligible for appointment as district and sessions judges. But as the law stood, such Indians would not be capable, in their magisterial capacity, of hearing charges against Europeans residing in their districts. The anomaly of the position was emphasised by the fact that an Indian already held the office of presidency magistrate at Calcutta, where he could hear charges against Europeans, a power which he would lose on promotion elsewhere. A bill, drafted by the law member, Ilbert, was therefore introduced to confer on Indian district judges the same powers as were enjoyed by their British colleagues. Against this measure a strong agitation arose among the indigo and tea-planters, who feared that the change would expose them to unfounded or exaggerated charges; and after prolonged discussion the bill was amended by government so as to give Europeans, accused of criminal offences in the mofassal, the right of demanding trial by jury. But while thus partially successful, the agitation proved to have been singularly ill-judged. It provoked strong resentment among the Indian middle-classes, who regarded it as casting a slur on their integrity, and it therefore gave a most powerful impetus to the attempts which Surendranāth Banerji and his friends were making to establish an effective political organisation.

Already in 1883 a conference had been held at Calcutta attended by delegates from other parts of India. In the next year a group of men, brought together at Madras by the annual convention of the Theosophical Society, resolved to set up a body which should embrace all the provinces of India. In 1885 the first Indian National Congress met at Poona. The goal which these early organisers proposed was the establishment of representative government, and they hoped that the congress would develop into an Indian parliament. Their early demands included the enlargement of the legislative councils, the inclusion in them of elected members, the grant of the power to discuss the budget

and to ask questions on all administrative matters, the abolition of the secretary of state's council, and the formation of a standing committee of the House of Commons to consider protests made by the legislative councils in matters in which their recommendations had been over-ruled by the executive governments.

From 1885 the National Congress held annual meetings. At first it was not easy to gather together any considerable number of delegates, and the rules were correspondingly loose. For some years delegates could be chosen by any kind of association and indeed at any public meeting convened by any person. Gradually these easy conditions were tightened up, and a general organisation came into being, supported by a considerable proportion of the middle classes in the larger cities. But the movement which it represented remained predominantly Hindu. Few Muslims had at first joined it; and although efforts were made to attract Muslim co-operation, although a Muslim was chosen president at the third meeting, and a resolution adopted at the fourth banning all proposals peculiarly unacceptable to either community, the Muslims continued to hold aloof. In this they were strongly influenced by the criticisms of Sayyid Ahmad, the founder of Aligarh. He disliked the proposals aimed at extending the selection of officials by competitive examination, which would unduly favour the Bengali Kayāsth at the expense of the Rājput and the Muslim. He disliked the proposals for the introduction of elected members, since this would be likely to exclude Muslims. He doubted too whether elected bodies would be willing to impose taxation even if they had the power.

While the leaders of the Hindu middle-classes were thus seeking the reconstruction of the government, and the Muslim leaders were resolving that such a change threatened many disadvantages, the government itself had been seeking to provide a school of political training by the extension of local self-government. Under past empires the villages of India had always been left to do, or leave undone, many things for themselves. Muslim and Hindu emperors alike had been sternly bent upon gathering in the land revenue, but had troubled the villages little otherwise. Local police, local education, local roads, had been supplied by the villagers' own efforts where such things were desired; and the only spur to their activity had been the responsibility of making good losses of travellers by robbery. In most provinces the villages had

head-men, who were at once the local representatives of the government and the mouthpieces of village opinion. These head-men had associated with them a group of village servants, to help them in carrying out their duties, and could always convene meetings of the village notables, who would discuss at extraordinary length matters laid before them until unanimity was reached or at all events until opposition was silenced. In such regions as in Bengal where large land-holders had come into existence, the village organisation had tended to decay, for their functions generally had devolved upon the great man of the neighbourhood. But elsewhere the villages had remained largely self-dependent. The establishment of the British government had, however, affected this village-system deeply. It was far more completely organised than any of its predecessors. Nothing like its regular chain of law-courts, for example, had ever before been seen in India. Then too the conception of law which it brought with it was at once more definite and more comprehensive than either the Hindu law, which had been largely a matter of fluctuating and variable custom, or the Muslim law which, though definite in character, had been narrowly limited in scope. Furthermore, its conception of the functions of government embraced many things which its predecessors had been content to ignore—education, for example, and roads. Under the pressure of these new influences the old village-system, weakened by a century of political chaos, had collapsed. The new courts absorbed the judicial functions which the village panchayats had exercised. The new precision of the law forced the villager to employ the professional aid of pleaders and attorneys. The new activity of the district officials confronted him with new proposals which at best were but half-understood.

The tendencies thus brought into play were scarcely affected by early and imperfect efforts to preserve village institutions. Munro at Madras, Elphinstone in Bombay, attempted to preserve the judicial panchayats. But their endeavours were not followed up, and the origins of the British system of local self-government in India are to be found in the districts and in the larger towns rather than in any development of village-organisation. The earliest specific instance of this policy is found in the action taken in Bengal under regulations of 1816 and 1819. It was then decided that public ferries should be managed by the officers of the govern-

ment, and that the surplus proceeds should be spent on roads, bridges, and other conveniences for travellers. Local committees were appointed in each district, with the district magistrate as secretary, to advise the government on the needs of the locality. This association of the district officials with the local gentry not only showed the former what works were considered most needful, but also led the latter to subscribe the funds needed for local roads which could not be constructed out of the inconsiderable surpluses available from the local tolls. In other provinces the district officials often levied a cess on the land revenue, to be expended on local purposes with the advice of local committees, and, though these cesses had no legal basis beyond the sanction of custom, they were paid readily. This was, however, a mere temporary phase. In Madras such cesses were legalised by an act of 1865; and in Bombay four years later an act authorised the appointment of district and taluk committees, to advise the district officials on the expenditure of local funds. The form of local self-government thus coming into existence differed from that long established in England. In England powerful officials of the central government had vanished with the decay of the sheriff's authority, and local self-government had thus come to be the business of local magnates working through a staff of their own. In India the collector, with his large executive staff, was the natural and most efficient agent by which local as well as provincial work could be executed; and his prominence and importance in the district necessarily meant that he would dominate the local committees instead of being their servant.

In 1870 Mayo had issued a resolution designed to place the existing incoherent and irregular state of affairs on a definite footing. The policy of the Government of India was two-fold. It hoped to provide for growing expenditure (especially on roads and education) by legalising the development of local taxation which would be better understood and more willingly borne if devised and voted by local men for local objects. It also hoped thus to associate more closely Indians and Europeans in the administration of affairs. Under this resolution a large number of provincial acts were passed, legalising, and in Bengal establishing for the first time, the collection of local cesses. But in the latter province much opposition was offered by the land-owners, on the ground that cesses were a violation of the permanent settlement.

In the legislative council Indian members declared that no more roads were wanted, although the recent famine in Orissa had just demonstrated the terrible insufficiency of land transport.

In the country towns affairs had followed a similar but easier course. As in the districts of many provinces, the magistrate had associated himself in early days with the principal merchants and householders; such informal committees had resolved by what means money for local purposes should be raised, and on what objects it should be spent; and the inhabitants were willing enough to contribute small sums by way of octroi-duties or house-rates to maintain night-watchmen and to keep the streets clean. This voluntary municipal system flourished especially in the Panjab, where in 1855 drainage had been provided in all the larger cities and quite elaborate projects formed for Lahore, Amritsar and Ambāla. In 1850 a municipal act had been passed, permitting the formal establishment of municipalities where the inhabitants petitioned for their introduction. This operated in a curiously uneven way. In Bombay the district officers had small difficulty in securing the necessary petitions from many towns and large villages. By 1856 as many as 292 municipalities had been created in the Satāra district alone, though many of them proved to be short-lived. But in Madras and the Panjab the people showed great reluctance to introduce the act. Between 1864 and 1868 municipal legislation—commonly of a vague form—was adopted by the provincial councils of Bengal, Madras, and the Panjab. In Oudh the Panjab act was followed. In Bombay a municipal act was adopted in 1873. In Madras municipal taxation was limited to an amount approved by the government for each municipality, which was increased by a government grant of 25 per cent. on the amount of the local rates. But in most places no legal limits were set to municipal taxation. The favourite mode of raising money was by the establishment of octroi-duties, in accordance with long-standing practice. Almost everywhere except in Lucknow (where a special act of 1864 had sanctioned the election of nineteen out of twenty-five municipal commissioners) the committees were appointed by the provincial government on the recommendation of the district officers. There was thus little “responsible” government, although there was much association of the principal local people with the officials in the administration of the towns. At the time there was small demand for election and

popular control, and rich merchants and land-owners preferred to seek government nomination rather than the people's suffrage.

The three presidency cities stood in a class by themselves, owing to their numerous European population, their relative size, and their superior wealth. At the close of the eighteenth century a British statute, passed in consequence of the disagreeable discovery that taxation by executive order was illegal within these little domains of English law, empowered the governor-general in council to appoint in each a number of justices of the peace, and enabled the latter to appoint watchmen and scavengers and to levy rates for their payment. But, although this enactment was based on English precedent, it failed to include provision for the punishment of malversation. In early days the justices' finances were assisted by the promotion of lotteries, the profits of which were laid out on public buildings, roads, and drains. But the assessments never sufficed for the due maintenance of roads and conservancy; at Bombay alone was any additional taxation imposed; and the justices as a body took small interest in their duties. Attempts were made to set up an elective body at Calcutta, but produced such gross abuses as to discredit the system of direct election for years. At Bombay in 1845 administration was entrusted to a committee—the Conservancy Board—consisting of two European and three Indian members elected by the justices, with the senior magistrate of police as chairman. In 1856 acts were passed vesting the administration of each city in three commissioners. But this plan too was unsatisfactory. The commissioners had no power to raise the necessary funds, they were not subject to due audit control, and they were in no way associated with the inhabitants. Between 1863 and 1867 therefore further changes were made. From this point local methods began to diverge, but the immediate general tendency was to concentrate executive power in the hands of a single man. At Calcutta, while general control was restored to the justices, 120 in number, their chairman, appointed by the provincial government, alone possessed executive authority. At Bombay, where the justices formed a body of 500, much the same was done, the executive official being designated the Municipal Commissioner. At Madras a municipal council of 32 members was created, but it could act only through its president. On the whole this new plan proved much more efficient than the former ones. Hogg at Calcutta and

Crawford at Bombay introduced great improvements in drainage, water-supply, and general sanitation. But it was felt that a dictatorship could not be more than a temporary expedient. The next move was in the direction of elective councils, less unwieldy in number than the justices had become, and invested with financial control over the executive official. This was first done at Bombay. In 1872 a council of sixty-four replaced the five hundred justices, one-quarter nominated by government, one-quarter chosen by the justices, and a half elected directly by the rate-payers. The commissioner's accounts were to be audited weekly by a standing committee of the council, and monthly by paid auditors. At Calcutta in 1876 and 1882 the municipal body was reduced from one hundred and twenty to seventy-two, with a majority elected by the rate-payers and audit provision imitated from that adopted at Bombay. But, while the Bombay scheme worked well, at Calcutta large committees were formed which sought to exercise a minutely detailed control over the executive until definite limits to such interference were laid down by an act of 1899. At Madras, where the municipal body had already been cut down, first half and then two-thirds of the members became elective.

In 1882 experiments over three-quarters of a century had thus been conducted with a view to the development of local self-governing bodies. But these had by no means conformed to the English pattern. Direct election had been generally unsuccessful outside the presidency towns; local bodies had been overshadowed by the power, knowledge, and energy of the executive officials; little had been achieved in the nature of political education, or in the actual transference of control in local matters from official into unofficial hands. In 1882, however, Ripon, the governor-general, issued a resolution defining a new policy. This aimed at avoiding the defects of past attempts. The English machinery of the ballot-box was to be introduced; and with the English machinery it was hoped that the English spirit of real local self-government would come. By learning to manage local affairs men would qualify themselves for wider political action. Local organisation would form a solid foundation for constitutional reform. It did not greatly matter if at first local affairs were mismanaged. People would learn from their mistakes. The great object should be to teach the use of the vote, to build up

electorates, to form a class accustomed not merely to discuss but to manage public affairs in a spirit of public responsibility.

In consequence of this resolution it was decided to establish under the existing district committees a series of boards, chosen wherever possible by election, with private persons instead of officials in executive charge. Some attempts were made to connect the new boards with the villages. In the Central Provinces village head-men grouped together were to choose members of the subordinate boards, while the latter were to choose members of the district boards. A somewhat similar plan was adopted in Bombay. In Madras village panchayats were recognised as electors for the taluk boards. But the district officials continued to provide the executive agency for both taluk and district boards, so that control was still exercised from within. In Bengal a most interesting experiment was proposed. A bill was introduced in 1883 to set up boards in each revenue sub-division, with a central board of supervision for the whole of the province, the members of the subordinate boards being chosen by village committees. When the bill had passed the provincial legislature and was awaiting the sanction of the home government, experimental elections of village committees were conducted. There was no secret ballot. The villagers were assembled and chose their representatives after open discussion. But this most hopeful plan was vetoed by the secretary of state, who insisted on setting up district boards, with the magistrate and collector at their head, to control and conduct local work within each district. Thus a measure, which would have gone far to put into practice the ideas of Ripon, was negatived, not by the hostility of the official world, but by the secretary of state's lack of comprehension. The net result in the districts was a very limited introduction of the ballot-box, elections in which no one took real interest, and the establishment of boards dependent upon the executive for the performance of their duties. Their apathy was shown by their neglect of means to increase the funds at their disposal. Their normal income was derived from cesses assessed and collected by the district officials. The district was far too large an area to be entrusted to elected members, who knew their own villages and the immediate neighbourhood but were ignorant of all the rest save perhaps the district headquarters. Even the revenue sub-division, the *taluk* or *tahsil*, was too large to permit local patriotism and a sense of common interests to develop in an effective degree.



Municipal developments were similarly disappointing in character. In every province acts were passed requiring a large proportion—a half or three-quarters—of the municipal boards to be elected, permitting an elective member to be appointed chairman, and sometimes allowing boards to choose a chairman for themselves. But elective members were not often appointed by government, or chosen by the boards, to the chairman's office. The fact was that the district officer could promote the interests and defend the rights of the municipality far better than any private person. Little interest was taken in the elections. Seats were often uncontested, and voters did not trouble to exercise their powers. Except in some of the larger towns where individuals of strong personality emerged, the municipal executives remained under official control. In 1915 in the Panjab only ten out of eighty-three municipalities entitled to elect their chairmen chose non-officials. In Bombay and the United Provinces the number of non-official chairmen was increased only by constant official pressure. Finance offered perpetual difficulties. Octroi-dues formed the traditional and popular means by which money could be raised for municipal purposes. But since this obstructed the general movement of trade, strong efforts were made from 1868 onwards to induce municipalities to replace the octroi by direct taxation. This was exceedingly unwelcome. Even where assessments were imposed, the elected members were most reluctant to insist on their regular collection and prompt payment. In Bengal at the close of the period a quarter of the municipalities collected less than a rupee per head. Insanitary conditions were preferred to strict administration, and progress in water-supply and drainage was largely dependent on occasional doles from the provincial governments.

On the whole the local self-government policy must be adjudged a failure. It did not train an electorate, it elicited the services of only a few active and patriotic men, it increased instead of diminishing the duties of the district officials. The popular reasons which have been usually adduced to explain this failure are the closeness of official control, the small extent of powers accorded to the municipal and rural boards, and the inadequate funds provided out of provincial revenues for the development of local self-government. These reasons undoubtedly explain why the leaders of the Indian political movement preferred to exhibit

their eloquence at the Congress meetings, in public assemblies, and in the columns of the press, rather than in the humble and laborious sphere of local administration. With certain notable exceptions, such as Gokhale, they shirked the exacting political school out of which the English system of self-government had been painfully elaborated, judging that quick minds and ready argument could make good the lack of practical political experience. But although the limitation of powers and the demand that local finance should be provided mainly out of local funds explain why many prominent Indians refused to co-operate actively in the field of local self-government, this is far from providing any complete explanation of the failure. Other more important factors were at work. Sufficient allowance was perhaps never made for the difference of conditions in England and India—the difference between a system of responsible government in a small and homogeneous country, and a system of highly centralised autocracy in a sub-continent fissured by every kind of religious and social division. The strong, well-organised administrative machine of the latter would be bound to dominate local institutions even more completely in India than it did under the centralised governments of Europe. In another way the experiment had been incomplete. The mechanism of ballot-box and voting-paper had been borrowed from England, but not the vital, educative basis of the English system. In India control was exercised through official supervision; in England it was exercised through financial responsibility. In the latter a local board which improperly expended public money, or neglected to gather in at the due time the rates which it had imposed, would find itself surcharged and the members would be collectively and individually liable to make good the public loss out of their private estates. But neither in the corporations established in the presidency towns, nor in the rural and municipal boards, was this most salutary provision applied. The men who accepted nomination or sought election to these bodies accepted no personal financial responsibility with their seats, and consequently membership was neither so selective nor so formative as it might have been. Herein certainly lies one of the fundamental reasons why local self-government worked so disappointingly. Lastly, in the rural areas, the system was never properly connected with the villages, where alone effective local life was to be found. The nearest

approach was made by the vetoed Bengal scheme of 1883. Experiments along those lines might have produced a really active spirit, a true electorate uncursed by voting-papers, and boards filled with men who were looked up to as the natural leaders of their neighbourhood and who would not have been diverted from local duties by the thought that the sphere was incommensurate with their dignity and importance.

While these attempts were being made to provide elementary schools of political education by means of local self-government, the demands of the National Congress and of the Indian press led to certain changes in the structure of the legislative councils. Lord Dufferin, who succeeded Ripon as governor-general in 1884, possessed not only great personal charm but also a large measure of political sagacity. In 1883 he had prepared a plan for the gradual introduction of popular influence into the despotic government of Egypt, where fundamental conditions were similar to those of India though the political situation was less complicated. In 1886 he wrote a very important minute on the question of political development. In this he dwelt on the importance of giving quickly without the appearance of coercion whatever concessions it might be judged right to make. The particular measures which he had in view were the enlargement of the legislative councils, and the introduction of some method of electing part of the non-official members. These changes would provide the Government of India and the provincial governments with independent Indian advice; but, since he proposed to maintain official majorities in the councils, the responsibility to the home government would be in no way impaired. These proposals, however, went much farther than the home government would go. In 1890 a bill was introduced into parliament to enlarge the councils, but Dufferin's elective proposals were completely suppressed, and the Irish crisis led to the abandonment of the bill, after debates in the House of Lords on the practicability of establishing the elective principle, which was supported by both Ripon and Northbrook. Not until 1892 was a measure enlarging the Indian councils passed into law. This contained a clause designedly wide enough to permit the application of the elective principle, but not prescribing it. "It would be a great evil", said Lord Salisbury in debate, "if, in any system of government which we gradually develop, the really strong portions of Indian society did not obtain that share in the

government to which their natural position among their own people traditionally entitled them." It was, however, clearly understood that the new rules which the Government of India were to frame would recognise the elective principle.

The result of the act was to increase materially the provincial councils, and to provide that a number of members should be nominated on the recommendation of the municipalities and rural boards; while four new members were to be recommended for the imperial council by the non-official members of the existing provincial councils and a fifth by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce. In future too the budgets were to be laid before the councils for discussion, and the right of interpellation was granted to the members. Although it was solemnly declared that the changes were not intended to represent any movement towards responsible government, they evidently involved important principles and were not mere matters of form. The councils established in 1861 had been exclusively legislative in character. No business save changes in the law could be laid before them. But now members could ask questions touching administrative and executive business, and they were given the first elements of that financial power on which responsible government has always rested. These concessions, linked with the introduction of free choice into the selection of members, naturally appeared to the Congress leaders as definite steps towards the liberalisation of Indian institutions. They began indeed to hope that they would succeed in securing for themselves in the name of the people the supreme control of the machine, regardless of the development of political experience among the populace. In political reform, as in education, the results of British policy were to raise the superstructure before the foundations had been laid.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### The Morley-Minto Reforms

While the Congress was planning the capture of the government machine by constitutional agitation, and while the government was seeking to lay the foundations of a broad political advance by developing local institutions, an extremist party was growing up among Indians advocating the use of violence. In this respect matters were following a normal course. The Italian *risorgimento*, the Russian movement, the Irish Home Rule movement, had likewise developed an external propaganda, professing more or less moderate aims by more or less moderate methods, and these too had been accompanied by the formation of subterranean societies, with revolutionary objects, for the perpetration of political crime. In India as elsewhere the precise relation between the secret and the avowed branches was obscure. But moderate leaders almost always hope to be carried towards success by the efforts of the extremists, almost always hope to make political capital out of crimes the preparation of which they prefer to ignore, and almost always forget that he who rides a tiger cannot dismount. In India, however, an ill-judged policy enabled the extremists to appear more openly and exert more control over the moderate organisation than was the normal case elsewhere. The Austrians in Italy, the imperial government in Russia, did not permit the extremists openly to spread their propaganda among the people at large. The British government in India did. This resulted from the fundamental conflict between the British position in India and British political ideas. In Great Britain the press was free, and political life based upon open discussion. But India presented the political monstrosity of a free press and an autocratic government. The position had been created by Metcalfe in 1835, when he withdrew all press restrictions on the ground that this was necessary to promote western knowledge in India. The measure probably reflects the influence of Bentinck and Macaulay; it was certainly opposed to the views of the best and ablest company's servants of the period. Neither Mountstuart Elphinstone nor Thomas Munro can justly be called men of illiberal views; both

looked forward to the time when the British, in the interests of both Indians and themselves, would withdraw from the control of the Indian government; but both were emphatic in declaring that the immediate liberty of the press would weaken the existing government before any other was ready to replace it. Their expectations were fulfilled. As the Indian press developed, a section of it devoted its energies to attacking the British government. In 1857 Canning had found it necessary to limit for a year its freedom of comment and perversion. In 1878 Lytton had laid restrictions on the vernacular press. In 1882 Ripon had repealed this act. Press attacks seem to have been regarded as a safety-valve. This curious example of argument by analogy seems to have missed the point that press attacks were more likely to increase than reduce the political pressure. In any case Ripon's policy was inconsistent with itself. He strove, as has been shown, to establish schools of political education in his rural boards and municipalities. But he judged the time far indeed from ripe for any fundamental political reform. He would not have dreamed of setting up responsible government, yet he restored freedom to the press as though he considered the days of autocracy almost run. The error was the more considerable since the British government in India was ill-constructed to resist the constant fret of newspaper criticism and attack. It rested, and had always rested, upon nothing firmer than popular acquiescence and the respect which the east has always paid to successful force. The people cherished a traditional respect for the commands of government, not because they were good but because they were thought to be backed by irresistible power. The religious basis on which a despotism may long rest as upon a rock had never existed. The popular basis on which self-government rests had never existed. The economic basis on which a well-organised oligarchy has often rested had never existed. Anything which lowered the readiness with which the government was obeyed, which taught the people to question the orders which might be issued, struck at the very roots of government in India. Full freedom of the press should therefore have been deferred until the autocrat was ready to abdicate. Ripon's measure might suitably have accompanied the reforms of 1919. But to couple it with the local self-government resolution of 1882 was to condemn the one or the other as an anachronism.

After this release the section of the Indian press devoted to invective became the more extreme; while the section which had inclined to argument rather than to abuse became the more abusive. The Ilbert Bill agitation provided matter for a multitude of leading articles. The early Congress meetings also served to stimulate press campaigns in favour of the changes advocated by the Congress leaders. But the appearance of a real extremist group of newspapers may be dated from the passing of the Age of Consent Act in 1891. The death of a Hindu child-wife at Calcutta had led to the prosecution of her husband for culpable homicide. The case excited considerable and unfavourable comment, and the legislature decided to prohibit cohabitation until the wife should be at least twelve years of age. As in the case of sati, many Hindus of Calcutta professed to see an attack on their religion in this beneficent if modest piece of social reform. One Calcutta newspaper was prosecuted for sedition on account of its comments on the new act. But the chief opposition came from the other side of India. At Bombay a considerable number of educated Indians coupled their demands for an increasing share in the government of the country with a strong advocacy of reforms within the structure of Indian society itself. But on the latter there was small agreement. The orthodox Hindus, who had hitherto held aloof from the congress-men as tainted with the falsities of western education, would clearly become more than ever hostile to the political movement if it were identified with social reform; and this would demonstrate to every foreign observer that the Congress could not claim to speak for Hinduism as a whole. None saw this so clearly as Bāl Gangadhar Tilak. He was a Chitpāvan Brāhman, the caste that had produced the family of the great Pēshwās. He was a man of outstanding personality—decided, eloquent, learned; and soon became a man of note at the Congress. He seems to have conceived the plan of bringing the orthodox Hindu under the banner of the National Congress, in order to reinforce the political discontent of himself and his fellows by any religious discontent that could be promoted. His Marāthi journal, the *Kāśari*, therefore denounced the Age of Consent bill as violating religious duties and bitterly attacked every Hindu supporter of it as a traitor to his faith. Rightly regarding youth as the most impressionable age, he took special pains to bring school-boys and college-students under his influence. He organ-

ised gymnastic societies, and developed a cult of Sīvajī as the national hero of the Marāṭha people. All the evils of India, he taught, had been brought upon her by foreigners—first the Muslims and then the British. In this he was but echoing the ideas which theosophical lecturers had been spreading for years. But, while Colonel Olcott and his companions had lectured in English, Tilak's vigorous Marāṭhi carried his words among the populace of a region where historical events had created more of a true national feeling than existed anywhere else in India.

Moreover, fortune favoured Tilak in his campaign, or, rather, he was on the alert to seize every opportunity. In 1896 famine disposed men to murmur. Then bubonic plague appeared in Bombay. There was no special reason why this in itself should have led to trouble. From time to time it had swept men away by whole families in every eastern port. It had ever been accepted as a decree of an inscrutable providence. But western men, obsessed with the hope of mastering some at least of the more unpleasant manifestations of nature, deemed it their duty to attempt to stay its ravages. No one yet knew the method by which bubonic plague was propagated. It was generally thought that stricken men communicated it directly to their fellows. Every effort was therefore made to segregate the victims. Houses were searched. At Poona British troops were employed as search-parties. Measures of so extraordinary a nature did much to transform the prevailing panic into popular resentment. They were very easily misrepresented. The Marāṭhi press abounded in complaint. Tilak's journal accused the government of deliberate oppression. In one article he described the horror with which Sīvajī, the national hero, must regard the condition of his people—impoverished, famine-stricken, diseased, and persecuted, the sacred Brāhman polluted with imprisonment among low castes, and veiled women insulted and dragged into the public view. In another he defended the conduct of Sīvajī in killing Afzal Khān by treachery. Great men, he said, were above the common rules of conduct. There was no sin in killing for the benefit of others, and his readers were exhorted to consider how unrightful was the position of the foreigner in India and to ponder the actions of the great. The hint was quickly taken. Two young Chitpāvans murdered a military officer and the India civilian in charge of plague-prevention at Poona. They were duly tried and executed.



Tilak himself was tried for sedition and imprisoned for eighteen months.

This experiment in instigating political crime was imitated in Bengal. There too religious motives were brought into play. There too school-boys were organised into gymnastic societies for political agitation. There too was worshipped the national hero whose successors had laid waste the province with fire and sword. In 1902 a small band of revolutionary conspirators had already been formed. Their efforts were aided by the Japanese victories over Russia, by the unpopularity of Curzon's educational reforms, but above all by the resentment against the partition of Bengal. That measure excited alarm among influential sections of the educated class. The Calcutta lawyers feared that the creation of a new province would mean the establishment of a court of appeal at Dacca and diminish the business of their own High Court. Journalists feared the appearance of new provincial newspapers which would restrict the circulation of the Calcutta press. The change seemed thus to endanger existing interests and was assured of powerful opposition. But this was intensified to an extraordinary degree by sentimental and political considerations. In Bengal the worship of Kālī, wife of Siva, had always been very popular. She there possessed a two-fold character. She delighted in bloody sacrifices; but she was also venerated as the Great Mother. This mingling of attributes, destructive and generative, recalls the deities of ancient civilisations of whom she is perhaps the last representative. Associated with her worship was yet another conception—Bengal as the mother-land. This conception, vague and cloudy as it was, offered a far better basis for the support of political desires by religious excitement than the cult of Śivaji or the indefensible hostility to the Age of Consent Act. A great revival of Kālī-worship took place. At her temple in Calcutta thousands of goats were slaughtered, while the partition was described as the rending in pieces of the revered mother by impious foreign hands. On the political side the partition meant the creation of a province in which the Muslims would form a clear majority of the population. It was therefore represented as the designed subjection of Hindus to Muslim interests. In support of the excitement thus called up was organised the *swādeshi* movement. This was designed to secure a boycott of foreign goods and their replacement by native—*swādeshi*—articles.

Students and school-boys were employed to picket shops; would-be purchasers of English cloth were abused and intimidated; shop-keepers who stocked it were threatened; and when in the new province Muslims resisted these endeavours to make them buy what they did not want, communal riots became frequent.

Under cover of this violent agitation, the revolutionary group formed secret societies, collected arms, prepared bombs, and scattered abroad newspapers and leaflets designed to vilify the government and inflame the people. It was a religious duty to get rid of the foreigner. The man who was executed for murdering an Englishman should be regarded as a martyr to his motherland. Miserly and luxurious men who refused to contribute subscriptions to the cause should be made to give by force. The doctrine fell on ready ears. Prices were rising, and with them the cost of living was increasing. But large numbers of the educated class lived on fixed salaries as clerks and school-masters. Their discontent rose as the purchasing power of their monthly pay fell. Then, too, the province was full of men who had failed in the various university examinations and who blamed the examiners and the government for the blight that had descended on their exaggerated hopes. Many even of those who had passed found themselves without the government posts which they had sought, or starving at the over-crowded bar, or teaching at miserably low pay in schools. These, and especially the last, became the eager disciples of the revolutionary movement, which through its adherents among teachers found a ready way into the classes of both schools and colleges. The result was a long series of political crimes. The terrorist associations attacked both the officials of government and their own countrymen. Within four months, in the cold weather of 1907-8, the lieutenant-governor's train was derailed, a former district magistrate of Dacca was shot at and wounded, and two Englishwomen were killed by a bomb thrown into their carriage. About the same time began a series of political dacoities. Dacoity had always been the characteristic crime of Bengal; but whereas in the past it had been the work of specific criminal castes, it was now conducted by groups of young *badralog*—middle-class people. Their methods were the same. Evidence was silenced by intimidation and murder. Sometimes the money and valuables stolen were devoted to the personal use of the

robbers. But the ostensible purpose always was to provide funds for the revolutionary movement.

These two movements, centring respectively at Poona and Calcutta, formed the most active branches, both characterised by the union of political and religious excitement. In the Panjab the latter was lacking. There advantage was taken of agrarian discontent arising out of legislation affecting the canal colonies. The leaders, Lājput Rai and Ajit Singh, sought to revive memories of Sikh rule, bitterly attacking as traitors those who served the government in the police or the army.

It has often been asserted that this unrest was basically due to the growing misery of the population under the depressing influences of British rule. Such statements lack both the support of evidence and any degree of inherent probability. So far as evidence goes, the population of India was more prosperous at the close of the nineteenth century than it had been at the beginning. Nor do men ponder rebellion when ground down by misery. A wholly wretched population is docile. When all the energies of a man are needed to save himself and his family from starvation, he has no time left for politics. Political discontent emerges, not among men who have always been destitute, but among men who find themselves worse off than they formerly were. This was predominantly the case with the professional and educated classes. Their growing numbers having exceeded the public demand for their services, and the rise in prices having reduced the value of the salaries they could command, they were all ready for political activity.

Blame also has been laid on the personality and policy of the governor-general who retired in 1905, Lord Curzon. In such matters contemporary judgment often lays too heavy a responsibility on individuals, and neglects the relentless pressure of general conditions. In like manner Dalhousie was blamed for bringing about the Indian Mutiny. But while the consequences of Dalhousie's and of Curzon's policy may be observed clearly in the developments which followed on their rule, the responsibility of both lay in failing to see what indirect and unexpected tendencies their conduct would call into action, and in the fact that their measures were timed unluckily rather than in themselves ill-considered. Curzon's reforming zeal, his partition of Bengal, his educational reforms, the douches of cold common-sense which he

poured from time to time on political enthusiasm, his strong and well-founded admiration of the change which a century of British government had produced in India, intensely annoyed the educated classes who claimed that this tutelage was out-of-date, and who were eager to grasp authority in their own hands. To this extent he certainly exasperated the Congress and facilitated the extension of extremist influence. But though a more conciliatory attitude might have smoothed away some part of the moderates' hostility, nothing short of complete abdication could have satisfied the irreconcilable elements.

This was exhibited clearly by the course of events under Curzon's successor, Lord Minto. Minto's aim was twofold. He desired to rally to the government the moderate group which had been antagonised by his predecessor, and to bring forward into active political life the large land-owners of the country. In this respect Minto's attitude was much more realistic than either that of his predecessor or that of the secretary of state with whom he found himself yoked to the plough of government. Minto's appointment as governor-general had been made in 1905, when the Balfour ministry was approaching its termination. In January 1906 a Liberal cabinet came into office, with Campbell-Bannerman as prime minister and John Morley as secretary of state for India. Morley's selection had been one of those accidents which characterise the working of responsible government. He possessed no special fitness for the office. He had never studied Indian affairs. But he was a convinced and obstinate defender of the party-creed, who had held subordinate offices in past administrations, with a deserved reputation for incisive speech and a character of greater honesty than is usual among politicians. His intellect was, however, narrowly doctrinaire. All his life had been passed among writers and speakers; outside the sphere of party-management his practical experience was small; he suffered therefore from all the disabilities which afflict the *intelligentsia* in every age and every region. He exaggerated the importance of the political arena. He exaggerated the importance of the spoken and written word. He was essentially a critic, and a better critic of books and speeches than of action and policy. Minto presented a strong contrast. He was a Conservative in politics, but had never been a violent party-man. He had seen active service in the army. He had managed landed estates. He loved fair play with all the

earnestness of the true sportsman, and would no more have done a dirty thing than he would have shot a bird sitting or pulled his horse in a steeple-chase. He had little of Morley's width of reading, or vigour of phrase; but he had learnt to read men if not books, and to manage men if not to manage periods. He had never been guilty of a calculated ambiguity. He had just served a term of office as governor-general of Canada with remarkable success, and had been reckoned the very man to handle with tactful skill the difficult situation which Curzon had left behind. In accordance with well-established custom he continued in office under the new Liberal ministry.

The problem which confronted him and the secretary of state was two-fold. To maintain ordered government the efforts of the revolutionary societies had to be met and checked; but it was equally essential to restrict the sources of discontent by associating with the government influential Indians drawn not only from among the urban middle-classes but also from among the land-owners in close touch with the rural districts. Action against the revolutionaries and the newspapers which favoured their designs was made difficult by the reluctance of Morley to associate himself and the ministry with a policy of repression. The Radicals persistently denied the serious character of the situation, claiming that the newspaper reports were exaggerated and that the bureaucratic government was attempting to evade reform under cover of the revolutionary bogey. But after long delay Morley was induced publicly to confess that "You may put picric acid in the ink and pen, just as much as in any steel bomb". Meetings held to promote hatred against the government were prohibited first by a temporary ordinance and then by a permanent act. An act was passed limiting the conditions under which persons might possess explosive substances. In June, 1908, the Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act was passed. Under this the most inflammatory of the Calcutta newspapers—the *Jugantar* or New Era—was suppressed. In 1910 a further act was passed. Prosecutions and other repressive measures followed. Tilak for instance had seized the occasion of the murder of the two Englishwomen in Bengal to assert that their death was due to the unbearable oppression of the government. He was tried and sentenced by an Indian judge to six years' transportation. Other leaders who were believed to be deeply concerned in promoting the revolutionary movement were deported under an old regulation of 1818.

In all these matters the policy clearly originated with Minto; Morley's view was that such measures would do more to discourage the moderates than to check the extremists. But here practical wisdom lay rather with the man of affairs than with the politician. The moderates were bound to express loud public disapproval of repression. They could not without endangering their position declare open war upon the party of violence. But they were in fact alarmed at the extent to which the revolutionary movement was spreading. The cleavage had already produced notable effects in the National Congress. In 1905 under the presidency of Gokhale, the Congress had supported the Bengal boycott. Gokhale had complained of the repression of the educated classes, and compared Curzon's policy with that of Aurangzib, as if the partition of Bengal and the Universities Act had been akin in spirit to the emperor's calling out his elephants to crush a path for him from the Delhi palace to the Jama Masjid through the Hindu throng appealing against the re-establishment of the infidel poll-tax. But in 1906 difficulties within the Congress were evaded only by one of those devices favoured by embarrassed politicians. A formula was found vague enough to conceal the widening gap between moderate and extremist. *Swarāj* was declared to be the goal of Indian progress; and that convenient catchword was accepted by all—by moderates in the sense of responsible parliamentary government, by extremists in the sense of absolute independence. In 1907 violence emerged. A preliminary meeting of the organising committee at Nāgpur, where the Congress was to have met, was forcibly broken up by a body of extremists. At Surat, where the Congress finally sat, the two parties came to blows again; the extremists were driven out; and then the Congress purged itself of irreconcilables like Tilak from Poona and Arabindo Ghose from Bengal. This was mainly due to the influence of two men, Gokhale and Surendranāth Banerji. Gokhale, the ablest and probably the most far-seeing of the moderates, had been and still remained an earnest advocate of social reform. He was therefore fundamentally separated from his fellow-casteman, Tilak, by his conceptions of both political method and political objects. Moreover, he was honest as well as courageous. A free and often severe critic of the existing administration, he would also declare unpalatable truths to his own people, reminding them that Indian troubles sprang less from foreign

dominion than from internal defects, that British rule had been a great instrument of progress, that the average degree of knowledge, energy, and self-sacrifice among Indians remained far below that of the western self-governing nations, and that real political progress depended far less on political concessions than on a raising of the average Indian capacity.

Surendranāth Banerji had long been in the forefront of agitation in Bengal. He had led the anti-partition movement. He had followed Tilak in seeking to reinforce the political agitation by religious zeal, and to enlist the young enthusiasm of students and school-boys in spreading his views among the people. At one time he had verged closely upon the irreconcilable extremist attitude. But he had been alarmed by the anarchical developments which had arisen in Bengal, and in 1908 swung back decisively into the moderate camp.

Meanwhile proposals for political reform, which Minto deemed the natural correlative to the repression of violence, had been under serious debate. Here again the views of the governor-general and the secretary of state differed profoundly. Morley's ideas were based upon the proposals which had been put forward by the National Congress, designed in the main to secure a large measure of the political machinery existing in England. To Minto, on the contrary, the enlargement of the legislative councils, the extension of elective methods, and the widening of the powers of the councils, seemed of far less moment than certain other considerations which did not necessarily affect the actual political structure. The numberless and deep divisions of the population seemed to him completely to rule out the establishment of real representative government. "We cannot move far in that direction", he wrote on May 16, 1907, "and any move we make is merely a sop to impossible ambitions." But these words were far from indicating any reluctance to undertake important reforms. The essence of the matter, as he saw it, was to bridge over the gulf between Indian and Englishman, which had been at once concealed and widened by the spreading use of the English language in India. "I cannot admit", he wrote at the close of 1906, "that we have only the aspirations of the so-called advanced party to deal with....I believe that we have something much bigger in front of us—the desire of a largely increasing class of well-educated and loyal men to possess a greater share in the govern-

ment of India. Since I have been in India I have talked with many such men, chiefs, land-owners and others; and I have found them almost universally...opposed to an increase of representative government, but strongly pressing the claims and capabilities of their countrymen to share in the highest executive councils of their country."

This thought perpetually recurred in his letters. "The more I see, the more convinced I am", he wrote in the following year, "that we cannot continue to govern India with any hopes of tranquillity till we give her educated classes a chance of a greater share in the government of the country." But this was to be sought not by a mere mechanical widening of the elective elements in the legislative councils, but by rendering them more truly representative, and above all by a considerable increase in the high executive offices open, in practice as well as in theory, to men of Indian birth. "The only way we can save India from a tremendous convulsion", he declared, "...is in recognising the right of the Indian gentleman, loyal at the present moment, to a greater share in the government of the country."

While therefore he was quite willing to accept such changes in the direction of parliamentary government as Morley desired, he was far from regarding them as the essential part of the plans which he was elaborating. While Morley, despite disclaimers alike in his correspondence with Minto and in his speeches in parliament, considered the enlargement of the legislative councils and the establishment of elective methods as leading directly towards the establishment of western institutions, Minto busied himself with bringing into the scheme of reforms changes which would demonstrate his principles of associating Indians with the business of administration and of providing large but unorganised masses with the means of self-expression. His share in the formation of the changes introduced by the act of 1909 was therefore far more personal than that of the secretary of state, who hardly did more than adopt current ideas. The statement may surprise those conversant only with the published documents. With studied egotism Morley's *Recollections* tacitly claim a wholly disproportionate share of credit for the measure with which his name and Minto's are connected, and his private correspondence more than once suggested that the official communications of the Government of India should be so drafted as to make its depend-



ence on the home government appear more evident. In fact his autocratic temperament and his doctrinaire ideas led him to consider the governor-general as his agent rather than as his colleague. Minto, however, succeeded to a great extent in defending the government over which he presided. He was particularly anxious that the Indian public should have no reason to think that reform was being forced on him from London, and refused altogether to allow "the Government of India to give a blank cheque, so to speak, to be filled in for us at home".

Minto's special contributions to the reform scheme of 1909 were three in number—the proposed advisory council, the provision of special representation for certain classes, and the inclusion of Indians in the executive councils. The first of these came to nothing, but is interesting as illustrating the ideas by which he was inspired. The proposal sprang out of a suggestion of Curzon's that a council of princes should be set up. Minto thought this by itself inadvisable, but turned his attention to the possibility of forming a council of land-owners, ruling chiefs, and men of influence outside the legislative council, to be summoned from time to time and consulted regarding projected changes in law or policy. The special advantage which he hoped thus to secure was to ascertain the views of rural India, scarcely represented by congresses or elected members of an exclusively urban character. As the discussions progressed, this proposal was developed—it appears, by the secretary of state's council—into a scheme for an advisory council consisting of both ruling princes and territorial magnates. This was designed to represent the views "of the hereditary leaders of the people, both in British India and in the principal native states". But in this form the proposal proved impracticable. Ruling chiefs refused to sit as equals beside the zamindars of British India; and Minto himself concluded that his purpose could be better achieved by other methods. The proposal was therefore abandoned.

The provision for an improved representative system in the legislative councils, though a difficult matter, was however, developed. The scheme adopted under the act of 1892 had worked very much in one direction. The members recommended for appointment by the local boards had consisted in the main of lawyers. The district municipalities had recommended forty lawyers out of a total of forty-three members; and even the

district boards, which might have been expected to possess a more rural complexion, had nominated nearly four times as many lawyers as land-owners. Direct nomination had done something to set this right, but lawyers had succeeded in obtaining over a third of the seats on the provincial councils, while lawyers and school-masters between them had formed 40 per cent. of the imperial council. Minto and his council did not deny "that the professional classes are entitled to a share of representation proportioned not merely to their numbers, which are small, but to their influence, which is large and tends continually to increase. But they are not prepared to allow them a virtual monopoly of the power exercised by the councils, and they believe that the soundest solution of the problem is to be found in supplying the requisite counterpoise...by creating an additional electorate recruited from the landed and moneyed classes".

The over-representation of urban interests was not the only problem to be considered. The Muslims demanded a larger proportion of seats than they had been able to secure in the past. They formed about a quarter of the population of British India, but had not secured an eighth of the seats filled by recommendation in the imperial council. These results were necessarily displeasing to the leaders of the community, who feared that further advances in the direction of self-government would result in an increasing political predominance of the Hindu professional classes. The fact was, as Sir Valentine Chirol pointed out at the time, that "the more we delegate of our authority in India to the natives of India, the more we must necessarily in practice delegate it to the Hindus who form the majority". The whole question of constitutional change was therefore viewed by Muslims with great apprehension. They had besides been exasperated by the Hindu opposition to the creation of a predominantly Muslim province in Eastern Bengal. Thus the long-standing social and religious division of India into Hindu and Muslim was sharpened into bitter hostility by political fears and projects. Hindu politicians have usually sought to represent this revival of a deep-seated and long existing jealousy as the work of government, seeking to ease the burden of rule by division, and encouraging Muslim hopes in order to set one community against the other. But Muslim anxiety was in part the product of circumstances, in part the product of Hindu policy. Any movement towards self-govern-

ment suggested to a great minority the growing need of fortifying its position; and the conduct of the Hindu politicians had shown no sympathy whatever with the Muslim position. When the Hindus could not bear Muslim influence to be predominant in a single province, when journalists like Tilak classed the Muslims with the British as the tyrants and despoilers of India, what might not be expected if ever political power really fell into Hindu hands? Muslim distrust of a possible Hindu rule was a source of great annoyance to the Hindu leaders, for it showed too plainly that they could not claim to speak for the country as a whole. Naturally therefore they sought to minimise the importance and sincerity of Muslim demands by accusing the government of inspiring a fictitious movement. But, however well Hindu and Muslim had dwelt together under a common subjection, the idea of self-government was more than enough to revive irreconcilable bitterness between groups whose social and religious practices were mutually repugnant.

As soon therefore as it was known that the Government of India had a reform scheme under consideration, a Muslim deputation, headed by the Aga Khān, waited upon Minto to urge the necessity of special provision to safeguard Muslim interests. The governor-general, whose great aim was to secure an improved degree of representation, was in natural sympathy with the demand that the existing lack of electoral provision for minorities should be amended. He agreed that their position should be estimated not merely by their numerical strength but also by their political importance and the services they had rendered to the empire.

In the circular despatch issued in August, 1907, for the purpose of eliciting both public opinion and official views, considerable emphasis was laid upon the need of giving the widest possible representation to the various classes, races and interests of the country. The creation of special electorates for the landed class and Muslims was suggested; and a scheme (which was in fact over-elaborated) was published, proposing to assign specific numbers of seats to each race, caste, and religion, with special electorates in each case. This detailed proposal was abandoned. But the Government of India, like the Decentralisation Commission which was sitting at this time, concluded "that representation by classes and interests is the only practicable method of embodying

the elective principle in the constitution of the Indian legislative councils". Special provision was therefore proposed; landed and Muslim constituencies should be established, and means taken to secure for each important class in the country at least one member well acquainted with its views.

While Morley was induced to agree that general territorial constituencies on the English pattern could not be trusted to reflect adequately the numberless cross-divisions by which India was seamed, he attempted to overcome the difficulties raised by special electorates by putting forward an alternative plan. This had been mainly prepared by MacDonnell, a retired Indian civilian who had had an unusually distinguished career alike in India and after his retirement in London. This contemplated a system of indirect elections. The primary electors might choose electoral colleges, which should include minority representatives in numbers proportioned to the strength of the various minorities; and this, it was hoped, might obviate the need of securing representation by nomination. This plan, however, met with much criticism, especially among the Muslims, and was judged unworkable. The statute which was finally passed by parliament directed the Government of India to prepare rules for the constitution of the legislative councils; and the rules which were at last issued with the secretary of state's approval provided for the creation of special land-holders' and Muslim constituencies in the principal provinces.

Minto's other individual contribution to the reforms of 1909 was the inclusion of Indian members in the executive councils. The idea of such appointments was far from new, but difficulties of various kinds had always prevented their serious consideration. It had been suggested that a ruling prince should be included in the governor-general's council; but this would have had the disadvantage of giving mortal offence to all the others; nor was it easy to find among the great land-owners, whom Minto and more than one of his predecessors had wished to bring forward, men who possessed at once sufficient knowledge of affairs and a sufficient grasp of English. This had indeed been the chief practical obstacle to the inclusion of some of the distinguished men who had emerged in the Indian states. Knowledge of English had, however, spread rapidly in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, and at the opening of the twentieth Minto

was convinced that the time was ripe for a convincing demonstration of good-will. The appointment of Indian members had had a place in his earliest projects of reform, and seemed to him of the utmost importance both from their probable effect on Indian opinion and from their expected influence on government policy. As the law stood, such action was only possible within certain narrow limitations. Indian members of the Indian Civil Service were eligible to all the seats in the governors' councils at Bombay and Madras, and to most of the seats in the governor-general's council. But the Indians of the service had mostly chosen the judicial rather than the executive line of employment, and, what was of more importance, had been debarred by their occupation from taking a part in Indian politics or securing a following in the Congress world. While their appointment to council might then have flattered Indian sentiment, the advantage would for the most part have been sentimental only. Their judicial experience would have been of small use, and their appointment would have conciliated few but the members of their own families. Prominent Indians outside the service were not eligible at all for seats in the subordinate councils or for most of the seats in the governor-general's council.

While this was the legal and practical position, Minto busied himself in 1906-7 in raising the question in his own executive council. Though he met with small encouragement, he resolved at last to recommend on his own responsibility the appointment of an Indian to his council. One cynical adviser suggested the creation of a special educational portfolio, on the ground that the educational departments had few friends. But the office of the law member was the most suitable for such a departure, both because it required no change in the existing law and because it opened the field to a very active and influential class. Serious opposition emerged against this proposal in England. It had only been supported in the governor-general's council by a single member besides Minto himself. Morley was unable to induce the Council of India to agree to the measure. He then laid it before the cabinet, where the opposition of Lord Ripon was decisive. For the moment therefore the project dropped, and all that immediately followed was the nomination of two Indians to the Council of India, appointments to which lay within the statutory powers of the secretary of state. Morley himself admitted that this step

would hardly have been taken but for the firm stand which Minto had made in favour of including Indians in the executive council.

Though foiled for the moment, Minto persisted in his advocacy of appointing Indian members to council. "The best reply", he thought, "that can be made to the unrest that is in the air would be the appointment of a native member to the viceroy's council." In consequence of his persistence, it was at last resolved to adopt his advice, to appoint an Indian member to his council, to enlarge the two presidency councils by one member each so as to permit the same being done at Bombay and Madras, and to take powers to create executive councils in the other provinces.

These reforms, so far as was necessary, were embodied in the Government of India Act, 1909, and the regulations made under it by the Government of India. The legislative councils were enlarged, their powers were increased, and they were authorised to adopt resolutions on matters of administrative and financial policy; elective methods of choice were at last formally introduced; the higher governments lost that exclusive character which had marked them from the inception of British rule; and special provision was made to secure in the enlarged legislatures representation of numerous and important classes without reducing the representation of those classes specially associated with the National Congress. "Regarding the scheme as a whole," the Government of India wrote, "we consider ourselves justified in claiming for it that it will really and effectively associate the people of India with the government in the work, not only of occasional legislation, but of actual every-day administration."

This claim was well substantiated. The existing councils were enlarged from a total of 124 to a total of 331 members; elected members increased from 39 to 136; and though the official majority was retained in the imperial council, it disappeared from the provincial legislatures. The original proposals had included the retention of the official majority—*i.e.* the retention of full executive control over legislation—in all the councils. This was regarded as a legitimate and necessary consequence of the nature of the Indian government, nor was it seriously attacked except by men of extremist leanings. However, as a result of discussions with the provincial governments, and, on consideration of the views expressed in the Indian journals and elsewhere, the Government of India finally proposed not to create an official majority in the

various councils but only to retain the power of calling one into existence if necessary. "We propose to work normally with a minority but to reserve power in the last resort to transform it into a majority." It was in this connection that Morley made his particular and individual contribution to the reform scheme as finally adopted. The limited powers of the provincial legislatures and the effective powers of veto exercised by the executive authorities seemed to him to render the retention in them of official majorities unnecessary. Moreover, the Bombay government had for some years worked without an official majority, and did not desire one. He therefore decided that the official majority should be discontinued in these bodies. But in respect of the imperial council he was not prepared to go as far as Minto. The essential condition of "liberalising" the provincial councils was "that the imperial supremacy shall be in no degree compromised". The Government of India, he held, must always be so constituted as to be able to carry out the orders, executive or legislative, which it might receive from Whitehall. In no circumstances must its dependence be impaired. "I am convinced", he wrote, "that a permanent official majority...is absolutely necessary."

The Morley-Minto reforms, enacted in 1909, and brought into force in the following year, did not bring political crime to an end, as Morley seems to have expected. As soon as his bill was brought into the House of Commons, he began to demand the release of the deportees. But Minto was resolved to move more cautiously, holding the view that the political purpose of the reforms was to rally the moderates to the government, not to conciliate the irreconcilables. In this he proved to have judged aright. The moderates under Gokhale's leadership, while sharply criticising the provisions to secure the representation of classes other than those composing the *intelligentsia*, wisely accepted the reforms as a substantial move towards associating Indians with the government of their country. Pandit Moti Lāl Nehru, for example, in a presidential address to a social congress held at Āgra in 1909, reminded his audience that even self-government on the colonial model could not convert Indians into a united nation until they purged themselves of "the many social diseases that your body politic suffers from". In 1910, when a new regulation was introduced to control newspaper incitement to political crime by requiring presses to deposit security which might be forfeited,

Gokhale supported the measure, which was passed by the imperial council without a division, and with only two members rising to speak against it. This notable success, which indicated in how great a degree Minto had secured the confidence of the moderate congress-men, was followed at once by the release of the persons who had been deported under the regulation of 1818. Minto had in fact succeeded by mingled tact and firmness in turning a nasty political corner. It may justly be said that the unanimity with which the leading Indian politicians supported the government on the outbreak of war in 1914 was due in no small degree to the conciliating effects of his reforms, coupled as they were with the firm repression of political crime and of those who instigated it.




## CHAPTER XIX

### Political Developments, 1910-19

The new press act of 1910 has been already mentioned. The earlier act had proved ineffective in preventing incitement to political crime, and sober minds were beginning to question the universal expedience of an unrestricted press. Further legislation had been recommended by the Indian princes. In the House of Lords in 1908 Lord Cromer recanted his former defence of Ripon's repeal of the Vernacular Press Act and admitted that the policy of complete freedom had failed alike in Egypt and in India. The earlier act too had led to the ostensible conduct of journals by mere nominees who went to prison for illegal publications one after another while the persons really responsible kept securely in the background. The new act was designed to make incitement to crime expensive as well as illegal. New presses were required to deposit security which might be forfeited if the press published illegal matter; forfeiture entailed the closing of the press which might be required to double the security if its owners desired to reopen it; and a second offence might entail not only forfeiture of the increased deposit but also confiscation of the press itself. Similar powers were granted over newspapers. An appeal against an order of forfeiture was allowed to the High Courts. The principles of this measure were approved by Gokhale, were accepted by the imperial council without a division, and indeed were attacked by only two of its members.

This act did much to check the open dissemination of revolutionary doctrines. But secret societies, especially in Bengal, continued their activity. Murders and dacoities continued. In the latter part of 1910 six occurred round Dacca, and sixteen more in 1911, although after a prolonged trial a number of men were convicted of conspiring to wage war against the king. The secret societies concerned in these and similar outbreaks found great advantage in the political immunities of French territory at Chandernagore. Pondichery also served as a refuge for political agitators in southern India. A newspaper which had been closed down at Madras was republished in the French settlement, and



the district-magistrate of Tinnevely was shot by a man connected with the political refugees there. At this time revolutionary effort was intimately associated with a group of agitators in Europe, originally established at the "India House" in London, but who had migrated to Paris after the murders of Curzon Wylie and Dr Lalkaka in 1909.

At the end of 1911 King George held a great durbar at Delhi to celebrate his accession to the throne. This was marked not only by the traditional splendour, but also by scenes of extraordinary popular enthusiasm. The classes which had exhibited the fiercest antagonism to the British rule exhibited also a mystical devotion to the person of the king, displaying the degree in which their behaviour was governed by sentiment. The king's accession was commemorated by a number of boons. The princes were relieved from all future payments of *nazarāna* or succession-dues. Special grants were made for the extension of elementary education. The lower grades of military and civil servants received bonuses of pay. Members of the Indian Army were declared eligible for the Victoria Cross. The king's visit was also made the occasion of announcing a change of great importance but dubious advantage. The capital was to be removed from Calcutta to Delhi, the partition of Bengal was to be undone, the new province of Eastern Bengal with its Muslim majority was to vanish as a separate entity, and instead Assam was to be administered by a chief commissioner, while Bihar, Orissa, and Chota Nāgpur were to be made into a separate province under a lieutenant-governor with an executive council.

These measures were at once subjected to sharp criticism. Their intrinsic wisdom and the method of their announcement were perhaps equally open to question. The reversal of the partition had indeed been pressed several times by Indian leaders on the secretary of state. Morley, however, had consistently refused to reopen the matter. It had occasioned keen resentment among the Hindu leaders in Bengal, but even the Hindu politicians of other provinces had not taken the matter very seriously, while in Bengal itself the agitation was fast dying away. Morley, therefore, thought that little could be gained by reopening a settled matter, while he himself regarded the division of the Bengalis into two groups as expedient rather than otherwise. In 1910 he retired from office and was succeeded by Lord Crewe, while

Edwin Montagu retained his former position as under-secretary. The change probably invested Montagu with a greater degree of influence than he had previously enjoyed. He had always been disposed to emphasise the predominance of the India Office in Indian affairs. He had ventured in defiance of the facts to describe the reforms of 1909 as entirely the work of the secretary of state and publicly to refer to the governor-general as the secretary of state's agent. He was a man of high ideals, sharp perceptions, but uncertain judgment; and preferred the spectacular to the cautious in the way of political action. He probably had much to do with the adoption of this policy by Lord Crewe and with the method chosen for its promulgation. The objections to the reversal of the partition were numerous. Eastern Bengal had always been a much neglected area so long as it had been administered from Calcutta, and its separation therefore seemed expedient. Again, if the transference of authority into Indian hands was to continue, it was well that there should be provinces predominantly Muslim, since in most the Muslims would form a minority. Thirdly the reversal of an administrative measure in the face of objections which were mainly sentimental in character, for which no solid reasons could be adduced, which had been made the pretext for an outburst of political crime, was politically unwise. It suggested that clamour alone, irrespective of reason, could secure concessions. Besides this, to cancel the partition when the opposition to it was sinking involved government in all the odium of an unpopular measure without securing the advantages of a timely acceptance of popular opinion. Lastly, while the Hindus of Bengal felt they had gained a victory for which they owed thanks to the efforts of none but themselves, the Muslims felt they had been deserted and must make the best terms they could with the rival party. The transference of the capital to the city renowned throughout the world as the centre of Mughal rule had been intended to off-set this Muslim reaction. It certainly carried with it an appeal to Muslim sentiment. But it was unlikely that any good Muslim would respond deeply. Why should Muslims be moved by the establishment of the infidel capital in a centre of Muslim glory? It was quite as likely to wound as to conciliate. The building of a new city would be enormously expensive, even though this might be partly concealed by the

modesty of initial estimates. It was widely felt that Calcutta, created, as it had been, by English enterprise and Indian co-operation, still remained the most appropriate capital for British India, and that little would be gained by removal to a city whose traditions were essentially those of oriental despotism. The main advantage which could be claimed for the move was that it would shift the seat of government from the agitated atmosphere of Bengal. The whole project appears to have been formulated in London without any formal consultation with the Government of India, while official discussion or protest seems to have been designedly avoided by the method of announcement. The arguments which might have been sent in reply to an official despatch could not be urged against a measure announced by the king in person. The procedure illustrates in a striking way the degree in which the authorities at the India Office had come to regard themselves as the real executive government of India. This tendency, which had come into being in 1858, and had been greatly strengthened by the character and ideas of Morley, was destined to reach its peak under the influence of Montagu.

The futility of this endeavour to conciliate revolutionary leaders was displayed by the events of the next few years. Lord Hardinge, who had succeeded Minto in 1910, narrowly escaped being killed by a bomb thrown at him in Delhi in 1912. In Bengal murder and dacoity continued unchecked. Bengali influence extended to Benares, where revolutionary societies were formed. In the Panjab a movement arose that was to develop under Parisian, American and Bengali guidance, into the *Ghadr* (Mutiny) Movement.

More ominous, however, than this continuance of political crime was the change in the Muslim attitude. Attempts were made to reduce the antagonism of the Hindu and Muslim leaders by holding a conference. Any results that might have followed from this were cast away by a Hindu member of the imperial legislative council who insisted on moving a resolution demanding the abolition of the special Muslim electorates. But although an alliance between Hindu and Muslim leaders proved impossible, the Muslim attitude to the government lost the friendliness which had marked it in recent years. Sayyid Ahmad had died in 1898, and no one of his school of thought could exercise the same degree of influence over the Muslim community. It was

much excited by the development of foreign affairs. The Italian seizure of Tripoli, the Anglo-Russian agreement in Persia, and the Balkan War all made it fear that soon no independent Muslim state would survive. The question too of the caliphate began more and more to exercise the minds of Indian Muslims. When the Turkish sultan assumed the title of caliph in 1517, his spiritual authority was not recognised in India. The Mughal emperors themselves assumed the same rank and style, and down to the Indian Mutiny and the final disappearance of the forms of empire from Delhi, no Indian Muslim seems to have looked to Constantinople for leadership or regarded the sultan with any special respect. With the disappearance of the shadowy Indian caliph, however, a new position emerged. For a time Indian Muslims were much perplexed. Whose name was to replace that of Bahādur Shāh in the Friday prayers? In the Panjab some are stated to have followed the extraordinary course of substituting the name of Queen Victoria. But after a period of considerable confusion, it was generally agreed that the sultan's name should be used in the *khūtba*. To the more vehement followers of Islam this meant a formal transference of allegiance; but the majority continued in the passive obedience which they had generally shown to the British power in India, while some, under the leadership of Sayyid Ahmad, held that the caliphate had lapsed with the Mongol destruction of the 'Abbāsids in 1258 and had never truly been revived. Early in the present century, however, when the sultan found himself pressed on the one hand by the European powers and on the other by the agnostic, cosmopolitan group known as the Young Turks, he hoped to strengthen his position by emphasising his claim to the spiritual leadership of Islam. His agents spread to India, and Indian interest deepened considerably. When the Balkan War broke out in 1912, Indian Muslims equipped a medical mission, subscribed to the Red Crescent Fund, and formed the society called "The Servants of the Ka'aba", the object of which was the maintenance of Turkish integrity. The excitement aroused by this propaganda was illustrated by events at Cawnpore. In the course of street improvements it had been decided to demolish a Hindu temple and a room and platform which had been added to a small mosque. When it was found possible to spare the temple, the Muslims at once demanded that these additions should also be spared. A wild

agitation arose, fostered from without; the police were attacked; lives were lost; and the matter gained importance enough for Lord Hardinge to visit the place and personally arrange a settlement. In the past whole mosques had been removed without the least complaint being raised.

In two respects the reforms of 1909 had produced unexpected results in actual working. It was found necessary to prevent attacks on government measures by official members of the new councils, and to prevent provincial governments from evading obedience to the orders of the secretary of state on the score of opposition by the non-official majority. The latter also began to influence the course of policy and legislation much more directly than had till then been the case. Down to 1917 not quite half the resolutions moved in the imperial council had been followed by official action in the sense desired, but the power of putting questions was too often used to demand information which was already published or of small public value. Important changes were often made in government bills in the course of discussions in select committee, which proved more useful than the formal debates, where non-official members aimed less at persuading the government than at addressing the outside public.

The act of 1909 had given powers to extend the council form of executive government from Bombay and Madras to the other major provinces. In 1910 this was carried into effect in Bengal, where the lieutenant-governor was replaced by a governor with a council of four members. When in the next year the province of Bihar was formed, the new lieutenant-governor was provided with an executive council, on the ground that the province, when part of Bengal, had already been under council-government. But this was the only instance in which an executive council was set up in a lieutenant-governor's province, although proposals were made to establish one in the United Provinces by resolutions moved in the imperial legislative council in 1911 and in the provincial council in 1913. Indian opinion favoured such changes partly because government by council was reckoned a form of government superior to the individual government of a lieutenant-governor, partly because council-government would favour the appointment of heads of provinces from among public men in England, and partly because they would increase the number of high offices available for Indian politicians. On the first occasion

the lieutenant-governor, Sir John Hewitt, opposed the change on the ground that the volume of work to be done would not justify the creation of such a body, and that it would be difficult to select Indians with a sufficient knowledge of public work. On the second occasion, Sir James (now Lord) Meston was lieutenant-governor. He held much the same views as his predecessor as regards the need of a council, but on the whole advised compliance as the demand would certainly grow and have to be conceded sooner or later. After a prolonged discussion, this recommendation was accepted by the Government of India and the secretary of state. But when in 1915 a draft proclamation was laid before parliament in accordance with the act of 1909, the House of Lords voted an address to the crown opposing it, and the matter therefore dropped.

The most embarrassing question, however, of the years immediately preceding the outbreak of war in 1914 was that raised by the status of Indians in the South African colonies. Indians had gone to South Africa in considerable numbers as indentured coolies, to work on the semi-tropical plantations. On the expiry of their term of service many had settled down as small shopkeepers and pedlars. The growth of their numbers led to the appearance of a much smaller group of Indian professional men, lawyers and doctors. The same neglect of sanitation as characterises Indian villages made the poorer and much larger section of the immigrants unwelcome neighbours; and their unpopularity was strengthened by the strong colour-sense of the South African colonists, especially among the large Dutch element, which was disposed to class the Indians with the native inhabitants. In the two Dutch republics special regulations were directed against them. From the Orange Free State they were completely excluded. In the Transvaal they could not acquire land or reside outside certain defined areas. This produced many complaints in India and formed indeed one of the grievances alleged against the Dutch republics before the outbreak of the South African War. But the absorption of the republics at the end of the war produced no improvement. The new authorities were primarily anxious so far as possible to conciliate Dutch sentiment; while the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1909 deprived the home government of all powers of direct interference. At the same time restrictions tended to increase. Indians were best



off in the Cape Colony. In Natal they had to pay a licence tax if they remained beyond the term of their indentures. They lost their franchise for the state legislature; and they were threatened with the loss of the municipal franchise. Mr M. R. Gāndhi first came into prominence in connection with these restrictions. He was a Gujarāṭi lawyer who had gone to South Africa in 1893 and had remained with the object of obtaining some improvement in the status of his countrymen. Inspired by the nonconformist resistance to payment of the educational rates under the Education Act of 1902, he organised a passive resistance movement. The Government of India supported the demands, but could not deal direct with the South African governments, while the home government, though favouring the Indian claims, was hampered by its long-standing and deliberate acceptance of the rights of self-governing colonies. However, milder legislation was introduced in 1911 and passive resistance ceased. But long delays occurred in the passing of the bills. The governor-general spoke publicly and severely of Indian grievances in the Union. Passive resistance revived and this time led to acts of violence; riots were followed by vigorous prosecutions; and at last a commission of enquiry followed which produced a temporary settlement of the question.

Although the crisis of 1907 had on the whole eased considerably in the following years, there remained many points of difficulty, when, in August, 1914, war broke out in Europe and at once involved all the major powers. The effect in India was remarkable. German propagandists had claimed that war in Europe would be followed by a general Indian revolt, comparable only with the Mutiny. Instead, all the great princes offered their personal services and all the resources of their states. In British India private individuals and political associations wrote and telegraphed declaring their support of the British cause. When the imperial legislative council met in September, the non-official members agreed unasked that India should contribute to the heavy financial burden of the war. Often before had Great Britain been involved in desperate struggles, but the only deep feeling which Indians had exhibited had been a general apprehension, tempered by a cautious calculation of probabilities.

This unexpected enthusiasm permitted the Government of India to make a far larger contribution to the struggle in men, services

and munitions than had ever been dreamt of. Only a year earlier it had been resolved, in accordance with the findings of the Indian Army Committee, that the duties of the Indian Army were limited to meeting local aggression and resisting any attack by a great power until reinforcements could arrive from England. India, it was laid down, "is not called upon to maintain troops for the specific purpose of placing them at the disposal of the home government for wars outside the Indian sphere". It had been computed that in favourable circumstances the Indian Army could spare for service outside the Indian frontiers two divisions. But at once four divisions, two infantry and two cavalry, with four artillery brigades in excess of establishment, were sent to France to take part in the bitter fighting of the autumn of 1914. Troops were sent to East Africa. Two divisions of Indian infantry and a brigade of cavalry were sent to Egypt. When no less than eight divisions had either been sent abroad or were posted on guard on the north-west frontier, it was resolved to embark on a campaign in Mesopotamia, whither by January, 1915, two whole divisions had been sent. As the war went on, the area of operations constantly expanded; and before peace was made, Indian soldiers had fought all over the near and middle east, besides many parts of Africa, North China, and France. Whereas in normal times the rate of combatant recruitment had been about 15,000 men a year, during the war-years it was raised to 200,000, of whom about a quarter came from the Panjab. Whereas in 1914 the total establishment of British officers with the Indian Army was only 2500, more than 23,000 were sent overseas in the course of the war.

This tremendous effort was achieved at a great, and indeed disproportionate, cost. The Indian Army had been called quite without preparation to undertake tasks which its organisation had never anticipated. Its leaders had contemplated wars, perhaps even a great and serious struggle, upon the frontier; but they had never guessed that the pick of the Indian troops would be sent to France, and that then the remainder, with the aid of newly raised battalions from England, would be required to conduct campaigns in Africa, in Irak, in Palestine. The effects of this situation were exaggerated by the early exhaustion of munitions, and by the excessive burden placed upon the commander-in-chief. The magazines had been emptied in order to

equip the divisions sent to France, and existing conditions of manufacture and supply prevented their being restocked with the quantities needed for the further conduct of the war, until a new system had been built up from the foundation. The commander-in-chief found himself, as Kitchener had insisted he should be, sole head of the Indian Army, and responsible alike for the training and discipline of the forces and for the technical departments without which a modern army is helpless. Kitchener had never supposed that the commander-in-chief would be called upon to bear so heavy a strain. But the system which he had set up was clearly over-centralised. The results appeared most clearly and disastrously in the early campaign in Mesopotamia. Failure of supplies, failure of medical attentions, failure of staff-organisation, failure of superior control were all revealed by the enquiries of a commission which public uneasiness had made necessary. But the blame seems due, far less to individual shortcomings than to the inevitable failure of an organisation required in a time of sudden crisis to carry out duties far more extensive than ever had been anticipated.

The task of government was rendered the more difficult during the period 1914-18 by the aid which external events lent to the revolutionary movements within India itself. German propaganda, Muslim anxiety produced by the entrance of Turkey into the war as an ally of Germany, Bolshevik propaganda following on the downfall of the imperial Russian government in 1917, the uncertain position on the north-west frontier where peace or war all along depended on whether the amir Habībullah could or could not hold his people in check, encouraged the revolutionaries to redoubled efforts. Shortly after the outbreak of the war there arrived at Calcutta a ship-load of Sikhs who had been recruited and carried to Vancouver for the express purpose (as it would seem) of being refused admission into British Columbia and then sent back to India to excite discontent. On arrival they refused to enter the special train designed to convey them back to their native province; a riot ensued; the returned emigrants proved to have been provided with revolvers; men were shot on both sides; and those Sikhs who escaped capture joined groups of dacoits and committed a series of violent crimes. In December, 1914, a Bombay Brāhman was employed to concert a joint-rebellion in Bengal and the Panjab. A general rising was planned

for the following February, but was frustrated by the betrayal of the plan. In consequence of these efforts, the Defence of India Act was passed, under which revolutionists could be tried by a bench of judges with no preliminary commitment and no power of appeal, and suspects against whom actual crime could not be juridically proved might be interned.

In 1915 came the unfortunate *Khilāfat* movement. Muslim uneasiness at the war with Turkey was exploited in order, if possible, to produce rebellion. The cry raised was that the Holy Places of Islam were in danger. Many unfortunate peasants were persuaded to sell their land and emigrate into Afghanistan. Muslim students from the Lahore colleges were induced to join fanatical groups in the tribal territory. A Turco-German mission at Kābul busied itself in seeking to promote open rebellion and in nominating a government to replace the British government on its overthrow. Other attempts were made by the *Ghadr* party in America to raise trouble in Burma, where Muslim agents were employed to instigate an Indian regiment to mutiny.

As the event showed, these attempts were adequately watched and forestalled by the secret intelligence of the government. Probably greater anxiety was occasioned by the changed attitude of many Indian leaders as the war drew on. The early enthusiasm of August and September, 1914, did not hold. This should have surprised nobody. The fickleness of popular feeling is the tritest of political commonplaces. Nor was much done to keep enthusiasm alive. It needed constant tending. Associations for voluntary work might have done much to keep it alive with the stimulus of emulation. But, except by Lord and Lady Willingdon at Bombay, little was done in this direction. As the first warmth of feeling cooled, as the burdens of war grew heavier, and the issue became less certain, the politicians began to change their tone. Something of this must be ascribed to the unbalanced praise and strong exaggeration of the part which India had played. English newspapers and politicians alike wrote and spoke as though India had saved the empire, and as though her effort, great as it was, had been really comparable with the efforts of the allied states, involved in as desperate a struggle as any that stands upon record. The effect of such language was unfortunate. It was naturally argued in Indian circles that Indian services would be acknowledged in the only way that could be acceptable to

Indian leaders, by the concession of substantial political changes; and when the cabinet, immersed in the overwhelming business of the hour, gave no sign of having considered the expected reorganisation of the empire, the early enthusiasm of political circles gave way to growing disappointment and suspicion. The calamitous mismanagement of Irish affairs seemed to indicate that the British government could be squeezed. New relations between Great Britain and the self-governing dominions too seemed to be in process of development; President Wilson, with headlong ineptitude, proposed "self-determination" as the goal to be attained on the conclusion of the war, while other leaders held out hopes that the war then raging was destined to be the last and that the dominion of armed force was drawing to its end. The new world thus foreshadowed, when the western powers should have attained to victory, the pathetic and delusive hopes spread abroad to encourage disheartened and weary combatants, seemed to promise the advent of an age when power and interests would be subordinated to argument and ideals. In these circumstances the Home Rule Movement was launched by Tilak and Mrs Besant. It was well calculated to attract wide support. Even the Muslims were for a while drawn into alliance with the extremest Hindu leaders. Forgetting the manifest dangers of their position in the excitement aroused by the Khilāfat movement, a considerable section of them agreed to accept a scheme hurriedly prepared as the basis of demands which were to be made in the name of a united India. In order to facilitate propaganda, Indian leaders in 1917 demanded the repeal of the Press Act of 1910. It was stigmatised as being at once ineffectual and oppressive. In fact while 143 newspapers had been formally warned under its provisions, in only three cases had the security been declared forfeit; while fifty-five presses had been warned, thirteen had forfeited their first security and only one its second. No forfeiture had been set aside by the High Courts, and the number of newspapers and presses had increased greatly, despite the existence of the act. The demand was therefore refused. Meanwhile Tilak and Mrs Besant succeeded in arousing a vigorous agitation. The government viewed this as undesirable and untimely, at a moment when the need of recruits, combatant and non-combatant alike, was great and growing. But unfortunately the views of the government were divided, its policy irresolute, its

action half-hearted. Mrs Besant was first restrained from entering Bombay and the Central Provinces, and then interned in the pleasant seclusion of the Nilgiris. But the agitation only redoubled under acts sharp enough to sting but not severe enough to hurt. The same ideas which in Indian minds were fostering agitation were in British minds shaking the strong confidence which had prevailed ever since the Mutiny in the British mission to the Indian peoples.

At last the war-worn British cabinet decided on making a pronouncement on the goal of British policy in India. The subject had long been under discussion. When Lord Chelmsford became governor-general in 1916, he had immediately invited his executive council to consider two questions. The first was, "What is the goal of British rule in India?" The conclusion reached was that the goal was "the endowment of British India as an integral part of the British Empire with self-government". The second question was, "What are the steps on the road to that goal?" But here greater difficulties of definition were found. The lines of advance which had been urged from time to time by the National Congress were provincial autonomy, further expansion and reform of the legislative and executive councils, the development of local self-government, and the abolition or at least the reform of the Council of India, which, it was claimed, had long laid the dead hand of obsolete experience on the constitutional development of India.

The gradual release of provincial administrations from the detailed control of the Government of India and of the secretary of state certainly formed an obvious line of advance. So early as 1911 it had been commended by the Government of India to the secretary of state. Sound policy, it wrote, appeared to lie in giving gradually to the provinces "a larger measure of self-government, until at last India would consist of a number of administrations, autonomous in all provincial affairs, with the Government of India above them all, and possessing power to interfere in cases of misgovernment, but ordinarily restricting their functions to matters of imperial concern". But the secretary of state refused to take any decision on this important proposal.

When Lord Chelmsford again raised the question, the government's conclusions were more specific than they had been in 1911. It was felt that self-government within the empire could not be

well attained by any blind imitation of dominion models. The social structure of India was too different to admit the adoption of colonial constitutions. But (as Lord Zetland has stated) a larger measure of control by Indians was desirable. This "would ultimately result in a form of self-government . . . differing possibly in many ways from that enjoyed by other parts of the empire, but evolved on lines which had taken into account India's past history and the special circumstances and traditions of her component peoples". It was therefore proposed to develop the existing local self-governing bodies, to increase the number of Indians appointed to high administrative posts, and to enlarge the elective element in the provincial legislatures so as to prepare for an extension of their constitutional powers. Sir Austen Chamberlain, then secretary of state, did not wish to go further at the moment than declare "an intention to foster the gradual development of free institutions". Montagu, who succeeded him in 1917, proposed a similar formula, which was finally recast by Curzon as the result of cabinet discussions into the words read by Montagu in the House of Commons on August 20, 1917. It ran, "The policy of His Majesty's government, with which the Government of India are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians with every branch of the administration, and the gradual development of self-governing institutions, with a view to the progressive realisation of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire". Such progress, it was added, could be achieved only by successive stages, to be determined by the British Government and the Government of India in accordance with the degree of success secured.

Meanwhile Indians had been busily devising constitutions. A body known as the "Madras Parliament", connected with Mrs Besant's Home Rule League, drew up one. Nineteen of the elected members of the imperial legislative council prepared another. A third was produced, in November, 1916, by representatives of the Hindu National Congress and of the Muslim League, and this was formally adopted by both bodies at meetings held in Lucknow in the following month. This proposed the direct election of four-fifths of all the members of the provincial legislatures, and a similar proportion of elected members in the imperial council, though the elective members of the latter were



to be chosen in part by the elective members of the provincial councils, and only in part by a direct vote. Apart from certain items of receipt and expenditure which were to be reserved as imperial, the provincial authorities were to become financially independent, subject to a vague general supervision. At the head of each province was to be a governor who in general was not to be a member of any service, with an executive council, half of which was to be chosen by the elective members of the legislative council. Resolutions of the latter were to be binding unless vetoed by the governor-in-council, and in the latter case, when repeated after a fixed interval, were to become absolute. Muslims were to have separate electorates, with a proportion of numbers considerably in excess of their numerical claims, but were no longer to be free to contest other seats; and any bill or resolution opposed by three-quarters of either the Hindu or the Muslim members as injurious to their community was not to be further proceeded with.

Another scheme was propounded by Mr Lionel Curtis and a group of his associates, who included Anglo-Indian officials of high rank. Mr Curtis was a leading member of the Round Table group, which had played a not inconsiderable part in bringing about the union of South Africa in 1909. They were convinced believers in the sobering effects of frank and informal discussion. In South Africa they believed that the formation of study-circles to discuss the conflicting outlooks of Briton and Dutchman had done much to moderate antagonism, and hoped that a like procedure might be followed by like results in India. Mr Curtis reached India in the latter half of 1916 and attempted to set this plan in operation. But advanced Indian opinion was from the first hostile to him, perhaps owing to his South African associations, perhaps also because it was reluctant to defend itself in an arena where rhetoric and invective would be idle weapons. A chance phrase in a private letter of his which was stolen, and published, was deliberately distorted in order to wreck his plan. But he persisted in his study of the Indian problem with the aid of such as were willing to work with him, seeking especially to test the possibility of a plan of devolution suggested by Sir William Duke early in 1916 when a member of the Council of India. The essence of this proposal lay in a projected division of the functions of government. Granted that a step was to be taken towards the



establishment of responsible government without abandoning the essential matters for which the paramount power felt itself peculiarly responsible, why should it not be possible to transfer to responsible ministers the other duties of government? Mr Curtis persuaded himself that this conception might really solve the difficulty of a gradual transference of power from English into Indian hands. Early in 1917, in his *Letter to the People of India*, he advocated the development of responsible government (in the dominion sense of the term) by this evolutionary method. He urged the formation of smaller provinces with a much higher degree of homogeneity than existed in the old ones, which had grown up largely by chance and often embraced peoples of diverse languages. In each province should be established elective assemblies, with a ministry in each dependent on commanding a majority of votes. These ministries and executive councils of the old pattern would form two parallel executives under the common control of a governor, who would deal with certain departments of business in consultation with the responsible ministers, and with the other departments in consultation with the non-responsible councillors. It was suggested that public works, local self-government, and primary education might be transferred to the management of the proposed ministers, leaving the remaining functions of government under official control as before. Gradually, and by degrees varying in different provinces in proportion as the transferred departments were worked successfully, the whole of the duties of the provincial governments might thus pass under the control of popular assemblies.

This ingenious plan was much discussed. A number of Europeans and Indians presented an address to government commending it in its general outlines. The National Congress, however, rejected it in favour of the plan of reform which it had already put forward; it thought that this should be introduced at once, and that a definite time should be laid down within which full responsible government was to be established.

Meanwhile Montagu resolved to visit India, ostensibly to consult with the Government of India and Indian leaders, actually in order to press the adoption of the scheme for dividing government into two parts—responsible and non-responsible. He was accompanied by a small committee, in which the original inventor of the scheme, Sir William Duke, had a place. He

rapidly toured India, interviewed a large number of politicians, exhibited great impatience with persons whose views differed from his own, and within six months of his arrival he and Lord Chelmsford signed the joint report in which dyarchy (as Sir William Duke's scheme had come to be called) was formally recommended for adoption. The report was drawn with great skill and persuasiveness. The first part of it was devoted to an historical exposition of the various endeavours which had been already made to modify the inherited autocracy of government in India. The second part discussed the methods by which the process might best be continued. The authors held that the sole practical solution lay in the development of responsible parliamentary government. The process, it was admitted, must be gradual, and the Congress proposals for the immediate establishment of full provincial autonomy were premature. It was also objected that such a legislative control over finance as Congress desired was impossible until the executives should become wholly responsible to the legislatures. Mr Curtis's plan to place certain departments of government under the legislatures, with executives responsible to the latter, was also rejected as likely to produce friction. The report agreed that the duties of provincial government should be divided into two groups, conducted respectively by an executive council and by a group of ministers chosen by the governor from the elected members of the legislature; but it recommended that the two halves should act as far as possible in union, that they should cultivate a habit of joint deliberation, and that the governor should remain free to reject the advice of his ministers in regard to their departments where he judged acceptance of it would produce serious disadvantages. It recommended a great increase in the number of non-official members in the legislatures, chosen wherever possible by direct election. It condemned the principle of communal representation as inconsistent with democracy; but reluctantly recognised the necessity of continuing it in the case of the Muslims.

All these schemes, whether produced by Indian politicians, by the Round Table group, or by the secretary of state and the governor-general, attached primary importance to the development of parliamentary government, and relegated "the increasing association of Indians with every branch of the administration" to a secondary place. It was evident that the establishment of the

former would at once secure the concession of the latter. Indian politicians very naturally, therefore, set the former in the foreground and devoted every effort to securing it. It was natural too that English politicians should consider the reorganisation of political institutions as more important than a mere matter of personnel. "Englishmen", once said Thomas Munro, "are as great fanatics in politics as Moslems in religion." He was thinking of the manner in which Cornwallis had forced English administrative and legal ideas upon Bengal. But in like manner Metcalfe had given India a free press; and so in the twentieth century Morley and Montagu had been seeking to prepare for a free parliament. This was in notable contrast with Minto's view, in which greater importance was attached to the administrative co-operation of Indian and Englishman. Montagu was disposed to assume that co-operation would automatically follow upon constitutional reform. Seldom has political dogmatism been more evident in the formulation of a scheme of government.

The Montagu-Chelmsford report was published in the middle of 1918. The more moderate politicians were inclined to approve, and so were the land-owners, provided they might retain the special rights of representation which they enjoyed. But the advanced party began at once to denounce the new proposals, declaring that they would accept nothing short of full provincial autonomy. The official world also was strongly critical, on the ground that the transferred departments would be ill-managed and that the new oligarchy which would be set in power would not work harmoniously with their official colleagues. The heads of provinces were summoned to Delhi to discuss possible alternatives. The principal criticism put forward was that as yet the men who on political grounds would have the best claims to selection as ministers lacked sufficient administrative experience; and that the best course would be to increase the association of Indians with the administration before making any move towards parliamentary government. Lord Ronaldshay and Sir Edward Gait considered that any delay in introducing constitutional reform would be regarded as a breach of faith. Others, however, recommended an alternative scheme in line with their objections to dyarchy. They proposed that in the first instance executive councils should be appointed containing an equal number of officials and non-officials. The governor would be free to distribute

the charge of departments as he thought best, and the official and non-official members would act together as a single government. The line of development which these proposals were designed to assist lay in the gradual increase in the number of non-official members, the extension of the functions entrusted to them, and the disuse of the governor's powers of overruling his council. The advantage which was claimed for this scheme was that it did not threaten to impair the efficiency of the administrative machine, and that it manifested equally with Minto's most characteristic measure a sincere desire no longer to engross, but to share power. Although it would involve no immediate constitutional change, it would provide an ever-growing number of men practised in administration in the highest fields, and thus prepare and train the responsible ministers of the future if constitutional changes, at a later time and in a less heated atmosphere, should still appear to be desirable.

In at least one respect this alternative proposal promised some advantage over the dyarchic scheme adopted by the secretary of state and the governor-general. The successful working of dyarchy presupposed conditions which it was in fact unwise to take for granted. For the two halves of the provincial governments to work smoothly together, compromise and tolerance would be needed. These commonplace virtues of English political life could not be assumed in a country where representative government was in its infancy. Again if ministers were to fulfil their functions properly, they would have not only to display ability in the conduct of business unfamiliar to them, but also to command a stable majority in the legislative councils. But whence was such a majority to be drawn? There were no political parties. These would have to be built up from the foundations. Communal groups would doubtless form themselves, divided by narrow communal interests; but these would tend either to hamper or pervert ministerial action. Ministers would have for a long time to rely upon a personal following; they would probably be driven to employ their ministerial power to keep that following together; in proportion as they succeeded in favouring their own group they would exasperate the rest; so that their careers were likely to be short and fitful. Above all their acceptance of office would mark them out as targets of attack by the extreme party whose complete hostility was in any

case assured. Neither among the ministers nor in the legislative councils was there any guarantee of the cordial co-operation without which the scheme must inevitably fail. The proposals of the heads of provinces, on the contrary, promised a much more workable system. The unity of the government would check eccentricity on the part of non-official members. They would be chosen from among the men who were disposed to work with government; and the unextended powers of the legislatures would not permit an embarrassing interference with the conduct of administration. As against the advantage of not weakening the mechanism of government had to be set the disadvantage of alienating those who insisted on the need of constitutional change. But the latter would perhaps have been a lesser evil than was thought, for appointments on the councils would have conciliated moderate leaders, while extremist leaders were resolved in no circumstances to be conciliated.

The secretary of state and the governor-general had, however, already decided in favour of the scheme to which they had set their hands, and the proposals of the heads of provinces were rejected. A committee, over which Lord Southborough presided, was then sent to India to frame proposals for the regulation of the franchise and the formation of constituencies. In the middle of 1919 a bill was introduced. It was referred to a joint-committee of both Houses, and passed into law on December 23. The new system established governors and executive councils in five provinces in the place of lieutenant-governors. The branches of government were divided into central and provincial, and the latter head again into "transferred" and "reserved" subjects. To deal with transferred subjects the governor was empowered to appoint ministers from the elected members of his legislative council. In accordance with a preponderance of Indian political opinion, the funds available for the transferred and for the reserved subjects were to be drawn from a joint purse, instead of being (as the Government of India had desired) definitely allocated between the two halves of government. This proved an unfortunate decision, and the more so by reason of the financial stringency which affected the Indian governments just at the critical time when the new arrangements were coming into operation. Budgets were to be passed by the legislative councils, but the governors were authorised to restore grants for reserved

subjects, where these were reduced or rejected by the legislatures. The councils were doubled in size, and were not to include more than 20 per cent. of officials, while 70 per cent. was to consist of elected members. The franchise and arrangement of constituencies varied greatly from province to province. The demand for separate, communal electorates, the principle of which had been condemned by the Montagu-Chelmsford report, proved widespread and vehement. Not only did the Muslims insist on retaining the special protection which they enjoyed, but numerous other bodies brought forward similar claims. In the Panjab, for example, the Sikhs claimed it with success; and in southern India the non-Brāhmans, though forming a large numerical majority, insisted that they required special seats to be reserved for them, owing to the superior education and organisation of the Brāhmans.

Although the Government of India was not split in two after the manner of the provincial governments, large changes were made in it also. The legislature was made bi-cameral, a new body, the Council of State, being established with a membership of sixty, of whom not more than twenty might be officials. The imperial legislative council, thenceforth to be known as the Legislative Assembly, was enlarged to one hundred and forty members, of whom one hundred were to be elective and only twenty-six officials. The official majority, which had vanished from the provincial councils in 1909, was thus withdrawn from the central legislature as well. Presidents were to be appointed in each chamber, in place of the executive head who had presided till then, and the legislature was entrusted with the obligation of adopting as well as discussing the budget. Executive control over the legislature thus disappeared from the central government. But it was still thought necessary to reserve means by which in the last resort the executive could ensure such legislation and grants of supply as it judged imperative. A bill rejected by the assembly might be "certified" by the governor-general as essential to the peace, order, or good government of the country; it could then be introduced into the council of state and when passed there need not be referred back to the assembly. In like manner a grant of supplies which was refused or proposed new taxation which was rejected, might be made operative by certification.

Such fundamental changes in the structure of the Indian governments involved a necessary reduction in the influence of

the secretary of state. Till 1919 the legal authority of the home government had always been supreme in so far as supreme authority could at any given moment be exercised from so great a distance. But the extension of the powers and influence of the Indian legislatures and their release from executive control, would evidently diminish the moral authority which Whitehall had claimed over a purely bureaucratic administration. This had been recognised by the select committee. The legal position, it held, could not as yet be modified, but it hoped that the secretary of state would interfere only in exceptional circumstances in matters "of purely Indian interest, where the government and the legislature of India are in agreement". The recommendation applied with special force to provincial subjects classified as "transferred" and placed under the management of ministers. Henceforth too the secretary of state was to be paid from British, and no longer from Indian revenues, while the functions which he discharged were reduced by the creation of a high commissioner, with duties akin to those of the dominion high commissioners, under the orders of the Government of India.

The passing of the act was signalled by the issue of a proclamation which may well challenge comparison with Queen Victoria's proclamation of 1858. It dwelt on the greatness of the changes and the demands which they would make upon all concerned in their operation. "There will be need of perseverance and mutual forbearance between all sections and races of my people in India. . . . I rely on the new popular assemblies to interpret wisely the wishes of those whom they represent. . . . I rely on the leaders of the people . . . to face responsibility and endure misrepresentations, to sacrifice much for the common interest of the state. . . . Equally do I rely upon my officers to respect their new colleagues, and to work with them in harmony and kindness, to assist the people and their representatives in an orderly advance towards free institutions; and to find in these new tasks a fresh opportunity to fulfil, as in the past, their highest purpose of service to my people."



# INDEX

- A'azz-ud-din, 454  
 Abanes, 71  
 'Abbās the Great, Shāh, 378, 394,  
     398, 409, 514  
 'Abbāsids, the, 205, 230, 240, 891  
 'Abd-ul-'aziz, 407  
 'Abd-ul-kādir, *see* Nāsir-ud-din  
     Sultān Khaljī  
 'Abd-ul-latīf, 363  
 'Abd-un-nabī, Shaikh, *see* Shaikh  
     'Abd-un-nabī  
 'Abd-us-samad, 362  
 Abdagases, 70, 72  
 Abdan, 72  
 'Abdullāh Jān, 806-8, 810, 811  
 'Abdullāh Khān, 388, 391, 395,  
     396  
 'Abdullāh Khān (of Mālwa), 346  
 'Abdullāh Khān Uzbeg, 343, 346,  
     348, 370  
 'Abdullāh Kutb Shāh, 403, 410,  
     411, 441  
 'Abdur Rahīm, 384  
 'Abdur Rahīm Khānkhānān, 340,  
     354, 372-5, 385, 386, 391, 393,  
     395  
 'Abdur Rahmān, 807, 810, 813,  
     814, 817, 822  
 'Abdur Razzāk (of Lār), 443, 444  
 Abhay Singh, 460, 461, 470  
 Abhimanyu, 113  
 Ābhīras, the, 60, 84, 91, 126  
 Abhisara, 24  
 Ābu, Mount, 123, 127, 361  
 Abu Bakr Tughluk, 248, 250  
 Abu Sa'īd, 305, 306  
 Abul Fath Hakīm, 371  
 Abul Fazl, 345, 356, 359, 360,  
     363, 365, 369, 372, 376, 400  
 Abul Hasan Kutb Shāh, 439-44  
 Abul Kāsim Namakīn, 383  
 Abyssinians, the, 494  
 Achaemenids, the, 5, 13, 17, 21,  
     47, 66, 67, 75  
 Achalgadh, 123  
 Aché, d', 554, 555  
 Achgi III, 161  
 Achyuta, 89  
 Achyutarāya, 176, 177  
 Acquaviva, Rodolfo, 367, 368  
*Acts of St Thomas*, the, 71  
 Adams, Major, 561  
 Ādan I, 193  
 Ādan II, 193  
 Adas, 577  
 Addison, Gulston, 678  
 Addison, Joseph, 678  
 Aden, 317, 485, 490, 493, 647,  
     648, 775, 803, 807  
 Adham Khān, 342-5  
 Ādhirājendra Chola, 191  
*adigar*, the, 530  
 'Ādil Khān Fārūki I, 302, 310  
 'Ādil Khān Fārūki II, 310, 311  
 'Ādil Khān Fārūki III ('Ālam  
     Khān), 307, 310, 311, 314  
 'Ādil Shāhī dynasty, 176, 296, 443  
 Adīna Khān, 473  
 Āditya I (Chola), 192, 194, 201  
 Ādityasena, 98, 101, 102, 108, 119  
 Ādityavardhana, 105  
 Ādityavarman, 102, 153  
 Ādivarāha, 198  
 'Adli, *see* Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh  
 Adoni, 174  
 Affonso, Martim, 274  
 Afghan War, First, 729, 804  
     — Second, 812, 817  
     — Third, 823  
 Afghanistan, 33, 44, 62, 63, 66, 67,  
     73, 91, 206, 467, 612, 614, 646,  
     651-62, 666, 746, 803, 805, 806,  
     809, 814, 817, 822, 823, 897  
 Afridis, the, 426-8



- Afzal Khān, 869  
 Aga Khān, the, 880  
 Agalassoi, the, 27  
 Agathocleia, 65  
 Agathocles, 64  
 Age of Consent Act, the, 868, 870  
 Agesilaos, 79  
 Aghar Khān, 427, 448  
 Agisala, *see* Agesilaos  
 Agnimitra, 54, 56  
 Āgra, 265-7, 275, 316, 324-7, 332, 333, 338-40, 348, 359, 365, 375-7, 383-5, 392, 394, 399-402, 404, 406-8, 413, 414, 416, 417, 420, 422, 435, 437, 448, 451, 455-7, 459, 461, 512, 513, 517, 521, 606, 716, 744, 746, 747, 754, 884  
 Agrammes, *see* Dhana Nanda and Nanda  
 Agricultural colleges, 847, 849  
 Agriculture, 790  
 Ahalya Bai, 618  
 Ahdad Raushanī, 388  
 Ahichchatra, 89  
 Ahmad (son of Malik Hasan), 295  
 Ahmad Beg, 395  
 Ahmad Chap, 220-2  
 Ahmad Khān Bahmanī, 285, 293  
 Ahmad Khān Bangash, 469-71, 474, 475  
 Ahmad Khān Fārūki, 279, 300, 310  
 Ahmad Nizām Shāh, 296, 297, 307, 311  
 Ahmad Shāh (of Delhi), 467, 468, 470-3  
 Ahmad Shāh I (of Gujarāt), 300-2, 310, 318  
 Ahmad Shāh II (of Gujarāt), 318  
 Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, 467, 468, 471, 473, 475, 477, 478, 549, 651  
 Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī, 175, 282, 283, 285, 286  
 Ahmad Shāh Bahmanī II, 297  
 Ahmad Shāh Durani, *see* Ahmad Shāh Abdālī  
 Ahmadābād, 302, 304, 308, 309, 311, 314, 316, 317, 319, 330, 352-4, 362, 413, 421, 513, 582, 599  
 Ahmadnagar, 176-8, 297, 298, 307, 311, 314, 315, 366, 369, 372-5, 389-91, 393, 394, 403, 412, 422, 435, 438, 442, 447, 450, 451, 494  
 Āhoms, the, 120, 404, 422-4  
 Ahsan Khān Fārūki, 310  
 Ahsan Shāh, 236  
 Aibak, Kurtb-ud-din, 136, 138, 140, 148, 210-13, 223, 334  
 Aihole inscription, the, 129, 151, 152, 198  
 Āin-i Akbarī, the, 355  
 'Ain-ul-mulk, Sultān 'Alā-ud-din, 226, 229, 230, 238, 239, 241, 243  
 Aitareya Brāhmaṇa, the, 14, 58  
 Aix-la-Chapelle, Treaty of, 538  
 Ājadeva, 140  
 Ajanta caves, the, 100, 153  
 Ajātasatru, 12-15, 17, 18  
 Ajavarman, 168  
 Ajayadeva, 135  
 Ajayapāla, 128, 135  
 Ajit Singh, 431, 432, 434, 448, 451, 452, 456, 459, 461  
 Ajit Singh, 665  
 Ajit Singh, 872  
 Ajivikas, the, 48, 51, 53  
 Ajmir, 126, 135, 136, 206, 208-10, 213, 303, 326, 343, 352, 366, 388, 389, 395, 404, 417, 418, 431-3, 452, 456, 459, 470  
 Akālavarsha, *see* Krishna I, II and III  
 Ākanna, 442  
 Ākat Khān Khaljī, 223, 224, 228  
 Akbar, 12, 116, 123, 270, 276, 279, 298, 319, 332, 334, 335, 337-79, 392, 401, 406, 408, 410, 420, 426, 428, 448, 453, 463, 494

- Akbar II, 478, 685  
 Akbarābād, *see* Āgra  
 Akesines, *see* Chināb, the  
 Ākmahal, *see* Rājmahal  
 Akmal Khān Afrīdī, 426-8  
 Al-Bīrūnī, 34, 120-2  
 Al-Hajjāj, 205  
 Al-Hākīm II, 240  
 Al-Kādir, 206  
 Al-Mustanjid Yūsuf, 305  
 Al-Mu'tadid, 246, 277  
 Al-Walid, Caliph, 205  
 'Alā-ud-daula, 465  
 'Alā-ud-dīn (of Khvārazm), 210, 212  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Bahman Shāh, 283, 288, 290, 291, 300  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Bahman Shāh II, 297  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Husain Jahānsūz, 208  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Husain Shāh (Bengal), 264, 276  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Husain Shāh Sayyid, 273, 274  
 'Alā-ud-dīn 'Imād Shāh, 297, 312, 314  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Khaljī, 221-30, 232, 243, 245, 349, 355  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Muhammad Khaljī, 136, 164, 166, 171, 220, 222-9  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Sikandar Shāh Tughluk, 250  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Sultān, *see* 'Ain-ul-mulk  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Sultān Lodī, 321, 322  
 'Alā-ud-dīn Tirmāshīrīn, *see* Tirmāshīrīn  
 'Alā-ul-mulk, 223, 224  
 Alahwirdī Khān Mahābat Jang, 465, 466, 474, 545, 547  
 Alakhāna, 121  
 'Ālam Khān, *see* 'Ādil Khān Fārūkī III  
 'Ālam Khān Lodī, *see* 'Alā-ud-dīn Sultān Lodī  
 'Ālam Shāh Sayyid, 259, 261, 262  
 'Ālambāgh, 753, 754  
 'Ālamgīr II, 473, 474  
 Alaungpaya, 678  
 Albuquerque, Affonso, 486, 488, 490, 492, 494, 499, 500, 503  
 Alexander of Epirus, 45  
 Alexander the Great, I, 21-33, 45, 53, 62, 64, 67, 223, 646  
 Alexandria (Charikar), 21  
 Alexandria (Egypt), 309, 487, 648, 753, 803  
 Alexandria (Sogdi), 28  
 Alexandria-in-Arachosia, 21  
 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh, 177, 178  
 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh I, 374  
 'Alī 'Ādil Shāh II, 412, 435, 437, 441  
 'Alī Barīd, 177  
 'Alī Khān, Rāja, of Khāndesh, 373, 374  
 'Alī Mardān, 211  
 'Alī Mardān Khān (governor of Kandahār), 404, 407  
 'Alī Mardān Khān (of Conjeeveram), 445  
 'Alī Masjid, 426, 661, 811  
 'Alī Muhammad Khān, 467, 469  
 'Alī Nakī, 413, 416  
 'Alī Shāh (Bengal), 270  
 'Alī Shāh Kar, 238  
 'Alī Shīr Khaljī, 301  
 Aligarh, 606, 744, 846, 855  
 Alikasadara, *see* Alexander of Epirus  
 'Ālim 'Alī Sayyid, 458  
 Aliwāl, 672  
 Allāhābād, 2, 43, 87, 89-92, 99, 100, 116, 118, 135, 195, 214, 220, 348, 351, 366, 375-7, 391, 395, 396, 417, 449, 454, 458, 462, 469, 470, 474, 562, 566, 595, 683, 739, 740, 744, 746, 750-2, 783, 846. *See also* Prayāga  
 Almeida, Francisco de, 310, 487-9, 492

- Almeida, Lourenço de, 310  
 Alp Khān Khalji, 227, 228, 299  
 Alptigin, 206  
 Altūniya, 213  
 Alūpas, the, 168  
 Alwar state, the, 214, 832  
 Amānullāh, 823  
 Amar Singh, 361, 376, 388, 389  
 Amarakosa, 99  
 Amarāvati, 197  
 Ambāla district, 452, 742, 806, 858  
 Amber, 326, 344, 345, 350, 351, 361, 372, 428, 437  
 Ambhi (Omphis), 21, 23, 24, 26, 27  
 Amboyna, 502, 515, 614, 790  
 Ambūr, 538  
 Amherst, Lord, 679, 685, 697, 716, 723  
 Amiens, Peace of, 613  
 Amini Commission, 634  
 Amīr 'Alī Barīd Shāh, 296-8, 314  
 Amīr-i-jumla, 278  
 Amīr Khān, 427  
 Amīr Khān, 619  
 Amīr Muzaffar, 256  
 Amitraghāta, *see* Bindusāra  
 Amirochates, *see* Bindusāra  
 Amma Vishnuvardhana VI, *see* Vishnuvardhana VI  
 Amoghavarsha, 124, 131, 132, 155, 158  
 Amritsar, 430, 858  
 Amsuvarman, 117  
 Amyntas, 65  
 Anahilavāda, *see* Anhilwār  
 Anaka, 128  
 Ānanda Bai, 576  
 Ānandapāla, 120-2, 135, 207  
 Ānandpur, 430  
 Ananta, 113  
 Anantadevī, 95  
 Anantakāya, *see* Antiochos II  
 Anantavarman Chodagangadeva, 156  
 Anantavarman (Maukhari), 103  
 Anartha, *see* Kāthiāwār  
 Anāsah, 7  
 Āndhan inscription, the, 82, 84  
 Āndhra dynasty, the, 10, 14, 36, 44, 53, 54, 57-61, 81-4, 100, 102, 132, 165, 166, 196, 197  
 Āndhra-Sātavāhanas, the, 195, 196  
 Āndraka, *see* Udaka  
 Androstenes, 63  
 Anga, 14, 16, 17  
 Angas, the, 10  
 Anglo-Dutch War, 516, 517, 519  
 Anglo-Mughal War, 521, 522  
 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty (1642), 516  
 Anglo-Portuguese Treaty (1654), 516  
 Angria Kānhoji, 527  
 Anhilwār, 115, 126-9, 134, 159, 302. *See also* Pātan  
 Ānta-mahāmātra, the, 46  
 Antaka, *see* Udaka  
 Antalkidas, 56, 65, 66  
 Antekina, *see* Antigonos  
 Antigonos, 31, 33, 45  
 Antimachos, 64  
 Antiochos (courtier of Menander), 65  
 Antiochos I, 62  
 Antiochos II (Theos), 44, 45, 64  
 Antiochos III (the Great), 54, 63, 64  
 Antiyaka, *see* Antiochos II  
 Anus, the, 7  
 Anwar-ud-dīn, 534, 536, 538  
 Aornos, 23  
 Aparājita, 183, 188, 201  
 Aphsad inscription, 101, 102, 119  
 Apollodotos I, 65  
 Apollodotos II, 65, 68  
 Apollonios of Tyana, 71  
 Apollophanes, 28, 65  
 Appa Sāhib, 620-2

- Appadevi, 133  
 Arab mercenaries, 689  
 Arabia, 180, 207, 647  
 Arabic, 716-18, 800, 842, 846  
 Arabs, the, 133-5, 205, 206, 212,  
     289; invade Sind, 122, 123, 205;  
     invade Gurjara territory, 131.  
     *See also* Mlechhas  
 Arachosia, 33, 34, 63  
 Arakan, 388, 419, 420, 424, 425,  
     491, 679, 680, 711  
 Aral, Sea of, 207  
 Ārām, 212  
 Aravalli hills, 432  
 Archaeological Survey, 2  
 Arcot, 446, 534, 536, 540, 541,  
     583, 624, 641  
 Arcot, South, 192  
 Argāon, 606  
 Arghūn tribe, 372  
 Argyll, Duke of, 771, 801, 806, 808,  
     809  
 Aria, 33  
 Arichit, 183, 201  
 Arikesari Māvarman, 182  
 Aristotle, 41, 223  
 Aritai, the, 28  
 Arjūn, 384, 430  
 Arjūn Taran, 383  
 Arjuna, 107, 119  
 Arjunāyanas, the, 91  
 Arkali Khān Khalji, 220, 222  
 Armagon, 517  
 Armenians, the, 527, 559, 561  
 Armies of the East India Company,  
     733-40  
 Arms Act, the, 853  
 Army Headquarters, 767  
 Arnold, Edwin, 842  
 Arrah, 745  
 Arrian, 27  
 Arsaces III, 63  
 Arsacids, the, 69  
 Artā, 70  
 Artabanus, 66  
 Artaxerxes Longimanus, *see* Bah-  
     man, son of Isfandiyār  
 Artemidoros, 65  
*Arthasāstra*, the, 12, 38-41, 99,  
     179, 181  
 Āryan invaders of India, 2-10, 14,  
     481  
 Āryāvarta, 89  
 Asad Khān, 445, 446, 455  
 Āsaf Jāh, *see* Nizām-ul-mulk  
 Āsaf Khān, 313  
 Āsaf Khān (brother of Nūr Jahān),  
     386, 387, 389, 393, 394, 397-9, 405  
 Āsaf Khān (governor of Kara),  
     346, 347  
 Āsaf-ud-daula, 571, 572, 593, 594,  
     611  
 Asālat Khān, 407  
 Asandivat (Hastināpura), 10, 11  
 Asāwal (Ahmadābād), 302  
 Ashphotachandra (Gaharwār), 137  
 Ashti, 621  
 Asiknī river (Chināb), 6  
 Asir, *see* Asirgarh  
 Asirgarh, 300, 307, 312, 375, 395,  
     396, 458  
 Askarī Mirzā, 328, 330, 332, 333  
 Asoka, 2, 14, 33, 34, 37, 38, 42-54,  
     57, 58, 62, 63, 76-8, 83, 87, 109,  
     111, 116, 181, 187, 193, 199  
 Aspavarman, 68-70  
 Assakenoi, the, 22  
 Assakenos, *see* Asvaka  
 Assam, 118-20, 160, 274, 404, 422,  
     423, 679, 680, 711, 778, 888.  
     *See also* Kāmarūpa and Kāmṛp  
 Assaye, 606, 617  
 Astes, *see* Hasti  
 Asvaghosha, 77, 78  
 Asvaka, 22  
 Asvamedha (horse-sacrifice), 55,  
     60, 85, 91, 94, 99, 100, 102, 166,  
     167, 190, 197  
 Asvapati, 13  
 Ataga Khail, 343

- Ataga Khān, *see* Shams-ud-dīn  
 Muhammad Ataga Khān  
 Atala Mosque (Jaunpur), 262  
 Atar Singh, 665  
*Atharva-Veda*, the, 11  
 Athghāt, 266  
 Attock, 23, 397, 426, 463, 671  
 Auckland, Lord, 651-4, 656, 658,  
 659, 662, 666, 667, 670, 694, 768,  
 804  
 Augustus, 74, 180, 181, 245  
 Auhadī, *see* Shams Khān Auhadī  
 Aungier, Gerald, 520  
 Aurangābād, 390, 391, 409, 413,  
 437-40, 466, 471, 472, 545, 621  
 Aurangzīb, 298, 334, 350, 389,  
 392, 402, 404, 408, 410-15, 417-  
 50, 475, 520-2, 524, 598, 725,  
 809, 875  
 Austen, Admiral, 825  
 Austrian Succession, War of, 535,  
 547  
 Auteuil, d', 538  
 Ava, 679, 680  
 Avamukta, 91  
 Avanisimha, *see* Simhavishnu Po-  
 tarāja  
 Avanti, 15, 16, 18, 19, 100, 128,  
 130-3, 142  
 Avantivarman (Maukhari), 103  
 Avantivarman (Utpala), 111, 112  
 Ayodhyā, 12, 78, 208, 327  
 Ayūb Khān, 814  
 A'zam Ghiyās-ud-dīn (Bengal),  
 271  
 A'zam-i-Humāyūn Lodī, 264  
 A'zam Shāh (son of Aurangzīb),  
 432, 442, 443, 448, 451  
 Āzarbāyjān, 286  
 Azes I, 68-70, 80  
 Azes II, 69, 70  
 Azevedo, de, 387  
 Azilises, 69  
 'Azīm-ush-shān, 453, 454  
 'Azīmullāh, 466  
 'Azīz Khammār, 241  
 'Azīz Koka Khān-i-A'zam, 350,  
 353, 354, 359, 365, 373, 389, 395  
 Azurara, 483  
 Bāb-ul-mandab, Straits of, 512  
 Bābā Nānak, 430  
 Bābaniya, 248  
 Bābur, 260, 269, 274, 298, 305,  
 313, 320-7, 333, 335, 380, 406,  
 408  
 Babylon, 27  
 Bactria, 21, 29, 53, 55, 62-7, 73, 75  
 Badakhshān, 322, 329, 345, 360,  
 366, 370, 407  
 Bādāmi, 151, 153, 159, 199  
 Badan Singh Jāt, 459, 470  
 Baghdād, 207, 230, 236  
 Baghela Rājputs, 461  
 Baglāna, 223, 241, 283  
 Bāgor, 352  
 Bagyidaw, 680  
 Bahādūr, 232  
 Bahādūr (of Bengal), 270, 279  
 Bahādūr Chaghatāy, 342, 348  
 Bahādūr Gilāni, 297  
 Bahādūr Khān, 416, 418  
 Bahādūr Khān, 439-41  
 Bahādūr Khān (of Khāndesh), 374,  
 375  
 Bahādūr Khān Lohānī (Sultān  
 Muhammad), 269  
 Bahādūr Nāhir, 250, 253  
 Bahādūr Nizām Shāh, 374, 375,  
 389  
 Bahādūr Shāh I (of Delhi), 430,  
 432-4, 437-43, 445, 451-3, 457  
 Bahādūr Shāh II (of Delhi), 478,  
 685, 742, 757, 891  
 Bahādūr Shāh (of Gujarāt), 302,  
 303, 313-17, 330, 331, 534, 349,  
 492, 493  
 Bahādūr Shāh Sūr, 355  
 Bahādurgarh, 444  
 Bāhikas, the, 120

- Bahman, son of Isfandiyār, 277  
 Bahmanī dynasty, the, 172-6, 243,  
 277-98, 390, 453  
 Bahraich, 328  
 Bahrām Bahman Shāh, 283  
 Bahrām (Ghaznavid), 208, 209  
 Bahrām Khān Māzandārāni, 248,  
 279  
 Bahrām Shāh (of Delhi), 128, 213,  
 214  
 Bahur, 539  
 Bairam Khān Khānkhānān, 337-  
 40, 352, 354, 368  
 Bairat, 44  
 Bajaur, 321, 426, 427  
 Bāji Rāo Pēshwā I, 461-3, 465,  
 466, 575, 599  
 Bāji Rāo Pēshwā II, 604-7, 618-22,  
 731  
 Bakhira, 52  
*Bakhshī*, the, 366  
 Bakht Singh, 470, 471  
 Bakhtiyār Khān, 210  
 Balā Sri Gautami, 59-61, 196  
 Balādhurī, 131  
 Balāditya, see Narasimhagupta Ba-  
 lāditya  
 Bālāghāt (Deccan), 400, 402  
 Bālājī Rāo Pēshwā, 466, 471, 472,  
 478, 527, 545, 577, 599  
 Bālājī Vishvanāth Pēshwā, 457  
 Bālāpur, 458  
 Balasore, 518  
 Balavarman, 89  
 Balban Ghiyās-ud-dīn, 214-17,  
 220, 231, 270  
 Balfour, A. J., 776, 873  
 Balharās, the, 123  
 Balkan War, the, 891  
 Balkh, 63, 305, 406-8  
 Bālkonāda, 291  
 Ballabgarh, 473  
 Ballāla I (Hoysala), 164  
 Ballālasena, 148  
 Balūchis, the, 667, 818  
 Balūchistan, 3, 33, 62, 67, 372, 818,  
 819  
 Bāmiān, 654  
 Bāna, 1, 19, 41, 53, 56, 83, 103,  
 109, 119, 129  
 Bānas, the, 188, 198  
 Banavasi, 59, 151, 152, 161, 162,  
 166, 167, 169, 170  
 Banda, 452, 456, 663  
 Banda Islands, 502, 516  
 Bandar 'Abbās, 504  
 Bandhuvarman, 94  
 Bangalore, 601  
 Bangash, 388, 404  
 Bankapur, 172  
 Bankāpuram, 283, 293, 294  
 Bantam, 500, 515  
 Bappadeva (Pallava), 196, 197  
 Baptists, the, 715  
 Bāpu Gokhala, 621  
 Barābar, 48  
 Barakzais, the, 651  
 Bārāmahal, the, 642, 643  
 Baran, 135, 218, 252  
 Baranī, 240  
 Bārappa, 126  
 Bārbak Shāh Lodī, 262, 264, 267  
 Bārbak Shāh Sultān Shāhẓāda, 272  
 Bardwān, 385, 395, 558, 630  
 Bareilly, 744  
 Bārha, Sayyids of, 453, 454, 458, 459  
 Barid-ul-mamālik, see Kāsim Barid-  
 ul-mamālik  
 Bārīkāb, 427  
 Barlas Turks, the, 324  
 Barlow, Sir George, 607, 613, 618,  
 621, 637  
 Barnadī river, 422  
 Barnett, Commodore, 535, 536  
 Baroda, 241, 319, 517, 599, 606,  
 619-21, 689, 832-5  
 Barrackpore, 744, 745, 751  
 Barros, 483  
 Barwell, R., 572, 574, 575  
 Basālat Jang, 586

- Basarh, *see* Vaisālī  
 Basra, 485, 494, 646  
 Bassein, 316, 492, 494, 505, 577, 578, 582, 605, 681  
 Bassein (Burma), 825  
 Bassein, Treaty of, 605, 607, 621  
 Batavia, 503, 504, 506, 507, 515, 529, 553  
 Batta, 564  
 Battikaloa, 504  
 Bauka, 133  
 Bayāna, 215, 253, 255, 264-6, 326, 517  
 Bāyazid, 141  
 Bāyazid, 370  
 Bāyazid Kararānī, 355  
 Bāyazid Shāh (of Bengal), 271  
 Bāz Bahādūr, 320, 342, 343, 346, 348  
 Bazodeo, *see* Vasudeva Kushān  
 Beaconsfield, Lord, *see* Disraeli, B.  
 Beās river, 6, 26, 27, 383  
 Bednor, 349, 591  
 Belem, 484  
 Belgaum, 293-5  
 Bellore, *see* Velāpura  
 Benares, 10, 134, 137, 138, 140, 145, 148, 166, 208, 210, 264, 348, 350, 356, 417, 428, 462, 572, 593, 594, 674, 711, 721, 744, 748, 751, 772, 890. *See also* Kāsi  
 Benfield, P., 584, 585, 588, 589  
 Bengal, 118, 132, 133, 137, 144-9, 189, 206, 208, 210, 212, 214, 215, 217, 219, 221, 231, 232, 238, 239, 244, 246, 247, 262-4, 270-6, 328, 330-4, 336, 355-8, 360, 365-7, 370, 375, 377, 385, 388, 395, 396, 404, 413, 417, 419, 420, 449, 451, 458, 465, 466, 474, 485, 491, 504, 507, 508, 518, 521, 523, 527, 528, 533, 547-51, 553-8, 562-4, 566, 567, 580, 583, 586, 588, 595, 625, 629, 668, 684, 722-4, 747, 772, 778, 792, 793, 843, 844, 846, 848, 851, 853, 856, 857, 860, 862, 864, 870, 875, 876, 886, 890, 892, 896, 904  
 — Bay of, 189, 491, 535, 678, 681  
 — *diwānī* of, 523, 683  
 — partition of, 870, 872, 875, 889  
 Bengal administration, 627, 629-40, 683, 699, 703, 704, 708 sqq.  
 Bengal Army, 732  
 Bengal Asiatic Society, 716  
 Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 865  
 Bengal Tenancy Act, 853  
 Bengali language, 276, 715  
 Bentinck, Lord William, 645, 651, 666, 689, 706-8, 714, 717, 723, 725, 726, 866  
 Berad tribe, 447  
 Berar, 100, 176, 177, 221, 227, 277, 279, 283, 286, 289, 290, 293, 294, 296-8, 312, 314, 366, 372-5, 393, 394, 396, 398, 400, 403, 447, 460, 463, 689, 694, 778. *See also* Vidarbha  
 Berlin, Congress and Treaty of, 811, 812  
 Berlin-Baghdād Railway, 821, 822  
 Bernier, François, 413  
 Besant, Mrs, 898-900  
 Besnagar, 54, 56, 65  
 Best, Thomas, 512  
 Bet Shankhodar, 308  
 Betel monopoly, 525, 641  
 Bethune, J. E. D., 846  
 Bhabra, 44, 47  
 Bhadaka, *see* Bhāgabhadra  
 Bhaddasāla, 20  
 Bhadra, 130, 142  
 Bhāgabhadra Kaśiputra, 56  
 Bhāgalpur, 357, 358. *See also* Narāyanapāla  
 Bhāgavata, *see* Bhāgabhadra  
 Bhagiratha, 166  
 Bhagwān Dās, 344, 349, 350, 353, 368, 370-2

- Bhairav, 293  
 Bhāndi (general of Harsha), 106  
 Bhāndi Gurjara, 130-2, 142  
 Bhānugupta, 97  
 Bharadvaja, 53  
 Bhāratas, the, 8, 10, 13, 15  
 Bharatavarsha, 57  
 Bhārhut, 54  
 Bhartpur, 459, 470, 692  
 Bhartridāman, 84  
 Bhartrihari, 109  
 Bhāskar Pant, 466  
 Bhāskara Ravivarman Chera, 194  
 Bhāskaravarman, 106, 119  
 Bhātarka, 101  
 Batha, *see* Rewa  
 Bhātinda, 121, 206, 209, 256, 257  
 Bhatnair, 251  
 Bhattiya, 16  
 Bhaul, 288  
 Bheda, 7, 16  
 Bhēra, 328, 362  
 Bhikshāchāra, 115  
 Bhillama I, 163  
 Bhillama II, 163, 165  
 Bhilmal, 129  
 Bhils, the, 264, 711  
 Bhilsa, 65, 123, 212, 221, 226, 266  
 Bhīm, *see* Bhīma (Shāhi)  
 Bhīm (of Jammū), 256  
 Bhīm Rāja, 395, 396  
 Bhīm Rāja (of Dwārka), 308  
 Bhīma (of Anhilwār), 125, 127, 128  
 Bhīma I (East Chālukya), 90, 125, 155, 158  
 Bhīma II, 155  
 Bhīma (Shāhi), 120, 121  
 Bhīma river, 286  
 Bhīma Singh, 225  
 Bhīma Vāghela, 209, 210  
 Bhīmadeva II, 128  
 Bhīmagupta, 113  
 Bhīmapāla, 120, 122  
 Bhīmarāja, 128  
 Bhīmasena, 11  
 Bhīmbar, 398  
 Bhitari, 95, 96  
 Bhogivarman, 168  
 Bhoja (of Kashmir), 114  
 Bhoja (of Mālwa), 141  
 Bhoja I Mihira Gurjara, 131, 133, 134, 141, 144  
 Bhoja II Gurjara, 134, 144  
 Bhoja Paramāra, 124, 125, 127, 159  
 Bhojakas, the, 57  
 Bhojas, the, 14, 44  
 Bhonslas, the, of Nāgpur, 599  
 Bhopāl, 43, 462  
 Bhūmaka, 80  
 Bhūpat, 353  
 Bhuyikā, 132  
 Biana, *see* Bayāna  
 Bible, the, 715  
 Bīdar, 176, 178, 236, 238, 242, 243, 277, 279, 287, 288, 290, 292, 295-8, 302, 304, 314, 412  
 Bīdār Bakht, 448, 449, 451  
 Biderra, 553  
 Bihar, 43, 102, 144, 145, 148, 208, 210, 247, 262, 264, 265, 269, 275, 321, 325, 327, 328, 330-3, 339, 347, 351, 356-9, 365, 366, 370, 384, 395, 417, 449, 451, 454, 455, 458, 465, 466, 474, 551, 552, 558, 559, 562, 564, 619, 684, 729, 778, 797, 888, 892.  
*See also* Videha  
 Bihar Mal, 342, 351  
 Bijāpur, 151, 162, 176-8, 289, 293-8, 372-4, 390, 391, 396, 401-3, 409-12, 435, 438-44, 446-8, 451, 489, 494, 498, 517  
 Bijjala, 162  
 Bikaner, 352, 384  
 Bikramājī, 268, 392  
 Bilgrām, Sayyids of, 453, 473  
 Bilhana, 125, 159-61, 190, 191  
 Biloshpur, 395



- Bilsad inscription, 94  
 Bimbisāra, 14, 16-18  
 Bindusāra Amitraghāta, 34, 42, 45  
 Bīr Narāyan, 346. *See also* Vīra  
     Narāyana  
 Bīr Singh (of Orchha), 376, 400,  
     404  
 Bīrbal, Rāja, 371, 426  
 Bird, R. M., 706  
 Bīrūnī, *see* Al-Bīrūnī  
 Bishan Singh, 449  
 Bishnupur, 271  
 Bishop's College, 716  
 Black Hole, the, 548  
 Bloch, Dr T., 93  
 Board of Control, the, 607, 613,  
     626, 627, 659, 668, 697, 715, 760,  
     761, 773  
 Board of Revenue, the, 634, 635,  
     642, 645, 710  
 Bodawpaya, 679  
 Bodh Gayā, 92  
 Bohras, the, 421  
 Boigne, Benoît de, 605  
 Bojador, Cape, 482  
 Bolān Pass, the, 418, 653, 659, 812  
 Bolshevik propaganda, 896  
 Bombay, 519, 520, 522, 523,  
     525-31, 575, 577-82, 584, 591,  
     622, 625, 646, 648, 654-6, 668,  
     719, 720, 722, 729, 745, 755, 772,  
     775, 788, 794, 797, 804, 807, 818,  
     842, 843, 846, 853, 856-62, 868,  
     869, 882, 883, 885, 886, 892,  
     894, 897, 899  
 Bombay administration, 705  
 Bombay Board of Education, 710  
 Bombay Burma Trading Corpora-  
     tion, 828  
 Bombay Education Society, 710  
 Bombay Marine, 519, 646  
 Bombay Native Education Society,  
     710  
 Bombay Presidency, 151, 156, 293  
 Boone, Charles, 527  
 Boscawen, Admiral E., 538  
 Bourbon, island of, 533, 613, 615,  
     616, 790  
 Brāhma (Western Chālukya gen-  
     eral), 165  
 Brāhmadatta, 16  
 Brāhmadattas, the, 13  
 Brāhman caste, the, 28, 37, 38,  
     49, 51, 61, 109, 113, 122, 130,  
     142, 153, 166, 172, 205, 208, 219,  
     245, 247, 265, 276, 281, 283, 293,  
     365, 442, 444, 449, 457, 728, 729,  
     731, 735, 738, 844, 869, 896, 907.  
     *See also* Shāhi dynasty  
 Brāhmanas, the, 9, 10, 13  
 Brahmanism, 60, 99, 182  
 Brahmapāla, 119, 120  
 Brahmaputra, delta of, 91, 119,  
     422, 425. *See also* Lauhitya  
 Brāhmī script, the, 47, 76, 80  
 Brāhmo Samāj, the, 851  
 Brandis, Dr, 789  
 Brasyer, Captain, 751  
 Brazil, 485, 497, 499  
 Brihad Āraṇyaka Upanishad, the, 11  
 Brihadratha (of Magadha), 16  
 Brihadratha Maurya, 53  
 Brihaspatimitra, *see* Pushyamitra  
     Sunga  
 Brihatkathā, the, 61  
 Bristow, John, 572, 573, 594  
 British Columbia, 896  
 British Indian Association, the,  
     853  
 Broach, 65, 130, 131, 163, 241, 242,  
     318, 319, 513, 517, 578, 580  
 Brodrick, St John, Lord Midleton,  
     776  
 Bruce, Captain, 819  
 Bruere, Major, 744  
 Brydon, Dr, 657  
 Bubonic plague, 869  
 Bucephala, 26  
 Budaun, 210, 215, 220, 224, 245,  
     246, 259, 262

- Budaunī, 242, 334, 343, 356, 357, 359-61  
 Buddha, 12-14, 16, 17, 48, 52, 77-9, 109  
 Buddha Konankamana, 52  
 Buddhism, 1, 46, 48-52, 55, 60, 78, 88, 97-9, 101, 107, 109, 116, 122, 143, 147, 199, 208, 210, 378, 820, 825, 829  
 Buddhyanakura, 196  
 Budhagupta, 97  
 Budī Chand, 353  
 Bughrā Khān, 216-18, 231, 270  
 Buhlūl Lodī, 258-60, 262, 263, 267, 268, 305, 333  
 Bukhāra, 73, 206, 346, 649, 654, 655, 805, 807  
 Bukka I, 172-4, 278, 280  
 Bukka II, 175, 281, 286  
 Bukkar, 654, 666  
 Bulāki, 395, 399  
 Bundelas, the, 139  
 Bundelkhand, 139, 206, 208, 214, 335, 351, 401, 403, 404, 449, 461, 693  
 Būndī, 303, 350, 351  
 Burgoyne, Sir John, 590  
 Burhān Nizām Shāh, 177, 297, 298, 314, 315, 390  
 Burhān Nizām Shāh II, 372-4  
 Burhān-ud-dīn, 318  
 Burhānpur, 300, 315, 316, 391, 394, 396, 397, 400, 438, 456, 458, 472, 580  
 Burke, Edmund, 565, 570, 594-6, 851  
 Burma, 678-81, 713, 735, 783, 822, 824-9, 843, 897  
 Burmese War, First, 679-80  
 — Second, 825  
 — Third, 829  
 Burnes, Alexander, 649, 652, 655  
 Burnes, Charles, 655  
 Burr, Colonel, 621  
 Bussy, C.-J. P., Marquis de, 540-2, 544-6, 550, 554, 556, 589  
 Butler Committee Report, the, 838  
 Būtuga, 158  
 Buwayhids, the, 207  
 Buxar, 328, 561, 586, 593  
 Buzurg Ummīd Khān, 425  
 Cabral, 485, 486  
 Cachar, 680  
 Caillaud, Colonel, 556  
 Calcutta, 521-3, 525-8, 530, 531, 536, 546-50, 552, 553, 556-9, 561, 562, 564, 566-8, 570, 616, 632-4, 638, 683, 708, 709, 716-18, 720, 723, 726, 730, 739, 768, 842, 843, 851, 854, 859, 860, 868, 870, 872, 874, 888, 890, 896  
 — University of, 847  
 Calicut, 484-6  
 Calicut, Zamorin of, 309, 485, 486  
 Caliphate, the, 891, 897  
 Call, John, 555  
 Calliope, 66  
 Camac, Major, 582  
 Cambay, 81, 129, 314, 316, 353  
 Campbell, Colonel, 591, 592  
 Campbell, Colonel, 724  
 Campbell, Sir Archibald, 679  
 Campbell, Sir Colin, 753-5  
 Campbell, Sir George, 797  
 Campbell-Bannerman, Sir H., 873  
 Camphuis, 506  
 Canara, 643  
 Cannanore, 172, 487, 488, 591  
 Canning, Captain, 679  
 Canning, George, 650  
 Canning, Lord, 650, 685, 709, 716, 726, 731, 733, 737, 741, 742, 745, 747, 754, 756, 764-6, 768-70, 779, 831, 842, 867  
 Canton, 616  
 Cape Colony, 894

- Capitulations, the, 513  
 Carey, William, 715  
 Carnac, Major, 558  
 Carnatic, the, 294, 410-12, 435, 439, 440, 445, 446, 466, 467, 517, 523, 534, 542-4, 546, 548, 551, 553, 576, 584, 586-8, 591, 598, 600, 601, 604, 609-11, 631, 668, 685, 686  
 Carnatic revenues, 588, 589  
 Cartana, 21  
 Cartier, J., 566  
 Caspar, *see* Gondophares  
 Caspian Sea, the, 75  
 Caste, 7, 844, 845, 851, 852  
 Castlereagh, Lord, 607  
 Castro, João de, 318, 494  
 Caucasus, the, 649  
 Cautley, Sir P. T., 710  
 Cavagnari, Sir L., 812, 813  
 Cawnpore, 744, 748-54, 891  
 Central Asia, 72, 75, 76, 803-23  
 Central India, 619, 688, 693, 745, 756  
 Central Provinces, the, 778, 783, 843, 861, 899  
 Ceuta, 482  
 Ceylon, 44, 52, 92, 160, 169, 181, 182, 184-90, 192, 198, 199, 491, 495, 502, 504-6, 614, 790  
 Chabela Rām, 458  
 Chach, 122, 123  
 Chaghatāy Khān, *see* Tirmāshirīn  
 'Alā-ud-dīn  
 Chaghatāy tribe, 342, 346-8  
 Chahumānas, the, *see* Chauhāns, the  
 Chait Singh, 592-5  
 Chākan, 290, 291, 296  
 Chaknadhvaj, 424  
 Chakrakotra, 160  
 Chakravarman, 112  
 Chakrāyudha, 132, 143  
 Chālukya-Vikrama Kāla era, the, 161  
 Chālukyas, the (general), 104, 107, 108, 118, 119, 123, 124, 126, 128, 129, 131, 141, 145, 151, 163-5, 167-70, 182, 188-90, 198, 200, 201, 205  
 — Eastern dynasty of, 90, 104, 106, 151, 152, 154-6, 158, 160, 161, 191, 198, 199  
 — Western dynasty of, (1) Bādāmi, 151, 157-9, 190-2  
 — — (2) Kalyāni, 151, 159-63, 190  
 Chamba, 392  
 Chambal, the, 266, 400, 401, 413, 463, 607, 621, 690  
 Chamber of Princes, the, 832  
 Chamberlain, Sir Austen, 900  
 Chamberlain, Sir Neville, 736, 811  
 Chambers, Mr Justice, 570, 633  
 Champā, 14, 16  
 Chāmpāner, 303, 304, 306, 309, 310, 314-16  
 Champat Rai, 404  
 Champion, Colonel, 567, 569  
 Chāmunda, 126  
 Chānakya, 32, 35, 38, 40, 41  
 Chānd Khān, 314  
 Chānd Sultān, 374  
 Chand-Rāisā, the, 136  
 Chanda, 390  
 Chanda Sāhib, 534, 538-43, 551, 554  
 Chandadanda, *see* Skandavarman  
 Kadamba  
 Chandel dynasty, the, 128, 134-6, 138-41, 143, 206, 208, 210, 346  
 Chanderī, 226, 266, 305, 307, 326, 327  
 Chandernagore, 533, 534, 549, 550, 613, 886  
 Chandra, 122  
 Chandrabhattarikā, Queen, 134  
 Chandradeva, 137  
 Chandraditya, 153  
 Chandragiri, the Nāyak of, 517  
 Chandragupta I, 87-9, 117

- Chandragupta II, 80, 83, 85, 92-5,  
 98-100, 167  
 Chandragupta Maurya I, 2, 16, 20,  
 31-5, 42-6, 54  
 Chandragutta, *see* Chandragupta  
 Maurya  
 Chandrapīda Lalitāditya, 111  
 Chandrapura, *see* Chandūr  
 Chandravali, 123  
 Chandravarman, 89  
 Chandu Lāl, 690  
 Chanduka, 131  
 Chandūr, 169-71  
 Chandwār (Firūzābād), 138, 255  
 Changama, 584  
 Charikar, 21, 22  
 Charles I, 518  
 Charles II, 516, 519, 523, 528,  
 529  
 Charnock, Job, 449, 521, 522  
 Charumati, 43  
 Chārvāka, 365  
 Chastana, 81-4  
 Chatgām, *see* Chittagong  
 Chatham, Lord, 565  
 Chattadeva, 168  
 Chattarpur, 139  
 Chaturbhujā, 169  
 Chauhāns, the, 135-7, 140, 147,  
 148, 206, 208, 226, 249  
 Chaul, 228, 310, 311, 487, 505  
 Chaulukyas, the, 125, 126, 159  
 Chaurāgarh, 346, 402  
 Chausa, 275, 331  
 Chauth, 447, 460, 466, 474, 534  
 Chāvadās, the, 126, 205  
 Chedi, 124, 125, 133, 134, 139-41,  
 145, 159, 160  
 Chellanā, 17  
 Chelmsford, Lord, 899, 903  
 Chera kingdom, the, 100, 179, 181,  
 182, 185-90, 193-5. *See also*  
 Kerāla  
 Chet Singh, 665  
 Cheta dynasty, the, 57  
 Chetaka, 16, 17  
 Chhahara, 68  
 Chhajjū, 'Abdullāh, 220  
 Chicacole, 90  
 Chief courts, the, 783  
 Child, Sir John, 522  
 Child, Sir Josia, 519, 520, 525  
 Chilianwāla, 677  
 Chilka, Lake, 545  
 Chimnaji, 461  
 China, 180, 235, 238, 240, 490,  
 744, 820, 821, 824, 895  
 — Indian relations with, 107, 116,  
 117  
 China trade, 696  
 Chināb, the, 6, 26-8, 383, 463  
 Chinese activities in Central Asia,  
 75, 76  
 Chinese wars, the, 753  
 Chingīz Khān, 212, 319  
 Chingleput, 554, 555  
 Chinhāt, 749  
 Chinsura, 504, 526, 553, 633  
 Chirol, Sir Valentine, 879  
 Chitor, 55, 225, 303, 306, 312, 313,  
 315, 316, 319, 348, 350, 351, 432  
 Chitpāvan Brāhmins, 731, 868, 869  
 Chitrakūta, 127  
 Chitrāl, 649, 819  
 Chitramaya, 200  
 Chittagong, 274, 275, 401, 424,  
 425, 491, 522, 558, 679  
 Chodadeva I, *see* Kulottunga  
 Chodadeva I  
 Chodagangadeva, *see* Anantavar-  
 ma Chodagangadeva  
 Chola dynasty, the, 44, 119, 124,  
 137, 145, 154-61, 164, 165, 168,  
 170, 171, 179, 181, 183, 185,  
 187-95, 197, 198, 201  
 Chola-Pāndya, 183  
 Cholamandalam (Coromandel),  
 187  
 Chalapuram, 189  
 Chota Nāgpur, 247, 275, 310, 888

- Chota Udaipur, 309  
 Choultry Court, the, 530  
 Christ, Order of, 499  
 Christianity, 367, 373, 378, 402,  
     405, 420, 483, 497, 498, 720, 726  
 Christie, Captain, 648  
 Chudāsama, rajas of Girnār, 308  
 Chukhsa, 68, 69, 80  
 Chunār, 264, 275, 327, 331, 333,  
     336, 350, 356, 593  
 Churāman, 449, 455-7, 459  
 Chutu dynasty, the, 60, 166, 196,  
     197  
 Cinnamon, 504, 790  
 Circars, the Northern, 545, 546,  
     555, 585, 619, 640, 642, 644, 711,  
     788  
 Cis-Sutlej Sikhs, the, 609, 615, 663,  
     670, 693, 747  
 Civil Procedure Code, the, 784  
 Clapham Sect, the, 715  
 Clarendon, Lord, 806  
 Claudius, 74, 75  
 Clavering, Sir John, 568, 569, 571,  
     573, 574, 593, 634  
 Clerk, Sir G. R., 658  
 Clive, Edward, Lord, 610  
 Clive, Robert, Lord, 474, 527,  
     539-68, 585, 597, 599, 612, 613,  
     631, 632, 683-5, 696, 728, 748  
 Close, Sir Barry, 619  
 Cloves, 790  
 Cochin, 309, 310, 484-9, 499, 505  
 Cockburn, Colonel, 580  
 Coconada, 293  
 Coen, J. P., 503, 515  
 Coimbatore, 90, 591, 642  
 Colbert, J.-B., 532  
 Colebrooke's *Digest*, 785  
 Collector, the, 631, 632, 634-40,  
     642, 644, 645, 707-10, 712, 788,  
     791, 793, 857  
 Colombo, 491, 496, 505  
 Colvin, John, 746  
 Commissioner, the, 709, 712, 787  
 Committee of Circuit, the, 631, 640  
 Committee of Public Instruction,  
     the, 717, 718  
 Committee of Secrecy, the, 626  
 Comorin, Cape, 534, 678  
 Compagnie van Verre, 500  
 Competitive recruitment, 798-800,  
     853  
 Conjeeveram, 188, 195, 200, 445.  
     *See also* Kānchī  
 Conolly, Arthur, 649  
 Conservancy Board, the, 859  
 Constantia (Roman coin type), 74,  
     75  
 Constantinople, 483, 513, 803, 821,  
     891  
 Converts, civil rights of, 726  
 Co-operative credit, 794, 795  
 Cooper's Hill, 802  
 Coote, Sir Eyre, 547, 552, 555,  
     587-9  
 Cornwallis, Lord, 599-603, 607,  
     609, 611, 612, 616-18, 628, 629,  
     634-6, 638, 639, 642, 684, 691,  
     696, 709, 714, 721, 722, 728, 904  
 Coromandel Coast, the, 187, 195,  
     484, 491, 503, 505, 507, 517, 526,  
     528, 535, 547  
 Cosmas, 98  
 Cotton, Sir Arthur, 710  
 Cotton cloths, 512  
 Council of Education, the, 718  
 Council of India, the, 764, 774,  
     855, 882, 899, 901  
 Council of the Indies, the, 497  
 Council of State, the, 907  
 Courteen, Sir William, 518  
 Courts of circuit, the, 636  
 Courts of law, 529-31, 631-3, 707,  
     708, 710, 782, 783  
 Courts of Quarter Sessions, 531,  
     570  
 Covenanted Civil Service, the,  
     702, 711, 712, 769, 787, 798, 799,  
     802, 842

- Cox, Captain Hiram, 679  
 Cranbrook, Lord, 812  
 Cranganore, 181, 194, 505  
 Crawford, John, 860  
 Crewe, Lord, 763, 888, 889  
 Crimean War, the, 662, 734, 739, 753, 803, 805  
 Criminal Procedure Code, the, 784  
 Cromer, Lord, 886  
 Cromwell, Oliver, 516, 519  
 Cubbon, Sir Mark, 689  
 Cuddalore, 589, 590  
 Cuddapah, 540  
 Cunha, Nuno da, 316, 492, 493  
 Currie, Sir Frederick, 676  
 Curtis, Mr L., 901-3  
 Curtius, 19  
 Curzon, Lord, 767-9, 776, 780-2, 792, 795, 798, 819, 821, 839, 870, 872-5, 900  
 Cuttack, 214, 606, 796  
  
 Dābhol, 228  
 Dabo, 667  
 Dacca, 388, 419, 422, 423, 425, 521, 679, 708, 870, 871, 886  
 Dacoity, 709, 829, 871, 886, 890, 896  
 Dādār, 418  
 Dadda I, 130  
 Dadda II, 101, 107, 131  
 Dadda III, 131  
 Dāhāla, 141  
 Dāhir, 122, 123, 205  
 Dahrasena Traikūtaka, 85  
 Daivaputras, the, 91  
 Dakshamitrā, 81  
 Dalai Lama, the, 820, 821  
 Dalhousie, Lord, 675-7, 681, 692-4, 709, 712, 714, 720, 723, 726, 730, 731, 734-6, 739, 742, 755, 770, 772, 776, 789, 824, 825, 832, 843, 872  
 Dalip Singh, 665, 672-4, 677  
 Daly, Sir H. D., 747  
 Dāmāghsada, 84  
 Dāmājada, *see* Dāmāghsada  
 Damajī Gaekwar, 466, 477, 478  
 Dāmālcheri Pass, 534  
 Damān, 314, 367, 494, 505, 512  
 Damana, 90  
 Damirike, 179  
 Dāmodaragupta, 98, 101  
 Dandabhukti, 145, 146  
 Dāndesh, 375  
 Danes, the, 617, 714-16, 816  
 Dāniyāl, 352, 373, 375, 376, 390, 398, 399  
 Dantidurga Khadgāvaloka, 154, 157, 201  
 Dantivarman (Pallava), 201  
 Dantivarman I (Rāshtrakūta), 157  
 Dārā Shikūh, 396, 405, 406, 409-14, 416-18, 421, 433  
 Darius, 21  
 Daroga, the, 637, 639, 707  
 Darsaka, 18  
 Darshan, 421  
 Daryā Khān (Afghan), 395, 396  
 Daryā Khān (Afrīdī), 427  
 Daryā Khān Lodi, 260  
 Daryā Khān Lohānī, 268, 321  
 Dāsapura, 94  
 Dasara, the, 619  
 Dasaratha, 42, 53  
 Dāsas, the, 7, 8, 179  
 Dasavarman, 159  
 Dasyus, the, *see* Dāsas, the  
 Dattadevī (wife of Samudragupta), 92  
 Dattadevī (wife of Samudravarman), 119  
 Dattājī Sindhia, 475  
 Dāūd Khān (of Gujarāt), 304  
 Dāūd Khān Fārūki, 297, 307, 310, 311  
 Dāūd Khān Karanānī, 355-8  
 Dāūd Khān Panī, 456, 466  
 Daulat Khān, 266

- Daulat Khān (governor of Kanda-  
hār), 408  
 Daulat Khān Lodī, 253, 268, 269,  
321, 322  
 Daulat Rāo Sindhia, 605-7, 619,  
621, 622  
 Daulatābād (Deogīr), 221, 233-8,  
241-3, 247, 277, 279, 283, 284,  
286, 291, 293-6, 298, 305, 314,  
391, 394, 400, 401, 403, 443, 444,  
450  
 Davāka, 91  
 Deccan, the, 13, 14, 16, 84, 90,  
100, 151-6, 166, 171, 221, 241,  
244, 246, 247, 249, 273, 277-98  
 Decentralisation Commission, the,  
880  
 Deddadevī, 142  
 Defence of India Act, the, 897  
 Delhi, 43, 128, 129, 136, 148, 166,  
171, 172; part II *passim*; 534,  
552, 566, 583, 599, 606, 607,  
651, 658, 684, 685, 730, 731,  
738-48, 750, 753, 778, 888,  
904  
 — new capital at, 888-900  
 Delhi territory, 711  
 Demetrios, 55  
 Demetrios I, 63-5  
 Demetrios II, 64  
 Deo-Baranark, 102  
 Deogāon, 606  
 Deogīr (Devagiri), 171, 221, 223,  
226-30, 233. *See also* Daulatābād  
and Devagiri  
 Deogīr Bariya, 309  
 Deopara, 148  
 Deorai, 418, 419  
 Deputy-commissioner, the, 787,  
788  
 Deputy-governor, the, 712  
 Devabhūmi, *see* Devabhūti  
 Devabhūti, 56  
 Devadatta, 17  
 Devagiri, 128, 129, 162-5, 171  
 Devagupta, 102  
 Devakarasena, 100  
 Deval Devi, 228  
 Devanāgarī, 47  
 Devānāmpriya Priyadarsin, *see*  
Asoka  
 Devapāla (Gurjara), 133, 139,  
143  
 Devapāla (Pāla), 143, 144, 147  
 Devapur, 447  
 Devarāja (Gupta), 94  
 Devarāja (Gurjara), 132, 133  
 Devarāshtra, 90, 91  
 Devarāya I, 282  
 Devarāya II, 175, 283  
 Devasena, 100  
 Devendravarman, 90  
 Dhana Nanda, 20, 31, 32  
 Dhanamjaya, 91  
 Dhanapāla, 124  
 Dhanga, 134, 139  
 Dhanyakataka, 58  
 Dhār, 226, 241, 299, 307  
 Dhāra, 125, 160, 164  
 Dharapuram, 591  
 Dharasena IV, 130  
*Dharma-mahāmātra*, 46  
 Dharmapāla, 132, 133, 142, 143,  
147, 199  
*Dharmasāstra*, the, 38  
 Dharmat, 413, 417  
 Dharwar, 189  
 Dhauli, 44  
 Dhān Singh, 665, 668  
 Dholpur, 263, 265, 266, 327, 394,  
413  
 Dhoyī, 149  
 Dhruva (Rāshtrakūta), 143  
 Dhruva Dhāravarsha (Rāshtra-  
kūta), 157  
 Dhruvadevī, 93, 94  
 Dhruvarāja, 142  
 Dhruvasena (Rāshtrakūta), 132  
 Dhruvasena II (Valabhī), 101,  
107

- Dhruvaswāminī, *see* Dhruvadevi  
 Dias, Bartholomew, 483  
 Diddā, 113, 121  
 Dīdvāna, 299  
 Dig, 459, 472, 473, 607  
 Dilāvar Khān, 425  
 Dilāvar Khān (African), 412  
 Dilāvar Khān (governor of Lahore), 383, 392  
 Dilāvar Khān (of Mālwa), 251, 253, 286, 287, 299, 301  
 Dilīr Khān, 423, 437, 440, 441  
 Dilpasand Khān, 296  
 Dīn-i Ilāhī, 368-70, 378  
 Dīnājpur, 271, 357  
 Dinapur, 744-6  
 Dindigul, 591  
 Dinkar Rāo, Sir, 738, 772, 833  
 Diodotos I, 62, 63  
 Diodotos II, 62-4  
 Dion Cassius, 75  
 Dionysos, 23  
 Dionysos (of the family of Apollodotos I), 65  
 Dipālpur, 251, 253, 259, 322, 350, 413  
 Dir, 425  
 Disraeli, B., 759, 808, 812, 814  
 District administration, 707-13, 787, 788, 791, 792  
 District judges, 636-9, 644, 645, 707-9, 854  
 District munsiffs, 636, 644, 645  
 Diū, 312, 314, 316-18, 367, 487, 488, 492-4, 505, 512  
 Divodāsa, 8, 54  
 Divvoka, 146  
 Dīwān, the, 366  
 Dīwāni of Bengal, the, 562, 565, 567, 585, 599, 631, 634  
 Dohad, 392, 401  
 Dominicans, the, 498  
 Dorasamudra, 164, 165, 169, 171  
 Dorjief, 820, 821  
 Dost 'Alī, 466, 534  
 Dost Muhammad, 649, 651-5, 657, 661, 677, 740, 804, 805, 807, 814  
 Downton, Nicholas, 387, 512, 513  
 Drake, Francis, 510  
 Drake, Roger, 548, 552  
 Drangiana, 67  
 Dravida, 179, 199  
 Dravidian languages, the, 5  
 Dravidian peoples, early, 7  
 Druhyus, the, 7  
 Dual government, 683  
 Duff, Alexander, 717  
 Dufferin, Lord, 817, 839, 864  
 Duke, Sir William, 901-3  
 Dulucha, 116  
 Dum-dum, 737, 738  
 Dumas, Benoît, 533  
 Duncan, Jonathan, 716, 721  
 Dundas, Henry, 607, 627, 628  
 Dūndi Khān, 475  
 Dunning, John, 626  
 Dupleix, J.-F., Marquis, 534-47, 551, 553, 554, 631, 733  
 Dupleix, Mme, 538  
 Durand, Sir Mortimer, 819, 839  
 Durga Dās, 431-3, 448  
 Durgāvatī, 342, 346  
 Durlabha, 126  
 Durlabhaka, 111  
 Durlabhavardhana, 111  
 Durvinita, 198  
 Dūta, 46  
 Dutch, the, 387, 500-9, 514, 525, 526, 529, 532, 533, 553, 600, 615-7, 678, 683, 733, 893  
 Dvāravatīpura, 227, 277  
 Dwārka, 308  
 Dyarchy, 903-5  
 East, Sir Hyde, 716  
 East Africa, 895  
 East India Company, 449, 510 sqq.  
 East Jumna Canal, the, 710  
 Eastern Bengal, 778, 879, 888, 889



- Education, 716, 718-20, 790, 791,  
     842-71  
 Edwardes, Sir Herbert, 675, 676,  
     712, 716, 746-8, 752  
 Egerton, Colonel, 580  
 Egypt, 179, 180, 205, 246, 317,  
     491, 603, 646, 648, 813, 864, 886,  
     895  
 Elam, 3-5, 8  
 Elamancha Kalingadesa, 90  
 Elāra, 187  
 Elgin, Eighth Earl of, 804, 832  
     — Ninth Earl of, 769, 776  
 Elizabeth, Queen, 378, 380, 510  
 Ellenborough, Lord, 659, 660,  
     666-70, 690, 697, 712, 759  
 Ellichpur, 221, 242, 286, 288  
 Elliot, Sir Gilbert, *see* Minto, First  
     Earl of  
 Ellis, W., 560  
 Ellore, 91  
 Elphinstone, General, 648, 655,  
     658, 661  
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart, 614,  
     620, 630, 690, 691, 713, 719, 722,  
     852, 856, 866  
 Enkhuisen, 500  
 Enriquez, Francisco, 367  
 Epander, 65  
 Eran, 89, 92, 94, 97  
 Erandapalla, 90  
 Erandol, 90  
 Ereyanga, 164  
 Etāwah, 253, 255, 261  
 Eucratides, 55, 64, 65, 69  
 Eudemos, 31  
 Eumenes, 31  
 Euphrates, the, 646  
 Euthydemus I, 63-5, 74  
 Euthydemus II, 64  
 Evangelical Movement, the, 715  
 Eyre, Major Vincent, 746  
  
 Fa Hien, 1, 98  
 Faizi, 345, 363  
  
 Famines, 237, 795-8  
 Farghāna, 321, 406  
 Farid Sayyid, 257  
 Farid Sūr, *see* Shīr Shāh of Sasarām  
 Farrukhābād, 469, 607  
 Farrukhsiyar, 454-7  
 Farrukhsiyar, English embassy to,  
     526, 527  
 Fārūki dynasty, 300-20  
 Fateh Singh, 534  
 Fateh Singh Gaekwar, 577  
 Fatehgarh, 744, 754  
 Fath 'Alī, 650  
 Fath Khān, 401  
 Fath Khān Lodī, 265  
 Fath Khān Tughluk, 249, 251  
 Fath Shāh Jalāl-ud-dīn, 272  
 Fathābād, 245  
 Fathābād (Afghanistan), 657  
 Fathābād. *See also* Sīkrī  
 Fathgarh, 470  
 Fathkhelda, *see* Shakarkhelda  
 Fathpur, *see* Sīkrī  
 Fathullāh 'Imād-ul-mulk, 293, 296,  
     297  
 Faujdār, the, 641  
 Fenny river, 425  
 Ferdinand and Isabella, 484  
 Ferry, Jules, 827, 828  
 Fidai Khān, 427  
 Financial decentralisation, 780, 781  
 Finkenstein, Treaty of, 649  
 Fīrūz (son of Iluttmish), 213, 214  
 Fīrūz Shāh Bahmanī, 172, 174,  
     175, 278, 281, 282, 285-7, 289  
 Fīrūz Shāh of Bengal, 274  
 Fīrūz Shāh Khaljī, 218, 220-2, 301  
 Fīrūz Shāh Tughluk, 270, 279, 299,  
     300, 710  
 Fīrūz Tughluk (Malik Rajab), 244-  
     9  
 Fīrūzābād, 245, 251, 255, 286, 292.  
     *See also* Chandwār  
 Fīrūzpūr, 245, 661, 670, 744, 746  
 Fīrūzshāh, 671, 677

- Fitch, Ralph, 380  
 Fletcher, Sir R., 585  
 Floyer, Charles, 538, 539  
 Forde, Lt.-Col., 546, 555  
 Foreign Department, 766  
 Foreign Party, in the Deccan, 289-  
   93, 295, 296  
 Forest Department, the, 789, 790,  
   802  
 Fort St David, 538, 554  
 Fort St George, *see* Madras  
 Fort William, College of, 609.  
   *See also* Calcutta  
 Fowke, Joseph, 569  
 Fowler, Sir Henry, 769  
 Fox, Charles James, 594, 626  
 Fox, Henry, 565  
 Fox frigate, 680, 824, 825  
 Francis, Sir Philip, 568, 570-2, 574,  
   575, 580, 594, 595, 632-5  
 Franciscans, the, 498  
 Fraser, Simon, 740  
 French, the, 471, 472, 529, 532-47,  
   586, 589, 601, 603, 606, 613-17,  
   678, 683, 803, 821, 822, 827, 895,  
   896  
 Frere, Sir Bartle, 668, 745, 770,  
   772, 775, 776, 784, 809  
 Füläd, 257  
 Füläd Khân, 281  
  
 Gad, 71, 72. *See also* Guda  
 Gadag, 165  
 Gadhwā, 93, 94  
 Gackwar, *see* Baroda  
 Gāgraun, 301, 313  
 Gāhadavālas, the, 135, 148, 149.  
   *See also* Gaharwārs  
 Gaharwārs, the, 137, 138, 140, 147,  
   208  
 Gahlots, the, 208, 225, 306  
 Gait, Sir Edward, 904  
 Gakkhars, the, 342  
 Galgala, 446  
 Galle, 505  
  
 Gama, Estevão da, 494  
 Gama, Francisco da, 499  
 Gama, Vasco da, 484-6, 500  
 Ganapatināga, 89  
 Ganda, 139, 140  
 Ganda (of Kālinjar), 207  
 Gandammak, 657  
 Gandammak, Treaty of, 812  
 Gandaphara, *see* Gondophares  
 Gandhāra, 13, 17, 47, 63, 64, 68,  
   72, 75, 100, 105, 120  
 Gandhāras, the, 44  
 Gāndhi, Mr M. R., 894  
 Ganesh, Rāja, 262, 271  
 Gangadās, Rāja, 303  
 Gangadhar, Pandit, 716  
 Gangadhar Sāstri, 620  
 Gangaikonda, 160  
 Gangarāja, 165  
 Gangarām, 449  
 Gangaridae, the, 20, 31  
 Ganges, the, 154, 155, 157, 158,  
   165, 167, 198, 201  
 Ganges, river and valley, 5, 6, 10,  
   12, 31, 32, 35, 57, 88, 89, 91,  
   134, 145, 148, 189, 194, 206, 210,  
   216, 220, 235, 261, 275, 327, 328,  
   331, 332, 356, 419, 470, 646, 679,  
   739, 745  
 Ganges-Jumna doāb, 754, 755  
 Gangeyadeva, 141  
 Ganjam, 44, 90, 724  
 Gargachandra, 115  
 Gargāon, 423  
 Gargī Samhitā, 55  
 Garha-Katanka, 268  
 Garhwāl, 403, 419, 430, 618  
 Gathaspar, *see* Gondophares  
 Gaudas, the, 102, 103, 106, 119,  
   132, 139, 142, 145-8, 157  
 Gaugamela, 68  
 Gauhati, 422  
 Gaur, 210, 270, 272-5, 331, 357  
 Gautama, *see* Buddha  
 Gautami, *see* Balā Sri Gautami

- Gautamīputra, 100  
 Gautamīputra Sṛī Sātakarni, 59,  
     81, 196  
 Gautamīputra Sṛī Yajña Sātakarni,  
     60  
 Gāvān of Gilān, *see* Mahmūd  
     Gāvān  
 Gavimath, 44  
 Gāwil, 288, 294  
 Gāya, 48, 109, 144, 145, 462  
 Gedrosia, 28, 29, 33  
 Genoese, the, 481  
*Gentoo Code*, the, 785  
 George III, 595, 683, 684  
 George V, 888  
 Germany, 821, 822, 839; war with,  
     894-7  
*Ghadr* Movement, the, 890, 898  
 Ghālib Khān, 252  
 Ghani Khān, 345  
 Ghataka, 80  
 Ghatorkacha (Gupta), 87, 88  
 Ghatorkachagupta (governor of  
     Eran), 94  
 Ghatorkachagupta (Gupta king),  
     96  
 Ghauts, Eastern, 154  
     — Western, 390, 495, 580  
 Ghāzī Arghūn Mirzā, 384  
 Ghāzī Khān Lodī, 269  
 Ghāzī-ud-dīn, 462  
 Ghāzī-ud-dīn Firūz Jang, 471, 472,  
     545  
 Ghāzī-ud-dīn Firūz Jang II,  
     472-5  
 Ghāzipur, 326, 607  
 Ghaznavids, the, 211. *See also*  
     Ghazni  
 Ghazni, 113, 140, 205, 207-10,  
     212, 322, 392, 404, 463, 654, 658,  
     660, 661; rulers of, 121, 138;  
     *see also* Mahmūd of Ghazni  
 Ghazni Khān, *see* Muhammad  
     Shāh (of Mālwa)  
 Ghazni Khān Fārūki, 310, 311  
 Gheria, 527  
 Ghilzais, the, 463  
 Ghiyās-ud-dīn Bahmanī, 285  
 Ghiyās-ud-dīn Balban, *see* Balban  
 Ghiyās-ud-dīn Khaljī (of Mālwa),  
     306, 307  
 Ghiyās-ud-dīn Muhammad Ghūrī,  
     208  
 Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluk, 225, 226,  
     230  
 Ghiyās-ud-dīn Tughluk II, 249,  
     250  
 Ghorāghāt, *see* Dīnājpur  
 Ghose, Arabindo, 875  
 Ghulām Kādīr, 478  
 Ghūr, 208-10  
 Ghūrīds, the, 138  
*Ghusl-khāna*, the, 382  
 Ghuzz Turkmāns, the, 209  
 Gibraltar, 803  
 Giers, M. de, 816  
 Girdhār, 458, 460  
 Girivṛāja, 17, 18  
 Girna river, 288  
 Girnār (Junāgarh), 42, 44, 45, 83,  
     242, 307-9  
 Girnār mountains, 308  
*Gitagovinda*, the, 149  
 Gladstone, W. E., 769, 806, 808,  
     809, 814-17  
 Glausai, the, 26  
 Goa, 169, 176, 293, 297, 363, 367,  
     373, 390, 401, 402, 489, 490,  
     493, 494, 496, 499, 500, 504, 505,  
     513, 527, 577, 617  
     — Archbishop of, 495, 497, 498  
     — Convention of, 516, 517  
 Goālpāra, 271  
 Godāvarī river, 57, 91, 124, 154,  
     166, 284, 293, 314, 374, 430, 710  
 Goddard, Colonel, 580, 582, 587  
 Godeheu, M., 544  
 Godhra, 304  
 Godolphin, Lord, 524  
 Godwin, General, 825

- Gogra, 217, 328  
 Gogūnda, 361  
 Gohad, 607  
 — rana of, 582  
 Gokhale, G. K., 863, 875, 884-6  
 Gokla (Jāt, of Tilpat), 429, 448  
 Golauli, 755  
 Golconda, 176-8, 279, 282, 296,  
 298, 373, 374, 395, 409-II, 421,  
 439-44, 446, 447, 451, 517, 518,  
 520, 523, 533  
 Gomāl (Gomati) river, 6  
 Gondal, 242  
 Gondophares, 67, 70-2, 74  
 Gondopharos, *see* Gondophares  
 Gonds, the, 139, 268, 280, 286,  
 288, 301, 402  
 Gondwāna, 287, 288, 301, 310,  
 342, 346, 347, 350  
 Good Hope, Cape of, 483, 510,  
 534, 614, 616, 646, 648, 753,  
 803  
 Gooty, 546  
 Gopāla, 132, 140, 142  
 Gopāla II, 144, 145  
 Gopāla (general), 140  
 Gopālavarman, 112  
 Gopika Bai, 576  
 Goradha, 57  
 Gortchakoff, Prince, 812  
 Gough, Sir Hugh, Lord, 671, 672,  
 676, 677, 739  
 Government of India, the, 698,  
 699, 701, 763-77, 779, 780  
 Government of India Act, 1858,  
 759-62  
 — 1909, 883  
 Governor-general, powers of,  
 627-9  
 Govind, 452  
 Govind Rai, 430  
 Govinda I, 157  
 Govinda II, 157  
 Govinda III, 133, 143, 155, 157,  
 158, 201  
 Govinda IV Prabhūtavarsha, 158  
 Govinda V, 155  
 Govindachandra, 137, 147, 189  
 Govindagupta, 94  
 Govindapāla, 147  
 Govindarāja, 136  
 Govindpur, *see* Calcutta  
 Grahavarman, 102, 103, 105  
 Grant, —, 648  
 Grant, James, 635  
 Greek War, the, 650  
 Greeks, the, 55, 62-8, 72. *See also*  
 Yavanas, the  
 Grenville, Lord, 613, 702, 798  
 Guda, 70-2  
 Gudaphara, *see* Gondophares  
 Gudaya, *see* Guda  
 Gudnaphara, *see* Gondophares  
 Gudufara, *see* Gondophares  
 Guhalladeva, 169  
 Guinea, 482, 483, 500  
 Gūjar Khān, 357  
 Gujarāt, 59, 124-6, 129, 133, 134,  
 151, 159, 205, 206, 209, 210,  
 223, 225-30, 239, 241-3, 248,  
 251-3, 273, 278, 280, 284-6, 288,  
 289, 293, 297, 299-320, 330, 331,  
 334, 340, 346, 352-4, 356, 362,  
 363, 366, 368, 373, 374, 387, 391,  
 392, 395, 398, 406, 407, 413, 416-  
 18, 427, 428, 434, 448, 459-62,  
 466, 478, 485, 492, 493, 504, 513,  
 577, 578, 582, 705  
 Gujrāt, 383, 677  
 Gulāb Singh, 665, 671-3  
 Gulbarga, 172, 173, 228, 238, 242,  
 243, 277, 278, 284-9, 293, 294,  
 297  
 Gumti river, 247  
 Gunādhyā, 61  
 Gunakāmadeva Vijayāditya Gu-  
 naka, 155  
 Guntoor, circar of, 586, 600  
 Gupta, 87, 88  
 — later dynasty, 141

- Gupta dynasty, the, 76, 80, 85,  
     103, 104, 106, 108, 119, 197  
 Gupta era, the, 87, 101  
 Gurdāspur, 337, 456  
 Gurjaras, the, 101, 105, 107, 119,  
     121, 123, 125, 129-35, 137, 139,  
     142, 144, 152, 157, 158  
 Gurkhas, the, 118, 617, 618, 663,  
     820  
   — recruitment of, 742  
   — war with, 620  
 Gurshāsp, 233  
 Gusana (Ouzanes), 72  
 Gwalior, 97, 123, 131, 133, 134,  
     206, 212, 219, 222, 253, 255,  
     258, 261, 263-8, 301, 326, 336,  
     338, 339, 346, 375, 389, 401, 403,  
     413, 416, 419, 449, 451, 478, 582,  
     599, 607, 690, 744, 755  
   — Treaty of, 621  
 Gyantse, 821  
  
 Habash Khān, 273  
 Habibullāh, 822, 896  
 Hāfiz, 271, 285  
 Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, 469, 475, 569  
 Hagāmasha, 69  
 Hagāna, 69  
 Haidar Kulī Khān, 459  
 Haihayas, the, 15. *See also* Kāla-  
     churis, the  
 Hājipur, 274, 356  
 Hajjāj, *see* Al-Hajjāj  
 Hājji Habibullāh, 363  
 Hājji Maulā, 224  
 Hākīm, *see* Al-Hākīm II  
 Hāla Sātavāhana, 61  
 Haladhara, 114  
 Halāyudha, 149  
 Haldighāt, 361  
 Halebid, 164, 227. *See also* Dorasa-  
     mudra  
 Halliday, Sir F. J., 709, 745  
 Hāsi, *see* Palāsikā  
 Haltur, 159  
  
 Hamasān, 207  
 Hamid Khān, 259, 260  
 Hamid Khān, 459, 460  
 Hamir Singh, 223, 224  
 Hamira, 136  
 Hampi, 172. *See also* Vijayanagar  
 Hamza Shāh (of Bengal), 271  
 Hamzabān, 353  
 Han dynasty, the, 79  
 Hangāl, 168-70  
 Hānsi, 268  
 Hānsū Karārāni, 355  
 Har Govind, 430  
 Har Kishan, 430  
 Har Singh, 253  
 Haranand, *see* Koka  
 Harapāla, 164  
 Harappa, 3, 4  
 Hardinge, Charles, Lord, 840, 890  
 Hardinge, Henry, Lord, 670, 672-  
     7, 694, 718, 892  
 Hare, David, 716, 851  
 Hari-rūd, the, 815  
 Harichandra, 130, 132, 133, 138  
 Harihara I, 169, 172  
 Harihara II, 174, 175, 281, 286  
 Harirāja, 136  
 Harisena, 99, 100  
 Harisimha, 118  
 Harivamsa, the, 131, 143  
 Harivarman (Kadamba), 167  
 Harivarman (Maukhari), 102  
 Harpāl, 228, 229  
 Harsha, era of, 108  
 Harsha (of Kashmir), 114, 115,  
     153  
 Harsha (Chandel), 134  
 Harshacharita, the, 1, 53, 104, 109,  
     129  
 Harshadeva, 139  
 Harshagupta, 101, 102  
 Harshaguptā, 102  
 Harshasimha, 124  
 Harshavardhana Silāditya, 101-9,  
     119, 129, 131, 198

- Hasan 'Alī Sayyid 'Abdullāh Khān  
     Kutb-ul-mulk, 454-6, 458, 459  
 Hasti, 23  
 Hastināpura, 10, 15. *See also*  
     Asandivat  
 Hastings, Lord, 617, 618, 620-4,  
     685, 687, 688, 694, 703, 852  
 Hastings, Warren, 554, 565-97,  
     613, 618, 625, 626, 628, 631-3,  
     640, 683, 696, 716, 783-5  
 Hastivarman, 91  
 Hathigumpha, 55, 57  
 Havelock, Henry, 658, 735, 751-3  
 Hawkins, William, 380, 382, 512  
 Hazāra district, 44  
 Heath, William, 522  
 Heber, Bishop, 717  
 Heliocles, 64-6, 74  
 Heliodoros, 56, 66  
 Hemachandra, 128  
 Hemādri, 163  
 Hemantasena, 147  
 Hemkaran, 313  
 Henry the Navigator, Prince, 482,  
     483  
 Henry IV (of France), 378, 532  
 Hephaistion, 23, 26-8  
 Herat, 467, 648-51, 653, 804, 805,  
     808, 812, 813, 815  
 Hercules, 23  
 Hermaeus, 66, 74  
 Herodotus, 1  
 Herzfeld, Dr, 69, 70  
 Hewitt, Sir John, 875  
 High Courts, the, 783, 886, 898  
 Hijāz, the, 449  
 Himālayas, the, 98, 125, 133, 187,  
     211, 238, 252, 337, 648  
 Hīmū, 336, 338, 339  
 Hīnayāna, *see* Buddhism  
 Hindāl Mīrzā, 275, 330-2  
 Hindaun, 395, 461  
 Hindu joint-family, the, 726  
 Hindu Kush, the, 21, 33, 44, 63, 64,  
     67, 73, 397, 407  
 Hindu law, 785, 786, 856  
 Hinduism, 199, 369, 378, 420  
 Hindustani Party, the, 453  
 Hippostratos, 65  
 Hira Singh, 665, 670, 671  
 Hiranyavarman, 200  
 Hisām Khān, 259  
 Hislop, Sir Thomas, 622  
 Hissār, 245  
 Hiuen Tsang, 1, 53, 77, 97, 98,  
     104, 106-11, 117, 119, 120, 122,  
     129, 153, 168, 199  
 Hiung-nu, the, 67, 72, 73  
 Hizabr Khān, 427  
 Hlutdaw, the, 826, 828  
 Hobart, Lord, 610  
 Hobhouse, Sir J. C., 804  
 Hodson, Major W. S. R., 748  
 Hogg, Sir S. S., 859  
 Holkar, state of, 577, 579, 580,  
     583, 598, 599, 605, 686, 731, 744,  
     755, 834  
 Hollond, John, 600  
 Holwell, J. Z., 556, 557, 560  
 Home government, the, 625-7,  
     697, 773-7. *See also* Board of  
     Control  
 Home Rule League, the, 898, 900  
 Hornby, Governor, 579, 580  
 House of Commons, the, 524, 626,  
     628, 633, 639, 697, 760, 761,  
     851, 900  
 House of Lords, the, 770, 864,  
     893  
 Houtmann, Cornelis van, 500  
 Hoysalas, the, 161-6, 168-72, 185,  
     191-3, 227, 228, 277  
 Hughes, Sir Edward, 589, 590  
 Hugli river, 521, 526, 548, 549,  
     553  
 Hugli town, 395, 401, 491, 518,  
     521-3, 531, 549, 709  
 Hūlāgū, 215, 230, 237  
 Hultsch, Dr, 50  
 Human sacrifices, 714

- Humāyūn, emperor, 270, 275, 276,  
     315, 316, 320, 322, 325, 329-37,  
     345, 353, 357, 358, 372, 492  
 — tomb of, 418, 748  
 Humāyūn, *see* 'Alā-ud-dīn Sikan-  
 dar Shāh Tughluk  
 Humāyūn Shāh Bahmanī, 291, 304  
 Hūnas, the, 95-8, 101, 104, 105,  
     124, 129  
 Hunter, Sir William, 845  
 Hunza campaign, the, 839  
 Husain 'Alī Sayyid Amīr-ul-  
     umarā, 454-9  
 Husain Beg, 384  
 Husain Kulī Khān Khānjahān,  
     353, 358, 360  
 Husainpur, *see* Fathgarh  
 Hūshang Malik, 237  
 Hūshang Shāh (of Mālwa), 257,  
     262, 288, 299-302  
 Hūshang Shāh II, 312  
 Hūshangābād, 301  
 Hūshiyār, 287  
 Huvishka, 76, 78, 79  
 Hydaspes, the, 21, 24, 27. *See also*  
     Jhelum  
 Hyder 'Alī, 576, 582-4, 586-8, 591,  
     598, 600, 610, 656, 686  
 Hyderabad, 28, 411, 439, 442, 443,  
     452, 460, 471, 472, 527, 541,  
     545-7, 554, 598, 601, 603, 686,  
     689, 690, 693-5, 730, 745  
 — (Sind), 667  
 Hydraotes, the, *see* Rāvi  
 Hyphasis, the, *see* Beās  
  
 'Ibādat-khāna, 358, 363, 365  
 Ibn Battūta, 171, 235, 236, 240  
 Ibrāhīm, 458, 459  
 Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh I, 177  
 Ibrāhīm 'Adil Shāh II, 374-91  
 Ibrāhīm Husain Mirzā, 353  
 Ibrāhīm Khān, 395  
 Ibrāhīm Khān Gārdī, 477  
 Ibrāhīm Khān Khaljī, 222  
 Ibrāhīm Khān Sūr, 333  
 Ibrāhīm Kutb Shāh, 177  
 Ibrāhīm Nizām Shāh, 374  
 Ibrāhīm Shāh Lodi, 267-9, 274,  
     321-5, 327  
 Ibrāhīm Shāh Sūr, 336  
 Ibrāhīm (Shams-ud-dīn) Sharkī,  
     253, 257, 262, 263  
 Idar, 299, 309, 313, 361  
 Ikbāl Khān, Mallū, *see* Mallū  
     Ikbāl Khān  
 Ikdāla, 246, 247, 273  
 Ikhtiyār Khān, 253, 317  
 Ikhtiyār-ul-mulk, 353, 354  
 Ikshvāku, 12  
 Īl-khāns, the, 212, 215, 235  
 Ilāhdād Lodi, Malik, 257, 258  
 Ilbert, Sir C., 854  
 Ilbert bill, the, 854, 868  
 Ili, 72  
 Iliyās Shāh, Shams-ud-dīn, 246,  
     270, 271, 273  
 Īltutmish, Shams-ud-dīn, 136, 212-  
     14, 224, 226  
 'Imād Shāhī dynasty, the, 296  
 'Imād-ul-mulk Khushkadam, 313,  
     314  
 Imāmgarh, 667  
 Imperial Gazetteer, the, 3  
 Imperial Service Troops, the, 839  
 Impey, Sir Elijah, 570, 571, 633,  
     783  
 India Act, Pitt's, 594, 597, 600,  
     626-9, 642, 684  
 India House, the, 888  
 Indian Army Committee, the, 895  
 Indian Association, the, 853  
 Indian Civil Service, the, *see*  
     Covenanted Civil Service  
 Indian High Courts Act, the, 783  
 Indian Mutiny, the, 728-57, 872,  
     891  
 Indian National Congress, the,  
     854, 855, 864, 866, 868, 873,  
     875, 876, 883, 899, 900, 902, 903

- Indian Privy Council, the, 840  
 Indians, employment of, 772, 801, 854, 881-3  
*Indica*, the, 121  
 Indigo, 517, 854  
 Indo-China, 516, 827  
 Indore, 599, 618, 622, 744, 755, 833; inscription at, 96  
 Indra I, 157  
 Indra II, 157  
 Indra III, Nityavarsha, 158  
 Indra III (Rāshtrakūta), 134, 139, 144  
 Indra Singh, 431  
 Indradatta Traikūta, 85  
 Indrapāla, 120  
 Indrarāja, 143, 158  
 Indravarman, 68, 70  
 Indrāyudha, *see* Indrarāja  
 Indūr, 227  
 Indus, the, 3, 5, 6, 20, 22-4, 26-8, 31-3, 44, 55, 67, 71, 73, 75, 77, 122, 210, 212, 239, 248, 351, 370, 418, 425, 426, 429, 463, 465, 467, 475, 477, 534, 666, 778, 805, 809  
 Infanticide, 688, 721  
 Inquisition, the, 505  
 Interim (Education) Report of the Statutory Commission, 850  
 Interlopers, 523  
 Intizām-ud-daula, 472, 473  
 Ionians, *see* Greeks  
 Ipsus, 33  
 Irādat Khān A'zam Khān, 392, 400  
 'Irak, 207, 251, 646, 768, 895, 896  
 Irān, 5, 21, 66, 67. *See also* Persia  
 Iranian deities, 79  
 Irāvati (Rāvi) river, 6  
 Irawadi, the, 422, 828  
 'Irīj, 263  
 Irivabedanga, 168  
 Irrigation, 710, 789, 796, 797  
 Isabella, 484  
 Isānavarman, 101, 102  
 Isfahān, 441  
 Isfandiyār, 277  
 Ishāk, 206  
 Isidore of Charax, 81  
 Isila, 46  
 Islam, 205, 209, 262, 378, 383  
 Islām Khān (governor of Bengal), 388  
 Islām Khān Lodī, 256, 257  
 Islām Shāh Sūr, 336, 340, 355  
 Islāmābād, *see* Chittagong, Mathura  
 Ismā'il (of Ghaznī), 206  
 Ismā'il 'Adil Shāh, 297  
 Ismā'il Khān, 445  
 Ismā'il Mukh, Nāsir-ud-dīn Ismā'il Shāh, 242, 243  
 Ismā'il Nizām Shāh, 373  
 Ismā'il Shāh Safavī, 311  
 Ismā'ili heretics, 209, 211, 213, 421  
 'Ismat Begum, 393  
 Istalif, 661  
 'Isvaradatta, 84  
 'Isvaravarman, 102  
 I'timād Khān, 318, 319, 344, 352  
 I'timād-ud-daula, 385, 386  
 I Tsing, 87, 88  
 'Iwāz Khān (governor of Bengal), 212  
 'Iwāz Khān (governor of Ghaznī), 404  
 Jacob, Colonel John, 809  
 Ja'far Khān, 458, 465  
 Jaffnapatam, 505  
 Jagaddeva, 115  
 Jagadekamala II, 162  
 Jagannāth, temple of, 247  
 Jagat Singh, 404, 405  
 Jagattunga, *see* Govinda III  
 Jagattunga (son of Krishna II), 158  
 Jagdallak, 427, 657  
 Jahānārā Begum, 405, 406, 411  
 Jahāndār Shāh, 453-5, 473



- Jahāngīr, 344, 352, 374-7, 380-98,  
 406, 420, 422, 428, 430, 454, 512,  
 513, 817  
 Jahāngīr Khān, 177  
 Jahāngīr Kulī Beg, 275  
 Jahāngīrnagar, 388  
 Jahānshāh, 453, 454, 457  
 Jahānsūz, *see* 'Alā-ud-dīn Husain  
 Jai Appa Sindhia, 470, 472  
 Jai Singh I, 417, 418, 437, 438  
 Jai Singh II, 433, 434, 452, 456,  
 457, 459, 461  
 Jaimal, 262  
 Jaimal Rāhor of Bednor, 349, 370  
 Jains, the, 16, 17, 34, 95, 126, 128,  
 131, 143, 164, 365, 369, 378  
 Jaintia, 680  
 Jaipāl, *see* Jayapāla  
 Jaipur, 44, 122, 417, 424, 449, 456,  
 457, 459, 471, 606, 693  
 Jaisalmer, 352  
 Jaitugi I, 163  
 Jajau, 451  
 Jājpur, 301  
 Jalāl, 370  
 Jalāl Khān (of Bālkonda), 291, 292  
 Jalāl Khān Lodī, 267, 268  
 Jalāl Khān (of Sasarām), 275, 331  
 Jalāl Shāh Lohānī, 333  
 Jalāl Shāh Sūr, 355  
 Jalāl-ud-dīn Firūz Shāh Khaljī, *see*  
 Firūz Shāh Khaljī  
 Jalāl-ud-dīn Mangobarni, *see* Man-  
 gobarni  
 Jalāl-ud-dīn Muhammad, 271, 272  
 Jalālābād, 426, 657-61  
 Jalandhar doāb, the, 91, 338, 340,  
 672  
 Jalauka, 53, 111  
 Jaleswār, 357  
 Jalila, 261  
 Jālor, 226  
 Jalwar, 470  
 Jamāl-ud-dīn Husainī Gīsū Daraz,  
 289  
 James, Commodore, 527  
 James I, 518  
 James II, 519, 523  
 Jammū, 256, 418, 430, 475, 665,  
 671  
 Jamrūd, 431, 451, 658  
 Janaka, 12, 13  
 Janamejaya, 11  
 Jāni Beg Arghūn Mirzā, 372, 384  
 Jānids, the, 406  
 Jānkojī Sindhia, 475  
 Japan, 491, 516  
 Jask, 514  
 Jasrat Khokhar, 251, 255, 256, 259  
 Jaswant Rāo Holkar, 605-7, 618  
 Jaswant Singh, 413, 417, 418, 427,  
 431, 432  
 Jātakas, the, 12, 13, 16  
 Jātavarman Kulasekhara, 184  
 Jātavarman Sundara Pāndya, 171,  
 185, 186  
 Jātavarman Vira Pāndya, 185  
 Jatila Parākrama Pāndya, 194  
 Jatila Parāntaka Pāndya, 182, 183  
 Jāts, the, 206, 207, 429, 448, 449,  
 455, 456, 459, 470, 472  
 Jaugada, 44  
 Jauhar, 225, 309, 313, 315, 327,  
 346, 349, 361  
 Jaunpur, 103, 245, 247, 250, 251,  
 253, 255, 257, 258, 260-5, 267,  
 271, 273, 274, 321, 326, 328, 331,  
 333, 339, 342, 346, 348, 356, 358,  
 362, 365, 395  
 Java, 143, 503, 512, 614-16  
 Jawāhir Bai, 315  
 Jawāhir Singh, 671  
 Jawān Bakht, 477  
 Jaxartes, the, *see* Syr Darya  
 Jayabhata III, 131  
 Jayachandra, 136, 138  
 Jayachandra (of Kanauj), 210  
 Jayadāman, 82, 83  
 Jayadekamala, 159  
 Jayadeva, 149

- Jayadhvaj, 423, 424  
 Jayaji Rāo Sindhia, *see* Sindhia  
 Jayakesin I (Kadamba), 187  
 Jayakesin I (Rāshtrakūta), 161, 169  
 Jayakesin II, 170  
 Jayakesin III, 170  
 Jayapāla, 119-22, 135, 139, 144, 206, 207  
 Jayāpida Vinayāditya, 111  
 Jayasekhara, 126  
 Jayasimha (founder of the Chālukyas), 151  
 Jayasimha I (Chālukya), 159  
 Jayasimha III (Chālukya), 125, 161, 189  
 Jayasimha (Kashmīr), 115  
 Jeddah, 309, 486  
 Jeṣakabhukti, 138  
 Jesuits, the, 367, 373, 379-82, 498  
 Jews, the, 194, 365, 484, 530  
 Jhānsi, 693, 744, 755  
 Jhārkhand, 247  
 Jharokha, the, 382, 386, 420  
 Jhelum river, 6, 26, 27, 214, 362, 397, 677  
 Jhujhār Khān, 319  
 Jhujhār Singh, 400, 402  
 Jiji Anaga, 343  
 Jina, *see* Mahāvira  
 Jindan, Rāni, 665, 670, 674  
 Jinji, 445, 446, 540  
 Jishnugupta, 117  
 Jivadāman, 84  
 Jivan, Malik, 418  
 Jivitagupta I, 101  
 Jivitagupta II, 98, 101, 102, 141  
 Jizya, the, 245, 345, 351, 429, 431, 433  
 Jnātrikas, the, 15  
 João II, 483  
 Jodhpur, 130-2, 413, 417, 431, 434, 448, 456, 459, 461, 470, 693. *See also* Mārwar  
 Joghalthembi, 59  
 Jones, Sir William, 716  
 Jouveau-Dubreuil, Prof., 91  
 Jugantar, the, 857  
 Jumna, the, 6, 7, 10, 137, 144, 214, 216, 218, 240, 255, 256, 301, 345, 408, 415, 455, 475, 477  
 Junāgarh (Girnār), 34, 95, 196, 242  
 Junaid, 123, 131  
 Junaid Kararāni, 358  
 Junnār, 81, 294, 398-400  
 Jurz, *see* Gurjara  
 Justices of the peace, the, 859, 860  
 Justin, 31, 32, 64  
 Jwāla-Mukhi, temple of, 248  
 Ka'aba, Servants of the, 891  
 Kabācha, Nāsir-ud-dīn, 212  
 Kābul, 64, 206, 256, 321, 322, 325, 328-30, 333, 337, 340, 343, 345, 347, 352, 365, 366, 368, 370, 372, 383-5, 388, 395, 397, 405, 406, 408, 409, 414, 417, 425-7, 431, 448, 451, 463, 467, 475, 649, 651-6, 658, 661, 678, 729, 738, 804, 805, 808, 811-14, 822, 897  
 Kābul river and valley, 6, 21, 22, 63, 66, 68, 73, 120-2  
 Kācha, *see* Samudragupta  
 Kachch, 82, 84, 126, 205, 242, 368, 417  
 Kachch, Rann of, 248, 308  
 Kachhwāhas, the, of Gwalior, 206  
 Kādambari, the, 109  
 Kadambas, the, 60, 100, 151, 165-71, 187, 197, 198, 201  
 Kādara, 189  
 Kādir, *see* Al-Kādir  
 Kādir Khān, 318  
 Kadphises I, 73-5  
 Kadphises II, *see* Wima Kadphises  
 Kadungon, 182  
 Kāfur, Malik Nāib, 91, 129, 164, 166, 169-71, 186, 225-8  
 Kaikeyas, the, 13  
 Kaikubād, 217, 218, 229, 270

- Kailāsanātha, 200  
 Kailwa, 349  
 Kāim Jang Bangash, 469  
 Kairala, *see* Kerāla  
 Kaisar Khān Fārūki, 308, 310  
 Kaithal, 253  
 Kaivartas, 146  
 Kākatiyas, the, 162, 163, 171, 172, 185, 186, 193, 195, 277  
 Kākavarna, 19  
 Kakka (Pratihāra), 133  
 Kakka I (Rāshtrakūta), 157  
 Kakka II Amoghavarsha, 158, 159  
 Kakkarāja II (Rāshtrakūta), 157, 158  
 Kakkuka, 132, 133  
 Kakrālī, 347  
 Kakubha, 96  
 Kākustha, *see* Kākusthavarman  
 Kākusthavarman, 166  
 Kālā Pahār, 358  
 Kālachuris, the, 100, 124, 130, 137, 140, 141, 145, 151, 160, 168, 170, 208  
 Kālachuryas, the, 162  
 Kalam, 288  
 Kalānaur, 337, 338  
 Kalanos, 24  
 Kalasa, 114  
 Kālāsoka, *see* Kākavarna  
 Kalāt, 809, 832  
 Kalhana, 43, 111, 115, 120-2  
 Kalhoras, the, 308  
 Kālī, worship of, 853  
 Kālidāsa, 41, 54-6, 99  
 Kālighāt, *see* Calcutta  
 Kalimullāh Shāh Bahmanī, 298  
 Kalinga dynasty, 54, 55, 57, 58, 100, 132, 146, 148, 156, 164, 188, 191  
 Kalingadesa, 13, 43-5, 164; Asoka's war in, 43, 46, 48  
 Kālinjar, 139, 140, 207, 210, 335, 351  
 Kallār (Lalliya Shāhi), 120, 121  
 Kālpi, 253, 257, 262-4, 267, 301, 326, 348, 349, 755  
 Kalsi, 44  
 Kalyānapura, 160  
 Kalyāni, 124, 125, 154, 159, 177, 412  
 Kām Bakhsh, 445-7, 451, 475  
 Kāmadeva, 168-70  
 Kamāl-ud-dīn, 257  
 Kamalū, 120. *See also* Kamaluka  
 Kamaluka, 121  
 Kamar-ud-dīn Khān, 462, 465, 467, 468  
 Kāmarūpa, 91, 101, 106, 107, 109, 118, 120, 142, 145, 146, 148. *See also* Kāmrup and Assam  
 Kāmasūtra, 41  
 Kambojas, the, 44, 143, 145, 147  
 Kampa, 172  
 Kampana, 172  
 Kampli, 172, 233  
 Kāmran Mīrzā, 330, 332, 333  
 Kāmran Sadozai, 651  
 Kāmruḍ, *see* Assam  
 Kāmruḍ, 404, 422, 423. *See also* Kāmarūpa and Assam  
 Kāmruḍ, Rāja, of Jammū, 418  
 Kanakagiri, 44  
 Kanarese districts, 165  
 Kanauj, 105, 109, 111, 132, 134-7, 139, 141-4, 147, 148, 206, 208, 210, 239, 253, 327, 330, 332, 343  
 Kānchi, 90, 152-4, 156, 160, 161, 165, 166, 188, 190, 195-201. *See also* Conjeeveram  
 Kandahār, 21, 67, 73, 332, 333, 372, 374, 384, 385, 394, 396, 404, 408, 409, 426, 463, 467, 649, 653, 654, 658-60, 804, 805, 809, 813, 814. *See also* Gandhāra  
 Kandhār, 292, 466  
 Kāner Dev, 226  
 Kangavarman Bhagīratha, 166  
 Kāngra (Nagarkot), 122, 238, 247, 353, 392, 663

- Kānhayya, 277-9, 282  
 Kanishka, 76-9, 111  
 Kanishka (viceroy), 79  
 Kanishkapura, 77  
 Kannanūr-Koppam, 185  
 Kansauh al-Ghaurī, 309, 487  
 Kanungo, the, 630, 631  
 Kānva dynasty, the, 56, 59  
 Kanyakubja, 134. *See also* Kanauj  
 Kāpālika sect, 199  
 Kāpardika, 170  
 Kara, 220-3, 225, 238, 241, 247,  
 264, 342, 346, 347, 417, 470. *See also* Kora  
 Karāchi, 666  
 Karad, 162  
 Karala, 12  
 Karamadande, 94  
 Karan, Rāja, 223, 226  
 Karan Singh, 389  
 Karāpa Pass, 427  
 Kararānī tribe, the, 355  
 Kārdars (Sind), 712  
 Karera, 305  
 Kārikāl, 554  
 Karikāla, 187, 193  
 Karim, *see* Muhammad I of Gujarāt  
 Karim Khān, 467  
 Kārkota dynasty, the, 111  
 Karna, 125, 127, 140, 141, 160  
 Karnadeva, 129, 137  
 Karnāl, 209, 463, 464, 477, 742,  
 747  
 Karnaphalī river, 425  
 Karnasuvarna, 119  
 Karnātaka, the, 166  
 Karnātakas, the, 154, 168. *See also*  
 Chālukyas  
 Karnātas, the, 124, 125, 145, 147  
 Karorī, the, 359  
 Kartarpur, 91  
 Kartripura, 91  
 Karunākara Tondamān, 156, 191  
 Kāruvākī, 53  
 Kashgar, 75, 77  
 Kashli Khān, 214  
 Kashmir, 1, 43, 45, 53, 54, 77, 78,  
 97, 109-16, 121, 122, 133, 252,  
 366, 370-2, 387, 392, 398, 402,  
 426, 430, 467, 649, 651, 663, 672,  
 673  
 — Chronicle, *see* Rājataranginī, the  
 Kāsi (Benares), 10, 12, 13  
 Kāsim Barīd-ul-mamālik, 296, 297  
 Kāsim Beg, 291  
 Kāsim Khān, 401, 402, 413  
 Kāsimbāzār, 518, 521, 548  
 Kāsimkota, 90  
 Kāsiputra Bhāgabhadra, 66  
 Kātantra, the, 61  
 Katchr, 216, 219, 246, 255, 265,  
 269, 467, 469. *See also* Rohil-  
 khand  
 Kāthiāwār, 44, 45, 84, 126, 133,  
 151, 207, 242, 307, 318, 319, 417,  
 688, 721  
 Kāthmāndu, 618  
 Kātyāyana, 179  
 Kaufmann, General, 807, 809-11  
 Kaulās, 279  
 Kaurāla, *see* Kerāla  
 Kauravas, the, 104  
 Kausāmbī, 10, 11, 15, 54  
 Kauthal, 173, 280  
 Kautilya Arthasāstra, *see* Arthasāstra  
 Kautilya, 20, 38-40. *See also*  
 Chānakya  
 Kauttura, *see* Kottūra-Pollāchi  
 Kavana, 162  
 Kāveri river, 187, 542, 710  
 Kāveripattanam (Puhār), 181, 187  
 Kavikalāsh, 444  
 Kāvya literature, 99  
 Kayāsths, the, 844, 855  
 Kaye, Sir John, 660  
 Kayūmars, 218  
 Kāzī, the, 366, 368  
 Keane, Sir John, 654  
 Keating, Colonel, 577, 578  
 Kedah, 189

- Kerāla (Malabar), 44, 90, 119, 125,  
 152, 153, 160, 161, 165, 179, 182,  
 193, 227. *See also* Chera  
 Keralaputra, 44, 90, 193  
 Kēsari, the, 868  
 Kesavasena, 149  
 Keshava Rai temple, 428  
 Keshub Chandra Sen, 851  
 Keyuravansha, 141  
 Khaibar Pass, 22, 426, 427, 431,  
 463, 658-61, 812  
 Khairpur, 667  
 Khajurāho, 139  
 Khajwa, 417, 454  
 Khalaf Hasan Malik-ut-tujjār, 287,  
 289, 291, 293  
 Khalbān, 357  
 Khalilullāh, 289  
 Khalilullāh Khān, 416, 427  
 Khalji dynasty, the, 220, 231  
 Khalji ibn Bakhtiyār, *see* Muham-  
 mad Khalji ibn Bakhtiyār  
 Khān Bahādūr, 746  
 Khān Daurān, 388, 403, 456, 459,  
 461, 462, 464, 465  
 Khandahat, 127  
 Khande Rāo Holkar, 470, 472  
 Khāndesh, 90, 279, 280, 286, 288-  
 90, 297, 299-320, 332, 362, 366,  
 373, 375, 391, 403  
 Khāndwa, 458  
 Khānjahān, *see* Makbūl Khān-  
 jahān; Husain Kulī Khān  
 Khānjahān Bahādūr, 449  
 Khānua, 326  
 Khānzamān Chaghatāy, 339, 342,  
 346, 348, 356  
 Kharak Singh, 665  
 Kharaosta, 70  
 Khāravēla, 55, 57, 58  
 Kharda, 691  
 Kharkir, 245  
 Kharoshthi script, the, 47, 73-7, 80  
 Khattaks, the, 404, 405, 426, 428  
 Khavāss Khān, 275  
 Khelna, 444, 446, 447  
 Kherla, 286, 288, 289, 301, 305  
 Khirkī, *see* Aurangābād  
 Khiva, 649, 650, 655, 807  
 Khizr Khān (of Bengal), 276  
 Khizr Khān Khalji, 228  
 Khizr Khān Sayyid, 252, 253, 255,  
 256  
 Khojak Pass, the, 659  
 Khokand, 805, 828  
 Khokhars, the, 210, 212-14, 250,  
 251, 255. *See also* Jasrat  
 Khonds, the, 724  
 Khotan, 75, 77  
 Khottiga, 123  
 Khottiga Nityavarsha, 158  
 Khurāsān, 207, 210, 237, 305, 321,  
 404, 650  
 Khurd-Kābul Pass, the, 657, 661  
 Khurram, *see* Shāhjahān  
 Khushāl Khān, Khattak, 426, 428  
 Khushkadam 'Imād-ul-mulk, *see*  
 'Imād-ul-mulk Khushkadam  
 Khusraw, Prince, 375, 376, 383,  
 384, 387, 389, 393-5, 397, 430  
 Khusraw II (of Persia), 153  
 Khusraw Khān, 186. *See also*  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Khusraw Shāh  
 Khusraw Malik, 209  
 Khusraw Shāh, 209  
 Khvāja Bāyazīd Lodi, 264  
 Khvāja Hājji, 166  
 Khvāja Hasan, 366  
 Khvāja Jahān, 237, 244  
 Khvāja Kalān, 322  
 Khvāja Mu'azzam, 345  
 Khvāja Safar, 317  
 Khvārazm, 207, 212  
 Kieu-Tsiu-K'io, *see* Kadphises I  
 Kilij Khān, 404  
 Kilūgharī, 218, 220  
 Kirat Singh, 261, 264  
 Kirāta, 117, 133  
 Kirmān, 211, 289  
 Kirtideva, 168

- Kirtivarman (Chandel), 140, 141  
 Kirtivarman I Pururanaparākrama  
 (Chālukya), 151, 152  
 Kirtivarman II, 154, 157  
 Kirtivarman (Kadamba), 168  
 Kishlu Khān, 215, 233  
 Kishtwār, 387, 392  
 Kistna district, 90, 91  
 Kirchener, Lord, 766, 832, 896  
 Ko-Perunjinga, *see* Perunjinga  
 Kochchadaiyan Ranadhīra, 182  
 Kohistān, 661  
 Koil, 255, 262, 470  
 Koinos, 26, 27  
 Koka, *alias* Haranand, 226, 249  
 Kokalla I, 141  
 Kokalla II, 141  
 Kolhapur, 190, 444, 745  
 Kolis, the, 286  
 Kondavir, 176, 294  
 Kondbā, 283  
 Kongu, 182, 185  
 Konkan, the, 85, 128, 161, 169-71,  
 290, 293, 297, 318, 434, 437, 438,  
 441, 442, 446, 462, 619  
 Koppal, 44  
 Koppam, 160, 190  
 Kora, 562, 595, 683. *See also* Kara  
 Korala, 90  
 Koran, the, 214  
 Koregāon, 621  
 Korkus, the, 305  
 Kosal, 286  
 Kosala (Oudh), 10, 12-14, 16-18,  
 90, 124, 139, 145, 189  
 Kosam, 96. *See also* Kausāmbī  
 Kotādevī, 116  
 Kotah, 326  
 Kotala, 264, 395  
 Kothūr (Kottūra-on-the-hill), 90  
 Kottunga, *see* Rājendra II (E.  
 Chālukya)  
 Kottūra, *see* Kothūr  
 Kottūra-Pollāchi, 90  
 Kotwāl, the, 278, 366  
 Kozoulo-Kadaphes, *see* Kadphises I  
 Kozoulo-Kadphises, *see* Kadphises I  
 Kramāditya, *see* Skandagupta  
 Krateros, 25, 27, 28, 67  
 Krishna I Akālavārsha *alias* Subha-  
 tunga, 154  
 Krishna II Akālavārsha *alias* Subha-  
 tunga, 141, 144  
 Krishna III Akālavārsha, 158, 183  
 Krishna Sātakarni, 58  
 Krishnā river, 57, 90, 154, 165, 174,  
 176, 178, 195, 196, 227, 228, 243,  
 277, 279, 281, 282, 286, 410,  
 710  
 Krishnadeva, 128  
 Krishnadevarāya, 177  
 Krishnagupta, 98  
 Krishnarāja, *see* Upendra  
 Krishnavarman I, 167  
 Krishnavarman II, 167, 198  
 Krivis, the, 10  
 Krumu river, 6  
 Kshaharas, the, 80  
 Kshaharāta dynasty, the, 59, 80-3  
 Kshatrapas, the, *see* Satraps; *also*  
 Sakas, the  
 Kshatriya caste, the, 19, 61, 124,  
 129, 142, 147, 166  
 Kshemagupta, 113, 121  
 Kshitipāla, *see* Mahipāla I  
 Kshudrakas, the, 27  
 Kubera, 91  
 Kuberanāgā, 94  
 Kubhā (Kābul) river, 6  
 Kublai Khān, 235  
 Kūch Bihar, 422  
 Kūdal-Sangaman, 192  
 Kudamūkkū, 183  
 Kūh-i-nūr, the, 325  
 Kūjārs, the, 467  
 Kujula-Kadaphes, *see* Kadphises I  
 Kujula-Kadphises, *see* Kadphises I  
 Kujula-Kaphsa, *see* Kadphises I  
 Kujula-Kasa, *see* Kadphises I  
 Kulaipa, 83

- Kulasekhara, 184, 192  
 Kuli Kutb Shāh, 296  
 Kulottunga Chodadeva I, 155, 184  
 Kulottunga Chodadeva II, 156  
 Kulottunga Chodadeva III Pānd-  
   yari, 184, 194, 306  
 Kulottunga Chola, *see* Rājendra II  
 Kulottunga Chola II, 192  
 Kuluchandra, 126  
 Kumāon, 606  
 Kumāon hills, 470  
 Kumāra, 108. *See also* Bhāskara-  
   varman  
 Kumāradevī, *see* Mahādevī Kumā-  
   radevī  
 Kumāragupta I, 93-6  
 Kumāragupta II Kramāditya, 96,  
   97  
 Kumāragupta (later Gupta dy-  
   nasty), 101, 102, 105  
 Kumārapāla (of Mālwa), 105  
 Kumārapāla (of Anhilwār), 128  
 Kumārapāla (Pāla), 146  
 Kumāravarman, 167  
 Kumbha, 302, 303, 305, 306  
 Kunāla, 53  
 Kunch, 755  
 Kūnika, *see* Ajātasatru  
 Kuntala, 100, 159, 166  
 Kunwar Singh, 745  
 Kurnool, 540, 730  
 Kurram district, 812  
 Kurram Pass, 812  
 Kurram river and valley, 6, 135  
 Kurram (South India), 200  
 Kurukshetra, 10, 12, 104  
 Kurus, the, 8, 10-12, 15  
 Kurusravana, 10  
 Kusasthala, 134  
 Kushān dynasty, the, 62, 66, 67,  
   71-80, 82, 88, 91, 92, 94, 97,  
   105, 120, 122  
 Kusthalapura, 91  
 Kusūmadhvaja, *see* Pātaliputra  
 Kusumapura, *see* Pātaliputra  
 Kutb Minār, 685, 739  
 Kutb Shāhī dynasty, the, 296, 421  
 Kutb-ud-dīn, 384  
 Kutb-ud-dīn Ahmad, 303, 304  
 Kutb-ud-dīn Aibak, *see* Aibak  
 Kutb-ud-dīn Khān, 469  
 Kutb-ud-dīn Khān (governor of  
   Bengal), 385  
 Kutb-ud-dīn Mubārak Shāh, *see*  
   Mubārak Shāh  
 Kutb-ul-‘Ālam, 262, 271  
 Kutlugh Khān, 214, 215, 238, 241  
 La Bourdonnais, B.-F. Mahé de,  
   534-6  
 La Haye, Admiral de, 533  
 La Touche, Maître de, 540  
 Labdanes, 71  
 Ladākh, 648  
 Lādili Begum, 393  
 Lagatūrmān, 120  
 Lahore, 209, 211-14, 216, 217, 237,  
   256, 259, 269, 322, 328, 332, 337,  
   347, 362, 366, 370, 373, 375, 376,  
   383, 384, 394, 395, 397-9, 402,  
   404, 416, 417, 430, 431, 452-4,  
   463, 468, 473, 614, 652, 658,  
   663, 665, 670-4, 676, 677, 742,  
   858, 897  
 — Treaty of, 673  
 Lājput Rai, 872  
 Lake, Lord, 606, 607, 684  
 Lākha, 126  
 Lakhnauti, *see* Nadiya  
 Lakhnāwati, 210, 211, 216, 217,  
   232, 270  
 Lakshmana, 130, 141  
 Lakshmanasena, 138, 148  
 Lakshmidara, 141  
 Lakshmīkarna, 145  
 Lāl Kumārī, 454  
 Lāl Singh, 671, 673, 674  
 Lalitāditya, *see* Muktapīda  
 Lalitapatan, 43, 116  
 Lalkaka, Dr, 888

- Lalliya Shāhi, 121  
 Lally, Count de, 546, 554-6  
 Lambert, Commodore, 680, 824  
 Lancaster, Captain James, 510  
 Land revenue, 632, 634, 635, 643,  
     703-7  
 Land tenures, 706-7, 792-4  
 Langāh, 260  
 Lankāpura, 184  
 Lansdowne, Lord, 821  
 Lār, 443, 444  
 Lārkāna, 3  
 Laswari, 606, 617  
 Lāta Chālukyās, the, 123, 131  
 Lātas, the, 105, 107, 124-6, 129,  
     130, 152, 158, 159, 170  
 Latif, 313, 314, 316  
 Lauhitya river, 98, 119. *See also*  
     Brahmaputra  
 Lauriya, 43, 52  
 Lavanaprasāda, 128  
 Law, Jacques, 541, 542  
 Law, Jean, 549, 550  
 Law, John, 533  
 Law, Hindu, 699  
 — Muslim, 699  
 — member of Council, 700, 701,  
     717  
 Law-courts, *see* Courts of law  
 Lawrence, George, 675  
 Lawrence, Henry, 668, 672-6, 729,  
     735, 738, 739, 742, 748, 749, 752  
 Lawrence, John, 712, 716, 742,  
     746-8, 768, 801, 802, 804-6, 809  
 Lawrence, Stringer, 541, 542, 555  
 Leedes, William, 380  
 Legislation, 699-701, 769-72, 782-  
     4, 786, 787, 864, 865  
 Lenoir, M., 533  
 Leslie, Colonel, 580  
 Lesseps, F. de, 807  
 Levant, the, 510  
 Levant Company, the, 513  
 Lévi, Sylvain, 117  
 Lewisham, Lord, 607  
 Lhasa, 820, 821  
 Liaka Kusūlaka, 68, 69, 80  
 Lichchhavi era, the, 117  
 Lichchhavis, the, 15, 18, 87, 88, 117  
 Lieutenant-governors, the, 699,  
     701, 768, 892  
 Linschoten, J. H., 500  
 Lisbon, 485, 496, 500  
 Livy, 1  
 Local self-government, 854, 855,  
     857-62, 864, 899  
 Lodi dynasty, the, 258, 264  
 Lodi Khān, 355, 356  
 Lohānī tribe, the, 268, 333  
 Loharas, the, 113, 115  
 Lohgarh, 452, 456  
 Lonī, 252  
 Lothana, 115  
 Lotteries, 842  
 Lucknow, 469, 474, 612, 731, 732,  
     742, 744, 748, 749, 751-4, 858,  
     900  
 Ludhiāna, 473, 651, 670  
 Ludhiāna Sikhs, the, 751  
 Lumbini Garden, the, 48, 52  
 Lumsden, Sir H. B., 675  
 Lysias, 65  
 Lytton, Lord, 769, 780, 797, 798,  
     801, 808, 810-12, 814, 815, 818,  
     840, 848, 867  
 Ma'bar, 185, 236  
 Macao, 490, 516  
 Macartney, Lord, 588-91, 609,  
     627, 629  
 Macaulay, Lord, 570, 572, 697,  
     700, 702, 717, 784, 798, 866  
 McCaskill, Sir J., 661  
 MacDonnell, Sir A., 881  
 Macedonians, the, *see* Alexander  
     the Great  
 Māchhiwāra, 467  
 Mackenzie, Holt, 705  
 Maclean, Colonel, 572, 573  
 Macleod, General N., 591



- Macleod, Sir Donald, 712  
 Macnaghten, Sir W., 654-8  
 McNeill, Sir J., 652  
 Macpherson, Sir John, 599, 634  
 Madagascar, 532  
 Madanapāla, 137, 146-8  
 Madanavarman, 128, 140  
 Mādanna, 442  
 Mādhava Rāo, Sir, 833  
 Mādhavagupta (later Gupta dynasty), 101, 102, 106  
 Mādhavagupta (of Mālwa), 105  
 Madhu Rāo, 575, 576  
 Madhu Rāo Narāyan, 579  
 Madhyadesa, 10, 107  
 Madhyamikā, 55  
 Mādrakas, the, 80, 91  
 Madras, 179, 517-20, 522, 523, 525, 526, 528-31, 535-8, 546, 549, 554, 555, 564, 584-8, 590, 591, 603, 610, 625, 629, 639, 658, 678, 719, 720, 724, 733, 772, 794, 797, 802, 842, 843, 846, 853, 854, 856-61, 882, 883, 886, 892  
 — administration of, 640-5, 704, 705  
 — Corporation of, 529-30  
 Madras Army, the, 643  
 Madras Parliament, the, 900  
 Madrid, Treaty of, 516  
 Madura, 90, 172, 182, 184, 186-8, 227, 229, 236, 240, 640. *See also* Kerāla, Keralaputra and Ma'bar  
 Maetsuycker, J., 504, 506  
 Maga, *see* Magas of Cyrene  
 Magadha, 10, 11, 13-19, 31, 32, 35, 54, 55, 57, 58, 65, 77, 97, 98, 101, 102, 105-8, 134, 141, 144, 146-51, 158, 208. *See also* Rājagriha  
 Magas of Cyrene, 45  
 Magellan, Straits of, 510  
 Magh tribe, the, 285, 424, 425  
 Magnesia, 63  
 Mahābalipuram, 198  
 Mahābat Khān, 401, 403, 427  
 Mahābat Khān Khānkhānān, 386-8, 395-8  
 Mahābhārata, the, 276  
 Mahādaji Rāo Sindhia, 478, 577, 579-83, 587, 589, 599, 604, 615  
 Mahādeva, 163  
 Mahādevī, 147  
 Mahādevī Kumāradevī, 87, 88  
 Māham Anaga, 340-4  
 Mahamalla, 199  
 Mahamallapuram, 199  
 Mahāmātra, 46, 50, 51  
 Mahānadi, the, 90, 362  
 Mahāpadma, *see* Nanda  
 Mahārājñi, *see* Mahādevī  
 Mahārājpur, 690  
 Mahārāshtra, 61, 90, 106, 172, 229  
 Mahāratha, 182  
 Mahāsenagupta (of Magadha), 105, 119  
 Mahāsenaguptā (wife of Ādityavardhana), 105  
 Mahāvagga, 17  
 Mahāvamsa, the, 181, 187  
 Mahāvira, 15, 16  
 Mahāyāna, *see* Buddhism  
 Mahdists, the, 363  
 Mahé, 179, 533, 535  
 Mahendra (brother of Asoka), 52  
 Mahendra (of Kosala), 90  
 Mahendra (of Pishtapuram), 90  
 Mahendra, Mount, 98  
 Mahendrapāla I, 134  
 Mahendrapāla II, 134  
 Mahendravarman I, 152, 153, 198, 199  
 Mahendravarman II, 199  
 Mahi Kanta, the, 788  
 Mahi river, 163, 353  
 Mahichandra, 137  
 Mahidpur, 622  
 Mahipāla I, 134, 139, 144, 145

- Mahipāla II, 146, 189  
 Mahmūd (son of Īltutmish), 212  
 Mahmūd Begarha, 293, 297, 304-  
   11, 316  
 Mahmūd Begarha II, 313, 314  
 Mahmūd Begarha III, 317-19  
 Mahmūd Gāvān of Gilān, 291,  
   293-5, 298  
 Mahmūd of Ghaznī, 113, 121, 122,  
   125, 127, 135, 139, 140, 205-10,  
   212, 223, 392, 429, 660  
 Mahmūd I Khaljī, 258, 263, 292,  
   301-6  
 Mahmūd II Khaljī, 266, 268, 306,  
   307, 312-15  
 Mahmūd Khān Bahmanī, 284  
 Mahmūd Khān Bangash, 469  
 Mahmūd Shāh Bahmanī, 296, 297  
 Mahmūd Shāh (of Bengal), 274-6  
 Mahmūd Shāh Lodī, 327, 328, 330,  
   333  
 Mahmūd Shāh Sharkī, 258, 260-3,  
   303  
 Mahmūdābād, 318  
 Mahobā, 140, 208, 210, 253. *See*  
   *also* Chandel dynasty  
 Mahodaya, 134, 144  
 Mahrat, 122  
 Mahsud tribe, the, 819  
 Māhūr, 286, 287, 294, 314  
 Maine, Sir Henry, 763, 787  
 Maitrakas, the, 101, 205  
 Maiwand, 814  
 Majnūn Khān Kākshāl, 351  
 Makbūl Khānjahān, 247, 249  
 Makhdūm-i-ālam, 274, 275  
 Makhdūm-ul-mulk, 363  
 Makrān, the, 648  
 Malabar, 90, 125, 179, 188, 535.  
   *See also* Kerāla  
 Malabar Coast, 483, 484, 487, 488,  
   504, 505, 507, 527, 533, 587, 591,  
   598  
 Malacca, 485, 489, 490, 495-7, 504  
   — Straits of, 487, 491, 616  
 Malāon, 618  
 Malartic, 603  
 Mālava era, the, 94  
 Mālavas, the, 27, 81, 91, 129, 139,  
   140  
 Mālavikā, 54  
 Mālavikāgnimitra, 54  
 Malay Archipelago, the, 180, 189,  
   490, 500, 615-17  
 Malay Peninsula, the, 516  
 Malay troops, 508  
 Malaya, *see* Travancore  
 Malayalam, 179  
 Malcolm, Sir John, 614, 621, 630,  
   648, 688, 719, 852  
 Mālda, 419  
 Malhar Rāo Gaekwar, 832-4  
 Malhar Rāo Holkar, 461, 462,  
   470-5, 477, 478  
 Malhar Rāo Holkar II, 619, 622  
 Mālī, Jām, 248  
 Maliba, *see* Mālwa  
 Malik 'Ambar, 391, 394-6, 403,  
   409  
 Malik Hasan, 293-6  
 Malik Rāja, *see* Ahmad Khān  
   Fārūki  
 Malik-ut-tujjār, *see* Khalaf Hasan  
 Mālkhed, 132, 155, 156  
 Mallas, the (early dynasty), 15  
   — (medieval Nepalese dynasty),  
   118  
 Mallavelly, 604  
 Mallideva, 169  
 Mallikarjuna (Kadamba), 168  
 Mallikarjuna (Konkan), 128  
 Mallikarjuna (Vijayanagar), 176  
 Malloi, the, *see* Mālavas, the  
 Mallū Ikbāl Khān, 251-3  
 Mālojī, 438  
 Malta, 803, 810  
 Mālwa, 58, 83, 84, 93, 100, 103,  
   105-7, 123-5, 128, 131, 133, 134,  
   136, 141, 157, 159, 160, 164, 206,  
   208, 212-14, 221, 226, 237, 241,

Mālwa (*cont.*)

- 243, 251, 253, 257, 258, 262,  
263, 266, 268, 280, 285, 286, 288,  
289, 291, 292, 299-320, 327, 330,  
331, 334, 336, 340-3, 346-8,  
350-2, 366, 374, 401, 413, 446,  
449, 451, 458, 460-3, 465, 466,  
475, 478, 606. *See also* Avanti
- Mamallapuram, 199
- Mambanos (Nahapāna), 81
- Mamelukes, the, 211, 309, 487, 491
- Māmlatdar, the, 704
- Mammuri (Silāhāra), 170
- Mān Singh, 263, 265-8
- Mān Singh (of Amber), 344, 345,  
350, 361, 366, 370-2, 376, 384,  
385
- Mānavadharmasāstra, *see* Manu,  
the Laws of
- Manavamma, 199
- Mandalay, 825, 828
- Māndalgarh, 361
- Mandar, tribe, 370
- Mandasor, 94, 97, 316
- Treaty of, 622
- Mandhata, 167
- Mandor, 130
- Mandrāel, 266
- Māndū, 226, 299-302, 304-6, 312,  
313, 315, 316, 346, 391, 392, 394,  
395, 403, 404, 451
- Mandulak Chudāsama, 307, 308
- Mandyaपुरा, 130
- Mangalesa Ranavikrānta, 151
- Mangalore, 182, 591, 603
- Treaty of, 592, 599
- Mangi, 155
- Mangobarni, Jalāl-ud-dīn, 212
- Manigula, 69
- Mānikpur, 396
- Manimangalam, 194
- Manimento, the, 496
- Manipur, 679, 680
- Mānjira river, 475
- Mānkot, 345
- Mankuwar, 94
- Manoel, King, 484, 489
- Mansabdār, the, 355, 360
- Mānsehra, 44
- Mantarāja, 90
- Manu, the Laws of, 40, 41, 99
- Manucci, Nicolao, 406
- Mānyakheta, 123, 124, 156-9
- Maramat department, the, 710
- Mārāpa, 169
- Marāthas, the, 221, 271, 278, 283,  
390, 403, 435-77, 520, 525, 527,  
534, 538, 545, 547, 566, 567, 575,  
577, 579, 580, 584, 586, 591, 598-  
601, 604, 605, 607, 611, 618-24,  
656, 664, 678, 686, 687, 692,  
705, 733, 750, 869. *See also*  
Mahārāshtra
- Marāthi, 578
- Māravarman, 182
- Māravarman Kulasekhara, 185, 186
- Māravarman Sundara Pāndya, 171,  
184, 185
- Mardān, 746, 747
- Marryat, Captain, 679
- Marshman, J., 715
- Mārtabān, 680, 825
- Mārtānda, temple, 111
- Martin, François, 533
- Mārttandavarman, 195
- Mārwarz, 227, 326, 335, 344, 351,  
431-4, 448, 451, 452, 456, 470.  
*See also* Jodhpur
- Mashhad, 816
- Maskat, 543
- Maski inscription, 42, 44
- Massaga, 22
- Massowah, 494
- Mas'ūd (of Delhi), 214
- Mas'ūd (of Ghazni), 207
- Mas'ūd Husain Mirzā, 353 \*
- Mas'ūd Khaljī (of Mālwa), 301,  
302
- Masulipatam, 517, 533, 545, 546,  
555, 640, 678

- Ma'sūm Khān (of Kābul), 365, 366  
 Ma'sūm Khān Farankhūdī, 365, 366  
 Māt, 78  
 Mathura, 15, 55, 69, 78-81, 95,  
     135, 416, 428, 429, 438, 462, 473  
 — dynasty of, 81  
 Matila, 89  
 Matriarchy, 181  
 Matronymics, used by the Ān-  
     dhras, 60  
 Matsya, *see* Rājputāna  
 Mattavilāsaprahasana, the, 199  
 Matthews, General, 591  
 Mau, 470  
 Mau-Sahaniya, 139  
 Mauakes, 68  
 Maues, 67-9, 80  
 Maukhalis, the, *see* Maukharis, the  
 Maukharis, the, 98, 101-6  
 Mauritius, 533-5, 555, 603, 613,  
     615  
 Maurya dynasty, the, 1, 20, 29,  
     31-53, 54, 57, 62, 63, 111, 181  
 Mayana, 146  
 Mayo, Lord, 780, 806, 846, 857  
 Mayor's Court, the, 531  
 Mayūra, 109  
 Mayūrasarman, 166  
 Mazzini, G., 852  
 Mecca, 340, 345, 353, 358, 364,  
     367, 369, 373, 421, 422  
 Medantaka, 130  
 Mediterranean, the, 494, 646, 803,  
     807  
 Mednī Rāi, 312, 313, 327, 335  
 Mednī Singh, 419  
 Meerut, 43, 252, 737, 740, 742, 744,  
     745, 749, 750  
 Megasthenes, 1, 16, 33-8, 40, 46,  
     48, 181  
 Meghadūta, the, 149  
 Meghavarman, 92  
 Melghāt, 304  
 Melinda, 484  
 Menander, 12, 55, 65, 68  
 Meos, the, 214-16  
 Meriah sacrifices, 724  
 Meros, *see* Meru  
 Mertha, 344, 351  
 Meru (Meros), 23  
 Merutunga, 109, 125  
 Merv, 815  
 Mesopotamia, 3, 5. *See also* 'Irak  
 Meston, Lord, 893  
 Mesurado, Cape, 482  
 Metcalfe, Lord, 614, 615, 689, 690,  
     691, 713, 866, 904  
 Methwold, W., 516  
 Mewār, 253, 302, 303, 305-7,  
     312-15, 325, 348, 351, 360, 361,  
     387-9, 391, 398, 431-4. *See also*  
     Udaipur  
 Mewāt, 214, 215, 219, 249, 250,  
     258, 261  
 Mhow, 744, 755  
 Miān-mir, 746  
 Miani, 667  
 Middleton, Sir H., 512  
 Midnapur, 357, 558  
 Mihira (Bhoja I), 133  
 Mihirakula, 97, 98  
 Mildenhall, J., 380  
 Milinda, 65. *See also* Menander  
 Milindapanha, the, 20, 55, 65  
 Military Department, the, 766  
 Mill, J. S., 851  
 Mindōn, 825, 827  
 Minnagar, 81  
 Minto, *see* Minnagar  
 Minto, First Earl of, 613, 615-18,  
     650, 709  
 Minto, Fourth Earl of, 822, 839,  
     840, 873-8, 880-4, 888, 890, 904,  
     905  
 Mīr Fazlullāh Injū Shirāzī, 285,  
     286  
 Mīr Habīb, 474  
 Mīr Ibrāhīm, 448  
 Mīr Ja'far, 547, 550-3, 556-8, 560,  
     561, 563, 569

- Mīr Jumla I, 120, 410-13, 417-19,  
     422-4, 426, 517  
 Mīr Jumla II, 456  
 Mīr Kāsim, 557-61, 684, 728  
*Mīr-i 'adl*, the, 366  
*Mīr-i bahar*, the, 366  
 Mirān, 552, 553, 556, 557  
*Mirās-dars*, the, 641, 644  
 Mirzāpur, 619, 744  
 Misdaos, 72  
 Missionaries, 714-16, 722, 723  
*Mitakshara*, the, 785  
 Mithilā, 12, 147  
 Mithridates I, 64  
 Mithridates II, 66-8  
 Mitradeva, 56  
 Mitrasen Brāhman, 457  
 Miyān Manjhū, 374  
 Miyān Mīnullāh, 290  
 Miyānalladevi, 127  
 Mlechchas, the, 96, 180. *See also*  
     Arabs, the  
 Moga, *see* Maues  
 Mohan Lāl, 550  
 Mohenjo-dāro, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8  
 Mohmand tribe, the, 427  
 Moira, Lord, *see* Hastings, Lord  
 Moluccas, the, 490, 502, 512  
 Monghyr, 132, 275, 331, 357, 417,  
     559, 561  
 Mongols, the, 212-17, 219, 225,  
     226, 228, 240, 242, 244, 270, 324,  
     891  
 Monserrate, Fr. A., 367, 368  
 Monson, Colonel, 568, 573, 632  
 Montagu, Mr E., 763, 889, 890,  
     900, 902, 903  
 Montagu-Chelmsford Report, the,  
     840, 904, 907  
 Montgomery, R., 712, 746, 755  
 Montgomery district, the, 3  
 Moorcroft, W., 648  
 Moore, Commodore, 577  
 Moplas, the, 485-7  
 Moradābād, 469, 470  
 Morārī Rāo, 542, 546  
 Moriya family, the, 32  
 Morley, Lord, 769, 776, 840, 873-  
     8, 881, 882, 884, 885, 890, 904  
 Mornington, Lord, *see* Wellesley,  
     Richard, Marquis  
 Moroba Phadnavis, 579  
 Mother-goddess, the, 5  
 Moti Lāl Nehru, 884  
*Moturfa*, the, 642  
 Mousikanos, 28  
 Mozambique, 495, 496  
*Mriga-hastin*, 7  
 Mrigasikhāvana, 88  
 Mrigesavarman, 167  
 Mubārak Khān, 261, 262  
 Mubārak Khān I Fārūki, 302, 310  
 Mubārak Shāh (of Bengal), 246  
 Mubārak Shāh Kutb-ud-dīn Khaljī,  
     164, 171  
 Mubārak Shāh Mu'izz-ud-dīn Say-  
     yid, 255, 256, 262, 301  
 Mubārak Sharkī, 253, 262  
 Mubārakābād, 256, 257  
 Mubārīz Khān, 460  
 Mudgal, 173, 175, 279-81, 283,  
     286, 297  
 Mūdki, 671  
*Mudrārākshasa*, the, 31, 32, 35, 42  
 Mudukudumi Peruvaludi, 182  
 Mughals, the, 492, 494, 512, 513,  
     598, 621, 646, 677, 678, 683, 750  
 Mughdatunga, 141  
 Mughīs Khaljī, 301  
 Mughuls, *see* Mongols  
 Muhāfiz Khān, 312  
 Muhammad, 223  
 Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh, 403, 411,  
     412  
 Muhammad 'Ādil Shāh Sūr ('Adlī),  
     336, 339  
 Muhammad Akbar, 431-3, 435,  
     448, 449, 457  
 Muhammad Akbar Khān, 655,  
     657, 661

- Muhammad 'Alī (of Egypt), 647, 648  
 Muhammad 'Alī Wālah, 538, 586, 588, 589, 610, 640  
 Muhammad Amīn Khān, 410, 411, 426, 427, 462  
 Muhammad Amīn Khān Chīn, 455, 458, 459  
 Muhammad Ghūrī, 209-11  
 Muhammad Hakīm Mīrzā, 340, 345-8, 365, 366, 370  
 Muhammad Husain Mīrzā, 353, 354  
 Muhammad ibn Bakhtiyār, 120, 148  
 Muhammad ibn Kāsim, 122, 205  
 Muhammad ibn Sām, 136, 138, 148  
 Muhammad ibn Tughluk, 170, 172, 231-40, 243-5, 250, 270, 277, 307  
 Muhammad Jauna Ulugh Khān, *see* Muhammad ibn Tughluk  
 Muhammad I Karīm (of Gujarāt), 302-4  
 Muhammad Khaljī ibn Bakhtiyār, 210, 211  
 Muhammad Khān (son of Balban), 217  
 Muhammad Khān (of Nāgaur), 266  
 Muhammad Khān Bangash, 461, 469  
 Muhammad Khān Sūr, 355  
 Muhammad Kulī, 474  
 Muhammad Lodī, 330  
 Muhammad Riza Khān, 562, 569, 571, 631, 632, 634  
 Muhammad Sayyid, 256-9, 302  
 Muhammad Shāh (of Delhi), 457, 459-68  
 Muhammad Shāh (of Mālwa), 301, 302  
 Muhammad Shāh (of Persia), 650  
 Muhammad Shāh Bahmanī I, 173, 174, 248, 278-80, 282-4  
 Muhammad Shāh Bahmanī II, 280, 284, 285  
 Muhammad Shāh Bahmanī III, 293-5, 298, 305  
 Muhammad Shāh Fārūki, 311, 314, 315, 317  
 Muhammad Sharkī, 261, 263  
 Muhammad Sultān, 411, 414, 417-19  
 Muhammad Sultān Mīrzā, 330  
 Muhammad Sūr, 336  
 Muhammad Yazdī Mullā, 365  
 Muhammad Zamān Mīrzā, 315, 330  
 Muhammadābād, *see* Chāmpāner  
 Muhammadans, *see* Muslims  
 Muharram Khān, 427  
 Mu'īn-ud-dīn Chishtī, 303, 343  
 Mu'īn-ul-mulk, 468, 471, 473  
 Mu'izz-ud-dīn, *see* Muhammad Ghūrī; *also* Mubārak Shāh  
 Mujāhid Bahmanī, 174, 280, 284  
 Mukarrab Khān, 251  
 Mukarrab Khān, 444  
 Mukarrab Khān (governor of Surat), 387  
 Mukham Singh, 459  
 Muktāpīda Lalitāditya, 111  
 Mūlarāja, 126, 134  
 Mūlarāja II, 128  
 Mūlraj, 676  
 Multān, 205, 209, 212, 215, 217, 218, 222, 226, 229, 230, 233, 239, 251, 252, 256, 257, 260, 366, 372, 373, 394, 404, 408, 417, 455, 467, 471, 663, 676, 677, 744, 747  
 Mumtāz Mahal, 392, 401  
 Mun, *England's Treasure by Foreign Trade*, 518  
 Municipalities, 858-60, 862  
 Mun'im Khān Khānkhanān, 340, 343-5, 348, 356, 357, 360  
 Munja, *see* Vākpati II  
 Munni Begum, 569  
 Munro, Major Hector, 561, 586

- Munro, Sir Thomas, 630, 639, 640,  
     643-5, 705, 708, 714, 719, 733,  
     736, 738, 852, 856, 866, 904  
*Munsiffs*, the, 636, 644, 645  
 Murā, 32  
 Murād, Prince, 352, 366, 373-6  
 Murād Bakhsh, 405-7, 413, 414,  
     416  
 Murād Mirzā Sultān, 374  
 Muralas, the, 124  
 Murshidābād, 465, 474, 548, 549,  
     551, 556, 557, 559, 561, 631, 679,  
     683, 708  
 Murtazā Nizām Shāh I, 372, 373  
 Murtazā Nizām Shāh II, 375, 390,  
     400, 401  
 Murundas, the, 91  
 Muslim law, 784, 856  
 Muslim League, the, 900  
 Muslims, the, 62, 105, 115, 116,  
     118, 120-2, 127-9, 135-8, 140,  
     147, 148, 164, 171, 173, 177,  
     178; part II, *passim*; 801, 846,  
     855, 870, 871, 879-81, 888-91,  
     897, 898, 901, 903, 907  
 Mussoorie, 44  
 Mustafā-ābād, 308  
 Mustanjid Yūsuf, *see* Al-Mus-  
     tanjid Yūsuf  
 Mu'tadid, *see* Al-Mu'tadid  
 Mutiny Act, the, 700  
*Muttaḥḍars*, 644  
 Muzaffar Husain Mirzā Safavid,  
     374  
 Muzaffar Jang, 539-41, 545  
 Muzaffar Khān Turbatī, 354, 357,  
     358, 365  
 Muzaffar Shāh (of Gujarāt), 251-3,  
     286, 299, 300  
 Muzaffar Shāh II (of Gujarāt),  
     310-14  
 Muzaffar Shāh III (of Gujarāt),  
     319, 352, 368  
 Muzaffarpur, 145  
 Muziris (Cranganore), 181, 194  
 Myingun, 827  
 Mysore, 164, 192, 227, 541, 542,  
     545, 576, 590, 591, 598, 600-4,  
     611, 686, 687, 689, 691, 693, 733,  
     830, 834, 835  
 Nāchnā, inscription at, 100  
 Nādir Shāh, 463-5, 467, 534, 651,  
     658  
 Nadiya, 148, 149, 210  
 Nāgabhatta I, 123, 130-2  
 Nāgabhatta II, 132, 133, 135, 143  
 Nāgadatta, 89  
*Nāgānanda*, the, 109  
 Naganna, 164  
 Nagarchain, 347, 352  
 Nagarkot, *see* Kāngra  
 Nāgas, the, 196, 197  
 Nāgasena (Buddhist sage), 65  
 Nāgasena (of Narwar), 89  
 Nāgaur, 219, 266, 304, 333, 384,  
     431, 470  
 Nāgpur, 123, 466, 478, 599, 606,  
     619-22, 693, 694, 735, 778,  
     875  
 Nahapāna Kshaharāta, 59, 80-3  
 Najābat Khān, 403  
 Najib Khān Amīr-ul-umarā, 473-7  
 Najm-ud-daula, 561  
 Najm-ud-dīn Gīlānī, 297  
 Nālandā, 97, 101  
 Nāna Phadnavis, 576-9, 582, 583,  
     600, 604, 605  
 Nāna Sāhib, 731, 745, 750, 752,  
     753, 755  
 Nānaghāt, 58  
 Nanakkāsa, 198  
 Nanda dynasty, the, 19, 20, 31, 32,  
     35, 38  
 Nandakumār, 549, 561, 569-71  
 Nandana, 362, 363  
 Nānder, 430, 452  
 Nandigupta, 113  
 Nandipotavarma, 154  
 Nandipura, 200

- Nandivarman II, 182, 200  
 Nandivarman III, 201  
 Nandurbār, 300, 304, 305, 313, 314  
 Nannuka, 139  
 Nānyadeva, 118  
 Napier, Robert, Lord, 712, 745  
 Napier, Sir Charles, 667, 668, 677, 708, 712, 730  
 Napōleon, 614, 646, 649, 803  
 Naraka, 118  
 Narasa, 176  
 Narasimha I, 165  
 Narasimha II, 165, 185, 192  
 Narasimha III, 165  
 Narasimhagupta Balāditya, 96-8  
 Narasimhavarman I Mahamalla, 152, 153, 199  
 Narasimhavarman II Rājasimha, 200  
 Narasingha, 286, 288  
 Naravāhana, 113  
 Naravardhana, 105  
 Naravarman, 127  
 Narāyan Rāo, 576  
 Narāyanapāla, 143, 144  
 Narendramrigarāja, *see* Vijayāditya II  
 Narendrasena Vākātaka, 100  
 Narnāla, 288. *See also* Nārnaul  
 Nārnaul, 362, 429, 470  
 Narwar, 89, 266, 307, 348, 376  
 Nasik, 58, 59, 61, 153, 396, 620  
 Nāsir Jang, 466, 469, 471, 539, 540, 542, 545  
 Nāsir Khān, *also* Shāh (of Kālpī), 263, 303  
 Nāsir Khān Fārūki, 286, 288-90, 300, 302, 310  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn (grandson of Bughrā Khān), 231  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Ismā'il Shāh, *see* Ismā'il Mukh  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Kabācha, *see* Kabācha  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Khaljī, 301  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Khusrāw Shāh, 229-31  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd, 214, 215  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd Khān (of Bengal), 272  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Mahmūd Tughluk, 250-3, 299  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Muhammad Shāh Tughluk, 249, 250  
 Nāsir-ud-dīn Sultān Khaljī (of Mālwa), 306, 307, 311  
 Nasirābād, 744  
 Nasr Muhammad, 406, 407  
 Nasrat Khān, 129  
 Nasrullāh, 822  
 Natal, 484, 894  
 Nātaputta, *see* Mahāvīra  
 Native states, the, 685-95, 830-41  
 Nau Nihāl Singh, 655, 665, 668  
 Nausari, 131  
 Naval Rai Rāja, 469  
 Navasāhasānka, *see* Sindhurāja  
 Navasāhasānka-charita, the, 123  
 Navsāri, 278  
 Navya, 148  
 Nayapāla, 145  
 Nazarāna, 692, 888  
 Nāzir, 278  
 Nāzira, *see* Gargāon  
 Nearchos, 28, 29  
 Nedumudi-Killi, 187, 193  
 Nedunjeliyan, 182, 193  
 Negapatam, 491, 505, 526, 553  
 Negombo, 505  
 Negrais Island, 678  
 Neill, General J. G. S., 745, 751, 752  
 Nellore, 172  
 Nelson, Lord, 617  
 Nelveli, 182  
 Nepāl, 43, 52, 91, 106, 107, 116-18, 159, 231, 617, 713  
 Nepāl era, the, 117  
 Nerbudda river, 7, 107, 152, 241, 243, 301, 343, 391, 394, 395, 434, 446, 461, 463, 471, 622  
 Netajī, 437



- Netherlands, *see* Dutch, the  
 Neutrality, treaties of, 535, 549  
 Newbery, John, 380  
 Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act, 874  
 Nga Chin Pyan, 679  
 Nicaea, 21, 22  
 — (on the Hydaspes), 26  
 Nicanor, 22  
 Nichakshu, 11  
 Nicholas I, 662  
 Nicholson, John, 675, 712, 735, 746, 748, 752  
 Nidar Bhīm, 207  
 Nidhanpur, 119  
 Niglīva, 43, 48, 52  
 Nikitin, Athanasius, 298  
 Nikū-siyar, 457  
 Nilapalli, 91  
 Nīlaraja, 91  
 Nilgiris, the, 899  
 Nīlkanth, 459  
 Nīmach, 744  
 Nī'matullāh (of Māhān), 289  
 Nirgranthas, the, 51  
 Nirjitavarman, 112  
 Nityavarsha, *see* Khottiga Nityavarsha  
 Niyāzī tribe, the, 336  
 Nizām, the, 664, 686, 689, 690, 693, 725, 745, 778, 832  
 Nizām 'Alī, 472, 545, 576, 582, 585, 586, 598, 600, 601, 603-06, 619, 730  
 Nizām Khān Sūr, 333  
 Nizām Shāh Bahmanī, 292, 293, 304, 305  
 Nizām Shāhī dynasty, the, 296  
 Nizām-ud-dīn (of Delhi), 217, 218  
 Nizām-ud-dīn, Jām (of Sind), 308, 310  
 Nizām-ud-dīn Ahmad, 368  
 Nizām-ul-mulk, Sultān 'Alā-ud-dīn, 240, 241  
 Nizām-ul-mulk Āsaf Jah, 455, 458, 459-63, 465, 466, 469, 471, 534, 539  
 Nizām-ul-mulk Ghūrī, 292, 296, 304  
 Nizāmat 'adālat, the, 722, 723  
 Non, Cape, 482  
 Non-Brahman castes, 907  
 Non-regulation Provinces, 668, 711, 712, 786-8  
 Noronha, Antonio de, 353  
 Norris, Sir Henry, 524  
 North, Lord, 568, 572, 573, 589, 594, 596, 626-8  
 North-west Frontier, the, 730, 817, 819, 820  
 North-west Frontier Province, the, 778, 819  
 North-western Provinces, the, 699, 708, 719, 720, 778, 793, 796, 797.  
*See also* United Provinces, the  
 — administration of, 705, 706  
 Northbrook, Lord, 769, 775, 806, 808, 864  
 Nott, General, 658, 660, 661, 729  
 Nowshera, 746  
 Nripatunga, 183  
 Nripatungavarman, 201  
 Nūr Jahān, 384-7, 392-400, 405, 454  
 Nūrpur, 404, 405  
 Nusrat Khān, 223, 236, 238  
 Nusrat Khān Tughluk, 251, 253  
 Nusrat Shāh (of Bengal), 274, 276, 328  
 Nyaungyan, 827  
 Nyāyapāla, *see* Nayapāla  
 Nysa, 23  
 Ochterlony, Colonel, 618  
 Octroi dues, 525, 858, 862  
 Odantapuri, 210  
 Odruka, *see* Udaka  
 Officers' Mutiny, 564  
 — at Madras, 613

- Ohind, 23, 121  
 Olcott, Colonel, 869  
 Oldenbarnevelt, J. van, 501  
 Omichand, 550  
 Omphis, *see* Ambhi  
 Opium, 512, 615  
 Orange Free State, 893  
 Orchha, 376, 400, 402-4  
 Ordenado, 496  
 Orissa, 90, 141, 145, 159, 176, 188, 189, 231, 247, 263, 274, 292, 294, 301, 357, 358, 366, 376, 395, 417, 449, 458, 465, 466, 474, 562, 684, 711, 724, 778, 796, 797, 858, 894  
 Orme, Robert, 549  
 Ormuz, 488-90, 495, 496, 514  
 Orthagnes, 70  
 Oudh, 12, 55, 215, 221, 224, 237, 239, 241, 262, 269, 274, 321, 325, 327, 347, 348, 365, 366, 395, 444, 458, 459, 464, 465, 469-73, 477, 552, 558, 561, 562, 566, 567, 572, 573, 593-5, 598, 604, 609, 611, 624, 683, 685-7, 691, 693, 694, 725, 731, 735, 752, 754-6, 778, 787, 793, 797, 858. *See also* Kosala  
 — Begums of, 592, 593, 595  
 Oudh Artillery, the, 729  
 Outram, Sir James, 667, 711, 735, 740, 752-5, 804  
 Ouvidor general, the, 496  
 Ouzanes, 72  
 Oxus, river and valley, 73, 649, 651, 662, 806  
 Oxydrakai, the, *see* Kshudrakas, the  
 Ozene, *see* Ujjain  
 Pabhosā, 56  
 Pacheco, Duarte, 486  
 Pacorus, 70  
 Padika, *see* Patika  
 Padmagupta, 123, 124  
 Padmavati, 15, 89  
 Pādshāh Begum, 440  
 Pagān, King, 680, 824, 825  
 Pahāla, 447  
 Pahār Singh, 404  
 Pahlavas, the, 66-8, 70-2, 81, 83  
 Pā'inghāt, the, 402  
 Paithan, 60, 284  
*Paiyalachchi*, the, 124  
 Pāk Pattan, 254  
 Pāla dynasty, the, 119, 132, 133, 137, 141-7, 206, 208  
 Palakka, *see* Palghaut  
 Palakollu, 90  
 Palāsikā (Halsi), 167  
 Palava, *see* Pallava dynasty, the  
 Palestine, 895  
 Palghaut, 90, 91, 591  
 Palibothra, *see* Pataliputra  
 Palk Strait, 227  
 Palkigundu, 44  
 Pallava dynasty, the, 59, 60, 90, 152-4, 157, 166, 167, 169, 181-3, 187-9, 192, 194-201  
 Palmerston, Lord, 651, 652, 662, 716, 807  
 Pāmban, 227  
 Pāmirs, the, 75, 77, 817  
 Pan Chao, 75  
 Panchāla, 54  
 Panchālas, the, 10, 15  
 Panchāsar, 126  
*Panchatantra*, the, 99  
*Panchayat*, the, 645, 665, 712, 856  
 Pāndavas, the, 104  
 Pāndhapur, 437, 438  
 Pāndus, the, 181  
 Pāndya dynasty, the, 44, 152-4, 157, 158, 165, 171, 179-88, 190, 192-5, 200, 201, 227  
 Pāndyari, *see* Kulottunga Choda-deva III Pāndyari  
 Pangu, 112  
 Pāngul, 282, 287  
 Panhāla, 297  
 Pānini, 13, 61, 62, 179

- Pāṇipat, 258, 269, 313, 322, 324,  
 326, 328, 338, 468, 473, 477, 478,  
 566, 575  
 Panjab, the, 3, 6, 10, 64, 68, 75, 77,  
 91, 121, 129, 205-16, 219, 235,  
 250-2, 254, 255, 258, 260, 265,  
 269, 321, 330, 336, 337, 340, 347,  
 350, 351, 353, 358, 362, 365, 366,  
 383, 394, 400, 405, 416, 417, 430,  
 451, 452, 465, 467, 468, 471, 473,  
 475, 614, 622, 646, 651, 653, 663,  
 666, 668, 671, 672, 675, 677, 694,  
 712, 723, 731, 734, 735, 739, 746-  
 8, 750, 778, 783, 786, 787, 789,  
 793, 794, 804, 818, 839, 846, 858,  
 862, 872, 890, 891, 895, 896, 907  
 — administration of, 706  
 Panjdeh, 816, 817, 839  
 Panna, 346  
 Pantaleon, 64  
 Pāpayya Pillai, 631  
*Parachakrakotapala*, 182  
 Parākrama, 184, 192  
 Parākrama Bahu, 186  
 Parākrama Pāndya, *see* Jatila Parā-  
 krama Pāndya  
 Parākramāditya, *see* Samudragupta  
 Paramānuka, 115  
 Paramāra, 123  
 Paramāra dynasty, the, 115, 123-5,  
 127, 128, 140, 158-60, 168, 226  
 Paramardi, 136. *See also* Parmāl  
 Paramārtha, 78  
 Paramesvara Potavarman, 194  
 Paramesvaravarman (Pallava), 199,  
 200  
 Paramesvaravarman I, 153  
 Paramjoti, 199  
 Parāntaka (Pāndya), *see* Jatila  
 Parāntaka Pāndya  
 Parāntaka I (Chola), 188, 194  
 Parāntaka II (Chola), 194  
 Parapanisadae, 33  
 Parasurāma, 189  
 Paravas, the, 182  
 Parenda, 412  
 Pariahs, the, 729  
 Parihār Brāhmans, 130  
 Parihāras (of Kanauj), 206, 208  
 Pārikshit, 11  
 Pārikshitas, the, 11, 12  
 Parindas, the, 44  
*Parishad*, the, 46  
 Pārli, 447  
 Parmāl, 140, 208, 210. *See also*  
 Paramardi  
 Parmenion, 22  
 Parsaji, 620  
 Parsis, the, 846  
 Parthia and the Parthians, 62-4,  
 66-8, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 80, 82,  
 196  
 Parushni river, 6  
 Parvagupta, 113  
 Parvataka, 32  
 Parviz, 391, 393, 395-8  
 Pasenadi, 17, 18. *See also* Prasenajit  
 Patāi, 309  
 Patala, 28  
 Pātaligama, *see* Pātaliputra  
 Pātaliputra, 2, 14, 18, 19, 43, 54,  
 55, 87, 88, 93, 99  
 Pātan, 319, 340  
 Patanjali, 55, 65, 195  
 Pathān frontier, the, 818  
 Pathān nawabs, the, 540, 545  
 Pathān tribes, the, 819  
 Pāthri, 293, 314  
 Patāla, 121, 747, 762  
 Patika, 68, 70, 80  
 Patna, 109, 137, 144, 145, 356, 358,  
 362, 365, 395, 396, 417, 449, 454,  
 474, 518, 521, 552, 558, 560, 561,  
 708, 730, 745, 783  
 Patna Case, the, 633  
 Patta, 349  
 Pattadakal, 154  
 Paul, Emperor, 649  
 Paulists, the, 498  
 Paurava, *see* Porus

- Pāvāgarh, 309  
*Pavanadūta*, the, 149  
 Pawārs, the, 206, 208  
 Peacock, Sir Barnes, 787  
 Peel, Sir Robert, 659  
 Pegu, 189, 491, 681, 825  
 Peithon, 28, 31  
 Penal Code, the, 721, 784  
 Penang, 510, 616  
 Pennār river, the, 187  
 Pepper, 616  
 Perambalūr, 185  
 Perambiyam, 201  
 Perara river, 160  
*Percalcos*, 496  
 Perdikkas, 23  
 Perim, 647  
*Periplus*, the, 60, 65, 71, 81, 180, 193  
 Perjury, 638  
 Permādi, 170  
 Perron, Pierre, 605, 606, 664  
 Persepolis, 21  
 Persia, 62, 66, 97, 107, 196, 205-8, 212, 215, 235, 251, 289, 333, 384, 394, 398, 407, 408, 409, 418, 421, 441, 448, 453, 458, 463, 504, 513, 514, 532, 534, 614, 646, 648-52, 666, 730, 742, 775, 803-7, 813, 815, 822, 891  
 — war with, 740  
 Persian, 716, 800, 844, 846, 852  
 Persian Gulf, 488, 489, 514, 517, 527, 646-8, 821, 822  
 Perunjinga, 192, 193, 201  
 Peruvalanallūr, 200  
 Peshāwar, 44, 77, 78, 135, 206, 425, 463, 614, 651-3, 657, 658, 663, 677; 678, 738, 746-8, 805, 811  
 Peshāwara Singh, 671  
 Pēshwā, the, 278, 438, 664, 686, 693, 719, 731  
 Peucolaos, 65  
 Peyton, Captain, 535, 536  
 Phāphāman, 264  
 Philip, 27, 31  
 Philostratos, 71  
 Philoxenos, 65  
 Phraates II, 66, 71  
 Pidia, 447  
 Piece-goods, 517, 521, 616, 696, 769  
 Pigot, George, Lord, 555, 585, 588, 590  
 Pilājī Gaekwar, 466  
 Pilgrim-tax, the, 127, 345  
 Pindāris, the, 477, 619, 621  
 Pipār, 470  
 Pīr Khān Lodī Khānjahān, 391, 397, 398, 400, 401  
 Pīr Muhammad, 251  
 Pīr Muhammad Khān, 340-3  
 Pirates, 527, 530, 646, 647  
 Pishīn, 425, 812, 814  
 Pishtapuram, 90, 152  
 Pitinikas, the, 44  
 Pitt, William, 594, 626-8, 642  
 Piyadasi, 42  
 Plassey, 474, 540, 550, 552, 558, 563, 584, 610, 683, 736  
 Pliny, 58, 75, 180, 181, 193  
 Plutarch, 32, 65  
 Pocock, Admiral, 554  
 Police, the, 636, 637, 639, 644, 707-9, 712, 723, 787, 791, 792  
 Political reform, 851-65, 866-908  
*Politics*, the, of Aristotle, 41  
 Pollilūr, 152, 198, 586, 587  
 Pollock, Sir G., 659, 660, 661, 729  
 Polo, 347  
 Polo, Marco, 186  
 Polybius, 54  
 Pondichery, 533-40, 543, 544, 547, 554-6, 558, 584, 613, 617, 886  
 Poona, 59, 435, 437, 576, 579-82, 598, 599, 604, 605, 619, 621, 686, 719, 802, 854, 872, 875  
 Popham, Captain W., 582  
 Port Louis, 534  
 Porto Novo, 587

- Portuguese, the, 176, 274, 309, 312, 314, 316-18, 353, 367, 380, 387, 395, 401, 402, 425, 441, 442, 481-505, 512-14, 529, 532, 533, 577, 617, 647, 678, 722, 733
- Porus, 21, 24-7, 29, 32
- Post Office, 736
- Pott, Lieut.-Colonel, 744
- Pottinger, Sir H., 648
- Poysalas, the, *see* Hoysalas, the
- Prabhākaradeva, 121
- Prabhākaravardhana, 105, 129
- Prabhāsa, 126, 127
- Prabhāvati Gupta, 94, 100
- Prabhūtarsha, *see* Govinda IV
- Prabodhachandrodaya, the, 140
- Prachyās, the, 31, 35
- Pradesika, 46
- Pradyota, 15, 16
- Pradyotas, the, 18
- Prāgjyotisha, *see* Assam
- Prāgjyotishapura, 118
- Prakāsāditya, 96, 97
- Prālabha, 119
- Prasenajit, 12, 13, 16
- Prasii, *see* Prachyās
- Pratāp Singh, 360, 361, 376, 388
- Pratāparudra II, 227, 231
- Pratihāras, the, 130, 131, 134, 135, 138, 139, 144. *See also* Gurjaras, the
- Pratishāna, 60
- Pravarasena I, 100
- Pravarasena II, 100
- Prayāga, 88, 101, 148. *See also* Allāhabād
- Prem Narāyan, Rāja, 402
- Press, the Newspaper, 853, 866-9, 884, 886, 898, 904
- Prester John, 483
- Principal sadr amīns, 707
- Prinsep, H. T., 718, 764
- Prithivī Singh, 419
- Prithivīpāla, 113
- Prithivīrāja, 136, 138, 140, 148, 208-10
- Prithivīsenā, 100, 166
- Prithivīvallabha, 124
- Private trade, 525-6
- Privy Council, the, 524, 531, 723, 786
- Priyadarsikā, the, 109
- Prola, 162
- Prome, 680, 825
- Provincial administration, 778-82
- Ptolemy, 60, 81, 83, 179, 181
- Ptolemy dynasty, 180
- Ptolemy Philadelphos, 45
- Public Services Commission, the, 802
- Public Works Department, the, 710, 712, 766, 789, 797, 802
- Puhār, *see* Kāverīpattanam
- Pukkusāti, 17
- Pulakesin I Satyāśraya, 151, 167
- Pulakesin II Satyāśraya, 107, 123, 129-31, 152, 153, 156, 168, 198, 199
- Pulicat, 503, 504, 517
- Pulindas, the, 14, 44
- Pulo Run, 516
- Puragupta Vikramāditya, 96
- Purānas, the, 1, 10, 16, 18, 19, 31, 41, 42, 45, 53, 55, 61, 99, 118
- Purandara, 169
- Purandhar, Treaty of, 578, 579, 583
- Purbiyyas, the, 747
- Puri, 44, 148, 247
- Pūrnavarman, 109
- Purnea, 548
- Purohita, the, 9
- Pururanaparākrama, *see* Kīrtivarman I
- Pūrus, the, 7, 8, 10
- Purushapura, *see* Peshāwar
- Pūsa, 847
- Pushkalavatī, 13
- Pushyamitra, 38

- Pushyamitra Sunga, 53-7  
 Pushyamitras, the, 95  
 Pushyavarman, 119  
  
 Quantaria, *see* Gandhāra  
 Quetta, 659, 809, 818  
  
 Radda, 115  
 Rādhā, 147  
 Radūpātī, 124  
 Raffles, Sir S., 616  
 Rafī'-ud-darajāt, 457  
 Rafī'-ud-daula, 457  
 Rafī'-ush-shān, 453, 454, 457  
 Raghu, 166  
 Rāghūji Bhonsla, 466, 474, 478, 534  
 Rāghūji Bhonsla, 620  
 Rāghunāth Rāo, 474, 475, 576, 578-83, 599, 604  
 Rāhappa, 157  
 Rāi Durlabh, 550, 551  
 Rāi dynasty, the, 122  
 Rāi Pithaura, *see* Prithivirāja  
 Rai Rai Singh, 384  
 Rāi Sāhasī, *see* Sāhasī  
 Rāichūr, 44, 173, 176, 280, 281, 290, 297  
 Raigarh, 438, 439, 441, 445, 447  
 Raihān, 214, 215  
 Railways, 796, 800  
 Raimal, 306, 307, 312  
 Raipur hills, 755  
 Rāisen, 266, 312, 335  
 Rāj Singh, 431-3  
 Rāja Ganesh, *see* Ganesh  
 Rāja Singha, 504  
 Rājādhirāja I, 189  
 Rājādhirāja II, 192, 194  
 Rājāditya, 158, 188  
 Rājagriha, 17, 57  
 Rājahmundry, 294  
 Rājapur, 113  
 Rājārāja I Rājakerarivarman (Chola), 159, 164, 183, 188, 189  
 Rājārāja II (Chola), 192  
 Rājārāja III (Chola), 185, 192, 193  
 Rājārāja Vishnuvardhana VIII (E. Chālukya), 155, 194  
 Rājārājesvāra temple, the, 189  
 Rājārām Jāt, 440, 441, 445, 446, 448, 449  
 Rājas Bai, 446  
 Rājasekhara, 134  
 Rājasimha I (Pāndya), 182  
 Rājasimha II (Pāndya), 183, 188, 194  
 Rājasimha Narasimhavarman II (Pallava), 200  
 Rājasthān, 205, 208, 219, 228, 361, 389, 393, 398, 406, 430, 432, 441, 451, 452, 463, 467, 470, 475  
 Rājataranginī, the, 98, 111  
 Rājendra I Gangavijayī (Chola), 119, 145, 159, 183  
 Rājendra II Gangaikonda Uttamachola (Chola), 189, 190  
 Rājendra III, 193  
 Rājendra II (E. Chālukya), 155, 156, 161, 191  
 Rājendra (brother of Rājādhirāja), 160, 190  
 Rājendra. *See also* Vīra Rājendra  
 Rājesvara temple, the, 200  
 Rajiga, *see* Rājendra II (E. Chālukya)  
 Rajjila, 130  
 Rāj Kumārs, the, 721  
 Rāj mahāl, 358, 395, 396, 417, 419  
 Rājputāna, 55, 84, 129-31, 133, 135, 136, 365, 434, 755. *See also* Rājasthān  
 Rājputs, the, 123, 212, 219, 221, 303, 305, 306, 308, 309, 312, 313, 315, 316, 326, 327, 330, 335, 348-50, 352, 361, 367, 378, 388, 389, 391, 397, 413, 414, 417, 427, 429, 431, 432, 434, 437, 449, 598, 609, 621, 622, 692, 693, 735, 855  
 Rāj rūp, 405

- Rājshāhi, 630  
*Rājuka*, 46  
 Rājūla, *see* Ranjubula  
 Rājuvula, *see* Ranjubula  
 Rājyapāla (Gurjara), 135, 137, 139  
 Rājyapāla (Pāla prince), 144  
 Rājyapāla (Pāla ruler), 144  
 Rājyasrī, 103, 105  
 Rājyavardhana, 102, 103, 105, 106  
 Rām Mohun Roy, 716, 717, 722,  
 723, 851  
 Rām Singh (of Jaipur), 424, 437,  
 470  
 Rām Singh (of Mārwar), 470, 471  
 Rāmachandra, 163, 164, 221, 222,  
 226, 227  
*Rāmacharita*, the, 146  
 Rāmāpāla, 146  
 Rāmchand, 351  
 Rāmchehra, 448  
 Rāmdās Pandit, 545  
 Rameswaram, 227  
 Rāmnād, 182  
 Rāmnarāyan, 551, 552, 558, 559  
 Rāmpūrva, 43, 52  
 Ranabhadra, 133  
 Ranarāga, 151  
 Ranarasika, 200  
 Ranavikrānta, *see* Mangalesa  
 Rangoon, 478, 678-81, 685, 757,  
 824, 825, 827, 828  
 Rangpur, 711  
 Ranjit Deo, 475  
 Ranjit Singh, 607, 614, 615, 651,  
 653, 655, 660, 663-6, 670, 671  
 Ranjubula, 65, 69, 70, 80  
 Rānoji Sindhia, 466  
 Ranthambhor, 136, 212, 219, 221,  
 223, 224, 266, 328, 350, 351, 379  
 Rão, Sir Dinkar, *see* Dinkar Rão, Sir  
 Rās-ul-khāima, 647  
 Rāshtrakūtas, the, 123, 124, 131-4,  
 137, 139, 141, 142, 144, 151,  
 154-6, 164, 168, 169, 183, 188,  
 201  
 Rashtrikas, the, 44, 57  
 Ratan Chānd, 456, 458  
 Ratan Singh, 315  
 Ratanpur, 141  
 Rāthor tribe, the, 335, 427, 431-4,  
 448  
 Ratnapāla, 119  
*Ratnāvalī*, the, 109  
 Raushan Akhtar, *see* Muhammad  
 Shāh of Delhi  
 Raushan-ud-daula Mosque, 464  
 Raushanis, the, 388, 426  
 Rāvi river (Hydraotes), 6, 26, 27  
 Ravivarman (Kadamba), 167, 198  
 Ravivarman Kulasekhara, 186, 195  
 Rawāri, 336  
 Rawlinson, Sir H., 809  
 Rawulpindi, 817  
 Raymond, M., 601, 603, 664  
 Rayy, 207  
 Raziyya, 213, 223  
 Read, Lieut.-Colonel A., 642  
 Red Crescent Fund, the, 891  
 Red Sea, 309, 310, 486-92, 512,  
 603, 646, 647, 775, 803, 807  
 Redi, 151  
 Regulating Act, the, 565-97, 625,  
 628, 632, 633, 637, 684  
 Regulation provinces, the, 710  
 Religious policy, British, 715, 716  
 — Portuguese, 497-9  
 Renaud, Major, 751, 752  
*Respondentia* loans, 526  
 Reva river, 134  
 Revatidvīpa, 151  
 Rewa, 208, 351  
 Rheede tot Drakestein, van, 507  
 Richelieu, Cardinal, 532  
*Rig-Veda*, the, 2, 4-6, 7, 8, 10,  
 13, 722  
 Rinchana, 116  
 Ripon, Lord, 769, 776, 780, 814,  
 848, 860, 861, 864, 867, 882, 886  
 Rishabhadatta, *see* Ushavadāta  
 Roberts, General, 734

- Roberts, Lord, 734, 738, 813, 814,  
     839  
 Robinson, John, 572  
 Roe, Sir Thomas, 380, 382, 389, 513  
 Rohankhed, 396  
 Rohilkhand, 260, 467, 470, 473,  
     561, 567, 568, 572, 746, 754  
 Rohillas, the, 566-9  
 Rohtās (Bengal), 275, 331, 355  
 — (Panjab), 395, 396, 398  
*Romanus Pontifex* bull, 482  
 Ronaldshay, Lord, *see* Zetland,  
     Lord  
 Rose, Sir Hugh, 745, 755  
 Round Table, the, 901, 903  
 Royal Engineers, the, 802  
 Rudra II, 195  
 Rudradāman, 38, 42, 45, 59-61,  
     82-4, 196  
 Rudradeva (contemporary of Sa-  
     mudragupta), 89  
 Rudradeva (Kākatiya), 163  
 Rudrasena I, 100  
 Rudrasena II, 94, 100  
 Rudrasimha II, 84  
 Rudrasimha III, 84, 93  
 Rukn-ud-dīn Bārbak, 272  
 Rumbold, Anwaer, 585  
 Rumbold, Sir Thomas, 585-7  
 Rūmi Khān, 494  
 Rumnindei, 43, 48  
 Rūpmatī, 342  
 Rupnath, 44, 54  
 Rūrki, 719, 802  
 Russia, 614, 646, 649-55, 661, 730,  
     775, 803, 805-12, 814, 815, 817,  
     818, 820-3, 839, 891  
 Russo-Afghan Boundary, the, 815,  
     816  
 Ryotwari settlement, the, 644,  
     704-5  
 Ryswick, Treaty of, 533  
 Sa'adat 'Alī, 611, 612  
 Sa'adat Khān, 251  
 Sa'adat Khān, Burhān-ul-mulk,  
     459, 464, 465  
 Sābājī Bhonsla, 475  
 Sabaras, the, 14  
 Sabarmati, 354  
 Sabians, the, 365  
 Sabuktigīn, 121, 139, 206  
 Sadāsiva, 177, 178  
 Sadāsiva Bhāu, 475, 477  
 Sadāsivarāya, 177  
 Sadhaura, 452, 456  
 Sādīr Khān, 262  
 Sadozais, the, 651, 663, 804, 813  
 Sadr 'adālat, the, 783  
 Sadr amīn, the, 636  
 Sadr dīwāni 'adālat, the, 637, 639  
 Sadr-i-jahān, 278, 285  
 Sadr-us-sudur, the, 339, 368  
 Sa'dullāh Khān Rohilla, 469, 470,  
     473  
 Safavids, the, 514  
 Safdar 'Alī, 534  
 Safdar Jang, 464, 469, 471-3  
 Safi Khān, 448  
 Safid Kish mountains, 208  
 Sāgar, 233, 285, 286, 721, 744, 755,  
     778  
 Sagauli, Treaty of, 618  
 Sagres, 482  
 Sāhamera, *see* Shāh Mīr  
 Sāhānusāhis, the, 91  
 Sahāranpur, 474  
 Sāhasī, Rāi, 122  
 Sahasrām, 44  
 Sāhib Khān Khaljī, 266, 312  
 Sahis, the, 91  
 Sāhisāhanusāhis, the, 91  
 Sāhū Rāja, 445, 447  
 Saif-ud-dīn Firūz Indil Khān, 272  
 Saif-ud-dīn Ghūrī, 284, 285  
 St George of the Mine, Fort, 483  
 St Malo, 533  
 St Thomas, 71, 72  
 St Vincent, Cape, 482  
 Saisunāga family, 19



- Saivism, 109  
 Saka era, the, 76, 78, 81-3  
 Sākala (Sialkot), 55, 64, 65  
 Sakanripakāla, the, *see* Saka era  
 Sakas, the, 59, 60, 62, 71-3, 76,  
 80, 81, 91-3, 97. *See also* Satraps,  
 Western  
 Sakat Singh, 348  
 Saket, 264  
 Sāketa, 12, 55  
 Sakharām Bāpu, 579  
 Saktivarman, 155  
 Sākya family, the, 16  
 Salābat Jang, 267, 268, 271, 545-7,  
 549, 551  
 Salankāyanas, the, 196  
 Sālar Jang, 745  
 Sālastambha, 119  
 Sālbāi, Treaty of, 583, 591, 592  
 Sale, Sir R., 658  
 Salem, 642  
 Salhana, 115  
 Salīm, *see* Jahāngir  
 Salīm Chishtī, Shaikh, 351  
 Salima Sultān Begum, 352  
 Salimgarh, 416  
 Salisbury, Lord, 762, 775, 807, 809,  
 810, 812, 864  
 Saljuk Turks, the, 207, 208  
 Sallina, *see* Satyāsraya  
 Salsette, 577, 578, 582  
 Salt Range, the, 210, 213, 214, 344  
 Salt-petre, 521, 553  
 Sālva Narasimha, 176  
 Salwīn river, 422  
 Sāmāna, 244, 253, 259  
 Sāmānd, 120, 121  
 Sāmānids, the, 206  
 Sāmānta, *see* Sāmānd  
 Sāmāntadeva, 121  
 Sāmāntasena, 146, 147  
 Samarkand, 251, 306, 321, 406, 407  
 Samatata, 91, 106  
 Sambara, 8  
 Sambhal, 257, 258, 265, 326, 347  
 Sāmbhar, 135, 136, 208, 461  
 Sambhu, 28  
 Sambhujī, 434, 435, 437, 440-2,  
 444, 445, 447  
 Sambhujī II, 446  
 Sambos, *see* Sambhu  
 Samgamesvara temple, the, 154  
 Sammas, the, 123  
 Samudra, 6  
 Samudragupta, 2, 15, 43, 86-94,  
 99, 100, 116-19, 152, 166, 195,  
 196  
 Samudravarman, 119  
 Samūgarh, 413, 414, 451, 455  
 Samyogitā, 138  
 San Thomé, 491, 517, 533, 538, 539  
 Sanabares, 70  
 Sanakānika, 93  
 Sanchi, 43, 93, 94  
 Sandeman, Major, 818, 819  
 Sandhyākara Nandi, 146  
 Sandracottos, *see* Chandragupta  
 Maurya  
 Sandwīp, 425  
 Sangala, 26  
 Sangam literature, the, 181, 182,  
 187  
 Sangameshwar, 290, 444  
 Sangrama Singh, 306, 312-15, 322,  
 326, 327, 348  
 Sangrāmādeva, 113, 122  
 Sangrāmarāja, 113  
 Sanjan plates, the, 131, 132  
 Sanjar, Sultān, 208  
 Sankama, 162  
 Sankara Yādava, 164, 222, 227, 228  
 Sankaravarman, 112, 121  
 Sāṅkhya philosophy, the, 9  
 Sannyāsis, the, 347  
 Sanskrit, 5, 180, 195, 197, 276,  
 716-19, 785, 800, 842, 844  
 Sanskrit College, the, 717  
 Sanskrit literature, 99, 109, 179  
 Santhāl rebellion, the, 711  
 Santhāl tribe, the, 787, 788

- Sāntivarman, 167, 168  
 São Gabriel, the, 484  
 São Jorge de Mina, 483  
 Sapedanes, 70  
 Sapor, *see* Shāpūr  
*Saptasataka*, the, 61  
 Sarakhs, 815  
 Sārang Khān, 251, 252  
 Sārangpur, 301, 342  
 Sarasvatī river, 6, 7, 104  
 Sarbuland Khān, 460, 461  
*Sardeshmukhi*, 460, 462, 466, 474  
*Sardeshpāndya*, 462  
 Sardulavarman, 103  
 Sargadvārī, 238, 239  
 Sarmad, 421  
 Sarnāl, 353  
 Sarsutī (Sarasvatī) river, 6  
 Sartiz, 242, 243  
 Sarvar, Malik, Sultān-ush-shark,  
     250, 253, 262  
 Sarvar-ul-mulk, 256, 258  
 Sarvavarman (grammarian), 61  
 Sarvavarman Maukhari, 102  
 Sasānka, 103, 106, 109, 119  
 Sasarām, 274, 333  
 Sasas, the, 70  
 Sasigupta, 22, 23  
 Sassanians, the, 79, 80  
 Sātakarni, 58  
 Sātakarni dynasty, *see* Āndhra  
     dynasty  
 Satānika Parantapa, 15  
*Satapatha-Brahmana*, 11  
 Satāra, 446, 447, 534, 538, 683, 858  
 Sātavāhana, *see* Āndhra dynasty,  
     the  
 Satavastra, 70  
 Satgāon, 272, 357  
*Sati*, 722-3, 851, 868  
 Satiyaputra, 44  
 Satnāmis, the, 429  
 Sātpura hills, the, 288, 678  
 Satraps, Northern, 80  
 — Western, 59-61, 80-5, 92, 196  
*Sattasai*, the, 61  
 Satyāsraya (Solliga, or Sallina),  
     159, 189. *See also* Pulakesin I & II,  
     Vikramāditya I, and Vinayāditya  
 Saubhāgasena, 54, 63  
 Saubhuti, 26  
 Saunders, Thomas, 539, 541, 543  
 Savanūr, 540  
 Sayyid ‘Abdullāh Khān, 358  
 Sayyid Ahmad, Sir, 772, 855, 890,  
     891  
 Sayyid dynasty, the, 252, 260,  
     291  
 Sayyid Khānjahān, 401, 403  
 Sayyid Lashkar Khān, 545, 546  
 Scott, Colonel, 612  
 Scottish East India Company, 518  
 Scripts, early, 4  
 Scythia and the Scythians, 62, 66,  
     67  
 Sea-customs, 525  
 Secretary of State for India, the,  
     760-3  
 Sedasere, 604  
 Schwān, 417  
 Seistān, 21, 66, 67, 806  
 Seleucids, the, 1, 44, 45, 63  
 Seleucus Nikator, 32-4, 45, 46  
 Sellappa, 176  
 Sena dynasty, the, 118, 138, 145,  
     147, 208  
*Senāpati*, the, 101  
 Sendamangalam, 192  
 Senguttuvan, 193  
 Sepoy forces, the, 547, 733-40  
 Serampore, 617, 715, 716, 722  
 Seringapatam, 601, 604, 610, 617  
 Sesodias, the, 432, 434  
 Seths, the, 550, 561  
 Seunachandra II, 161, 163  
 Seven Years’ War, the, 549, 554,  
     585  
 Sey Yānaikkan, 194  
 Shādī Khān, 228  
 Shāh ‘Abbās, *see* ‘Abbās the Great

- Shāh 'Abbās II, 408, 421  
 Shāh Abul Ma'ālī, 345  
 Shāh 'Ālam II, 474, 475, 478, 552, 556, 558, 562, 563, 566, 585, 683, 685  
 Shāh Beg, 374  
 Shāh Begum, 376  
 Shāh Husain Arghūn, 372  
 Shāh Kar, 238  
 Shāh Mansūr, 366  
 Shāh Mīr, 116  
 Shāh Mīrzā, 354  
 Shāh Nawāz Khān, 467, 546  
 Shāh Safī, 404  
 Shāh Shujā', 614, 651, 653-5, 657, 660, 661, 730  
 Shāhbāz Khān, 365  
 Shahbazgarhi, 43  
 Shāhi dynasty, the, 113, 120-2, 296  
 Shāhjahān, 298, 374, 386, 388, 389, 391, 393-6, 398-415, 420, 430, 435, 513  
 Shāhjahān III, 475, 477  
 Shāhjahānābād, *see* Delhi  
 Shāhji Bhonsla, 403  
 Shāhji Bhonsla, 435, 439  
 Shahjiki Dheri mound, 78  
 Shāhrukh, 255, 256, 321  
 Shāhrukh Mīrzā, 370, 383  
 Shāhryār, 393, 394, 397-9  
 Shāhū Lodi, Malik, 239  
 Shaikh 'Abd-un-nabī, 363  
 Shaikh 'Alī, 256, 257  
 Shaikh Dāniyāl, 352  
 Shaikh Farīd, 383  
 Shaikh Gadā'i, 339  
 Shaikh Mubārak, 345, 363, 364, 368  
 Shaikh Mu'in-ud-dīn Chishtī, *see* Mu'in-ud-dīn Chishtī  
 Shaikh Salīm Chishtī, *see* Salīm Chishtī  
 Shaikh Yūsuf, 257, 260  
 Shakar Khān, 318  
 Shakarkhelda, 460  
 Shālīmār Garden, 468  
 Shams Khān Auhadī, 253  
 Shams-ud-dīn, *see* Shāh Mīr  
 Shams-ud-dīn Ahmad, 272  
 Shams-ud-dīn Dāūd Bahmanī, 280, 284, 285  
 Shams-ud-dīn Īltutmish, *see* Īltutmish  
 Shams-ud-dīn Iliyās Shāh, *see* Iliyās Shāh Shams-ud-dīn  
 Shams-ud-dīn Muhammad Ataga Khān, 343, 344  
 Shams-ud-dīn Muzaffar Shāh Sīdī Badr, 273  
 Shams-ud-dīn Yūsuf, 263, 272  
 Shāns, the, 422, 681, 825  
 Shansabānids, the, 208  
 Shāpūr, 72, 101  
 Sharkī dynasty, the, 250, 251, 262  
 Shashtadeva, 169, 170  
 Shashtha, 169  
 Shaukat Jang, 548  
 Shāyista Khān, 425, 437  
 Shegām, 458  
 Shelburne, Lord, 596  
 Sherley, Sir R., 409  
 Shiah, the, 289, 297, 311, 339, 346, 363, 365, 406, 421, 442, 453, 472, 491  
 Shihāb-ud-dīn Khaljī, 307, 312  
 Shihāb-ud-dīn Muhammad, *see* Muhammad Ghūrī  
 Shihāb-ud-dīn 'Umar, 229  
 Shipping and ship-building, 482, 483, 500, 502, 647  
 Shīr Afkan Khān, 385  
 Shīr 'Alī, 805-14, 817, 825  
 Shīr Khān (Shāh) of Sasarām, 274-6, 316, 318, 330-6, 351, 355, 358, 377-9  
 Shīr Khān Fūlādī, 319  
 Shīr Singh, 665, 677  
 Shirkes, the, 444  
 Sholapur, 177, 178, 443  
 Sholingarh, 587

- Shore, Frederick, 638, 713  
 Shore, Sir John, 601, 610, 611, 614,  
   635, 639, 713  
 Shorkot, 256  
 Shujā'at Khān, 388  
 Shujā'at Khān, 427  
 Shujā'at Khān, 459  
 Shujā'at Khān (of Mālwa), 334,  
   336, 340  
 Shujā'at Khān (of Sasarām), 318,  
   320  
 Shujā'-ud-daula, 465, 473, 474,  
   477, 478, 569, 571  
 Shwēdagōn Pagoda, 825  
 Sialkot, 328, 671, 744. *See also*  
   Sākala  
 Siam, 824, 826  
 Sibi, 812, 814  
 Siboi, the, 27  
 Sibirytios, 34  
 Siddapura, 44  
 Siddhantam, 90  
 Siddharāja, 127, 128  
 Sidhpur, 126  
 Sidi Maulā, 221  
 Sifur, *see* Shāpūr  
 Sihor, 312  
 Sijda, the, 369, 420  
 Sikandar (of Gujarāt), 313  
 Sikandar 'Adil Shāh, 440-3  
 Sikandar Khān (of Bālkonda), 291,  
   292  
 Sikandar Khān Uzbeg, 348  
 Sikandar Shāh (of Bengal), 246,  
   247, 270, 271  
 Sikandar Shāh (Nizām Khān)  
   Lodī, 264, 266, 268  
 Sikandar Sūr, 336-40  
 Sikandarābād, 477  
 Sikandra, 448, 472  
 Sikhs, the, 383, 452, 607, 614,  
   651-3, 658-61, 663, 664, 666,  
   668-73, 675-7, 730, 733, 739,  
   746, 747, 801, 805, 809, 818, 896,  
   907  
 Sikkim, 617, 618, 820, 821  
 Sikri, 326, 351-4, 356, 358, 360,  
   362, 363, 367, 368, 370, 376, 380,  
   392, 394, 408, 457  
 Silāditya (Valabhi), 101  
 Silāditya, *see* Harshavardhana  
 Silāhāras, the, 162, 169, 170  
 Silahdi, 335  
 Silk, 514, 521  
 Siluka, 131, 132  
 Simhabhata, *see* Harshasimha  
 Simhaka, *see* Siyaka  
 Simhavarman, 167  
 Simhavishnu, 197  
 Simhavishnu Potarāja Avanisimha,  
   198, 200  
 Simla, 768, 806  
 Simraon, 118  
 Simuka (Sātakarni), 56  
 Sind, 3, 5, 28, 84, 105, 107, 122,  
   123, 125, 126, 132, 133, 135, 205,  
   212, 213, 242, 244, 248, 308, 310,  
   327, 332, 366, 372, 385, 398, 418,  
   465, 467, 651-4, 666-8, 708, 712,  
   745, 783, 818  
 Sindas, the, 161, 162, 165, 168  
 Sindhia, 664, 688, 692, 693, 731,  
   744, 753, 755, 832, 840  
 Sindhianwalas, the, 665, 670  
 Sindhu (Indus) river, 6  
 Sindhurāja Navasāhasānka, 124  
 Singapore, 616, 753, 803  
 Singarh, 446, 447  
 Singhana, 128, 162, 163  
 Sinhāla, 92. *See also* Ceylon  
 Sinsani, 449  
 Sipāhsālār, the, 366  
 Siphor, *see* Shāpūr  
 Sipihir Shikūh, 418  
 Sipri, 307, 582, 755  
 Sirāj-ud-daula, 546, 548-51, 684  
 Sirhind, 247, 255-7, 337, 338, 366,  
   452, 467, 469, 475  
 Siri, 225  
 Sirmūr, 249, 250

- Sirohi, 35  
 Sironj, 463  
 Siroptolemaios, 60  
 Sirpur, 90  
 Sirsi, 169  
 Sirswagarh, 140  
 Sisikottos, *see* Sasigupta  
 Sisunāga, 15, 18, 19  
 Sitāna, 730, 746  
 Sivadeva, 117, 118  
 Sīvajī, 278, 421, 434-40, 465, 520, 521, 869, 870  
 Sīvajī III, 446  
 Sīvānanda, 198  
 Sivarāja, 146  
 Sivaskandavarman, 196, 197  
 Siwālik hills, the, 215  
 Siyaka I Paramāra, 124  
 Siyaka II Harshasimha, 124, 158  
 Siyyar-ul-Mutakherin, 569  
 Skandagupta, 95-7, 99, 100, 129  
 Skandasiṣṭha, 197  
 Skandavarman Kadamba, 167  
 Skandavarman Pallava, 197  
 Skelton, Colonel, 738  
 Slave kings of Delhi, 211, 212  
 Slave-trade, 647, 720, 721  
 Slavery, 720, 721  
 Sleeman, Colonel, 694, 722, 725  
 Smith, Adam, 525  
 Smith, General Richard, 566  
 Sobrāon, 672  
 Social policy, 720-7  
 Social reform, 851, 868  
 Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, the, 714  
 Socotra, 309, 488, 489  
 Sodas, the, 308  
 Sodāsa, 70  
 Sogar, 449  
 Sogdi, 28  
 Soghdiana, 73  
 Solankis, the, 126, 128, 206  
 Solliga, *see* Satyāśraya  
 Solomon, 180  
 Soma, 9  
 Somadeva, 15  
 Somavansī, 117  
 Sombalpur, 90  
 Somesvara, *see* Sovideva  
 Somesvara I Trailokyamalla Aha-  
 vamalla (W. Chālukya), 141,  
 145, 158-60, 190  
 Somesvara II (W. Chālukya), 118,  
 125, 156, 160, 161, 170, 190, 191  
 Somesvara III (W. Chālukya), 161  
 Somesvara IV (W. Chālukya),  
 162, 163, 165  
 Somesvara (Chauhān), 136  
 Somnārth, 126-9, 141, 207, 428,  
 429, 660  
 Sōn river, 34, 144, 558  
 Sonārgāon, 247, 275  
 Sonpur, 88  
 Sopāra, 44  
 Sopeithes, *see* Saubhuti  
 Sophagasenus, *see* Saubhāgesena  
 Sophytes, *see* Saubhuti  
 Sōpur, 112  
 Sorāth (Kāthiāwār), 307, 308  
 South Africa, 901  
 — Indians in, 893, 894  
 South African War, the, 893  
 Southborough, Lord, 898  
 Sovideva (Somesvara), 162  
 Soyara Bai, 440  
 Spain, 205, 368  
 Spalagadames, 68, 69  
 Spalahores, 68, 69  
 Spalirises, 69, 80  
 Spice islands, 614  
 Spice monopoly and trade, 490,  
 500, 505, 512, 514  
 Sramanas, the, 51  
 Srāvasti, 12  
 Srenika, *see* Bimbisāra  
 Sṛī Harshadeva, *see* Harshasimha  
 Srikākula, 58  
 Sṛīmāra Sṛivallabha, 182, 183  
 Sṛīnagar, 43, 45, 419

- Srinjayas, the, 10  
 Srirangam, 542  
 Srutasena, 11  
 Staal, Baron de, 815, 816  
 Stanley, Lord, 702, 703, 762, 800  
 Statutory Civil Service, the, 801, 802, 840  
 Sthānvisvara, *see* Thānesar  
 Stolietoff, General, 810, 811  
 Strabo, 63  
 Strachey, Sir John, 773  
 Strachey, Sir Richard, 797  
 Strato I, 65, 80  
 Strato II, 65, 69  
 Stravani, 131  
 Stuart, Major-general James, 589-91  
 Suakim, 494  
 Sūba, 366  
 Subhatunga, *see* Krishna I and II  
 Sudarsana, 34, 38  
 Sudās, 7, 8  
 Sudra caste, the, 19, 122, 844  
 Suez, 310, 317, 487, 493, 494, 646, 648, 753, 775, 803  
 Suez Canal, the, 803, 807  
 Suffren, Bailli de, 589, 590  
 Sūfī-ism, 363, 365, 405  
 Sugandhā, 112  
 Sūhadeva, 116  
 Sujyeshtha, 56  
 Sukarchakia *misl*, the, 663  
 Sukhavarman, 112  
 Sukkur, 417  
 Sulaimān I, 317  
 Sulaimān Kararānī, 355  
 Sulaimān Mīrzā (of Badakhshān), 345, 360  
 Sulaimān Pasha, 317, 493  
 Sulaimān Shāh, 441  
 Sulaimān Shikūh, 413, 417, 419  
*Sulh-i-kull*, 378  
 Sulikas, the, 102  
 Sullivan, Laurence, 565  
 Sultān Salima Begum, 376, 385  
 Sultān Shujā', 402, 404-6, 413, 417, 419, 422, 454  
 Sumatra, 143, 512, 516, 616, 617  
 Sumeria, 3, 4, 67  
 Sumra dynasty, the, 123, 308  
 Sundara Pāndya, *see* Jātavarman  
 Sundara Pāndya  
 Sundarbans, the, 366  
 Sundarī, 132  
 Sunga dynasty, the, 53-6, 58, 59  
 Sunidha, 14  
 Sunnis, the, 289, 346, 363, 365, 405, 406, 420, 421, 442, 453, 491, 492, 730  
 Supayālat, 826  
 Supervisors, 631  
 Supreme Courts, the, 571, 632, 633, 684, 699, 701, 769, 782, 783, 787  
 Sūr tribe, the, 333, 336  
 Sūra, 112  
 Suraj Mal Jāt, 392, 472, 473, 475  
 Surāj-ud-dīn, 174  
 Sūrapāla, 144  
 Sūrapāla II, 146  
 Sūras, the, 148  
 Sūrasenas, the, 15  
 Surāshtra, 59, 83, 93, 95, 101, 127, 128  
 Surat, 353, 387, 437, 439, 446, 492, 504, 512, 513, 515-17, 520, 522, 527, 533, 577, 579, 580, 646, 875  
 — Treaty of, 577-9  
 Surendranāth Banerji, 853, 854, 875, 876  
 Surjan Hāra, 350  
 Surkhāb, 427  
 Surman, John, 527  
 Sūryamatī, 113  
 Sūryavamsis, the, *see* Lichchhavis, the  
 Sūryavarman, 102  
 Susarma Kānva, 57  
 Susima, 42  
 Sussala, 114, 115  
 Susthitavarman, 101, 119

- Sūtanūtī, *see* Calcutta  
 Sutlej river, 6, 209, 240, 251, 383,  
     417, 467, 607, 615, 617, 651, 653,  
     666, 670, 672, 677, 681  
 Sutudrī river, 6  
 Suvarnagiri, 43, 45, 46  
 Suvarnadrug, 527  
 Suvāstu (Swāt) river, 6  
 Suvisākha, 83, 196  
 Suyūrghātmish, 256  
 Suyya, 112  
 Suyyapura, 112  
 Svapnavāsavadattā, 18  
 Swādeshi movement, the, 870  
 Swally Hole, 513  
 Swāmidatta, 90  
 Swarāj, 875  
 Swāt, 426, 730  
 Swāt river, 6  
 Symes, Colonel Michael, 679  
 Syr Darya, the, 72  
 Syria, 205, 207, 647  
 Syriam, 491, 678  
  
 Ta-Hia, 73  
*Tabakāt-i Akbarī*, 355  
 Tabriz, 649  
 Tacitus, 1, 70  
 Taghī, 242, 243, 307  
 Tagus river, 489  
 Tahavvur Khān, 432, 433  
 Tahnāp Shāh I, 333  
 Tahsildars, the, 641, 704, 708  
 Taikas, the, 120  
 Taila II (Tailapa) Ahavamalla, 124,  
     151, 154, 158, 159, 168  
 Taila III, 162  
 Tailanga (? Kākatīya), 163  
 Tailapa, *see* Taila  
 Tāj Khān Kararānī, 355  
 Tāj Mahal, the, 408  
 Tāj-ud-dīn Yildiz, *see* Yildiz  
 Takht-i Bahi, 71  
 Takkola, 158  
 Takings, the, 678, 679, 681, 825  
  
 Talaiyālangānam, 182  
 Talamba, 251  
 Talegāon, 580  
 Talgund inscription, the, 166  
 Talikota, 178  
 Tālpuras, the, 651  
 Talukdars of Oudh, the, 731, 732,  
     746, 752, 754, 756, 793  
 Tamil language, the, 179, 180, 195  
 Tamil literature, 181, 193  
 Tamil people, 181, 197, 200, 201  
*Tamilakam*, 179  
 Tamraparni, *see* Ceylon  
 Tānda, 357, 362, 365, 419  
 Tanjore, 185, 188, 189, 192, 193,  
     439, 440, 539, 541, 542, 553,  
     585, 641  
 Tānk, 622, 832  
 Tantia Topi, 753-5  
 Taptī river, 163, 279, 300, 362,  
     390, 434, 582  
 Tāra Bai, 446  
*Taraf* and *tarafdār*, 277  
 Tāranāth, 63, 107  
 Tarāorī, 136, 138, 209  
 Tardi Beg, 338, 339  
 Tārū, 383  
 Tarojanapāla, 120  
 Tarshish, 180  
 Tashkent, 805, 807, 810, 811, 814  
 Tata, 131  
 Tatta, 242, 248, 398  
 Taxila, 2, 11, 13, 21-5, 27, 31, 34,  
     42, 43, 45, 64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 74,  
     76  
 Tayler, William, 745  
 Tea, 697, 854  
 Tegh Bahādūr, 430  
 Teherān, 614, 649-51  
 — Treaty of, 649, 650  
 Tej Singh, 671  
 Telegraph system, 774, 775  
 Telingāna, 227, 228, 231, 236, 247,  
     279, 280, 287, 292-4, 296, 404  
 Teliyāgarhi, 275, 331, 357, 358

- Tellaru, 201  
 Tellicherry, 535  
 Telugu country, the, 195-7  
 Tenasserim, 678, 680  
 Terai, the, 43, 48, 618  
 Terrorism, 869-72, 874-6, 886, 888, 890, 896  
 Texel, the, 500  
 Tezin, 661  
*Thags*, the, 220, 221, 724, 725  
 Thälner, 279, 300  
 Thāna district, 44, 577  
 Thānesar, 104, 105, 119, 129, 152, 347  
 Thar, the, 205  
 Tharrawaddy, 680, 824, 825  
 Theosophical Society, the, 854, 869  
 Thibaw, 826-9  
 Thomas, Prof. F. W., 63  
 Thomason, James, 706, 719  
 Thomason College of Engineering, the, 719  
 Thucydides, 1  
 Thūn, 456, 459  
 Tiastanes, *see* Chastana  
 Tibet, 107, 111, 116, 117, 120, 142, 238, 820, 821  
 Tilak, 207  
 Tilak, Bāl Gangadhar, 868-70, 874-6, 880, 898  
 Tilpat, 223, 429  
 Timarchus, 64  
 Timbuctoo, 483  
 Timūr, 251, 252, 256, 260, 262, 286, 288, 299, 305, 321, 324, 731  
 Timūr Shāh Abdālī, 473, 475, 651  
 Tinnevely, 182, 186, 640, 888  
 Tippera, 145  
 Tipu Sultān, 591, 592, 598-604, 606, 610, 629, 642, 643, 686, 713  
 Tirabhukti, *see* Tirhut  
 Tirhut, 118, 144, 231, 246, 262-4, 274  
 Tirmāshirīn, Chaghatāy, 'Alā-ud-dīn, 235, 237  
 Tirmiz, 273  
 Tirumalai, 145  
 Tirumalas, the, 177  
 Titus, 77  
 Tivara, 53  
 Tobacco, 525, 641  
 Tod, Colonel James, 350, 351  
 Toda Bhīm, 458  
 Todar Mal, 355-9, 362, 365, 366, 372, 383, 390, 410  
 Toma, 447  
 Tomāras, the, of Delhi, 206, 208  
 Tondaimandalam, 197, 201  
 Tonkin, 827, 828  
 Tonwār, 253, 268  
 Topra, 43  
 Toramāna Hūna, 97  
 Toramāna (of Kamaluka), 121  
 Tories, the, 523, 594  
 Torture Commission, the, 708  
 Tosali, 43, 45  
 Townshend, Charles, 565  
 Trafalgar, 617, 713  
 Traikūtakas, the, 85  
 Trajan, 75, 77  
 Tranquebar, 617, 714  
 Transoxiana, 205, 206, 237, 305, 321, 342, 346, 406, 407, 453  
 Transvaal, the, 893  
 Trasadasyu, 8  
 Travancore, 148, 176, 186, 188, 193-5, 599, 600  
 Trevelyan, Sir Charles, 717  
 Tribhuvana, 113  
 Tribhuvanamalla Kadamba, 170  
 Trichinopoly, 172, 200, 534, 538, 539, 541, 542, 546, 554, 555, 609  
 Trikuta, 100  
 Trilochanapāla, 120, 122, 135  
 Trimbakji Danglia, 620  
 Trincomalee, 533  
 Trinomalai, 584  
 Tripartite Treaty, the, 653  
 Tripoli, 891  
 Tripura, 141



- Tritsus, the, 7, 10, 54  
 Tughalchīn, 285, 286  
 Tughlukābād, 258, 390  
 Tughril Beg, 216  
 Tukaroi, 357  
 Tukhāras, the, 107  
 Tulsi Bai, 619  
*Tulughma*, 324, 326, 327  
 Tulus, the, 165  
 Tumain, 94  
 Tunga, 113  
 Tungabhadra, the, 157, 160, 161,  
 173, 175, 190, 227, 228, 233, 243,  
 279, 282, 410  
 Turamaya, *see* Ptolemy Phila-  
 delphos  
 Turanians, the, 453, 455, 458, 465,  
 466  
 Turkey, 896, 897  
 Turkish language, the, 512  
 Turkistān, 321, 803  
 Turkistān, Russian, 803, 815  
 Turkmāns, the, 805  
 Turkomānchai, Treaty of, 650  
 Turks (Turushkas), the, 120, 125,  
 133, 166, 206, 289, 335, 483, 491-  
 5, 514  
 Turks, Ottoman, 409, 775  
 Turushkas, the, *see* Turks, the  
 Turvasas, the, 7  
 Tushāspha, 34, 38, 45  
 Twenty-four Parganas, the, 553  
 Tyāgasinha, 119  
  
 Uch, 209  
 Uchchala, 114, 115  
 Ūda, 305  
 Udabhāndapura, *see* Ohind  
 Udai Singh, 315, 348, 360  
 Udaipur, 348, 431, 432, 451. *See*  
*also* Mewār, Udayapur  
 Udaka, 56  
 Udaya, 18  
 Udayachandra, 200  
 Ūdayāditya, 125  
 Udayagiri, 93, 94, 172, 176  
 Udayana (Udena), 15, 18  
 Udayanadeva, 116  
 Udayapur, 123, 125. *See also*  
 Udaipur  
 Udayibhadra, *see* Udaya  
 Udena, *see* Udayana  
 Ugrasena (dynasty uncertain), 16  
 Ugrasena (Nanda), 19  
 Ugrasena (of Palakka), 91  
 Ugrasena (Pārikshita), 11  
 Ujjain, 15, 42, 43, 45, 81, 93, 99,  
 123, 131, 157, 212, 226, 312, 313,  
 315, 413  
 Ultūn Bahādur, 242  
 Ulugh Khān Khaljī, 222, 223. *See*  
*also* Muhammad ibn Tughluk  
 ‘Umar Khān, 302  
 ‘Umar Shaikh, 321  
 ‘Umarkot, 332  
 ‘Umdat-ul-umarā, 610  
 Uncovenanted Service, the, 798,  
 801  
 Und, *see* Ohind  
 Undopherros, *see* Gondophares  
 United Provinces, the, 778, 798,  
 845, 846, 862, 892  
 Universities Act (1904), 847, 875  
 Upagupta (Buddhist saint), 52  
 Upagupta (princess), 102  
 Ūparkot, 308  
 Upendra, 123  
 Upper Bāri Doāb Canal, the, 713  
 Upper Ganges Canal, the, 710  
 Upton, Colonel, 578, 579  
 Ūraiyyūr, 187  
 Urdu, 846  
 Ushās, 10  
 Ushavadāta, 81, 82  
 Usīnaras, the, 10  
 ‘Usmān, 388  
 Utgīr, 266  
 Utkala, 146  
 Utkarsha, 114  
 Utpalas, the, 111, 113

- Uttamabhadras, the, 81  
 Uttaramerur, 188  
 Uttarapatha, 57  
 Uzain, *see* Ujjain  
 Uzbegs, the, 321, 347, 348, 407.  
     *See also* Chaghatây tribe  
  
 Vaddiga Amoghavarsha, 158  
 Vādhiār, 126  
 Vagada, 124  
 Vāgbhata, 136  
 Vāghelas, the, 128, 129, 208, 209, 223  
 Vaidyadeva, 146  
 Vaijayanti (Banavasī), 59  
 Vailampallam, 279  
 Vainyagupta Dvādasāditya, 96  
 Vairasimha I, 124  
 Vairasimha II Vajratasvāmin, 124  
 Vairodhaka, 32  
 Vaisāli, 16-18, 88, 93, 94  
 Vaisampāyana, 11  
 Vaishnavas, the, 164  
 Vajih-ul-mulk, 299  
 Vajjis, the, 14  
 Vajratasvāmin, *see* Vairasimha II  
 Vākātakas, the, 94, 100, 166, 167  
*Vakīl-us-saltāna*, 278, 285, 286  
 Vākpati I (Paramāra), 124  
 Vākpati II (Munja), 124, 159  
 Valabhī, 101, 104, 106, 107, 109, 130, 131, 205  
 Vālavalabhī, 146  
 Valiullāh Shāh Bahmanī, 298  
 Valla, 131  
 Vallabha, *see* Kīrtivarman II  
 Valudavūr, 539  
 Vanarāja, 126  
 Vancouver Island, 896  
 Vanga, 132, 142, 149, 151  
 Vāṅgaladesa, 145  
 Vansittart, Henry, 557-60, 565  
 Vantideva, 115  
 Vapyata, 142  
 Varaguna, *see* Varagunavarman  
 Varagunavarman, 183  
 Varāhamihira, 99  
 Vardanes, 70, 71  
 Vardhamāna, *see* Mahāvīra  
 Vardhanas, the, 104, 105  
 Varendra, 146  
*Varna*, 7  
 Vasas, the, 10  
 Vāsavadatta, 15  
 Vāsishka, 79  
 Vasishtha, 7, 9  
 Vāsishthīputra Śrī Pulumāvi, 59, 60  
 Vassakāra, 14  
 Vasudeva (Sunga minister), 56  
 Vasudeva Kushān, 79  
 Vasumitra, 55, 56, 78  
 Vātāpi, 151-3, 167, 199  
 Vatsa, 133  
 Vatsarāja, 131, 132, 142, 143, 157  
 Vatsas, the, 15  
*Vedor da fazenda*, 496, 497  
 Vegi, 91  
 Velāpura, 164  
 Vellore, 446, 730  
 Velūr, 183  
 Velūr river, 187  
 Venād, 182, 194  
 Venetians, the, 481, 487, 495, 500  
 Vengi, 91, 151, 152, 154-8, 160, 192, 198  
 Venkata, 179  
 Venkatarāya, 177  
 Vennil, 193  
 Verelst, Henry, 566, 631  
 Vernacular Press Act, 853, 854, 886  
 Vernon, Sir E., 589  
 Vice-admiralty courts, 530  
 Victoria, Queen, 662, 761, 833, 834, 840, 848, 891, 908  
 Victoria Cross, the, 888  
 Vidarbha, 13, 54, 59, 132. *See also* Berar  
 Videha, 10, 12-14. *See also* Bihar  
 Vidisa, 54

- Vidudabha, 13  
 Vidyadhara, 139  
*Vidyālaya*, the, 716  
 Vidyaranya, 172  
 Vighrahapāla I, 144  
 Vighrahapāla II, 145  
 Vighrahapāla III, 141, 145, 146  
 Vighraharāja, 135, 136  
 Vijālaya, 188  
 Vijaya, *see* Vira Vijaya  
 Vijayabāhu, 190  
 Vijayachandra, 137, 138  
 Vijayāditya Satyāśraya (Chālukya), 153, 154  
 Vijayāditya II Narendramrigarāja, 154  
 Vijayāditya III Gunaka, *see* Gunakāmadeva  
 Vijayāditya III (E. Chālukya), 158  
 Vijayāditya VI, 145, 155  
 Vijayāditya VII, 155  
 Vijayāditya (Silāhāra of Karad), 162  
 Vijayāditya (of Vengi), 157, 191  
 Vijayāditya Vishnuchitta (Kadamba), 170  
 Vijayadrug, *see* Gheria  
 Vijayamalla, 114  
 Vijayanagar, 166, 172–8, 186, 236, 277–98, 372, 410, 491, 517  
 — (city), 280–4, 286, 287  
 Vijayapāla, 134, 135  
 Vijayasena, 118, 146, 148  
 Vijayaskandavarman, *see* Sivaskandavarman  
 Vikrama, 184  
 Vikrama Chola, 191, 192  
 Vikrama era, the, 82  
 Vikrama Pāndya, 184  
 Vikramāditya, *see* Chandragupta II; *also* Skandagupta  
 Vikramāditya I Satyāśraya, 153, 182, 199, 200  
 Vikramāditya II, 154  
 Vikramāditya IV (Chālukya), 141  
 Vikramāditya V, 159  
 Vikramāditya VI (Chālukya), 118, 119, 156, 160, 161, 163, 165, 170, 190–2  
 Vikramāditya (rāna of Mewār), 315, 325  
*Vikramānkadevacharita*, the, 155  
 Vikramasila, 143  
 Vilinam, 194  
 Village communities, 706, 732  
 Vinayāditya, *see* Jayāpīda  
 Vinayāditya Hoysala, 164  
 Vinayāditya Satyāśraya, 153, 189  
 Vināyak (son of Kānhayya), 279  
 Vināyak Deo (of Dholpur), 262, 265, 266  
 Vināyak Deva, 173  
 Vindapharna, 70  
 Vindhya hills, the, 6, 106, 143, 157, 678  
 Vindyasakti Vākātaka, 100, 101  
 Vipās river, the, 6  
 Vira, 148, 171  
 Vira Ballāla I Hoysala, 162, 165  
 Vira Ballāla III, 166, 169, 170, 172, 227, 233  
 Vira Narasimha, 176  
 Vira Narāyana, 136, 162  
 Vira Pāndya, 183, 186, 194  
 Vira Rājendra, 190  
 Vira Rājendradeva I, 160  
 Vira Ravivarman, 194  
 Vira Somesvara, 165  
 Vira Vijaya, 175, 282, 283  
 Viradhavala, 128  
 Virakerāla, 194  
 Virakurcha, 197  
 Virasena, 147  
 Virasena (son of Asoka), 63  
 Virasena Sāba, 93  
 Virupāksha, 176  
 Viśaladeva, 128  
 Vishnuchitta, *see* Vijayāditya Kadamba  
 Vishnugopa, 90, 195, 196

- Vishnugupta (later Gupta dynasty), 102  
 Vishnugupta Chānakya, *see* Chānakya  
 Vishnugupta Chandrāditya, 96  
 Vishnuvardhana Hoysala, 164, 165, 168, 170, 192  
 Vishnuvardhana I (E. Chālukya), 152, 154  
 Vishnuvardhana VI Amma, 155  
 Vishnuvardhana VIII, 155  
 Vishnuvarman Kadamba, 198  
 Vishvanāth temple, the, 428  
 Visvāmitra, 9  
 Visvarūpasena, 149  
 Visvās Rāo, 475, 477  
 Visvasena, 84  
 Visvavarma (Pallava), 196  
 Vitastā (Jhelum) river, 6  
 Vithal Rāo, 474  
 Vitkevitch, Captain, 652  
 Vizagapatam, 90, 640  
 Volagases, 70  
 Vonones, 68-70  
*Vratākanda*, 163  
 Vyāghra, 100  
 Vyāghrarāja, 90  
 Vyāghrasena Traikūtaka, 85  
 Vyankojī, 439, 440  
  
 Wade, Colonel C. M., 668  
 Wadgaon, Convention of, 580  
 Wahhabis, the, 730, 745, 853  
 Wahind, *see* Ohind  
 Wākhinkhera, 447  
*Wākei a-nawīs*, 366  
 Walid, *see* Al-Walid  
 Walker, Colonel, 688, 721  
 Wandiwash, 446, 555  
 Wang Hsuen Tse, 107, 119  
 Warangal, 171, 173, 185, 186, 227, 231, 236, 237, 278, 279, 292, 294  
 Ward, W., 715  
 Wassāf, 186  
  
 Watson, Admiral C., 527, 544, 547, 549, 550  
 Watts, William, 549, 552  
 Wazir 'Alī, 611  
*Wazir-i-ashraf*, 278  
*Wazir-i-kull*, 278  
 Wazir Jamil Kākshāl, 365  
 Wazirābād, 463  
 Wellesley, Arthur, Duke of Wellington, 606, 660  
 Wellesley, Henry, 612  
 Wellesley, Richard, Marquis, 603-13, 615, 617, 622, 624, 639, 650, 668, 684, 687, 689-91, 694, 705, 713, 715, 721, 722, 776, 835, 840  
 Wellington, Duke of, *see* Wellesley, Arthur  
 West Indies, the, 721  
 West Jumna Canal, the, 710  
 Weymouth, Lord, 565  
 Wheeler, Sir Hugh, 746-9  
 Whigs, the, 523, 524, 594, 660, 667, 697, 714, 851  
 Whitchill, John, 587  
 Widow-remarriage, 726  
 Wilberforce, William, 715  
 Willingdon, Lord and Lady, 897  
 Wilson, James, 763, 779  
 Wilson, President, 898  
 Wima Kadphises, 74-7, 82  
 Wimala Dharma, 502  
 Wood, Benjamin, 510  
 Wood, Sir Charles, 697, 701, 720, 762, 770, 771, 775, 776  
 Woolwich, 738  
 Wu-sun, the, 72, 73  
 Wyllie, Curzon, 888  
  
 Xandrames, *see* Nanda, and Dhana Nanda  
  
 Yadava dynasty (ancient), 15  
 — (of Devagiri), 128, 129, 161-6, 169-71, 221  
 — (of E. Bengal), 146

- Yadus, the, 7, 164  
 Yaghrush Khān, 230  
 Yahyā Khān, 467  
 Yajnasena, 54  
 Yajnavalkya Vājasaneyā, 11, 12, 785  
 Yajyavarman, 103  
 Yaklakī, Malik, 230  
 Yakshamalla, 118  
 Ya'kūb, Amīr, 812, 813  
 Ya'kūb (of Kashmīr), 370  
 Ya'kūb Khān (African), 396  
 Yākūt, 213  
 Yandabo, Treaty of, 680, 824  
 Yasahkarna, 141  
 Yasaskara, 113, 115  
 Yasodharman, 97, 98  
 Yasomatī, 105  
 Yasovardhana, 131  
 Yasovarman (Chandel), 134, 139, 142  
 Yasovarman (Paramāra), 111, 127  
 Yaudheyas, the, 80, 84, 91  
 Yauvanasrī, 145  
 Yava, 8  
 Yavanas, the, 34, 44, 45, 55, 59, 60, 62, 65, 66, 81, 180. *See also* Greeks, the  
 Yen-Kao-Chen, *see* Wima Kad-phises  
 Yildiz, Tāj-ud-dīn, 211, 212  
 Yonas, the, 44, 62  
 Young Turks, the, 891  
 Younghusband, Colonel, 821  
 Ysāmōtika, 82, 83  
 Yuddhamalla, 155  
 Yueh-chi, the, 67, 72, 73, 74  
 Yukta, 46  
 Yunnan, 826, 829  
 Yūsuf 'Ādil Shāh, 289, 293-6  
 Yūsuf Shāh (of Kashmīr), 370, 371  
 Yūsufzais, the, 370, 371, 404, 426  
 Yuta, 46  
 Zafar Khān, *see* Bahman Shāh and Muzaḥḥar Shāh of Gujarāt  
 Zafar Khān (of Bengal), 246, 247  
 Zain Khān, 370, 371, 426, 450  
 Zain-ud-dīn, 283  
 Zakariya Khān, 463, 465, 467  
 Zamān Shāh, 612, 614, 663  
 Zamānia, 356  
 Zands, the, 467  
 Zeionises, 69  
 Zetland, Lord, 900, 904  
 Zoilos, 65  
 Zoroastrianism, 72, 78, 365, 368, 378  
 Zul-fikār Khān, 445, 446, 454, 455  
 Zul-fikār Khān, Amīr-ul-umarā, 470